- — Iran Update, October 28, 2024
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at 10/28/24 7:51pmRia Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes "severely damaged” Iran’s air defense and missile production capabilities.[1] Unspecified sources within the Israeli defense establishment reported that Israel’s attack destroyed all of Iran’s long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and long-range detection radars, leaving Iran with only domestically produced short-range defense batteries.[2] Western reporting has confirmed damage at a storage unit within the Abadan oil refinery in Khuzestan province and a TIECO oil and gas machinery factory in Tehran province, among others, following the IDF strikes.[3] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called the strikes on Iran the most significant IDF Air Force operation since the Six-Day War in 1967, emphasizing that their impact represents "a change in the balance of power.”[4] Gallant stated that the damage from the strikes puts Iran at a “huge disadvantage” when it comes to future Israeli attacks.[5]Unspecified Iranian sources told Israeli media that Israel also targeted and breached Iranian radar systems in Syria before launching its attack on Iran.[6] The sources noted that the radar screens in Iran’s defense systems “froze“ before the IDF strikes.[7] CTP-ISW previously reported that the IDF likely targeted Iran’s early detection network in Syria and Iraq that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack.[8]Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. CTP-ISW previously reported that Israeli strikes in Iran have targeted four S-300 air defense systems in Iran.[9] Israeli sources reported that Iran had only four S-300 batteries, suggesting that Iran does not have any functional S-300 batteries right now.[10] The Russian-made S-300 is the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.Senior Iranian defense and political officials are downplaying the extent of the strike’s damage while simultaneously threatening a response.[11] Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh claimed on October 28 that the Israeli attack caused only “minor” damage that Iran has since repaired.[12]Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—killed ten Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officers in an attack on a police patrol unit in Taftan County, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26.[13] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces regional headquarters responsible for Sistan and Baluchistan Province “destroyed” the team responsible for the attack on October 27.[14] The IRGC Ground Forces regional headquarters reported that its forces killed four Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested four additional fighters. IRGC Ground Forces troops injured an unspecified number of fighters as they attempted to withdraw. This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[15]Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.[16] Israeli media reported that mediators attempted to combine a “small” Egyptian proposal with a comprehensive, multi-stage US-Qatar settlement.[17] CTP-ISW has not seen the details of this US-Qatar settlement. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi publicly proposed an initial two-day ceasefire in which four Israeli hostages would be exchanged with an unidentified number of Palestinian prisoners.[18] This would be followed by 10 days of further negotiations. Sisi’s proposed plan bears a resemblance to the proposal of Egyptian General Intelligence Service head Hassan Rashad on October 22 for a “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would facilitate negotiations for a more comprehensive ceasefire-hostage deal.[19] A Palestinian source close to the negotiations told Reuters that Hamas would ”listen” to new offers but remains committed to achieving a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[20] Hamas likely believes that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip by waiting out the Israelis, making it unclear why a smaller ceasefire-hostage deal would facilitate successful talks.[21] An Israeli source told Israeli media on October 27 that Netanyahu is willing to conclude the IDF operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon in exchange for a diplomatic resolution that guarantees Israel’s war aims are achieved.[22] Israeli media reported that Israeli officials intend to host a follow-up summit soon to continue negotiations, with the involvement of Egyptian Intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, and potentially Hamas.[23]Hamas has attempted to coerce Palestinian civilians against leaving the northern Gaza Strip since IDF operations in Jabalia resumed on October 6, including by shooting civilians in the legs. The IDF said that civilian evacuations have taken longer than expected due to Hamas physically preventing Palestinians from leaving the north, including by shooting some civilians in the legs.[24] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson similarly said on October 23 that Hamas is physically assaulting Palestinian civilians evacuating Jabalia to discourage them from evacuating the area.[25] Israeli media reported on October 28 that 50,000 Palestinian civilians from the northern Gaza Strip have evacuated south since the IDF began clearing operations in Jabalia on October 6.[26] The IDF has repeatedly warned civilians to travel to al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip and expanded the humanitarian zone eastward on October 26, likely to accommodate an increased flow of internally displaced Palestinians from the northern Gaza Strip.[27]The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.[28] Israel must approve an extension to allow Palestinian banks in the West Bank to maintain ties with Israeli banks by October 31. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and seven foreign counterparts wrote a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25 and warned that Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s decision to not approve the extension may lead to the collapse of the Palestinian economy.[29] Smotrich has threatened to withhold his approval to extend a waiver that allows payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority for the import of food, water, electricity, and other services in the West Bank.[30] The restriction on the extension would cut Palestinian banks off from over $13 billion in trade with Israel, thus “damaging Israel’s economy and exacerbating an already dire economic situation in the West Bank,” according to the letter.[31] Yellen and her counterparts also added that the collapse of the Palestinian economy would threaten Israeli security interests in the region.[32] Smotrich has so far refused to renew the waiver but has until October 31 to do so.[33] US officials told Axios that the Biden administration recently told Israel that it had determined that Palestinian banks met Smotrich’s conditions for renewal.[34]A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.[35] A Yemeni journalist reported on October 26 that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah.[36] The Houthi fighters killed in southern Lebanon are from Saada Governorate in Yemen. Houthis from Saada Governorate are often given preferential treatment due to their close family ties and long-time service within the Houthi movement.[37] Fighters from Saada, given their loyalty, would be the most likely choices for important foreign missions like advising Hezbollah.Key Takeaways:Iran: Senior Israeli officials stated that Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Iran on October 25 "severely damaged" Iran's air defense capabilities, which would make Iran more vulnerable to future attacks. Constrained Russian manufacturing capacity for new ground-based air defense systems and Russia’s demand for these systems in Ukraine may limit Iran’s ability to acquire new S-300s in the near term. Some Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s S-300s on October 25.Gaza Strip: Mossad head David Barnea met with CIA Director Bill Burns and Qatari Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha on October 27 and 28 to continue ceasefire-hostage negotiations.West Bank: The US Treasury Secretary and seven of her foreign counterparts warned Israel that its decision to withhold payments from Israel to the Palestinian Authority risks an economic collapse in the West Bank that would be detrimental to Israeli security interests.Yemen: A Yemeni journalist reported that five Houthi fighters died in southern Lebanon fighting alongside Hezbollah, suggesting that Houthi fighters are embedded within Hezbollah there.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 28. Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters with the support of the IDF Air Force.[38] Israeli forces also investigated and destroyed underground shafts and located large quantities of weapons.[39] Israeli media reported that the IDF plans to continue operations in Jabalia to destroy the hundreds of Hamas fighters that the IDF believes remain in the Jabalia area.[40] The IDF added that civilians have completely evacuated the area.[41] The IDF said that the Jabalia refugee camp is Hamas’ main command-and-control “area” in the northern Gaza Strip, according to an Israeli media correspondent.[42] IDF sources added to the Israeli media correspondent that Hamas was surprised by the IDF’s “quick push” into the Jabalia area when the IDF resumed its clearing operations on October 6 and hundreds of Hamas commanders, including top commanders, were trapped.[43] The IDF has detained around 600 suspected militia fighters at checkpoints as Palestinian civilians evacuated from Jabalia. The IDF has killed hundreds of militia fighters during operations in Jabalia since October 6.[44] The IDF withdrew the 460th Armored Brigade from Jabalia on October 28, while the 84th Infantry and 401st Armored brigades remained in the area.[45]Hamas detonated an explosively formed penetrator targeting Israeli armor within Jabalia camp on October 27.[46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades also fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers on October 28.[47]Israeli forces completed a raid on a Hamas command-and-control site inside Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabalia on October 28.[48] The IDF said Hamas was using ambulances from the hospital to move Hamas fighters around the Gaza Strip.[49] Israeli forces evacuated patients, staff, and civilians sheltering in the hospital before they began the raid but Israeli forces kept emergency facilities functional. Israeli forces detained 40 Hamas fighters during the hospital’s evacuation and dozens more after the raid, including fighters who participated in the October 7 attacks.[50] Israeli forces also killed 20 gunmen and found weapons, money, and Hamas documents in the hospital and the surrounding area.[51]The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas command-and-control site in the northern Gaza Strip on October 27.[52] The IDF stated that Hamas fighters used the former Asma school in al Shati camp to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces and Israeli territory. The IDF added that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties.[53] Hamas-affiliated media claimed that three journalists were killed in the attack.[54] The IDF said that the journalists worked for Hamas’ media apparatus but that the journalists were not the targets of the strike.[55]Palestinian militias continued to target Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired rockets targeting Israeli forces and armor along the Netzarim Corridor on October 27.[56] The Popular Resistance Committees and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad mortared an Israeli command-and-control site along the Netzarim Corridor on October 28.[57]The IDF 252nd Division continued targeted raids in the central Gaza Strip on October 28, killing multiple fighters and destroying a military building in the area.[58] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from vehicles north Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on October 27.[59]The IDF 933rd Infantry Brigade, deployed under the 143rd Division, killed armed fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure in the Rafah area on October 28.[60] Israeli forces coordinated an IAF strike that targeted and killed militia fighters operating in a rigged house near Israeli forces.[61] A Palestinian journalist reported heavy gunfire from military vehicles east of Rafah.[62]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelAn unknown individual fired small arms targeting an Israeli settlement of Shaked in the West Bank on October 28.[63] The attacker approached the settlement in a vehicle and opened fire targeting the settlement before fleeing to a nearby Palestinian village on foot.[64] The IDF reported no casualties and launched a search operation in the area to locate the attacker.[65]Israeli security forces detained 11 wanted persons in several locations across the West Bank during overnight raids on October 27 and 28.[66] The IDF interrogated 20 individuals suspected of “terrorist activity” and confiscated tens of thousands of Israeli shekels in “terrorist funds.”[67] The IDF also confiscated three firearms during the raids in the West Bank.Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least four locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on October 27.[68] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces operating in several locations across Jenin Governorate.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese sources reported that IDF artillery continued to shell areas in Hasbaya District, southeastern Lebanon, on October 28. Lebanese sources reported that the IDF conducted artillery shelling in Halta, Kfarchouba, and Shebaa.[69] The IDF said on October 15 that the IDF 210th Division has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous areas in Hasbaya District over the past three weeks.[70]The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Odaisseh on October 27. Geolocated footage posted on October 27 showed the IDF demolishing buildings in northern Odaisseh.[71] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, Northern Command Commander Major General Uri Gordin, and 98th Division Commander Brigadier General Guy Levy toured a Hezbollah underground compound in southern Lebanon.[72] The IDF said that the IDF had demolished the tunnel in the past two days.[73] Hezbollah fired two barrages of rockets targeting Israeli forces in al Amra, west of al Wazzani.[74]The IDF 91st Division has “destroyed” Hezbollah’s ability to conduct a ground infiltration into Israel from Kfar Kila.[75] The IDF said that Israeli forces had conducted numerous covert operations into Kfar Kila village and its surroundings to conduct reconnaissance on several Hezbollah targets over the past year.[76] The IDF announced that the IDF 769th Territorial Brigade had expanded operations into the Kfar Kila area on an unspecified date in the past few weeks.[77] The 769th Territorial Brigade has destroyed hundreds of Hezbollah military buildings, thousands of weapons, and seized Hezbollah documents, launchers, and tactical equipment since beginning operations in the area.[78] These assets belonged to the Radwan special operation forces (SOF), according to the IDF.[79] Israeli Army Radio reported that 1,000 Radwan fighters had planned to conduct a ground operation into Israel from Kfar Kila.[80] The IDF said that Israeli operations have “destroyed“ Hezbollah’s capabilities to conduct ground raids into Israel from Kfar Kila.[81] Hezbollah may still be able to conduct indirect fire attacks from the Kfar Kila area into Israel, however.[82]Hezbollah claimed that it engaged Israeli forces that were operating near Kfar Kila on October 28.[83] Hezbollah fired four barrages of rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces on the Kfar Kila-Metula border.[84] Hezbollah fired small arms targeting Israeli personnel and armor advancing towards Tal Nahhas, north of Kfar Kila.[85]The IDF 91st Division also appeared to continue clearing operations in Hula on October 27. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 27 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in central Hula along the Marjaayoun-Bint Jbeil Road, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated in the area. The 91st Division directed an airstrike targeting a cell of Hezbollah fighters that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[86]The IDF 36th Division continued operations in Aitaroun on October 27.[87] Geolocated footage posted on October 27 showed the IDF destroying a tunnel underneath an unnamed road in central Aitaroun.[88] Israeli forces have operated in and near Aitaroun since October 23.[89]The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 28.[90] Israeli forces continued to locate Hezbollah infrastructure and facilities.[91] Lebanese media reported that Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces between al Dahyra and Yarine.[92] Lebanese sources also reported that Israeli tanks fired at unspecified targets in the adjacent towns of Umm Tutteh, Yarine, and Jebbayn.[93] The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure on October 28.[94] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, including a rocket launcher and dozens of Hezbollah fighters.[95] The IDF Air Force also struck weapons depots, military buildings, and observation posts in central Tyre affiliated with Hezbollah‘s southwestern command, the Aziz unit.[96] The IDF said that Tyre is a significant area for Aziz unit activities.[97] The IDF issued evacuation warnings to Tyre residents prior to the strikes.[98]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 27 to 2:00pm ET on October 28. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 27. [99] Hezbollah targeted a prominent IDF air defense and communications site on Mount Meron, which Hezbollah has targeted repeatedly since October 2023.[100] Hezbollah continued to target Israeli military-industrial sites in northern Israel.[101] Hezbollah began regularly targeting Israeli military-industrial sites in late September when the IDF intensified its air campaign across Lebanon.[102]The Israeli Defense Ministry signed a $500 million agreement with Israeli defense technology companies on October 28 to expand the production of a laser air defense system.[103] The deal with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems will “significantly increase” the production of the laser units needed for the Iron Beam system.[104] Israeli officials estimate that the Iron Beam will be operational within a year.[105] The Iron Beam has an unlimited magazine as it uses high-energy lasers.[106] The lasers are significantly cheaper to use compared to Iron Dome interceptor missiles.[107] Lasers would minimize collateral damage that current Israeli air defense systems that use interceptor missiles risk.[108] The system is designed to be used in tandem with other defense systems such as the Iron Dome.[109] Iron Beam, which intercepts short-range rockets, mortars, and drones, would be particularly useful for protecting northern Israel from Hezbollah.[110]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIranian-backed Iraqi militia al Thawriyyun claimed that it conducted a drone and rocket attack targeting US forces at al Tanf Garrison in eastern Syria on October 27.[111] Syrian media reported that US-led Coalition forces intercepted a drone near al Tanf Garrison on October 27.[112] Al Thawriyyun has conducted three attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since July 26 and is likely a cover group for some elements within Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[113] Kataib Hezbollah condemned Israel for using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[114] Kataib Hezbollah said that the attack could not have happened without the “agreement and premeditation” of the United States and that the United States will “pay the price for its recklessness.”[115] This attack does not appear to be in response to Israel’s attack on Iran, as al Thawriyyun conducted attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria before Israel attacked Iran.The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed one attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 27.[116] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting a military target in northern Israel.[117] [1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ced99eznje9o[2] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15954[3] https://x.com/Shayan86/status/1850926406122766832 ;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html?smid=url-share ; 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https://t.me/mmirleb/8422 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8423 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8424 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8426 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8433 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8434 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8439 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8440 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8446 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8449 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8450 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8451 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8452 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8453 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8456 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8457[100] https://t.me/mmirleb/8450 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-23-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-26-2024 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-23-2024[101] https://t.me/mmirleb/8440[102] https://t.me/mmirleb/7323 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7212 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7243[103] jpost dot com /breaking-news/article-826401 ; www ynetnews dot com/article/s1pu5phgkx#autoplay [104] www ynetnews dot com/article/s1pu5phgkx#autoplay ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850815412620914847[105] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15956[106] rafael dot co.il /system/iron-beam[107] rafael dot co.il /system/iron-beam ; jpost dot com /breaking-news/article-826401[108] rafael dot co.il /system/iron-beam[109] rafael dot co dot il /system/iron-beam[110] www ynetnews dot com/article/s1pu5phgkx#autoplay[111] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Alleged IRI Unit Dormant for 2 Months Claims Missile and Drone Strike on U.S. Positions in Syria,” October 28, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com.[112] https://thiqa-agency dot com/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%81-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d9%8a-%d9%8a%d8%b3%d9%82%d8%b7-%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%91%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a8-%d9%82/[113] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-make-recent-attacks-coalition-bases-iraq-and-syria ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-26-2024 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080624[114] https://t.me/centerkaf/4679[115] https://t.me/centerkaf/4679[116] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1414[117] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1414- — Iran Update, October 24, 2024
- at 10/28/24 6:36pmKelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Victoria Penza, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the Palestinian Authority (PA) to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[1] Hamas Political Bureau member Mousa Abu Marzouk met with Deputy Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow on October 23 to request that Russia pressure PA President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Hamas over a national unity government.Hamas is likely responding to the Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.[2] The plan would involve appointing a reformed PA led by an independent prime minister to administer the Gaza Strip, leaving Hamas excluded from post-war governance. Negotiating a national unity government with the PA, on the other hand, would allow Hamas to retain a role in post-war governance. Hamas would likely exploit the establishment of a national unity government to gradually expand its control and influence in the Gaza Strip.US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days.[3] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Qatari Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamad bin Abdulrahman al Thani announced the plans on October 24. Al Thani added that Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.[4] A Hamas delegation separately traveled to Egypt on October 24.[5] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist negotiating position on October 18.[6]PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank in recent weeks in order to crack down on the Palestinian militias there.[7] This PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank in response to Iranian efforts to empower the militias and undermine the PA. PA forces have arrested at least three Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in Tubas during this period.[8] Residents have reported violent clashes between PA forces and militias there in recent weeks as well.[9] Palestinian militias, including Hamas and PIJ, have accused the PA of serving Israeli interests and called on militants to confront the PA forces in Tubas.[10] The PA operation into Tubas came as Israeli forces conducted their own campaign in August and September 2024 to degrade Palestinian militia across the West Bank in recent months.[11]Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties have fully implemented UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah military activity in southern Lebanon. Berri’s assertion ignores the extensive, decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW has previously argued that the UN Interim Force in Lebanon has largely failed to undertake its assigned tasks, which includes enforcing UNSCR 1701.[12] Berri reportedly made the assertion that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701 during a meeting with senior US official Amos Hochstein in Beirut on October 21.[13] Hochstein has reportedly suggested amending UNSCR 1701 by expanding the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to southern Lebanon.Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati separately announced on October 24 that his government plans to recruit more LAF troops and possibly deploy 8,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon.[14] The LAF currently has about 5,000 personnel in southern Lebanon.[15] It is unclear whether the 8,000 number is the envisioned end strength for the LAF in southern Lebanon or would be in addition to the 5,000 soldiers already there. Increasing the LAF force size is unlikely to improve the enforcement of UNSCR 1701, however, so long as the Lebanese state and LAF are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah activity in the area.Key Takeaways:Gaza Strip: Hamas is seeking Russian support in pressuring the PA to negotiate over a national unity government with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is responding to an Emirati-proposed plan for post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, which would marginalize Hamas.Gaza Strip: US and Israeli officials will resume negotiations in Qatar on a ceasefire-hostage agreement for the Gaza Strip in the coming days. Qatar has reengaged Hamas since Israel killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.West Bank: PA President Mahmoud Abbas has “poured” forces into Tubas in the West Bank to crack down on Iranian-backed militias there. The PA effort is meant to diminish the influence of the militias in the northern West Bank.Lebanon: Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said that all relevant parties are adhering to UNSCR 1701, which prohibits Lebanese Hezbollah activity in southern Lebanon. Berri ignored the decades-long Hezbollah efforts to entrench itself militarily there.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia on October 24.[16] The IDF 401st Armored Brigade killed several Palestinian fighters and confiscated weapons, including Kalashnikov-style rifles and explosives.[17] The IDF stated that it detained over 200 militia fighters.[18] The IDF has continued to engage Palestinian fighters in Jabalia in northern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 23. Hamas detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) and fired thermobaric rockets targeting Israeli forces in two locations in Jabalia refugee camp.[19]Palestinian militias conducted at least two attacks targeting Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor on October 24.[20] xThe IDF 252nd Division continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on October 24.[21] The IDF 454th Artillery Brigade launched a raid targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure in the central Gaza Strip on October 24.[22] A local Palestinian report stated that Israeli armor conducted clearing operations southeast of al Bureij camp on October 24.[23] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces conducting clearing operations southeast of al Bureij.[24] Local Palestinian media claimed that the IDF also operated in eastern and northern Nuseirat, citing reports of IDF gunfire in the area.[25]The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a Hamas command-and-control site in Nuseirat.[26] The IDF reported that Hamas established the command-and-control site in the former al Shuhada a Nuseirat School. The IDF stated that Hamas used this site to plan attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[27] The IDF reported that it took several steps to minimize civilian casualties.[28] Al Awda Hospital stated that at least 17 were killed and 42 wounded in the airstrike.[29]The IDF 143rd Division continued operating in the southern Gaza Strip on October 24.[30] A local Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF operated between Khan Younis and Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[31] The journalist reported artillery shelling along the al Naseer and Meraj Streets between Khan Younis and Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[32] ”Hundreds of families“ have been displaced in those areas as a result of IDF activities in the southern Gaza Strip on October 24, according to a local Palestinian journalist.[33] West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli security services arrested a Palestinian individual who has suspected involvement in “terrorist activities” in Jaffa, Israel, on October 24.[34] The IDF acted on intelligence that the individual was planning to conduct a terror attack. The IDF stated the individual was residing in Israel illegally.The IDF foiled an attempted terror attack near the Avnei Hefetz settlement in the northern West Bank on October 24.[35] The IDF found and disabled two explosive devices near a water well during a routine search.[36] The IDF did not report any casualties from the incident.[37] No group has claimed responsibility for planting the explosives, however, a Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) flag was found near the well.[38] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that unidentified individuals detonated a similar IED targeting Israeli forces searching the same well in August.[39]The IDF detained several “terror suspects” in Nablus on October 24.[40] The IDF separately conducted several detainments in al Fawwar, Hebron.Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in one location in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 23.[41] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement detonated IEDs targeting an Israeli military vehicle in Nablus on October 24.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaIDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on October 23 that the IDF could reach a decisive end to the war.[42] Halevi said that Israel has degraded Hezbollah’s senior leadership “in a very thorough way.”[43] The IDF recently confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut three weeks prior. CTP-ISW previously noted that Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further affect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions.[44]Hezbollah claimed that it has continued to engage the IDF 210th Division in Hasbaya District.[45] Hezbollah previously claimed on October 23 that Israeli forces attempted to advance into the outskirts of Kfarchouba and Shebaa towns.[46] Hezbollah stated that it attacked Israeli positions with unspecified weapons.[47] Lebanese sources reported IDF artillery targeting Kfarchouba and Shebaa on October 24.[48]The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 24.[49] The 98th Division located weapons depots containing hundreds of anti-tank missiles and mortar shells.[50] Israeli forces directed airstrikes that killed several militants in the area.[51] Hezbollah stated that it attacked advancing Israeli forces between Odaisseh, Rab Thalatheen, and Taybeh with small arms and rockets and caused the forces to retreat.[52] Hezbollah also fired anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli armor northwest of Odaisseh and rockets targeting IDF personnel on the eastern outskirts of Markaba.[53]The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 24. The IDF 769th Infantry Brigade and 91st Division engineers destroyed an underground Radwan special operations forces (SOF) complex on the outskirts of Blida.[54] Israeli forces, including the 769th Brigade and the Shaldag SOF unit, had previously located the complex during covert raids into southern Lebanon over the past year.[55] Geolocated footage previously showed Israeli forces clearing the buildings on October 20.[56] The 769th Infantry Brigade also raided military buildings, including a Hezbollah weapons warehouse in a hotel.[57] Israeli forces located hundreds of anti-tank launchers and long-range missiles that Hezbollah has launched towards northern Israel in recent months.[58] The 91st Division killed about 20 Hezbollah fighters and located large quantities of weapons, including rocket launchers, mortars, and ammunition.[59] Hezbollah claimed that Israeli forces attempted to advance towards eastern neighborhoods in Houla on October 23.[60]The IDF 36th Division expanded clearing operations in Aitaroun and Aita al Shaab on October 24.[61] The 36th Division located and destroyed a number of weapons depots, a rocket launcher, and improvised explosive devices.[62] Hezbollah claimed on October 23 that Israeli forces attempted to advance towards Aitaroun’s town center from the east and from the west.[63] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 24 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in Aitaroun, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the town. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 24 also showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in the eastern outskirts, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the eastern outskirts of Aitaroun. Hezbollah fired mortars and rockets targeting IDF personnel east of Aitaroun.[64]Hezbollah fighters fired small arms and several anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli armor operating in Aita al Shaab.[65] Hezbollah claimed that it killed or wounded several IDF personnel.[66]The IDF 146th Division continued to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons during clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 24. The 146th Division located dozens of Kalashnikov rifles and shoulder-fired missiles inside a house.[67] The 646th Paratroopers Brigade (Res.) conducted operations cleared areas of Hezbollah fighters and destroyed Hezbollah infrastructure, weapons, and several Hezbollah positions.[68] Israeli forces located an underground residence complex that Radwan SOF intended to use to conduct ground attacks into Israel.[69] Israeli forces found bunk beds, storage cabinets, food, weapons, and launching positions inside the complex.[70] The 646th Paratroopers Brigade also located four munitions warehouses containing Kalashnikov rifles, ammunition, rockets, mortars, shoulder-fired missiles, RPGs, and advanced anti-tank missiles.[71]Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 24 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in Dahyra and eastern Matmoura, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the area. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Dahyra.[72] The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure on October 24. The IDF Air Force struck over 160 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including launchers, fighters, military infrastructure, and weapon depots.[73] The IDF said it struck a number of Hezbollah’s weapons storage and manufacturing positions in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[74] The IDF issued warnings to residents of Burj al Barajneh and Hadath to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[75] Lebanon’s National News Agency reported that the IDF conducted a total of 17 strikes that destroyed six buildings in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[76] Lebanon’s National News Agency claimed that the IDF strikes were ”the most violent” to hit Beirut’s southern suburbs since the war started.[77]The IDF continued to target Hezbollah’s drone unit, Unit 127, on October 24. The IDF said it killed a Unit 127 fighter in a targeted strike in southern Lebanon.[78] The fighter had launched a drone targeting Israel.[79] The IDF strikes targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure are part of its response to Hezbollah’s October 13 attack on an IDF base in Binyamina, Israel, that killed four Israeli soldiers.[80]The LAF claimed that three LAF soldiers were killed in an IDF airstrike on a town near the Israel-Lebanon border.[81] The IDF is investigating the reports and stated that it does not intend to harm any Lebanese soldiers.[82] US Defense Secretary Austin Lloyd expressed concerns about reports of Israeli strikes against the LAF and stressed the importance of taking steps to ensure the safety of LAF soldiers and UN peacekeepers during his call with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.[83] This incident marks the third Israeli strike that targeted LAF positions since October 1.[84]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 23 to 2:00pm ET on October 24. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least eighteen attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 23.[85] The IDF reported that Hezbollah launched at least 120 rockets on October 24.[86] The IDF reported that Hezbollah launched at least 50 of the 120 total rockets at Nahariya on October 24.[87] Hezbollah injured at least two Israelis in its attack on Nahariya.[88] Hezbollah continued to target civilian sites in Kiryat Shmona, Safed, Karmiel, and Nahariya.[89] The IDF intercepted at least two Hezbollah drones on October 24.[90] Hezbollah continued targeted Israeli forces along the Lebanon-Israel border in five separate incidents.[91]Hezbollah continued to conduct long-range attacks into central Israel, including one attack on Tel Aviv and two on Haifa.[92] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[93] Hezbollah’s Operations Room also noted on October 17 that Hezbollah would ”escalate” its attacks in the coming days.[94] Hezbollah has since expanded the scope and pace of operations into Israel, including by targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Caesarea with an attack drone on October 19 and conducting multiple attacks targeting Tel Aviv in central Israel.[95]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 23. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in northern Israel[96]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel[97]A drone attack targeting an unspecified "vital target” in the Jordan Valley[98]The IDF likely conducted airstrikes targeting two Syrian Arab Army (SAA) sites in Syria on October 22.[99] The airstrikes struck SAA sites in western Homs and Kafr Sousa neighborhood in Damascus. The Syrian Defense Ministry stated that the Israeli airstrikes killed one SAA personnel and injured seven others.[100]Iranian state and Houthi media reported that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes targeting the Hudaydah airport twice overnight between October 23-24.[101] Anti-Houthi media reported that a US airstrike targeted a Houthi military tunnel in the Hudaydah airport.[102] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not acknowledged the strike at the time of writing.Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi vowed to continue missile and naval operations against Israel in his weekly speech on October 24.[103] Abdulmalik claimed that Israel wants to control the security of Lebanon. Abdulmalik reiterated that Iranian-backed Iraqi groups have increased their ”position.“ The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has increased its rate of claimed attacks targeting Israel since mid-September 2024.[104] Abdulmalik praised the recent Hezbollah attack targeting the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19.[105]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with numerous foreign leaders on the sidelines of the two-day BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23 and 24. Pezeshkian met with the following leaders:Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Pashinyan called for increasing economic, commercial, and energy cooperation with Iran.[106]Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko. Pezeshkian claimed that US sanctions are ineffective and emphasized that Iran can expand relations with Belarus as it has with Russia.[107] Lukashenko called for greater economic cooperation between Iran and Belarus and emphasized that the completion of the International North-South Transport Corridor will increase Iranian-Belarusian commercial exchanges.[108]Bolivian President Luis Arce Catacora. Catacora expressed willingness to expand cooperation with Iran and expressed concern about the war in the Middle East.[109]Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi. Sisi and Pezeshkian discussed efforts to stop the October 7 War.[110] Egypt—along with the United States and Qatar—has mediated ceasefire-hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas throughout the war. Sisi called for greater understanding between Iran and Egypt.[111] Iran and Egypt do not have formal diplomatic ties, although Iran has signaled its willingness to restore relations with Egypt in recent months. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi recently met with Sisi in Cairo on October 17.[112]Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. Nahyan and Pezeshkian emphasized the need to stop Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.[113] Pezeshkian also reiterated Iran’s territorial claims to the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands in the Persian Gulf.[114]Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran will give a “decisive and unbelievable response” to Israel if Israel attacks Iran.[115]South African President Cyril Ramaphosa. Pezeshkian claimed that Iran’s membership in BRICS can help “reduce unilateralism” and decrease the effectiveness of international sanctions.[116]Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. Pezeshkian claimed that “independent” countries can create a “new world order.”[117] Iran has historically tried to use multilateral institutions, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to encourage the formation of a “multilateral” world order to confront US “unilateralism.” Maduro called for Iran and Venezuela to increase energy cooperation.[118][1] https://ria dot ru/20241024/hamas-1979718574.html[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-25-2024[3] https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-qatari-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-mohammed-bin-abdulrahman-al-thani-at-a-joint-press-availability-4/[4] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2na4ubo000h3b6pmpist1pm[5] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2na4ubo000h3b6pmpist1pm[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-18-2024[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-treads-tightrope-west-bank-crackdown-militants-2024-10-24/[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-treads-tightrope-west-bank-crackdown-militants-2024-10-24/[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-treads-tightrope-west-bank-crackdown-militants-2024-10-24/[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-authority-treads-tightrope-west-bank-crackdown-militants-2024-10-24/; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/734[11] https://jcpa.org/the-idfs-operation-summer-camps-against-the-iranian-terrorist-army-on-the-west-bank/[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-21-2024[13] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions; www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/in-lebanon-us-envoy-says-conflict-has-escalated-out-of-control[14] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2n5e6hs000t3b6omaoyxh0p[15] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/12/lebanese-army-laf-israel-hezbollah/31d369ea-8855-11ef-8274-e0558282750d_story.html[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301764555628687[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301764555628687[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301764555628687[19] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8216/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-D9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20077/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-383-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88[20] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20077/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-383-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88 ; https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4453 ;https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7744[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301764555628687[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301767353200789[23] https://t.me/hamza20300/304597[24] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4454[25] https://t.me/hamza20300/304711 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/304673[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849415228779385135[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849415231824388251[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849415234705932438[29] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2n62gnj000y3b6oe9wez7en[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301767353200789[31] https://t.me/hamza20300/304762[32] https://t.me/hamza20300/304772 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/304772 [33] https://t.me/hamza20300/304772[34] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1849454393189412891[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849444679130980660[36] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15782 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15791[37] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1849446581700837702[38] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15791[39] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15782[40] https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-825923[41] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14967[42] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1849483378422124635; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849483297224609839[43] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1849483378422124635[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-23-2024[45] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237 [47] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237[48] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95188; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95274; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/116185[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301758599745769[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301758599745769[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301758599745769[52] https://t.me/mmirleb/8261[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/8263;https://t.me/mmirleb/8264;https://t.me/mmirleb/8265[54] www dot idf.il/242223; https://x.com/GalElbaz3/status/1849481080526577743[55] www dot idf.il/242223[56] https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1848032299834851411; https://x.com/YinonMagal/status/1847986426022924533 [57] www dot idf.il/242223[58] www dot idf.il/242223[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301748797567334; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301758599745769[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301761959383422[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301761959383422 [63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237 [64] https://t.me/mmirleb/8259[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/8256[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/8257[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301748797567334[68] www dot idf.il/242213[69] www dot idf.il/242213[70] www dot idf.il/242213[71] www dot idf.il/242213[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/8235[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849301738756440459 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849322286681117145[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849343875384524910[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849156944075936085[76] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2mj748x0000356mi3i059vq[77] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2mj748x0000356mi3i059vq[78] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849432368597061795[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849432368597061795[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[81] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1849396638483104172 ; https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2mt83qv00053b6osi6d5a1g[82] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/lebanese-army-says-3-soldiers-killed-in-israeli-strike-in-south-lebanon-village[83] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-24-24#cm2mn5uj7000w356m49yn6341[84] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/21/world/middleeast/israel-kills-lebanese-army-soldiers.html[85] https://t.me/mmirleb/8243 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8252 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8250 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849374667204710410 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8253 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8254 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8251 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8253 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8258 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8260 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8262 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8266 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8267 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8269 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8270 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8271 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8278 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8279[86] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-some-120-rockets-fired-at-northern-israel-so-far-today/[87] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/at-least-two-injured-as-barrage-of-50-rockets-fired-at-nahariya-area/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8252[88] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15761 ; https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-at-least-2-israelis-wounded-in-heavy-hezbollah-barrage-at-nahariya[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/8254 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8251 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8262;https://t.me/mmirleb/8252[90] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849468742427697647 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849468742427697647[91] https://t.me/mmirleb/8278 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8271 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8270; https://t.me/mmirleb/8253 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8253[92] https://t.me/mmirleb/8243 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8269 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8250[93] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate101524[94] https://t.me/mmirleb/8014[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-19-2024 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8148 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8194 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8198 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8243[96] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1392[97] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1395[98] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1394[99] https://www.sana dot sy/en/?p=340565 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1849376224650346528[100] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0ouKuArmbQWWcg8NAQ54KtqSk8amKMUjfobqu7BVxLb6wBMvPrCxc416j1KoGef7El[101] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/700558 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1849182455917432996[102] https://www.4may dot net/news/125796[103] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3387821.htm[104] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-17-2024[105] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3387821.htm ; almanar dot com.lb/12649958[106] https://president dot ir/fa/154769[107] https://president dot ir/fa/154781[108] https://president dot ir/fa/154781[109] https://president dot ir/fa/154792[110] https://president dot ir/fa/154738[111] https://president dot ir/fa/154738[112] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-foreign-minister-makes-rare-trip-egypt-2024-10-17/[113] https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4116118-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3[114] https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4116118-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3[115] https://president dot ir/fa/154695[116] https://president dot ir/fa/154752[117] https://president dot ir/fa/154786[118] https://president dot ir/fa/154786
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2024
- at 10/28/24 5:49pmChristina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Katherine Wells, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 23, 2024, 7:45pm ETClick here to view ISW's portfolio of Russia-Ukraine interactive maps, including our control-of-terrain in Ukraine map, 3D control-of-terrain topographic map, and timelapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires. The Kazan Declaration notably only mentioned Russia's war in Ukraine once.[1] The declaration states that all signatories should act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter — including the provision on respect for territorial integrity — and that BRICS states welcome "relevant" offers of mediation aimed at ensuring a peaceful settlement of the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Ukraine has emphasized that the "principles of the UN Charter" is a main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia's war under international law.[2] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the Kazan Declaration, stating that it shows that Russia failed to "export" its views on changing the world order and global security architecture to BRICS summit participant states.[3] The Ukrainian MFA stated that the declaration also demonstrates that BRICS states are not unified around Russia's war against Ukraine, likely since many of these countries support the UN Charter's principles. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service similarly assessed that the BRICS summit will not result in the international community's approval of an alternative system of international settlements that Russia wants and stated that India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brazil, and South Africa opposed the transformation of BRICS into an anti-US coalition.[4]People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine. Xi emphasized the need to promote “a rapid de-escalation" of Russia’s war in Ukraine and avoid “adding fuel to the fire” during the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23.[5] Xi also stated that BRICS members must prevent the spreading of the war to “third parties” and avoid the escalation of hostilities. Xi stated that the PRC, Brazil and countries of the Global South created a group of “Friends of Peace,” which aims to unite voices in support of a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[6] Xi had previously called for de-escalation of the war and attempted to position the PRC as an impartial third-party mediator for a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine.[7] Russia has been increasingly leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of directly involving North Korea in the war amid reports of North Korean combat forces training in Russia for possible participation in the war.[8]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[9] NOTE: This text also appears in ISW-CTP's October 23 Iran Update. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[10] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[11] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[12] It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[13] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[14] The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s "neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The Iranian regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[15] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war. Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 22 and 23 shows that Russian forces have advanced along Skhidna Street in northeastern Selydove and northward along Berehova and Zakhysnykiv streets in eastern Selydove towards the center of the town.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 23 also shows that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) seized Izmailivka (southeast of Selydove), and additional geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces also advanced on the northeastern outskirts of Novoselydivka (west of Izmailivka and south of Selydove) and in fields northwest of Tsukuryne (also south of Selydove but north of the Izmailivka-Novoselydivka area).[17] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Selydove, reached the outskirts of Vyshneve (west of Selydove) via the C05091 road by pushing northwestward from Tsukuryne, and made territorial gains in Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[18]Russian advances into Selydove, as well as territorial gains to the south and north of the town, may soon cause Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area to avoid being trapped within a collapsing pocket. Ukrainian forces appear to have committed to a robust defense of Selydove, however, and have largely delayed Russian advances since Russian forces first began attacking into the settlement around August 2024.[19] Selydove is not Russia's operational objective on this part of the front, notably, and Ukraine's decision to defend the settlement has likely fixed a relatively large contingent of Russian troops on the southern flank of Pokrovsk — which is Russia's primary, and operationally meaningful, objective in the area.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets identified this dynamic on October 21, noting that the Russian command in the Pokrovsk direction is now facing several more localized "problems" that do not directly lend themselves to the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.[21] Mashovets emphasized that while a large number of Russian forces have been committed to the entire Pokrovsk front, a large contingent of 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) and 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) units are involved in trying to seize Selydove, as opposed to developing attacks on Pokrovsk.[22] Mashovets concluded that the Russian command created a large operational reserve for Russian forces to attack Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but that these forces got bogged down in attacks on Selydove and the southern flank of Pokrovsk, which the Russian command had hoped to capture rapidly.[23] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor largely agreed with Mashovets' analysis, noting that despite the widely understood value of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, "the process is stalling."[24] The milblogger stated that the Russian command's fixation on the southern flank of Pokrovsk has led to a "spreading of forces and resources" that has resulted in "excessive" Russian infantry losses and afforded Ukrainian troops additional time to further fortify Pokrovsk itself.Russia may well take Selydove in the coming days, but the capture of Selydove does not inherently portend the seizure of Pokrovsk, and, in fact, the seizure of Selydove is likely to have exhausted and attrited Russian forces in a way that will likely reduce their combat effectiveness if they are ordered to pivot towards Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian defense of Pokrovsk and its approaches (namely the rail-line and the M-30 highway) has already stymied Russian advances towards the city, and attrition of Russian forces in the area will likely further slow these advances, damaging Russian offensive prospects in the area in the coming weeks.[25]The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reported on October 23 that the US government has evidence that there are North Korean troops in Russia but that it is unclear what they are doing.[26] National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby also stated on October 23 that North Korea deployed at least 3,000 personnel to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between early to mid-October but that it is unclear if these forces will enter combat alongside Russian forces.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 22 that potentially two "brigades" of 6,000 North Korean personnel each (larger that the doctrinal endstrength of a typical brigade) are training in Russia.[28] South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 23 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated during a closed-door parliamentary intelligence committee meeting that North Korea has sent 3,000 troops to Russia so far to support Russia's war in Ukraine and will send a total of 10,000 by December 2024.[29] Yonhap News Agency also reported that a NIS assessment stated that North Korean munitions factories that produce weapons that North Korea has shipped to Russia are operating at "full capacity."[30] ISW will discuss the development of Russia-North Korea relations and assess the implications of recent North Korean troops deployments on the security situation both in Ukraine and on the Korean Peninsula in a forthcoming special edition.Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin approved the plan for the Zapad-2025 exercises on October 23 during Belousov’s visit to Minsk.[31] Khrenin announced that the Russian and Belarusian general staffs had already begun preparations for Zapad-2025 exercises and stated that these exercises will help to improve the combat readiness of the regional grouping of forces and the ability of Russian and Belarusian forces to jointly fulfill their tasks.[32] Belousov noted that Russian and Belarusian forces will practice tasks that take into account "modern threats to Russia and Belarus,' including experiences from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33] Belousov and Khrenin also approved the Union State military security Work Plan for 2025 and 2027, emphasized the continuation of Russian-Belarusian cooperation in military-technical sphere, and reiterated that Moscow and Minsk are completing preparations for a new security concept under the Union State framework.[34] The last Zapad exercises — which have historically occurred once every four years — took place in September 2021, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably cancelled the planned 'Zapad-2023' exercises scheduled for September 2023.[35] ISW will discuss the development and implications of the Union State security, economic, and societal integration in an upcoming report.Key Takeaways:The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine.Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front.The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework.Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting on October 23. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo).[36] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian mechanized assault on Zeleny Shlyakh on October 22.[37] Geolocated footage published on October 22 and 23 indicates that Russian forces recently recaptured Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and regained positions southeast of Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[38] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Plekhovo, Malaya Lokyna (north of Sudzha), Sudzha, Pokrovsky (southeast of Korenevo), and Zeleny Shlyakh.[39] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and "Kamerton" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz) are reportedly operating near Sudzha; elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha); elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya; elements of the 106th VDV Division and 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) are reportedly operating near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo); and elements of the "Kashtan" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz) and 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[40]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks west of the main Kursk Oblast salient in Glushkovsky Raion on October 23. Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[41]Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov acknowledged on October 23 that Russian forces have committed at least 187 confirmed crimes, including murder and rape, since Russian forces deployed to defend Kursk Oblast but claimed that Chechen Akhmat forces were not responsible.[42]Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots may be reducing the ratio between Russian and Ukrainian artillery fires across the frontline. Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine reported on October 23 that Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated that the ratio between Russian and Ukrainian artillery fires is now about one-to-two in favor of Russian forces — a significant reduction from one-to-seven or one-to-eight in early 2024 and from one-to-three at the start of Summer 2024.[43] Havrylyuk attributed this reduction to Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots and to Ukraine's qualitatively superior Western artillery systems. Ukrainian forces notably struck the Oktyabrskii and Toropets ammunition depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk ammunition depot in Krasnodar Krai in September 2024.[44]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 22 and 23.[45] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on October 23 that the Russian military is replacing personnel in this direction with newly recruited contract soldiers, many of whom are convict recruits, instead of transferring personnel from other areas of the frontline to this direction.[46] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on October 23 that Russian forces began conducting infantry-led assaults in small groups near Vovchansk.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced westward along the N-26 highway west of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces, including elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]), seized Serebryanka (southwest of Kreminna).[49] A Russian milblogger denied the claim, however.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and pushed Ukrainian forces up to 10 kilometers from the settlement, although ISW has not observed Russian advances 10 kilometers directly west of Stelmakhivka.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Pishchane, Kruhlyakivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Lozova, and Kolisnykivka; east of Svatove near Vyshene; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske.[52] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 23 that Russian forces are frequently conducting platoon-sized to reduced company-sized mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction.[53] Mashovets also stated that Russian units operating in the Kupyansk direction have deployed eight to 10 tactical missile systems, including Iskander systems, to the area.[54] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 4th Tank Division, 47th Tank Division, and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Krokhmalne-Hlushkivka direction.[55] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and BARS-9 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[56]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked near Bondarne (southwest of Siversk and northeast of Chasiv Yar) on October 22.[57] Artillery elements of the Russian 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continued to operate in the Siversk direction.[58]Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian sources made unconfirmed claims that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and eastern Chasiv Yar.[59] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported that some Russian assault groups occasionally cross the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal but have not broken through Ukrainian defenses west of the canal.[60] Bobovnikova added that Russian forces are unable to transfer vehicles across the canal because Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are preventing the construction of pontoon crossings. Russian forces continued to attack northeast of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka.[61] A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are using first person view (FPV) drones to strike Russian military equipment as far as Pokrovske (about 27km east of Chasiv Yar) to interdict Russian ground lines of communications to Bakhmut.[62] The milblogger added that it is too premature to talk about a Russian breakthrough in Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating in northeastern Chasiv Yar and near Stupky Holubovski 2 (a forest area southeast of Chasiv Yar), respectively.[63] Elements of the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 88th 'Hispaniola' Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and other unspecified elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps are reportedly operating north of Chasiv Yar; and elements of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are operating south of Chasiv Yar.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[66] Russian forces reportedly continued to attack within Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka on October 22 and 23.[67] A Ukrainian special purpose brigade reported that Russian forces launch hourly assaults on the outskirts of Niu York (south of Toretsk) but that the Ukrainian brigade was recently able to stabilize the frontline and slow the pace of Russian advances in the area.[68] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA’s (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) 1st 'Slavic' Brigade and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[69] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[70]Please see topline text about Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.Russian forces continued assaults in the Kurakhove direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces reportedly attacked southeast of Kurakhove near Hostre and Dalne.