Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Senior officers advised Hegseth to keep civilian-protection program. He axed it anyway

 

at 8/25/26 10:35am

Shortly after taking office last year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth polled the nation’s top commanders about cutting a program designed to protect civilians during U.S. military operations. Hegseth had bet senior officers would endorse his view that focusing on civilian security was “woke” and out of step with “maximum lethality,” current and former defense officials told ProPublica. Instead, every commander rebuffed the idea. The poll from early 2025, which has not been previously reported, cemented top-level military support for Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response, a relatively new program adopted after years of heavy civilian tolls in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. As part of its mission, CHMR (pronounced “chimmer”) stationed personnel within major regional commands. Officials tried to develop a picture of life on the ground in combat zones to aid decision-making on military strikes and avoid or minimize civilian harm. In the poll, Hegseth gave commanders three options: cut 65% of staff but keep the effort operational, continue with only a small centralized office in Washington, or eliminate the program. Nine commanders chose the first option to preserve the enterprise as much as possible, according to a memo reviewed by ProPublica. Leaders of two commands, one overseeing the nuclear arsenal and the other focused on cyber threats, declined all three options, asking to maintain the full program. Leaders at U.S. Central Command, the Tampa, Florida-based center that oversees military action in the Middle East, pressed to keep its full CHMR staff of 16. Eliminating or scaling back the effort would “result in decreased efficiency of U.S. lethal operations due to an increased risk of target misidentification and reduced battlespace awareness,” a memo reviewed by ProPublica said. Erik Kurilla, the Army general who was then in charge of Central Command, and several other senior officers directly involved in combat operations had appealed to Hegseth to keep the program. They explained that it was a valuable tool, another retired general said — but “that intent was overridden.” Hegseth gutted the effort, leaving only a handful of people to carry out the mission. It was stripped of almost all of its funding, even as the U.S. launched new campaigns in Somalia, Yemen and Iran. One official summed up the Hegseth approach as: “Bombs away!” Hegseth’s early exchanges with the generals made clear that the civilian harm program had no future in his reimagined “Department of War.” “No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement,” Hegseth would later tell a gathering of hundreds of generals and admirals. But now, after U.S. missile strikes have killed hundreds of civilians in Iran and Yemen, episodes that drew global criticism and questions from Congress, the program could soon be partially revived. The about-face would mark a rare reversal in a department that hasn’t tolerated dissent under Hegseth and President Donald Trump. Last year’s military memos detail a delicate pushback that may preserve at least the framework of the civilian security campaign. Current and former defense officials described the evolution of the civilian security program on condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation from the Trump administration. The Pentagon did not respond to requests for comment about the poll or the program’s revival. Casualties, Outrage The first major military operation of Hegseth’s tenure — an air campaign in Yemen in the spring of 2025 — killed 153 civilians and wounded 243 others. The majority of the deaths came from just two strikes, ranking them among the deadliest for civilians the Pentagon has acknowledged in modern warfare, said Airwars, a British watchdog that tracks civilian harm from military operations. The toll was confirmed in the Pentagon’s 2025 annual report for civilian casualties, The Washington Post first reported. Hegseth described the Yemen operation at the time as a “clear, limited mission executed with ruthlessness, full stop.” By the time the U.S. began attacking Iran the next year, the Pentagon’s civilian protection program was down from a little under 200 people to around two dozen, some working only part time, the current and former defense officials said. Central Command, which said it needed a minimum of nine of its 16 staffers to function, was left with one person. On the first day of the U.S. and Israel’s war on Iran, a U.S. airstrike hit a school in Minab, a city near the Strait of Hormuz, killing more than 100 children and igniting international outrage. The Shajarat al-Tayyiba Primary School is in ruins in Minab, Iran, on March 31. Hamid Vakili/Anadolu via Getty Images Hegseth and the commander in charge of the Iran operation, Adm. Brad Cooper, were questioned about the strike before Congress. Hegseth said the U.S. does not target civilians and would investigate. Early reports on that investigation, yet to be publicly released, have said outdated U.S. intelligence led to the attack on the school. Democratic senators and humanitarian groups questioned whether the cuts to the civilian protection personnel also contributed to the school tragedy. In a letter to Hegseth in April, 11 senators said the school strike, as well as other deadly attacks on civilians in Iran, reflected “the administration’s broader disregard for the strategic, legal, and moral imperative to minimize civilian harm,” noting the dismantling of civilian harm reduction efforts. “This is a concerning pattern and raises questions about whether the administration is upholding international law and the laws of war,” it said. Previously, a Pentagon spokesperson declined to answer questions from ProPublica about the letter, saying it would “respond directly” to Congress. Concerns were voiced by military leaders before Hegseth largely eliminated the operation. One exception is the Department of the Army, headed by a civilian appointee, which agreed with getting rid of CHMR entirely. Leaders at Central Command told Hegseth’s top staff in a memo that CHMR “enhanced our precision and accuracy, making us more lethal.” The memo added, “The operational and strategic value of this work is widely recognized.” At the same time, the Joint Staff echoed the commanders’ sentiment. According to correspondence reviewed by ProPublica, the Joint Staff disagreed with the Army acting secretary, who said in a February 2025 memo that the program was redundant and recommended Congress repeal the law that set it in motion. As pressure has built from both Congress and within the military to restore the program, the Defense Department appears to have backpedaled. In April, Elbridge Colby, the Defense Department’s undersecretary of policy, sent a follow-up memo about the civilian-protection enterprise to Hegseth. This time, there was only one proposal on the table: reboot the program, albeit at reduced staff levels with 70 full-time people. In that memo, Colby wrote that maintaining 35% of CHMR would address investigations into civilian harm, reports to Congress and payments to those harmed. The same commanders Hegseth polled earlier endorsed the move, several defense officials told ProPublica. The proposal would allow all regional commands to reconstitute their civilian-harm-reduction staff, and the Virginia-based Civilian Protection Center of Excellence for training, data, and research would move from under the Army to the Joint Staff. The move, officials say, gives the mission more heft and eases collaboration with the Navy and Air Force, which are at the forefront of the administration’s campaigns. “If not for the combatant commanders,” one defense official said, the program would be “dead.” The harm-mitigation effort makes up a tiny fraction of the Defense Department’s billions in spending. The center near the Pentagon had an annual budget of $7 million, officials said, with the cross-command total for all civilian security work estimated at around $80 million before the cuts. Officials expect a refashioned program to operate on a smaller budget. Military leaders steeped in lessons from the post-9/11 “forever wars” repeatedly have affirmed harm mitigation as an asset on the battlefield. Civilian casualties undermine U.S. objectives and help boost insurgent recruiting, analysts say. The Pentagon had formalized CHMR in 2022, detailing steps to protect noncombatants and investigate reports of casualties. Commanders had publicly championed the program in congressional testimony and defense journals. The current head of European Command, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, co-wrote a paper calling it a “watershed” development. In some cases the staff acted as a “red team” pushing back on strikes and the possible collateral damage. The center of excellence focused on institutionalizing best practices, training service members and collecting data on civilian harm. Those efforts and “operational effectiveness are the same thing,” one retired general told ProPublica. “They’re two sides of the same coin.” ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Treasury sanctions Iranian hackers tied to critical-infrastructure breaches

 

at 8/25/26 10:00am

The Treasury Department sanctioned five Iranian citizens on Monday over alleged cyberattacks and theft aimed at U.S. critical infrastructure, government offices, and digital assets. The designations were part of a much broader sanctions package that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called an “economic D-Day” aimed at isolating Iran and cutting off its revenue during the ongoing war. Treasury accused four of the people — Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i, and Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi — of participating in a hacking operation directed by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Blagh, Balujeh, and Kadkhoda’i allegedly carried out most of the group’s intrusions. Since late 2023, they have breached and stolen data from U.S. energy companies, defense contractors, health care institutions, technology firms and financial institutions, according to the department. The three are believed to have also compromised several local, state, and federal government offices during the summer of 2024. Treasury officials said Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Behzad Mesri, who was previously sanctioned in 2018, have led the group since at least 2023. The hackers regularly conducted operations for the intelligence ministry, though officials said personal profit also played a role in their activity. The department separately sanctioned Arman Kahzadian, another alleged member of the network who focused on digital asset theft. Officials said Kahzadian illicitly took control of a cryptocurrency wallet holding more than $30,000 in Bitcoin in 2023. Other members sometimes turned their attention to targets inside Iran. Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Balujeh allegedly stole data from an Iranian telecommunications company in 2025. Treasury said that activity reflected the hackers’ willingness to put their own financial interests ahead of work benefiting Tehran. Four of the five people sanctioned Monday were also charged last week in the Justice Department’s expanded case against 17 Iranian cyber actors affiliated with the Mabna Institute. Prosecutors have accused the Tehran-based firm of conducting a sprawling hacking-for-hire campaign for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other Iranian partners. The group allegedly breached universities, government agencies, and companies while stealing more than 31 terabytes of academic research and intellectual property. The sanctions come amid heightened concern about Iran’s ability to reach vulnerable U.S. infrastructure. CISA and the FBI have recently helped water utilities recover from cyberattacks affecting at least 12 states. Some U.S. officials suspect Iran-linked hackers were responsible, although CISA has not publicly attributed those intrusions. Federal agencies also warned earlier this year that Iran-aligned groups were targeting industrial control systems used across the energy, water and government sectors. The cyber sanctions were part of a broader package targeting nearly 60 people, companies and vessels tied to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, oil trade and hacking operations. The moves block assets under U.S. control and generally prohibit Americans from doing business with those designated. Treasury also expanded sanctions categories to target people and companies operating in Iran’s digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping sectors. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— Treasury sanctions Iranian hackers tied to critical infrastructure breaches