[71] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove); an element of a reconnaissance battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) is reportedly operating near Dalne alongside elements of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[72]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on October 23. Geolocated footage published on October 23 showed that Russian forces advanced in the fields southeast of Bohoyavlenka (west of Vuhledar), and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made additional advances in the fields southeast of Bohoyavlenka.[73] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Katerynivka; northwest of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka and Novoukrainka; and west of Vuhledar near Zolota Nyva on October 22 and 23.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are operating near Antonivka.[75]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[76] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 and 23 that Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka.[77]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka on October 22 and 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[79]Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on October 23 that over 20 Ukrainian drones struck civilian infrastructure near Enerhodar and an administrative building in Vasylivka (east of Enerhodar) and cut off electricity to 13 nearby settlements. ISW cannot independently confirm this claim, however.[80]Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 22 and 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 23 that Russian and Ukrainian mining efforts in the Kherson direction are limiting the number of safe Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and preventing the effective delivery of ammunition and food to Russian soldiers in the Kherson direction.[82] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces need naval drones in the Kherson direction to detect mines in remotely mined areas in the Dnipro River Delta area and that the naval drone deficit is causing Russian soldiers to make their own naval drones. Drone operators of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kherson City.[83] Drone operators and other elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment’s (76th VDV Division) 4th Company are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[84]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and four naval drones in the Black Sea heading towards occupied Crimea.[85]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23, using Shahed-136/131s and other unspecified drone models. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 81 strike drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and one Kh-31P guided missile from over the Black Sea towards Odesa Oblast.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that as of 0900 local time on October 23 Ukrainian forces had shot down 57 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Sumy, Cherkasy, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts, that 15 drones had become "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that nine more remained in Ukrainian air space. Cherkasy Oblast sources reported that Russian drones struck civilian and transportation infrastructure in Cherkaskyi, Zolotonoskyi, and Umanskyi raions, including a bus station.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck an airbase in Uman, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[88] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that the Kh-31P missile struck Odesa City.[89] Kyiv Oblast Head Ruslan Kravchenko reported that debris from a damaged drone fell outside of unspecified settlements in Kyiv Oblast but did not cause any significant damage.[90]Russian forces appear to be adapting the tactics of their drone strike campaign to overcome Ukrainian anti-drone adaptations. A Russian milblogger highlighted Russia's recent use of "Gerbera" drones in strikes on Sumy Oblast, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces use Gerbera drones in the first of three waves of drones launched at a specific target.[91] The milblogger noted that Russian forces use the Gerbera drones, which are made from foam plastic and are indistinguishable from Shaheds on radars, to confuse and distract Ukrainian mobile fire groups by flying in circles at low altitude, while Shahed-type drones follow in the subsequent two waves, taking advantage of gaps in air defense generated by the deployment of the Gerberas.[92] Ukrainian shoot-down rates of drone strikes remain high (typically well over 50 percent), however, suggesting that Russian forces have not yet adopted this tactic at the scale needed to cause battle-field wide impacts.Russia is leveraging its domestication of Shahed-type drone production to increase the number of Shahed-type drones it is able employ in strikes against Ukraine. A Ukrainian military research expert told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Krym on October 23 that there are now three types of distinct Shahed-type drones — those marked "M," which represents Iranian production; "I," which represents Russian domestic production with imported Iranian components; and "K," which represents Russian domestic production with domestic components.[93] The Ukrainian expert noted that the number of Shaheds marked "I" and "K" is now very substantial, indicating that Russia has significantly increased its domestic production of Shahed models. Russia has reportedly learned how to produce drone fuselages and other components, which allowed Russia to launch an estimated 1,334 Shahed drones at Ukraine in the month of September alone.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian opposition outlets reported on October 23 that at least seven conscripts in the 232nd Rocket Artillery Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) received a one-time direct deposit of 405,000 rubles (about $4,220) from Russian regional authorities under the decree regulating payments to conscripts and contract servicemen, despite not having signed a Russian military service contract.[94] The Russian authorities have been incentivizing military contract service through large one-time payments (essentially signing bonuses) as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.[95] Russian opposition outlets reported that the Russian military prohibited the conscripts from leaving their base to go to a bank to refuse the money transfer and later transferred them to Rostov Oblast.[96] Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that a man who had never served in the Russian military received a direct deposit of 660,514 rubles (about $6,900) from the Russian MoD even though he had not signed a Russian military service contract.[97] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that conscripts in the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army, CMD) complained in early October that they had received a one-time direct deposits of 305,000 rubles (about $3,500) from Russian regional authorities for allegedly signing Russian military contracts despite not actually having done so.[98]Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov stated on October 23 that Rostec plans to triple the volume of drone deliveries to the Russian military for use in Ukraine by the end of 2024.[99] Chemezov claimed that Rostec subsidiaries produced four times more drones in 2023 than in 2022 and noted that the widespread drone usage has significantly changed warfighting in only several years.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)The head of the "Melodiya" Intelligence Center of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces have started to test drone swarm technology, which allows Russian forces to overcome Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems, near Chasiv Yar.[100]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russia continues to seize and exploit the economic potential of occupied Ukraine to bolster Russia's wartime economy. Donetsk Oblast occupation Minister of Industry and Trade Yevgeny Ponomarenko told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 20 that Mariupol occupation authorities plan to transfer the ownership of Mariupol's Azovmash and Azovelectrostal enterprises to Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec in order to resume production at the sites.[101] Prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the destruction that Russia's occupation of Mariupol has wrought on the city, Azovmash was the largest machine-building plant in all of Ukraine, while Azovelectrostal was a major supplier of steel products.[102] Both Azovmash and Azovelectrostal suffered damage and lost their production capabilities due to Russia's invasion and occupation of Mariupol.[103] Rostec will likely inject the enterprises with substantial investments in order to re-start their production of metal and machine parts, which Russia will likely use to support its defense industrial base's production effort to support the war. The seizure and exploitation of Ukrainian enterprises for Russian economic benefit is a critical component of Russia's occupation strategy in Ukraine — Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov estimated that Russia had seized and transferred nearly 500 Ukrainian enterprises to Russian control as of March 2024.[104] ISW has previously reported on the ways in which Russian officials and regime-linked actors, as well as the Russia state, have exploited Ukrainian economic assets for personal, military, and financial gain.[105]Ukrainian outlet Suspilne published an investigation on October 21 detailing Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky's role in the illegal deportations of Ukrainian civilians, supporting ISW's long running assessments on Balitsky's admitted use of forced deportation as a punitive measure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[106] Suspilne found that Balitsky first signed a decree in July 2022 legalizing forced deportations within occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, entitled "on measures of responsibility for the commission of certain offences that encroach on public order and public safety." Suspilne emphasized that Balitsky has repeatedly positioned himself as an "ideologue" advocating for deportations of anyone who does not display explicitly pro-Russian views. ISW reported in February 2024 that Balitsky openly admitted to overseeing the forcible deportation of individuals who did not support Russia's invasion of Ukraine and assessed at the time that it shows the extent to which Russian occupation authorities are supporting and even promoting such illegal policies.[107]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)See topline text.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://static dot kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/MUCfWDg0QRs3xfMUiCAmF3LEh02OL3Hk.pdf[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524[3] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/komentar-mzs-shchodo-pidsumkovoyi-deklaraciyi-samitu-briks-u-kazani[4] https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obiednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalitsiyu[5] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/23/7480995/; https://english.www.gov dot cn/news/202410/23/content_WS6718e939c6d0868f4e8ec383.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281161 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281179 http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75375 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281046 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281174; tps://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obyednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalicziyu/; https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obiednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalitsiyu[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75375 ;[7] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/12/01/chinas-xi-and-eus-michel-call-for-ukraine-de-escalation-at-meeting; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessment%20March%2017%2C%202023.pdf[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12006[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184686;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184722[10] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[11] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[12] https://tass dot com/world/1390491; http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/75137[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-22-2024[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-tells-israel-not-even-consider-attacking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-tass-2024-10-17/[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2023 [16] https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/183; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7209; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1849069350789009737; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7211; https://t.me/karadag15brop/76; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7217; https://t.me/diomeddog/3608; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79230; https://t.me/motopatriot/28628 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141794; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17838 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59717[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7221; https://t.me/rubpak/223; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7219?single; https://t.me/mo114rf/56; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28802; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79236; https://t.me/motopatriot/28631; https://t.me/mo114rf/57; https://t.me/motopatriot/28630; https://t.me/dva_majors/55772 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133443 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141798; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7212; https://t.me/zhdanovrt/1457; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1849048080470933846[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79214; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79206; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28787[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1832015263023165819[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1606[25] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/09/06/ukrainian-reinforcements-are-counterattacking-outside-pokrovsk/[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/23/austin-north-korea-troops-russia/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/23/glava-pentagona-zayavil-chto-voennye-kndr-nahodyatsya-v-rossii-chto-oni-tam-delayut-neponyatno ; https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-troops-russia-us-defense-secretary-says-2024-10-23/[27] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/23/politics/lloyd-austin-north-korea-troops-russia/index.html[28] https://www.president dot gov.ua/en/news/ye-sotni-faktiv-ochevidno-neobgruntovanih-invalidnostej-u-po-93981[29] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20241023012852320?section=nk/nk[30] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20241023005700315?section=nk/nk[31] https://t.me/modmilby/42742; https://t.me/modmilby/42737; https://suspilne dot media/864193-rf-i-bilorus-provedut-cergovi-spilni-vijskovi-navcanna/; https://t.me/mod_russia/44846; https://t.me/mod_russia/44850[32] https://t.me/modmilby/42737[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/44850; https://t.me/tass_agency/281135 [34] https://t.me/mod_russia/44850; https://t.me/tass_agency/281116 ; https://t.me/modmilby/42737[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2023[36] https://x.com/budeshta/status/1848770427700822265; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/3549[37] https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79202[38] https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1848797244029649047; https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1848801605581475965; https://t.me/rugbygroup/72 ; https://x.com/budeshta/status/1849112812649685382; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190834 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190861 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190905[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/44851; https://t.me/rybar/64664[40] https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/wargonzo/22768; https://t.me/wargonzo/22777; https://t.me/motopatriot/28609; https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55741; https://t.me/rusich_army/17889; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79209[42] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/23/komandir-ahmata-zayavil-chto-rossiyskie-voennye-sovershili-187-prestupleniy-v-kurskoy-oblasti; https://t.me/agentstvonews/7776; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oADsefVPbk0[43] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rozriv-snaryadah-mizh-rf-ta-ukrayinoyu-rekordno-1729666158.html/amp[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 [45]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2220 [46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/dvoh-troh-tyzhniv-ne-bude-v-sylah-oborony-oczinyly-termin-prydatnosti-rosijskogo-soldata-na-harkivskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/ScdUZNkwcYc[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/23/i-drit-ne-neskinchennyj-i-mozhe-zachepytys-rosijske-vundervaffe-ne-lyakaye-zahysnykiv-vovchanska/[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7214; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/637[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/44848 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44855 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281186[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/55755[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/281069 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11642 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803 ;[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2289;[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2287;[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2286;[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2286[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [58] https://t.me/epoddubny/21435[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28775[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/ridkisnyj-ptah-doletyt-do-seredyny-kanalu-sproba-proryvu-v-chasovomu-yaru-zahlynulasya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl [62] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849[63] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28775; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806; https://t.me/tass_agency/281070 [65] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849[66] https://t.me/motopatriot/28612; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17849[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/znyshhennya-porcziyamy-azovczi-nyshhat-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan-u-nyu-jorku/; https://t.me/azov_media/6185 [68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/znyshhennya-porcziyamy-azovczi-nyshhat-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan-u-nyu-jorku/; https://t.me/azov_media/6185 [69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141795; https://t.me/sashakots/49712[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141795[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79245 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12862; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12872[73] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7215; https://t.me/voin_dv/11450; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28794[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716; https://t.me/wargonzo/22754 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59714; https://t.me/voin_dv/11449; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716[75] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28791; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28781[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [78]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/55742 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55705 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17787 [80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17819 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281084 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55720[81]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/55785 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1849074132773732723 [83] https://t.me/dva_majors/55690 [84] https://t.me/dva_majors/55733 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55734 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55805[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/44842[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/21782[87] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/863907-na-cerkasini-zbili-sist-droniv-vlucili-u-avtovokzal/; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/863987-vibite-sklo-poskodzeni-stini-ta-avtomobili-prokuratura-rozslidue-vlucanna-droniv-u-pidpriemstva-u-cerkasah/; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/864059-poskodzena-pokrivla-vibiti-vikna-dveri-e-rujnuvanna-stin-foto-vlucanna-saheda-v-avtostanciu-u-cerkasah/[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17818 [89] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid02hui5N5GbHxsJdLxDFfWEXSYwhVJKwMKb2bZQPMX8JpcBZCCo3AaWmnDm8jyJryXTl[90] https://www.facebook.com/RuslanKravchenkoKyiv/posts/pfbid0uexnmYCstyd15NRTFF2bpVPSkULk1yKwJ8gY9z5aMQryMsNCduxdFekELKN5CM3gl?locale=uk_UA[91] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190567; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190525?single; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17848[92] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17848; https://en dot defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/gerbera_the_new_russian_foam_plastic_killer_drone_showcased_in_detail_video-11338.html[93] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/863809-krim-ak-odin-z-osnovnih-majdancikiv-rf-dla-zapusku-sahediv-so-vidomo-pro-rosijske-virobnictvo-droniv-i-ak-ih-zbivati/[94] https://t.me/sotaproject/88803 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20655 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali ; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2024/10/09/74184035/ ; https://okno dot group/srochnikam-perevodyat-dengi-za-falshivye-kontrakty-i-uvozyat-na-front/[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[96] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali ; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2024/10/09/74184035/ ; https://okno dot group/srochnikam-perevodyat-dengi-za-falshivye-kontrakty-i-uvozyat-na-front/[97] https://t.me/sotaproject/88824 [98] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali[99] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22197519[100] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22194713[101] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22174101[102] https://www.azovmash dot com/ua/history; https://www.azovmash dot com/ua/investors/1382088575; https://vz dot ru/news/2024/10/21/1293483.html[103] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/vorog-planuye-stvoryty-kontsern-na-bazi-zahoplenogo-azovmashu/; https://vz dot ru/news/2024/10/21/1293483.html[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/5461; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf[105] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2023[106] https://suspilne dot media/863617-stavlenna-ak-do-rabiv-hto-i-ak-deportuvav-ta-vidpravlav-u-trudove-rabstvo-ukrainciv-z-okupovanoi-castini-zaporizza/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024[107] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2024
- at 10/28/24 4:54pmChristina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, William Runkel, and Fredrick W. KaganOctober 28, 2024, 4:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on October 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.[1] Rutte stated that senior representatives from South Korea's National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense and other Western allies shared intelligence assessments during a meeting on the morning of October 28 about North Korea's growing involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte stated that the deployment of North Korean forces represented a significant escalation in North Korea's involvement in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a breach of United National Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and a “dangerous expansion” of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Rutte, on behalf of NATO, called for Russia and North Korea to immediately cease these actions and stated that he will meet with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov later on October 28. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 27 that Russian forces are transferring North Korean military personnel along the E38 Kursk-Voronezh highway in vehicles with civilian license plates.[2] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on October 28 that Ukrainian forces have not engaged North Korean forces in combat or taken North Korean forces as prisoners of war (POWs), although Ukrainian intelligence has information indicating that North Korean forces have been transferred to Kursk Oblast.[3] ISW previously noted that the involvement of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[4]Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities. Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that falling drone debris damaged two unspecified industrial enterprises in Anninsky and Novokhopersky raions.[5] Geolocated footage shows a fire in Krasnoye, Novokhopersky Raion.[6] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian drones struck the Ethanol Spirit distillery in Krasnoye.[7] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko posted footage of a drone strike against a distillery in Krasnoye and noted that Russian distilleries produce rocket fuel and fuel for aviation brake systems, technical needs, and anti-icing agents.[8] Kovalenko stated that Ukrainian strikes against Russian distilleries are meant to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.[9] Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Tula Oblast.[10]Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine. Putin held a meeting with the Russian government about the economy on October 28 and highlighted Russian industrial growth and low unemployment rates.[11] Putin claimed that Russian industry has grown 4.5 percent in the first eight months of 2024 and that Russia's manufacturing and mechanical engineering sectors grew by 8.15 percent and almost 20 percent, respectively. Putin claimed that Russian unemployment is at a record low for the third month in a row at 2.4 percent and particularly highlighted low unemployment rates among Russians under the age of 25. Putin noted, however, the Russia's economy “slowed somewhat” in the third quarter of 2024 and that the Russian economy is facing “difficulties and imbalances,” such as international sanctions against Russia and Russian personnel, technology, and logistics shortages. Putin claimed that the 2025–2027 federal budget will focus on developing a supply-side economy, increasing the production of goods and services, launching new investment projects, and creating modern jobs in all sectors. The September 2024 draft bill of the 2025–2027 federal budget expected Russia to spend about 41 percent of its annual expenditures on national security and defense in 2025 — somewhat at odds with Putin's claimed desire to focus on goods and services and new investments.[12] A Russian insider source claimed on October 28 that several major Russian political figures, including Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin, CEO of Russian financial development institution DOM.RF Vitaly Mutko, CEO of Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec Sergei Chemezov, and Russian elites Oleg Deripaska and Alexei Mordashov, are expressing their discontent with the Russian Central Bank's announcement to raise the key interest rate to 21 percent.[13] ISW recently assessed that Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term.[14]The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.[15] The Moldovan Central Election Commission submitted its reports on the referendum to the court on October 25, and the court has until November 4 to either confirm or reject the results, according to the Moldovan Electoral Code.[16] ISW recently assessed that although there have been widespread Moldovan official reports about electoral violations in the October 20 vote, it is unclear if these reports will meet the required threshold for the Constitutional Court to nullify the referendum results.[17] Renato Usatii, who came in third in the first round of the Moldovan presidential election with 213,169 votes, stated on October 28 that he would not endorse Maia Sandu or Alexandr Stoianoglo in the November 3 presidential run off.[18] Vasile Tarlev, who gained 49,316 votes in the first round; Ion Chicu, who gained 31,797 votes; and Natalia Morari, who gained 9,444 votes all endorsed Stoianoglo. ISW recently assessed that Usatii's possible endorsement of Stoianoglo would likely have allowed Stoianoglo to seriously challenge Sandu in the second round, and it is unclear how Usatii's refusal to endorse either candidate will affect the outcome of the November 3 runoff.[19]Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili urged Georgian citizens to take to the streets of Tbilisi on October 28 to protest the election results that local Georgian and international election observation bodies have largely condemned for large-scale voting irregularities.[20] Zourabichvili, alongside various representatives from pro-Western opposition parties, addressed thousands of peaceful protesters and stated that they will continue to reject the reportedly fraudulent and Russian-influenced election results and urged Georgians to continue to collect evidence of voting irregularities.[21] Member of the opposition Unity-National Movement Party Giorgi Vashadze called for an international administration to hold snap elections without the participation of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC).[22] Zourabichvili and the opposition stated that they will continue to challenge the election results and noted that they will clarify their next steps in the coming days. The Russian information space continued to express jubilation over the Georgian Dream victory while Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev called for the arrest of Zourabichvili for “calling for a coup.”[23] US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stated on October 28 that the US will not rule out possible consequences to Georgian officials if the Georgian Dream party continued its anti-democratic trajectory, urging the party to conduct full investigations into allegations related to the results.[24] Twenty-eight European Union (EU) ministers issued a joint statement on October 28 expressing concern over voting irregularities and stated that the violations of electoral integrity are “incompatible” with EU candidate country standards, highlighting a potential further deterioration in Georgia's EU membership prospects.[25]Key Takeaways:NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that South Korean intelligence officials shared evidence with NATO officials on October 28 that North Korean units are operating in Kursk Oblast.Ukrainian forces conducted another series of drone strikes against Russian distilleries on the night of October 27 to 28, reportedly to reduce Russian aviation capabilities.Russian President Vladimir Putin briefly acknowledged Russia's labor shortages on October 28, but highlighted Russia's low unemployment rates in an attempt to reframe this challenge in a beneficial light and claim that the Russian economy is able to sustain a long war in Ukraine.The Moldovan Constitutional Court stated it that it will review the results of the October 20 European Union (EU) referendum on October 31, and the third runner up in the first round of the presidential election announced that he would not endorse a candidate in the runoff.Georgian civil society, opposition, and international election observers continue to reject the results of the 2024 Georgian parliament elections amid a large-scale demonstration in Tbilisi on October 28.Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Kupyansk, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southwest of Donetsk City. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novoivanovka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[26] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; southeast of Korenevo near Nizhny Klin, Novoivanovka, Alexandriya, Lyubimovka, and Darino; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[27] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian sources' claims that Ukrainian forces recaptured Darino are unconfirmed.[28] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo).[29] Fighting continued west of the main Ukrainian salient in Glushkovsky Raion on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novy Put (south of Glushkovo), and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces have not completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novy Put.[30] Ukrainian sources reported on October 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized assault with at least three armored vehicles east of Novy Put.[31]Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on October 27 that elements of the Russian military, Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia repelled a “group of people” trying to cross the Russian-Ukrainian border near Manev, Klimovsky Raion, Bryansk Oblast.[32] The Russian FSB made a similar claim on October 28, labeling the actors a “sabotage and reconnaissance group.”[33]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on October 27 and 28 but did not advance.[34] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on October 28 that the Russian grouping in the Kharkiv direction is comprised mainly of forces of the Leningrad Military District's (LMD) 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and 11th Army Corps (AC).[35] Mashovets noted that many elements of the 6th CAA and 11th AC are split between Russian efforts in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Kupyansk.[36] Mashovets reported that the 11th AC's 18th Motorized Rifle Division is predominantly responsible for operations near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City), and that Russia is currently forming the 68th Motorized Rifle Division as part of the 6th CAA to operate in this direction.[37] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast have three main tasks — to capture northern Vovchansk and advance into Tykhe (east of Vovchansk); to regain control of Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City) and advance towards Lyptsi; and to pin Ukrainian forces in northern Kharkiv Oblast to distract them from efforts in Kursk Oblast and in the Kupyansk direction.[38] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk amid ongoing offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 28. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Kupyansk within Kolisnykivka and southwest of Kruhlyakivka.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka; south of Kupyansk in Zahryzove; northwest of Stelmakhivka (west of Svatove); from Novosadove in the direction of Terny (both west of Kreminna); and within Torske (west of Kreminna).[40] Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synivka, Petropavlivka, and Pershotravneve; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove near Lozova and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, Novomykhailivka, Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Zarichne, Terny, and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka.[41] Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka.[42] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Siversk direction on OCT 28.Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar; northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; and south of Chasiv Year near Stupochky and Predtechyne on October 27 and 28.[43] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” and “Vostok-V” brigades and drone operators of the “Burevestnik” detachment (all part of the Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[44] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on October 28, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 28 that Russian forces advanced in central Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[45] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk; south of Toretsk near Niu-York; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on October 27 and 28.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sverdlov Street in Toretsk.[47] Elements of the Russian 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion (51st Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Crops [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[48] Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 28. Geolocated footage published on October 27 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Selydove, within central Vyshneve, and near Novodmytrivka (all southeast of Pokrovsk).[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 28 that Russian forces seized Tsukuryne (southeast of Selydove), and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) with seizing the settlement.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed on October 28 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vyshneve, capturing the settlement; that Russian forces advanced southwest of Vyshneve; and that Russian forces advanced east of Kreminna Balka (south of Selydove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Selydove, Novodmytrivka, Kurakhivka, Novoselydivka, Tsukuryne, and Vyshneve on October 27 and 28.[52] The commander of a Ukrainian company operating near Selydove stated on October 27 that Russian forces can “afford” to deploy 600 troops per week to infantry assaults in Selydove and that Russian forces appear to have enough reserve forces to constantly conduct assaults in the area.[53] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Selydove stated that Russian forces have transferred personnel from the northern area of the Pokrovsk direction to the Selydove area to support infantry assaults.[54] The spokesperson also stated that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes less frequently and prefer to conduct precise strikes with first-person view (FPV) drones attached to and dropped from a reconnaissance drone. Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), the 30th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (90th Guards Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and the Russian 71st Separate Spetsnaz Brigade are reportedly operating in Selydove; and elements of the Russian “Black Hussars” detachment of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and BARS-Sarmat volunteer detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating near Vyshneve.[55] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka and on the outskirts of Kurakhove itself on October 27 and 28, but there were no confirmed changes in the frontline.[56]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area. Geolocated footage published on October 25 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Yelyzavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[57] Additional geolocated footage published on October 28 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault southwest of Katerynivka (northeast of Vuhledar) indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[58] Additional geolocated footage published on October 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar).[59] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near and within Katerynivka; near Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar), Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar), and Zolota Nyva (west of Vuhledar); and within Shakhtarske.[60] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka and Antonivka; northwest of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka, Novoukrainka, Shakhtarske; and west of Vuhledar near Zolota Nyva on October 27 and 28.[61] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Katerynivka; elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka; elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shakhtarske; and elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Makarivka (west of Vuhledar and south of Velyka Novosilka).[62] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 28. Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28. Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 49th Separate Air Assault Brigade (reportedly subordinated to the 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the general Zaporizhia direction and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka, respectively. [63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Dnipro direction, likely referring to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and the islands of the Dnipro River Delta, on October 27 and 28. [64] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed-type and other unidentified strike drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 66 drones over Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts as of 1030 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 24 Russian drones were “lost in location,” four drones flew into Russian and Belarusian air space, and several drones struck civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Ukraine's Emergency Services reported that a Russian strike damaged residential infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[66]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian government continues to manipulate criminal law in order to increase Russia's offensive capabilities. Rosgvardia announced via Russian media on October 28 that it will exempt gun owners whom authorities previously convicted of minor offenses from criminal liability if they donate their weapons for use in Ukraine.[67] This “pardon-for-weapons” scheme continues a pattern of Russian authorities suspending criminal liabilities in order to increase military capacity--Russian authorities have recently codified procedures to commute individual criminal sentences in exchange for military service and appear to be extending this practice to generate greater access to small arms.[68] Rosgvardia has accepted civilian weapons for use in combat in Ukraine since August 2024.[69]Novosibirsk City Mayor Maxim Kudryavtsev signed a resolution on October 24 granting employees from the Novosibirsk mayoral office a 100,000 ruble ($1,023) one-time payment for signing a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[70] ISW has reported at length on recent Russian efforts to incentivize contract recruitment by increasing one-time signing bonuses and assessed that such efforts appear to be increasing strain on Russia's war time economy.[71]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Belarus and Russian federal subjects continue to cooperate, likely as part of sanctions evasion schemes. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Sakhalin Oblast Governor Valery Limarenko on October 28 and called for increased cooperation in the sphere of import substitution.[72]The People's Republic of China (PRC) is likely learning lessons from the Russian military through Belarusian forces. Belarusian Special Operations Forces Commander Major General Vadim Denisenko stated on October 27 that representatives from the PRC, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have participated in military exercises in Belarus in the past three to four months.[73] Denisenko claimed that the PRC is interested in lessons Belarussian forces have learned related to the war in Ukraine, such as how to use drones, clear trenches, and storm buildings.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/282120; https://t.me/wargonzo/22847; https://t.me/wargonzo/22846; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79573[45] https://t.me/rybar/64861[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl[47] https://t.me/rybar/64861[48] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12895[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7282; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/385; https://t.me/rusich_army/17995 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850961765301129433; https://t.me/shershni68/322[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/45030; https://t.me/tass_agency/282176; https://t.me/mod_russia/45032[51] https://t.me/motopatriot/28903 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17995; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79581; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28939; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110; https://t.me/wargonzo/22836; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11684 [52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28903 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18140[53] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/idut-po-trupah-na-shodi-rosiyany-poklaly-za-tyzhden-600-vlasnyh-soldativ-za-selo-z-odniyeyi-vulyczi/ ; https://youtu.be/aDXWlQ2K0dM[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/drony-matky-pid-selydovym-vorog-prorvavsya-do-mista-zavdyaky-znachnij-perevazi-v-zhyvij-syli/[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79570; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79550; https://t.me/motopatriot/28905; https://t.me/rybar/64842[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/191665 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56095[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7284; https://t.me/osirskiy/906[58] https://t.me/odshbr79/410; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7295[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7296; https://t.me/morpex_V/3310; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850663572872802799[60] https://t.me/rybar/64843; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28925 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28933 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28951 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28887[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28925 ; https://t.me/rybar/64843 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56110[62] https://t.me/rybar/64843 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142430 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11523[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142390 ; https://t.me/vrogov/17798[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02WTc4aJCnkrMc6CUsL8dnU8BxWVhSwwwoReYr8o4ui2X8zBKHPeTr7gefvQxk9BJXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0TC8JstdyU21C3erK1ChdLoQqLir7Z89xoKH3Wk3KTmNEo6fH9BLiiPAD9QBKzs2Rl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034NHBahwcubzUjnLusWtxFHReFgG66PuBLdJ8duXH6k3MgLWPy8MSrxhdPtTPgvSjl[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/22029[66] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34189[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/282170; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/988970; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo[68] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024 [69] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/28/rosgvardiya-poobeschala-osvobozhdat-ot-otvetstvennosti-za-melkie-narusheniya-vladeltsev-oruzhiya-esli-oni-sdadut-ego-na-nuzhdy-svo[70] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20719[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102724[72] https://mlyn dot by/28102024/kak-uvelichit-vklad-dalnevostochnyh-regionov-vo-vneshnyuyu-torgovlyu-belarusi-i-rossii-mnenie-lukashenko/; https://t.me/pul_1/14110[73] https://belta dot by/society/view/s-kakimi-stranami-vooruzhennye-sily-belarusi-proveli-uchenija-rasskazal-komandujuschij-sso-671320-2024/
- — Iran Update, October 21, 2024
- at 10/27/24 10:20pmKatherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Anthony Carrillo, Kyle Moran, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Axios reported that Israel insisted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) be allowed to engage in “active enforcement” to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and rebuilding infrastructure near the Israel-Lebanon border.[1] Israel also demanded that the IDF Air Force enjoy “freedom of operation” in Lebanese airspace.[2] US special envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut on October 21 to discuss Israel’s conditions with senior Lebanese officials.[3]Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.[4] Hezbollah is equally unlikely to accept these conditions, and Hezbollah leadership has previously indicated that it remains unwilling to agree to a separate deal that does not include an end to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[5] This would rule out an agreement to return to UNSC Resolution 1701 without a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[6] An unspecified Israeli official said that Israel’s conditions resemble UN Resolution 1701 with “increased enforcement.”[7]UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[8] CTP-ISW has previously stated that Netanyahu’s demand to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament are provisions that are already in part enshrined in UN Resolution 1701 and should have been enforced by UNIFIL.[9] UNIFIL has failed to execute this mandate and prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing military infrastructure south of the Litani River. US officials, such as Amos Hochstein, have reportedly expressed interest in amending UN Resolution 1701 by expanding the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon.[10] Increasing the LAF’s force size is unlikely to enable the LAF to better enforce UN Resolution 1701, however, if Lebanese soldiers and their government (of which Hezbollah is a part) are unwilling to prevent Hezbollah fighters from operating in the area.The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF Air Force conducted airstrikes targeting at least nine branches of al Qard al Hassan in Beirut’s southern suburbs and across Lebanon on October 20.[11] Al Qard al Hassan is one of Hezbollah’s main financial assets in Lebanon, providing financial services such as loans or ATM deposits and withdrawals to over 300,000 members of Lebanon‘s Shia population.[12] Israeli Army Radio reported that al Qard al Hassan also manages Hezbollah’s banking system, including its payroll for Hezbollah fighters.[13] Al Qard al Hassan reportedly receives direct funding from Iran.[14] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF targeted al Qard al Hassan branches in Laylaki, Chiyah, and Burj al Barajneh in Beirut’s southern suburbs and in Nabatieh, Tyre, Shehabieh, Baalbek, Hermel, and Rayak, in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.[15] An unspecified senior Israeli official said that the objective of Israel’s ”broad wave of attacks” targeting al Qard al Hassan is to undermine Hezbollah’s economic stability and erode the trust that the Lebanese Shia community, including Hezbollah’s rank-and-file, holds in Hezbollah.[16] This will degrade Hezbollah’s ability to function during the war and ability to “rebuild and rearm on the day after,” according to the Israeli official.[17] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously expressed that Israel seeks to obtain a postwar agreement that would prevent Hezbollah from reorganizing and rearming and from continuing to threaten Israel in the long term.[18]The IDF’s effort to erode the Shia population’s trust in Hezbollah is consistent with previous Israeli efforts to do so. Netanyahu recently asked the Lebanese people to “take back [their] country” from Hezbollah, for example.[19] It is unclear at this time if this strategy has successfully diminished public support for Hezbollah in Lebanon.The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.[20] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari stated that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah’s financial arm responsible for “funneling cash from Iran to Hezbollah.”[21] Hagari did not state the specific individual’s name or position but stated that the individual had only been in the position for a “few weeks since his predecessor was killed.” IDF has conducted various strikes targeting the Hezbollah financial system in Lebanon in recent days. Syrian state media stated that the airstrike killed at least two people.[22]Military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30.[23] The IDF Northern Command said that Hezbollah continues to fire from its ”residual rocket capabilities” but that this is not ”significant” fire.[24] The IDF air campaign has concentrated its efforts on targeting Hezbollah rocket assets and weapons stockpiles. Degrading Hezbollah’s rocket assets is a necessary step to remove the threat that Hezbollah poses to northern Israeli towns. Hezbollah has continued to fire large barrages of daily rockets into northern and central Israel despite IDF operations targeting its rocket capabilities, however.[25] Hezbollah launched over 170 rockets on October 20, for example.[26] An Israeli think tank reported that Hezbollah’s daily average of fire into Israel is four times greater than the daily average before Israel’s ground operations.[27]Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.[28] Israeli forces have raided and seized terrain in border towns and areas over the past three weeks to prevent Hezbollah direct fire attacks and ground attacks into Israel, supporting the stated Israeli war aim of returning Israeli civilians to the north.[29] While these raids have led to the likely severe degradation of Hezbollah capabilities in border towns, it is unclear how IDF strikes deeper into Lebanon have succeeded in degrading Hezbollah’s longer-range rocket and missile assets. These capabilities will continue to threaten residents of northern and central Israel.The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on Jabal Kahil on October 20, north of Maroun el Ras, indicating that Israeli forces had seized and were operating on the hill.[30] The IDF has similarly seized hills in Mays al Jabal, Odaisseh, and Blida. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces have conducted operations in some border villages that are only visible from Israeli territory and ”not seen” by Hezbollah forces. These positions on hills and in towns overlooking northern Israel would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support rocket and mortar attacks into northern Israel. The correspondent claimed that Hezbollah fighters have conducted rocket attacks that have deterred Israeli forces from seizing the ”second line” of border towns.[31] Israeli forces have entered one “second-line“ village but have not attempted to seize other ” second-line” towns.[32] The fact that Israeli forces have entered one of these villages indicates that the IDF is not ”deterred.” It is highly unlikely that intermittent shelling would deter a combat-experienced force such as the IDF units operating in southern Lebanon.Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. The Shin Bet and Israeli police arrested seven Israeli Jewish citizens of Azeri heritage in Haifa and northern Israel on charges of espionage for “hundreds of tasks” for Iranian intelligence agencies in a counterintelligence operation.[33] The suspects had been in contact with Iranian agents, and the Israeli State Attorney’s Office called this the most serious case they have investigated in recent years.[34] The suspects were reportedly recruited using financial inducements that were routed through Russian intermediaries who traveled to Israel.[35]The suspects reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones. Prosecutors stated that police and the Shin Bet accused the suspects of photographing and collecting information on Israeli energy and port infrastructure, IDF base and facilities, including the Kirya defense headquarters in Tel Aviv, Nevatim and Ramat David air bases, and Iron Dome battery sites, for Iran for around two years.[36] The suspects’ handlers also sent maps of certain sites to the suspects, including a map of the Golani Training Base, which Hezbollah struck with a drone on October 13.[37] The fact that the base’s dining facility was struck at dinner time with a Hezbollah drone suggests that some intelligence asset had observed patterns of life and understood the exact layout of the base and specific buildings within the base. Hezbollah has also targeted Iron Dome batteries with drone attacks, which this Iranian-led intelligence effort may have enabled.US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated on October 21 that the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in Israel is “in place.”[38] Austin declined to confirm if the anti-missile system was fully operational but said that it could be put into operation ”very quickly.” The US deployed the THAAD anti-missile system and US military personnel to operate the system to Israel on October 13 to bolster Israeli air defenses following the April 13 and October 1 Iranian attacks on Israel. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is set to meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[39]The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened. White House spokesperson John Kirby claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip through the Kerem Shalom border crossing, which connects Israel and Rafah Governorate.[40] The presence of armed gangs and criminal groups controlling the flow of aid could indicate decreasing Hamas internal control and governance capabilities, given that controlling the movement of humanitarian aid and distributing it to Hamas supporters is one way by which Hamas could maintain control in the Gaza Strip. Armed gangs and criminal groups could still cooperate with Hamas, however. Kirby noted that Israel had allowed 120 trucks of aid into the Gaza Strip over the last few days. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an increase in humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 250 trucks per day on October 19.[41] Netanyahu’s decision followed a letter from the United States to senior Israeli officials on October 13 warning that the Biden administration would be forced to take unspecified steps, implying the withholding of military aid to Israel, if aid was not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[42]Key Takeaways:Israeli Goals in Lebanon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Office recently gave US officials a document detailing Israel’s conditions for a ceasefire and diplomatic solution to end the war with Hezbollah. Lebanon, the United Nations, and the international community are highly unlikely to accept any Israeli conditions that would allow for continued Israeli operations in Lebanese territory, according to US officials.Israeli Air Campaign: The IDF is attempting to erode the Lebanese Shia community’s support for Hezbollah by targeting a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Lebanon. The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a senior member of Lebanese Hezbollah’s financial system in Damascus, Syria, on October 21.Israeli Military Assessments of Ground Operations: Israeli military officials assessed that IDF operations have destroyed around two-thirds of Hezbollah’s rocket capabilities since the IDF began ground operations on September 30. Israeli military officials indicated that the IDF expects to finish its initial phase of ground operations in southern Lebanon within a few weeks and would soon achieve the conditions to return northern residents to their homes.Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: The IDF has seized several hills and villages in southern Lebanon that would allow Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel.Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: Iran is attempting to use spies in Israel to observe Israeli military facilities and possibly to support targeting efforts. Israel arrested seven suspects who reportedly photographed and collected information on key sites in Israel for Iranian handlers, indicating that Iran may have been using these suspects to support effective targeting of Israel with missiles and drones.Gaza Strip: The White House National Security spokesperson claimed that armed gangs and criminal groups are preventing humanitarian aid from entering the Gaza Strip, suggesting that Hamas control over internal security and governance in the southern Gaza Strip is weakened. Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued operations near Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 20.[43] IDF forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters and destroyed militia infrastructure and tunnel shafts. The 401st Armored Brigade killed multiple Palestinian fighters who posed a threat to Israeli forces via tank fire, direct engagement, and directing airstrikes.[44] Hamas conducted six rocket-propelled grenade attacks targeting Israeli armor near Jabalia.[45]Palestinian militias conducted two attacks targeting Israeli command-and-control sites along the Netzarim Corridor on October 21. [46] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade also mortared an Israeli command-and-control site north of Gaza City. [47]The IDF 252nd Division continued operations in the central Gaza Strip on October 20.[48] IDF forces destroyed militia infrastructure and a weapons depot. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from vehicles north of al Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps.[49] The IDF 252nd Division resumed clearing operations in those camps on October 17, after last operating in the central Gaza Strip on October 8. [50]The IDF 143rd Division killed multiple fighters who posed a threat to Israeli forces in Rafah on October 20. [51] The National Resistance Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees conducted one indirect fire attack targeting Israeli forces east of Jabalia on October 21.[52] The IDF intercepted one rocket that crossed from the northern Gaza Strip.[53]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW did not record any engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut-off on October 20. An unspecified Palestinian fighter threw Molotov cocktails and a burning tire at the Israeli settlement of Midgal Oz in the West Bank on October 20.[54] Israeli settlement protection forces arrested the individual and turned him over to Israeli security forces. Israeli security forces conducted a “battalion-sized” operation in Deir Abu Mashaal, Ramallah Governorate, and arrested 15 wanted individuals.[55]Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF 98th Division continued operations in Markaba and other southeastern Lebanese towns.[56] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 20 showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks in northern Markaba, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the area. The 98th Division killed several Hezbollah fighters in the past day, including tactical-level commanders and a cell of fighters that fired an anti-tank guided missile at Israeli forces.[57] Hezbollah conducted multiple attacks targeting the 98th Division on October 21. Hezbollah fighters fired multiple salvos of rockets targeting Israeli forces operating east of Markaba.[58] Hezbollah claimed that it targeted Israeli personnel who were attempting to evacuate killed and injured soldiers.[59] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces at the Kfar Kila crossing, and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that Hezbollah targeted Israeli personnel west of Odaisseh.[60]The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on October 21.[61] Commercially available satellite imagery showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks roughly one kilometer south of Nabi Youchaa, suggesting that Israeli forces operated in the area. The 91st Division directed an airstrike that struck and killed a cell of Hezbollah fighters that fired rockets targeting northern Israel.[62] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces moving on Jabal Kahil, northeast of Maroun al Ras.[63] The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southern Lebanon on October 21.[64] The 36th Division located underground infrastructure and anti-tank guided missile launchers aimed at northern Israeli towns.[65] Israeli forces also directed airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters.[66] The IDF 188th Armored Brigade killed fighters and located and destroyed underground infrastructure and weapons caches in southern Lebanon.[67] The 188th Armored Brigade located a munitions warehouse in the "heart" of a residential neighborhood.[68] Israeli forces found dozens of long- and short-range missiles, ammunition, small arms, explosives, and medical equipment.[69] The 188th Armored Brigade also located and destroyed a loaded rocket launcher mounted on a vehicle.[70] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Aita al Shaab.[71]The IDF 146th Division continued operations in southwest Lebanon on October 21.[72] The 146th Division located and destroyed underground Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons caches, including anti-tank guided missiles and an anti-tank launcher aimed at northern Israel.[73]IDF special operations forces continued to operate in southern Lebanon.[74] The IDF Maglan and Egoz units are both currently deployed in southern Lebanon to support ground operations.[75] Israeli special operations forces prepared explosive-laden drones to target and destroy Hezbollah anti-tank positions and headquarters.[76] Israeli special operations forces also located a warehouse containing dozens of rockets, a grenade launcher, vests, helmets, and other combat equipment. [77] Egoz Unit fighters operated with the 36th Division near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh on October 20.[78] The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure on October 21. The IDF said it struck around 300 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon in the past day, including Hezbollah ammunition depots, launchers, anti-tank positions, and infrastructure.[79] The IDF Air Force struck dozens of launchers aimed at Israel and IDF positions.[80] The IAF also struck 15 short-range missile launchers in southern Lebanon aimed at Israel that Hezbollah used to fire at the Western Galilee.[81] The IDF conducted a strike on a launcher that Hezbollah fighters used to target central Israel.[82] The IDF said the launcher was prepared to launch again.[83] The IDF aims to disrupt Hezbollah’s capabilities to strike Israel.This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 20 to 2:00pm ET on October 21. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah conducted at least 16 rocket and drone attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 20.[84] The IDF intercepted five drones over the Mediterranean Sea before they crossed into Israeli territory on October 21.[85] Israeli Army Radio stated the drones were launched from Lebanon.[86] Hezbollah continued to target civilian sites in northern Israel including Kiryat Shmona, Karmiel, Ma'alot Tarshiha and Kabri.[87] Hezbollah continued to target IDF personnel in towns on the Israel-Lebanon border including Zarit and Shomera.[88] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting an IDF artillery position in Odum in the Golan Heights for the first time.[89] Hezbollah launched drones at Israeli forces in the Yiftach Barracks.[90]The Israeli Airports Authority briefly suspended flight takeoffs from Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv, possibly due to a ballistic missile interception over northern Israel on October 21. The Israeli Airports Authority said that it suspended flights due to unspecified security concerns, but Israeli media reported the suspension occurred following a ballistic missile interception in northern Israel.[91] No militia group has claimed a ballistic missile attack targeting Israel at this time.Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 20.[92] The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Golan Heights.[93] The IDF Air Force intercepted the drone in Syrian airspace before it entered Israeli airspace.[94]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Jordan Valley.[95] An Israeli media correspondent reported that the IDF Air Force intercepted the drone.[96]A drone attack targeting a military target in the Golan Heights.[97]Iran hosted a joint maritime exercise in the north Indian Ocean from October 19-20.[98] The Artesh Navy, IRGC Navy, Russia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, India, Thailand, Pakistan, Qatar, and Bangladesh participated in the exercise known as the Indian Oceans Naval Symposium Maritime Exercise 2024.[99] The exercise involved maritime fighting drills, search operations, oil spill prevention, control.[100] The exercise ended with a naval parade of participating units followed by Iran’s Jamaran destroyer. Iranian Artesh Navy Commander Admiral Shahram Irani said that the exercise demonstrated Iran’s involvement in the region.[101] IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi stated that the exercise showed that the Iranian armed forces are always at “full readiness.”[102]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Turkish officials in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 18.[103] Araghchi discussed opportunities for expanding bilateral trade, tourism, and counterterrorism cooperation between Iran and Turkey during his meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.[104] Araghchi emphasized the need for Turkey to “make decisions and implement urgent measures” to confront Israel.[105] Araghchi separately held a joint press conference with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan to discuss bilateral security and economic cooperation and regional tensions.[106] Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baqaei stated that Araghchi will travel to Bahrain and Kuwait starting on October 21.[107]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will travel to Kazan, Russia, on October 22 to attend the two-day BRICS summit and meet with the presidents of Russia, China, India, and Egypt.[108] Pezeshkian is also expected to sign a new 20-year cooperation agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin aimed at deepening the pre-existing Russo-Iranian strategic partnership, although the full details of this agreement are not yet public.[109] Pezeshkian will also participate in meetings with leaders from the “BRICS and the Global South” bloc, aimed at strengthening multilateralism and countering Western influence.[110] [i] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions[2] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions[3] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions[4] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-15-2024[6] http://unscr.com/files/2006/01701.pdf[7] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions [8] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024[10] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/israel-us-lebanon-end-war-conditions [11] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz6wq71ly5po ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848223082206417096[12] www.ynetnews dot com/article/hyhlslmg11 ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-expands-lebanon-campaign-with-strikes-on-banks-it-links-to-hezbollah-4dc856c6?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3[13] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15694[14] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15694[15] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz6wq71ly5po[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15694; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-expands-lebanon-campaign-with-strikes-on-banks-it-links-to-hezbollah-4dc856c6?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3[17] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15694; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-expands-lebanon-campaign-with-strikes-on-banks-it-links-to-hezbollah-4dc856c6?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos3[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2024[20] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-killed-top-hezbollah-money-man-in-syria-strike-promises-more-attacks-on-terror-groups-financial-network/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-damascus-mazzeh-area-appears-be-car-state-media-says-2024-10-21/[21] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-it-killed-top-hezbollah-money-man-in-syria-strike-promises-more-attacks-on-terror-groups-financial-network/[22] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/explosion-damascus-mazzeh-area-appears-be-car-state-media-says-2024-10-21/[23] https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-10-21/ty-article/.premium/idf-believes-northern-residents-could-soon-return-home-as-lebanon-campaign-nears-end/00000192-afcc-daee-a9fb-efdebcdf0000; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15700[24] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15700[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024[27] https://israel-alma dot org/2024/10/21/hezbollah-attacks-against-israel-since-the-beginning-of-the-ground-maneuver-in-lebanon-data-review-october-1-20-2024/[28] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15700[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-16-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2024[30] https://t.me/mmirleb/8114[31] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11324[32] https://t.me/mmirleb/7980[33] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/21/world/middleeast/israel-iran-spying-arrests.html;https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/7-israelis-arrested-for-spying-on-behalf-of-iran-suspects-accused-of-collecting-information-on-military-bases/; https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-825487[34] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/7-israelis-arrested-for-spying-on-behalf-of-iran-suspects-accused-of-collecting-information-on-military-bases/[35] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-825487[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-busts-spy-ring-acting-iran-security-services-say-2024-10-21/;https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/7-israelis-arrested-for-spying-on-behalf-of-iran-suspects-accused-of-collecting-information-on-military-bases/[37] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/7-israelis-arrested-for-spying-on-behalf-of-iran-suspects-accused-of-collecting-information-on-military-bases/;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-13-2024[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-says-thaad-anti-missile-system-is-in-place-israel-2024-10-21/[39] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-herzog-to-meet-blinken-tomorrow/[40] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/white-house-says-armed-gangs-blocking-aid-going-into-southern-gaza/[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-19-2024[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-19-2024[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211643311763943[44] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211643311763943[45] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/news/details/20075 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/statements/details/8206[46] https://t.me/sarayaps/18714 ; https://t.me/alwya2000/7034[47] https://t.me/darebmojahden/5294[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211646889558102[49] https://t.me/hamza20300/303387 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/303406 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/303498[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-17-2024[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211646889558102[52] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4452[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848371669942813166[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848107274364973554[55] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848301652647768212[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211649502617777[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211655185842683[58] https://t.me/mmirleb/8116;https://t.me/mmirleb/8118;https://t.me/mmirleb/8121[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/8120[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/8122 ;https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11317; https://t.me/mmirleb/8090[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211649502617777[62] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211655185842683[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8114[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211649502617777[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211658427998656[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211658427998656[67] https://www dot idf.il/241394[68] https://www dot idf.il/241394 [69] https://www dot idf.il/241394 [70] https://www dot idf.il/241394 [71] https://t.me/mmirleb/8138[72] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211649502617777[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848211658427998656 [74] https://www dot idf.il/241436[75] https://www dot idf.il/241436 [76] https://www dot idf.il/241436 [77] https://www dot idf.il/241436 [78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848394114728943955[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848415141290795238 ; 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https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/ben-gurion-airport-said-limiting-take-offs-amid-security-concerns/ ; https://www.jpost dot com/breaking-news/article-825511[92] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1371 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1373 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1375[93] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1371[94] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848091102374469792[95] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1373[96] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1848239090866520475[97] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1375[98] https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1729324821946416485/IONS-2024-Joint-Naval-Exercise%2C-Hosted-by-Iran%2C-Kicks-off-in-Persian-Gulf ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/28/3181415 ;[99] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/28/3181415 [101] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/21/735683/Iran-Navy-Shahram-Irani-Indian-Ocean-Naval-Symposium-IONS-Maritime-Exercise-IMEX-2024maritime-transport-routes-sea-based-economy[102] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/21/735672/Senior-general-Iran-armed-forces-fully-ready[103] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/755229 ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/755230[104] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6262002[105] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/755229[106] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6261627 ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/755230[107] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/07/30/3182874/[108] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/10/19/735571/Iran-Russia-President-Masoud-Pezeshkian-BRICS-summit-Habibollah-Abbasi-Vladimir-Putin-Xi-Jinping[109] https://amwaj.media/media-monitor/russia-signals-upcoming-signing-of-strategic-partnership-accord-with-iranhttps://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-11-2024#_ednf3de1297805d58b76b70b95a3ef7ab6919[110] https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/07/30/3183137/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%BE%D8%B2%D8%B4%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%A7-4-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 23, 2024
- at 10/27/24 9:47pmChristina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov,Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Katherine Wells, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 23, 2024, 7:45pm ETClick here to view ISW's portfolio of Russia-Ukraine interactive maps, including our control-of-terrain in Ukraine map, 3D control-of-terrain topographic map, and timelapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires. The Kazan Declaration notably only mentioned Russia's war in Ukraine once.[1] The declaration states that all signatories should act in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter — including the provision on respect for territorial integrity — and that BRICS states welcome "relevant" offers of mediation aimed at ensuring a peaceful settlement of the war through dialogue and diplomacy. Ukraine has emphasized that the "principles of the UN Charter" is a main avenue through which Ukraine can achieve peace and highlighted the illegality of Russia's war under international law.[2] The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded to the Kazan Declaration, stating that it shows that Russia failed to "export" its views on changing the world order and global security architecture to BRICS summit participant states.[3] The Ukrainian MFA stated that the declaration also demonstrates that BRICS states are not unified around Russia's war against Ukraine, likely since many of these countries support the UN Charter's principles. Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service similarly assessed that the BRICS summit will not result in the international community's approval of an alternative system of international settlements that Russia wants and stated that India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Brazil, and South Africa opposed the transformation of BRICS into an anti-US coalition.[4]People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine. Xi emphasized the need to promote “a rapid de-escalation" of Russia’s war in Ukraine and avoid “adding fuel to the fire” during the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan on October 23.[5] Xi also stated that BRICS members must prevent the spreading of the war to “third parties” and avoid the escalation of hostilities. Xi stated that the PRC, Brazil and countries of the Global South created a group of “Friends of Peace,” which aims to unite voices in support of a peaceful resolution of Russia’s war in Ukraine.[6] Xi had previously called for de-escalation of the war and attempted to position the PRC as an impartial third-party mediator for a negotiated peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine.[7] Russia has been increasingly leveraging partnerships with North Korea and Iran, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused Russia of directly involving North Korea in the war amid reports of North Korean combat forces training in Russia for possible participation in the war.[8]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[9] NOTE: This text also appears in ISW-CTP's October 23 Iran Update. Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[10] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[11] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[12] It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[13] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[14] The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s "neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The Iranian regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[15] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war. Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front. Geolocated footage published on October 22 and 23 shows that Russian forces have advanced along Skhidna Street in northeastern Selydove and northward along Berehova and Zakhysnykiv streets in eastern Selydove towards the center of the town.[16] Geolocated footage published on October 23 also shows that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) seized Izmailivka (southeast of Selydove), and additional geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces also advanced on the northeastern outskirts of Novoselydivka (west of Izmailivka and south of Selydove) and in fields northwest of Tsukuryne (also south of Selydove but north of the Izmailivka-Novoselydivka area).[17] Russian sources widely claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Selydove, reached the outskirts of Vyshneve (west of Selydove) via the C05091 road by pushing northwestward from Tsukuryne, and made territorial gains in Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[18]Russian advances into Selydove, as well as territorial gains to the south and north of the town, may soon cause Ukrainian troops to withdraw from the area to avoid being trapped within a collapsing pocket. Ukrainian forces appear to have committed to a robust defense of Selydove, however, and have largely delayed Russian advances since Russian forces first began attacking into the settlement around August 2024.[19] Selydove is not Russia's operational objective on this part of the front, notably, and Ukraine's decision to defend the settlement has likely fixed a relatively large contingent of Russian troops on the southern flank of Pokrovsk — which is Russia's primary, and operationally meaningful, objective in the area.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets identified this dynamic on October 21, noting that the Russian command in the Pokrovsk direction is now facing several more localized "problems" that do not directly lend themselves to the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk.[21] Mashovets emphasized that while a large number of Russian forces have been committed to the entire Pokrovsk front, a large contingent of 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Central Military District [CMD]) and 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) units are involved in trying to seize Selydove, as opposed to developing attacks on Pokrovsk.[22] Mashovets concluded that the Russian command created a large operational reserve for Russian forces to attack Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, but that these forces got bogged down in attacks on Selydove and the southern flank of Pokrovsk, which the Russian command had hoped to capture rapidly.[23] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor largely agreed with Mashovets' analysis, noting that despite the widely understood value of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, "the process is stalling."[24] The milblogger stated that the Russian command's fixation on the southern flank of Pokrovsk has led to a "spreading of forces and resources" that has resulted in "excessive" Russian infantry losses and afforded Ukrainian troops additional time to further fortify Pokrovsk itself.Russia may well take Selydove in the coming days, but the capture of Selydove does not inherently portend the seizure of Pokrovsk, and, in fact, the seizure of Selydove is likely to have exhausted and attrited Russian forces in a way that will likely reduce their combat effectiveness if they are ordered to pivot towards Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian defense of Pokrovsk and its approaches (namely the rail-line and the M-30 highway) has already stymied Russian advances towards the city, and attrition of Russian forces in the area will likely further slow these advances, damaging Russian offensive prospects in the area in the coming weeks.[25]The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reported on October 23 that the US government has evidence that there are North Korean troops in Russia but that it is unclear what they are doing.[26] National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby also stated on October 23 that North Korea deployed at least 3,000 personnel to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between early to mid-October but that it is unclear if these forces will enter combat alongside Russian forces.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 22 that potentially two "brigades" of 6,000 North Korean personnel each (larger that the doctrinal endstrength of a typical brigade) are training in Russia.[28] South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 23 that South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated during a closed-door parliamentary intelligence committee meeting that North Korea has sent 3,000 troops to Russia so far to support Russia's war in Ukraine and will send a total of 10,000 by December 2024.[29] Yonhap News Agency also reported that a NIS assessment stated that North Korean munitions factories that produce weapons that North Korea has shipped to Russia are operating at "full capacity."[30] ISW will discuss the development of Russia-North Korea relations and assess the implications of recent North Korean troops deployments on the security situation both in Ukraine and on the Korean Peninsula in a forthcoming special edition.Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin approved the plan for the Zapad-2025 exercises on October 23 during Belousov’s visit to Minsk.[31] Khrenin announced that the Russian and Belarusian general staffs had already begun preparations for Zapad-2025 exercises and stated that these exercises will help to improve the combat readiness of the regional grouping of forces and the ability of Russian and Belarusian forces to jointly fulfill their tasks.[32] Belousov noted that Russian and Belarusian forces will practice tasks that take into account "modern threats to Russia and Belarus,' including experiences from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33] Belousov and Khrenin also approved the Union State military security Work Plan for 2025 and 2027, emphasized the continuation of Russian-Belarusian cooperation in military-technical sphere, and reiterated that Moscow and Minsk are completing preparations for a new security concept under the Union State framework.[34] The last Zapad exercises — which have historically occurred once every four years — took place in September 2021, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) notably cancelled the planned 'Zapad-2023' exercises scheduled for September 2023.[35] ISW will discuss the development and implications of the Union State security, economic, and societal integration in an upcoming report.Key Takeaways:The adoption of the Kazan Declaration on the second day of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on October 23 demonstrated that Russia has not yet secured the international support nor created the alternative security structure that the Kremlin desires.People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping reiterated the PRC’s longstanding position calling for de-escalation in Russia’s war in Ukraine and discouraged the involvement of third parties in the war amid reports of Russia preparing to deploy North Korean troops to Ukraine.Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.Russian forces have made significant tactical advances into and around Selydove in recent days, but the Russian military command's apparent focus on securing Selydove has come at the expense of Russian forces' ability to sustain a meaningful offensive drive directly on Pokrovsk — Russia's self-defined operational objective on this sector of the front.The Pentagon and White House confirmed the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia.Russia and Belarus announced plans to conduct the “Zapad-2025” command staff exercise on an unspecified date in 2025 against the backdrop of deepening Russian-Belarusian security integration within the Union State framework.Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting on October 23. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo).[36] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian mechanized assault on Zeleny Shlyakh on October 22.[37] Geolocated footage published on October 22 and 23 indicates that Russian forces recently recaptured Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and regained positions southeast of Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[38] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Plekhovo, Malaya Lokyna (north of Sudzha), Sudzha, Pokrovsky (southeast of Korenevo), and Zeleny Shlyakh.[39] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and "Kamerton" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz) are reportedly operating near Sudzha; elements of the 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha); elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Malaya Loknya; elements of the 106th VDV Division and 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) are reportedly operating near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo); and elements of the "Kashtan" detachment (Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz) and 76th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[40]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks west of the main Kursk Oblast salient in Glushkovsky Raion on October 23. Elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[41]Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov acknowledged on October 23 that Russian forces have committed at least 187 confirmed crimes, including murder and rape, since Russian forces deployed to defend Kursk Oblast but claimed that Chechen Akhmat forces were not responsible.[42]Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian ammunition depots may be reducing the ratio between Russian and Ukrainian artillery fires across the frontline. Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine reported on October 23 that Ukrainian First Deputy Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated that the ratio between Russian and Ukrainian artillery fires is now about one-to-two in favor of Russian forces — a significant reduction from one-to-seven or one-to-eight in early 2024 and from one-to-three at the start of Summer 2024.[43] Havrylyuk attributed this reduction to Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots and to Ukraine's qualitatively superior Western artillery systems. Ukrainian forces notably struck the Oktyabrskii and Toropets ammunition depots in Tver Oblast and the Tikhoretsk ammunition depot in Krasnodar Krai in September 2024.[44]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 23 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 22 and 23.[45] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on October 23 that the Russian military is replacing personnel in this direction with newly recruited contract soldiers, many of whom are convict recruits, instead of transferring personnel from other areas of the frontline to this direction.[46] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on October 23 that Russian forces began conducting infantry-led assaults in small groups near Vovchansk.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction amid continued Russian offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Geolocated footage published on October 23 indicates that Russian forces advanced westward along the N-26 highway west of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces, including elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]), seized Serebryanka (southwest of Kreminna).[49] A Russian milblogger denied the claim, however.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and pushed Ukrainian forces up to 10 kilometers from the settlement, although ISW has not observed Russian advances 10 kilometers directly west of Stelmakhivka.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; northwest of Svatove near Pishchane, Kruhlyakivka, Stepova Novoselivka, Lozova, and Kolisnykivka; east of Svatove near Vyshene; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske.[52] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 23 that Russian forces are frequently conducting platoon-sized to reduced company-sized mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction.[53] Mashovets also stated that Russian units operating in the Kupyansk direction have deployed eight to 10 tactical missile systems, including Iskander systems, to the area.[54] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 4th Tank Division, 47th Tank Division, and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in the Krokhmalne-Hlushkivka direction.[55] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and BARS-9 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[56]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces reportedly unsuccessfully attacked near Bondarne (southwest of Siversk and northeast of Chasiv Yar) on October 22.[57] Artillery elements of the Russian 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continued to operate in the Siversk direction.[58]Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction, but ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of these claims. Russian sources made unconfirmed claims that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and eastern Chasiv Yar.[59] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova reported that some Russian assault groups occasionally cross the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal but have not broken through Ukrainian defenses west of the canal.[60] Bobovnikova added that Russian forces are unable to transfer vehicles across the canal because Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes are preventing the construction of pontoon crossings. Russian forces continued to attack northeast of Chasiv Yar near Hryhorivka.[61] A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne (VDV) Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces are using first person view (FPV) drones to strike Russian military equipment as far as Pokrovske (about 27km east of Chasiv Yar) to interdict Russian ground lines of communications to Bakhmut.[62] The milblogger added that it is too premature to talk about a Russian breakthrough in Chasiv Yar. Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division’s 217th and 331st VDV regiments are reportedly operating in northeastern Chasiv Yar and near Stupky Holubovski 2 (a forest area southeast of Chasiv Yar), respectively.[63] Elements of the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 88th 'Hispaniola' Volunteer Brigade and Sever-V Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64] Elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and other unspecified elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps are reportedly operating north of Chasiv Yar; and elements of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are operating south of Chasiv Yar.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[66] Russian forces reportedly continued to attack within Toretsk and southwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka on October 22 and 23.[67] A Ukrainian special purpose brigade reported that Russian forces launch hourly assaults on the outskirts of Niu York (south of Toretsk) but that the Ukrainian brigade was recently able to stabilize the frontline and slow the pace of Russian advances in the area.[68] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA’s (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) 1st 'Slavic' Brigade and 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[69] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[70]Please see topline text about Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.Russian forces continued assaults in the Kurakhove direction on October 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces reportedly attacked southeast of Kurakhove near Hostre and Dalne.[71] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove); an element of a reconnaissance battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) is reportedly operating near Dalne alongside elements of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA).[72]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on October 23. Geolocated footage published on October 23 showed that Russian forces advanced in the fields southeast of Bohoyavlenka (west of Vuhledar), and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made additional advances in the fields southeast of Bohoyavlenka.[73] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Katerynivka; northwest of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka and Novoukrainka; and west of Vuhledar near Zolota Nyva on October 22 and 23.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are operating near Antonivka.[75]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 22 and 23 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and west of Staromayorske (south of Velyka Novosilka).[76] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 22 and 23 that Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka.[77]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka on October 22 and 23, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[78] Drone operators of the Russian 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[79]Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on October 23 that over 20 Ukrainian drones struck civilian infrastructure near Enerhodar and an administrative building in Vasylivka (east of Enerhodar) and cut off electricity to 13 nearby settlements. ISW cannot independently confirm this claim, however.[80]Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 22 and 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 23 that Russian and Ukrainian mining efforts in the Kherson direction are limiting the number of safe Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and preventing the effective delivery of ammunition and food to Russian soldiers in the Kherson direction.[82] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces need naval drones in the Kherson direction to detect mines in remotely mined areas in the Dnipro River Delta area and that the naval drone deficit is causing Russian soldiers to make their own naval drones. Drone operators of the Russian 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment (70th Motorized Rifle Division, 18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kherson City.[83] Drone operators and other elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment’s (76th VDV Division) 4th Company are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[84]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces destroyed 10 Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea and four naval drones in the Black Sea heading towards occupied Crimea.[85]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 22 to 23, using Shahed-136/131s and other unspecified drone models. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 81 strike drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and one Kh-31P guided missile from over the Black Sea towards Odesa Oblast.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that as of 0900 local time on October 23 Ukrainian forces had shot down 57 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Sumy, Cherkasy, Khmelnytskyi, Ternopil, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Poltava, Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts, that 15 drones had become "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that nine more remained in Ukrainian air space. Cherkasy Oblast sources reported that Russian drones struck civilian and transportation infrastructure in Cherkaskyi, Zolotonoskyi, and Umanskyi raions, including a bus station.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck an airbase in Uman, although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[88] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that the Kh-31P missile struck Odesa City.[89] Kyiv Oblast Head Ruslan Kravchenko reported that debris from a damaged drone fell outside of unspecified settlements in Kyiv Oblast but did not cause any significant damage.[90]Russian forces appear to be adapting the tactics of their drone strike campaign to overcome Ukrainian anti-drone adaptations. A Russian milblogger highlighted Russia's recent use of "Gerbera" drones in strikes on Sumy Oblast, and another milblogger claimed that Russian forces use Gerbera drones in the first of three waves of drones launched at a specific target.[91] The milblogger noted that Russian forces use the Gerbera drones, which are made from foam plastic and are indistinguishable from Shaheds on radars, to confuse and distract Ukrainian mobile fire groups by flying in circles at low altitude, while Shahed-type drones follow in the subsequent two waves, taking advantage of gaps in air defense generated by the deployment of the Gerberas.[92] Ukrainian shoot-down rates of drone strikes remain high (typically well over 50 percent), however, suggesting that Russian forces have not yet adopted this tactic at the scale needed to cause battle-field wide impacts.Russia is leveraging its domestication of Shahed-type drone production to increase the number of Shahed-type drones it is able employ in strikes against Ukraine. A Ukrainian military research expert told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Krym on October 23 that there are now three types of distinct Shahed-type drones — those marked "M," which represents Iranian production; "I," which represents Russian domestic production with imported Iranian components; and "K," which represents Russian domestic production with domestic components.[93] The Ukrainian expert noted that the number of Shaheds marked "I" and "K" is now very substantial, indicating that Russia has significantly increased its domestic production of Shahed models. Russia has reportedly learned how to produce drone fuselages and other components, which allowed Russia to launch an estimated 1,334 Shahed drones at Ukraine in the month of September alone.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian military is reportedly coercing Russian conscripts into contract service in the Russian military by issuing enlistment bonuses to conscripts who never signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Russian opposition outlets reported on October 23 that at least seven conscripts in the 232nd Rocket Artillery Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) received a one-time direct deposit of 405,000 rubles (about $4,220) from Russian regional authorities under the decree regulating payments to conscripts and contract servicemen, despite not having signed a Russian military service contract.[94] The Russian authorities have been incentivizing military contract service through large one-time payments (essentially signing bonuses) as part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.[95] Russian opposition outlets reported that the Russian military prohibited the conscripts from leaving their base to go to a bank to refuse the money transfer and later transferred them to Rostov Oblast.[96] Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported that a man who had never served in the Russian military received a direct deposit of 660,514 rubles (about $6,900) from the Russian MoD even though he had not signed a Russian military service contract.[97] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted that conscripts in the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army, CMD) complained in early October that they had received a one-time direct deposits of 305,000 rubles (about $3,500) from Russian regional authorities for allegedly signing Russian military contracts despite not actually having done so.[98]Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov stated on October 23 that Rostec plans to triple the volume of drone deliveries to the Russian military for use in Ukraine by the end of 2024.[99] Chemezov claimed that Rostec subsidiaries produced four times more drones in 2023 than in 2022 and noted that the widespread drone usage has significantly changed warfighting in only several years.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) The head of the "Melodiya" Intelligence Center of the Russian 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) claimed on October 23 that Russian forces have started to test drone swarm technology, which allows Russian forces to overcome Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems, near Chasiv Yar.[100]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russia continues to seize and exploit the economic potential of occupied Ukraine to bolster Russia's wartime economy. Donetsk Oblast occupation Minister of Industry and Trade Yevgeny Ponomarenko told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 20 that Mariupol occupation authorities plan to transfer the ownership of Mariupol's Azovmash and Azovelectrostal enterprises to Russian state defense conglomerate Rostec in order to resume production at the sites.[101] Prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the destruction that Russia's occupation of Mariupol has wrought on the city, Azovmash was the largest machine-building plant in all of Ukraine, while Azovelectrostal was a major supplier of steel products.[102] Both Azovmash and Azovelectrostal suffered damage and lost their production capabilities due to Russia's invasion and occupation of Mariupol.[103] Rostec will likely inject the enterprises with substantial investments in order to re-start their production of metal and machine parts, which Russia will likely use to support its defense industrial base's production effort to support the war. The seizure and exploitation of Ukrainian enterprises for Russian economic benefit is a critical component of Russia's occupation strategy in Ukraine — Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov estimated that Russia had seized and transferred nearly 500 Ukrainian enterprises to Russian control as of March 2024.[104] ISW has previously reported on the ways in which Russian officials and regime-linked actors, as well as the Russia state, have exploited Ukrainian economic assets for personal, military, and financial gain.[105]Ukrainian outlet Suspilne published an investigation on October 21 detailing Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky's role in the illegal deportations of Ukrainian civilians, supporting ISW's long running assessments on Balitsky's admitted use of forced deportation as a punitive measure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[106] Suspilne found that Balitsky first signed a decree in July 2022 legalizing forced deportations within occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, entitled "on measures of responsibility for the commission of certain offences that encroach on public order and public safety." Suspilne emphasized that Balitsky has repeatedly positioned himself as an "ideologue" advocating for deportations of anyone who does not display explicitly pro-Russian views. ISW reported in February 2024 that Balitsky openly admitted to overseeing the forcible deportation of individuals who did not support Russia's invasion of Ukraine and assessed at the time that it shows the extent to which Russian occupation authorities are supporting and even promoting such illegal policies.[107]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)See topline text. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://static dot kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/MUCfWDg0QRs3xfMUiCAmF3LEh02OL3Hk.pdf[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524[3] https://mfa.gov dot ua/news/komentar-mzs-shchodo-pidsumkovoyi-deklaraciyi-samitu-briks-u-kazani[4] https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obiednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalitsiyu[5] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2024/10/23/7480995/; https://english.www.gov dot cn/news/202410/23/content_WS6718e939c6d0868f4e8ec383.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281161 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281179 http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75375 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281046 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281174; tps://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obyednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalicziyu/; https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/lidery-briks-vystupyly-proty-planiv-rf-iz-peretvorennya-obiednannya-na-antyamerykansku-koalitsiyu[6] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/75375 ;[7] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/12/01/chinas-xi-and-eus-michel-call-for-ukraine-de-escalation-at-meeting; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessment%20March%2017%2C%202023.pdf[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12006[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184686;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184722[10] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[11] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[12] https://tass dot com/world/1390491; http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/75137[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-22-2024[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-tells-israel-not-even-consider-attacking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-tass-2024-10-17/[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2023 [16] https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/183; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7209; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/1849069350789009737; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7211; https://t.me/karadag15brop/76; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7217; https://t.me/diomeddog/3608; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79230; https://t.me/motopatriot/28628 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141794; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17838 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59717[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7221; https://t.me/rubpak/223; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7219?single; https://t.me/mo114rf/56; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28802; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79236; https://t.me/motopatriot/28631; https://t.me/mo114rf/57; https://t.me/motopatriot/28630; https://t.me/dva_majors/55772 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133443 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141798; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7212; https://t.me/zhdanovrt/1457; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1849048080470933846[18] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79214; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79206; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28787[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1832015263023165819[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1606[25] https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/09/06/ukrainian-reinforcements-are-counterattacking-outside-pokrovsk/[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/23/austin-north-korea-troops-russia/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/23/glava-pentagona-zayavil-chto-voennye-kndr-nahodyatsya-v-rossii-chto-oni-tam-delayut-neponyatno ; https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korean-troops-russia-us-defense-secretary-says-2024-10-23/[27] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/23/politics/lloyd-austin-north-korea-troops-russia/index.html[28] https://www.president dot gov.ua/en/news/ye-sotni-faktiv-ochevidno-neobgruntovanih-invalidnostej-u-po-93981[29] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20241023012852320?section=nk/nk[30] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20241023005700315?section=nk/nk[31] https://t.me/modmilby/42742; https://t.me/modmilby/42737; https://suspilne dot media/864193-rf-i-bilorus-provedut-cergovi-spilni-vijskovi-navcanna/; https://t.me/mod_russia/44846; https://t.me/mod_russia/44850[32] https://t.me/modmilby/42737[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/44850; https://t.me/tass_agency/281135 [34] https://t.me/mod_russia/44850; https://t.me/tass_agency/281116 ; https://t.me/modmilby/42737[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2023[36] https://x.com/budeshta/status/1848770427700822265; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/3549[37] https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79202[38] https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1848797244029649047; https://x.com/alexskichambe/status/1848801605581475965; https://t.me/rugbygroup/72 ; https://x.com/budeshta/status/1849112812649685382; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190834 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190861 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190905[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/44851; https://t.me/rybar/64664[40] https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/wargonzo/22768; https://t.me/wargonzo/22777; https://t.me/motopatriot/28609; https://t.me/rybar/64664; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190638 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55741; https://t.me/rusich_army/17889; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79209[42] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/23/komandir-ahmata-zayavil-chto-rossiyskie-voennye-sovershili-187-prestupleniy-v-kurskoy-oblasti; https://t.me/agentstvonews/7776; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oADsefVPbk0[43] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/rozriv-snaryadah-mizh-rf-ta-ukrayinoyu-rekordno-1729666158.html/amp[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 [45]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2220 [46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/dvoh-troh-tyzhniv-ne-bude-v-sylah-oborony-oczinyly-termin-prydatnosti-rosijskogo-soldata-na-harkivskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/ScdUZNkwcYc[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/23/i-drit-ne-neskinchennyj-i-mozhe-zachepytys-rosijske-vundervaffe-ne-lyakaye-zahysnykiv-vovchanska/[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7214; https://t.me/fedorenkoys/637[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/44848 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44855 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281186[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/55755[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/281069 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11642 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803 ;[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2289;[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2287;[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2286;[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2286[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [58] https://t.me/epoddubny/21435[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28775[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/23/ridkisnyj-ptah-doletyt-do-seredyny-kanalu-sproba-proryvu-v-chasovomu-yaru-zahlynulasya/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl [62] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849[63] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28775; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806[64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17806; https://t.me/tass_agency/281070 [65] https://t.me/rusich_army/17896 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141849[66] https://t.me/motopatriot/28612; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17849[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/znyshhennya-porcziyamy-azovczi-nyshhat-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan-u-nyu-jorku/; https://t.me/azov_media/6185 [68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/znyshhennya-porcziyamy-azovczi-nyshhat-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan-u-nyu-jorku/; https://t.me/azov_media/6185 [69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141795; https://t.me/sashakots/49712[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141795[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79245 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12862; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12872[73] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7215; https://t.me/voin_dv/11450; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28794[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716; https://t.me/wargonzo/22754 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59714; https://t.me/voin_dv/11449; https://t.me/dva_majors/55716[75] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803[76] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28791; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28781[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l [78]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0VtQMdGBm5reUBA4yCF6m4p2LFy9b7tTewdHwDJJWGEY3AxyuAyYwg15Nfb2eLjDSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/55742 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55705 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17787 [80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17819 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281084 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55720[81]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qSmVM9iedLxXyXqoPm8furjdUTyEYrh4CNDgNdSXRGPC8JxAgjLR9NuxVKsTdB9Zl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ZtUSci6gSQQgEyP98zAyT1ZQVY9DG4iB8ZgJBsdLdmTNUwpBvDCNHhmT9jb4qNt6l[82] https://t.me/dva_majors/55785 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1849074132773732723 [83] https://t.me/dva_majors/55690 [84] https://t.me/dva_majors/55733 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55734 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55805[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/44842[86] https://t.me/kpszsu/21782[87] https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/863907-na-cerkasini-zbili-sist-droniv-vlucili-u-avtovokzal/; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/863987-vibite-sklo-poskodzeni-stini-ta-avtomobili-prokuratura-rozslidue-vlucanna-droniv-u-pidpriemstva-u-cerkasah/; https://suspilne dot media/cherkasy/864059-poskodzena-pokrivla-vibiti-vikna-dveri-e-rujnuvanna-stin-foto-vlucanna-saheda-v-avtostanciu-u-cerkasah/[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17818 [89] https://www.facebook.com/PvKPivden/posts/pfbid02hui5N5GbHxsJdLxDFfWEXSYwhVJKwMKb2bZQPMX8JpcBZCCo3AaWmnDm8jyJryXTl[90] https://www.facebook.com/RuslanKravchenkoKyiv/posts/pfbid0uexnmYCstyd15NRTFF2bpVPSkULk1yKwJ8gY9z5aMQryMsNCduxdFekELKN5CM3gl?locale=uk_UA[91] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190803; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190567; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/190525?single; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17848[92] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17848; https://en dot defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/gerbera_the_new_russian_foam_plastic_killer_drone_showcased_in_detail_video-11338.html[93] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/863809-krim-ak-odin-z-osnovnih-majdancikiv-rf-dla-zapusku-sahediv-so-vidomo-pro-rosijske-virobnictvo-droniv-i-ak-ih-zbivati/[94] https://t.me/sotaproject/88803 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20655 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali ; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2024/10/09/74184035/ ; https://okno dot group/srochnikam-perevodyat-dengi-za-falshivye-kontrakty-i-uvozyat-na-front/[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[96] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali ; https://74 dot ru/text/world/2024/10/09/74184035/ ; https://okno dot group/srochnikam-perevodyat-dengi-za-falshivye-kontrakty-i-uvozyat-na-front/[97] https://t.me/sotaproject/88824 [98] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/23/srochniki-iz-chasti-v-kurganskoy-oblasti-poluchili-po-405-tysyach-rubley-za-kontrakty-s-minoborony-kotorye-oni-ne-zaklyuchali[99] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22197519[100] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22194713[101] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22174101[102] https://www.azovmash dot com/ua/history; https://www.azovmash dot com/ua/investors/1382088575; https://vz dot ru/news/2024/10/21/1293483.html[103] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/vorog-planuye-stvoryty-kontsern-na-bazi-zahoplenogo-azovmashu/; https://vz dot ru/news/2024/10/21/1293483.html[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/5461; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf[105] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2023[106] https://suspilne dot media/863617-stavlenna-ak-do-rabiv-hto-i-ak-deportuvav-ta-vidpravlav-u-trudove-rabstvo-ukrainciv-z-okupovanoi-castini-zaporizza/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024[107] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 21, 2024
- at 10/27/24 9:47pmChristina Harward, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 21, 2024, 6:35pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2pm ET on October 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff. The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) completed the vote count on October 21 and reported that 50.46 percent (751,235) voted in favor of the EU referendum and that 49.54 percent (737,639) voted against — a difference of only 13,596 votes.[1] The CEC reported that Sandu took first place in the presidential election with 42.45 percent (656,354) and Stoianoglo took second with 25.98 percent (401,726). Sandu failed to gain the majority vote required to win in the first round, and she and Stoianoglo will move to the second round. Moldovan authorities counted votes from polling stations abroad last, during which the number of votes in favor of the referendum and Sandu greatly increased. Sandu stated early on October 21 while Moldovan authorities were still counting votes that "criminal groups" and "foreign forces" — likely referring to Russia and Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor — used tens of millions of euros to spread propaganda to destabilize Moldova.[2] Sandu stated that Moldovan authorities have evidence that the criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes and that the scale of fraud was "unprecedented." The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations' (ENEMO) International Election Observation Mission reported on October 21 that it found "massive malign foreign interference attempts" ahead of the October 20 election despite Moldovan authorities' efforts to counter misinformation and vote buying schemes.[3] The BBC reported that it witnessed at least one instance of vote buying at a polling station in the pro-Russian breakaway Moldovan republic of Transnistria after a voter exited the poll and asked where she would receive her promised payment.[4] Moldovan authorities previously reported that Shor used a Russian state bank to distribute at least $15 million to Shor-affiliated regional leaders and voters in Moldova in September 2024 alone.[5]Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Moldovan authorities used "totalitarian" methods during the election campaign and that the number of votes supporting the referendum "inexplicably" began to increase during the later stages of counting.[6] Zakharova claimed that the West is trying to turn Moldova into a "Russophobic NATO appendage deprived of sovereignty." Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Moldovan authorities of persecuting opposition forces and claimed that Russian authorities are monitoring the allegedly questionable increase in the number of votes for Sandu and in support of the referendum.[7] Several Russian milbloggers, including Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers, claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the election results and adjusted the referendum's voter turnout numbers.[8] One milblogger called for Russian authorities to create a network of "analytical and information centers" that will study how to influence processes in Moldova and promote Russia's state interests in Russia.[9]US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin traveled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.[10] The aid package includes additional HIMARS ammunition; 155mm and 105mm artillery ammunition; 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar systems and rounds; tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin anti-armor systems; M113 armored personnel carriers; satellite communication equipment; and small arms and ammunition.[11]Russia appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia. South Korea's Foreign Ministry summoned Russia's Ambassador to South Korea, Georgy Zinoviev, over reports of the deployment of North Korean military personnel to Russia.[12] The Russian Embassy in South Korea falsely framed the event as a voluntary meeting, as opposed to a diplomatic summons, and notably claimed that any cooperation between Russia and North Korea "is not directed against the security interests" of Seoul.[13] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia-North Korea cooperation "should not cause concern" to other states, and that information about the alleged presence of North Korean troops in Russia may be "contradictory."[14] The Kremlin's apparent desire to assure South Korea that its cooperation with North Korea is not a threat to Seoul suggests that the Kremlin remains very concerned about the prospect of Seoul's potential pivot towards providing Ukraine with necessary military support, and the implications of worsened relations with Seoul for Russian security interests in the Asia Pacific region. Russia has previously attempted to court Seoul in order to mitigate the impacts of its growing reliance on North Korea, as ISW has noted.[15]Russian forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of chemical weapons. Ukrainian officials reported on October 21 that Russian forces executed two unarmed Ukrainian POWs near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast on October 18 by shooting them while restrained at point-blank range.[16] ISW assessed that Russian forces have recently increased systematic executions of Ukrainian POWs in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs, which forbids the inhumane treatment and execution of POWs.[17] A Russian milblogger also posted footage and openly claimed on October 20 that Russian forces are using chloropicrin (a pesticide and lung damaging agent) against Ukrainian forces.[18] The US Department of State announced on May 1 that it had determined that Russian forces are using chloropicrin and riot control agents (RCAs) in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.[19] Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces are increasingly equipping grenades with chloropicrin.[20] The apparent systematic perpetration of war crimes throughout the entire theater suggests that Russian forces continue to operate at a low level of discipline, and that Russian field commanders are doing nothing to prevent their subordinates from engaging in such criminal behaviors, or may even be encouraging them. There is no evidence that Russia is holding Russian personnel accountable for the violations of the laws of war that have been reported.Key Takeaways:Moldova's October 20 European Union (EU) referendum passed by an extremely narrow margin in large part due to support from the Moldovan diaspora, and current Moldovan President Maia Sandu will face Alexandr Stoianoglo in a second round of voting on November 3. Several Moldovan and European officials reported potential Russian interference in the election, and the Kremlin and its affiliates in Moldova will likely continue their malign influence efforts in the leadup to the November 3 runoff.Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers claimed that Moldovan authorities falsified the results of the election and referendum and continued to promote long-standing Kremlin narratives targeting Moldova's path towards European integration.US Secretary of Defense Llyod Austin travelled to Kyiv on October 21 and announced a new $400 million military aid package for Ukraine.Russia appears to be scrambling to reduce tensions with South Korea following credible reports of intensified North Korean cooperation with Russia, including South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence warnings that a contingent of North Korean troops has deployed for training to Russia.Russian forces continue to systematically perpetrate war crimes, including the continued executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and use of chemical weapons.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the western part of the Kursk Oblast salient. Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna, southeast of Pokrovsk, and southeast of Kurakhove. Russian forces recently conducted several mechanized attacks of various echelons in the Kurakhove direction. Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced on the western side of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting within and west of the salient. Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced in western Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo).[21] Fighting reportedly continued southwest of Glushkovo (west of the Kursk Oblast salient) near Novyi Put and Veseloye; southeast of Korenevo near Nizhny Klin, Novoivanovka, Lyubimovka, Leonidovo, and Zeleny Shlyakh; northeast of Sudzha near Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; east of Sudzha near Kolmakov; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo and Cherkasskaya Konopelka on October 20 and 21.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to cross the international border near Volfino (southwest of Glushkovo), and that Ukrainian forces deployed additional reserves near the Kruglenkoye-Nikolskiy line (northwest of Sudzha and southeast of Korenevo,) where they launched an attack with two mechanized company tactical groups.[23] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, 83rd Separate VDV Brigade, and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating near Lyubimovka and Zeleny Shlyakh; elements of the 56th VDV Regiment are also operating near Novyi Put; and elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] Medical elements of the Russian “Chernye Volki” ("Black Wolves”) evacuation detachment recently redeployed from the Bakhmut direction to the Kursk direction.[25] Elements of the Russian "Arbat,” "Pyatnashka,” "Sarmat,” and "Arkhangely” units (all part of the Dikaya Division of Donbas [Russian Volunteer Corps]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Russian sources are trying to justify the slow rate of Russian advances in Kursk Oblast by falsely framing this direction as uniquely challenging. A commander of the Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz detachment claimed that fighting in Kursk Oblast is very intense and claimed that the Kursk direction is the most difficult frontline area of the entire theater.[27] The detachment commander claimed that Russian forces are fighting against 14 Ukrainian brigades and 'Western private military companies,” also likely in attempt to explain away the slower Russian pace in the area.[28]Russian microelectronics manufacturer “Kremniy El Group” - one of the largest manufacturers of microelectronics and chips in Russia - announced on October 21 that it has temporarily suspended its operations due to Ukrainian drone strikes on the plant’s production and administrative buildings overnight on October 18 and 19.[29] “Kremniy El Group" announced that the drone strikes damaged special power supply facilities, and “Kremniy El Group” CEO Oleg Dantsev emphasized that the manufacturer is facing difficulties purchasing spare parts to repair the energy infrastructure.[30]The Ukrainian General Staff announced that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system overnight on October 21 approximately 60 kilometers from the frontline.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff did not specify whether Ukrainian forces struck the Buk-M3 system in Russia or occupied Ukraine.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Lyptsi on October 20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[32] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces advanced west of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 21. Geolocated footage published on October 21 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least three armored vehicles, during which Russian forces advanced east of Terny (west of Kreminna).[33] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, Lozova, Novoosynove, and Pishchane; west of Svatove near Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Yampolivka, Hrekivka, and in the direction of Novomykhailivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novosadove; west of Kreminna near Zarichne and Terny; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanske forest on October 20 to 21.[34] Elements of the Russian BARS-9 (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk-Svatove direction.[35] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 21 but did not advance. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne.[36] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated that Russian forces continue to use various types of equipment, ranging from tanks and infantry fighting vehicles to golf carts and motorcycles, to conduct assaults in the Siversk direction.[37]Russian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Chasiv Yar on October 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Several milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to one kilometer in depth south of the T0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway towards Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of this claim.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating in this area are between seven and eight kilometers from the outskirts of Kostyantynivka, which is relatively consistent with ISW's assessment of control of terrain south of Chasiv Yar.[39] Elements of the Russian 331st and 217th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) and the 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[40] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on October 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Druzhby Street in central Toretsk, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of this claim.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that intense fighting is occurring street-to-street within Toretsk, and that Russian forces are also fighting northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba and south of Toretsk near Nelipivka.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk itself and west of Toretsk in the direction of Shcherbynivka.[43] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 1st, 9th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are operating in the Toretsk direction, and reported that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade's 109th Motorized Rifle Regiment were responsible for the capture of Niu York (south of Toretsk) and advances into Nelipivka.[44] Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 21. Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces have advanced to Lysychanska Street in northeastern Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced to Stepna Street in southeastern Selydove and westward along the E-50 highway north of Selydove, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[46] Additional geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) advanced to Zelena Street in central Zoryane (southeast of Selydove), consistent with several milblogger claims that Russian forces crossed the Vovcha River in Zoryane and advanced into the center of the settlement with the intent of attacking northwestward into Hirnyk.[47] Russian security forces told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 21 that Ukrainian forces have begun withdrawing from Hirnyk, although ISW cannot confirm this claim.[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have established fire control over all roads leading into Selydove, complicating Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction.[49] Mashovets noted that while Russian forces are having some success southeast of Pokrovsk, the Russian command has failed to properly prioritize Pokrovsk itself as the main operational effort, leading to the tactical "fragmentation" of Russian objectives in this area into much more localized efforts, such as the effort to surround Selydove.[50] Mashovets also confirmed that elements of the Russian 30th and 15th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), with support of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) recently seized Hrodivka, Mykolaivka, and Krasnyi Yar (all southeast of Pokrovsk), which Russian sources initially claimed Russian forces seized between late September to mid-October.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Sukha Balka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Promin, Selydove, Lysivka, Mykhailivka, and Sukhyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk in the direction of Novotroiitske.[52] Mashovets noted that elements of the 2nd CAA are fighting near Selydove, while elements of the 90th Tank Division (CMD), with support of elements of the 51st and 2nd CAAs are operating south of Selydove.[53] Elements of the "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight on the side of Russia, are also reportedly fighting near Pokrovsk.[54] Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kurakhove during several mechanized assaults of varying echelons. Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows Russian forces advancing north of Kostyantynivka (southeast of Kurakhove) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault consisting of 19 armored vehicles and four tanks.[55] Additional geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Katerynivka (west of Kostyantynivka and southeast of Kurakhove) during a reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault.[56] This footage suggests that Russian forces have seized Kostyantynivka, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) originally claimed in August 2024.[57] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove) additionally posted recent footage of Ukrainian forces repelling a reinforced company-sized mechanized attack from Maksymilyanivka towards Kurakhove.[58] Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows that Russian forces advanced in the "dacha area east of Kurakhove, suggesting that Russian forces have likely seized the entirety of Maksymilyanivka.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued offensive operations near Kurakhove itself; northeast of Kurakhove near Kurakhivka; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and southeast of Kurakhove near Antonivka and Kostyantynivka.[60] Mashovets reported that elements of the 51st CAA, 90th Tank Division (CMD), and 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating east of Kurakhove.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar on October 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar) and in field areas northeast of Vuhledar, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[62] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Vuhledar near Vodyane, near Bohoyavlenka, and northwest of Vuhledar towards Novoukraiinka.[63] Elements of the Russian 14th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]), 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]), and drone operators of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the western Donetsk Oblast area and near Vuhledar.[64] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 21.