 

at 8/25/26 10:00am

The Treasury Department sanctioned five Iranian citizens on Monday over alleged cyberattacks and theft aimed at U.S. critical infrastructure, government offices, and digital assets. The designations were part of a much broader sanctions package that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent called an “economic D-Day” aimed at isolating Iran and cutting off its revenue during the ongoing war. Treasury accused four of the people — Keyvan Fayyaz Ghareh Blagh, Saber Shahbazi Balujeh, Mohammad Reza Kadkhoda’i, and Mojtaba Ghal’eh-Kuhi — of participating in a hacking operation directed by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Blagh, Balujeh, and Kadkhoda’i allegedly carried out most of the group’s intrusions. Since late 2023, they have breached and stolen data from U.S. energy companies, defense contractors, health care institutions, technology firms and financial institutions, according to the department. The three are believed to have also compromised several local, state, and federal government offices during the summer of 2024. Treasury officials said Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Behzad Mesri, who was previously sanctioned in 2018, have led the group since at least 2023. The hackers regularly conducted operations for the intelligence ministry, though officials said personal profit also played a role in their activity. The department separately sanctioned Arman Kahzadian, another alleged member of the network who focused on digital asset theft. Officials said Kahzadian illicitly took control of a cryptocurrency wallet holding more than $30,000 in Bitcoin in 2023. Other members sometimes turned their attention to targets inside Iran. Ghal’eh-Kuhi and Balujeh allegedly stole data from an Iranian telecommunications company in 2025. Treasury said that activity reflected the hackers’ willingness to put their own financial interests ahead of work benefiting Tehran. Four of the five people sanctioned Monday were also charged last week in the Justice Department’s expanded case against 17 Iranian cyber actors affiliated with the Mabna Institute. Prosecutors have accused the Tehran-based firm of conducting a sprawling hacking-for-hire campaign for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other Iranian partners. The group allegedly breached universities, government agencies, and companies while stealing more than 31 terabytes of academic research and intellectual property. The sanctions come amid heightened concern about Iran’s ability to reach vulnerable U.S. infrastructure. CISA and the FBI have recently helped water utilities recover from cyberattacks affecting at least 12 states. Some U.S. officials suspect Iran-linked hackers were responsible, although CISA has not publicly attributed those intrusions. Federal agencies also warned earlier this year that Iran-aligned groups were targeting industrial control systems used across the energy, water and government sectors. The cyber sanctions were part of a broader package targeting nearly 60 people, companies and vessels tied to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, oil trade and hacking operations. The moves block assets under U.S. control and generally prohibit Americans from doing business with those designated. Treasury also expanded sanctions categories to target people and companies operating in Iran’s digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping sectors. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— As US preps for more space launches, WH orders integration with air-traffic control

 

at 8/24/26 2:37pm

A new space-transportation policy released by the Trump administration Thursday aims to build the infrastructure needed to rapidly increase U.S.-led rocket launches in coming years, including links to the nations modernizing air traffic control systems.  President Donald Trump’s strategy sets a goal of supporting “more than 1,000 launches and reentries” by 2030, largely through working with commercial companies to build sites across the country.  This will require the Pentagon and NASA to work together to “operate Federal launch and reentry ranges and facilities in a transparent manner that accommodates government and non government users,” Trumps memo said.  Other relevant agencies will also need to be involved in these discussions, the strategy adds, to develop and publish range schedules that can “maximize efficient use of range resources for commercial users” and “optimize launch capacity.” To facilitate more space launches in U.S. airspace, the memo directs the Transportation Department—with the Pentagon and NASA—to “implement a plan to integrate space launch and reentry management into airspace and traffic control modernization efforts” and “designate priority airspace for critical space launch corridors” within 180 days of the policy’s release. Under Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration has been driving the administration’s effort to overhaul the nation’s outdated air traffic control systems. The modernization initiative was announced by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy in May 2025 after several high-profile airspace incidents, including the deadly collision of an Army Black Hawk helicopter and a commercial airliner near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport that January. While the project includes some brick-and-mortar upgrades at U.S. airports and related facilities, most of the effort is focused on updating outdated air traffic monitoring and communications systems. The One Big Beautiful Bill, which was signed into law in July 2025, allocated $12.5 billion for the modernization effort. Five months later, Transportation officials said they would need an additional $20 billion. It remains to be seen what steps will be needed to integrate the administration’s strategy with the air traffic control modernization effort, and whether or not this will have any impact on the project’s timeline. The FAA announced in December that it awarded Peraton a $1.5-billion contract to serve as the project’s prime integrator, although Politico reported on Thursday that officials within the agency were growing frustrated by the company’s management of the massive systems overhaul.  In April, Duffy said, “We’re on track to have this project completed before President Trump leaves office.” Asked for comment, Transportation directed Nextgov/FCW to a Friday press release that announced the agency’s request for public comment on where new space launch facilities should be built, as well as how it should go about setting aside “priority airspace” for future launches.  Neither Transportation’s request for information nor its press release includes details about how the space transportation policy would be integrated with the agency’s air traffic control modernization project. An FAA spokesperson similarly pointed to Transportations release and said the agency is "seeking input on how increased launch cadence can be integrated into the U.S. airspace system." ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Space transportation policy calls for integration with air traffic control modernization

 

at 8/24/26 2:37pm

New space transportation policy released by the Trump administration Thursday looks to build out the infrastructure capabilities needed to rapidly increase the number of U.S.-led rocket launches in the coming years, including by tying the push with ongoing efforts to modernize the nation’s outdated air traffic control systems.  President Donald Trump’s strategy sets a goal of supporting “more than 1,000 launches and reentries” by 2030, largely by prioritizing enhanced commercial sector engagement and increasing the number of launch and entry sites across the country.  Building out this infrastructure, the policy says, will entail the Pentagon and NASA working together to “operate Federal launch and reentry ranges and facilities in a transparent manner that accommodates government and non government users.”  Other relevant agencies will also need to be involved in these discussions, the strategy adds, to develop and publish range schedules that can “maximize efficient use of range resources for commercial users” and “optimize launch capacity.” To help facilitate more space launches in U.S. airspace, the Transportation Department—in coordination with the Pentagon and NASA—is directed to “implement a plan to integrate space launch and reentry management into airspace and traffic control modernization efforts” and “designate priority airspace for critical space launch corridors” within 180 days of the policy’s release. Under Transportation’s leadership, the Federal Aviation Administration has been driving the administration’s effort to radically overhaul the nation’s outdated air traffic control systems. The modernization initiative was announced by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy in May 2025 and followed several high-profile airspace incidents, including a deadly crash between an Army Black Hawk helicopter and a commercial airliner near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport that January. While the project includes some brick-and-mortar upgrades at U.S. airports and related facilities, most of the effort is focused on updating outdated air traffic monitoring and communications systems. The One Big, Beautiful Bill, which was signed into law in July 2025, allocated $12.5 billion for the modernization effort. Transportation, however, called that amount a “down payment” that December and said it would need an additional $20 billion for the initiative. It remains to be seen what steps will be needed to integrate the administration’s strategy with the air traffic control modernization effort, and whether or not this will have any impact on the project’s timeline. The FAA announced in December that it awarded Peraton a $1.5 billion contract to serve as the project’s prime integrator, although Politico reported on Thursday that officials within the agency were growing frustrated by the company’s management of the massive systems overhaul.  During an April event, however, Duffy said “we’re on track to have this project completed before President Trump leaves office.” When reached for comment, Transportation directed Nextgov/FCW to a Friday press release that announced the agency’s request for public comment on where new space launch facilities should be built, as well as how it should go about setting aside “priority airspace” for future launches.  Both Transportation’s request for information and press release, however, did not include any details as to how the space transportation policy would be integrated with the agency’s air traffic control modernization project. An FAA spokesperson similarly referenced Transportations release and said the agency is "seeking input on how increased launch cadence can be integrated into the U.S. airspace system." ]]

[Category: Policy]

— Lawmaker pushes for AI containment language in FRONTIER Act

 

at 8/24/26 2:29pm

A Democratic lawmaker hopes to include language prescribing large language model containment practices in pending House legislation on artificial intelligence in the wake of the OpenAI models attack on Hugging Face networks.  Rep. Suhas Subramanyam, D-Va., gave updates on the House’s AI-related legislative plans during a Center for Strategic and International Studies event Monday. He said the OpenAI models’ breach from containment environments during routine testing has prompted potential updates to the pending FRONTIER Act, which was introduced in July by Reps. Jay Obernolte, R-Calif., and Lori Trahan, D-Mass.  “Theres a lot of things that were trying to fine-tune in the bill, and were going to be working on that in September,” Subramanyam said. “A lot of what were doing in the bill is encouraging third parties to be involved with the companies along the way, to make sure theres containment in place. Its assumed in the bill that were going to be doing a lot on containment, but one of the things Im going to be working on is trying to see if we can get explicit containment prescription guidelines in the bill to do that.” Currently, the bill’s language features risk mitigation efforts that hinge on independent safety evaluations and assessments of the lifecycle of a given model, including training and deployment, along with auditing ongoing compliance efforts. It also explicitly mandates the creation of a vehicle to report critical safety incidents related to AI models.   Subramanyam, who on Aug. 10 joined fellow lawmakers in signing a letter asking for OpenAI to disclose more information about the containment breach, said the window for Congress to act is closing. “Im hoping that by the end of the year … we, as a Congress and as a federal government, have at least worked towards solving the big concern about an AI model getting out and going a little crazy and doing a lot of harm to a lot of people,” he said. Subramanyam added that he is actively looking for feedback on the best ways to codify containment strategies outside of voluntary participation from large AI developers.  Leadership at Hugging Face voiced support for a standardized incident reporting method as well. Ian Reynolds, the AI public policy manager at Hugging Face, also said at Thursdays CSIS event that it would be helpful for lawmakers and policy officials to improve the path to incident reporting on future agentic misalignment. “We need better standardized disclosure and transparency requirements in this space to help build broader ecosystem resilience,” Reynolds said.  ]]

[Category: Policy]

— NSA's non-disclosure agreements lack whistleblower-rights provisions: watchdog

 

at 8/24/26 2:00pm

The National Security Agency routinely fails to inform employees of their rights under whistleblower protection laws when they sign non-disclosure agreements, the intelligence agency’s inspector general concluded this week. Although the NSA is not subject to the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, Congress has since 1988 used annual appropriations laws to compel the agency to follow most of its rules. The exceptions are those enforced by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which lacks jurisdiction to review matters involving counterintelligence and foreign intelligence. But according to a report from the NSA inspector general, most of the agency’s non-disclosure agreements lack the required reference to federal whistleblower protections, meaning that its employees “may not be aware” of their rights to disclose violations of law or instances of waste, fraud and abuse. “We identified five unique NSA-developed NDAs. One of the five NDAs, NSA’s Security Agreement, did not include the current required whistleblower provisions but did include language related to whistleblower protections and had some statutory references,” the inspector general wrote. “The remaining four NDAs made no mention of whistleblower protections . . . Additionally, the OIG identified another five agreements that were not titled or identified as nondisclosure agreements but implied nondisclosure obligations and did not include the required whistleblower protection provisions.” The report comes as the Trump administration considers promulgating a standardized NDA for use across government. The proposal has drawn bipartisan criticism for the chilling effect it could have on employees who witness misconduct while on the job. The critics include Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, who requested the inspector general’s review. The watchdog also found that the process by which NSA employees obtain access “compartmented information” include more nondisclosure provisions that similarly lack the needed whistleblower protection language. “The subject matter experts we spoke with explained that individual offices develop their own access agreement brief sheets using a template, and an affiliate’s acknowledgement of one of these electronic brief sheets serves as the nondisclosure agreement,” the report states. “In interviews with SMEs, two opened brief sheets of their own and noted that the required provisions were not present. We reviewed the template and noted that it lacked inclusion of the required whistleblower protection provisions.” The inspector general recommended creating a process to ensure all nondisclosure policies, forms and agreements include the statutorily mandated whistleblower protection language, as well as assigning the task to an official within the agency. NSA concurred with the IG’s recommendations and said it planned to assign compliance to the agency’s chief of staff. [[Related Posts]] ]]