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on October 20 and 21, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[65] Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[66] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and the 52nd Airborne (VDV) Artillery Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[67] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M/North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile launched from occupied Crimea; one Kh-35 and one Kh-31P missile over the Black Sea; and 116 strike drones (including Shahed-136/131s) from Kursk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 59 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Vinnytsya, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Poltava oblasts; that 45 drones were "lost,” possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures; and that 10 drones remained in Ukrainian air space as of 0930 local time. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on October 20 that Russian forces launched 129 Iranian-made Shahed drones on the night of October 18, amounting to a total of 6,130 Shahed launches since the start of 2024.[69] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhiy Lysak reported on October 21 that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Kryvyi Rih and damaged civilian infrastructure, including a cultural site.[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian Iskander-M missiles struck a hotel housing foreign EW specialists in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on October 21, though ISW is unable to verify this claim.[71] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported on October 21 that Russian forces launched several waves of drone strikes targeting Kyiv City and that Ukrainian forces downed up to 10 drones.[72] Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper reported on October 21 that Russian forces launched a combined missile and drone strike targeting port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[73] Romensky Raion Representative Valentina Nazarenko reported on October 21 that Russian aviation struck critical infrastructure in Romensky Raion, Sumy Oblast and that Ukrainian forces destroyed four Shaheds over Sumy Oblast.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that a Russian Shahed strike damaged an electrical substation near Anastasivka and Lypova Dolyna, Sumy Oblast and cut off power to Romny, Sumy Oblast and other neighboring settlements in Romensky Raion and near Lypova Dolyna.[75] Ukraine's Northern Group of Forces reported on October 21 that Russian forces damaged three critical infrastructure objects in Anastasivka, Lypova Dolyna, and Romny, Sumy Oblast.[76] The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported on October 21 that Russian forces conducted a ballistic missile strike on a residential area in Zaporizhia City.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian missiles struck port areas and damaged oil infrastructure near Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast on October 20 to 21.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military drone production plant in Zaporizhia City, which the milblogger alleged Ukrainian forces used to strike Crimea.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 21 that Russian Shahed drones struck a Ukrainian air base and damaged one Ukrainian Su-27 fighter jet near Ozerne, Zhytomyr Oblast, but ISW cannot confirm this claim.[80] Kharkiv Oblast National Police Head Volodymyr Tymoshko reported on October 21 that Russian forces struck three raions in Kharkiv City with KAB-250 glide bombs, resulting in civilian casualties.[81] Russian opposition outlet Sever Realii reported on October 20 that Russian forces used four guided aerial bombs and Grom-E1 hybrid bombs to strike civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv Oblast.[82] Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on October 21 that Russian forces struck the Osnovyansky Raion of Kharkiv City with one KAB bomb and used six guided aerial bombs to strike elsewhere in Kharkiv Oblast.[83] Tymoshko noted that the Russian strikes were 'chaotic” in nature and intended to 'terrorize the civilian population” instead of targeting Ukrainian military targets.[84]Occupied Zaporizhia Oblast Governor Yevgeny Balitsky baselessly claimed on October 21 that Western countries may organize a false flag operation to destroy the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant and blame Russia for the destruction of the plant.[85]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian authorities continue to increase one-time payments in an effort to recruit volunteers for contract military service and avoid further mobilization. Russian sources reported on October 21 that authorities in Moscow Oblast reportedly increased the one-time enlistment bonuses to contract soldiers to 2.3 million rubles (about $23,759), which includes all categories of military personnel.[86] A Russian milblogger complained on October 21 that efforts of Russian authorities to increase the rate of contract-to-mobilized servicemembers leads to increases in unmotivated personnel.[87] Another Russian milblogger responded by claiming that Russian authorities who loosen regulations on the rights of mobilized and contract soldiers are those who want to advance their own careers at the expense of the lives of Russian servicemembers.[88]Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce occupied Ukrainian populations into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported on October 21 that Russian occupation authorities are offering money and social packages to schoolchildren in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast for signing contracts with the Russian MoD.[89] Teachers in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories emphasize signing of such contract as the most financially beneficial form of military service.Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on October 21 that unspecified actors murdered the Chief of Staff of the Russian 52nd Aviation Squadron of Heavy Bombardment Regiment, Dmitry Golenkov, near Suponevo, Bryansk Oblast.[90]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down a Russian “Orion” reconnaissance and strike drone over Kursk Oblast, which could carry up to four air-to-surface missiles.[91] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian “Orion” drones are dangerous because they can both conduct aerial reconnaissance and inflict strikes on ground targets.[92]Russian sources claimed that Russia will conduct tests of the Tallamho Design Bureau’s “T1-am” modernized drone direction finding system, which can now operate via cellular signal.[93] Russian sources claimed that the use of cellular signal will allow Russia to place sensors at any distance and will make drone detection calculations more accurate. Russian sources said that this transition to cellular signal will allow acoustic reconnaissance systems to detect drone flying along riverbeds, which Russian forces can currently hear but not see. The T1-am system reportedly can include up to 250 sensors, which are deployed around facilities in the rear or along the international border, particularly in Belgorod Oblast.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced on October 21 that Belarus and Russia are discussing the construction of the Moscow-Brest expressway.[94]The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that a Belarusian delegation participated in a forum for young officers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Beijing on October 21.[95]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://pv.cec dot md/cec-template-referendum-results.html[2] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/dimensiunea-fraudei-este-fara-precedent-maia-sandu-dupa-afisarea-primelor-rezultatele/; https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/1848130004028125266[3] https://enemo dot org/storage/uploads/QS8aYy9j1jaipfrf4AmVQE8DmWlRxGgDCb3AACtx.pdf[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1wnr5qdxe7o[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[6] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1976983/[7] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/10/2024/671613919a7947d182b2ebdd; https://ria dot ru/20241021/moldaviya-1979088595.html[8] https://t.me/pezdicide/3669; https://t.me/rybar/64621; https://t.me/rybar/64610 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22724; https://t.me/wargonzo/22731 ; https://t.me/rybar/64596; https://t.me/dva_majors/55552 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20083; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141536 ; https://t.me/yurist_yug/1056[9] https://t.me/dva_majors/55578[10] https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3941006/austin-affirms-united-states-unwavering-support-for-ukraine-during-visit-to-kyiv/[11] https://x.com/laraseligman/status/1848332848312328573[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russian-ambassador-seoul-summoned-over-nkorean-troop-deployment-yonhap-reports-2024-10-21/[13] https://t.me/rembskorea/5293[14] https://t.me/tass_agency/280642[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011924[16] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/862691-poblizu-selidovogo-na-doneccini-rosijski-vijska-rozstrilali-dvoh-polonenih-bijciv-zsu-prokuratura/ ; https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0yaSrHE3E1ZpogfgCQGps3392ZFnNT3EEEjykUakcR1Y5WHXt2CkjgNCHWL4Yi2Pjl ; https://t.me/dmytro_lubinetzs/7018[17] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024[18] https://avia dot pro/news/dshrg-rusich-soobshchaet-o-primenenii-hlorpikrina; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14437; https://www.reddit.com/r/tjournal_refugees/comments/1g87oji/%D1%89%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B4%D0%BD%D0%B5_%D0%B7%D1%96%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F_%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4_%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%96%D0%B2/; https://t.me/dshrg2/2431[19] https://www.state.gov/imposing-new-measures-on-russia-for-its-full-scale-war-and-use-of-chemical-weapons-against-ukraine-2/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524[21] https://t.me/brygada47/1031; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7199; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21460[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/44760; https://t.me/rybar/64598; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19208; https://t.me/rusich_army/17844 https://t.me/rusich_army/17844; https://t.me/rusich_army/17851; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17717[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/rybar/64598; https://t.me/wargonzo/22726; https://t.me/basurin_e/14979 ; https://t.me/shot_shot/73072[24] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11629; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11621; https://t.me/dva_majors/55562 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141535; https://t.me/rusich_army/17851; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79065[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141448[26] https://t.me/zovgrad/21690[27] https://t.me/tass_agency/280582[28] https://t.me/tass_agency/280578[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19-2024; https://t.me/istories_media/7894 ; https://group-kremny dot ru/news/osnovnaya-zadacha-vozobnovlenie-proizvodstva/ ; https://www.platan dot ru/brands/kremn.shtml ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10385; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10404; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/10/2024/671642879a79479fe92836c6; https://group-kremny dot ru/news/osnovnaya-zadacha-vozobnovlenie-proizvodstva/[30] https://t.me/istories_media/7894[31] qdpudHoGYGMN8CitwKg5JfknJFzKsxjGfEjjHejpEl[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2201[33] https://t.me/OMIBr_60/558; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7195[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l; https://t.me/rusich_army/17844[35] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141542[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl[37] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/shturmy-odynakiv-ta-proryvy-na-golf-karah-de-i-chomu-vorog-transformuye-svoyu-taktyku/ ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/862481-rosijska-armia-zmensila-kilkist-atak-na-troh-napramkah-na-doneccini-so-ce-oznacae/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17674; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17697; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79066[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79066; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17697; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17674[40] https://t.me/voin_dv/11431; https://t.me/dva_majors/55535; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141517[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28710[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17672; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79106[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2279[45] https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/179; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7194[46] https://t.me/motopatriot/28571[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12847; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7192; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79092; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28729[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/280690[49] https://t.me/tass_agency/280604; https://t.me/dva_majors/55547; https://t.me/rybar/64608; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17698[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2278[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2281[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79113; https://ria dot ru/20240823/ukraina-1967939158.html; https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic[55] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21448; https://t.me/odshbr79/399; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14441[56] https://t.me/opforukraine/42; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7196[57] https://x.com/Ukraine_Twi/status/1848312679338836469; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1848323740620173518; https://t.me/mod_russia/42775; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21448; https://t [dot] me/odshbr79/399[58] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/yak-zhe-vono-goryt-desantnyky-pokazaly-chergovu-nevdalu-sprobu-proryvu-okupantiv/; https://www.facebook.com/oaembr46/videos/2787752321388663/ ; https://suspilne dot media/862161-zelenskij-sklikav-zasidanna-rnbo-cerez-falsivi-invalidnosti-obstril-harkova-971-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1729506350&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4100[59] https://smotrim dot ru/article/4185561?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=vesti; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7181; https://t.me/mod_russia/44602[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2282[62] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28744[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/11425; https://t.me/voin_dv/11428; https://t.me/voin_dv/11427[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l [66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gV9P6PQmmQMhNaLy95evcsAN7ic5ArDH8RsQeoQA9maq3rHJaktTCRvsDibg6Pqql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wJX8RAgNhSUU2LW4iP9ZctwwAgbZLGrjhb1H5Y2iYkQsAjsHxNHTs1csXfTqgXYFl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09Vz3hGka7MdJWezBzarGHKJhsW7ceXNMstwmY3rfAjyZB2PJEAEmLhvF3s12KSD8l[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/55555; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/10/21/vlasti-rf-otpravlyayut-na-voynu-urozhentsev-drugih-gosudarstv-v-hersonskoy-oblasti-voyuyut-vyhodtsy-s-kuby-fotografii[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/21696[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/prezydent-vijna-prodovzhytsya-yakshho-ne-zupynyty-soyuz-rosiyi-ta-pivnichnoyi-koreyi/; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/za-cej-tizhden-u-nas-ye-pidtrimka-vid-partneriv-za-planom-pe-93949[70] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16837; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/kryvyj-rig-znovu-pid-udarom-rosijski-rakety-poshkodyly-obyekt-kultury/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/raketna-ataka-na-kryvyj-rig-poraneno-dytynu-ta-troye-doroslyh/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16830; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16836 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/862383-vijska-rf-znovu-zavdali-raketnogo-udaru-po-krivomu-rogu/[71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141524 ;https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529 ;https://t.me/rusich_army/17857[72] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pyatygodynna-tryvoga-v-kyyevi-ulamky-droniv-sprychynyly-pozhezhi-ta-poshkodzhennya/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8701 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/ataka-droniv-na-kyyivshhynu-znyshheno-vsi-czili-ale-ulamky-poshkodyly-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://t.me/kyivoda/21678 ; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8698 ; https://suspilne dot media/862173-rosijska-armia-bezpilotnikami-atakuvala-kiiv-so-vidomo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/862221-poskodzeni-budinki-avtomobili-ta-rinok-naslidki-rosijskoi-ataki-kiivsini/[73] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pozhezhi-ta-rujnuvannya-raketna-ataka-po-pryportovij-infrastrukturi-odeshhyny/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7178[74] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/862211-rf-atakuvala-energeticnij-obekt-v-romenskomu-rajoni-na-sumsini/ ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0264g5AwpcZgxmQVNNGtTh9jitWSiQpsxonkyb81FE789bB34HWYULgGnqfVjiD83Sl&id=100068589042866[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529[76] https://www.facebook.com/kommander.nord/posts/pfbid0zbrd6EyXCnLRg12ErkpiMggvWU3SbmSfqruSuVP2jVosY1SE9oPvstoc75CbRaS6l?locale=ru_RU ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280626[77] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/34589[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/55525 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/14994 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/14980 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17852 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529[79] https://t.me/tass_agency/280589[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141529[81] https://www.npu dot gov.ua/news/stanom-na-0300-u-kharkovi-12-liudei-postrazhdaly-cherez-rosiiski-obstrily-politseiski-zadokumentuvaly-naslidky-vorozhoi-ataky?v=6715a26fe43ee; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-moment-udaru-po-harkovu-zrosla-kilkist-postrazhdalyh/[82] https://t.me/severrealii/27841[83] https://t.me/synegubov/11674 ; https://t.me/synegubov/11670[84] https://www.npu dot gov.ua/news/stanom-na-0300-u-kharkovi-12-liudei-postrazhdaly-cherez-rosiiski-obstrily-politseiski-zadokumentuvaly-naslidky-vorozhoi-ataky?v=6715a26fe43ee; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/pravoohoronczi-pokazaly-moment-udaru-po-harkovu-zrosla-kilkist-postrazhdalyh/[85] https://t.me/tass_agency/280588[86] https://news-balashiha dot ru/incident/2024/10/21/111260.html; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59664[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/55585[88] https://t.me/zhivoff/17529[89] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/22123 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/862259-proponuut-grosi-ta-socpaket-starsoklasnikiv-u-starobilskomu-rajoni-agituut-pidpisati-kontrakt-z-armieu-rf/ [90] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/na-rosiyi-zabyly-nasmert-molotkom-lotchyka-vynnogo-u-raketnyh-udarah-po-dnipru/; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/molotok-spravedlyvosti-na-rosii-likvidovano-voiennoho-zlochyntsia-dmitriia-golienkova.html ; https://suspilne dot media/862243-pid-branskom-u-rosii-znajdeno-tilo-nacalnika-aviacijnoi-eskadrili-vks-rf-gur-mo/; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/molotok-spravedlyvosti-na-rosii-likvidovano-voiennoho-zlochyntsia-dmitriia-golienkova.html; https://t.me/astrapress/66805; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14438[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/desantnyky-zbyly-na-kurshhyni-bpla-z-4-raketamy/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4099[92] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/20/desantnyky-zbyly-na-kurshhyni-bpla-z-4-raketamy/; https://t.me/ua_dshv/4099[93] https://t.me/motopatriot/28577; https://t.me/northernwarriors/536; https://t.me/bes_pilot/1090[94] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/274003; https://belta dot by/president/view/belarus-i-rossija-obsuzhdajut-stroitelstvo-skorostnoj-magistrali-moskva-brest-669690-2024/[95] https://t.me/modmilby/42678
- — Possible Russian Gains in Georgia and Moldova
- at 10/27/24 9:16pmDavit Gasparyan and Christina HarwardOctober 27, 2024, 7pm ET The Kremlin continues to pursue its longstanding hybrid warfare efforts to regain effective control of the territories of the former Soviet Union even as it seeks to gain control of Ukraine through military force. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine is, in fact, supporting Russian hybrid warfare efforts in former Soviet states, particularly Moldova and Georgia, as pro-Russian local political leaders and influencers benefit from the implicit threat of Russian aggression against their own states. Moscow seeks to regain momentum in its efforts to reconsolidate control over the post-Soviet space through the ongoing elections in Moldova and Georgia and will seek to capitalize on successes in those elections to advance its objectives in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.Russia has implemented various methods from its hybrid warfare playbook to influence the recent Georgian elections and directly interfere in the recent Moldovan election. The Kremlin relied on information operations in both Georgia and Moldova and is tailoring its methods to the distinctive characteristics of Moldova's and Georgia's histories, governments, geopolitics, and societies. ISW offers the following updates on the October 26 parliamentary elections in Georgia and the October 20 first-round presidential election and EU referendum in Moldova. ISW will continue to analyze Moscow's attempts to influence and interfere in these elections and forecast how the Kremlin can exploit the results of these elections in future reports.GeorgiaPreliminary results show that the ruling Georgian Dream party has won the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections, sparking widespread allegations of voter irregularities and setting the stage for protests, further complications in Georgia-West relations, and enhanced Kremlin influence in Georgia and the South Caucasus.Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party won a simple majority of around 54 percent in the Georgian parliamentary elections held on October 26, 2024, according to preliminary results that the opposition is challenging.[1] Preliminary results released by the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC) on October 27 with 99 percent of precincts reporting suggest that the Georgian Dream party won nearly 54 percent of the seats in parliament, while the four main pro-Western opposition parties together won about 38 percent. The results suggest that Georgian Dream will gain around 89 seats in the 150-member parliament, short of the “constitutional majority” of 113 seats required to enact the constitutional changes it hoped for, such as banning pro-Western opposition parties.[2] Western and Georgian opposition exit polls had suggested that Georgian Dream would only win a plurality of votes (around 40 percent) giving the combined opposition parties a clear majority.[3]International election observers, Western officials, and the Georgian opposition are contesting the election results alleging systematic violations. Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili announced on October 28 that she does not recognize the results of the election, calling it a “total robbery” and stating that the Georgian people witnessed a “Russian special operation,” suggesting unspecified large-scale Russian interference.[4] Most of the pro-Western opposition parties poised to gain seats in the parliament also rejected the results of the election, calling them fraudulent while some, including the Coalition for Change and Unity-National Movement, stated that they will reject their parliamentary mandates (and presumably refuse to take their seats in a parliament formed on the basis of this election).[5] The Helsinki Commission Chair to the US State Department, National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), and other international election observing bodies have stated that the Georgian parliamentary elections were marred by violence, voter intimidation, violation of voter secrecy, instances of ballot stuffing, vote buying, violations of “neutrality zones” around polling stations, attacks against opposition members and offices, and double voting, among other irregularities—statements consistent with those of many Georgian civil society organizations and Georgian election observers who have called for the annulment of the results.[6] Western officials also questioned the validity of the election results with many EU, UK, and US officials highlighting irregularities, urging Georgian authorities to investigate them, and even questioning the future of EU-Georgia relations.[7]Georgian President Zourabichvili and the Georgian opposition could seek to contest the results of the Georgian parliamentary elections through legal mechanisms and demonstrations. The Georgian Constitution established legal mechanisms through which the Georgian president, at least one-fifth of parliament, or the public defender can dispute the “constitutionality of referendums or elections” (Chapter Six, Article 60.4.h) by referring violations to the Constitutional Court.[8] The Georgian Constitutional Court, however, has recently aligned itself with the Georgian Dream party by refusing to suspend the controversial Georgian Dream-proposed “foreign agent” law while also ruling that Zourabichvili violated the Georgian Constitution in 2023 by making international working visits without Georgian Dream’s approval, consistent with the party’s accusations against her.[9] The Georgian Parliament requires 76 members for a quorum, and if the current election results stand, then Georgian Dream will likely form a government even if the opposition candidates do not take their seats.[10]The opposition and Georgian civil society will likely engage in large-scale demonstrations in support of electoral challenges but have not yet announced specific legal steps that they will take, instead calling for now for the support of the international community.[11] Zourabichvili, in coordination with the main pro-Western opposition parties, urged Georgians to gather outside the Georgian parliament to protest the election results on October 28.[12] Chairperson of the Unity-National Movement (UNM) opposition party Tina Bokuchava stated that her party “will fight like never before” for Georgia’s European future and suggested that there will be large-scale protests in coordination with Zourabichvili.[13] Georgian society has yet to conduct large-scale protests regarding the election results as of October 27, manifesting only small protests likely in anticipation of Zourabichvili’s formal announcements.[14] Georgian Dream has likely prepared for a protest scenario given Georgian society’s rich history of protests, particularly in the runup to the election. Georgian Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri announced on October 24 the purchase of several new water cannons for Georgian riot police, likely in anticipation of possible protests.[15]The European Union (EU) may further halt Georgia’s EU membership progress while taking additional steps in response to allegations of widespread electoral irregularities. President of the European Council Charles Michel called on the Georgian CEC and authorities to investigate the plethora of voting irregularities highlighted by international election observers while urging Georgian Dream to demonstrate its commitment to Georgia’s EU path, indicating that the EU will assess the future of Georgia-EU relations in November.[16] Various EU member state officials also voiced concern over reports of voting irregularities and showed support for the Georgian people’s EU aspirations.[17] EU officials have previously repeatedly voiced concerns over Georgia’s democratic backsliding, particularly under Georgian Dream’s rule, and recently suggested that Georgia must conduct free and fair parliamentary elections - among other requirements - in order to successfully resume its currently halted trajectory towards EU membership.[18] EU officials have also hinted at the possibility of revoking Georgia’s visa-free access to the Schengen zone.[19] Some Western countries have already frozen funding to and cooperation with Georgia because of its democratic backsliding, and the failure of Georgian authorities to address election fraud claims will likely continue this trajectory and further harm Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.[20]The atmosphere of instability in Georgia will likely derail the Georgian peoples’ Euro-Atlantic aspirations while enhancing Russian influence in Georgia and the broader South Caucasus. Georgian society largely remains committed to Georgia's EU and NATO membership. A Caucasus Barometer survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in April and May 2024 reported that 70 percent of Georgians support EU membership and 57 percent of Georgians support NATO membership.[21] A failure to properly investigate election irregularity allegations will likely distance Georgia from the West given the repeated warnings of Western countries and officials. A likely large-scale opposition protest movement against the election results would demonstrate the continued willingness of the Georgian people to advocate for their Euro-Atlantic aspirations, yet Georgian Dream rhetoric surrounding the election results and its previous response to protests suggests that a Georgian Dream government is more likely to crack down against protests and redouble its movement away from the West. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze celebrated the election results and stated that allegations of systematic fraud are unfounded lies by the opposition and that voting irregularities are a common occurrence in all countries.[22] Georgian Dream has previously used force against protesters, particularly during demonstrations against the “foreign agent” law passed in May 2024, including with water cannons, intimidation tactics, and police crackdowns.[23] A refusal to acknowledge and systematically address the issues surrounding the parliamentary elections will likely instigate greater protests from the opposition which, in turn, could open the possibility for further Georgian Dream crackdowns against the opposition and broader Georgian civil society. Such a development would not only distance Georgia from its Western partners due to continued anti-Western rhetoric, crackdowns on civil society, and overall democratic backsliding, but would likely also support Kremlin efforts to enhance Russian influence in Georgia, the South Caucasus, and broader post-Soviet space. The Russian information space has largely celebrated the Georgian Dream victory, clearly indicating that the party is the Kremlin’s preferred choice.[24] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin will likely leverage a Georgian Dream victory and the party’s pro-Russian rhetoric as an opportunity to enhance its role in Georgia amid previously waning influence in the region in order to reassert its perceived zone of influence and revive imperial boundaries and buffer zones.[25]MoldovaThe presidential election will move into a second round on November 3, but it is not yet clear if the Moldovan Constitutional Court will finalize the results of the October 20 referendum amid allegations of serious irregularities.The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) confirmed on October 24 and 25 the final results of the October 20 first round presidential election and EU referendum. The Moldovan CEC reported on October 24 that Maia Sandu received 42.49 percent of the vote (656,852 votes) and that Alexandr Stoianoglo received 25.95 percent (401,215).[26] The CEC reported that 50.35 percent (749,719) voted in favor of the referendum, with 49.65 percent (739,155) voting against.[27] The CEC stated that 50.72 percent of all registered voters participated in the referendum – over the 1/3 required for the referendum to be deemed valid.[28]The Moldovan CEC validated the results of the referendum and submitted its report on the referendum to the Moldovan Constitutional Court, which has 10 days (i.e. until November 4) to either confirm or reject the referendum results.[29] The Moldovan Electoral Code states that the court has 10 days to examine the CEC documents and confirm or reject the results of the referendum.[30] The Electoral Code also states that the Constitutional Court can declare the referendum "null and void" if there were "serious violations" of the electoral code during voting or vote counting that "influenced the results of the referendum as a whole." Should the court nullify the results, there will a repeat vote within two weeks, whereas if the court approves the results, the referendum's proposed amendments to the constitution will enter into force upon their publication in the Constitutional Court's Official Gazette. The Constitutional Court could, notably, announce its decision about the referendum results after the November 3 presidential runoff.Moldovan authorities continue to discuss electoral violations during the October 20 voting, and it is unclear if the Constitutional Court will nullify the results of the referendum due to these reported violations. Moldovan General Police Inspectorate Head Viorel Cernauteanu reported on October 24 that Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor and Russian state bank Promsvyazbank (PSB) brought $15 million into Moldova in September 2024 and another $24 million in October 2024.[31] Cernauteanu reported that 138,000 Moldovans received money through PSB but that the scale of Shor's voter bribery is likely must higher as each money transfer was likely disbursed to several people within Shor's network. Cernauteanu stated that Moldovan police have uncovered two vote buying schemes – either by transferring money through PSB or using couriers to physically pay people for their vote.The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate reported on October 26 that it had drawn up more than 630 reports on "passive electoral corruption" between October 24 and 26 and that the police sent more than 400 of these to the National Anticorruption Center for examination and legal action.[32] President of the Moldovan CEC Angelica Caraman stated on October 26 that Moldovan police found that the Kremlin- and Shor-linked Victory electoral bloc committed "countless" actions that violated electoral legislation in the campaign period and on election day, including distributing "agitational materials" related to the referendum and organizing unlawful meetings with voters.[33] Caraman also noted that authorities collected video showing "obvious" signs of violations of the principle of secrecy during voting and even attempts to influence voters.A self-described Moldovan "officer" reportedly sent an anonymous email to several Moldovan journalists and outlets on October 25 with a list of 3,789 people in "Shor's network."[34] The "officer" reportedly stated that their unspecified workplace has been investigating the Shor network for years and has passed information about "thousands" of "collaborators from Shor's network" to the Prosecutor's Office and the judiciary, but that most prosecutors "destroy the files" and prolong the cases. The letter also alleged that Shor has "bought" most of the employees in the Prosecutor's Office for Combatting Organized Crime and Special Cases and that Shor instructed the people within the network to vote no in the referendum and to vote for Stoianoglo or Victoria Furtuna in the presidential election. ISW cannot confirm the letter or its claims. Several Moldovan outlets reported that they verified some of the names on the list and confirmed that the people worked or still work for "Shor's network."[35]The Moldovan Constitutional Court may deem these electoral violations "serious" enough to nullify the results of the referendum. On the other hand, these reported electoral violations were part of efforts to increase the number of votes against the referendum, but since the referendum still passed and met the required turnout despite, the court may find that these violations did not "influence the results of the referendum as a whole."The Moldovan Communist Party demanded a recount of the votes cast at polling stations abroad, claiming that there were violations at diaspora polls that amount to a "possible massive fraud operation."[36] The Communist Party complained that many polling stations located in EU states displayed EU flags and that this amounted to "electoral agitation" for voters to support the referendum. Moldovan CEC Spokesperson Rodica Sirbu stated on October 24 that the Constitutional Court will be able to decide if a recount is necessary during its 10-day review of the CEC's report.[37]Current President Maia Sandu and former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo will face off in the second round of voting on November 3. Stoianoglo received more support in the first round of voting than pre-election polling suggested. A poll by Moldovan think tank Watchdog from October 11 to 16 just before the October 20 election showed that nine percent of respondents would vote for Stoianoglo.[38] Earlier polling in August and September 2024 also showed 9.9 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively, supporting Stoianoglo.[39] These polls only surveyed Moldovan voters residing within Moldova and did not take into account the diaspora vote, but Stoianoglo only received a limited number of votes from abroad (19,287).[40] Polling of Moldovans within Moldova therefore likely provides relatively accurate depiction of his overall voter support base.It is unclear how much support Stoianoglo will receive from other opposition candidates in the second round. Renato Usatii, the former mayor of the pro-Russian city of Balti and head of his "Our Party" political party, came in third with 13.79 percent of the vote (213,169 votes).[41] Usatii's possible endorsement of Stoianoglo would likely allow Stoianoglo to challenge Sandu seriously in the second round. Usatii, however, has a mixed record on endorsements in previous elections, and it is unclear if he will endorse Stoianoglo, Sandu, or neither. Usatii endorsed former Moldovan President Igor Dodon in the second round of voting in 2016 but called on his supporters to oppose Dodon in the second round of elections in 2020 (essentially indirectly endorsing Sandu).[42] Usatii stated on October 22 that he would consult with his party and report in the "coming days" about his decisions regarding the second round of voting.[43]Should the rest of the opposition candidates endorse Stoianoglo, he could receive roughly an additional 274,000 votes in the second round, assuming that turnout rates remain the same. It is unclear at this time, however, if opposition candidates will back Stoianoglo or if all opposition voters would even vote for him. Some Moldovans who voted for other opposition candidates may vote for Sandu in the second round, especially as many opposition candidates, including some who are Kremlin-affiliated or Kremlin-friendly, adopted pro-EU platform that sounded similar to Sandu's.[44] Stoianoglo's presidential platform ostensibly supports Moldova's European integration but labels Russia a "development partner" with which Moldova "must be friends."[45] Stoianoglo reiterated these themes in a debate against Sandu on October 27, stating that he is a "supporter of the EU" but did not participate in the referendum because he thought the referendum only pursued Sandu's "personal goals."[46] He also claimed that if elected, he would establish relations with all of Moldova's "development partners," including the EU, the US, Russia, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[47] More Moldovans within Moldova voted for the referendum (568,883) than voted for Sandu in the first round (487,558), and these approximately 80,000 voters may vote for Sandu and not the anti-referendum Stoianoglo in the second round. Voters intent on supporting the referendum but less enthusiastic for Sandu might, contrarily, stay home in the runoff, which could give Stoianoglo an advantage.More Moldovans living abroad may vote for Sandu in the November 3 second round if patterns from the 2020 presidential election repeat. Significant increases in turnout between the first and second rounds in the 2020 presidential election among the largely pro-Sandu Moldovan diaspora helped Sandu eventually secure her victory against Dodon by 16 points.[48] A total of 150,022 Moldovans living abroad voted in the 2020 first round, whereas 263,177 voted in the 2020 second round.[49] A total of 239,419 Moldovans living abroad already voted in the 2024 first round - a significantly higher turnout than in the 2020 first round, likely due to the lifting of COVID pandemic restrictions and a desire to vote in the EU referendum.[50] 169,294 Moldovans living abroad voted for Sandu in the 2024 first round, and 243,605 Moldovans living abroad eventually voted for her in the 2020 second round against Dodon. Turnout will be important, however, and it is not yet clear if the runoff will generate more or less turnout than the first round that coincided with the referendum.The Kremlin will likely try to prevent Sandu's re-election on November 3, possibly even by igniting violent protests in the lead up to the runoff or following the announcement of the results. Southeastern Europe-focused outlet Balkan Insight reported on October 18 that sources within Moldovan security structures with direct knowledge of the investigation stated that Shor funded the training of young Moldovans in Moscow, Republika Srpska, and Serbia by Serbian and Bulgarian nationals connected to Russian intelligence services and the Wagner Group.[51] The young Moldovans reportedly learned protest and destabilization tactics that involved weapons and explosives. The US Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina called on October 24 for Bosnian authorities to "thoroughly investigate" the reported training camp in Republika Srpska.[52] These reports suggest that Moscow was trying to ignite violent protests in Moldova, and although Moldovan authorities have arrested some people involved in the training scheme, there remains a threat that Kremlin-linked actors will try to foment violence either in the lead up to the November 3 runoff or in the weeks following to contest the results.[1] https://results.cec dot gov.ge/#/en-us/election_57/tr/dashboard[2] https://civil dot ge/archives/621188; https://www.dw dot com/en/georgia-ruling-georgian-dream-party-wins-election/a-70611564; https://www.voanews.com/a/georgian-president-calls-for-protests-after-ruling-party-wins-disputed-election/7841159.html[3] https://www.rfi dot fr/en/international/20241027-georgia-thrown-into-political-turmoil-after-disputed-vote; https://www.edisonresearch.com/edison-research-exit-poll-projects-clear-victory-for-opposition-parties-in-republic-of-georgia-parliamentary-elections/[4] https://civil dot ge/archives/631657; https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-president-protests-election-salome-zourabichvili-widespread-citizens/; https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-parliamentary-vote-violence-intimidation-russia-west/33175194.html[5] https://oc-media dot org/live-updates-opposition-and-observer-groups-vow-to-fight-georgian-dream-win/; https://jam-news dot net/georgias-opposition-on-the-election-results/; https://www.voanews.com/a/despair-in-tbilisi-as-georgian-dream-leads-in-election-results/7840716.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-parliamentary-vote-violence-intimidation-russia-west/33175194.html; https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=1021323569682291; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=529613696523600; https://civil.ge/archives/627971; https://agenda dot ge/en/news/2024/41302#gsc.tab=0[6] https://www.csce.gov/press-releases/chairman-wilson-calls-on-state-department-to-investigate-allegations-of-fraud-in-georgian-elections/; https://x.com/CharlesMichel/status/1850575679248593036?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1850575679248593036%7Ctwgr%5E2c38facaeb0cffa480d06403c86f08939740edd8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fcivil.ge%2Farchives%2F627971; https://civil dot ge/archives/631413; https://www.ndi.org/publications/ndi-presents-preliminary-statement-georgian-elections-and-finds-pre-election-period[7] https://x.com/CharlesMichel/status/1850575679248593036; https://x.com/EspenBarthEide/status/1850584177608966453; https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1850602710019531150; https://x.com/jnbarrot/status/1850601303506079831; https://x.com/ministerBZ/status/1850551001301778451; https://x.com/GermanyDiplo/status/1850532269506634088; https://x.com/RJukneviciene/status/1850528130026410290; https://x.com/aliciakearns/status/1850285704724861311; https://x.com/Tsahkna/status/1850479150919786962;[8] https://matsne.gov dot ge/en/document/view/30346?publication=36[9] https://civil dot ge/archives/627785; https://agenda dot ge/en/news/2024/40341#gsc.tab=0; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnnlMVPU6GE; https://civil dot ge/archives/563563[10] https://civil dot ge/archives/537869[11] https://x.com/Zourabichvili_S/status/1721558673107898758[12] https://x.com/Zourabichvili_S/status/1850624029448667459; https://x.com/Zourabichvili_S/status/1850623129783251168; https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-president-protests-election-salome-zourabichvili-widespread-citizens/[13] https://www.interpressnews dot ge/en/article/134307-tina-bokuchava-we-do-not-accept-the-results-of-the-hijacked-elections-we-are-not-going-to-recognize-the-stolen-results/[14] https://x.com/OCMediaorg/status/1850545685470257655?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1850545685470257655%7Ctwgr%5Edfe14026ece46db4016eb793981e11740f5dc523%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Foc-media.org%2Flive-updates-opposition-and-observer-groups-vow-to-fight-georgian-dream-win%2F[15] https://oc-media dot org/georgian-riot-police-purchase-new-water-cannons/; https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-election-dream-zurabishvili-saakashvili-russia-kobakhidze/33165650.html[16] https://x.com/CharlesMichel/status/1850575679248593036[17] https://x.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1850602710019531150; https://www.eeas dot europa.eu/eeas/georgia-joint-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-and-european-commission-parliamentary_en; https://x.com/MariaStenergard/status/1850592597921644823; https://x.com/GermanyDiplo/status/1850532269506634088[18] https://civil dot ge/archives/625445; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cql82we090vo[19] https://georgiatoday dot ge/ministers-of-european-affairs-of-13-eu-countries-the-european-future-of-georgia-is-in-your-hands/; https://www.interpressnews dot ge/ka/article/815436-evroparlamentari-marketa-gregorova-sakartvelos-kandidatis-statusi-mivecit-da-misi-ukan-cageba-shegvizlia-vizaliberalizacia-mivecit-da-misi-ukan-cageba-shegvizlia/; https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-prime-minister-irakli-kobakhidze-eu-visa-free-travel-agreement-election-democratic-backsliding-rule-of-law/[20] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3827839/postponement-of-exercise-noble-partner-announcement/; https://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/32961682.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/tbilisi-foreign-agent-blinken--visa-protest-/32961744.html; https://www.radiotavisupleba dot ge/a/33027609.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-halts-georgia-accession/33027858.html; https://x.com/EUinGeorgia/status/1843623247855923598; https://www.europarl dot europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20241003IPR24429/parliament-says-georgia-s-democracy-is-at-risk; https://www.reuters.com/world/britain-freezes-security-dialogue-with-georgia-georgian-media-reports-2024-10-15/[21] https://caucasusbarometer dot org/en/cb2024ge/EUSUPP/ ; https://caucasusbarometer dot org/en/cb2024ge/NATOSUPP/[22] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78ddj25kgvo[23] https://www.npr.org/2024/05/05/1249263717/protests-in-georgia-over-countrys-foreign-influence-bill; https://www.rferl.org/a/georgian-protesters-elections-october-foreign-agent-law/32972822.html; https://civil dot ge/archives/606294[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/georgia-votes-election-seen-stark-choice-between-russia-west-2024-10-26/; https://t.me/SolovievLive/291459; https://t.me/SolovievLive/291459; https://t.me/SolovievLive/291459; https://t.me/rybar/64817; https://t.me/rybar/64818; https://t.me/pezdicide/3671[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-or-west-stakes-georgia%E2%80%99s-election[26] https://a.cec dot md/ro/comisia-electorala-centrala-a-publicat-rezultatele-alegerilor-pentru-functia-2781_111807.html; https://pv dot cec.md/cec-template-presidential-results.html[27] https://pv dot cec.md/cec-template-referendum-results.html ; https://a dot cec.md/ro/cec-a-totalizat-rezultatele-referendumului-republican-constitutional-din-20-2781_111818.html[28] https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-totalizat-rezultatele-referendumului-republican-constitutional-din-20-2781_111818.html[29] https://a.cec dot md/ro/cec-a-totalizat-rezultatele-referendumului-republican-constitutional-din-20-2781_111818.html[30] https://www.legis dot md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=144550&lang=ro[31] https://romania dot europalibera.org/a/aproape-40-milioane-de-dolari-ar-fi-cheltuit-sor-in-doua-luni-pentru-a-corupe-alegatorii-moldoveni-politia/33171742.html[32] https://agora dot md/2024/10/26/coruptia-electorala-in-vizorul-autoritatilor-peste-sase-sute-de-procese-verbale-intocmite-in-ultimele-doua-zile[33] https://stiri dot md/article/politica/cec-propune-sanctionarea-agitatiei-electorale-mascate-drept-intalniri-cu-cetatenii/[34] https://www.zdg dot md/stiri/stiri-justitie/doc-mesajul-anonim-trimis-de-un-ofiter-care-isi-respecta-profesia-si-o-lista-cu-3-789-de-persoane-din-reteaua-lui-sor-noi-privim-cum-ei-ies-din-detentie/[35] https://www.zdg dot md/stiri/stiri-justitie/doc-mesajul-anonim-trimis-de-un-ofiter-care-isi-respecta-profesia-si-o-lista-cu-3-789-de-persoane-din-reteaua-lui-sor-noi-privim-cum-ei-ies-din-detentie/; https://nordnews dot md/alegeri/doc-pot-fi-in-localitatea-ta-demascarea-soristilor-politia-cere-sprijin-in-lupta-contra-fraudei-electorale/[36] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/cand-va-putea-fi-dispusa-renumararea-voturilor-la-referendum-ceruta-de-comunisti/33171905.html[37] https://moldova dot europalibera.org/a/cand-va-putea-fi-dispusa-renumararea-voturilor-la-referendum-ceruta-de-comunisti/33171905.html[38] https://watchdog dot md/en/polls/208333/sondaj-socio-politic-octombrie-2024/[39] https://www.ipn dot md/ro/67-dintre-respondentii-unui-sondaj-idata-sunt-decisi-sa-8013_1107509.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zgGuvNQvgII ; https://www.dw dot com/ro/sondaj-op%C8%9Biune-cert%C4%83-pro-ue-a-moldovenilor/a-70302780; Watchdog, CEC commissioned https://watchdog dot md/polls/208281/preferintele-electorale-in-cazul-alegerilor-prezidentiale-si-parlamentare-rezultatele-unui-sondaj-de-opinie/[40] https://pv dot cec.md/cec-template-presidential-results.html[41] https://pv.cec dot md/cec-template-presidential-results.html[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections; https://noi dot md/md/news_id/93654[43] https://www.pn dot md/en/post/our-party-leader-renato-usatii-after-consultations-with-activists-we-will-inform-about-our-actions-in-second-round-of-presidential-elections~67174c108474aa4803c2200d[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[46] https://newsmaker dot md/ro/propunerea-lui-stoianoglo-catre-sandu-sa-semnam-o-declaratie-privind-garantarea-ireversibilitatii-cursului-de-integrare-europeana/[47] https://romania dot europalibera.org/a/cum-a-fost-dezbatere-prezidentiala-stoianoglo-se-declara-pro-european-dar-sandu-il-declara-cal-troian-/33175109.html[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[49] https://alegeri dot md/w/Votarea_peste_hotarele_Republicii_Moldova#Votarea_.C3.AEn_2024[50] https://pv.cec dot md/cec-template-presidential-results.html[51] https://balkaninsight dot com/2024/10/18/moldovan-officials-detail-plot-to-train-election-disrupters-in-bosnia-serbia/[52] https://moldova.europalibera dot org/a/pe-urmele-moldovenilor-instruiti-de-rusi-in-balcani-statele-unite-cred-ca-tabara-se-afla-in-republica-srpska/33171733.html
- — Iran Update, October 27, 2024
- at 10/27/24 9:16pmCarolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Andie Parry, Siddhant Kishore, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network during its strikes on Iran on October 25. The IDF struck and disabled air defense command-and-control sites and radars, including at some S-300 sites.[1] The S-300 is Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates. The IDF struck three or four S-300 sites, including one at the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran.[2] Three unspecified Iranian officials told the New York Times that the IDF strikes have caused major alarm among Iranian leaders.[3]Some of the air defense sites that the IDF struck were protecting critical energy infrastructure in western and southwestern Iran. Western media confirmed that IDF struck air defense sites around the Abadan oil refinery, Bandar Imam Khomeini energy complex and port, and the Tang-eh Bijar gas field.[4] Degrading the air defenses around these sites could leave them more vulnerable to future strikes.CTP-ISW previously reported on how the IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and transfer them to partners abroad, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. The IDF strikes—in addition to targeting air defense sites—hit drone and missile production facilities across Iran.[5] Commercially available satellite imagery revealed significant damage at the Parchin military complex, for example. The Parchin complex is one the most expansive and secretive Iranian missile production facilities. Some of the targets that the IDF targeted at the missile facilities were sophisticated mixing machines used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[6] Iran will likely need months or possible a year or more to acquire new mixing equipment.[7]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said that, despite Israeli efforts to "magnify these actions for its own specific agenda”, it would be “misguided” for Iran to overlook the attacks during a speech in Tehran on October 27.[8] Khamenei emphasized that Iranian officials will “assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done” to show Israel "who the Iranian people are.” The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry called on October 26 for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council.[9] UN Security Council President Pascale Christine Baeriswyl announced that the council will convene on October 28 to discuss the IDF strikes on Iran.[10]Hamas has rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover in the Gaza Strip. Mossad Director David Barnea proposed the deal in a recent meeting with Egyptian officials.[11] Senior Hamas official Khalil al Hayya rejected the proposal and reiterated Hamas’ intent to continue fighting for influence in the Gaza Strip.[12] Hamas is exploiting the lack of a post-war plan for the Gaza Strip by lobbying for the establishment of a national unity government with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Hamas likely calculates that it could slowly coopt and control any unity government with the PA and thereby retain a prominent role in post-war governance in the Gaza Strip.Hamas rejecting the deal that would protect its leaders supports CTP-ISW's assessment that the death of Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to prompt a shift in Hamas strategy in the war. Sinwar similarly rejected a deal with Israel that would grant him safety in September 2024.[13] CTP-ISW assessed at the time that Sinwar would almost certainly reject the deal due to his deep commitment to fighting and destroying Israel.[14] Hamas will likely continue to engage in ceasefire-hostage negotiations with Israel in order to secure its maximalist demands, such as the IDF withdrawing completely from the Gaza Strip. Hamas officials and international negotiators are currently in Doha for further talks.[15]Key Takeaways:Iran: The IDF inflicted serious damage to the Iranian integrated air defense network in its strikes on October 25. This is in addition to the disruption that the IDF may have imposed on the Iranian ability to build missiles.Gaza Strip: Hamas rejected a deal with Israel that would grant Hamas leaders safe passage from the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release of Israeli hostages. Hamas’ rejection indicates that the group has not accepted defeat and calculates that it can survive and recover from the war.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 27. Israeli forces have killed over 40 Palestinian fighters since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on October 26.[16] The IDF 84th Brigade (162nd Division) destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and found a large quantity of weapons.[17] The Hamas-run Gazan Health Ministry claimed that dozens of civilians were killed or injured in an Israeli airstrike on a residential area in Beit Lahia.[18] The IDF stated that it had targeted Hamas fighters in the area.[19]The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas command-and-control site in the northern Gaza Strip on October 27.[20] The IDF stated that Hamas fighters used the former Salah al Din school in Gaza City to plan and conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces and into Israeli territory.[21] The IDF added that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties.Palestinian militias claimed to have conducted three attacks targeting Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 26.[22] The IDF 252nd Division operates around the Netzarim Corridor.[23]The IDF 252nd Division destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters in close-quarters combat in the central Gaza Strip on October 27.[24] The IDF Air Force struck militia buildings in the area. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from areas surrounding Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps.[25] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli personnel and vehicles southeast of Bureij camp on October 27.[26]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelAn Arab Israeli individual conducted a truck-ramming attack near the IDF Glilot intelligence base in central Israel on October 27.[27] The attacker rammed a truck into a group of Israeli civilians at a bus stop at the Glilot junction, killing one Israeli civilian and injuring 37 others.[28] Armed Israeli civilians shot and killed the attacker.[29] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent identified the attacker as an Arab Israeli citizen from Qalansawe—an Arab-majority city in central Israel.[30] Palestinian militias praised the attack, however, no group has taken responsibility at the time of this writing.[31] The IDF Glilot intelligence base houses the IDF Unit 8200, which is a signals collection unit, and the Mossad headquarters.[32] Iran targeted the base in its large-scale ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1.[33]A Palestinian individual attempted a car-ramming and stabbing attack targeting Israeli forces in Hizma, Jerusalem Governorate, in the West Bank on October 27.[34] The attacker approached Israeli forces in a vehicle and tried to stab IDF personnel in the area before the IDF shot and killed the attacker.[35] The IDF reported no casualties.Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least one location in Jenin since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 26.[36] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces. The Mujahidin Brigades—Palestinian Mujahidin Movement’s military wing—separately fired small arms at an IDF checkpoint near Bethlehem in the West Bank.[37]Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces around Kfar Kila.[38] Local media reported that Israeli forces continued to demolish buildings in Odaisseh, which is adjacent to Kfar Kila.[39]The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon, likely between Blida and Hula. The IDF 226th Brigade (91st Division) has continued operations in southern Lebanon in recent days.[40] The brigade raided a Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces (SOF) “staging area” in a village in southern Lebanon.[41] The forces have directed about 150 strikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure over the past week.[42]Hezbollah engaged the IDF 288th Infantry Brigade (91st Division), killing five reservists and injuring another 13 on October 26.[43] Israeli sources reported that three Hezbollah militants also died.[44] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that the IDF is investigating the incident.[45] Hezbollah has not explicitly acknowledged the incident at the time of this writing but claimed two attacks targeting Israeli infantry on the outskirts of Hula with an anti-tank guided missile and rocket fire.[46] Hezbollah claimed that it killed and wounded Israeli forces in the anti-tank guided missile attack.[47] The 91st Division is operating around Blida and Hula.[48]The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southern Lebanon around the Aita al Shaab, Aitaroun, and Ramyeh. Hezbollah conducted at least three waves of indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Aitaroun.[49] The IDF Air Force killed the Hezbollah commander for Bint Jbeil on October 25 and then killed his deputy on October 26.[50] The October 26 airstrikes also killed the Hezbollah Bint Jbeil artillery commander.[51] The IDF 1st Infantry Brigade (36th Division) has killed dozens of Hezbollah militants over the past week.[52] The 1st Brigade has also seized weapons and destroyed underground Hezbollah infrastructure, including caches buried near the border fence.[53]The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 26. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in al Dhayra.[54] A Hezbollah-affiliated military correspondent reported small arms clashes and rocket fire targeting Israeli forces in Yarine, the town adjacent to al Dhayra.[55] The IDF 146th Division directed an airstrike targeting Hezbollah militants in a building.[56]The IDF continued its air campaign to targeting Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure on October 27. The IDF Air Force struck over 120 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including infrastructure used by Hezbollah’s drone unit in southern Lebanon.[57] The IDF Air Force struck multiple weapons production sites in southern Beirut.[58] The IDF issued warnings to residents of Burj al Barajneh and Hadath neighborhoods to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[59]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 26 to 2:00pm ET on October 27. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 14 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on October 27.[60] The spokesperson told residents that they should move north of the Awali River.[61] The IDF previously requested residents to evacuate from all but four of the towns.Hezbollah has conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 26.[62] A Hezbollah one-way attack drone struck and damaged a military industrial site east of Acre, northern Israel.[63] The company produces aviation components for both military and commercial contracts.[64] The attack drone injured two people.[65] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that warning sirens did not sound in the correct location near the industrial site.[66] Hezbollah fired 75 rockets at another military industrial site east of Haifa.[67] Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in nine separate incidents.[68] Hezbollah conducted five attacks targeting Israeli forces east of Hula, where Israeli forces are reportedly conducting clearing operations.[69]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 26.[70] The claims include the following:Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Golan Heights[71]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat[72][1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/israel-air-defenses-iran-energy-sites.html[6] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[7] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[8] https://english.khamenei dot ir/news/11208/Zionist-regime-must-be-made-to-realize-power-of-Iranian-nation[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/06/3186660/[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-expected-meet-monday-over-israels-strike-iran-diplomats-say-2024-10-27/[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-israel-to-join-new-talks-for-short-term-gaza-cease-fire-3855399a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-israel-to-join-new-talks-for-short-term-gaza-cease-fire-3855399a?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2024[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-11-2024[15] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-strikes-on-iran-while-measured-push-region-deeper-into-a-dangerous-era-24751826?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos4[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412061932585013[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412061932585013[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/27/israel-iran-tehran-war-news-gaza-hamas/[19] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/27/israel-iran-tehran-war-news-gaza-hamas/[20] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850304402357158051[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850304405322473602[22] https://t.me/sarayaps/18752 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4461 ; https://t.me/abualiajel/469[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412065472573894[25] https://t.me/hamza20300/305547 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305580 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305585[26] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4454[27] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15935 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850457540011700710[28] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15942 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15935[29] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850462668546613391[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15936[31] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/10/27/4420/ ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18751 ; https://t.me/nedalps/4462[32] https://www.idf dot il/en/mini-sites/directorates/military-intelligence-directorate/military-intelligence-directorate/[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-1-2024[34] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850492339116015778[35] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15937 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15938[36] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1684[37] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14972[38] https://t.me/mmirleb/8398[39] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/96535[40] www dot idf.il/243035[41] www dot idf.il/243035[42] https://www dot idf.il/243035[43] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/4-reservists-killed-in-battle-with-hezbollah-in-south-lebanon-idf-announces/ ; https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC271020247864347 ; https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC27102024657983[44] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/4-reservists-killed-in-battle-with-hezbollah-in-south-lebanon-idf-announces/[45] https://x.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1850463218071712201[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/8391 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8414[47] https://t.me/mmirleb/8391[48] https://t.me/mmirleb/8237[49] https://t.me/mmirleb/8409 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8413 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8418[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850501164262920234 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850502239728673089[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850501164262920234 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850502239728673089[52] www dot idf.il/242896[53] www dot idf.il/242896[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/8411[55] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/96429[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412053288132786[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412049534271959 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412053288132786[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850412038926803011 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/96351 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/96313[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850285651830132888[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850483168232554777[61] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850483168232554777[62] https://t.me/mmirleb/8386 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8387 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8390 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8396 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8399 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8400; https://t.me/mmirleb/8401 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850508498141839568 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8405 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8406 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8407 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8408 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8410 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8412 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8416 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8419[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8390 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850431816445894855[64] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850433710589378645[65] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850425825352441885[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15921[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/8399 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15939 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850496906792706244[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/8412 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8408 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8410 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8406 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8400 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8396 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8386 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8387[69] https://t.me/mmirleb/8395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8406 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8408 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8410 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8412 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8391[70] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1408 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1410 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1412[71] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1408 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1410[72] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1412
- — Iran Update, October 20, 2024
- at 10/27/24 6:26pmKelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Siddhant Kishore, Ben Rezaei, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip. Palestinian fighters recently detonated a pre-planted improvised explosive device (IED), killing IDF 401st Armored Brigade Commander Colonel Ehsan Daqsa.[1] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Daqsa is the most senior IDF officer killed in the Gaza Strip since the October 7 war began.[2] Daqsa, the 52nd Battalion commander (401st Armored Brigade), and two other officers activated a trip wire after they moved about 20 meters from their tanks towards an observation post in Jabalia. The trip wire detonated an IED that killed Daqsa.[3] The 52nd Battalion commander was seriously injured and the other two officers sustained light to moderate injuries.[4] The IDF appointed 162nd Division Deputy Commander Colonel Meir Biderman as the acting commander of the 401st Brigade.[5]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.[6] Araghchi discussed recent ceasefire efforts in a meeting with Hamas’ Shura Council head Mohammad Ismail Darwish.[7] Darwish thanked Araghchi for Iran’s continued support and stated that the Palestinian militias will continue their fight against Israel. Araghchi separately met with Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya and senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk.[8] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[9] Araghchi stated in an interview with Turkish media following the meetings that Iran has already identified its targets in Israel for a potential retaliatory strike should Israel attack Iran.[10] Araghchi implied that Iran would only target military targets in Israel in such a retaliation. Araghchi traveled to Turkey to attend the 3+3 meeting with Russian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and Armenian officials to discuss the south Caucasus in Istanbul on October 18.[11]The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.[12] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF intercepted a small quadcopter drone that crossed into Israel from Egypt.[13] The IDF reported that the drone was ferrying eight handguns and an unspecified amount of ammunition.[14]Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.[15]The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[16] The Israeli security cabinet met in the command bunker in the Kirya instead of in its normal meeting room inside the base.[17] The cabinet discussed several ”sensitive issues including the Iranian issue.”[18] Earlier reports stated that the security cabinet was expected to discuss increasing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip and vote on whether to approve finding an armed contracting group to distribute humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip.[19] This meeting also comes as Israel continues preparations for a possible retaliation to Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack.[20]An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon.[21] The LAF announced on X that the airstrike targeted an LAF vehicle on a road between Ain Ebel and Hanine in Bint Jbeil District.[22] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF confirmed that it conducted the airstrike.[23] The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck.[24] The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”[25]The IDF targeted and killed three senior Hezbollah officers in Tibnin, Bint Jbeil District, on October 20.[26] The IDF killed a senior member of Hezbollah's southern front headquarters Hajj Abbas Salameh.[27] Salameh conducted operations in the Bint Jbeil area and has held several positions previously on the southern front.[28] The IDF also killed Hezbollah radio communications expert Reza Abbas Awada and Ahmad Ali Hussein, the head of Hezbollah’s strategic weapon production unit.[29] The IDF said that Hussein had completed "in-depth training" in Iran.[30]Key Takeaways:Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters killed an IDF brigade commander in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip.Iran and Hamas: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with senior Hamas leadership in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 19.Weapons Smuggling on the Egypt-Israel Border: The IDF thwarted a weapons smuggling attempt from Egypt into Israel on October 19.Ceasefire Talks: Israeli Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar traveled to Cairo, Egypt, to discuss renewing hostage negotiations with incoming Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Mahmoud Rashad on October 20.Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: The Israeli security cabinet convened in Tel Aviv on October 20 after the Hezbollah attack on the residence of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.Israeli Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers in a military vehicle on October 20 in southern Lebanon. The IDF said that the Lebanese soldiers were driving in an unmarked vehicle towards an area where Israeli forces were operating and the IDF decided to strike the truck. The IDF clarified that “the Lebanese army and the objectives of the Lebanese state are not a target as far as we are concerned.”Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF Air Force struck multiple militia targets in the Gaza Strip in the past 24 hours, including weapons depots, military buildings, and other militia infrastructure.[31]The IDF 162nd, 252nd, and 143rd Divisions continued operations in the northern, central, and southern Gaza Strip on October 20.[32] IDF forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters, destroyed militia infrastructure, and confiscated large quantities of weapons.[33] The 162nd, 252nd, and 143rd Divisions are currently deployed in Jabalia, the central Gaza Strip, and near Rafah respectively.[34]Palestinian militias, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor near Jabalia refugee camp.[35] Hamas detonated an anti-personnel mine and fired small arms and grenades targeting Israeli forces west of the camp.[36] PIJ mortared Israeli forces east of the camp.[37]The IDF called the Hamas-run Gazan Information Ministry’s causality numbers from an IDF Air Force strike in the northern Gaza Strip “exaggerated and inconsistent.”[38] The Gazan Information Ministry claimed 73 Palestinians died in an IDF airstrike in Beit Lahiya.[39] The Hamas-run Palestinian Health Ministry claimed around 87 Palestinians were killed or missing in Beit Lahiya due to the strike.[40] The IDF said that a preliminary investigation revealed that the existing figures are inconsistent with the IDF’s information and the precision munitions used in the strike.[41] The IDF said the strike targeted a Hamas asset.[42] Palestinian health authorities reported that Israeli forces separately fired artillery shells at a hospital northeast of Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip.[43] The IDF said it operated against militia fighters near the hospital but did not intentionally direct fire at it.[44]Palestinian militias fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces operating along the Netzarim Corridor on October 20.[45] The 252nd Division operates along the Netzarim Corridor.[46]Oxfam claimed that the IDF Air Force bombed a water utility vehicle east of Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 19, killing four water engineers and workers.[47] The IDF said that Israeli forces fired an artillery shell at suspicious figures one kilometer from the border with Israel in the southern Gaza Strip but is reviewing the incident.[48]The IDF said that Israeli forces, in cooperation with the IDF Air Force, killed Palestinian militia fighters operating near Israeli forces in the southern Gaza Strip on October 20.[49] The 143rd Division currently operates near Rafah.[50] A Palestinian journalist reported that an Israeli military vehicle operated near the Rafah border crossing on October 20.[51] The National Resistance Brigades also mortared Israeli forces near the Rafah crossing on October 20.[52]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelAn unidentified Palestinian individual conducted a car-ramming attack near the Israeli settlement of Ofra in the northern West Bank on October 19.[53] The Israeli Army Radio reported that the attacker rammed his vehicle against an Israeli police vehicle at the settlement entrance.[54] Israeli forces killed the attacker and reported no Israeli casualties.[55]The IDF detained four armed Palestinians at a religious site near Jericho in the West Bank on October 20.[56] The IDF also confiscated M16 rifles and magazines from the detainees. The IDF detained the Palestinians after receiving reports of suspicious activities at Nabi Musa near Jericho.[57]Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 19.[58] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms targeting Israeli forces operating in Jenin.[59] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms and detonated IEDs targeting Israeli forces operating in Balata refugee camp, Nablus.[60] PIJ separately fired small arms targeting an Israeli civilian vehicle in an Israeli settlement of Mevo Dotan in the West Bank.[61]This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF 210th Division continued operations in Hasbaya District, southern Lebanon, on October 20. Hezbollah-affiliated media reported IDF movement on Jabal al Sedana, north of the Israeli-controlled Shebaa Farms.[62] Hezbollah-affiliated media also reported that Hezbollah fighters fired rockets targeting Israeli forces operating in the area.[63] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF continued artillery shelling near Kfarchouba and Shebaa on October 20.[64] The IDF also reportedly conducted an airstrike that severed the road between Kfarchouba and Kfarhamam.[65] The IDF said on October 15 that the IDF 810th Brigade (210th Division) has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous areas in Hasbaya District over the past two weeks.[66]The IDF 98th Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 20. Geolocated footage posted on October 19 shows Israeli forces advancing down a road southeast of Kfar Kila.[67] Israeli forces killed Hezbollah fighters and located weapons caches, including grenades, Kalashnikov rifles, magazines, and other unspecified combat equipment.[68] Israeli forces destroyed several launchers aimed at Israeli territory.[69] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting a cell of Hezbollah fighters that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[70] Hezbollah claimed four rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Markaba, including in Markaba’s old municipality in the western part of the town.[71] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting Israeli forces operating west of Odaisseh.[72] The IDF directed artillery fire targeting Odaisseh, according to Lebanese sources.[73]The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 20.[74] An Israeli journalist reported that the IDF 769th Territorial Brigade demolished buildings on the outskirts of Blida from which Hezbollah planned to conduct attacks into Israel.[75] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Qalaa Heights, Blida.[76] The IDF previously at least partially secured the town of Blida, demonstrated by the IDF allowing Israeli journalists to visit the town on October 10.[77]The IDF 36th Division continued to advance in Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh in southern Lebanon on October 20. Commercially available satellite imagery and geolocated footage indicate that the 36th Division expanded operations into previously-uncleared areas of eastern Aita al Shaab and advanced east along the Aita al Shaab-Rmeish road.[78] Hezbollah-affiliated media confirmed this and noted that Israeli forces engaged Hezbollah forces in eastern Aita al Shaab.[79] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 20 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings north of Ramyeh, suggesting that the IDF also advanced north of Ramyeh.The IDF 1st Infantry Brigade continued “targeted ground operations” and located Hezbollah infrastructure above and below ground, including dozens of tunnel shafts, hundreds of weapons, and documents that Hezbollah fighters “left behind.”[80] The 1st Infantry Brigade and Egoz Unit fighters killed Hezbollah fighters in ground encounters and in airstrikes in cooperation with the IDF Air Force.[81] The IDF said that the 1st Infantry Brigade has killed 60 Hezbollah fighters in its operations so far.[82] Lebanese media reported airstrikes and artillery fire in the Aita al Shaab area.[83]Israeli forces conducted operations near Yarine, southwestern Lebanon, on October 20. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 20 showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks extending from the Israeli border up to Yarine, indicating that Israeli forces operated south of Yarine. The IDF has not acknowledged operations in Yarine as of this writing.The 146th Division continued operations in southwestern Lebanon. Israeli forces located and destroyed weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles, launchers, and ammunition.[84] Israeli forces attacked over 100 military targets used by Hezbollah in the past day, including rigged buildings and a weapons warehouse.[85]The IDF conducted multiple airstrikes targeting Hezbollah's intelligence apparatus headquarters and an underground weapons workshop in Dahiyeh, Beirut, on October 20.[86] Lebanese sources reported two airstrikes in the Haret Hreik and Hadath neighborhoods.[87] The IDF said it took steps to avoid civilian harm in the attacks.[88] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters on October 19 that the number of civilian casualties in Lebanon was “far too high” and that he would “like to see Israel scale back some of the strikes it’s taking, especially in and around Beirut.”[89] US officials have repeatedly expressed concern about Israeli airstrikes in Beirut.[90] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati said recently that the Lebanese government had received ”a sort of guarantee” from the Biden administration that Israel would curb airstrikes on Beirut.[91]The IDF Air Force continued to strike Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including Hezbollah fighters, rocket launchers, and military infrastructure.[92] The IDF Air Force targeted over 65 Hezbollah fighters in airstrikes on October 20.[93] The IDF said it struck a rocket launcher that Hezbollah fighters used to fire dozens of launches at the Western Galilee earlier on October 20.[94] Lebanese sources reported that Israel conducted 14 airstrikes targeting al Khiam.[95]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 19 to 2:00pm ET on October 20. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 18 rocket attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 19.[96] The IDF announced that Hezbollah launched over 170 rockets into northern Israel on October 20.[97] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting a Northern Command air defense base in Birya and an IDF base west of Lake Tiberias.[98] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting an IDF base in southern Haifa.[99] The IDF continued to target civilian sites in northern Israel, including Kiryat Ata, east of Haifa, and Rosh Pina.[100] The IDF said that Hezbollah munitions caused multiple fires in the Upper Galilee and Western Galilee.[101] Hezbollah also continued to target IDF personnel in towns on the Israel-Lebanon border, including Manara, Adamit, and Misgav Am.[102]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 19.[103] The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat.[104] The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone near Eilat heading towards Israel from the east before it entered Israeli airspace.[105]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Golan Heights.[106] The IDF Air Force intercepted a drone in the Golan Heights that had entered Israeli airspace from Syria.[107]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Golan Heights.[108] The drone fell in an open area in the Golan Heights, causing no casualties.[109]Emirati-based outlet Erem News reported that Lebanese Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem relocated from Lebanon to Tehran on October 5.[110] Erem News is a UAE-based outlet run by Tajeldin Abdul Haq, a Jordanian national who has previously worked by al Sharq al Awsat and Elaph, which are both London-based outlets.[111] An unspecified Iranian source told Erem News that the "highest authority in Iran,” likely referring to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, ordered Qassem to relocate due to concerns for his safety following a series of Israeli operations targeting senior Axis of Resistance leaders including former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and his presumed successor Hashem Safi el Din in Beirut.[112] The Iranian source told Erem News that Qassem accompanied Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on an Iranian plane to Iran via Syria.[113] The source stated that Qassem delivered his last two recorded speeches on October 7 and October 15 from Tehran.[114] CTP-ISW previously reported that Araghchi traveled from Lebanon to Syria on October 4.[115] CTP-ISW cannot independently corroborate this report.An Iranian decision to relocate Qassem would be consistent with previous Iranian efforts to convince former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah to relocate to Tehran to avoid Israeli targeting. 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https://t.me/alichoeib1970/11305[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/8105; https://t.me/mmirleb/8099; https://t.me/mmirleb/8100; https://t.me/mmirleb/8088; https://t.me/mmirleb/8089; https://t.me/mmirleb/8091; https://t.me/mmirleb/8094; https://t.me/mmirleb/8083; https://t.me/mmirleb/8084; https://t.me/mmirleb/8085; https://t.me/mmirleb/8086; https://t.me/mmirleb/8087; https://t.me/mmirleb/8081; https://t.me/mmirleb/8079; https://t.me/mmirleb/8080; https://t.me/mmirleb/8077; https://t.me/mmirleb/8074; https://t.me/mmirleb/8075[97] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-over-170-rockets-launched-from-lebanon-at-northern-israel-today-no-injuries-in-latest-volleys[98] https://t.me/mmirleb/8100; https://t.me/mmirleb/8101[99] https://t.me/mmirleb/8105[100] https://t.me/mmirleb/8080; https://t.me/mmirleb/8075[101] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847919421638975796[102] https://t.me/mmirleb/8085; https://t.me/mmirleb/8077; https://t.me/mmirleb/8089[103] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1365 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1366 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1369[104] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1365[105] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847707137973375472 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1847707888883523667[106] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1366[107] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847723327936155728[108] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1369[109] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847824716263809207[110] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/world/6d8uuje[111] https://web.archive.org/web/20191214161527/https://elaph.com/Web/AkhbarKhasa/2007/7/250407.html?sectionarchive=AkhbarKhasa[112] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-airstrikes-28-september-2024-c4751957433ff944c4eb06027885a973 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hashem-safieddine-nasrallah-relative-seen-future-hezbollah-leader-2024-10-08/[113] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/world/6d8uuje[114] https://www.eremnews dot com/news/world/6d8uuje ;[115] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-4-2024#_edn649efae199c61251be81b2af142625e449[116] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-khamenei-warned-nasrallah-israeli-plot-kill-him-sources-say-2024-10-02/ ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-2-2024
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2024
- at 10/27/24 5:47pmKarolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, Christina Harward,Davit Gasparyan, and George BarrosOctober 27, 2024, 5pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will cover updates on the Georgian parliamentary election and Moldovan presidential first round election and EU referendum in a separate special edition publication. Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long term. The Washington Post reported on October 27 that the Russian economy is "in danger of overheating," noting that Russia's excessively high military spending has fueled economic growth in a way that has forced Russian companies to artificially raise their salaries in order to fulfill labor demands by remaining competitive with Russia’s high military salaries.[1] The Washington Post quoted Russian Central Bank Head Elvira Nabiullina, who warned in July 2024 that Russia's labor force and production capacity are "almost exhausted." The Washington Post noted that private Russian companies are struggling to keep up with Russian military salaries and are increasingly having to offer wages several times higher than the typical industry averages. ISW has recently reported that Russian regional authorities are significantly increasing the one-time signing bonuses for Russian contract servicemembers in order to sustain Russia’s rate of force generation (roughly 30,000 troops per month), which underscores the fact that Russia does not have an indefinite pool of manpower and must financially and socially reckon with the ever-growing costs of replenishing its frontline losses via various force-generation avenues.[2] The Washington Post also noted that Russia's stringent migration policies, particularly after the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack, have further depleted Russia's labor pool and amplified economic frictions. This has particularly become the case as migrant workers are increasingly identifying Russia as a hostile and unattractive place to relocate for work.[3] ISW has reported at length on the balance that Putin is trying to strike between catering to his pro-war ultranationalist constituency, which espouses extreme anti-migrant sentiments, and his practical need to leverage migrant labor both economically and militarily.[4]Putin very likely assesses that calling another partial mobilization wave, or introducing general mobilization, will be too costly to his regime, and has therefore resorted to crypto-mobilization efforts that appear to be placing greater and greater strains on the Russian wartime economy. The recent appearance of North Korean troops in Russia, and their reported deployment to the combat zone in Kursk Oblast, further suggests that Putin's entire force-generation system is very tenuous.[5] The costs of fueling the war will increase as Russia continues to burn through manpower and materiel on the frontline. Russian resources are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely. Russia's economy will reach a burnout point. That burnout point will inflict great costs on Russian society, which may force Putin to make major decisions about how to resource Russia’s war or change Russia’s mode of warfighting to preserve his regime’s stability.Key Takeaways:Russia's economy and war effort is coming under increasing strain, which will pose increasingly acute challenges to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ability to sustain the war over the long-term.Ukrainian and Russian forces both advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.Russian forces advanced in and near Selydove and northwest of Vuhledar. Russian authorities are using Cossack organizations to militarize Russian children and build out Russia's force generation reserve in the long term.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian ground attacks in the area on October 27. Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and east of Kolmakov (east of Sudzha).[6] Russian sources, including the Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on October 27 that Ukrainian forces attacked southeast of Korenevo near Zeleny Shlyakh, Novoivanvoka, Daryino, Nizhny Klin, Pogrebki, and Nikolaevo-Daryino; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[7]Russian forces recently marginally advanced within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[8] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are operating near Lyubimovka (southeast of Korenevo); elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Cherkasskaya Konopelka (southeast of Sudzha); and elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[9]A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novy Put in Glushkovsky Raion, west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, as of the evening of October 26.[10]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 26 and 27.[11] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yevhenii Romanov stated 60 percent of the 122mm and 152mm artillery ammunition that Russian forces are firing in the Kharkiv direction is from North Korea.[12] Romanov stated that the North Korean shells are poor quality and do not hit their targets or explode at the right time. Romanov also noted that the Russian military may be delivering Iranian-provided ammunition to Russian forces in the area. Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[13]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on October 26 shows Ukrainian forces successfully repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault northeast of Torske (west of Kreminna).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian Spetsnaz units are operating near Senkove (south of Kupyansk on the west bank of the Oskil River), although ISW has not observed any visual or independent confirmation that Russian forces have crossed the Oskil River.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Pershotravneve (west of Svatove) and into the northern outskirts of Terny (west of Kreminna).[16] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are intensifying glide bomb strikes against Kupyansk and the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in an attempt to gain a foothold on the left bank of the Oskil River and assault Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[17] The Ukrainian commander stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction two weeks ago, which may refer to the Russian reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault launched in the Kupyansk direction on September 26.[18] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka, Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove; southeast of Kupyansk near Vyshneve, Lozova, and Berestove; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve; northwest of Kreminna near Chereshchyna, Terny, Hrekivka, Novomykhailivka, and Makiivka; south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka; west of Kreminna near Torske and Zarichne; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka on October 26 and 27.[19]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on October 26 and 27.[20] Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reported operating in the Siversk direction.[21]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) on October 27.[22] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[23]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on October 27 but did not advance. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting within Toretsk itself; south of Toretsk near Niu-York; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka.[24] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on October 27 that Russian forces control two-thirds (67 percent) of Toretsk, although ISW has only observed visual evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy about 23 percent of the city.[25]Russian forces continued to advance in and near Selydove amid continued intensive offensive operations southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows Russian forces raising a flag over the Selydove City Council building, indicating that Russian forces have made advances into central Selydove.[26] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and are clearing the entirety of Selydove, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian forces operating in western Selydove.[27] Geolocated footage published on October 27 also shows that Russian forces recently advanced south of Vyshneve (just west of Selydove).[28] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces have also advanced into Vyshneve, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian forces operating within Vyshneve.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Vozdvyzhenka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Yar, Krutyi Yar, Mykolaivka, Lysivka, and Selydove on October 26 and 27.[30] Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Hirnyk (southeast of Pokrovsk), and elements of the 1453rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Selydove.[31] Elements of the 74th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the general Pokrovsk direction.[32]Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting west of Oleksandropil; near Dalne, Hostre, Maksymilyanivka, and Kurakhivka; and on the eastern outskirts of Kurakhove itself.[33] Elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil, and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating on the outskirt of Kurakhove.[34]Russian forces recently advanced near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on October 27. Geolocated footage published on October 27 shows a Russian soldier raising the flag of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) over central Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized most of the settlement.[35] Russian security forces told Kremlin newswire TASS on October 27 that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from most of their positions in Bohoyavlenka.[36] Additional geolocated footage published on October 26 shows that Russian forces have advanced in fields southwest of Novoukrainka (southwest of Bohoyavlenka and northwest of Vuhledar).[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in southern Novoukrainka, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of this claim.[38] A Ukrainian brigade operating near Vuhledar posted footage on October 26 of a Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian mechanized assault near Zolota Nyva (west of Vuhledar) and reported that Russian forces used several dozens of pieces of equipment including tanks and armored vehicles, of which Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed 20 pieces of equipment.[39] ISW cannot independently confirm when the mechanized assault took place, nor the echelon of the attack. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka, Antonivka, Kostyantynivka, and Yelyzavetivka, and near Bohoyavlenka, Novoukrainka, and Zolota Nyva.[40] Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment), 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]), and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating near Bohoyavlenka; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 36th CAA (EMD) are operating near Shakhtarske and Novoukrainka; elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, EMD) are operating near Katerynivka; and elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating near Antonivka.[41]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 27. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn confirmed on October 27 that Russian forces managed to recently seize Levadne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting efforts to restore positions in the area even though Levadne is in a tactically challenging lowland area.[42]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked in the vicinity of Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) on October 26 and 27.[43] Ukraine's Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that the Ukrainian military has not detected Russian efforts to form offensive groups in southern Ukraine.[44]Russian forces continued ground attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 26 and 27 but did not make any confirmed advances.[45] Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue operating in Kherson Oblast.[46]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-136/131 drones and drones of an unidentified type from Oryol and Kursk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[47] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones over Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Chernihiv oblasts; that 32 drones became "lost," possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures; and that one drone flew into Belarusian airspace as of 0930 local time on October 27.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on October 27 that Russian forces have launched 1,100 glide bombs, 560 strike drones, and 20 missiles of various types at Ukraine in the past week.[48]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian authorities are using Cossack organizations to militarize Russian children and build out Russia's force generation reserve in the long term. Russian opposition outlet SOTA reported on October 27 that another group of 300 children began training at the Patriotic Education Center in Belgorod Oblast, where they reportedly will learn about Cossack military culture, uniforms, and weapons handling.[49] SOTA noted that the Russian Presidential Fund is providing the funding for this program, which is aimed at "popularizing Cossack history and Cossack culture" and the "moral and patriotic education of the younger generation."[50] ISW has recently reported on Russia's use of Cossack organizations, including the youth-focused Cossack cadet corps, as a method of building out Russia's long term mobilization reserve.[51]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russia will reportedly represent Belarus at the World Bank, likely as part of ongoing efforts to co-opt Belarusian foreign policy. Executive Director representing Russia at the World Bank Roman Marshavin announced on October 27 that Russia will represent Belarus at the World Bank starting in November 2024.[52] A Turkish national representing several European countries previously represented Belarus at the World Bank.[53] ISW will release a forthcoming long-form report about how the Kremlin seeks to de facto annex Belarus, including by establishing control of Belarusian monetary policy by imposing a Russian-Belarusian currency union using the Russian ruble.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/27/russia-economy-overheating-inflation-interest-rates-war/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wp_homepage[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/27/russia-economy-overheating-inflation-interest-rates-war/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=wp_homepage[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar06272024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/25/world/europe/north-korean-troops-arrive-kursk-russia.html; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-25/north-korea-to-send-more-troops-to-russia-soon-intelligence-documents-reveal[6] (Olgovka) https://x.com/budeshta/status/1850413310405149002; https://t.me/rusich_army/17973(Kolmakov) https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1850510495574335962; https://t.me/PubgWithoutSaving/121[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/44994 ; https://t.me/rybar/64821 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/56037 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142269[8] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850255136225886670; https://t.me/foxtrot_uav/92; https://t.me/severnnyi/2453; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1850255499737825463[9] https://t.me/rusich_army/17973 ; https://t.me/russian_airborne/7779 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142239 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142216 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14588[10] https://t.me/rybar/64821[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l[12] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/26/spravzhnya-radyanska-yakist-chomu-v-zsu-zadovoleni-pivnichnokorejskymy-ta-iranskymy-boyeprypasamy/[13] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142290[14] https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1850292721547694212; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/579; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1850239140799164677[15] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11682[16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18083 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/15137[17] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/prasuyut-kabamy-ta-prosuvayutsya-najdeshevshym-resursom-u-zsu-rozkryly-metu-okupantiv-na-kupyanshhyni/[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/prasuyut-kabamy-ta-prosuvayutsya-najdeshevshym-resursom-u-zsu-rozkryly-metu-okupantiv-na-kupyanshhyni/[19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l[21] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142303[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul[23] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142295[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l; https://t.me/epoddubny/21457[25] https://t.me/tass_agency/281990[26] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1850572752035500233; https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/12269[27] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79503; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18065; https://t.me/dva_majors/56037; https://t.me/rusich_army/17995; https://t.me/sashakots/49790; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142260; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142268; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79541[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/18237; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7281; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1850517240971472968[29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79545 https://t.me/z_arhiv/28920 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142344; . https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59774[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l[31] https://t.me/AMinuteOfReadiness/627; https://t.me/motopatriot/28868; https://t.me/mo114rf/62[32] https://t.me/urga_74/2268 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142241[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18043 (Oleksandropil); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142261; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142322 (Kurakhove)[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/21666; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1850463342550237480; https://t.me/voin_dv/11502; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7271; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1850461961768554791; https://t.me/motopatriot/28843; https://t.me/motopatriot/28847[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/282010[37] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1850328879396773894; https://t.me/SPN_SIGMA/930; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7269; https://t.me/SPN_SIGMA/930[38] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28899[39] https://t.me/opbr_zsu/384; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14584; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/prezydentska-brygada-rozbyla-shturmovi-pidrozdily-okupantiv-poblyzu-vugledara/[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl; https://t.me/rybar/64819[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/56017 (Antonivka); https://t.me/z_arhiv/28915; https://t.me/voin_dv/11507 (Katerynivka); https://t.me/motopatriot/28843; https://t.me/motopatriot/28847; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28917; https://t.me/voin_dv/11493 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11501 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11506 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11508 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11504 (Bohoyavlenka); https://t.me/rybar/64819 (Shakhtarske-Novoukrainka)[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/rajon-levadnogo-kontrolyuyut-zsu-uspih-voroga-maye-obmezhenyj-harakter/[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l[44] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/27/zaporizhzhya-the-economist-ta-mozhlyvi-plany-okupantiv-v-ouv-tavriya-nadaly-oficzijnyj-komentar/[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kjJqR5hb2eMWxUX3G5qUi6cwjWALfPQEC2qdyEy3436c9fsr3rhfZLWjC356TkGul ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02FsE4y9jEDBshbSGnnaSh1HreLVyaeXLz6uEwTAgZzHD5dSc8QkAPfu3991pQUkXUl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02JEcUY7Bi6n3fe4hYgpbAGSFQBQEbfMc9XYfQdH1nNnc6FL9GnhkHKkJmHzVtBh93l[46] https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/452; https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/3289[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/21984[48] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12206[49] https://t.me/sotaproject/88984[50] https://t.me/sotaproject/88984; https://президентскиегранты dot рф/public/application/item?id=eb7a92a6-7a60-431a-b87b-7f480460c515[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2024[52] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/22241283[53] https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/h/hayrettin-demircan
- — Iran Update, October 23, 2024
- at 10/26/24 9:25pmAndie Parry, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Annika Ganzeveld, Avery Borens,and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[1] Pezeshkian met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss Russo-Iranian economic and strategic relations on the sidelines of the summit.[2] Pezeshkian stated that the two officials will finalize and sign memorandums soon, suggesting that both states will sign the new comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.[3] Putin authorized the signing of the deal on September 18.[4]It is in Iran’s interests to have a formalized agreement with Russia. Iran presumably will seek greater international support as Israel’s ground and air offensives on the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have disrupted some elements of Iran’s proxy network. This disruption is particularly notable given that Hezbollah’s capabilities — which now appear degraded by Israeli action at a minimum — have long served as Iran’s principal deterrence against Israeli attack.[5] Russia has discouraged Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, demonstrating the advantages of strong Iranian relations with Russia.[6] The Pezeshkian administration’s policy continues former President Ebrahim Raisi’s “neighborhood policy.” This policy is centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states, thus demonstrating the administration’s efforts to mitigate the impact of international sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy. The regime calculates that mitigating the impact of sanctions increases domestic stability and regime credibility.[7] Russo-Iranian cooperation has accelerated since the start of Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine due to Iran’s military support in the war.Pezeshkian also met with PRC President Xi Jinping on October 23.[8] This meeting’s details are not publicly available, but the officials probably discussed regional developments and growing Sino-Iranian strategic partnership, including Iranian oil exports to the PRC.[9] Iranian Energy minister Abbas Aliabadi separately discussed trade and foreign capital investment with member countries of the Belt and Road Forum in Qingdao, China.[10]Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.[11] It is unlikely that Pezeshkian’s conversations with Putin and Xi Jinping will result in BRICS taking any tangible steps to undermine the US dollar in the near future. Russian and Iranian officials have used this de-dollarization rhetoric before, but this rhetoric has historically not resulted in any tangible movement against the dollar.[12] Pezeshkian underlined the urgency in which BRICS countries need to create an integrated trade system with new mechanisms and technologies, which is a reference to an alternative to the SWIFT international messaging system, as proposals in his speech at the summit.[13] Pezeshkian explicitly stated that these would address sanctions and prevent future sanctions and even to counter the US dollar.[14]The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3.[15] Safi ed Din was leader of Hezbollah’s executive council and a member of Hezbollah’s political-military Shura Council.[16] Hezbollah confirmed his death on October 23, several hours after Israel released its statement.[17] Hezbollah similarly only confirmed the deaths of other senior Hezbollah leaders, like Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr, after Israel confirmed their deaths.[18] Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have alluded to Safi ed Din’s death over the past three weeks.[19] IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi accused Hezbollah of hiding the deaths of top commanders on October 18.[20]Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further affect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. Safi ed Din was dead for 20 days before both sides formally acknowledged his fate, meaning Hezbollah leadership has very likely recovered from the initial disorder caused by Safi ed Din’s death and adapted to his absence.[21] Safi ed Din was very well positioned to take over control of Hezbollah from Nasrallah given the IDF reports that Safi ed Din “carried out [Nasrallah’s] duties” when Nasrallah was outside of the Lebanon or out of communication.[22] Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said on October 8 that Hezbollah would wait to appoint a new Secretary General but that there is not a leadership vacuum.[23] Another Hezbollah leader said that the group had a “joint command in place.”[24]The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high-level Hezbollah commanders in the October 3 strike in Beirut. The IDF said that over 25 Hezbollah intelligence personnel were present in the underground bunker during the strike.[25] Several senior Hezbollah intelligence officers died in the strike, including Hezbollah’s aerial intelligence collection leader and intelligence head in Syria.[26] The overall chief of Hezbollah’s intelligence staff, Ali Hussein Hazima, also died in the strike.[27] The deaths of Hezbollah’s top intelligence officers were more likely to have an immediate impact on Hezbollah’s operations in southern Lebanon and northern Israel than Safi ed Din’s death, though Hezbollah has presumably adapted to the loss of these leaders. Safi ed Din’s death will have ramifications for Hezbollah’s long-term trajectory, however.The 146th Division continued to locate and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons during clearing operations in Marwahin, southwestern Lebanon on October 23.[28] The 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) located a large cache of weapons inside a mosque. The IDF reported that the cache of weapons included long-range sniper equipment, night vision goggles, rocket-propelled grenades, various grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, and Kornet missiles.Hezbollah fighters, if they had withdrawn from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly withdrawing—instead fled their positions. CTP-ISW noted on October 10 that Hezbollah fighters do not appear to be defending against Israeli forces in these villages, as the Israeli forces have consistently encountered weapons caches and infrastructure formerly used by Hezbollah fighters that ”left the area.”[29] CTP-ISW assessed that the Israeli air campaign into Lebanon has likely severely disrupted the strategic- and operational-level military leadership in Hezbollah and impeded Hezbollah‘s ability to conduct and sustain coherent military campaigns at least in the short term.[30]Key Takeaways:Russo-Iranian Cooperation: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated Iran’s intentions to increase ties with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23. Pezeshkian emphasized the need for BRICS countries to pursue economic cooperation that undermine the US dollar, almost certainly to achieve Iran’s economic goal of mitigating international sanctions on the Iranian economy through its neighborhood policy.Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the death of Hashem Safi ed Din—the presumed successor to Hassan Nasrallah—in an airstrike on Beirut on October 3. Hashem Safi ed Din’s confirmed death will impact Hezbollah’s political succession but will not further affect Hezbollah’s immediate tactical decisions. The IDF confirmed that it killed several other high level Hezbollah commanders in the October 4 strike in Beirut.Israeli Ground Operation in Lebanon: An IDF armored brigade captured a large stock of high-end Hezbollah equipment, including night vision goggles and Kornet missiles, in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters, if they withdrew from the area in an orderly fashion, would have presumably withdrawn with high-end weapons systems like Kornets and equipment like night vision goggles. This suggests that Hezbollah fighters—rather than seeking to delay Israeli forces in an organized fashion by slowly executing an orderly delay—instead fled their positions.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Jabalia on October 23. The IDF killed an unspecified number of Palestinian fighters in Jabalia and confiscated weapons.[31]The IDF is continuing to facilitate the evacuation of civilians from Jabalia along established routes. The IDF also detained “dozens” of Palestinian fighters while facilitating the evacuation. The IDF Arabic spokesperson reported that Hamas is physically assaulting Palestinian civilians evacuating Jabalia in order to discourage them from evacuating the area.[32] The IDF has evacuated more than 20,000 Palestinian civilians from Jabalia since the IDF launched a new clearing operation on October 6. The operation that began on October 6 aims to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts in the northern Gaza Strip.[33]The IDF continued to engage Palestinian fighters in Jabalia in northern Gaza Strip since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 22. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired tandem-charge anti-tank rockets targeting two IDF vehicles operating in eastern Jabalia refugee camp.[34]The World Health Organization (WHO) postponed the third and final phase of the polio vaccination campaign in the Gaza Strip, which was set to begin on October 23. The WHO said it postponed the campaign due to the ongoing Israeli clearing operations in the north and the subsequent evacuation of Palestinian civilians from the area.[35] International healthcare workers administered the first dose of the dual dose polio vaccine to Palestinian children across the Strip in September 2024.[36] The WHO provided second doses to Palestinian children in the central and southern Gaza Strip in October.[37] The WHO stated that ongoing Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip has created logistical and operational difficulties for healthcare workers.[38] The WHO aimed to vaccinate 119,279 children in the northern Gaza Strip in the final phase of the polio vaccination campaign across the Gaza Strip.The IDF 252nd Division directed an airstrike targeting a building operated by several armed Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on October 23.[39] The IDF also conducted an airstrike targeting a Hamas command-and-control site in Gaza City.[40] The IDF reported that Hamas established the command-and-control site in what was the al Zahra School in Gaza City before the war. The IDF said that Hamas used this command-and-control site to plan attacks targeting Israeli forces in the area.[41] The IDF reported that it used precision munitions and intelligence to minimize civilian casualties.Elements of the IDF 143rd Division operated in Rafah in southern Gaza Strip on October 23.[42] The IDF identified several Palestinian fighters in Rafah and directed an airstrike that killed the fighters.[43] The IDF observed secondary explosions following the airstrike indicating the presence of explosive materials at the site of the airstrike.The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine fired rockets targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on October 23.[44] West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW did not record any engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 22. Israeli security forces arrested “a number of wanted individuals” throughout the West Bank on October 22 and 23.[45] Israeli security forces confiscated various undisclosed weapons.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 23. Lebanese media reported artillery shelling around Taybeh and Kafr Kila.[46] Hezbollah claimed one rocket attack targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Taybeh.[47] The IDF 98th Division has operated in towns and villages adjacent to Taybeh, such as Kfar Kila, since the beginning of IDF ground operations in Lebanon.[48] Hezbollah claimed on October 22 that it engaged Israeli forces advancing towards Taybeh.[49] Lebanese media also reported artillery shelling around Yohmor, north of Taybeh.[50]Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 23 showed tank tread tracks south of Markaba, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the area. Hezbollah launched six rocket attacks targeting forces operating between Odaisseh, Rab al Thalathine, and Markaba.[51] Hezbollah also launched two rocket attack targeting Israeli forces in Houla, south of Markaba.[52]The IDF 36th Division expanded clearing operations in southern Lebanon on October 23. The 36th Division directed airstrikes that killed over 20 Hezbollah fighters who posed a threat to Israeli forces operating in the area.[53] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 23 showed tank tracks advancing down a hill towards southeastern Aitaroun. Hezbollah claimed it engaged Israeli forces with small arms fire in southwestern Aitaroun, forcing Israeli forces to retreat.[54] Hezbollah claimed its fighters mortared Israeli forces as the IDF withdrew.Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 23 showed Israeli tank tracks and destroyed infrastructure in northern Marwahin, indicating Israeli forces conducted clearing operations in the area. Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Ramiyeh.[55] Lebanese media reported artillery shelling around Hanine.[56]Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 23 showed Israeli forces expanded clearing operations indications south of Yarine and west along Dahyra-Yarine road. Hezbollah claimed one rocket attack targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Dahyra.[57]The IDF Air Force continued to degrade Hezbollah’s tactical-level leadership and command sites across Lebanon. The IDF struck and killed Hezbollah regional commanders for Jibchit, Jouaiyya, and Qana sectors of southern Lebanon in recent days.[58] Hezbollah tactical-level sector commanders organize attacks from their geographical areas targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. The IDF Air Force also struck and killed Hezbollah air unit specialist on October 22 in Hermel, northern Lebanon.[59] The IDF struck three Hezbollah drone unit headquarters on October 22.[60] The IDF has targeted dozens Hezbollah drone unit assets over the last month.[61] Israel also targeted Hezbollah command and control sites in central Tyre city, southern Lebanon.[62] The IDF said that the sites included Hezbollah’s southern front headquarters.[63] The IDF specified that its air campaign targeting headquarters in Tyre aims to "make it difficult” for Hezbollah to ”restore its military capabilities."[64] The IDF also targeted several weapons depots and manufacturing sites in southern Beirut.[65]These maps illustrate individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. These maps depict strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 22 to 2:00pm ET on October 23. These maps are not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least 20 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 22.[66] The IDF said that Hezbollah launched at least 90 rockets from Lebanon into Israel over the past day.[67] Nine Hezbollah attacks targeted IDF positions on the eastern side of the Israel-Lebanon border in Hezbollah’s Nasr Unit area of operations.[68] Hezbollah conducted four rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in Misgav Am, northeastern Israel.[69] Hezbollah similarly concentrated fire on Misgav Am on October 22.[70] Hezbollah fighters launched rockets targeting Israeli forces in Margaliot, which is adjacent to the Lebanese town of Markaba. Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Markaba.[71] Hezbollah’s attacks on IDF elements aim to degrade the IDF’s ability to conduct effective ground and air operations, though these attacks appear ineffective.Hezbollah also launched rockets targeting IDF bases and Israeli military-industrial sites. Hezbollah fired long-range rockets targeting an IDF signals intelligence base in the suburbs of Tel Aviv and drones at an IDF base south of Haifa.[72] Hezbollah fired rockets targeting a military-industrial site northeast of Haifa.[73]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceLocal Syrian and Axis of Resistance-affiliated sources reported that Iranian-backed militants launched rockets targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor, Syria, on October 22.[74] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these reports. CENTCOM has not at this time issued a statement about any ongoing live-fire exercises in northeastern Syria.The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed seven attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 22. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in the Jordan Valley.[75]Three drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in the Golan Heights.[76]Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Eilat.[77]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in central Israel.[78]The Israeli Air Force intercepted two drones that were “launched from the east” over Israeli territorial waters near Eilat on October 22.[79] The Israeli Air Force separately intercepted a drone that was “launched from the east” in Syrian airspace on October 22.[80]Iraqi Acting Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi met with his Lebanese counterpart, Nabih Berri, in Beirut on October 23.[81] Mandalawi claimed that Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip threaten global security and may generate “devastating” economic conditions in the Middle East.[82] Mandalawi called on Islamic and Arab parliaments to support the Iraqi parliament’s diplomatic efforts to end the October 7 War.[83]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized the importance of resisting and confronting Israel in a speech in Tehran on October 23.[84] Khamenei stated that the war in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and the West Bank are pivotal in changing the "fate and history of the region."[85]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed Passive Defense Organization head Brigadier General Gholam Reza Jalali as special assistant to the president in passive defense matters on October 22.[86] The Passive Defense Organization is an Iranian regime institution responsible for defending Iran's civilian, military, cyber, and nuclear infrastructure from attacks. The organization oversees cyber warfare, coordinates responses to natural disasters, and enhances national resilience across critical sectors like banking, energy, and nuclear security.[87] Jalali will enhance interagency collaboration and promote a culture of passive defense across Iran in his new role.[88]A US-based Middle East outlet, citing unspecified Israeli and American security sources, reported on October 23 that in recent days the United States and Israel have reached an “understanding” regarding Israel’s retaliatory strike on Iran.[89] The reported ”understanding” stipulates that if Israel refrains from targeting Iran’s oil industries and nuclear power infrastructure before the US general election on November 5, then the United States will lift its suspension on certain arms and munitions shipments to Israel. The United States will also reportedly increase its attacks on Houthi weapons depots in Yemen as part of the deal. The report further claimed that the Pentagon is considering sending a second THAAD anti-missile battery system to Israel. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report.[1] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184686;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184722[2] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[3] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266619[4] https://tass dot com/world/1390491; http://en.kremlin dot ru/acts/news/75137[5] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-22-2024[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-tells-israel-not-even-consider-attacking-iranian-nuclear-facilities-tass-2024-10-17/[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2023[8] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184722[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/iran-china-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement-2021-03-27/ ;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/04/business/iran-oil-sales-china.html[10] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6266517/[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184504[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/what-proposals-will-russia-push-brics-summit-2024-10-16/ ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-5-2023 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-24-2023[13] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/02/3184504[14] https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1729683401405814395/Iranian-President-Calls-for-BRICS-Economic-Synergy%2C-Resistance-Against-US-Dollar[15] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848815432402375094[16] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848815444922380401 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848815432402375094[17] https://t.me/C_Military1/63547[18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/31/who-isfuad-shukr ; https://t.me/C_Military1/60721 ’ https://x.com/idfonline/status/1839950364264526168[19] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100824[20] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1847281779012465122[21] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424[22] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848817721200545986[23] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100824[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-obstructing-search-hezbollahs-safieddine-hezbollah-official-says-2024-10-06/[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848815441302720976[26] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848817721200545986[27] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848817721200545986[28] www dot idf.il/242077[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-10-2024[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-28-2024[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940293904597134[32] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848971781547212978[33] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849059941648093577 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024[34] https://t.me/sarayaps/18727[35] https://www.who.int/news/item/23-10-2024-intense-bombardments--mass-displacements-and-lack-of-access-in-northern-gaza-force-the-postponement-of-polio-vaccination-campaign[36] https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/second-round-polio-vaccination-begins-gaza-strip[37] https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/second-round-polio-vaccination-begins-gaza-strip[38] https://www.who.int/news/item/23-10-2024-intense-bombardments--mass-displacements-and-lack-of-access-in-northern-gaza-force-the-postponement-of-polio-vaccination-campaign[39] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940302679118273[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849104423252844760[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849104426482450712[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940302679118273[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940302679118273[44] https://t.me/pflpgaza1/14732[45] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849030256222515248[46] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/94677 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/94746 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/94746[47] https://t.me/mmirleb/8207[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-2-2024[49] https://t.me/mmirleb/8159 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8189[50] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/94785[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/8200 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8201 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8202 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8203 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8206 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8215[52] https://t.me/mmirleb/8226 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8219[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940285587292234[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/8230[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/8221 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8229[56] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/94677[57] https://t.me/mmirleb/8235[58] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848940268969394659 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1848941363489894431[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848968262668697677 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848969022911455551[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848582370234187957[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848968265697046753[62] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849070454964634021[63] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849070454964634021[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849068788911645162[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848986681128435820 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848986685935120389 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848987220419490218[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/8191 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8192 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8193 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8194 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8195 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8198 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8205 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8208 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8209; https://t.me/mmirleb/8210; https://t.me/mmirleb/8211 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8213 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8216; https://t.me/mmirleb/8217; https://t.me/mmirleb/8218; https://t.me/mmirleb/8220; https://t.me/mmirleb/8223 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849002623678005521 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849046804249145839 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848998050775134371[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848955808685404245 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849002623678005521 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849046804249145839 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849086112452534631 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849145029505266064 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849150196711649664[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/8192 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8193; https://t.me/mmirleb/8194; https://t.me/mmirleb/8195; https://t.me/mmirleb/8205; https://t.me/mmirleb/8208; https://t.me/mmirleb/8211; https://t.me/mmirleb/8217; https://t.me/mmirleb/8218[69] https://t.me/mmirleb/8195; https://t.me/mmirleb/8205; https://t.me/mmirleb/8211; https://t.me/mmirleb/8217[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-22-2024[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-22-2024 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8218[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/8198; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848955808685404245; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848953846220931189; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1848956235271336270 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8233; https://t.me/mmirleb/8223[73] https://t.me/mmirleb/8209[74] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news/3387195.htm; https://www.athrpress dot com/%d9%84%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%b9%d8%a9-%d8%ae%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d9%87%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ac%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%87%d8%af/%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%a9/%d9%85%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%a7%d9%86/; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1 ; https://x.com/OALD24/status/1848798966391189783[75] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1381[76] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1383 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1387 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1390[77] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1385 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1386[78] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1389[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848918245845193000[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848931912888320061[81] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1163880[82] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1163880[83] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1163880[84] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27713[85] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/27713[86] https://president dot ir/fa/154682[87] https://www.aei.org/articles/iran-passive-defense-organization-and-basij-sign-memorandum-of-understanding/[88] https://president dot ir/fa/154682[89] https://x.com/3KooH/status/1848898736413454738 ; https://www.al-monitor dot com/originals/2024/10/inside-us-israel-understanding-reward-netanyahu-not-targeting-irans-oil-fields
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 20, 2024