[Category: Policy]

— New contract aims to keep Space Force’s multi-billion-dollar projects on budget

 

at 8/24/26 2:55am

As the Space Force takes on new, multi-billion-dollar national security programs, the service has awarded a new contract to keep those projects on track and on budget, Defense One has learned.  The service’s Space Systems Integration Office awarded Integrate, a Seattle-based firm, a multi-million dollar contract for its AI-enabled project management program. Last year, the company netted a $25 million contract with the Space Force’s Mission Manifest Office to manage the service major multi-payload launch operation project. Now, as the service embarks on massive programs such as building the Space Data Network and the Space-Based Airborne Moving Target Indicator, the service is expanding its use of the company’s software to help keep program managers on the right track. “SSIO serves as the central nervous system for the Space Force and the singular integrator across the majority of the national security space enterprise,” Integrate told Defense One. “To maintain the U.S. advantage in space, the office is actively pursuing technological advancements to ensure programs are executed within cost and schedule constraints, and to provide leaders with real-time visibility into the entire Space Force portfolio.” The Space Systems Integration Office, which is within Space Systems Command and oversees its acquisitions programs, has a growing list of national security projects. So far, seven of the nine newly-established Space Force Portfolio Acquisition Executives are using the program, with the others to be onboarded in the near future. The service’s $71.3 billion budget request this year, if passed, would mark the largest percentage increase for any military branch since 1952, according to Aerospace America. Service leaders say the new program is necessary to keep everything on the right track. “As the speed of acquisition becomes increasingly critical to the success of our programs, the Space Force is prioritizing technologies that equip our leaders with more timely, data-driven decision-making capabilities,” Helen Ying, the Space Force’s system of systems engineering lead, said in a statement. “Integrate’s project management platform strengthens our capacity to visualize the minute details and track broader objectives within the Space Force’s programs.” The existing—and antiquated—project management system can lead to mismanagement, miscommunication, and missed deadlines, the company said. “They might get a hand-drawn PowerPoint with triangles on it sent over in an email or a table in an email with Gantt bars colored in, literally to show this is happening in September and this is happening in August. They dont have any granularity. Its like the minimum that meets the contract requirements in some cases,” John Conafay, Integrate’s CEO, said in an interview. “The most advanced is Microsoft Project Server, which, Microsoft Project was released the same year as Tetris.” Conafay said his program differs from the current workflow dominated by sending emails and downloading files, and instead offers a clear single schedule that is modified in real-time and across multiple organization levels and classification levels to easily manage sprawling national security work. Integrate’s contract with the Space Systems Integration Office comes as one of the Trump administration’s major programs, the Golden Dome missile defense shield, is facing budgetary headwinds. Gen. Michael Guetlein, the programs direct reporting program manager, warned attendees at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, this month that if Congress doesn’t sort crucial supplementary funding, the program will be in dire straits. Golden Dome is not a Space Force program, but the service is helping develop key technology for the architecture. Conafay said Integrate’s system helps in budget-controlled environments to ensure "things are done on time and within budget” and holds contractors accountable. He said the service’s adoption of an upgraded project management system shows they’re taking those budget constraints seriously. “It shows an incredible amount of responsibility to the taxpayer to use a software that can fundamentally modernize something that hasnt been since 1984,” Conafay said.  ]]

[Category: Business]

— The wrong way to review US force posture in Europe

 

at 8/23/26 6:00am

Bloomberg recently reported that the Trump administration will consider European countries’ ideological positions and support for U.S. policies as part of the European posture review that is currently underway. Whether a country has supported the 2026 Iran War, placed recent restrictions on U.S. forces based in their country, or “publicly opposed” regulations that constrain U.S. business in Europe will all be factors in determining where and how many forces remain stationed in Europe. These loyalty tests depart from decades of established practices of evaluating and adjusting U.S. force posture, are likely to backfire, and above all, could leave America less safe.  The U.S. military’s ability to find, fix, and finish practically any target around the world is built on its global military posture. No other country has ever had such varied and dispersed capabilities, all enabled by an unparalleled network of allies and partners. The importance of our overseas posture leads many new administrations to look at whether troop levels, capabilities, and locations match the most recent threat assessments. So when Secretary Hegseth announced a European posture review in June, neither of the authors was particularly surprised. When we served in the Obama and Biden administrations, both of us were involved in these types of major posture decisions from different perches, including inside the Pentagon, the White House, and at the U.S. Mission to NATO. We consider such reviews to be wise—but only when their purpose and scope are clearly defined and when the results are based not on politics but on the advice of our top civilian and military leaders.  Unfortunately, that doesn’t appear to be where the Trump administration is starting. By making a list of pass/fail questions about a country’s overarching loyalty to the United States—which has never been a condition of NATO membership—the Pentagon is conflating ideological fealty with costly and consequential questions about the future of U.S. defense policy. In our experience, useful posture reviews start by evaluating what the U.S. needs to meet the contingencies it may face now and in the future. Instead of measuring allies’ loyalty, the administration should answer four key questions. First, how might the Russia-Ukraine war end and what will follow? Despite a campaign promise to end it within 24 hours, the war shows no signs of stopping. Even more concerning, over the last year, Russia has increasingly tested NATO unity with airspace violations, cyber attacks, and sabotage operations. If the U.S. makes drastic posture changes, Russia might conclude that Washington is signaling disinterest in European security. An emboldened Moscow might choose to act against NATO territory.   Second, what types of global dependencies will exist in the coming three to five years? U.S. forces in Europe are often deployed to the Middle East and Africa, so this review must consider contingencies outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Recall that U.S. forces in Europe helped enable last summer’s 12-day war and Operation Midnight Hammer against Iranian nuclear facilities, and that they have been crucial for generating forces in the current 2026 war against Iran. AFRICOM’s headquarters has been located in Europe since the combatant command was created nearly two decades ago. The tyranny of distance across the African continent, coupled with the smaller U.S. posture there since the 2023 Niger coup, only further highlights the operational relevance of European posture for Africa.  Third, how do we expect European capabilities to evolve? Europeans are spending substantially more on defense than they have in decades, a shift that was turbocharged by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, it will be another five to ten years before they can provide for their own security. The United States must take Europe’s growing defense arsenal into consideration without leaving the continent exposed. At a minimum, and for the foreseeable future, the United States will likely need to leave in Europe strategic enablers such as lift, refueling, and long-range strike platforms; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; and command-and-control infrastructure. Nuclear forces will need to be part of that mix as well.  Finally, beyond geopolitics, the Pentagon will face a series of age-old questions about basing that influence recruitment, retention, and the overall readiness of the force. Chief among them: is rotational or permanent stationing a better fit for today’s security environment and the health of the force? Rotational forces are often more costly and can be harder on troops since these tours are traditionally unaccompanied. Posture reviews are extraordinarily complicated because they require predicting future requirements and weighing those requirements against the competing needs of multiple regional commanders. Such reviews can also damage our important, and increasingly fragile, relationships with allies if not handled with deft and delicate diplomacy. It’s rare to get it just right.  The worst thing the United States could do right now is to base this important posture review on which allies have backed U.S. foreign policy—especially as being an ally of the United States has never required blind loyalty. Allies are already reacting to the leaked questionnaire and pushing back.  Loyalty tests don’t build loyalty. They erode it.  Mara Karlin served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and is a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. Julianne Smith served as U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO from 2021 to 2024 and is a Distinguished Nonresident Fellow in Defense and Security at the Chicago Council for Global Affairs. ]]

[Category: Ideas]

— AI-enabled deception threatens future operations, raises chances of large conflict, says Special Operations leader

 

at 8/21/26 3:27pm

HONOLULU — Faster intelligence gathering and analysis enabled by AI is allowing special operators to pull off missions that would have been impossible years ago, U.S. Special Operations Command leader Adm. Frank Bradley, said Wednesday. But malign actors empowered by simple AI tools are undermining military and civilian leaders’ confidence in digital information, he said. That credibility decay, raising doubt about what is and is not true, will affect not just operations but the ability of the United States to “generate that unity of effort” to deter or defend against adversarial attack, he said.  “I have been plagued by my own staff hijinks on the use of artificial intelligence,” he told the Global SOF Foundation’s Indo-Pacific Irregular Warfare Symposium, a meeting of international special operations forces, industry representatives, and some lawmakers. “If you werent part of the inside crew, you probably couldnt tell the difference because of how capable AI is at creating deepfake content.” Ongoing Russian and Chinese efforts to deceive Western audiences, both for tactical gain and to influence public sentiment, sometimes called “active measures,” get a boost from AI tools. But those efforts are hardly isolated. Ibrahim Traoré, the leader of a junta currently controlling Burkina Faso, has shown how easy it is for even small-scale dictators to use AI tools to gain control of populations. “Active measures have eaten the world,” one former State Department intelligence official told Defense One. More persuasive AI-enabled content, quietly but consistently shaping perceptions about what is happening where, has become the dominant feature of a new critical battleground, Bradley said. “Exposing hostile behavior for exactly what it is—that early credible illumination is a critical advantage…Information advantage leads to decision advantage,” he said. A U.S. military official who works in counter-intelligence and foreign influence analysis said, “AI has made deception scalable. Even outside of specific campaigns, that will undermine confidence in all intelligence gathering. Every source of information will become increasingly suspect. We’re no longer just fighting phishing emails, were fighting synthetic voices, cloned faces, and entire fake identities convincing enough to fool the people who know the real person best.” The former State Department official said the United States, under the new Trump administration, had surrendered critical tools to watch and detect foreign influence just as adversaries were ramping up their ability to conduct influence operations. “The information environment itself is much less transparent, ironically, than it used to be,” they said, describing how changes in leadership at social media companies had decreased transparency into issues like content moderation and allowing disinformation on the platform.  “The structures that were protecting the domestic environment dont exist anymore. Its not clear whos able to see this,” they said, referring to governmental offices like the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) at the FBI, the Foreign Malign Influence Center at the DNI, and various USAID activities and programs. A secondary effect of those decisions: analysts or intelligence officers not directly working with those entities but who might be tracking foreign influence attacks in some other way will be less likely to raise concerns about what they see.  “The federal bureaucracy is very sensitive to priorities of political leadership, and I think you realize at this point that looking at this stuff is not going to be a career-enhancing move,” they said. “Were in this period now where we are largely flying blind.” A new playing field New tools to synthesize intelligence from multiple sources at scale will provide new pathways for getting to the truth faster. That is already enabling faster joint operations of the sort that would not have been possible just a few years ago, Bradley said.  He pointed to the April rescue of a downed F-15 pilot behind enemy lines, “made possible by a tightly synchronized intelligence, cyber-enabled support, and disciplined coordination across multiple elements.” It was the sort of coordination that can only occur when multiple elements can share a common intelligence picture that changes as quickly as real-world conditions, and data that effectively predicts how conditions will change, he said. An intelligence official described how those new intelligence streams are shaping decisions not just for commanders, but for everyone at once. “About 10 years ago, [virtual imagery] was just for analysts, or just for the people who had specialties into these things. But now were bringing 10, 20, 30—I mean, dozens, if not thousands, of different data sources in to build that operator level,” they said. “And it updates every 15 minutes.” The challenge going forward, Bradley and the intelligence official said, is not just finding new intelligence and data streams, but trusting them—especially in a future information environment where adversarial AI agents are finding new methods to access and alter data and intelligence.  “Were spending a good bit of time and energy right now inside the the Department of War, but across the United States government as well, to ensure that those data sets and that those those systems are are appropriately protected against agentic AI attacks that might, that are coming,” Bradley said. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— There’s no shortcut to replenish US munitions stockpiles