- at 10/26/24 8:16pmChristina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans,and Frederick W. KaganOctober 20, 2024, 3:50pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on October 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Lipetsk-2 Air Base and caused a fire and secondary explosions.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces targeted ammunition depots, fuel storage, and aircraft and noted that the Russian military bases Su-34 fighter-bomber, Su-35 fighter, and MiG-31 interceptor/fighter fixed-wing aircraft at the base. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces intercepted drones over Lipetsk City and Oblast and that a crashed drone caused a fire in an unspecified area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that forces from Ukraine's SBU, GUR, and SSO also struck the Sverdlov Plant, causing secondary explosions.[3] The Sverdlov plant produces chemicals for artillery ammunition and stores and produces glide bombs, and sources in Ukrainian intelligence told Western and Ukrainian news outlets that the plant is one of Russia's largest explosives factories.[4] Geolocated footage published on October 20 shows an explosion near the Sverdlov Plant.[5] The US imposed sanctions on the Sverdlov Plant in July 2023 for its support of Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[6] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the Dzerzhinsk industrial zone and that several plant employees received minor injuries.[7]Moldovan authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union (EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to be valid. Current Moldovan President Maia Sandu is up for re-election, and the referendum — if passed — would change the Moldovan Constitution to define EU membership as one of Moldova's "strategic objectives."[8] The presidential election and referendum results will both be considered valid, as they surpassed the 33.33 percent voter turnout requirement.[9] The Moldovan Central Election Commission (CEC) reported that about 51 percent of registered voters had already voted in the presidential election by the end of the voting period within Moldova, but polling stations abroad are still open as of the time of this publication.[10] Moldovan media reported that 42.44 percent of voters had already participated in the referendum as of 1800 local time in Moldova.[11] ISW recently assessed that, although Moldova stands to advance its path towards European integration with the October 20 election and referendum, the Kremlin will continue its efforts to sabotage Moldova's EU accession and destabilize Moldovan democracy into the next decade.[12]Moldovan authorities reported several attempted electoral violations, including attempts by pro-Russian actors to influence the results of the election and destabilize Moldova through violent protests and other kinetic activities. The Moldovan General Police Inspectorate reported that authorities have observed 113 electoral violations within Moldova as of 1830 local time, including photographing the ballot, damaging the ballot, and organizing the transport of voters.[13] The Moldovan CEC stated that "observers" from unspecified pro-Russian Moldovan political parties requested access to polling stations in Russia and Romania but that authorities denied their requests as they had not officially registered as observers before the deadline.[14] The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on October 20 that unspecified actors "artificially" created large lines at the two polling stations in Russia as part of attempts to illegally transport voters to the polling stations.[15] Moldovan IPN News Agency reported that unspecified actors gave Moldovan voters at the polling station in Moscow "invitations" to a restaurant, claiming that the Moldovan embassy in Russia organized the event — a claim that embassy representatives denied.[16] The "Cultural Educational Center of Moldova," which is reportedly affiliated with US-sanctioned, Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politician Ilan Shor, reportedly offered voters in Moscow "Moldovan citizen in Russia" cards that offered free services, such as internet, medical, legal, and banking services in Russia.[17] Moldovan media reported a bomb threat at a polling station in Italy but did not specify the responsible actor.[18] Director of Moldova's Intelligence and Security Service Alexandru Musteata reported on October 17 that Moldovan authorities found that foreign instructors affiliated with the Wagner Group had trained a group of about 100 young, pro-Russian Moldovans at "guerilla camps" in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.[19] Musteata stated that the Moldovans learned how to challenge law enforcement, use weapons and objects to cause non-lethal injuries, use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and handle drones with explosive attachments. The Moldovan police also reported that over 300 Moldovans learned about protest tactics at a training ground near Moscow and that Shor's Eurasia non-profit organization funded the training. Kremlin authorities and pro-Kremlin Moldovan actors may plan to ignite protests after the election as part of efforts to destabilize Moldovan society and discredit the results.Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling from a window in Moscow.[20] Russian sources claimed that Rogachev left a suicide note and had been suffering from late-stage cancer.[21] One Russian insider source, claiming to cite unspecified people within Rogachev's "inner circle," denied that Rogachev had cancer and claimed that his death was unexpected for his family.[22] Rogachev held various positions in Yukos from 1996 to 2007, including vice president, before becoming the executive director of the Russian private investment fund ONEXIM Group and later the deputy general director of the Russian mining and metallurgical company Nornickel.[23] Russian opposition activist Mikhail Khodorkovsky owned Yukos until Russian authorities arrested Khodorkovsky, likely for political reasons, in 2003 and closed the company in 2007.[24]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City and Russian state-owned defense enterprise Sverdlov in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of October 19 to 20.Moldovan authorities have yet to announce the results of the October 20 presidential election and European Union (EU) referendum, but both the election and referendum have passed the required voter turnout threshold to be valid.Russian sources claimed on October 20 that former Russian Yukos Oil Company Vice President for Corporate Management Mikhail Rogachev was found dead in a possible suicide after falling from a window in Moscow.Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha and Russian forces recently marginally advanced near Toretsk and Selydove. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasUkrainian Defense Industrial Base EffortsRussian Information Operations and NarrativesSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced north of Sudzha amid continued fighting in Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast on October 20. Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Cherkassoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha).[25] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked north of Sudzha near Malaya Loknya and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo and that Ukrainian forces attacked southeast of Korenevo near Kruglenkoye and Leonidovo.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that information about Russian forces seizing Plekhovo is unconfirmed.[27] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Zeleny Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo), and elements of the "Alabai" reconnaissance group are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[28]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported on ground attacks in Glushkovsky Raion (west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast) on October 20.Please see topline text about Ukrainian strikes in Russia.Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on October 19 and 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces reportedly advanced near Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 19. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central and southern Kruhlyakivka (south of Kupyansk) and that Russian forces occupy at least half of the settlement.[30] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted three separate mechanized assaults of an unspecified echelon against Kruhlyakivka on October 19.[31] Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka; northwest of Svatove near Novoosynove, Lozova, Kolsynivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Stepova Novoselivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Novomyhailivka, Yampolivka, and Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near Zarichne and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Serebryanka on October 19 and 20.[32] A Russian source claimed that Russian aviation is striking unspecified Ukrainian crossings over the Oskil River.[33] Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Kruhlyakivka, and elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[34]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Russian offensive operations in the Siversk direction on October 20.Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Zhovtnevyi Microraion of eastern Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[35] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal disguised in civilian clothes - a war crime, if confirmed.[36] Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar towards Stupochky and Predtechyne, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka on October 19 and 20.[37] Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 1st Detachment of the Russian "Volki" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[38]Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 20. Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Nelipivka (south of Toretsk) and along Druzhby Street in central Toretsk.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Toretsk, including near Niu York, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of further Russian advances in this area.[40] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne, near Toretsk itself, and southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on October 19 and 20.[41]Russian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations east and southeast of the settlement on October 20. Geolocated footage published on October 20 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced on the northeastern outskirts of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along unspecified streets in eastern Selydove and are attacking the settlement from the north and south.[43] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Vyshneve (south of Pokrovsk and immediately west of Selydove) from the south along the railway line.[44] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced into Vozdvyzhenka (east of Pokrovsk) and near Hirnyk (southeast of Pokrovsk).[45] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske and southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar, Mykhailivka, Selydove, Novodmytrivka, Hirnyk, Zhelanne Druhe, and Zoryane on October 19 and 20.[46] Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a platoon-sized Ukrainian mechanized counterattack near Tsukuryne (southeast of Pokrovsk and Selydove).[47] Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[48]Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove on October 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further within and south of Maksymilyanivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[49] Russian forces continued assaults near Maksymilyanivka and Kurakhove on October 19 and 20.[50] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 2nd Assault Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar on October 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Katerynivka, Antonivka (both northeast of Vuhledar), and Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar) and advanced 4.5 kilometers in depth in the direction of Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[52] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized up to 45 percent of Katerynivka, but ISW currently assesses that Russian forces control no more than 30 percent of the settlement.[53] Russian forces continued assaults near Antonivka, Katerynivka, Yelizavetivka, Vodyane, and Bohoyavlenka on October 19 and 20.[54] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating north of Vuhledar, and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka.[55]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian ground activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 20.Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on October 19 and 20, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[56] Elements of the Russian 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[57]Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 19 and 20 but did not make any confirmed advances.[58] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[59]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 49 Shahed drones and drones of an unspecified type alongside two Iskander-M ballistic missiles.[60] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 31 drones over Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Zhytomyr, Lviv, Odesa, Sumy, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts; that 13 drones were “lost in location,” possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures; and that two drones flew toward Belarus. Ukrainian officials reported on October 20 that Russian forces struck Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with two ballistic missiles, damaging civilian infrastructure.[61] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported on October 20 that Russian forces launched several waves of drones strikes targeting Kyiv City from the south and northeast and that Ukrainian forces downed about 10 drones.[62] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported on October 20 that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City, Derhachi Raion, and Solonytsivka Hromada with three KAB glide bombs.[63] Ukrainian officials reported on October 19 that Russian forces conducted three airstrikes on Zaporizhzhia City, damaging civilian infrastructure, and that Russian forces conducted two KAB glide bomb strikes near Zaporizhzhia City, hitting a supermarket.[64]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and current Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin highlighted problems in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and defense technology development in an interview with Russian outlet Moskovsky Komsomolets published on October 20.[65] Rogozin claimed that "unprofessional" managers in Russian defense industrial enterprises are preventing widespread technological adaptations in the Russian military. Rogozin claimed that Russian pilots need a "backup" navigation system to operate their aircraft and drop bombs in areas with Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and sarcastically claimed that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) had to "change its registration" due to Ukrainian naval drone strikes. Rogozin claimed that Russian forces have successfully used "Vandal" first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber optic cables in the Kursk direction since the drone is reportedly more resistant to EW but noted that Russian forces need more trench EW systems and more EW resistant drones. Rogozin claimed that the newly formed Russian BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) will provide feedback on the technology it tests on the battlefield to the Russian DIB in order to improve its products for the Russian military. Rogozin also tacitly praised Ukraine's establishment of its Unmanned Systems Forces and advocated for the Russian military to create a new branch for unmanned systems or robotic systems.A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor complained on October 19 that the Russian military is incurring unnecessary losses by using specialists in assault operations and failing to provide sufficient training to new personnel.[66] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using specialists, including but not limited to drone operators, to conduct assaults, which is unnecessarily exhausting valuable Russian military resources. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military incurs unnecessary losses because it fails to sufficiently train new personnel in first aid, engineering basics, sapper work, unit coordination, and coordination with aerial reconnaissance and fire support.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)ISW is permanently suspending regular coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts and will cover any notable inflections in topline text or separate special editions moving forward.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Russian Information Operations and NarrativesISW is permanently suspending regular coverage of Russian information operations and narratives as a section in the daily updates and will cover any notable inflections in topline text or separate special editions moving forward.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ccT5GHLFv5N3g7W9gpwTyqbJxZFLvWb8wRCnyQqm1BKKnS5hydbANRikvi4BuUHl[2] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/3558 ; https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/3562[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ccT5GHLFv5N3g7W9gpwTyqbJxZFLvWb8wRCnyQqm1BKKnS5hydbANRikvi4BuUHl[4] https://www.newsweek.com/russia-sverdlov-explosives-plant-ukraine-drone-attacks-dzerzhinsk-nizhny-novgorod-1971796 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/20/rosiyany-zbyly-svoyim-najbilshym-zavodom-z-vyrobnycztva-vybuhivky-kilka-ukrayinskyh-droniv/[5] https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1847899184038629708 ; https://x.com/nexta_tv/status/1847888499346718736[6] https://www.state.gov/imposing-additional-sanctions-on-those-supporting-russias-war-against-ukraine/ ; https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=44204[7] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/5270[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[9] https://www.legis dot md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=144550&lang=ro# ; 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l[30] https://t.me/rybar/64581 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79022 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28700[31] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79022; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17663;[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l; https://t.me/rybar/64581[33] https://t.me/rybar/64581[34] https://t.me/rybar/64581; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17663; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141399[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/554 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28704[36] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/861841-taktika-tarakana-rosiani-perebigaut-cerez-kanal-ta-peredagautsa-v-civilne-situacia-bila-casovogo-aru/[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22707[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/55469 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55481 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17632[39] https://t.me/OBiloshytskiy/1031; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7177 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7178; https://t.me/OBiloshytskiy/1032[40] https://t.me/wargonzo/22707 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55456[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7176; https://t.me/ghost_of_khortytsia/177[43] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79030 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17637 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17668[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141427 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141438 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17668[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17667 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79057 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141437 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17658[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55456 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22707[47] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59650 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22707[48] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79016[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/55456 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28694 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22707[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12845[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/11420 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19204 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22707 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55456 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55456 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/14975[53] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19204[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19205[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/11410 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141398 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11415[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VBED6hCAJMjFyNJWBBgeCUtxRd4TRcGg5VbpcWB1LxNbz6FqJiPJEXzaHPzs6kSCl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/44738[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Ko2xaoMCEYXTz1d29UC1YzYUxSA64G7diPjDReabwuuyoVJ4Ui9eVAn63EPiwNQel ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02AunGWcWWBtZDRoxBL7y54T3yAYNg9H4osjUrN9L35aiLKTFVVxCkxdnLg3zhC4N9l[59] https://t.me/dva_majors/55466 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55467 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55489[60] https://t.me/kpszsu/21631[61] https://t.me/vilkul/8196; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16810 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16815[62] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8690[63] https://t.me/synegubov/11656[64] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/26808; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/861653-armia-rf-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni/ ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/34529[65] https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2024/10/20/dmitriy-rogozin-realno-na-nashikh-glazakh-proizoshla-voennotekhnicheskaya-revolyuciya.html[66] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1601
- — Iran Update, October 26, 2024
- at 10/26/24 8:15pmAndie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted three waves of strikes into Iran on October 25. The strikes were in response to the large-scale ballistic missile attack that Iran launched against Israel on October 1. The IDF targeted around 20 locations around Tehran and western Iran, including vital air defense assets and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs.[1] The IDF in particular struck four S-300 air defense batteries, which are Russian-made and the most advanced air defense system that Iran operates.[2] That the IDF hit these batteries highlights the relative vulnerabilities of the S-300, especially against advanced platforms like the F-35 fighter jet. The IDF separately struck prominent defense industrial sites, such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes outside Tehran.[3] These complexes are managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry. The regime uses these facilities to develop and manufacture advanced weapons systems, including solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran has used the Parchin complex previously for high explosives testing in support of its nuclear weapons program.[4] International inspectors found traces of uranium there in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[5] Although there are no known nuclear activities currently at the Parchin and Khojir complexes, the IDF strikes could impede Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, given the role that these complexes could play in building a delivery system.The IDF strikes could also disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Three unspecified Israeli sources told Axios that the IDF targeted sophisticated mixing equipment used to make solid fuel for advanced ballistic missiles, such as those that Tehran has used to attack Israel directly.[6] Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that the IDF destroyed several buildings at the Parchin and Khojir complexes. The imagery shows no signs of secondary explosions, which is consistent with the IDF targeting industrial mixers rather than weapons storage facilities. The IDF strike on the Khojir complex comes after the regime began expanding the facilities there in August 2023 in order to increase the Iranian capacity to build missiles.[7] The Israeli sources speaking to Axios said that Iran will need to buy new mixers from China.[8] Doing so could take months or possibly a year or more, hampering the Iranian ability to replenish its missile stockpiles and those of its allies in the Axis of Resistance.The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria immediately before launching strikes into Iran.[9] The IDF was likely targeting early warning radars and sensors that would have given Iran advanced notice of the incoming Israeli attack. Iran has in recent years worked to build an early detection network across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in order to better defend against Israeli airstrikes.Iranian officials and state media have downplayed the amount of damage that the IDF inflicted. The regime boasted that it prevented IDF aircraft from entering Iranian airspace and that the strikes caused only limited damage. The strikes did kill four Artesh officers, however, presumably at the air defense sites that the IDF struck.[10] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry responded to the IDF strikes saying that Iran has the ”right and duty to defend itself against foreign acts of aggression.”[11]A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence on October 25.[12] The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it launched a drone attack targeting an unspecified ”vital site” in Israel. The naming of the group appears inspired by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that has conducted regular drone and missile attacks on Israel in recent months. The IDF has not commented on the claimed drone attack at the time of this writing.Key Takeaways:Iran: The IDF conducted three waves of strikes in Iran targeting air defenses and facilities tied to the Iranian drone and missile programs. These strikes could disrupt the Iranian ability to build missiles and send some to its partners, such as Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis.Saudi Arabia: A new Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia announced its existence. The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed that it fired a drone toward Israel.Lebanon: The IDF destroyed a large underground Lebanese Hezbollah complex in southeastern Lebanon. The location, size, sophistication, and structure of the complex suggested that it was meant for offensive operations against Israel.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division reportedly continued operations around Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on October 26. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles northwest of Jabalia and within Jabalia camp.[13] Palestinian militias conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces around Jabalia on October 26, including Hamas detonating a rigged house north of Jabalia refugee camp.[14] Hamas claimed to kill and wound Israeli forces in this attack.[15]Palestinian militias claimed to have conducted two attacks targeting IDF command-and-control sites around the Netzarim Corridor since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[16] The IDF 252nd Division operates around the Netzarim Corridor.[17]The IDF expanded al Mawasi humanitarian zone eastward on October 26.[18] The IDF has repeatedly released evacuation orders for Palestinian civilians in Jabalia and the surrounding areas, telling residents to travel south to al Mawasi humanitarian zone.[19] The IDF continues to operate in the northern Gaza Strip since it launched a new clearing operation into Jabalia refugee camp on October 6 in order to disrupt Hamas reconstitution efforts.[20]The IDF 252nd Division destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on October 26.[21] The 5th Brigade (252nd Division) directed an airstrike to destroy a militia observation post.[22] The strike caused secondary explosions, indicating the presence of munitions at the site. The 454th Fire Brigade (252nd Division) separately directed a strike that destroyed an observation post and a weapons depot.[23] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles around Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps.[24] The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli personnel and vehicles southeast of al Bureij camp.[25]The IDF 933rd Brigade (143rd Division) continued operations in Rafah on October 26.[26] Israeli forces destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure and killed Palestinian fighters. Israeli forces also located a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.[27] A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from IDF vehicles west of Rafah on October 25 and 26.[28] West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces killed local Hamas commander in Tulkarm, Islam Jamil Odeh, on October 25.[29] Israeli forces surrounded Odeh in a building and used a “pressure cooker“ tactic to force him out.[30] Odeh opened fire on Israeli forces before he was killed.[31] The IDF identified weapons in his vehicle, including materials for assembling explosives.[32] Odeh assumed command of Hamas in Tulkarm after the IDF struck and killed his predecessor, Zaher Yasser Aoufi, on October 4.[33] Odeh was responsible for planning attacks, including attacks planned for the anniversary of October 7.[34] A Hamas official and other Tulkarm militias mourned Odeh’s death.[35]Palestinian fighters have attacked Israeli forces in at least three locations in Tulkarm since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[36] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers in Tulkarm.[37]Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives: Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaIsraeli forces destroyed a “strategic” underground Hezbollah complex in Rab el Thalathine, southeastern Lebanon, on October 26.[38] The IDF 98th Division and Yahalom Engineering Unit used 400 tons of explosives to destroy the “largest” Hezbollah complex ever found in southern Lebanon.[39] The detonation triggered earthquake alerts across northern Israel.[40] Israeli forces spent two weeks securing the area and mapping the complex.[41] The tunnel had weapons and supplies for hundreds of Hezbollah militants.[42] IDF officers at the complex said that they encountered some resistance from Hezbollah militants guarding the complex in the first two days of operations.[43] Hezbollah and local sources have reported consistent engagements with Israeli forces in Rab el Thalathine but few were close quarters combat.[44]Hezbollah likely built the compound in Rab el Thalathine for offensive operations against Israel. Hezbollah had built the over one-and-a-half-kilometer-long complex over the past 15 years.[45] The complex had rooms large enough for a company of Radwan special operations forces (SOF) to gather and receive orders.[46] The size, sophistication, and supply stocks in the compound—coupled with its very close proximity to the Israel-Lebanon border—suggest that Hezbollah could have used this tunnel in its planned ”Conquer the Galilee” ground attack into Israel.[47] Hezbollah planned for “Conquer the Galilee” to be a similar offensive to Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack and to target northern Israeli towns.[48] The compound is about five kilometers from the over 20,000 Israelis living in Kiryat Shmona and would have allowed Hezbollah militants to rapidly mobilize and launch an attack against the town and surrounding areas. The IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The 98th Division directed strikes on Hezbollah military buildings, militants, and anti-tank missile firing sites.[49] Division forces also located several rocket launchers aimed and primed for launch at northern Israel.[50] Hezbollah has claimed at least two attacks targeting Israeli forces in the 98th Division’s area of operations in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 25.[51] The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The 91st Division engaged Hezbollah militants and seized weapons, including four loaded rocket launchers mounted on trucks capable of firing 160 rockets into Israel.[52] The IDF 288th Infantry Division (Res.) directed strikes on a Hezbollah squad operating from a munitions warehouse.[53] The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 25. The 146th Division killed several Hezbollah militants in ground and air engagements.[54] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in Ras Naqoura.[55]The IDF continued its air campaign to targeting Hezbollah capabilities, infrastructure, and leaders on October 26. The IDF Air Force struck over 70 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, including anti-tank positions, ammunition depots, and military headquarters.[56] The IDF Air Force struck multiple weapons manufacturing sites and the headquarters of Hezbollah’s intelligence division in southern Beirut.[57] The IDF issued warnings to residents of Burj al Barajneh and Haret Hreik to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[58] The IDF also struck a Hezbollah air defense cell that had launched a missile targeting an Israeli drone near Kfar Fila, north of the Litani River.[59]Hezbollah has conducted at least 25 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25.[60] Hezbollah conducted four drone and rocket attacks into central and northern Israel under its ”Khaybar“ campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel killing Hassan Nasrallah.[61] Khaybar operations often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel, such as Tel Nof Airbase near Tel Aviv.[62]Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in eight separate incidents.[63] Hezbollah claimed a record of 48 attacks targeting Israeli forces in Lebanon and sites in Israel on October 25.[64]Hezbollah told the residents of 25 northern Israeli towns and cities to evacuate “immediately.”[65] Hezbollah stated that the towns had become legitimate targets for attacks due to the presence of Israeli soldiers there staging operations into Lebanon.[66] Israel has repeatedly issued similar evacuation notices for Lebanese residents ahead of airstrikes.[67] Hezbollah has expanded its target list over the past month to include these towns and regularly fires drones and rockets at these civilians areas.[68] These towns are outside Israel’s closed military zones and do not border Lebanon. Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed one attack targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 25. The group claimed to launch a one-way attack drone targeting an unspecified military site in Acre.[69] The group added that it would attack Israel at an ”escalating pace.”[70] [1] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-back-at-iran-further-expanding-the-war-in-the-middle-east-759cc6ec?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos2 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/26/israel-attacks-iran-retaliation-analysis/[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/irans-state-media-plays-down-israeli-attacks.html ; https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/world/middleeast/irans-state-media-plays-down-israeli-attacks.html; https://x.com/Vahid/status/1849995331951325275[4] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/new-information-about-the-parchin-site/8[5] https://www.wsj.com/articles/uranium-provides-new-clue-on-irans-past-nuclear-arms-work-1466380760[6] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/satellite-photos-show-iran-expanding-missile-production-sources-say-2024-07-08/[8] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/26/israel-strike-iran-missile-production[9] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-826132[10] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1268009 ; https://farsnews dot ir/TM_911/1729932120306337649[11] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-says-it-has-duty-to-defend-itself-after-israeli-strikes-2-soldiers-killed/ ; https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/755585[12] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1850195344576913453[13] https://t.me/hamza20300/305183 ; https://t.me/saedalzaneen8/129837[14] https://t.me/C_Military1/63893 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5314[15] https://t.me/C_Military1/63893[16] https://t.me/sarayaps/18743 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7750[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-20-2024[18] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850132629703585913[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2024[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-6-2024[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058048519237959[22] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058052063408377[23] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058052063408377[24] https://t.me/hamza20300/305102 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305192 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305149 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305156 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305170[25] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4454[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058060754014492[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058060754014492[28] https://t.me/hamza20300/305209 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305202[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140677952143637[30] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15889[31] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15889 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140681777348708[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140681777348708[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140684516225490 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140684516225490 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850140693584318519[35] https://hamasinfo dot info/2024/10/26/4412 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/751[36] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7749 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/753 ; https://t.me/alredalsrey/750[37] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7749 ; https://t.me/sarayatulkarm/752[38] https://x.com/KJ_X23/status/1850116859841900663 ; www dot idf.il/242499[39] www dot idf.il/242499 ; www dot timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850209740514628088[40] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850030656710947229 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1850098487297266149[41] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91824 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91882 ; www dot idf.il/242499[42] www dot idf.il/242499[43] https://www dot idf.il/242499 ; www dot timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion/[44] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/88501; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91599 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91722 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91824 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/91882 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7942 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7949 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/92171 ; https://t.me/dahieh4all/42313 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/92537 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8123 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8158 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8162 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8200 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8201 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8204 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8206 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8215 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8261 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95306[45] https://www dot idf.il/242499[46] www dot timesofisrael.com/under-a-lebanese-border-village-idf-finds-huge-hezbollah-base-primed-for-invasion/[47] https://www dot idf.il/242499[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sB9wtaWHRxw&ab_channel=IsraelDefenseForces[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058048519237959[50] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850172448848695591[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/8374 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8347[52] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850172445237395891[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058009453486409 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058019352068457[54] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850058019352068457[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/8364[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850057957997765117[57] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850100313262277060[58] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849882867716763996[59] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850100309353267457 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850101671709356267[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/8349 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8350 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8351 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8352 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8353 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8354 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8358 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15871 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8362 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8363 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8365 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8366 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8367 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8368 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8369 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8370 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8371 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8372 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8373 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8375 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8376 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8378 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8379[61] https://t.me/mmirleb/8375 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8378 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8349[62] https://t.me/mmirleb/8361[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8350 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8351 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8352 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8354 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8355 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8358 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8365 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8369[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/8356 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8357[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/8381[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/8381[67] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100724 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100624[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/8348 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8171 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8134 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8375[69] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1406[70] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1406
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2024
- at 10/26/24 8:15pmNicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 26, 2024, 5:45 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The October 26, 2024 Georgian parliamentary election will be covered in a separate special edition.Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia. Bloomberg reported that it viewed South Korean intelligence documents from an unspecified date that assessed that the first group of 1,500 North Korean "elite special forces" had arrived in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai between October 8 and 13 and that this first group was part of a planned deployment of roughly 10,000 North Korean soldiers in total.[1] Bloomberg also reported that the documents assessed that North Korea has sent roughly 8 million rounds of 122mm and 152mm shells to Russia since August 2023, roughly 100 KN-23 Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles, and an unspecified number of Bulsae-4 anti-tank weapons. Bloomberg, citing two people familiar with the matter, stated that South Korean officials will share South Korea's assessments about North Korean-Russian cooperation with NATO officials at an October 28 NATO meeting. The New York Times (NYT), citing one unnamed Ukrainian official and two unnamed US officials, reported on October 25 that "several thousand" North Korean soldiers arrived at Kursk Oblast to participate in an upcoming Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces from their salient in Kursk Oblast.[2] The officials stated that North Korean forces have not engaged in combat operations yet and that the North Korean forces' task in Kursk oblast is unclear. The officials noted that a significant contingent of North Korean forces would help the Russian military to avoid pulling additional forces from eastern Ukraine to participate in counteroffensive operations in Kursk Oblast. A senior Ukrainian official told the NYT that a maximum number of 5,000 elite North Korean troops had likely arrived in Russia by October 21.[3] The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger announced on October 26 that Rheinmetall already opened one plant in Ukraine that serves as a maintenance and production facility for infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks and is on track to build a powder factory and a munitions manufacturing plant in Ukraine.[4] Papperger added that Rheinmetall expects to begin the production of the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles at the recently operational plant in Ukraine by the end of 2024. Rheinmetall also reportedly plans to open a joint production facility for air defense systems in Ukraine. Rheinmetall announced in March 2024 that it plans to open at least four weapons manufacturing plants in Ukraine.[5]Key Takeaways:Bloomberg reported on October 25, citing South Korean intelligence documents, that a second group of North Korean soldiers will soon deploy to Russia.German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced preparations to open additional defense industrial plants in Ukraine.Russian forces recently advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast and near Pokrovsk and Vuhledar. Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian President Vladimir Putin continued to double down on his likely exaggerated claims about Russian progress in Kursk Oblast amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations and in the context of the likely imminent deployment of North Korean troops to combat in this area. Putin told Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on October 25 that two weeks ago (likely the week of October 6 through 13) elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) broke through Ukrainian defenses around 10 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian international border and advanced to unspecified positions near the border.[6] Putin claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), 51st and 137th airborne (VDV) regiments (both part of the 106th VDV Division), 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 83rd Separate VDV Brigade participated in these operations. Putin once again claimed that Russian forces have encircled 2,000 Ukrainian forces in an area of about six kilometers by 15 kilometers. Putin also claimed that Russian forces guarantee the safety of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW), although a spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kursk direction reported that Russian commanders issued an order to not take Ukrainian POWs, and presumably instead to kill any Ukrainian servicemembers who surrender or are captured by Russian forces.[7] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi notably refuted Putin‘s earlier claims of Russian forces encircling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast on October 25.[8] Putin’s interview with Zarubin was broadcasted on Russian state television and is likely part of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to explain away Russia’s inability to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast after nearly three months and ahead of the reported imminent arrival of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast. Putin may also be setting informational conditions to give Russian forces credit for any progress North Korean troops make in regaining control of Russian territory in Kursk.Ukrainian forces recently launched a likely reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault on Russian positions in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 26 show that Ukrainian forces conducted a likely reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault east of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo), and the footage indicates that Russian forces likely regained positions east of Novy Put at an earlier date and that Ukrainian forces likely maintain positions southeast of Novy Put along the Russian-Ukrainian international border.[9] Elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Novy Put.[10]Ukrainian and Russian forces continued to fight in Ukraine’s main salient in Kursk Oblast on October 26, but the frontline did not change. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that fighting continued southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Lyubimovka, and Zeleny Shlyakh; north of Sudzha near Kamyshovka; northwest of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Malaya Loknya; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo on October 25 and 26.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to operate in Darino (southeast of Korenevo).[12] Elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) continued to operate near Lyubimovka and Zeleny Shlyakh.[13]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 26 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 25 and 26.[14] Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yevhenii Romanov stated that Ukrainian forces are preventing Russian forces from advancing toward Kharkiv City through Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City) but that Russian forces have significantly destroyed most buildings in Lyptsi, leaving no habitable buildings in the settlement.[15]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 26 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Vyshneve; and northwest of Kreminna near Terny, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[16] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka; south of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Vyshneve; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve; northwest of Kreminna near Terny, Hrekivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Torske; south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka; and southwest of Kreminna near Serebryanka and the Serebryanske forest area on October 25 and 26.[17]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Daryivka and Vyimka on October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area.[18] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on October 26 that elements of the Russian 6th, 7th, and 123th motorized rifle brigades (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and reserves of the 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd CAA) are unsuccessfully attacking near Bilohorivka, Ivano-Daryivka, and Vyimka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske.[19] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 85th and 88th motorized rifle brigades (3rd CAA) are attacking south of Siversk along the railway line in the direction of Pereizne and towards Fedorivka. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have two regiments (possibly one airborne [VDV] regiment and one motorized rifle regiment) from the Russian “mobilization reserve” and two reserve battalions of the 3rd CAA in their operational reserve in the Siversk direction.[20] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have no tanks and roughly three dozen armored vehicles in reserve in this direction.Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[21] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division and 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) recently marginally advanced across the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal south of Hryhorivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and that elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps and the 2nd "Veterany" Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps and reportedly subordinated to Redut private military company [PMC]) recently advanced near Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar) and seized part of the Zhovtnevyi Microraion (eastern Chasiv Yar).[22] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) recently unsuccessfully attacked southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske and Kurdyumivka.[23] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have up to three regiments, including one VDV regiment of the 98th VDV Division and two motorized rifle regiments currently in Rostov Oblast, and up to three battalions of the 3rd AC in their operational reserve in the Kramatorsk direction.[24] Mashovets estimated that Russian forces currently have six to eight tanks and 85-88 armored vehicles in reserve in this direction.Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself and southwest of Toretsk in the direction of Shcherbynivka on October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[25]Russian forces recently marginally advanced east and southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 26. Geolocated footage published on October 25 and 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the eastern outskirts of Novotoretske (east of Pokrovsk), west of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), into the Korotchenko mine waste heap northeast of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk), and into northern Oleksandropil (southeast of Pokrovsk).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 71st Separate Spetsnaz Brigade raised a flag over the waste heap northeast of Selydove and that Russian forces advanced one kilometer within Seldyove.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) seized Oleksandropil, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) seized Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove) and advanced to Mine No. 42 southwest of Hirnyk.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the train station in southern Vyshneve (southwest of Selydove), west of Tsukuryne (southeast of Selydove), and further northeast of Novodmytrivka (south of Selydove).[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk advanced north of Hrodivka and west of Krasnyi Yar.[30] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka, Myrolyubivka, Promin, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lyskivka, Mykolaivka, Selydove, Novoselydivka, Novodmytrivka, Izmailivka, and Stepanivka on October 25 and 26.[31] Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Novotoretske (east of Pokrovsk), and elements of the Russian "Borz" and "Storm" assault battalions are reportedly operating southeast of Pokrovsk near Zoryane.[32]Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove near Hostre, and Dalne on October 25 and 26, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[33] Artillerymen of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and the 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kurakhove.[34]Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 26. Geolocated footage published on October 26 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Pobieda (southwest of Donetsk City).[35] Geolocated footage published on October 26 showing a Russian reinforced platoon-seized assault and another Russian reduced company-seized assault indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Zolota Nyva and north and northwest of Prechystivka (both west of Vuhledar).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern and western Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar), reached the outskirts of Novoukrainka (northwest of Vuhledar), and gained a foothold in the southeastern outskirts of Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[37] Russian forces continued attacking southwest of Donetsk City and northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, Yelyzavetivka, and Katerynivka and north of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka on October 25 and 26.[38] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka; and elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD] operating in the Zolota Nyva-Prechystivka area.[39]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 26.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces reportedly attacked north of Robotyne in the direction of Novodanylivka on October 26.[40] New recruits of the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly training in the Zaporizhia direction; and drone operators of the 150th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[41]Russian forces continued attacking in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 25 and 26 but did not make any confirmed advances.[42] A milblogger affiliated with the Russian Air Force claimed that an unspecified Russian military helicopter crashed in the Kerch Strait near occupied Crimea.[43]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces launched another missile and drone strike targeting Ukrainian rear areas overnight on October 25 and 26, resulting in the destruction of civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea, two Kh-59 cruise missiles from Bryansk Oblast, two missiles of an unknown type from Belgorod Oblast, and 91 Shahed-type and other unidentified strike drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[44] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down 44 drones as of 1200 local time over Kirovohrad, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Kursk oblasts; that 44 Russian drones became ”locally lost;” that one drone flew into Belarusian airspace; and that one drone remained in the Ukrainian airspace as of 1200 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and Dnipro City, resulting in civilian casualties. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Ukrainian state officials reported that Russian strikes against Dnipro City destroyed a two-floor residential building and killed four civilians and damaged the Mechnikov Hospital (one of the largest Ukrainian medical facilities) and other civilian infrastructure.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted the Mechnikov Hospital with Iskander-M missiles but missed, possibly due to the Ukrainian use of electronic warfare (EW) systems.[46] Ukrainian regional officials also reported that Russian Shahed drones struck residential buildings and a hotel in Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and a high-rise apartment building in Solomyanskyi Raion, Kyiv City.[47]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian military command is reportedly continuing to commit military specialists to assault operations and incurring unnecessary losses, likely in an effort to centralize control over Russian forces and maintain the tempo of Russian offensive operations throughout the theater. A former Russian Storm Z instructor and milblogger claimed on October 26 that he received a message from the frontlines that the Russian military command is transferring a group of experienced Russian drone operators to infantry units in an unspecified direction.[48] The milblogger accused the Russian military command of failing to effectively use drone specialists and hindering the Russian military from achieving parity with or even superiority over Ukrainian drone operations. ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command has been indiscriminately committing specialists to grinding assault operations, partly in support of Russia’s ongoing force centralization efforts and in an attempt to maintain the offensive tempo in eastern Ukraine.[49]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-25/north-korea-to-send-more-troops-to-russia-soon-intelligence-documents-reveal[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/25/world/europe/north-korean-troops-arrive-kursk-russia.html[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/25/world/europe/north-korean-troops-arrive-kursk-russia.html[4] https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/four-rheinmetall-plants-set-to-launch-in-1729944205.html; https://euromaidanpress dot com/2024/10/26/german-arms-giant-rheinmetall-to-open-second-ukraine-plant-with-four-in-total/[5] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/rheinmetall-plans-to-construct-four-weapon-1710433612.html[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/281740 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281741 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281742 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281743 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281744 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281745 ; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2885131 ; https://iz dot ru/1780498/2024-10-25/putin-soobshchil-ob-okruzhenii-vs-rf-2-tys-ukrainskikh-boevikov-v-kurskoi-oblasti [7] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/na-kurskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-otrymaly-nakaz-ne-braty-v-polon-ukrayinskyh-vijskovyh/ [8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024[9] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7262; https://t.me/khornegroup/2875; https://t.me/rybar/64781; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142214; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812[10] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79445; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18029[11] https://t.me/mod_russia/44955; https://t.me/rybar/64781; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79411; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79419; https://t.me/dva_majors/55958; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142199; https://t.me/milinfolive/133579[12] https://t.me/motopatriot/28801; https://t.me/rybar/64781[13] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79411; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79419[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[15] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/26/harkiv-u-nebezpeczi-u-zsu-prokomentuvaly-vazhlyvist-zvilnennya-lypcziv/[16] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28880 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28867 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28841[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[19] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2298[20] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2297 [21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812[22] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2298[23] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2299[24] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2297[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[26] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7258; https://t.me/urga_74/2258 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7265; https://t.me/ggwpteam2504/148 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7253; https://t.me/voenacher/73567 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7255; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12884[27] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18019 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79446 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18024 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28853 ; https://t.me/rybar/64810[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79434 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18017 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28856 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12884 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21454 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/44953 https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22819 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28873 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79458 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18032 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133647 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79434 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28785; https://t.me/motopatriot/28786 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142146; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142157 [29] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79432 ; https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/191364 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55947 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55958 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28853 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17962 ; https://t.me/sashakots/49778 ; https://t.me/rybar/64811 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28802 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28813 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28807[30] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17774[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/22812 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/22817 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28802[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[34] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12885 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79406[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7250; https://t.me/mechanized33/467; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1850168034448622071[36] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1849927458864181470; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7251; https://t.me/morpex_V/3287; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7260; https://t.me/SPN_SIGMA/930; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28849; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7266; https://t.me/opbr_zsu/384[37] https://t.me/z_arhiv/28849 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79473 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22812 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18037 ; https://t.me/ne_rybar/2479 ; https://t.me/rybar/64814[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[39] https://t.me/voin_dv/11492 ; https://t.me/rybar/64814[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/55997; https://t.me/milinfolive/133604[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028Vn1oSR8trA1cxgH4qgw3zhsRex6s9zeXhfFo13RAG1pdgcMnf3UXL9EdaRBEJ1Pl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid029qCxD8XM7EL5zaAoivLtN4rsTsqkc8utdraZa6MAQQkC5NFiDY7jfcGDRvgQckaZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rmyrjNsiLzttL7TGUr23JbWRdGxwrTjcq2szCTjVz2tGrnRZkUZaFhZ89mZXNp6hl[43] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52079 ; https://t.me/astrapress/67203; https://t.me/fighter_bomber/18566[44] https://t.me/kpszsu/21943[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/vid-raketnogo-udaru-po-dnipru-zagynula-druzhyna-ta-donka-policzejskogo/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16993 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16991 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16983 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16982; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16972; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16971; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16969; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16971; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16968 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16965; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/16966; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/raketnyj-udar-po-dnipru-sered-majzhe-20-poranenyh-4-dytyny/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34082; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/prezydent-vidreaguvav-na-rosijski-obstrily-nadijnyj-myr-mozhlyvyj-lyshe-cherez-sylu/; https://x.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1850143899852878143[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/18018[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/25/u-bagatopoverhivku-solom%ca%bcyanskogo-rajonu-vluchyv-shahed-pochalasya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/3639; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/naslidky-udaru-po-kyyevu-drony-zrujnuvaly-budynok-u-solomyanskomu-rajoni-ye-zagybli/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34079; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/26/vorog-prodovzhuye-teroryzuvaty-myrne-naselennya-hmelnychchyny/; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/ZQ6ipjK6BT5kfcfo/[48] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1625[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2024
- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, October 23, 2024
- at 10/25/24 9:10pmAuthors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, and Henry Mann of the Institute for the Study of War;Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: October 22, 2024The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways The ROC Mainland Affairs Council criticized the PRC for interfering in Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry after Taiwanese artists and performers reposted the PRC’s announcement of military drills around Taiwan on October 14.The PRC accused a joint US-Canadian transit of the Taiwan Strait of undermining peace and threatening the PRC’s sovereignty.PRC President Xi Jinping traveled to Kazan, Russia for the 16th BRICS summit from October 22 to 24. The summit will cover BRICS expansion and deepening financial cooperation among member states. The United States sanctioned two PRC firms involved in producing drones for Russia. This is the first time the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanThe ROC Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) criticized the PRC for interfering in Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry after Taiwanese artists and performers reposted PRC announcements of military drills around Taiwan on October 14.[1] The MAC stated that the CCP uses political ideology to intervene in performing arts activities and has even required artists to make political statements when performing in mainland China due to strict regulations against “endangering national unity sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” Several artists reposted specific CCP unification slogans during the PRC’s Joint Sword 2024B exercises last week, such as “reunification with the motherland is inevitable.”[2] The PRC state broadcaster CCTV subsequently published screenshots of Taiwanese artists’ expressions of support for unification and encouraged them to follow up and clarify their stances.[3]The MAC emphasized the CCP’s inculcation of political ideology in the art and entertainment industry in a statement on October 1. It called out the CCP for mobilizing Taiwanese celebrities to express pro-unification stances to their audiences after dozens of Taiwanese artists, actors, and celebrities publicly supported unification.The PRC pressures Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry in a variety of ways, ranging from threats of banning and ostracization to direct co-optation. Some of the banned performers and bands have expressed support for Taiwanese statehood, whereas others have simply performed at concerts dedicated to causes such as anti-annexation and support for Hong Kong protesters in 2019. The PRC pressured the popular Taiwanese band Mayday to support the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China in December 2023.[4] Reuters cited an anonymous source who provided access to an internal security note that details the PRC’s threats to fine the band for lip-syncing, a fraudulent offense in the PRC. Several Taiwanese YouTubers also called attention to CCP efforts to recruit them to facilitate United Front work in June 2024. The United Front is a whole-of-government and society effort to advance the CCP’s ideology and interests by co-opting non-government segments of Chinese society. United Front activities against Taiwan aim to inculcate in the Taiwanese public CCP notions that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of that China. The celebrities claimed that the CCP is spending considerable resources to lure Taiwanese internet celebrities to influence Taiwanese politics.[5] YouTuber Ba Jiong revealed that a draft contract he received discussed a plan to establish a “Taiwan Support Party” that artists would join as honorary members to shape the future of PRC-Taiwan relations.[6] The terms stated that the CCP would invest millions of dollars to enable Taiwanese artists to put on shows and events that promoted CCP-aligned narratives of cross-strait relations.The PRC likely aims to shape the younger generation’s perceptions of Taiwan’s political status and Chinese identity to conform to CCP cross-strait policies through such pressure on Taiwan’s arts and entertainment industry. Young people make up most of celebrities’ fans and therefore are the audience for their political expressions, both at in-person events and on social media. The PRC thanked South Africa for demanding that Taiwan relocate its representative office out of Pretoria. South Africa first asked Taiwan’s representative office to relocate from Pretoria, its administrative capital, verbally in December 2023.[7] It also requested that Taiwan relocate the office in April 2024 and then issued an “ultimatum” to Taipei on October 7, 2024, stating that it would close the office if it did not relocate.[8] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning approved of South Africa’s demand and stated that the one-China principle is “a recognized norm of international relations and the will of the international community and the general trend.” She also said that “‘Taiwan independence’ is unpopular and will fail.”[9]Taipei responded by declaring it will not relocate the office. Taiwanese officials have stated that Taipei “retains the right to determine its location and status,” because the office is Taiwanese property.[10] ROC Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said that the office “is still in operation and will stay in the capital” and that South Africa is violating a 1997 agreement stating that Taiwan could maintain an office in South Africa’s capital despite South Africa’s formal relations with the PRC (established in 1996, before South Africa broke off ties with Taiwan in 1998).[11] Taiwan may also consider requesting South Africa to move its representative office out of Taipei in response.[12]Taiwan faced a similar issue in 2017 when Nigeria ordered Taiwan’s liaison office to relocate from the administrative capital. In this case, Taiwan complied.[13] The Washington Post reported that it “remains unclear whether South Africa would follow through on its threat to shut down the office’s operations if Taipei sticks with its insistence on not moving.”[14]ChinaThe PLA conducted live-fire drills near an island in the Taiwan Strait a week after it carried out the Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan. The Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) announced that the drills would take place in the waters near Niushan Island on October 22, eight days after the Joint Sword exercise and two days after a US and Canadian warship jointly transited the Taiwan Strait. Niushan Island, part of Fujian Province, is 165 kilometers from Taipei and 80 kilometers south of Taiwan’s Matsu islands. It is the closest point in the PRC to the main island of Taiwan.[15] Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said the PLA drill is part of an annual routine military exercise. It said the PLA is using the drill to exert deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.[16]CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping visited an island county opposite Taiwan days after the PLA’s Joint Sword 2024B exercise around Taiwan. Xi visited Dongshan County on October 16 as part of an inspection tour of Fujian Province. Dongshan County was the site of a battle in 1953 in which the ROC unsuccessfully tried to retake the island from the PLA, four years after the CCP established the PRC and expelled the KMT from the mainland. It was the last battle of its kind between PRC and ROC forces. Dongshan has also been the site of PLA drills, including landing exercises. PRC media and government readouts did not specify whether Xi inspected military facilities in Dongshan and did not mention any connection with the Joint Sword exercise.[17] Xi visited the memorial hall of former Dongshan CCP Party Secretary Gu Wenchang. CCTV and other state media noted that Xi has mentioned Gu in speeches many times and that Gu played an important role in defending Dongshan from KMT forces.[18] This is Xi’s first inspection tour of Fujian since 2021.The PRC accused a joint US-Canadian transit of the Taiwan Strait of undermining peace and threatening the PRC’s sovereignty. The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver jointly conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait on October 20. A statement from US INDOPACOM said the ships transited through a “high seas corridor in the Strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal state.”[19] PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) spokesperson Li Xi said the ETC mobilized naval and air forces to monitor the transit. Li claimed the transit “disturbed the situation and undermined the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.”[20] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Lin Jian claimed that “the Taiwan issue is not an issue of freedom of navigation, but an issue concerning China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.” He said the PRC “firmly opposes any country provoking or threatening China's sovereignty and security in the name of freedom of navigation.”[21] The rhetoric reflects frequently stated PRC positions and is similar to its response to the Canadian transit on August 1 and the German transit on September 14.[22] It is harsher than the response to the previous US-Canada joint transit in November 2023, however, when the ETC did not accuse the United States and Canada of undermining peace.[23]PRC President Xi Jinping traveled to Kazan, Russia for the 16th BRICS summit from October 22 to 24. The BRICS summit will be the first to include new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Its original members are Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa.[24] Russian foreign affairs advisor Yuri Ushakov called the summit “the largest foreign policy event ever held by Russia,” with high-level representatives from 36 countries attending including 20 heads of state.[25] Xi arrived in Kazan, along with CCP Secretary of the Secretariat Cai Qi and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on October 22.[26] MFA spokesperson Lin Jian said that the PRC is "willing to work with all parties to promote the steady and long-term development of the 'Greater BRICS Cooperation.'"[27]BRICS expansion will be an agenda item for discussion in Kazan. Lin Jian noted that the Kazan summit will constitute the first meeting since BRICS’ expansion.[28] Four new members joined in 2024. Saudi Arabia was also invited to join but has not yet accepted the invitation.[29] Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov claimed in September that the next wave of membership expansion will be announced at the Kazan summit, though BRICS officials have not confirmed this claim.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin said at least 34 countries have expressed interest in joining BRICS, including Turkey, a NATO member.[31] PRC ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui said in an interview with state-owned Global Times that the summit will outline a “development blueprint for the BRICS mechanism” and that the PRC welcomed further expansion of BRICS and “BRICS Plus” cooperation.[32]Financial cooperation among BRICS countries will also be a major topic and priority for the PRC. Global Times cited Institute of Developing Countries at the China Institute of International Studies Director Wang Youming, reporting that economic and financial cooperation is expected to be among key topics.”[33] Ambassador Zhang said the summit aimed to achieve “new landmark results” in areas such as finance, artificial intelligence, and energy and minerals. He particularly stressed financial cooperation, saying that countries should “strive to promote breakthroughs in domestic currency settlement and cross-border payment cooperation.” Zhang commented on the prospects of promoting a common BRICS currency by noting that the PRC has advanced the internationalization of its currency, the renminbi. BRICS adopting the renminbi, or another common currency, would reduce reliance on the US dollar among Global South countries.[34]Northeast AsiaJapanThe Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) claimed that it “expelled” a Japanese fishing boat from the territorial waters of the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands. CCG Spokesman Liu Dejun claimed the vessel was illegally fishing in Chinese waters on October 15 and 16.[35] The PRC and ROC both claim sovereignty over the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, which they call the Diaoyu Islands. Japan’s Coast Guard reported that CCG ships entered the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands two days in a row, marking the 39th such incursion in 2024, but did not confirm whether the CCG expelled a Japanese boat.[36] There have been between four and twenty CCG incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the islands in months since April 2019. The CCG’s claimed expulsion of Japanese boats from the waters around the Senkaku Islands serves to legitimize the PRC’s law enforcement jurisdiction there and demonstrate the PRC’s de facto control of the islands, even though Japan administers the islands.The CCG began near-daily incursions into the Senkaku Islands’ contiguous zone, and occasionally territorial waters, in 2012. It significantly increased the frequency of these incursions in 2019. It has made 90–110 incursions in most months since April 2019 into the Senkaku Islands’ contiguous zone. There have been only 9 days since October 20, 2023, without CCG incursions into the Senkaku contiguous waters. This behavior appears to be part of a long-term PRC strategy to gradually erode Japanese control and assert Chinese sovereignty over the islands.[37]RussiaThe United States sanctioned two PRC firms involved in producing drones for Russia. This is the first time that the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. A US Department of Treasury statement said that the two PRC firms worked with US-sanctioned Russian firms to develop and manufacture the Garpiya-series drone in PRC-based factories and ship them to Russia.[38] Russia has deployed Garpiya drones against Ukraine.[39] The Treasury statement said that the PRC-based Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. produced the L550E engine for the Garpiya in the PRC in collaboration with Russian company Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol (IEMZ Kupol), a subsidiary of Russian state-owned weapons company Almaz-Antey.The statement also stated that the PRC company Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co. works with the Russian firm TSK Vektor to ship the UAVs to Russia. TSK Vektor is an intermediary between IEMZ Kupol and its PRC suppliers. TSK Vektor and IEMZ Kupol are both under US sanctions. The statement said that Redlepus has used Vektor to export components with UAV applications since the beginning of 2024, including aircraft engines, parts of automatic data processing machines, and electrical components. It further said Redlepus worked with IEMZ Kupol and TSK Vektor to establish a joint drone research and production center. [40] Reuters previously reported on the collaboration between Redlepus and the Russian firms to produce drones, including establishing a joint drone research center in the PRC’s Xinjiang region.[41]The PRC MFA told Reuters it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[42] Xiamen Limbach and Redlepus Viktor are private firms. PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment nevertheless marks a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermines the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.South AsiaThe PRC and India reached an agreement on border issues contested since 2020.[43] Weeks-long disengagement talks between the two sides concluded with an agreement that both sides would resume border patrols along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between Aksai Chin and Ladakh.[44] The two sides have held rounds of talks while maintaining military assets stationed at the border since Indian and PRC forces attacked each other with sticks and stones in May 2020. Indian PM Narendra Modi and PRC President Xi Jinping agreed to “intensify” de-escalation efforts at the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.[45]Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated that “the disengagement process with China has been completed.” Reuters reported that “the two militaries will patrol contested points along the border according to an agreed schedule.”[46] The two sides have not released a joint statement.[47] PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated in a press conference that “at present, the two sides have reached a solution to the relevant issues, which China has positively evaluated. In the next step, China will work with India to implement the above solution.”[48]The PRC affirmed that it seeks to expand PRC-Pakistan cooperation at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Islamabad. In his first visit to Pakistan as PRC Premier, Li Qiang met with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting. Li stated that “China is willing to work with Pakistan, focusing on establishing an upgraded version of the CPEC.”[49] Li said that the new China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will “aim to accelerate the construction of major projects in areas such as railways, roads, and ports” and increase “practical cooperation in agriculture, mining, information technology, and energy.”[50] PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stated in an October 14 regular press conference that “China and Pakistan are iron-clad friends and all-weather strategic partners.”[51]Expanded PRC-Pakistan cooperation could take the form of counterterrorism and security efforts. The South China Morning Post reported that Li Qiang met with Pakistani military officials during his visit and told them that the PRC hopes to improve counterterrorism cooperation. Li told Sharif that “China firmly supports Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and is willing to actively promote counterterrorism cooperation, helping Pakistan to strengthen its counterterrorism capacity building.”[52] The SCO summit took place following a militant attack that killed two Chinese nationals in Karachi on October 6. This attack prompted PRC calls for Pakistan to improve its security situation and raised questions about Pakistan’s ability to protect PRC assets. Islamabad’s inability to control its security situation has long frustrated Beijing. [1] https://www.mac dot gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=52CC50D0762B987A[2] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/acn/202410150090.aspx[3] https://www.cna dot com.tw/news/acn/202405270375.aspx[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-pressures-influential-taiwanese-band-ahead-elections-sources-2023-12-28/[5] https://news.ltn dot com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4707881[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qnElihmXaUE[7] https://www.chinatimes dot com/realtimenews/20241022002848-260407?chdtv[8] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202410210006[9] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202410/t20241018_11510015.shtml[10] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/10/22/taiwan-south-africa-representative-office-pretoria-johannesburg/023156a8-9038-11ef-b5b1-75167840d9f3_story.html[11] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202410210006[12] https://focustaiwan dot tw/politics/202410210006[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/10/22/taiwan-south-africa-representative-office-pretoria-johannesburg/023156a8-9038-11ef-b5b1-75167840d9f3_story.html[14] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2024/10/22/taiwan-south-africa-representative-office-pretoria-johannesburg/023156a8-9038-11ef-b5b1-75167840d9f3_story.html[15] https://focustaiwan dot tw/cross-strait/202410210023https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/military/article/3283292/china-plans-live-fire-drills-taiwan-strait-after-us-and-canada-warships-transit-there?module=topic_widget&pgtype=article[16] https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/front/archives/2024/10/22/2003825694[17] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3282578/chinese-president-xi-visits-taiwan-facing-island-after-pla-drills-simulate-blockade?module=top_story&pgtype=subsectionhttp://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/topone/202410/t20241016_12656867.htm[18] http://www.81 dot cn/xx_207779/16346067.html[19] https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3940364/us-7th-fleet-destroyer-and-the-royal-canadian-navy-conduct-bilateral-transit-in/[20] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/bmst/202410/t20241021_12657647.htm[21] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202410/t20241021_11510871.shtml[22] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/bmst/202408/t20240801_12639545.htmhttp://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/bmst/202409/t20240914_12650232.htm[23] http://www.gwytb.gov dot cn/bmst/202311/t20231103_12578918.htm[24] https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/oct/22/putin-brics-summit-russia-china-india-iran-kazan[25] https://apnews.com/article/russia-brics-summit-china-india-ukraine-war-39e90fce8443b922f4d224c65c2ec932[26] Fmprc.gov dot cn/zyxw/202410/t20241022_11511381.shtml[27] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202410/t20241021_11510871.shtml[28] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202410/t20241021_11510871.shtml[29] https://www.firstpost.com/world/is-saudi-arabia-a-brics-member-or-not-a-curious-case-of-invitation-acceptance-and-a-delay-13828018.html[30] https://www.rt dot com/news/604925-brics-dozen-new-members/https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202410/1321569.shtml[31] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-vladimir-putin-brics-summit-2024-brazil-b2633312.html[32] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202410/1321609.shtml[33] Globaltimes dot cn/page/202410/1321612.shtml?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email[34] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202410/1321609.shtml[35] https://www.ccg.gov dot cn/wqzf/202410/t20241017_2513.html[36] https://www.cna.com dot tw/news/aipl/202410170200.aspx[37] https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html[38] https://home.treasury dot gov/news/press-releases/jy2651[39] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-new-kamikaze-drone-with-chinese-engine-say-european-intel-2024-09-13/[40] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2651https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-new-kamikaze-drone-with-chinese-engine-say-european-intel-2024-09-13/[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-produces-new-kamikaze-drone-with-chinese-engine-say-european-intel-2024-09-13/[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-concerned-by-report-russia-secret-war-drones-project-china-white-house-says-2024-09-25/https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/[43][43] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/22/world/asia/india-china-border.html[44] Scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3283289/india-announces-deal-china-patrolling-shared-border-sparking-hope-better-ties[45] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/22/asia/india-china-border-agreement-intl-hnk/index.html[46] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/india-china-have-arrived-border-patrolling-pact-indias-top-diplomat-says-2024-10-21/[47] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/22/asia/india-china-border-agreement-intl-hnk/index.html[48] Fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202410/t20241022_11511370.shtml[49] Scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3282458/chinas-li-qiang-vows-upgraded-pakistan-economic-corridor-first-visit-islamabad[50] Scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3282458/chinas-li-qiang-vows-upgraded-pakistan-economic-corridor-first-visit-islamabad[51] Fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/202410/t20241014_11507198.shtml[52] https://scmp dot com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3282458/chinas-li-qiang-vows-upgraded-pakistan-economic-corridor-first-visit-islamabad?module=top_story&pgtype=subsection
- — Iran Update, October 19, 2024
- at 10/25/24 9:10pmKelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Three drones crossed into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 19.[1] The IDF said that one of the drones "hit a building“ in Caesarea with no casualties.[2] Israeli residents reported hearing a large explosion following the drone’s impact.[3] Neither Netanyahu nor his wife were at the residence at the time of the impact, according to the Prime Minister’s Office.[4] Leaked images of the residence show damage to the side of a building.[5] Netanyahu warned in a statement that the Iranian-backed groups that tried to ”assassinate” him made a ”grave mistake.”[6]Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Drones pose substantial challenges for IDF air defenses, though the IDF is gradually improving its counter-drone capabilities. The IDF intercepted the other two drones that crossed from Lebanon and triggered warning alarms in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.[7] CTP-ISW is unable to assess what the targets of these two drones may have been. Hezbollah most recently penetrated Israeli air defenses when a drone struck the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade’s training camp south of Haifa on October 13. Hezbollah combined short-range, imprecise rockets with drones and missiles during the October 13 attack. There have not been indications that Hezbollah also used imprecise indirect fires, such as rockets, in the October 19 attack targeting Netanyahu. Hezbollah has used single drones to penetrate Israeli air defenses in the past, however, by flying the drones at a low altitude and through challenging terrain to prevent radar detection.[8]Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders. These Israeli operations resulted in the deaths of Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah has not claimed or acknowledged the attack as of this writing, but Hezbollah’s operations did announce on October 18 that it would “transition to a new and escalating phase” in its attacks on Israel.[9] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem also said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[10]Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, according to an unspecified Israeli official. An unspecified Israeli intelligence official told the Wall Street Journal that Hezbollah drone attacks are increasing in frequency following a brief lull caused by the death of Hezbollah’s drone unit commander in an Israeli strike in Beirut on September 26.[11] The Israeli intelligence official said that Unit 127—Hezbollah’s drone unit—is composed of a “few dozen” fighters and that the unit ”suffered” after Israel killed its commander.[12] CTP-ISW observed a brief interval for six days after the commander’s death on September 26 in which Hezbollah fired no drones or a single drone into Israeli territory.Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander. Hezbollah drone attacks have increased in recent days in both frequency and deadliness. Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah has launched about thirty drones into Israel in the past week.[13] A Hezbollah drone killed four IDF personnel and injured over 60 more in Binyamina on October 13, and another drone attack could have killed Netanyahu on October 19.[14] The IDF has continued targeting tactical-level Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon, which CTP-ISW has assessed may be diminishing the combat effectiveness of some Hezbollah units.[15] The effects generated by the removal of Hezbollah commanders is a temporary effect, however. Hezbollah forces remain structured as a conventional fighting force. Military organizations are designed to absorb casualties and rapidly replace commanders to overcome temporary disruptions caused by the loss of leaders.[16]Some recent Hezbollah attacks, such as the drone strike on the 1st Infantry Brigade’s base, indicate that Hezbollah has rebuilt at least some of its communications structure that the IDF campaign previously severely degraded. Hezbollah launched a combined offensive of rockets, missiles, and drones in the 1st Infantry Brigade attack, suggesting that Hezbollah had restored some communication between its rocket, missile, and drone units in order to coordinate the simultaneous launches.[17]Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement.[18] CTP-ISW has assessed that Hayya is Sinwar’s most likely successor as Hamas political leader.[19] The Hamas officials said that Hamas will begin discussions to determine Yahya Sinwar’s successor “very soon.”[20] A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.[21] Hayya and an accompanying Hamas delegation met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on October 19 to discuss the October 9 meeting between Hamas and Fatah in Cairo addressing post-war governance in the Gaza Strip and recent "developments.”[22] Hayya—who, like Sinwar, is close to Iran—has shown little willingness to moderate his positions.[23]Key Takeaways:Hezbollah Drone Strike Targeting Netanyahu: Hezbollah likely conducted a drone attack targeting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel, on October 19. Hezbollah likely intended to kill Netanyahu by using drones to evade Israeli air defenses. Hezbollah may have decided to target higher-value Israeli officials in response to recent Israeli operations that have killed multiple senior Axis leaders.Hezbollah Drone Operations: Israeli operations temporarily disrupted the operations of Hezbollah’s drone unit in late September, but Hezbollah’s drone unit appears to have reconstituted and overcome the temporary disruption caused by the loss of its commander.Sinwar Succession: Two unspecified Hamas officials cited by the BBC on October 19 stated that Deputy Political Bureau Chairman Khalil al Hayya is considered a strong candidate for Sinwar’s replacement. A separate unspecified Hamas official speaking to the BBC said that Hamas’ conditions for a ceasefire-hostage deal have not changed despite Sinwar’s death, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment.Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: The 91st Division continued operations in Mhaibib, southern Lebanon, on October 19. The IDF 8th Armored Brigade and Yahalom combat engineers demolished a Radwan SOF tunnel north of Mhaibib. Part of the complex ran underneath a Lebanese school.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division engaged Palestinian fighters and directed airstrikes during clearing operations in Jabalia on October 19.[24] Geolocated footage posted on October 19 showed Israeli forces detaining Palestinian men for questioning near the Indonesian Hospital in northern Jabalia.[25] Geolocated imagery posted on October 17 showed Israeli forces operating at the former Othman bin Affan Secondary School for Boys in western Jabalia.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirmed that Israeli forces have been operating at the school since as early as October 14.The IDF 252nd Division directed airstrikes targeting buildings used by Hamas to conduct sniper attacks and plant explosives in the central Gaza Strip on October 19.[27] The 252nd Division has operated in Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps, in the central Gaza Strip, since October 17.[28]The IDF 143rd Division killed the commander of Hamas’ Tel al Sultan Battalion Mahmoud Hamdan on October 18.[29] Israeli forces engaged Hamdan in a firefight approximately 200 meters from where the former leader of Hamas Yahya Sinwar died. The 933rd Infantry Brigade killed two groups of Palestinian fighters that posed a threat to their forces.[30]Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered an increase in humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip to 250 trucks per day.[31] The Israeli security cabinet is set to review and vote on the order on October 20. This decision follows a letter from the United States to senior Israeli officials on October 13 warning that the Biden administration will be forced to take unspecified steps, implying the withholding of military aid to Israel, if aid is not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[32]The Israeli body overseeing humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip announced on October 19 that 81 crates of humanitarian aid were airdropped into Khan Younis in coordination with the United Arab Emirates.[33] COGAT stated that the crates contained 10,000 packages of food and medical supplies.West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW did not record any engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cut-off on October 18.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese media reported that the IDF conducted artillery shelling near Kfarchouba, Hasbaya District, on October 18.[34] The IDF said on October 15 that the IDF 810th Brigade (210th Division) has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous terrain in Hasbaya District over the past week.[35]The 98th Division continued operations around Kfar Kila and Markaba, southeast Lebanon, on October 19. The IDF said that the IDF 35th Paratrooper and 89th Commando brigades are operating in the IDF’s “furthest point” of operations in southern Lebanon.[36] CTP-ISW assesses that the 98th Division has advanced approximately 2.7 kilometers into Lebanon in Rab al Thalatheen, likely the furthest point of advance across any advance in southern Lebanon. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 19 showed flattened buildings in western Markaba, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the area. Satellite imagery also showed Israeli forces advancing along a road southeast of Kfar Kila. The IDF 7th Armored Brigade located a Hezbollah compound within a school and located numerous weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), weapons parts, and other combat equipment.[37] Israeli forces also located an observation post overlooking towns in the Galilee panhandle and found explosives and intelligence equipment.[38] The IDF 55th Paratrooper Brigade (Res.) located and destroyed dozens of weapons, including Kornet anti-tank missile launchers, explosives, dozens of RPGs, and others.[39] Hezbollah mortared Israeli forces near Fatima Gate between Kfar Kila and Metula.[40]The 91st Division continued operations in Mhaibib, southern Lebanon, on October 19.[41] The IDF 8th Armored Brigade and Yahalom combat engineers demolished a Radwan SOF tunnel north of Mhaibib.[42] Part of the complex ran underneath a Lebanese school. Israeli forces located a command center, a weapons depot, residences, scooter bikes, ammunition, and other military equipment within the complex.[43] Israeli forces demolished a similar Radwan SOF underground structure in Mhaibib on October 16.[44] Israeli forces located weapons and equipment near the complex, including mines, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft guns, grenades, RPG launchers, machine guns, Kalashnikov rifles, and ammunition.[45] Israeli forces also located and destroyed over 50 shafts and underground infrastructure found in mosques, schools, and other civilian buildings.[46]The 36th Division continued operations near Aita al Shaab, southern Lebanon, on October 19. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 19 showed flattening buildings northwest of Aita al Shaab, indicating Israeli forces continued to operate in the area. Israeli forces destroyed numerous weapons, including rocket launchers, rockets, and Kornet anti-tank guided missile launchers aimed to fire at northern Israel.[47] Hezbollah fighters launched rockets targeting Israeli forces in Aita al Shaab.[48] The IDF 188th Armored Brigade directed an airstrike targeting a launcher from which Hezbollah launched rockets at Israeli forces.[49]Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted artillery shelling near Tayr Harfa and Naqoura, Tyre District, on October 19.[50] The IDF last acknowledged the 146th Division’s operations in southwest Lebanon on October 14.[51]The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and leadership on October 19. The IDF struck Hezbollah weapons depots and launchers aimed at northern Israel.[52] The IDF also conducted multiple strikes targeting weapons warehouses and infrastructure used by Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus in Dahiyeh, Beirut.[53] Local Lebanese media reported at least eleven strikes targeting sites in Dahiyeh.[54] CTP-ISW cannot confirm local Lebanese reporting. The IDF issued evacuation warnings to residents of Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, and Choueifat al Umara to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructures.[55] The IDF also reportedly struck a vehicle in Jounieh, north of Beirut.[56] The strike killed two people.[57] Jounieh is a majority-Christian city.The IDF also targeted and killed Hezbollah’s deputy commander of the Bint Jbeil sector, Nasser Abd al Aziz Rashid.[58] Rashid promoted and carried out attacks from the Bint Jbeil area against Israelis.[59] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Rashid had taken over the Bint Jbeil sector’s command after the previous commander, Emad Maatuk, was seriously injured.[60] The correspondent reported that a senior officer in the Nasr Unit who oversaw rocket fire was also killed in the airstrike.[61]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 18 to 2:00pm ET on October 19. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah conducted at least 23 attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on October 18.[62] Hezbollah conducted one drone and three rocket attacks on Israeli military targets around Haifa.[63] The IDF detected approximately 30 rockets launched towards the Haifa Bay area and intercepted some.[64] Hezbollah attacked the Nashraim base southeast of Haifa for the first time since it started its attacks into northern Israel on October 8.[65] Hezbollah also attacked the Philon base, east of Safed, for the first time since it started its attacks into northern Israel on October 8, 2023.[66]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIranian parliamentarians recently proposed two pieces of legislation to develop the Iranian nuclear program.[67] Forty parliamentarians signed the first piece of legislation, which is titled “Development Plan for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology,” and 63 parliamentarians signed the second piece, which is titled “Plan to Develop [Iran’s] Nuclear Industry.”[68] Both pieces of legislation call for developing new nuclear reactors, including small modular reactors, fast neutron reactors, nuclear fusion reactors, and nuclear research reactors.[69] The legislations also call for increasing Iran’s nuclear power capacity to 7,000 megawatts.[70] Iran currently has one operational 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant in Bushehr.[71]Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei emphasized Hamas’ resilience in a statement commemorating Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yahya Sinwar on October 19.[72] Khamenei stated that “Hamas is alive and will remain alive” and reiterated Iran’s support for Palestinian militias.The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militants—has claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 18.[73] The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in northern Israel.[74]A drone attack targeting an unspecified "vital target" in the Golan Heights.[75]The IDF intercepted a drone that was heading toward Israel from Syria on October 18.[76] The drone did not enter Israeli airspace. The IDF also identified a drone that was launched "from the east" and entered Israeli airspace from Syria on October 18.[77] The drone crashed in the northern Golan Heights, causing no injuries.Iranian-backed Iraqi militia supporters attacked a Saudi media office in Baghdad on October 18 after the media outlet labeled several Axis of Resistance leaders, including Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, as “terrorists.”[78] Approximately 400-500 individuals attacked the office.[79] An unspecified Iraqi Interior Ministry official stated that the protesters destroyed computers and electronic equipment in the office and set fire to part of the building.[80] Some protesters reportedly carried Popular Mobilization Forces and Kataib Hezbollah flags.[81]Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on October 18 that the Houthis “successfully” targeted the Malta-flagged Megalopolis container ship in the Arabian Sea with multiple drones.[82] Sarea stated they targeted the ship for violating the Houthi ban on vessels accessing Israeli ports.[83]Houthi media claimed on October 18 that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted two airstrikes targeting Ras Issa, Hudaydah Province, Yemen.[84] US Central Command has not confirmed the strikes at the time of this writing.[1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847507161871511895[2] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847507161871511895[3] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hezbollah-drone-targets-netanyahus-house-in-caesarea-pm-wife-not-home-no-injuries/[4] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15640[5] https://x.com/MiddleEastIndex/status/1847637206816498123[6] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1847686585552134536[7] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847507161871511895[8] https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-824454; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/israel-faces-fierce-evasive-foe-hezbollahs-drones-114784152[9] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/92850[10] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate101524[11] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-drone-from-lebanon-flew-toward-netanyahus-home-4f577832?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-confirms-commander-of-hezbollahs-aerial-forces-killed-in-beirut-strike/ ; https://t.me/mmirleb/7352[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-drone-from-lebanon-flew-toward-netanyahus-home-4f577832?mod=middle-east_news_article_pos1[13] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15654[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024; https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1847686585552134536 [15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04p04lq27ko[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/sinwars-death-will-not-end-israeli-operations-in-the-gaza-strip ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-17-2024[20] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04p04lq27ko[21] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c04p04lq27ko[22] www dot hamasinfo.info/?p=4280 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fatah-leaders-hold-palestinian-unity-talks-cairo-2024-10-09/[23] https://x.com/IpIndependent/status/1847259588543828191[24] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847537396482445475[25] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1847650929882845276[26] https://x.com/JakeGodin/status/1847448052816085191 ; https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1846891250454053324[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847537433333666147[28] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-17-2024[29] https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-10-18/ty-article-live/u-s-defense-chief-sinwars-death-provides-opportunity-to-end-terrible-war-in-gaza/00000192-9d4d-d012-a3b2-fd7d06680000?liveBlogItemId=1631817827&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#1631817827[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1847537387527647648[31] https://www.kan.org dot il/content/kan-news/politic/813897/[32] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/10/15/us-weapons-israel-gaza-aid/ ; 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- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 22, 2024
- at 10/25/24 9:10pmChristina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 22, 2024, 5:40pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on October 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military. Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged distilleries in Yefremov and Luzhlovsky.[1] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Ukrainian drone strike also damaged local Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and Federal Security Service (FSB) buildings near the distillery in Yefremov.[2] Russian opposition and insider sources posted footage showing a fire near the Yefremov distillery, synthetic rubber plant (just northwest of the distillery), and thermal power plant (just northeast of the distillery).[3] Tambov Oblast Governor Maksim Egorov claimed that a drone struck the Biokhim enterprise in Rasskozovo, starting a fire.[4] Biokhim produces ethyl alcohol, and its website claims that it manufactures products that are of "strategic importance to the [Russian] state."[5] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksander Gusev claimed that Russian forces "suppressed" a drone that then fell on an unspecified industrial enterprise in Voronezh Oblast, damaging a workshop.[6] Head of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russia uses alcohol factories to manufacture fuel for military needs and explosives.[7]South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine. South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on October 22 that a South Korean government source stated that South Korea is considering sending South Korean military personnel, likely from intelligence units, to Ukraine to monitor North Korean forces' tactics and combat capabilities and to question captured North Koreans.[8] The source also reportedly stated that South Korea will prioritize giving Ukraine defensive weapons over lethal aid but, if South Korea were to provide lethal weapons, Seoul will first try to find a way to provide them indirectly to Ukraine. South Korean National Security Director Chang Ho-jin stated on June 20 following the initial creation of the Russian-North Korean strategic partnership agreement on June 19 that the agreement had encouraged South Korea to change its long-standing policy prohibiting the transfer of arms to Ukraine, and Yonhap News Agency reported on June 21 that South Korea was considering sending 155mm artillery shells and unspecified air defense systems to Ukraine.[9] South Korea's continued consideration of sending lethal aid to Ukraine comes against the backdrop of threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 20, when Putin stated that Seoul would be making "a very big mistake" if it decided to supply arms to Ukraine.[10]Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told The War Zone on October 22 that the first North Korean military personnel are expected to arrive in Kursk Oblast on October 23 but that it is unclear how large the force grouping will be or how they will be equipped.[11] Newsweek reported that a South Korean government official stated that North Korea sent fighter pilots to Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai in September 2024, possibly to train on Russian combat aircraft that Russia has allegedly supplied to North Korea, or to supplement Russia's pilot shortages.[12]Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the Taliban’s Minister of Trade and Industry Nooruddin Azizi, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and other world leaders also arrived in Kazan on October 22.[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with PRC President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit during which both leaders emphasized the importance of multifaceted Russia-PRC relations while Xi highlighted BRICS as a format for global strategic cooperation.[14] Putin also met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa with whom he discussed bilateral ties, the creation of a multipolar world order, and the use of national currencies in mutual trade settlements.[15] Modi reiterated the need to find "the earliest possible" peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine and reaffirmed India’s role as a potential mediator.[16]Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri reported on October 22 that India returned 85 Indian citizens who had involuntarily joined the Russian military to fight in Ukraine and that Modi would negotiate with Russian authorities the return of 20 more Indian nationals during the BRICS summit.[17] Russia will likely use the BRICS summit as an opportunity to showcase its efforts at enhancing global ties with non-Western states and possibly establish deals and trade mechanisms through which it can support its war efforts in Ukraine by mitigating the impacts of Western sanctions.A recent Russian opinion poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Current Time reported on October 22 that they viewed the results of a recent poll conducted by independent Russian opposition polling organization Chronicles between September 10 and 17.[18] The Chronicles survey found that 78 percent of respondents stated that they generally approve of Putin's activities as Russian president but wanted the government to prioritize issues that are "directly opposite of the actual actions" of Putin, such as domestic social and economic problems (83 percent), a peace treaty with Ukraine that includes mutual concessions (61 percent), and the restoration of relations with Western states (43 percent). Putin has refrained from transferring the Russian economy to a full wartime footing, but the Russian government has nevertheless heavily focused Russian federal spending on defense and national security instead of social policies.[19] Putin has demonstrated that he is uninterested in agreeing to Russian concessions to Ukraine, repeatedly indicating that he is not interested in negotiations that do not result in Ukraine's complete capitulation and even demanding that Ukrainian forces withdraw from areas of eastern and southern Ukraine that Russian forces do not currently occupy.[20] Putin has repeatedly tried to distance himself from incompetent, corrupt, and overly bureaucratic Russian officials and has attempted to posture himself as a capable and caring leader who can quickly resolve average Russians' issues, despite the fact that he is behind the decision-making that most of the population appears to take issue with.[21]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes on the night of October 21 to 22 targeting distilleries in Russia that reportedly manufacture products for the Russian military.South Korea may be considering directly sending weapons and intelligence personnel to Ukraine in response to the reported deployment of North Korean troops to Russia to participate in Russia's war in Ukraine.Thirty-six world leaders, including from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India, South Africa, and Iran, arrived in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, for the 16th annual BRICS summit held from October 22 to 24 during which Russia will likely seek to establish mechanisms to enhance its war effort in Ukraine.A recent Russian opinion poll suggests that Russian President Vladimir Putin enjoys widespread support among Russian citizens even though many do not agree with some of the Kremlin's policies, including about the war.Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove and Vuhledar.Russian forces conducted multilateral military exercises with international partners. Iran hosted Russian and Omani naval forces as part of the "IMEX 2024" naval drills, which took place between October 19-20 in the Indian Ocean.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the northern part of the Kursk Oblast salient. Geolocated footage published on October 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced in fields south of Sheptukhovka (southeast of Korenevo) during two platoon-sized mechanized assaults.[22] Russian sources reported intense fighting and Ukrainian counterattacks southeast of Korenevo, particularly near Zeleny Shlyakh, Novoivanovka, and Lyubimovka.[23] Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian forces are using M1 Abrams tanks in Kursk Oblast for the first time in attacks near Novoivanovka.[24] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting also continued west of the main Kursk Oblast salient in Glushkovsky Raion near Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[25] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment), and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Lyubimovka, while elements of the 11th VDV Brigade are operating southeast of Sudzha.[26] Elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]), 83rd VDV Brigade, and 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are also operating throughout Kursk Oblast.[27]Please see topline text about Ukrainian strikes in Russia.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. Ukrainian sources stated on October 22 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) and north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi.[28] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevhenii Romanov stated on October 21 that Russian forces began using drones with wired communications in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[29] Romanov stated that the wired drones effectively act as conventional anti-tank guided missiles but that their effectiveness is impeded by the length of connective fiber optic wire, added weight of the wire, and the susceptibility to catch on obstacles. Romanov noted that Ukrainian forces have already developed methods to counter the wired Russian drones. Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue to operate near Lyptsi.[30]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 22, but did not make any confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on October 22 that Russian forces seized Novosadove (northwest of Kreminna).[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 22 that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Stelmakhivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[32] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Kupyansk near Lyman Pershyi; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zelenyi Hai, Stelmakhivka, Lozova, and Pishchane; west of Svatove near Dzherelne and Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Hrekivka, and in the direction of Katerynivka and Novomykhailivka; northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, Novosadove; and west of Kreminna near Torske and Terny on October 21 to 22.[33] Elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Stelmakhivka.[34]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on October 21 and 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[35] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[36]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on October 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Chasiv Yar near Vasyukivka and near Chasiv Yar itself on October 21 and 22.[37] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces have conducted assaults every day in the past month and that Russian forces took advantage of foggy weather to cross the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal recently.[38] Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction; elements of the 8th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in northeastern Chasiv Yar; and elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating within Chasiv Yar.[39]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on October 22, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on October 21 and 22.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are transferring a large number of reinforcements from an unspecified sector of the front to Toretsk, which the milblogger claimed is currently the Russian military's main attack direction.[41]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on October 22 but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on October 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces continue to operate west of Krasnyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) and in northern Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove and southeast of Pokrovsk), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims.[43] Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Sukha Balka, Vozdvyzhenka, and Myrolyubivka and southeast of Pokrovsk near Selydove, Lysivka, Mykhailivka, Krasnyi Yar, Krutyi Yar, Hirnyk, Novodmytrivka, Zoryane, Novoselydivka, and Izmailivka on October 21 and 22.[44] A Ukrainian officer in a brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that rainy conditions reduce the Russian military's ability to operate reconnaissance and strike drones but do not affect Russian artillery operations.[45] The officer stated that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems are able to deactivate half of the Russian drones that approach Ukrainian positions.Russian forces recently advanced east of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 22. Geolocated footage published on October 22 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reduced company-sized Russian mechanized assault indicates that Russian forces advanced westward along the O0510 Marinka-Kurakhove highway, east of Kurakhove.[46] Russian forces continued attacking east and southeast of Kurakhove near Hostre, Dalne, and Heorhiivka on October 21 and 22.[47]Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City near Vuhledar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on October 22. Geolocated footage published on October 22 showing Ukrainian forces striking Russian personnel of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) indicates that Russian forces advanced in eastern Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, within Katerynivka, north of Vodyane, and northwest of Vuhledar near Bohoyavlenka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[49] Russian forces continued attacking near Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Yelyzavetivka (all northeast of Vuhledar); Bohoyavlenka and Novoukrainka (west of Vuhledar); and Zolota Nyva (west of Vuhledar) on October 21 and 22.[50] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating near Vuhledar; elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue operating near Zolota Nyva; and elements of the "Aleppo" drone detachment of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, EMD) reportedly continue operating near Yelyzavetivka.[51]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported on ground activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 22. Snipers of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction (south of Hulyaipole).[52]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka on October 21 and 22, but there were no confirmed advances.[53] Ukrainian forces are reportedly counterattacking in Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[54] Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy (eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[55]Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[56]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 21 to 22, mainly targeting Sumy Oblast. Ukraine's Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 60 drones, including Shahed-136/131s and other drones of an unspecified type, from in Kursk Oblast and Yeysk and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[57] Ukrainian forces shot down 17 drones over Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts and 25 over Sumy Oblast.[58] Ukraine's Air Force reported that 10 drones got "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, one flew into Belarusian airspace, three flew back into Russian airspace, and one remained in Ukrainian airspace as of the morning of October 22.[59] Sumy Oblast officials reported that Shahed drones targeted Sumy City, killing three and damaging civilian infrastructure.[60]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian forces conducted multilateral military exercises with international partners. Iran hosted Russian and Omani naval forces as part of the "IMEX 2024" naval drills, which took place between October 19-20 in the Indian Ocean.[61] The exercises were intended to bolster collective security and increase multilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and Oman. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand observed the drills.[62] Such joint naval exercises are intended to posture against the United States in its regional areas of interest and increase the interoperability of various participating forces. Russian personnel of the 201st Military Base (Central Military District) additionally began the joint "Frontier-2024" as part of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)'s Collective Rapid Reaction Force format. Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik military personnel are participating in the exercises, which will practice fighting in mountain and desert terrain and providing air defense cover in such environments.[63]The Kremlin posthumously awarded the Order of Courage to a Russian drone operator whose death sparked intense criticism amongst the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community. Russian milbloggers and media claimed that the Kremlin awarded Junior Sergeant Dmitry Lysakovsky (alias Goodwin), a deceased drone operator from the Russian 87th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) with the Order of Courage on October 22.[64] ISW previously reported that Lysakovsky died in combat on September 13 after the Russian command disbanded his specialized drone unit and committed him to a frontal assault in Donetsk Oblast as punishment for criticizing the Russian command.[65] Lysakovsky’s death caused outrage within the Russian milblogger community as Russian milbloggers claimed that the 51st CAA’s practice of sending specialists to conduct frontal assaults as punishment for dissent is indicative of poor Russian command discipline and degrades the quality of Russian forces. ISW previously reported that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov met with Russian milbloggers on September 27 to quell Russian milbloggers’ complaints about the death of Lysakovsky and another prominent Russian drone operator.[66] The Kremlin's decision to posthumously award Goodwin with military honors is likely an additional effort to appease the complaints of the milblogger communities.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Kremlin newswire TASS claimed on October 22 that the Russian company TsBK presented a new mini- first-person view (FPV) hexacopter drone that can carry a six-kilogram payload up to 12 kilometers without remote equipment and signal repeaters, or up to 20 kilometers with remote equipment and signal repeaters.[67]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on October 22 that it has begun the routine dispatch of citizens called up for military service to their respective military units.[68] The Belarusian MoD noted that about 10,000 Belarusian citizens will enter units of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Service, and various security agencies between October 22 and November 23. Personnel who have served the terms of their compulsory military service will in turn be released from their units during the same time period.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/dmilyaev/1537; https://t.me/astrapress/66940[2] https://t.me/astrapress/66940[3] https://t.me/vchkogpu/51902; https://t.me/vchkogpu/51899; https://t.me/vchkogpu/51900 ; https://t.me/astrapress/66892[4] https://t.me/egorovmb/4544;[5] https://biohim68rsk dot ucoz.ru/index/o_predprijatii/0-17; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/22/10/2024/671724f09a794740bd0555af?from=newsfeed; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/22/ukrainskie-bespilotniki-atakovali-dva-spirtzavoda-v-tulskoy-oblasti-i-odin-v-tambovskoy[6] https://t.me/gusev_36/2905; https://t.me/gusev_36/2906[7] https://newsukraine dot rbc.ua/news/russia-s-distilleries-hit-by-ukrainian-drones-1729586609.html[8] https://en.yna dot co.kr/view/AEN20241022003400315?section=nk/nk; https://www.twz.com/news-features/south-korea-could-send-advisors-weapons-to-ukraine-over-north-korean-troop-movements[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324[11] https://www.twz.com/news-features/south-korea-could-send-advisors-weapons-to-ukraine-over-north-korean-troop-movements[12] https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-news-pilots-could-fly-russian-warplanes-ukraine-report-1972650[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/280979; https://t.me/tass_agency/280818; https://t.me/tass_agency/280830 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280905; https://t.me/tass_agency/280842; https://t.me/tass_agency/280975; https://t.me/tass_agency/280976; https://t.me/tass_agency/280995; https://t.me/tass_agency/280997 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281002 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281006; https://t.me/tass_agency/280785 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280795; https://t.me/rybar/64659; https://ria dot ru/20241022/gazuani-1979362930.html; https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/oct/22/putin-brics-summit-russia-china-india-iran-kazan; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-10-21/why-turkey-a-nato-member-wants-to-join-brics[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75370 ; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6214 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280874 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280969 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280970 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280971 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280981[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75369 ; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6213; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46873; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46868; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75368 ; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6212; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46867[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75368 ; http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6212[17] https://www.hindustantimes dot com/india-news/85-indians-discharged-from-russian-army-india-working-for-release-of-20-more-101729523715856.html[18] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/10/22/proekt-hroniki-bolshinstvo-zayavlyayuschih-o-podderzhke-putina-rossiyan-hotyat-veschey-polnostyu-protivopolozhnyh-ego-deystviyam-naprimer-mira-s-ukrainoy ; https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/rossiya-putin-opros/33168308.html ; https://www.chronicles dot report/chapter13[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar093024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090124; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2024[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423[22] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1848451574622007703; https://t.me/ombr41/861[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17784; https://t.me/dva_majors/55652?single; https://t.me/dva_majors/55652; https://t.me/motopatriot/28604; https://t.me/rusich_army/17873; https://t.me/dva_majors/55619; https://t.me/motopatriot/28589; https://t.me/mod_russia/44816; https://t.me/milinfolive/133389[24] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14463; https://t.me/andriyshTime/28595 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133333[25] https://t.me/rybar/64633[26] https://t.me/rybar/64633; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1848461968828731404 ; https://t.me/kozhemiakoofficial/2020 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1848466859735322891; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79141[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/44797; https://t.me/rusich_army/17873[28]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql[29] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/21/drony-na-motuzochczi-zapuskayut-okupanty-na-harkivshhyni-chy-ye-poryatunok-vid-drotovyh-bpla/; https://youtu.be/j5TqaWCCdUg[30] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14464[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/44813; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17765; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/17712; https://t.me/epoddubny/21412; https://t.me/sashakots/49682 [32] https://t.me/motopatriot/28608[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l[34] https://t.me/motopatriot/28608[35] https://t.me/epoddubny/21413; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql[36] https://t.me/epoddubny/21413[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l; https://t.me/wargonzo/22741[38] https://suspilne dot media/862945-ssa-vidilat-800-mln-na-virobnictvo-ukrainskih-bpla-seul-moze-nadislati-vijskovih-v-ukrainu-972-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1729600854&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwQl49tDPTk[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/55605; https://t.me/tass_agency/280812 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/280824; https://t.me/dva_majors/55689; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/43134[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl; https://t.me/wargonzo/22741[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59677[42] https://t.me/groupbpla/422; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7203; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2024[43] https://t.me/rybar/64630 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59687 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59691 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55619 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19210 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17759[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55619 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141641 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133392 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59677[45] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/10/22/negoda-chystyt-nebo-vid-droniv-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7202; https://t.me/oaembr46/1096[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7205; https://t.me/gimbatov34/3803; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7207; https://t.me/dva_majors/55662[49] https://t.me/motopatriot/28597; https://t.me/motopatriot/28584 ; https://t.me/rybar/64630 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/28764 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79163 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17781 [50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/141641 ; https://t.me/rybar/64652 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17781[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/55647; https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/13123 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11439 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11440[52] https://t.me/voin_dv/11432[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0AVkt4xHYu2GUs24v997tQo9VwTCzN2Z5oa5AMKTRUsH1juk2Cb9zhF8tYuXSyDeql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02x3z8B5SiSL2hLYR65rL19LotJ9uxBT1rDnca7HBPWv9HqoyMqBKCRszbm2iXfFA8l[54] https://t.me/tass_agency/280968[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/11432[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid026YR2i8SftPa9gBL4qs593hzMvdQN6Q7TUXX4HJdkhbZXBaFU3JJDNLywGkBvQUmTl[57] https://t.me/kpszsu/21744[58] https://t.me/kpszsu/21744; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/tragichna-nich-u-sumah-shahedy-zabraly-zhyttya-troh-lyudej-vklyuchno-z-dytynoyu/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/30782[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/21744[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/10/22/tragichna-nich-u-sumah-shahedy-zabraly-zhyttya-troh-lyudej-vklyuchno-z-dytynoyu/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/30782; https://t.me/suspilnesumy/25924[61] https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-hosts-joint-naval-drills-with-russia-oman-indian-ocean-state-media-reports-2024-10-19/[62] https://www.voanews.com/a/iran-hosts-joint-naval-drills-with-russia-oman-in-indian-ocean/7828715.html ; https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-hosts-joint-naval-drills-with-russia-oman-indian-ocean-state-media-reports-2024-10-19/[63] https://t.me/odkb_csto/2116; https://t.me/MID_Russia/46869[64] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59689; https://t.me/wargonzo/22751 ; https://nn.tsargrad dot tv/news/guru-bpla-gudvin-nagrazhdjon-ordenom-muzhestva-posmertno_1071541[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2024[66] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024[67] https://t.me/tass_agency/280902 [68] https://t.me/modmilby/42698
- — Iran Update, October 22, 2024