 

at 8/21/26 4:00am

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — As the U.S. military’s critical munitions are quickly used in the Iran war and slowly produced at home, companies are eagerly pitching new low-cost solutions, and the Pentagon is keen to make big deals. But defense experts say those new, cheaper missiles—and the push to accelerate production of existing weapons—wont soon overcome problems exacerbated by the Iran war, even though they will eventually provide the military much-needed options. At the Space and Missile Defense Symposium last week, Boeing unveiled a low-cost seeker missile, with crucial hit-to-kill guidance technology used on the PAC-3 missile, made of commercial, off-the-shelf components. At the same conference, Northrop Grumman released its “cost-effective” 50-millimeter gun-based drone defense system to “address a critical short-range air defense gap.”  And last month at the Farnborough International Air Show, Lockheed Martin announced a more affordable, proximity-detonation version of its Patriot missile. But those solutions will likely only boost the Pentagon’s stockpiles if the Iran war drags on and if officials quickly award contracts. “The push for low-cost munitions is unlikely to have a material effect on the Iran War—at least not anytime soon,” said Becca Wasser, Bloomberg Economics’s defense lead.  And, she said, making enough new weapons, at the right cost, is only part of the problem. “Getting to a lower cost for exquisite munitions will take time. It requires developing new weapons or adapting old ones, which means going through new testing and evaluation processes,” she said. “If the Iran war drags on for years, that’s when the drive for lower cost interceptors and munitions could have an impact,” because “wars of attrition require enormous amounts of material—and the lower price tag helps.” Right now, the Pentagon is blowing through its prized Patriot and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missiles, and they won’t get replaced anytime soon, defense analysts say—even with novel framework deals.  In the last year, top officials have been pushing those deals with major defense primes and are continuing the administration’s rallying cry for the firms to build and innovate faster. Some of those are starting to bear fruit. This week, RTX netted a seven-year, $22.9 billion Tomahawk missile contract with the U.S. Navy under a new deal, showing that the military is making big bets on legacy systems as it pursues newer options. But those legacy munitions still take time to manufacture. In a recent report, the American Enterprise Institute think tank found that it would take 27 years for defense contractors to produce THAADs at the current maximum annual rate of 96 interceptors a year to reach quantities the Pentagon wants.  There “will be a window of vulnerability for several years until inventories return to their previous levels, and another several years before they get to the levels that war planners desire,” according to a May report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “These newer, lower-cost munitions absolutely should be part of the way we fix this. But we shouldnt be kidding ourselves that theyre going to be ready quickly en masse, are operational, and our forces are trained and understand how to use them,” said Todd Harrison, AEI’s defense budget expert. “It will take years, some sooner than others. And I think it remains to be seen if theyre going to be available in large quantities sooner than the reorders of the more exquisite existing weapons.”  Framework deals aren’t contracts The Pentagon has already inked framework agreements for low-cost and traditional munitions. Overall, experts say they are a step in the right direction. “Its not a contract, but it helps give the companies a demand signal they can take to their boards and their shareholders, and…it reduces their risks, so they can make increased capital expenditures, or capex, investments,” said Jerry McGinn, a CSIS senior fellow and the director of the Center for the Industrial Base. McGinn teased an upcoming CSIS analysis that found publicly-traded companies with framework agreements increased their capex investment by 31 percent from the second quarter of 2025 to the same quarter this year. “Theyre clearly investing more and its hard not to tie it to those framework agreements. But the challenge is that the framework agreement is an agreement…Its a best faith effort. Its not a contract,” he said.  Congress still has to appropriate the money, the companies have to get on contract, and then they have to deliver, McGinn said. And none of that is guaranteed. McGinn said he’s keen to watch how many contracts come out of the framework deals.  One of the first major contracts was a seven-year, $35 billion undefinitized contract with Lockheed Martin for THAADs, which leaves some aspects of the agreement open—to be finalized before the contract starts.  Undefinitized contract actions, or UCAs, require special approval and are used for urgent work that all parties “agree needs to begin before final agreement can be reached on price.” Lockheed Martin executives said they’re up to the task.  “If you look at the framework agreements weve signed, weve leaned into the ask that the country has made of us. Lockheed Martin has never shied away from stepping up to the line and doing whats been asked,” Johnathon Caldwell, Lockheeds vice president of strategic and missile defense systems, told reporters at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium. “Were in an unprecedented era where speed matters, and were able to bring capabilities to market in weeks and months, not years and decades. Were putting our money on the table, and our commitment.” It’s a tall order for companies to surge production capacity of those munitions, especially amid supply chain bottlenecks for major components such as solid rocket motors.  But it helps that the Pentagon’s actually allocating and committing money to those problems, Bloomberg’s Wasser said. “The framework agreements are just that—-agreements, not contracts. Until these are on contract, you won’t see a lot of companies surging production,” she said. “All these efforts—sending the demand signal to industry, qualifying more [solid rocket motor] suppliers, ramping up missile procurement—help, but they don’t solve the problem.” Low-cost munitions, long-term solutions Lockheed’s more affordable version of the PAC-3 missile comes with some tradeoffs, and a timeline. “We basically modified the front end, modified the back end, took out the [Attitude Control Motors], so its no longer hit-to-kill,” Jason Reynolds, Lockheed’s vice president and general manager of integrated air and missile defense, told reporters during a briefing at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium, adding that it integrates with existing munitions systems “at reduced range.” However, PAC-3 ACE isn’t expecting a first flight until early 2028, and won’t go to production until 18 months after that. “Everybody wants more air defense interceptors as quickly as possible, and anything that is as capable or nearly as capable as a PAC-3 MSC is a very attractive offer,” Reynolds said on the sidelines of the conference. There’s no doubt that a more affordable version of the highly-sought after PAC-3 is useful, said Tom Karako, CSIS’ director of the Missile Defense Project. But the question remains: Will the Pentagon buy it? “PAC-3 ACE is not a contract. Its a concept that theyve had for a while and they rolled it out,” he said. “I think the time is right for PAC-3 ACE, but its a concept, and if youre really attacking the root cause problem, you know the root cause here is the customer.” A few weeks after the PAC-3 ACE contract was announced, Boeing unveiled its Ultra Low-Cost Seeker. It’s a push to make the company’s precision-guided technology, which makes Patriot missiles deadly and expensive, more accessible and affordable. “The system uses commercial off-the-shelf components that Boeing adapted for military use,” the company said in a news release this month. “ULCS leverages our seeker expertise developed on programs like PAC-3 MSE, but delivers a different seeker capability that can be applied at low cost to numerous defensive and offensive products to address lower-complexity threats.” The seeker is still under development, and more flight tests are expected in 2027. Officials declined to provide exact figures on how much more affordable the new product was compared to existing technology. Overall, there seem to be more options for cheaper replacements to hypersonic or cruise missiles than for top-tier air defense missiles like Patriots and THAAD weapons, said Mark Montgomery, a retired rear admiral and senior fellow for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.  New entrants are also getting in the low-cost missiles game—and landing contracts. There’s Andurils Barracuda, Zone 5 Technologies’ Rusty Dagger, and Coaspire’s cruise missile.  “We’re seeing it in hypersonic missiles with a company called Castelion…But were not seeing it in air defense weapons,” Montgomery said. X-Bow Systems revealed its modestly priced $100,000 drone destroyer at the Farnborough International Airshow. The company also landed a $11 million deal this week with the Missile Defense Agency to develop and test low-cost interceptors. And the fact that these companies are landing contracts, may be indicative of faster production and delivery in a matter of several months, opposed to years, Montgomery said.  But producing low-cost munitions isn’t necessarily a solution to the U.S. military’s current stockpile problem.  “Its about transitioning your arsenal long term to a high-low mix. But some of these things can come soon,” Montgomery said. “So it doesnt impact the next stage of the war. But it could impact a 2027 end game. And it certainly will impact being ready in 2028, 2029 for Russia or China to do something.”  Strategic shifts While industry is answering the call to build more affordable munitions, defense experts question whether the military is willing to use them. In March, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine declared that the U.S. military was pivoting from “from stand-off munitions to stand-in munitions” meaning a pivot from long-range weapons outside the battlefield to ones that need to be dropped within conflict zones. But CSIS’ Karako said there’s been no significant switch to plentiful GPS-guided, freefall weapons like Joint Direct Attack Munitions in the months since that statement. "We have 140,000 JDAMS, we have low-cost munitions today. The reason that were not using them, and the reason that were hemorrhaging our Tomahawks instead, has to do with extreme  risk aversion,” Karako said. “That risk aversion calculus is not going to change just because you have some new entrance, low-cost, low-range missile. We have, today, plenty of munitions that we could use, but were not using.” A month after Caine made his comments, a F-15E went down over Iran. The complicated rescue of the two U.S. airmen pushed President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth to proclaim the military had “achieved overwhelming air dominance and superiority” over the hostile territory.  Airpower experts previously told Defense One that broad terms used by the administration painted an inaccurate reality of the dangerous situation U.S. pilots find themselves in over the region. That lack of total control also limits which munitions the military is willing to use. “Despite efforts to gain air supremacy over Iran, the U.S. was only able to gain localized air superiority over some parts. That reduced the ability to drop JDAMs instead,” Wasser said. “Switching to a strategy that relies on JDAMs would mean accepting more risk—or taking steps to further degrade Iranian capabilities to allow for greater U.S. use of the skies without threat.” Experts told Defense One the Iran war has exacerbated long-standing problems with how the military uses and buys munitions. And while it’s possible the Pentagon could weather this conflict, the resulting mission depletion will likely make future wars—particularly with China—a struggle. “These missiles will also be critical for a potential Western Pacific conflict,” an April CSIS report said. “Even before the Iran war, stockpiles were deemed insufficient for a peer competitor fight. That shortfall is now even more acute, and building stockpiles to levels adequate for a war with China will take additional time.” Until production on existing munitions and interceptors ramps up and the Pentagon buys a new mix of high- and low-end missiles, Karako said the military should look at the plentiful munitions it already has—and use them. “The more immediate thing that we could be doing is changing our tactics,” Karako said. “Weve hemorrhaged our long-range stuff, and the thing that we could do is we could start using gravity bombs, but were not willing to do that … Everytime CENTCOM fires a Tomahawk at somebody without air defense, an angel loses its wings in PACOM.” ]]

[Category: Business]

— Golden Dome Caucus chair says building support, funding for missile shield is a ‘tough slog’

 

at 8/20/26 1:55pm

One of Golden Dome’s most supportive voices in Congress fears that prioritizing Iran war funding along with continuous partisan gridlock threatens President Donald Trump’s plans for a sprawling missile defense shield. Rep. Jeff Crank, R-Colo., told Defense One in an interview Wednesday evening that funding for Golden Dome is a “concern of mine.” Only about $400 million of the $17.5 billion the White House is seeking next year for the homeland missile shield is in the baseline budget, while the rest relies on funds through a Congress-controlled funding maneuver known as reconciliation. A third $90 billion reconciliation package working through the cogs of Congress significantly scaled down the Pentagon’s initial $350 billion request and primarily focuses on funding operations and replenishing munitions from the Iran war. “I think we largely funded Golden Dome through reconciliation, and that only works if the money is there that we gave them through reconciliation,” Crank said. “So, if it needs to be used for other things, and you know, gosh, if those other things are paying for operations in Iran or replenishing depleted capabilities and things like that, then I do have a big concern." Crank’s warning mirrors concerns by Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein, Golden Dome’s direct-reporting program manager, at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville last week. The four-star program czar told attendees that if Congress doesn’t get funding sorted, “there is no Golden Dome.” Defense analysts have said that in addition to some of the more technical hurdles, such as space-based interceptors, political gridlock is one of the program’s biggest obstacles to gaining momentum.  “Spending more to reduce risks to the homeland increases risks elsewhere—through higher borrowing and taxes that impose economic risks, or through cuts to other defense and non-defense funding that carry security and political risks of their own,” AEI’s Todd Harrison wrote in a report last year. “In the end, Golden Dome’s cost will not be determined by fiscal constraints or technical capabilities, but by political choices: which risks leaders are willing to mitigate, which they are willing to trade, and which they are prepared to accept.” Guetlein told reporters last week that there is ongoing Defense Department discussion “about how to go forward,” and officials are planning for contingencies. Crank said he supports the general’s optimism to continue building the missile shield, but also understands the fiscal reality the program faces. “I trust Gen. Guetlein implicitly to do everything he can to do this, and I know theyll be compliant with the law in doing so,” Crank said. “But theres also only so much money, right? And if you allocate it to certain things at the department, it cant be used for other things.” “I am concerned that if Congress doesnt appropriate money for some of the operations in Iran that are going on, that theyre going to have to take it from somewhere,” he added. “I wouldnt want that to be Golden Dome, and I certainly wouldnt want it to be things like quality of life or the things that weve already funded through the reconciliation bill.” The Colorado Republican co-chairs the House’s Golden Dome Caucus alongside Rep. Dale Strong, R-Ala. Presently, there are no Democrats in that group, according to LegiStorm. Crank has been attempting to win over his colleagues on the other side of the aisle to support additional funding for the program.  “I do think there are some on that side, and were working to get with them. And I predominantly think its the people that probably have in their district, they have either military facilities or contractors that are working on these types of things, so it benefits them to be for Golden Dome or to be for ballistic missile defense programs,” Crank said. “So, were working on that. Its a tough slog.” Crank’s district encompasses Colorado Springs, which is home to Peterson and Schriever Space Force Bases as well as Cheyenne Mountain Space Force Station, U.S. Northern Command’s alternate command center.  Last year, after a years-long political tug-of-war, Crank’s district lost U.S. Space Command’s headquarters to Huntsville, Alabama. However, the Colorado Republican told Defense One that the Space Force’s Infrastructure Portfolio Acquisition Executive is moving from Space Systems Command in California, to Colorado Springs. The office controls $4 billion in the service’s contracts, according to a Colorado Springs Chamber & Economic Development Corporation press release. The move is expected to happen by the end of this year. It’s is one of many major Space Force investments in the area, including the construction of a new Space Force Operations Facility at Schriever, Air Force Secretary Troy Meink announced in May. “All of those combined will be far in excess of what we would lose with the Space Command headquarters moving now,” Crank said. ]]

[Category: Defense Systems]

— Defense Business Brief: Arcfield’s state of play; SMD wrap up; X-Bow Systems’ MDA win

 

at 8/19/26 7:28pm

HUNTSVILLE, Ala.—There are less than four months left in the year, but defense and aerospace company Arcfield’s plans seem to just be getting started, as they prepare for an upcoming satellite launch and explore manufacturing a highly specialized component key for optical sensors and laser communications. “Theres a lot going on at Arcfield. And what were really focused on is bringing the government a fully-baked solution,” Dan Knight, Arcfield’s vice president for Golden Dome initiatives and strategy, told Defense One at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Ala., last week. “Instead of saying, ‘Hey, Im the one-trick wonder that just does sensors,’ or ‘Im the one-trick wonder that just does architecture,’ we leverage all of our expertise across our organization to bring something that can be easily integrated and operationalized.” Arcfield is planning to test several sensors in the coming months, and its subsidiary, Orion Space Solutions, expects to launch a very low earth orbit, or VLEO, satellite in September.  “You launch it up to the International Space Station. One of the astronauts up there takes it out, puts it in like a little Pez dispenser, and drops it down into very low Earth orbit,” Knight said. “Theres a lot of sensing that happens in the ionosphere with this particular satellite—and some communications packages and other things.” Knight said the company is forging geostationary orbit satellite plans for 2027 on top of supporting Golden Dome with mission engineering. “We have a long history of [low-Earth orbit] satellites. Were building a GEO refueler so that the Space Force can maneuver without regret…and then we do optical and [high frequency] sensors,” Knight said, speaking about missile warning and tracking. The company also wants to scale its manufacturing ability for a very special type of glass.  “We want to get into the manufacturing business of something called an etalon. And youre like, Ive never heard the word etalon in my life!” Knight said with a laugh. “Its a highly polished piece of glass. And its needed for a variety of optical applications—so laser communications, very precise telescopes, and very, very sophisticated optical sensors like the ones we build.” The move comes as the U.S. military increasingly relies on sensors to garner intel, improve navigation, and fuel autonomy, all while the White House pushes for domestic manufacturing of national security technologies.   “Theres a backlog based on our foreign suppliers. We really want to get that investment from the government, which is what theyve said they want to do, and get that online so that we can provide etalons for the defense industrial base,” Knight said, referring to working with the Pentagon’s Manufacturing Technology, or ManTech, program.  Arcfield already makes etalons for its products but expansion would support internal growth and the industrial base overall, Knight said. The company has conducted demos and submitted a white paper to start the process with hopes of getting government funding to help build out its manufacturing capacity for a larger scale. “We want to expand our manufacturing line for our optical sensor…and within that, thats going to require a fairly significant expansion of the etalon production. We cant [rely] on a company in Canada that produces it,” he said. Welcome You’ve reached the Defense Business Brief, where we dig into what the Pentagon buys, who they’re buying from, and why. Send along your tips, feedback, and song recommendations to lwilliams@defenseone.com. Check out the Defense Business Brief archive here, and tell your friends to subscribe! A space-age name change. The German air force, Luftwaffe, officially changed its English name translation to the German Air and Space Force, said Maj. Gen. Michael Traut, who leads Germany’s Space Command.  “What weve seen is that the air and the space domains [are] increasingly merging,” Traut said during an international space panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium last week.  Germany wants to procure space surveillance radars, he said, adding that, “Of course, we know that capable missile defense radars can look into space as well. As such, Im completely interested in the data they provide, and Im completely interested in the integration.” Last year, Germany committed €35 billion to space-related defense projects. The NATO nation is also interested in hypersonic vehicles, specifically space planes, presenting “an opportunity to operate in different altitudes we were used to,” Traut said.  “We are absolutely committed strategically to develop and operate space planes in high atmospheric hypersonic operations. [That] not only sets us up to defend against enemy threats, but to explore and make use of that altitude as well.” Increased munitions options means launchers should do more with less. Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher, or CAML, represents the kind of thinking we need around launchers, Brig. Gen. Robert J. Mikesh, the Army’s capability program executive for offensive fires, said during the symposium.  “We should not think of every launcher as permanently married to a single missile or munition,” Mikesh said.  “We need to think about adaptable platforms, commonality, autonomy, payloads for both offensive or defensive environments, reduced soldier burden and the ability to integrate new capabilities more rapidly. The launcher can no longer be an afterthought,” Mikesh said. Bonus round: NORTHCOM keeps eye on security needs for power generation and increasingly electrified military systems and command and control centers, said Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard, the command’s deputy commander.  “We are aware of some of the issues with respect to that,” Jarrard said during the Q&A portion of his keynote at the symposium. “Obviously some of our critical infrastructure requires some of those energy sources. And so I will say thats on our radar…But it hasnt necessarily risen to the level we consider it to be a problem that we have to deal with directly, right now.” One thing that is top of mind: The lack of sensors to spot and protect military bases from drone attacks.  Making moves + other news The Missile Defense Agency awarded X-Bow Systems an $11 million contract for testing and development of low-cost interceptors. Rocketmaker United Launch Alliance names Mark Peller as CEO. Sam Mehta takes over as L3Harris’ CEO, following the ousting of Chris Kubasik. Auriga Space brings on former MDA Director Trey Obering as an advisor, Defense One has learned. REGENT’s seaglider drone platform performs in the Silent Swarm defense event. CACI opens a manufacturing center in Rochester, N.Y.  Havoc AI teams up with Red Cat.  The Pentagon is auditing academic institutions to scrutinize foreign ties. Related: Reuters looks at how U.S. military funding fueled China’s robot dog boo ]]

[Category: Business]

— DOJ charges 17 Iranians in cybertheft campaign

 

at 8/19/26 10:13am

Federal prosecutors have charged 17 Iranians affiliated with the Tehran-based Mabna Institute over an alleged hacking-for-hire operation that stole research and intellectual property from hundreds of universities and compromised email accounts belonging to U.S. government agencies and companies. The 14-count superseding indictment, unsealed Tuesday, adds eight defendants to a case brought against nine other members of the firm in 2018. Prosecutors said the expanded charges expose a broader network that conducted cyber intrusions for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other Iranian government and university clients. The Mabna Institute targeted systems belonging to 144 U.S. universities, 178 universities abroad, at least 42 U.S. companies, 11 foreign companies and at least five federal and state government agencies since around 2013, according to the Justice Department. The victims included the Labor Department, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the states of Hawaii and Indiana, the United Nations and UNICEF. The hackers also allegedly targeted HBO and unnamed technology firms and defense contractors. Prosecutors said the university campaign targeted more than 100,000 professors’ accounts worldwide and successfully compromised approximately 8,000. The hackers used stolen credentials to access journals, dissertations, electronic books and other research spanning fields ranging from medicine and engineering to the social sciences. All told, the group allegedly stole at least 31.5 terabytes of academic data and intellectual property. U.S. universities had spent more than $3.4 billion to procure or obtain access to the targeted materials, although prosecutors did not characterize that entire amount as a financial loss from the theft. Some of the stolen material was later sold to customers in Iran through two websites. One offered academic resources taken from universities, while the other allowed customers to use compromised professors’ accounts to enter university library systems directly, according to the indictment. Prosecutors said Mabna’s founders established the firm to help Iranian universities and research organizations obtain scientific resources from abroad. It employed or contracted with hackers who carried out phishing attacks, searched for vulnerable systems and traded credentials for compromised accounts. The defendants face charges that include conspiracy to commit computer intrusions, wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. Some of the offenses carry maximum prison sentences of 20 years. The State Department is separately offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the location of five of the defendants. The charges come amid concerns about Iran’s use of cyber operations during the ongoing war. Since U.S. and Israeli strikes began in February, suspected Iran-aligned groups have been linked to a disruptive attack against medical technology company Stryker, the compromise of FBI Director Kash Patel’s personal email and attacks against industrial-control systems across several U.S. sectors. More than 30 Minnesota water systems and water infrastructure in several other states have been targeted in the last month in activity some officials suspect may be tied to Iran. U.S. officials previously told Nextgov/FCW that they expected Iranian and Iran-aligned cyber operations to continue regardless of whether fighting subsided. ]]

[Category: Threats]

— What Trump’s tech strategy means for the military, deterring China, and the future of AI

 

at 8/19/26 1:44am

The newest White House tech strategy pushes faster development of emerging technologies for the military, gives defense innovators more room to experiment, and will broaden the federal market for young defense tech startups. But it also doubles down on a particular approach to developing AI—one that favors a handful of well-connected U.S. tech companies at the expense of other innovative approaches. That could benefit China and slow the U.S. military from getting the tools commanders actually want.  Here’s a breakdown of the winners and losers. Winners: swarms, deployed AI, faster military technology The strategy puts a big emphasis on new, tech-driven approaches to warfare, particularly the use of drones and even drone swarms alongside manned and legacy assets. Specifically, it calls for “optimal combinations of lower-cost (and sometimes lower-tech or attritable) platforms that can be deployed in larger numbers and complement more limited numbers of sophisticated platforms.” Over the last decade, efforts to field autonomous aircraft alongside fighter jets or ships, for instance, have been uneven at best—even when the Pentagon changed its talking points on the necessity for large numbers of low-cost drones—constrained by programs internal buying policies and previous commitments to other programs investments. The Replicator program provides a vivid example, hailed as an essential pathfinder but receiving only $1 billion in funding. The new strategy sets specific “priority areas” for new military research and spending: undersea, space, and AI and autonomy. These priorities are the most relevant to “deterrence in the Indo-Pacific”—as in, preventing China from launching a major conflict. Within those priority areas, it lists “multi-agent systems and swarm intelligence” and various uses of autonomy, from robotics to command and control, as “critical.” The strategy also takes square aim at policies and practices that slow down military buying of new technologies. Building off other executive orders, it pushes Pentagon buyers to bypass traditional acquisitions in favor of a “mix” of contract types, such as performance-based contracts and other transaction authorities, or OTAs. It also resets the tone for military purchasing toward “faster non-traditional approaches that may involve higher risk but offer high potential reward,” something that commanders, younger defense tech leaders, and even lawmakers have long pushed for. Perhaps most importantly, it also takes steps to actually grow the market for younger defense tech players beyond just the military. It takes aim at foreign military sales rules and export controls that hobble the sale of much defense tech to allies. That will be especially important for newer defense companies trying to secure early-stage investment to survive. And it calls for other federal agencies to build “streamlined pathways” for smaller companies to at least get their foot in the door, even via partnerships that don’t offer young companies much more than access to federal infrastructure, such as “Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and Agreements for Commercializing Technology (ACTs).” Losers: open weights, small AI While the strategy champions smaller, more innovative players in defense, it also weighs in on the debate about what the future of AI should look like and comes down on the side of Big Tech companies that are pushing a specific, energy-intensive, and deeply unpopular future of AI over emerging strategies favored increasingly by researchers. China will benefit from the oversight, Michael Schiffer, a partner at Scalare Advisors and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, wrote on Tuesday for Just Security. In its section on critical technologies for support, the strategy lists “Foundation models, including large language, multimodal, and world systems.” The section also includes niche tech areas like brain-computer interfaces but omits entirely open-weight models and open-source software development. Here’s why that’s important: Foundation models, such as today’s large language models from companies like OpenAI and Anthropic, represent just one potential method for building AI tools—one that relies heavily on pushing as much data through as much computational infrastructure as possible to achieve something that looks like “reasoning,” but that’s really just plain old probability calculation. Anthropic co-founder Dario Amodei helped to transform that concept from a research effort into a massive endeavor to acquire computational resources and data as quickly as possible. Amodei explained it simply in a 2023 discussion with Dwarkesh Patel. “It turns out that raw scale—more compute and more data—drives capabilities far more powerfully than complex algorithmic inventions or hand-crafted architectural changes.” A small handful of frontier AI labs, and their big cloud computer backers, are in a literal race for company survival because there’s only so much power, so many chips to continue to pursue “raw scale.” If, as Amodei says, just having more “more compute” and “more data” means having the best performing models, then whoever has the most of those resources can push out any competitor.  It’s no wonder the AI race has become a concentration of wealth and power, in just a handful of labs with their large cloud compute backers. No wonder, also, that public perception of AI has plummeted: just 18 percent of Americans believe it will be a positive force for the United States, one new poll found. But the foundation model approach does have its fans: large-scale U.S. cloud providers who have invested billions in foundation model labs.  The very way the strategy frames the issue plays to the idea that AI has one future and that winning the AI race or achieving dominance means favoring a handful of players. But it’s also a theme that plays out in many of the White House’s policies and executive orders around AI. Meanwhile, alternative approaches to building AI are emerging. Rather than race to build more data centers and find more data to throw at the problem of AI, they use parameters that already exist that are freely available, called open weight models, as opposed to closed weights that are protected intellectual property. And they use those in conjunction with alternative architectures that make using those models more energy efficient. Many of these alternative approaches to building AI perform almost as well as what Anthropic and OpenAI are offering, and have the potential to do so at far lower energy costs.  Why it matters to the military The finite amount of compute power, data, and good will when it comes to AI could become a strategic problem for the U.S. military. If public sentiment undermines congressional and financial support for research and development in the field, officials fear, the country might lose its AI edge to China, which has openly declared its intention to pull ahead. In the meantime, frontier-AI models also create tactical and operational problems for the militaries that use them. Troops and military units in the field can’t count on the connectivity that tools based on large models need. And in a new report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jake Steckler writes, “Ukraine’s computational architecture, consisting of Western cloud access, domestic data centers, and forward-deployed compute nodes, is already straining as it integrates more AI into targeting and coordination.” Open-weight models don’t appear in the new strategy, though it does list niche and far-fetched concepts like brain-computer interfaces as “critical.” That’s a huge oversight and a potential gift to China, argues Schiffer. “China’s advances in open-weight AI have exposed the limits of a U.S. strategy built too heavily on the idea of denying them access to American technology and American markets,” he said. ]]

[Category: Science & Tech]

— The Russian hurdle in Trump’s new offensive cyber program

 

at 8/18/26 1:26pm

President Donald Trump’s new plan to enlist private companies to help disrupt cybercriminals abroad may face a fundamental problem when it comes to Russia: distinguishing criminal hackers and state-backed operatives. Russian intelligence services have long tolerated, protected or intermittently recruited financially-motivated hackers without exercising full control over them. That dynamic gives Moscow easier access to hacking talent, and it complicates a major carveout in Trump’s new directive that excludes groups part of or directed by a foreign government, experts and former U.S. officials say. “The line between government control, government-affiliated and government-acknowledged is certainly blurry in Russia,” said Michael Daniel, president and CEO of the Cyber Threat Alliance and a former White House cybersecurity coordinator under President Barack Obama. “Determining the exact relationship between malicious actors and the Russian government has long been a challenge and is often impossible.” A White House memorandum signed last week paves the way for vetted U.S. companies to conduct cyber surveillance and operations that manipulate, disrupt and destroy systems used by foreign criminal groups. Companies would work under contracts with the Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security, and every operation would require written approval. The memo says eligible targets cannot be “an institutional part of a foreign government” or “wholly operated under a foreign government’s direction.” It then instructs officials to assume a group is not part of, or wholly controlled by, a foreign government unless “clear intelligence” establishes that connection. Such intelligence collection from spy agencies like the National Security Agency and CIA can help firms determine targeting criteria, though it may not be enough for Russia’s ever-evolving cyber landscape. “Russia’s cyber web is opaque and always shifting, blurring lines between government and cybercriminal, with no single rule for understanding each and every relationship,” said Justin Sherman, CEO of Global Cyber Strategies, a Washington, D.C.-based research and advisory firm. Some of that ambiguity is intentional and allows the Kremlin to expand the pool of hackers it can covertly draw upon, Sherman said. It also reflects broader and pervasive corruption conditions inside Russia. U.S. companies may have insights about those groups but lack the broader intelligence available to the government. Federal agencies, meanwhile, can only share or declassify so much, he said. “Private companies have critical insights in some ways and limited in others,” Sherman said. With an incomplete picture, “you’re bound to get it wrong some of the time.” Simple indicators don’t necessarily settle attribution questions, he added. Ties with the FSB — Russia’s Federal Security Service that succeeded the Soviet Union’s KGB — do not by themselves prove that a criminal group is state-directed, nor does a Russian intelligence service’s use of tools developed by criminals establish continuous government control. “Simple, bumper sticker ideas for deciding if a Russian cybercriminal is a state actor or not will often collapse in practice,” said Sherman. Past cases illustrate how those relationships can work. In 2017, the DOJ charged two FSB officers with directing and protecting criminal hackers involved in the breach of Yahoo. Prosecutors said one of the hackers also conducted separate intrusions for personal profit. The Treasury Department has similarly said Maksim Yakubets, the alleged leader of the Evil Corp cybercrime organization, worked for the FSB and was tasked with projects on behalf of the Russian state while his organization carried out financially motivated attacks. “The Russians haven’t been strangers to using private sector proxies to get what they want, as long as they’re not attacking them,” said Chris Painter, a former State Department cyber coordinator and White House cyber official. He questioned how a company could determine where a particular group falls along that continuum when the answer is often not immediately apparent, even for well-resourced governments. The new policy is the latest step in an offensive cyber posture the administration has been building for the last year. Trump’s national cybersecurity strategy, released in March, called for “unprecedented coordination” between government and industry on offensive and defensive missions. It pledged to “unleash the private sector” by creating incentives for companies to identify and disrupt adversary networks. But that set-up remained unclear for months. National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross said shortly after the strategy’s release that he was “not talking about private sector, industry or companies engaged in a cyber offensive campaign.” Instead, he described companies sharing information and capabilities that would enable the government to respond. Some industry executives interviewed by Nextgov/FCW in April nevertheless predicted that the government would eventually contract with companies to support cyber operations. They also raised unresolved questions about legal authorities and how experts would define the fine line between creating obstacles for adversaries and hacking them offensively. The administration moved further in May when its counterterrorism strategy explicitly identified offensive cyber operations as one of the tools Washington could use against threatening groups and the states that support them. That document offered scant details about how such operations would work. Sherman argued that the U.S. shouldn’t let uncertainty about Russia’s cyber links stop it from taking action. The United States is overdue to reconsider assumptions about restraint and do more to counter Russia’s offensive cyber activity, he said, but a more aggressive posture does not make the underlying attribution decisions any easier. Daniel said that ambiguity could give Washington leverage. Moscow could either let an operation against known criminals go unanswered or object and risk exposing its ties to them. “The U.S. could use this formulation to call the Russians’ bluff — either acknowledge a relationship or let the group take the damage,” he said. But maintaining that bind would require the United States to choose its targets carefully. If a company inadvertently struck clandestine personnel from Moscow’s intelligence and security agencies, he added, the operation could create substantially greater consequences. Cybercriminals routinely operate through hijacked servers and systems belonging to unwitting third parties, meaning companies carrying out hacks may have to distinguish targeted criminals from the infrastructure they have compromised. “A lot is left to be determined on how the oversight is going to work, how the targeting is going to work,” Painter said. “That’s all supposed to be decided in 60 days,” he said, referring to the timeline the new policy must be developed by. Painter said the best version of the program would be a tightly controlled process in which the government uses intelligence provided by companies and its own agencies to select legitimate targets. Companies would likely want written assurances that the government had approved a target and that their actions were covered by the program, he said. The public directive does not explain how responsibility would be divided if a contractor followed an approved plan and the underlying intelligence proved wrong. Much of the operational process will also be governed by a classified annex. Coordinating government decisions and private-sector activity in something approaching real time will itself be difficult, Daniel said.  “I don’t know of any analogous precedent,” he added. A DHS spokesperson did not respond to questions about how the administration would distinguish Russian cybercrime groups from state-linked actors or who would bear responsibility if a target were misidentified. The department “looks forward to implementing President Trump’s directive to combat cyber-enabled transnational crime threatening Americans and our businesses,” the spokesperson said. “Last year alone, cyber-enabled Transnational Criminal Organizations stole more than $20 billion directly from Americans through rampant fraud, ransomware, and extortion schemes,” White House spokesperson Lauren Bis said when asked the same line of questions. “The Trump administration is mounting an aggressive campaign to disrupt these illicit syndicates and dismantle them at the source.”  The Justice and State departments did not provide comments. Russia’s embassy in Washington was also contacted. The prospect of operations against pro-Russia cybercriminals carries a possible diplomatic dimension. Trump has continued direct engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin and has sought to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. The two leaders agreed in July to maintain contact and speak again. The administration has previously adjusted its cyber posture during negotiations with Moscow. Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., who chairs the House Armed Services Committee’s cyber panel, confirmed last year that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered a brief pause in U.S. Cyber Command operations against Russia as the administration pursued Ukraine talks.  The memorandum requires coordination with the State Department, suggesting diplomatic consequences will be considered before an operation is approved. It does not say publicly how officials would weigh disrupting a Russian cybercrime group against other negotiations with the Kremlin. “If there’s a decision made that says we’re being careful with Russia now because we’re in some sensitive talks, that will play into it,” Painter said. Companies could also “paint the target on themselves” and face Russian retaliation if their involvement became public, he added. Even if a company is required to keep its role secret, it wouldn’t prevent an adversary or another party from exposing it. “I understand what they’re trying to do, and if it has really robust oversight, and including targeting and review and oversight of what they’re doing, it might work fine,” Painter said. “But there’s so much of a chance of that going wrong.” ]]

[Category: Policy]

— DISA awards Peraton $953M communications infrastructure contract

 

at 8/18/26 11:19am

Peraton has won a potential 10-year, $953 million contract to continue providing communication infrastructure services to the Defense Information Systems Agency for data centers and hybrid cloud computing environments. DISA received three proposals for this third iteration of its Capacity Services Communications contract, the agency said in an award notice first posted Friday. CSC III emphasizes on-demand communications capabilities as the agency adjusts its requirements based on mission needs instead of a fixed equipment set, according to solicitation documents from February. Peraton is tasked with providing hardware, operating software, storage, network management tools and software, automation tools and software and technical services across DISA and non-DISA sites around the world. Work will take place over an initial five-year base period and up to five individual option years. Peraton inherited the CSC program in 2021 through its combination with Perspecta, which purchased longtime incumbent Knight Point Systems in 2019. Knight Point won the first iteration in 2011 and secured the recompete in 2018. DISA has obligated $573 million in task order volume against the current contract ahead of its April 2027 sunset, according to GovTribe data. Editors note: DISA updated its award notice post-publication to say the contract ceiling is $953 million. ]]

[Category: Business]

— White House S&T strategy calls for new approaches to safeguard US research

 

at 8/17/26 4:20pm

The Trump administration says the nation’s science and technology research ecosystem needs to embrace “novel security solutions” to ensure the U.S. maintains its global edge, according to a new document publicly released on Monday.  The National Security Science and Technology Strategy published by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy outlines how the U.S. innovation sector should be leveraged and guarded to defend the country. The new document builds off last year’s National Security Strategy, which called, in part, for “protecting the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and bolstering the resilience of the American technology sector.” To help safeguard the nation’s innovation sector from threats “that could impair U.S. economic and military strength and competitiveness,” the strategy calls for “approaches that protect without inhibiting the productivity and agility of the national security S&T enterprise.” President Donald Trump previously moved to curtail illicit foreign interference in the nation’s research institutions, most notably through a January 2021 memo that sought to keep adversarial governments from exploiting U.S. science and technology research. Lawmakers from both parties have also pushed legislation to limit Chinese involvement in federally-funded research projects, and the Pentagon similarly announced on Monday that it called for 30 U.S. academic institutions to review their ties with foreign entities. But the strategy says research institutions need to take further steps to enhance their threat awareness, including conducting “automated research security vetting” of agency-funded research proposals and performing continuous monitoring of federally-supported projects.  It also calls for “bolstering counter-intelligence support to governmental and non-governmental research centers” — which would give researchers more immediate and timely insights into potential threats—and creating “risk-based review criteria and a repository of sharable information to enhance the efficiency of information collection and sharing among agencies.” It noted, for instance, that the FBI-led Quantum Information Science and Technology Counterintelligence Protection Team “brings an interagency team of quantum experts and security professionals to fine-tune technology protection and security outreach activities for the quickly evolving quantum R&D community.” Another section calls for “establishing cybersecurity guidelines for researchers and research institutions,” although it is sparse on the details of what this would look like. The National Science Foundation, for its part, has a research security policy framework that includes some cyber-specific guidance as part of its broader blueprint.  “Given the evolving nature of research security threats, security experts should embrace comprehensive, new, and novel security solutions, particularly where they can be crafted to address unique or nuanced requirements of specific technology fields,” the document said.  The strategy’s implementation section highlights the need to enhance K-12 and higher education training opportunities and bring more skilled talent into the federal workforce—an effort the Trump administration has been undertaking, in part, by prioritizing skills-based hiring over degree requirements.  Notably, however, the strategy references the need to attract more nonimmigrant tech workers to the U.S., which differs from the Trump administration’s prior stance that called for a more restrictive approach. “The United States will further strengthen its workforce by attracting and retaining top-tier global talent in critical national security S&T fields,” the strategy says. “Agencies will collaborate on using existing authorities to recruit the exquisite talent necessary to ensure the national security S&T Enterprise leads the world in developing and applying these technologies.” OSTP did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the strategy’s inclusion of the need to attract and retain global talent.  Last year’s National Security Strategy said, in part, that the U.S. “cannot allow meritocracy to be used as a justification to open America’s labor market to the world in the name of finding ‘global talent’ that undercuts American workers.” Trump issued a proclamation in September 2025 that moved to restrict the number of H-1B visas, saying that the program has harmed American workers. The visas allow U.S. firms to temporarily hire foreign workers, with the tech industry notably using the program to attract nonimmigrant talent. The proclamation attempted to institute a $100,000 H-1B visa fee, although a district court has overturned that mandate. In addition to calling for the nation’s innovation sector to embrace new security solutions, the strategy said the U.S. needs to speed up its pace of innovation, build up its domestic “technological resilience” and focus its science and technology ecosystem on “maintaining battlefield advantage, countering strategic threats to the homeland, and shaping the competition toward areas of U.S. strength.” Nextgov/FCW Cyber Reporter David DiMolfetta contributed to this story. ]]

[Category: Science & Tech]

— Bill expanding paid leave for feds pared back in Senate

 

at 8/17/26 3:54pm

Legislation aimed at improving the amount of paid leave federal employees are eligible each year took another step forward as Democratic senators introduced companion legislation shortly before Congress left for its August recess. In June, a bipartisan group of House lawmakers introduced the Comprehensive Paid Leave for Federal Employees Act (H.R. 9261), a measure that would provide feds with up to 12 weeks each year of paid family leave, to be used to attend to a serious health condition or care for a spouse, child or parent. It also would cover absences needed in connection with a family member’s deployment into active-duty military service, or to help a family member who has been the survivor of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking. And last month, Sens. Brian Schatz, D-Hawaii, and seven other Democrats introduced their own version of the bill (S. 5168). That measure also extends 12 weeks per year of paid family leave to federal workers to deal with a health condition or a family member’s health condition and to attend to a family member’s military deployment, but it excises the provision relating to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault and stalking. “Right now, our laws are forcing federal workers to make the impossible choice between caring for their families and keeping their jobs,” Schatz said in a statement. “Our bill will provide federal workers with 12 weeks of paid leave, giving them the time they need to take care of their own health and their loved ones.” [[Related Posts]] Paid family leave and other provisions relating to federal workers has recently been a tougher sell for the Senate side of the U.S. Capitol. In 2019, as lawmakers considered providing 12 weeks of paid parental leave to federal workers each year via the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, the House’s version of the legislation also included family leave, only for the Senate to balk during negotiations between the chambers. Likewise, the House has included a provision blocking President Trump’s anti-union executive orders’ implementation at the Pentagon in both last year’s NDAA and the one currently under consideration. The Senate stripped the provision from their version of the bill last year. Despite the more pared-back approach, the Senate’s family leave bill has still attracted the support of several unions and other federal employee associations. “Expanding paid family and medical leave ensures federal employees never have to choose between caring for themselves or a loved one and serving the American people,” said Everett Kelley, national president of the American Federation of Government Employees. “This legislation will strengthen the federal workforce, improve employee retention, and help the government remain a competitive employer for the dedicated public servants our nation depends on.” “Federal employees should never have to choose between caring for their loved ones and paying their bills on time,” said National Treasury Employees Union National President Doreen Greenwald. “The Comprehensive Paid Family Leave Act would provide federal workers with the flexibility and support they need during some of life’s most significant moments. As the federal government works to attract and retain talented public servants, providing comprehensive paid family leave is both the right thing to do and a smart investment in the workforce.” ]]

[Category: Policy]

— CMMC Works. Now let’s sharpen it.

 

at 8/17/26 1:19pm

I built the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification because self-attestation was failing our war industrial base. Contractors could simply promise they were following basic cybersecurity practices, with no verification behind that promise. Our adversaries noticed that gap long before Washington did—and they have not eased up since. If anything, the opposite is true.  Nation-state actors and the ransomware crews they tolerate or direct are more aggressive, better funded, and faster than they were five years ago. This is not the moment to loosen the standard. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement requirements behind CMMC should not change, and I would not support it if they did. But defending a program doesnt mean pretending its perfectly aimed. Now that CMMC is a final rule moving into real contracts, its the right time to ask: are we targeting it precisely enough? I dont think we are yet—and artificial intelligence, used correctly, can help fix that without touching the cybersecurity bar itself. The problem is targeting, not the standard CMMCs requirements hinge on controlled unclassified information. But CUI determinations across the war industrial base are inconsistent: Two subcontractors doing nearly identical work can end up with completely different assessments because the call still depends on manual judgment with incomplete visibility into how data actually flows down. Some small businesses get pushed into heavy assessment burdens for data that isnt really CUI. Others handling real, sensitive data slip through with a lighter requirement. Neither outcome helps national security; the first wastes compliance dollars, the second leaves real exposure unaddressed. AI can do the first-pass sorting here—flagging likely CUI from contract language and statements of work and catching mismatches between what a prime contract designates and what actually flows down to subcontractors — far more consistently than todays patchwork of manual reviews. In this scenario, a human with contracting authority still makes the final call. But that human should be working from a much better starting point than we give them now. Small business is the economy, not just the supply chain Small businesses are 99.9% of American companies and employ nearly half the private workforce. And right now, they face threats most arent equipped to handle: ransomware that can shut down operations overnight; AI-enabled fraud thats harder to spot every year, and a coming reckoning when quantum computing breaks todays standard encryption. The quantum threat is already real, since data harvested now can simply be decrypted later. Im glad the Small Business Administration is leaning into this. Its Cybersecurity for Small Business Pilot Program has done real work funding training through state partners. But training grants arent capital, and no amount of counseling gets a small manufacturer through a ransomware recovery or a quantum-resistant encryption upgrade. Small businesses cant get favorable financing for cybersecurity the way they can for equipment because most lenders dont know how to underwrite it. We need a dedicated SBA loan program for cybersecurity investment—open to every small business, not just those working with the Department of War—to fund things like multi-factor authentication rollouts, endpoint detection, incident response, and early migration toward quantum-resistant encryption, before its an emergency instead of a plan. Same mission, two fronts Inside the war industrial base, use AI to make sure CUI calls and flow-down match reality. Outside it, give the broader small business economy the capital to defend itself against adversaries who are only getting more aggressive. I still believe unverified promises are not a security strategy. But precision and support arent the enemies of security—theyre what make it sustainable. Sharpen how we target CMMC, and open the door for every small business to invest in its own war footing. Thats not lowering the bar. Thats making sure the bar is doing its job. Katie Arrington is a former South Carolina state legislator and cybersecurity executive who served as DOD CISO for Acquisition and Sustainment starting in 2019, and later returned as DOD CISO/PTDO DOD CIO under the second Trump administration. She spearheaded the Pentagon’s initial efforts to create the CMMC program for defense contractors beginning in 2019, driven by a conviction that contractors needed to actually prove — not just self-attest to — their cybersecurity compliance in order to protect sensitive defense data from adversaries. Her commitment to the program has been described as stemming from a deeply personal mission to secure the Defense Industrial Base from cyber threats that jeopardize national security. ]]

[Category: Ideas]

— Army’s Apache grounding prompted by deadly Texas crash will end this week, memo says

 

at 8/17/26 1:15pm

Army officials plan to resume Apache training flights in days, after the fleet was grounded following a crash that left two soldiers dead in Texas, according to an internal memo reviewed by Defense One. The two soldiers, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Deontre T. Huey and Warrant Officer Seth L. Olmstead, died during a maintenance test flight out of Fort Hood on Aug. 12. On Friday, Army officials announced a stand down of AH64 Apache training flight operations and said in a news release it “will remain in effect until we have a better understanding of the root cause of the accident.”  However, a widely circulated internal Aug. 14 memo reviewed by Defense One said the grounding “concludes on midnight Tuesday,” with plans for “flight operations resuming on Wednesday 19 August.” The document acknowledges that from fiscal year 2023 through this year, the Army had nine fatalities from nineteen Class A mishaps, the term used for the services deadliest and costliest incidents.  “During the Army aviation AH-64 fleet safety stand down, commands will focus on aviation academics and safety related topics,” the memo states. “Senior commanders will be involved during the aviation safety stand down. Opening remarks shall be provided by general officers, who will articulate the importance of this event. Commanders will review, brief, and discuss an overview of current safety statistics and trends.”  Safety stand downs are common after military crashes, but the current Apache grounding marks the latest in a recent string of safety mishaps for the storied attack helicopter. Three months ago, Defense One exclusively revealed a transmission problem that could “result in loss of tail rotor thrust, electrical power, and hydraulics. Some of the AH-64 Echo models had to be grounded as a result. Prior to that investigation, there had been at least three Apache incidents—including one crash during a maintenance flight out of Fort Hood, according to photos and information from a pilot. While investigations into the crash are ongoing, a U.S. official told Defense One the service  was “able to eliminate the transmission as a causal factor.” The official confirmed the Apache fleet would resume training flights this week. A Boeing executive told Defense One on the sidelines of the Farnborough International Air Show in the United Kingdom last month that they couldn’t share the progress on fixing those transmission problems. “Boeing does have crews that are there working with the U.S. Army on some of those components,” said Mark Ballew, Boeing Defense, Space, and Security’s senior director of business development and strategy for vertical lift. “So our teams been there, they’ve been working there for the last month-plus on that.”  A Boeing spokesman told Defense One on Sunday the company is still working with the Army on the transmission problem. Apaches are being relied on heavily during the ongoing war in Iran, are part of major foreign military sales this year, and have been used for high-level transportation of Defense Department leaders and celebrities.  Officials wrote in Friday’s memo that “CENTCOM deployed formations are exempt from the safety stand down requirements.”  In June, an Apache went down near the coast of Oman while “patrolling international waters,” according to U.S. Central Command. After the helicopter was reportedly struck by an Iranian drone, the U.S. military deployed a Navy drone boat to rescue the downed crew.  ]]

[Category: Defense Systems]

— Defense firm L3Harris promotes Mehta to CEO in abrupt leadership change

 

at 8/17/26 7:31am

L3Harris Technologies’ board of directors has promoted Sam Mehta to chief executive from his former role as president of space and mission systems in an abrupt leadership change announced Monday. Chris Kubasik, L3Harris’ CEO since June 2021, stepped down from that position and his other roles as chairman and member of the board of directors effective immediately. L3Harris said the board determined to enter into a separation agreement with Kubasik after an investigation found conduct by him that was “not consistent with the values of the company as outlined in its code of conduct.” The company added the alleged conduct was not related to its financial reporting, controls, customer relationships or operational performance. Mehta joined L3Harris in 2023 as president of the communications segment, then added the additional title of president of the space and mission systems segment at the start of this year. This transition at the very top of L3Harris is taking place in a year where the company announced its intentions to take the missile solutions segment public following a $1 billion investment from the Defense Department. L3Harris originally eyed the second half of this year for the initial public offering, but Kubasik told investors in July that the IPO is being delayed until at least mid-2027 because of market conditions the company sees as not reflecting the value of Mission Solutions. Kubasik’s tenure as CEO started with the completion of the integration of L3 Technologies and Harris Corp. following their merger in 2019, and includes the $4.7 billion acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne in 2023. The pending Missile Solutions IPO is not the only move L3Harris has undertaken with respect to its space business. L3Harris closed the sale of a 60% stake in the space propulsion and power systems business this month to AE Industrial Partners, while retaining a 40% stake. In addition to Mehta’s promotion, Lauren Barnes has moved up to be president of the space and mission systems segment from her prior role as president of spectrum superiority. Christopher Aebli, formerly president of mission critical communications, was elevated to president of the communications and spectrum dominance. Lewis Hay III, a member of the L3Harris and a predecessor board since 2002, was elected chairman after previously holding the title of lead independent director. ]]

[Category: Business]

As of 8/26/26 10:36am. Last new 8/25/26 11:57am.