- at 10/25/24 9:10pmKelly Campa, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, Sven Karaman, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.[1] The source stated that Israeli operations targeting key Hezbollah leadership and the Israeli air campaign have significantly disrupted Hezbollah funding. The official stated that Iran used Syria as a conduit to provide Hezbollah with $50 million in cash each month prior to the start of the Israeli operations in Lebanon. IDF Spokesperson Daniel Hagari stated that Iran transfers money to Hezbollah through the transfer of oil and money from Iran to Syria through Hezbollah’s Unit 4400.[2] Hezbollah Unit 4400 is responsible for the transfer of funds and weapons from Iran to Hezbollah.[3] Israel killed the commander of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, and his subsequent replacement on October 1 and October 21.[4] This report follows recent IDF airstrikes targeting branches of a Hezbollah-affiliated financial institution in Beirut in recent days.[5]Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers.[6] The spokesperson noted in a press conference on October 22 that Hezbollah fighters had come “close” to seizing Israeli soldiers over the past several days but had not yet succeeded.[7] Hezbollah has a long history of taking Israeli soldiers prisoner to exchange for Hezbollah fighters held by Israel.[8] The spokesperson confirmed that Israel had detained Hezbollah fighters since beginning operations in southern Lebanon.[9] The IDF said that it has detained many Radwan fighters and has published clips of their testimony, including statements from fighters that many Hezbollah fighters fled southern Lebanon after Hassan Nasrallah’s death.[10] The Hezbollah official said that “after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations.[11]Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.[12] Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem said on October 15 that Hezbollah would initiate a new phase of the war designed to inflict high casualties on Israel.[13] Hezbollah’s Operations Room also noted on October 17 that Hezbollah would “escalate” its attacks in the coming days.[14] Hezbollah has since expanded the scope and pace of operations into Israel, including by targeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s home in Tel Aviv with an attack drone on October 19.[15] Hezbollah has consistently claimed ground engagements in southern Lebanon at a higher rate since the first week of Israeli ground operations, although this may be a result of increased proximity between Israeli and Hezbollah forces as Israeli forces operate in additional areas of southern Lebanon.[16] Hezbollah has conducted at least 39 attacks on Israeli forces, towns, and air assets over the past day.[17] Hezbollah officials have consistently argued that Hezbollah command, control, and logistical networks have returned to full operational capacity after being degraded by Israel’s air campaign in late September 2024.[18]Hezbollah formally claimed responsibility for the October 19 drone attack on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Caesarea, Israel.[19] Hezbollah took “full and sole responsibility” for the attack.[20]US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.[21] Blinken urged Netanyahu to “capitalize” on Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s death to secure a ceasefire and hostage release deal in the Gaza Strip.[22] Blinken and Netanyahu also discussed ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the fighting in Lebanon and enable civilians to return to their homes along the border.[23] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran. Araghchi said that the Iranian military is monitoring all US troop movements on the ground and air regionally.[24] Araghchi’s warning probably seeks to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces based in Arab countries to support Israeli retaliation against Iran and Israeli defense against Iranian attacks. This effort also supports Iran’s larger grand strategic objective of expelling US forces from the Middle East by subtly prodding these countries to constrain US efforts in the region. Araghchi also met with Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al Khalifa and Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid al Zayani in Manama, Bahrain, on October 21.[25] Araghchi met with Kuwaiti Prince Sheikh Sabah Khaled al Hammad al Dabah and Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali al Hiyaya in Kuwait City on October 22.[26] Araghchi warned during a press conference in Kuwait that Israel knows what Iran can do in response if Israel attacks Iran’s critical infrastructure.[27]The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.[28] The Shin Bet and Israeli Police stated in a joint statement that Iran directed the suspects to assassinate a senior Israeli nuclear scientist and the mayor of an undisclosed large city in central Israel.[29] Iran also instructed the individuals to photograph various undisclosed locations, vandalize sites in Jerusalem, and post graffiti calling for the release of the Hamas-held Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip. This is likely part of an Iranian effort to sow division in Israeli society and increase pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The joint statement confirmed that Israeli security forces arrested the 23-year-old “leader of the ring” who had recruited the six additional members.[30] A security official stated that the seven individuals worked as an “organized cell.”[31] Six of the suspects are Israeli citizens, and the seventh suspect is an Israeli permanent resident.This report comes one day after Israeli authorities arrested a separate Iranian spy network comprised of seven Israeli citizens who were given “hundreds of tasks” including observing Israeli military facilities.[32] Israeli police arrested an Israeli citizen in September accused of participating in an Iranian plot to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[33] Israeli media reported that this is the fifth public case of Iranian espionage attempts in Israel in the past month.[34]Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.[35] The 460th Armored Brigade (162nd Division) engaged Palestinian fighters on October 14 who used the former UNRWA medical facility as a weapons storage and base of operations.[36] The IDF reported that it detained Palestinian fighters who were attempting to retreat south by hiding among civilians as they evacuated south.[37] The IDF reported that ”thousands” of civilians were evacuated from the area south to Gaza City.[38]Key Takeaways:Israeli Air Campaign: A senior Israeli intelligence official told Iranian anti-regime media that Israel’s recent operations in Lebanon have disrupted Iran’s ability to provide funds to Hezbollah.Hezbollah Operations in Lebanon: Hezbollah’s chief media official said that Hezbollah is attempting to capture Israeli soldiers. The Hezbollah official said that "after the war there will be indirect negotiations to recover our prisoners,” suggesting that Hezbollah wants to capture Israeli soldiers for future negotiations. Hezbollah’s chief media official also noted that Hezbollah had increased the pace of offensive and defensive operations against Israel.Blinken’s Regional Visit: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on October 22.Iran: Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi obliquely threatened Arab states hosting US forces on October 21, which is probably an attempt to pressure Arab states to discourage the United States from using its forces in the region to support an Israeli retaliation against Iran.Iranian Intelligence Efforts in Israel: The Israeli Police arrested seven individuals in East Jerusalem on October 22 on suspicion of planning and supporting attacks for Iran.Gaza Strip: Geolocated imagery posted on October 21 showed Israeli forces evacuating Palestinians from and distributing water in the area surrounding a former UNRWA medical clinic in northern Jabalia.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division expanded clearing operations in Jabalia, northern Gaza Strip, on October 22.[39] The IDF continued to engage Palestinian fighters in other areas of Jabalia as Palestinian civilians evacuated via established evacuation routes.[40] The 401st Armored Brigade directed an airstrike targeting approximately 10 Palestinian fighters that posed a threat to Israeli forces operating in the area.[41] The Mujahideen Brigades conducted two mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces east and west of Jabalia refugee camp.[42] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-proclaimed militant wing of Fatah—mortared an IDF headquarters in eastern Jabalia refugee camp.[43] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine engaged Israeli forces located in a building in western Jabalia refugee camp.[44]The IDF killed 18 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters in an airstrike on October 17.[45] The IDF struck a Hamas and PIJ command-and-control center located in the former Abu Hasan School in the northern Gaza Strip.[46] The airstrike killed Hamas and PIJ battalion commanders, squad leaders, and fighters.[47]IDF Southern Command Commander Major General Yaron Finkelman held a situational assessment with the 162nd Division Commander Brigadier General Itzik Cohen and other unspecified commanders on October 21.[48]Elements of the 143rd Division completed an operation in Beit Lahia on October 22.[49] Israeli forces destroyed several tunnel entrances and rocket launch sites.The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades launched a salvo of rockets at Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor.[50]The 252nd Division destroyed tunnel openings and rocket launch sites during clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip.[51] The 252nd Division resumed clearing operations in Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip on October 17.[52]The Egyptian General Intelligence Service head Hassan Rashad proposed a new “small” ceasefire-hostage deal on October 20 during a meeting with Shin Bet head Ronen Bar.[53] The Egyptian proposal stipulates that Hamas would release a “small” number of Israeli hostages for a “few” days ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Rashad claimed that the smaller ceasefire-hostage deal would facilitate negotiations to reach a more comprehensive ceasefire-hostage agreement. Bar claimed that there is a window of opportunity to renew hostage-ceasefire negotiations according to an unspecified source “with knowledge of the meeting” who was cited by Axios. Unspecified Israeli officials cited by Axios claimed that Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant supported the proposal while Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich opposed the plan. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken claimed that Yahya Sinwar’s death presented an opportunity to reach a ceasefire-hostage agreement and urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to seize the opportunity during a separate meeting in Jerusalem on October 22.[54]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW did not record any engagements between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 21.Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaLebanese sources reported that the IDF conducted artillery shelling in the town of Shebaa.[55] The IDF said on October 15 that the IDF 810th Brigade (210th Division) has conducted several “targeted raids” from Mount Dov into the mountainous areas in Hasbaya District over the past three weeks.[56]Hezbollah reported that Israeli forces attempted to enter Taybeh in southeastern Lebanon on October 22.[57] The IDF 98th Division has operated in Taybeh’s adjacent towns and villages since the beginning of IDF ground operations in Lebanon.[58] Hezbollah claimed that fighters engaged Israeli infantry and tank units attempting to advance near Taybeh.[59] Hezbollah said—without providing any evidence—that its attack caused Israeli forces to retreat from the area.[60] Hezbollah also fired rockets and anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli infantry and armor between Taybeh and Odaisseh and Rab al Thalatheen, which are respectively east and south of Taybeh.[61]The IDF 98th Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon on October 22. The 98th Division located a Hezbollah operations room and directed an airstrike that killed 15 fighters in the compound.[62] The IDF 55th Paratroopers Brigade (Res.) directed an airstrike targeting two armed Radwan SOF fighters barricaded in a building.[63] The 55th Paratroopers Brigade also separately destroyed a launcher with four "missiles" ready to launch at Israel.[64] Israeli forces located and destroyed a weapons warehouse in southeastern Lebanon.[65] Hezbollah fighters targeted Israeli forces operating in Markaba with rockets.[66]The IDF 91st Division continued operations in southeast Lebanon on October 22.[67] The IDF said that the IDF 3rd Infantry Brigade (Res.) has operated in both built-up residential areas and mountainous terrain and raided numerous Hezbollah compounds and weapons depots.[68] The 3rd Infantry Brigade has destroyed about 150 Hezbollah targets, including underground infrastructure and weapons stockpiles.[69] The 3rd Infantry Brigade also directed an airstrike targeting a cache of weapons hidden in a mosque.[70] The IDF said that it detected secondary explosions after the strike.[71] The IDF said that the 91st Division has also continued to conduct “defensive missions” in northern Israeli towns.[72]The IDF 36th Division continued operations in Aita al Shaab on October 22.[73] Geolocated local footage showed IDF armor moving away from Aita al Shaab towards Rmeish on the Aita al Shaab-Rmeish road, east of Aita al Shaab.[74] Lebanese sources reported that Israeli ground forces conducted operations while Israeli artillery and airstrikes targeted the area.[75] The IDF 188th Armored Brigade destroyed several “operational" facilities and a Hezbollah weapons depot in southern Lebanon.[76] The 188th Armored Brigade also located numerous underground tunnel shafts, including tunnels that served as the headquarters for the region’s Hezbollah unit.[77] Hezbollah fighters fired rockets at Israeli forces operating in Aita al Shaab.[78] Lebanese sources also reported that the IDF clashed with Hezbollah fighters in al Qouzah, northwest of Aita al Shaab.[79] The IDF 36th Division has been operating near Aita al Shaab and Ramyeh since October 13.[80]The IDF 146th Division continued operations in southwest Lebanon on October 22.[81] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 21 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in central Yarine, indicating that Israeli forces operated in the area. The IDF 146th Division killed Hezbollah fighters, attacked dozens of militia targets, and destroyed weapons.[82] IDF Northern Command commander Major General Ori Gordin visited the 146th Division to conduct a situational assessment with the division’s commander and the IDF 205th Armored Brigade (Res.) commander.[83] Gordin said that Israeli operations have ”dealt a very serious blow to Hezbollah’s command and control.”[84]The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure on October 22. The IDF said it struck numerous Hezbollah targets across Lebanon in the past day, including Hezbollah munition depots and military infrastructure in Dahiyeh, Beirut.[85] The IDF Air Force also struck a Hezbollah naval base in Dahiyeh near Rafik Hariri International Airport in Dahiyeh.[86] The IDF said that Hezbollah’s naval unit used the position as a vital operational center to instruct its naval forces and store naval vessels used for maritime attacks against Israel.[87] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that 63 people were killed in Israeli attacks on October 21, marking the most fatalities in a single day since September 30.[88]The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting Hezbollah drone assets on October 22. The IDF said it struck three headquarters for Unit 127—Hezbollah’s drone unit—“deep in Lebanon.”[89] The IDF conducted several strikes targeting the Bekaa Valley on October 22, although it is unclear which strikes were associated with Hezbollah‘s drone unit.[90] The IDF said that Unit 127 used some of these positions to launch drones towards Israel.[91] The IDF vowed to respond to Hezbollah’s October 13 attack on an IDF base in Binyamina, Israel, that killed four Israeli soldiers by targeting Hezbollah’s drone unit and drone production infrastructure.[92]The IDF struck an unspecified Hezbollah target nearby the Rafik Hariri University Hospital in the Jnah neighborhood of Beirut.[93] The strike killed at least 18 individuals.[94] UN Human Rights Chief Volker Turk stated that he was ”appalled” by the strike and that any incidents that affect hospitals must be investigated thoroughly and promptly.[95] US State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel stated that the US asked Israel for additional information about the strike.[96] The IDF told the Washington Post that the hospital itself and its operations were not affected nor were the targets of the strike.[97]The IDF Air Force also struck about ten Hezbollah command-and control-complexes outside of Tyre, southern Lebanon.[98] The IDF stated it struck a Radwan SOF headquarters located in al Hosh.[99] Hezbollah used these positions to plan and conduct its operations against Israeli civilians and Israeli forces.[100] The IDF issued warnings to residents of al Hosh to evacuate at least one kilometer from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to the strikes.[101]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 21 to 2:00pm ET on October 22. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 21.[102] Hezbollah continued to target civilian sites in northern Israel including Kiryat Shmona, Hatzor, and Beit HaEmek.[103] Hezbollah targeted Israeli forces in four separate incidents in Misgav Am.[104] Hezbollah continued to conduct long range attacks into central Israel, including six attacks in the suburbs of Haifa and Tel Aviv.[105] The IDF detected one rocket fired from Lebanon that landed in the West Bank near Modi'in Illit on October 22.[106]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIraqi Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi traveled to Beirut on October 22 as part of Iraqi diplomatic efforts to prevent the October 7 War from escalating further.[107] Mandalawi is affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties.[108] Mandalawi will meet with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and other unspecified Lebanese officials on October 23.[109] Iraqi media reported that Mandalawi’s arrival in Beirut coincided with an Israeli airstrike near Beirut International Airport.[110] Mandalawi was not injured in the strike.[111]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq--a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 21. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting a “vital target” in Tiberias, which is an Israeli city located on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee.[112]A drone attack targeting a “vital target” in the Jordan Valley.[113]Israeli officials and media have not commented on the attack claims at the time of this writing.Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan, on October 22.[114] Vahedi will visit the “Sindh Shield 2024” military exercise at the Mushaf Air Base in Sargodha, Pakistan, on October 23.[115] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey are participating in the exercise.[116] Vahedi will also meet with Pakistani Air Force Commander Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir in the coming days.[117]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 23.[118] Pezeshkian and Modi discussed the development of the Chabahar Port and the International North South Transport Corridor.[119] Pezeshkian emphasized that Iran seeks to develop political and economic relations with India through its membership in BRICS.[120] Pezeshkian and Modi also discussed the October 7 War, with Modi emphasizing the need to protect civilians in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[121]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian submitted the budget for the next Persian calendar year (March 2025 - March 2026) to the Iranian Parliament on October 22.[122] Pezeshkian stated that the budget bill was compliant with the seventh five-year development plan, which is a former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi-era agenda aimed at increasing economic growth, minimizing government debt, and optimizing the state budget.[123] Pezeshkian emphasized that the proposal prioritizes strengthening Iran's military and defense budget "given the regional conditions."[124] The proposed budget forecasts the price of oil per barrel to be $63, and predicts a thirty-two percent increase in revenue from oil, gas, and related products.[125] The total proposed budget amounts to approximately 6,400 trillion tomans, or $152 billion USD, a nearly $45 billion USD increase from Iran’s approved budget for the current Persian calendar year.[126] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated that the parliament will start reviewing the budget on October 30.[127] Houthi Spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the Houthis launched a “Palestine 2” ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv on October 22.[128] Israeli media did not acknowledge the attack. CTP-ISW cannot verify if these attacks took place. The Houthis previously claimed a “Palestine 2” hypersonic missile attack targeting Israel on September 14 that the IDF said that it "partially intercepted.”[129]Local Syrian media reported that 25 Houthi fighters with experience using missiles and drones crossed into Syria from Iraq near the Albu Kamal border crossing.[130] Houthi fighters have previously cooperated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the Kataib Hezbollah-controlled Jurf al Sakhr area south of Baghdad.[131] Kataib Hezbollah is an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia group. CENTCOM conducted an airstrike in late July 2024 that killed a high-ranking Houthi commander in Jurf al Sakhr.[132] Kataib Hezbollah also controls the Albu Kamal border crossing, which would have allowed it to facilitate the movement of Iranian-backed personnel and Iranian-provided materiel into Syria.[133] CTP-ISW previously reported on increased cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi groups, including the Houthis sending a drone expert to Iraq to train Iraqi militia members.[134] Israeli sources have also reported on an increase in Houthi personnel presence in Syria over the past two months.[135][1] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202410218755[2] www dot idf.il/241644[3] https://www.barrons.com/news/hezbollah-finance-chief-killed-in-syria-israeli-army-e8f88178 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-says-strike-killed-head-of-hezbollah-unit-charged-with-smuggling-arms-from-iran/[4] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/idf-says-strike-killed-head-of-hezbollah-unit-charged-with-smuggling-arms-from-iran/ ; 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https://t.me/mmirleb/8138[79] https://t.me/LebUpdate/45872[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848578936445222914[82] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848578936445222914[83] www dot idf.il/241935[84] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1848733565590052978[85] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848578835479974177 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848781986036416582 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848781986036416582 [86] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848632638577291483 [87] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848632638577291483 [88] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-22-24-intl-hnk#cm2kmnuin00053b6otg82gqlp [89] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848582370234187957 [90] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848582370234187957 [91] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848582370234187957 [92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[93] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c93p3g1v1z4o ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/22/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-lebanon-hezbollah/#link-JMWRAPFKVRDBJBSZY3JY27TIWE [94] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-22-24-intl-hnk#cm2kjxf87000m3b6ouy1pdrbu ; [95] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-22-24-intl-hnk#cm2kpl44c00003b6o943gi6d5 [96] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-22-24-intl-hnk#cm2kqjkg4000p3b6o000dwyba [97] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/22/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-lebanon-hezbollah/#link-JMWRAPFKVRDBJBSZY3JY27TIWE [98] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848729189475659819 [99] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848729189475659819 [100] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848729189475659819 [101] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1848629503448518939 [102] https://t.me/mmirleb/8143 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848574266775687363 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8155 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8156 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8157 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8160 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8163 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8164 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8165 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8169 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8171 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8172 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8175 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8177 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8180 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8187 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8188 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8190[103] https://t.me/mmirleb/8171 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8172 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8165[104] https://t.me/mmirleb/8160 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8177 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8180 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8187[105] https://t.me/mmirleb/8156 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8157 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8175 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8143 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8155 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8190[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1848574266775687363[107] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1-%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9[108] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/2023-12-4%20Iran%20Update%20PDF.pdf[109] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1163678[110] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1-%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B9[111] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?Key=1163678[112] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1377[113] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1379[114] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1267307[115] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1267307[116] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2574006/pakistan[117] https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1267307[118] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/827341 ;https://indianexpress dot com/article/india/pm-modi-meets-iranian-president-pezeshkian-brics-summit-in-russia-9633670/[119] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/827341 ;https://indianexpress dot com/article/india/pm-modi-meets-iranian-president-pezeshkian-brics-summit-in-russia-9633670/[120] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/827341[121] https://indianexpress dot com/article/india/pm-modi-meets-iranian-president-pezeshkian-brics-summit-in-russia-9633670/[122] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/01/3183873[123] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/01/3183873 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-26-2024[124] https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/economy/irans-1404-budget-proposal-fuel-price-hikes-defense-spending-boost-and-increased-taxation-amid-economic-strain/[125] https://mehrnews dot com/news/6265327 ; https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6264723[126] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/01/3183873 ; https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/492719/MPs-approve-general-outlines-of-national-budget-bill[127] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/01/3183873[128] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1848706732505145751[129] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-15-2024 ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-16-2024 ;https://www.saba dot ye/en/news3372733.htm[130] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/for-the-first-time-houthi-militia-arrives-in-deir-ezzor/[131] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/08/iran-update-august-7-2024.html[132] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/08/iran-update-august-7-2024.html[133] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2023[134] https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/08/iran-update-august-7-2024.html ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-september-25-2024[135] https://www.terrorism-info dot org.il/app/uploads/2024/09/E_197_24.pdf;https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-houthis-deploying-forces-in-syria-prelude-to-new-escalation
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25, 2024
- at 10/25/24 8:38pmDavit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and Frederick W. KaganOctober 25, 2024, 7:05 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on October 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.[1] Zelensky stressed that Russia's involvement of North Korean forces in combat is an escalatory step and urged the international community to apply pressure on Moscow and Pyongyang. Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans confirmed on October 25 that Dutch intelligence assesses that Russia is deploying at least 1,500 North Korean forces likely to Kursk Oblast.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published an intercepted audio recording on October 25 in which elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in Kursk Oblast reportedly expressed concerns about the ability of North Korean troops to adjust to Russian command culture and language upon their deployment to the region.[3] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian air assault brigade operating in the Kursk direction stated that Ukrainian forces have not yet observed North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast and emphasized that North Korean forces do not have experience fighting in large-scale, technologically-driven wars.[4] Head of Ukraine’s Center for Military Legal Research Oleksandr Mysyenko stated on October 25 that Russia’s efforts to directly involve North Korean forces in the war are ultimately indicative of Russia's inability to recruit sufficient personnel amid systematic yet likely unsuccessful attempts to recruit volunteers domestically.[5]North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Jong Gyu failed to deny reports of North Korean troop deployments to Russia but claimed that such deployments would be in line with principles of international law.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin once again failed to deny the presence of the North Korean troops in Russia during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan and stated that it is Russia’s sovereign decision to activate the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea signed on June 18, 2024.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov similarly claimed that the provision of military assistance under the treaty is a signal of deterrence and that military assistance will be activated only in the event of “aggression” against any of the parties to the treaty.[8] The participation of North Korean troops in combat operations in Kursk Oblast or frontline areas in Ukraine would make North Korea an active combatant and belligerent in Russia's war in Ukraine. The Kremlin may be setting information operations to accuse Ukraine of being the aggressor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine to justify its use of North Korean forces as combatants in its war.Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine. Putin responded to a question during an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 following the conclusion of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan on whether exhausted Ukrainian troops, Western war fatigue, or Russian military’s power is contributing to the success of Russian theater-wide offensive operations.[9] Putin responded by stating that Russia should continue to double down on its war effort in Ukraine and not pay attention to discussions of the enemy's fatigue. Putin added that the West is “beginning to realistically assess the situation around Ukraine” and “change its rhetoric” about the need for Russia’s “strategic defeat,” and that Russia can “only praise” the West for this rhetorical shift away from complete Russian defeat in Ukraine. Putin later stated in the interview that any outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine must be in Russia’s favor and be based on the "realities on the battlefield," indicating that Russia remains committed to its original goal of forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate and destroying Ukraine’s statehood and military and that Western hesitance in support for Ukraine only encourages Russia's commitment to this goal. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s theory of victory rests on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either of its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and that it is far from clear that the West will do so.[10]Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast. Putin responded to a question during his interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya 1 on October 25 about his earlier claims on October 24 that Russian forces “blocked” roughly 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Kursk Oblast.[11] Putin doubled down on this claim, stating that Ukrainian forces that are “encircled” in Kursk Oblast “do not even really understand that they are encircled.”[12] Putin also claimed that Ukrainian forces have lost control over encircled units and emphasized that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had not publicly reported on claimed successful Russian infiltration of some Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast. Putin once again failed to acknowledge that the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast extends from the Ukrainian-Russian international border and that Ukrainian forces can freely transit the sections of the border under Ukrainian control. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi notably refuted Putin’s October 24 claims of Ukrainian forces being encircled and suffering significant losses, and in turn, reported that Russian manpower casualties total 17,819 personnel (including 711 prisoners of war [POWs]) since August 8.[13] ISW cannot independently verify Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses, however, Russian and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces are continuing to operate in Kursk Oblast.[14] Putin’s exaggerated statistics on Ukrainian losses are likely part of his attempt to explain away Russia’s inability to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast after nearly three months in the context of the likely imminent deployment of North Korean troops to combat in this area.Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures within the Kremlin. Putin signed a decree on October 25 adding Zhoga to the Russian Security Council — a key Russian consultative body that informs Putin’s decisions on national security issues.[15] Zhoga previously served as a member of Putin's re-election campaign initiatives group, and the Kremlin previously highlighted Zhoga and an interaction between Zhoga and Putin to announce Putin's presidential bid in December 2023.[16] Zhoga is also the highest-profile Kremlin appointee from the ”Time of Heroes” professional training program that aims to prepare Russian veterans to take municipal, regional, and federal government positions.[17] Zhoga is now the youngest member of the Russian Security Council at 49 years old. A Russian Telegram channel that routinely shares insider information commented on Zhoga’s appointment, stating that Putin typically includes newly appointed plenipotentiaries in the Russian Security Council, and Putin appointed Zhoga as the Presidential Representative to the Ural Federal Okrug on October 2.[18] The Telegram channel added that Zhoga’s appointment significantly increased the influence of Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko’s group within the Kremlin.[19] Kiriyenko has been a leading figure in the Kremlin’s efforts to establish a new elite via the ”Time of Heroes” program.[20] Zhoga’s appointment follows the promotion of presidential aide and close personal ally Alexei Dyumin to the Russian Security Council on September 30.[21] Dyumin had been the youngest-ever member of the council before Zhoga.[22] ISW continues to assess that Putin appears to be using the "Time of Heroes" program to militarize the Russian government, further solidify a pro-war ideology in the Russian state and society, and form a new, highly militarized elite class.[23]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to “influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.[24] Peskov stated on October 25 that the January 2025 presidential elections in Belarus are an “internal matter” but that everyone in Russia will support Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's candidacy nevertheless. Peskov claimed that while the West interfered in the 2020 Belarusian presidential elections, the West will likely fail to do so again given that Belarus has learned from previous experience. Peskov also accused the West of unprecedented attempts to interfere in the Georgian and Moldovan elections and claimed that Moscow is not trying to influence the elections of these countries. Peskov’s accusations come amid statements from Moldovan officials, including Moldovan President Maia Sandu, about unprecedented levels of election interference from Kremlin-linked officials in the first round of Moldovan presidential elections that were held on October 20.[25] Sandu stated on October 21 that Moldovan authorities have evidence that criminal groups wanted to buy 300,000 Moldovan votes against Moldova’s European Union (EU) membership referendum and Sandu herself in favor of pro-Russian presidential candidates. The Georgian parliamentary elections will be held on October 26 and Russian officials and milbloggers have launched information operations portraying Georgian Dream as the stable choice for Georgia’s future and discrediting openly pro-Western opposition parties while suggesting that a Georgian Dream victory could lead to territorial reconciliation, including potential compromises on the Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[26] Russia has a rich history of attempting to influence elections in post-Soviet countries in its favor through war, economic pressures, political threats, information operations, and other modes of meddling.[27]Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.[28] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin ordered a federal-level investigation into the murder of a female taxi driver purportedly by a member of the local Roma community in Korkino and the ensuing riots during which roughly 150 people attacked the home of several Roma people.[29] Russian authorities reportedly quickly quelled the riot, detained 30 people, and blocked a Telegram channel accused of encouraging locals to participate in the riot.[30] Russian authorities have consistently struggled to balance placating xenophobic sentiments among Russian ultranationalists and Russian communities with maintaining Russia's economic and internal security, particularly given Russia's dependence on migrants and non-ethnic Russian communities for economic growth and force generation.[31] ISW has previously noted that the Kremlin is working to develop the capacity to use information operations on social media platforms to trigger kinetic activity, and the role of social media accounts in provoking such riots highlights the influence that such Russian operations could have abroad.[32]German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.[33]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia will imminently deploy North Korean forces to unspecified combat zones on October 27 and 28, as Russian and North Korean officials continued to issue vague yet suggestive statements regarding the possible presence of North Korean troops in Russia.Russian President Vladimir Putin signaled that Western “Ukraine fatigue” is encouraging Russia to continue its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and pursue its theory of victory predicated on Russia outlasting Western support for Ukraine.Putin also continued to exaggerate Russian progress in Kursk Oblast, likely in an attempt to reassure domestic audiences of the Russian military's ability to suppress Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Plenipotentiary Representative in the Urals Lieutenant Colonel Artyom Zhoga to the Russian Security Council, likely in an ongoing effort to establish younger, pro-war figures within the Kremlin.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia does not seek to “influence” elections of other countries "unlike the West" amid continued evidence to the contrary.Russian authorities swiftly responded to xenophobic riots in Korkino, Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25, a marked change from Russian authorities' slow and disorganized response to the October 2023 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan.German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall announced on October 24 that it recently delivered 20 additional Marder infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine and noted that Germany financed the delivery of the vehicles.Ukrainian forces advanced near Borki and regained lost territory near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.Russian forces advanced near Siversk, Pokrovsk, and regained territory near Obukhovka.The Kremlin is continuing to forge new state-affiliated veteran societies and organizations likely in an ongoing effort to replace veteran organizations that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach t within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Borki (southeast of Sudzha).[34] Additional geolocated footage published on October 25 indicates that Russian forces recently recaptured positions east of Obukhovka (southeast of Korenevo).[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Plekhovo (southeast of Sudzha).[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces recaptured Darino (southeast of Korenevo and southeast of Lyubimovka) are unconfirmed.[37] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Zeleny Shlyakh, and Alexandriya; east of Sudzha near Russkaya Konopelka; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 24 that Ukrainian forces seized positions south of Kireyevka (north of Sudzha and on the northeastern edge of the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast).[39] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[40]Fighting continued in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on October 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked with one tank and two armored fighting vehicles near Novy Put (south of Glushkovo).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are unconfirmed reports that some Ukrainian forces withdrew beyond the international border into Ukraine following fighting near Novy Put, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[42]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 25 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya (southwest of Vovchansk) on October 24 and 25.[43]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers near Stelmakhivka (west of Svatove) and that Russian forces control "most of" Kruhlyakivka (south of Kupyansk).[44] ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim of Russian advances and has only observed visual confirmation that Russian forces occupy roughly 25 percent of Kruhlyakivka. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Kolisnykivka, and Novoosynove; west of Svatove near Vyshneve; southwest of Svatove near Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Katerynivka, and Tverdokhlibove; west of Kreminna near Terny, Zarichne, and Torske; and south of Kreminna near Serebryanka.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to destroy bridges over the Oskil River in order to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction, with one Russian milblogger claiming that Russian forces destroyed the last crossing over the river.[46]Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian air defenses in the Russian near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system and destroyed the 9C36 radar system of a Buk-M2 air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast "several tens of kilometers" from the frontline on the night of October 24 to 25.[47] Ukrainian official sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 system on the night of October 20 to 21 in an unspecified area roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline as well as a Russian Buk-M2 system in southern Ukraine on October 23. [48]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced east of Siversk amid continued offensive operations in the area on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Verkhnokamyanka (east of Siversk) during a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka (both southeast of Siversk) on October 24 and 25.[50] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[51]Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 24 shows that Ukrainian forces are operating southeast of Chasiv Yar at Mine Block 9 where ISW previously observed Russian forces operating - indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the area.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into a forested area east of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm this claim.[53] Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) on October 24 and 25.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that rainy weather conditions are forcing Russian forces to utilize vehicles more suitable for muddy conditions, including all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and SUVs, instead of motorcycles in Bakhmut Raion.[55] The milblogger noted that Russian infantry movement is currently "slow, labor-intensive, and generally ineffective." Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating south of Chasiv Yar.[56] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[57]Ukrainian forces recently regained positions in southern Toretsk amid continued Russian assaults in and around the settlement on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows that Ukrainian forces are operating along Tobolenka Street in southern Toretsk where ISW previously observed confirmed Russian advances – indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in the area.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm this claim.[59] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk on October 25.[60] Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the ”Sparta” Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk) and Toretsk, respectively.[61] Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pokrovsk amid continued Russian offensive operations east and southeast of the town on October 25. Geolocated footage published on October 24 indicates that elements of the "Maxim Krivonos" volunteer detachment, allegedly formed by former members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who defected to fight for Russia, recently regained positions near Mine No. 1 northeast of Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within and near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk), including in Seldyove's 11th Microraion in the northern part of the settlement, and advanced along Berehova, Tsentralna, and Shevchenka streets within central and eastern Selydove.[63] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the railway line into Vyshneve (south of Pokrovsk and west of Seldyove) and advanced into eastern Kreminna Balka from Tsukuryne (both south of Selydove), although one milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Vyshneve.[64] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Novodmytrivka (southeast of Selydove) and near Novoselydivka (south of Selydove) and seized positions in western Hirnyk (southeast of Selydove).[65] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, Vozdvyzhenka, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Yar, Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, Novohrodivka, Marynivka, Mykolaivka, Selydove, Mykhailivka, Novodmytrivka, Hirnyk, Zoryane, Izmailivka, and Novoselydivka on October 24 and 25.[66] Elements of the Russian "Black Hussars" detachment of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (both of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), including its 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating near Selydove.[67] Elements of the Russian "Mora" detachment reportedly continue to operate near Memryk (southeast of Pokrovsk).[68]Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kurakhove on October 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing south of Heorhiivka.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have encircled roughly 20 Ukrainian servicemembers in Hostre and that Ukrainian forces are engaging Russian forces with small arms fire, although another Russian milblogger denied this claim.[70] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Maksymilyanivka and Hostre on October 24 and 25.[71] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Dalnye (south of Kurakhove).[72]Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Donetsk City on October 25, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Kostyantynivka, Katerynivka, Antonivka, and Vodyane and north of Vuhledar near Novoukrainka and Bohoyavlenka on October 24 and 25.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Katerynivka, in an area 3.85 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers in depth near Bohoyavlenka from Vodyane and Vuhledar, and into Shakhtarske (west of Vuhledar).[74] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bohoyavlenka.[75] Elements of the Russian 26th Radio, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodonetske (west of Vuhledar).[76]Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on Russian activity in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 25.Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast northeast of Robotyne near Novoandrivka and north of Robotyne in the direction of Novodanylivka on October 24 and 25 but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[77] Ukrainian Volunteer Army Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk reported on October 25 that Russian forces are transferring additional reserve forces to the Zaporizhia direction from rear areas of Russian-occupied Ukraine.[78] Bratchuk noted that Russian forces are intensifying assault operations in the Zaporizhia direction and that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating more actively and trying to identify vulnerabilities in Ukrainian defenses in this direction.Russian forces continued attacks in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on October 24 and 25 but did not make any confirmed advances.[79] Elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[80] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[81]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 63 Shahed-136/131 drones and other drones of an unidentified type from Oryol and Kursk oblasts and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[82] Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed 36 drones over Odesa, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Lviv, Rivne, and Poltava oblasts as of 1000 local time on October 25, and 16 Russian drones were reportedly "lost in location," possibly due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures. Kyiv City Military Administration Head Serhiy Popko reported that drone debris fell in Darnytskyi Raion, starting a fire in an open area.[83]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian government signed a bill on October 25 that will allow military personnel on leave to receive medical care at any hospital or clinic, likely in part to placate Russian ultranationalists and milbloggers.[84] The Russian government signed this bill into law based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s instructions, and this law will be in effect for the duration of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[85] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously only allowed Russian servicemen to seek medical assistance at Russian MoD-affiliated hospitals while on vacations, which is not available in all Russian regions. Russian milbloggers claimed that they raised this problem during their first meeting with Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and ISW had routinely assessed that Belousov’s meetings with milbloggers are likely part of the ongoing Kremlin effort to coopt the Russian milblogger community.[86]The Kremlin is continuing to forge new state-affiliated veterans societies and organizations likely in an ongoing effort to replace veterans organizations that have been critical of Russia’s conduct of war in Ukraine. The Russian MoD announced on October 25 that the founding meeting of the “SVOi” Military Brotherhood (a play on Russia's use of the term "special military operation" [SVO] and the Russian word "svoi" - which means our own) took place in the Central House of the Russian Army (CDRA) in Moscow, and that military personnel and veterans of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine organized the event.[87] The Russian MoD claimed that the All-Russian Public Organization of Veterans and its chairperson, Army General Viktor Yermakov, and the leaders of the other veteran organizations also initiated the founding of the “SVOi” organization. The “SVOi” organization will reportedly focus on providing assistance to Russian servicemen and paying tribute to deceased personnel. Russian veteran organizations, notably the All-Russian Officers Assembly and the Moscow Oblast detachment of the ”Airborne Union” veteran association, had previously criticized the Kremlin’s conduct of the war and command changes, respectively.[88] The Kremlin may be attempting to form new state-run veteran organizations to prevent veterans from criticizing or opposing the regime.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not reporting on activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed on October 25 that the prospect of Belarus joining the Russian Federation is impossible and infeasible and that Russian President Vladimir Putin has never "set himself the goal of conquering Ukraine."[89]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 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https://t.me/z4lpr/829[53] https://t.me/motopatriot/28732[54]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l ;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ysNiKbKdfzbhiSffCz8g2LiYywKHd8UmzetpjnxiESmUZbEL1vsJ9sTdFRh9oM9cl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800[55] https://t.me/SnpSpN/355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28716[56] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1849876436036849973; https://t.me/z4lpr/829[57] https://t.me/SnpSpN/355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28716;[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7242; https://t.me/ZParaBellumMD/12214[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17967[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800[61] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/40870[62] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1849520461975020000; https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic/660[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/55898 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17963 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800 ; https://t.me/rybar/64734 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28710 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55937 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28734 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79364 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17936 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/17930 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17968[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79392 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28710 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28728 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55937 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28742 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28748 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/133567 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55939 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55940 ; https://t.me/osetin20/9505 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/17968[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79367 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142010 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28756[66] https://t.me/rybar/64734 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ysNiKbKdfzbhiSffCz8g2LiYywKHd8UmzetpjnxiESmUZbEL1vsJ9sTdFRh9oM9cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l[67] https://t.me/motopatriot/28710 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/28729[68] https://t.me/rusich_army/17939[69] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79367[70] https://t.me/motopatriot/28744 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59742[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ysNiKbKdfzbhiSffCz8g2LiYywKHd8UmzetpjnxiESmUZbEL1vsJ9sTdFRh9oM9cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l[72] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12877[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ysNiKbKdfzbhiSffCz8g2LiYywKHd8UmzetpjnxiESmUZbEL1vsJ9sTdFRh9oM9cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79367 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/59742 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55895 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/55898 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/22800 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79368 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79402[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/11478[76] https://t.me/basurin_e/15102[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ysNiKbKdfzbhiSffCz8g2LiYywKHd8UmzetpjnxiESmUZbEL1vsJ9sTdFRh9oM9cl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l[78] https://suspilne dot media/865379-udar-po-novij-posti-na-doneccini-ukrainski-organizacii-zasudili-vizit-genseka-oon-do-rosii-975-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1729865222&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/866011-vijskovi-rf-pidtaguut-rezervi-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-bratcuk/[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02amutndrjNzqw4ExSdXDxt1WoQtfJDFmeVZ3GAeoNCijwNLjwD8fyjtdQNCKEeUq8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qzDnTzMwgCvpkK9PLm7XLwNScLWEHrBkCRZBN3Sat3yDNbvLCambGJqfPqNjik93l[80] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/40868[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/55907[82] https://t.me/kpszsu/21886[83] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/8780[84] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/22225153[85] https://tas dot ru/obschestvo/22225153[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024; https://t.me/dva_majors/55931 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11668; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/142068; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/79389[87] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/22228643[88] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23[89] https://t.me/tass_agency/281571 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/281574
- — Iran Update, October 25, 2024
- at 10/25/24 8:38pmAnnika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Anthony Carillo, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Note: CTP-ISW is tracking early reports that Israel has launched airstrikes in Iran in retaliation for the Iranian ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1. CTP-ISW will continue to track these developments and report on them further in the coming days.Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.[1] These comments were likely an information operation meant to coerce Israel into limiting its strike on Iran. The Iranian officials, which included two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers, told the New York Times that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ordered the Iranian armed forces to develop multiple retaliatory options.[2] The officials claimed that if Israel inflicts “major harm,” such as by targeting energy and nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials, the retaliatory options would include firing as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles at Israel, increasing Iranian-backed militia attacks across the Middle East, and disrupting commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[3] The threat against global shipping comes as Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have threatened to start an “energy war” in the Middle East.[4] The Iranian officials also claimed that Tehran could refrain from retaliating if Israel only strikes military targets—rather than energy or nuclear infrastructure or senior Iranian officials.[5]US Air Force F-16s from the 480th Fighter Squadron arrived in the Middle East on October 25.[6]Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.[7] The committee was reportedly formed after Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024. The committee was meant to facilitate decision-making when Sinwar was out of contact in the Gaza Strip, which happened regularly. The committee is led by Khalil al Hayya, who represents Hamas in the Gaza Strip on the committee. The committee also includes Zaher Jabarin, who represents the West Bank, Khaled Meshal, who represents the Palestinian diaspora, Mohammad Darwish, who is the Hamas Shura Council head, and the secretary of the Hamas Political Bureau, whose identity is unknown.Hayya reiterated Hamas’ maximalist demands for a ceasefire-hostage agreement with Israel on October 24, reflecting how Hamas's strategy is unlikely to change significantly following the death of Sinwar.[8] Hayya discussed the maximalist demands in a meeting with Egyptian intelligence director Hassan Mahmoud Rashad. The meeting comes as Egypt proposed a new “small” ceasefire-hostage deal that would require Hamas to release a “small” number of Israeli hostages for a “few” days ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[9]Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.[10] The IRGC reportedly facilitated the transfer of the intelligence to the Houthis at some unspecified point in 2024, helping the Houthis to target vessels that had deactivated their radio signals. The US Maritime Administration in March 2024 advised vessels to deactivate their radios when transiting near Yemen in order to protect themselves from Houthi attacks.[11] Iran has separately tried to broker a deal between Russia and the Houthis that would transfer Russian anti-ship cruise missiles to the Houthis, further enabling attacks on international shipping.[12] There is no evidence that Russia has sent missiles to the Houthis at this time, however, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13]Lebanese Hezbollah has killed nine Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers in southern Lebanon since October 24.[14] The IDF 2nd Carmeli Brigade (Res.) (146th Division) encountered Hezbollah militants during clearing operations in a forested area in southwestern Lebanon on October 24.[15] The Hezbollah militants emerged from a tunnel shaft and threw grenades at Israeli forces.[16] Hezbollah killed four reservist soldiers in an exchange of fire and injured six others.[17] The IDF assessed that the Hezbollah militants were also killed in the exchange.[18] The IDF has continued to encounter and directly engage Hezbollah forces, typically in small groups of fighters, during clearing operations.[19] Hezbollah also conducted an indirect fire attack and killed five reservists from the 8th Armored Brigade (91st Division).[20] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets targeting an area near a building where 8th Armored Brigade soldiers were staying.[21] An IDF logistics convoy unit was also present in the building.[22] The attack injured 24 other IDF soldiers.[23] Hezbollah has primarily targeted Israeli forces in southern Lebanon with indirect fire.[24]Key Takeaways:Iran: Four unspecified Iranian officials outlined to Western media how Tehran could retaliate in response to an Israeli strike on Iran.Hamas: Two unspecified Hamas officials claimed that Hamas will replace its leader, Yahya Sinwar, with a five-person committee based in Doha.Houthis: Russia has provided the Houthis with targeting intelligence to support their attacks targeting international shipping, according to the Wall Street Journal.Gaza StripAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division has killed “dozens” of fighters, seized weapons, and destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure during clearing operations since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 24.[25] The IDF reported on October 25 that the 162nd Division is operating in “the heart” of Jabalia refugee camp around Kamal Adwan Hospital.[26] An Israeli military correspondent reported that Israeli forces have surrounded the hospital and have begun to evacuate patients and detain fighters present.[27] The correspondent said that around 600 Palestinians have been evacuated from the Kamal Adwan Hospital area.[28] Geolocated footage posted on October 23 showed Israeli forces detaining Palestinian men near the Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan Primary School in Jabalia refugee camp.[29] Israeli forces also destroyed a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and engaged nearby fighters in an unspecified part of Jabalia.[30]The IDF 252nd Division engaged Palestinian fighters and destroyed Hamas infrastructure and rocket launch sites during clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on October 25.[31]Palestinian media reported that Israeli forces conducted a limited raid in Khan Younis on October 25.[32] A Palestinian journalist claimed that Israeli air elements and artillery supported ground forces in al Manara, Qizan al Najjar, Maan, and Jurt al Lut, east of Khan Younis. The journalist also claimed that 38 Palestinians died during the Israeli raid.The IDF 143rd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on October 25.[33] The IDF reported that Israeli forces destroyed militia targets and killed Palestinian fighters through ground and air engagements.[34]The IDF reported that its 143rd Division killed the Hamas Nukhba commander in the Central Camps Brigade on October 23.[35] The IDF stated that the commander participated in the murder and kidnapping of Israeli civilians in Migunit near Reim on October 7.[36] He also directed attacks on Israeli forces during the October 7 War. The IDF stated that the commander worked as a member of UNRWA starting in July 2022.[37]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives:Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelPalestinian fighters have attacked Israeli forces in at least two locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 24.[38] PIJ fired small arms targeting IDF observation posts and “military targets” in the Mevo Dotan settlement in the northern West Bank on October 24.[39] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) separately fired small arms targeting IDF military equipment at the Jalamah checkpoint on the Israel-West Bank border on October 25.[40]Northern Israel and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near termExpel the United States from SyriaThe IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon.[41] The 98th Division identified and killed a cell of Hezbollah fighters preparing to ambush Israeli forces.[42] Israeli forces also destroyed a Kornet anti-tank missile launcher that was ready to launch.[43]Hezbollah has claimed at least 12 attacks targeting Israeli forces in the 98th Division’s area of operations in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on October 24.[44] Hezbollah fired anti-tank guided missiles targeting Israeli personnel and armor on the outskirts of Odaisseh and claimed to fire another ATGM targeting an IDF rescue force.[45] Hezbollah claimed it fired at least five distinct barrages of rockets and ATGMs targeting Israeli forces near Markaba.[46] Hezbollah also claimed to target an IDF unit with unspecified weapons in Wazzani, east of Kfar Kila.[47]The IDF 91st Division continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon. The 91st Division directed an airstrike targeting killed the commander of the Aitaroun area's Radwan unit, Abbas Adnan Musallam.[48] Musallam conducted numerous attacks against Israeli forces.[49] Israeli Army Radio said that Musallam conducted attacks targeting Malkia and Avivim in northern Israel and had planned a ground attack targeting those communities.[50] Hezbollah claimed an Israeli tank attempted to advance towards Houla on October 25.[51] Hezbollah claimed it confronted the tank with anti-tank guided missiles, small arms, and rocket-propelled grenades.[52] Hezbollah also claimed it fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on the outskirts of Houla.[53]Israeli forces continued operations in Aitaroun on October 25. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli soldiers east of Aitaroun on October 25.[54] Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces in unspecified clashes in Aitaroun.[55]The IDF 146th Division continued clearing operations in southwestern Lebanon on October 25. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on October 25 showed flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in Boustane, a Lebanese border village west of Marwahin, indicating that Israeli forces operating in the area. The 146th Division attacked over 50 Hezbollah targets, including an anti-tank position and other infrastructure.[56] The IDF 2nd Infantry Brigade (Res.) recently located two underground Hezbollah combat compounds in a Lebanese village.[57] Israeli forces found and killed Hezbollah fighters inside one of the compounds.[58] The 2nd Infantry Brigade also identified a large weapons depot in a "rugged mountainous area.”[59] The IDF said a Radwan special operations force (SOF) company had intended to use this weapons cache to conduct a ground attack into Israel.[60] Israeli forces used 11 trucks to transport Kornet anti-tank missiles, launchers, grenades, rifles, and other combat equipment found in the Radwan depot to Israel.[61]Hezbollah continued to target Israeli forces in southwestern Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed it fired anti-tank guided missiles and Israeli personnel and armor on the outskirts of Marwahin.[62] Hezbollah claimed it killed or injured an IDF tank’s crew.[63]UNIFIL reported that Israeli soldiers fired at UN peacekeepers at an observation post near Dahyra, southwestern Lebanon, on October 22.[64] UNIFIL said that the peacekeepers observed Israeli forces conducting clearing operations in houses near a permanent UN observation post.[65] Israeli forces fired small arms at the post “upon realizing they were being observed.”[66] The UNIFIL peacekeepers withdrew from the post as a result.[67] UNIFIL reminded the IDF to ensure the safety of UN personnel.[68]UNIFIL reported that UNIFIL personnel and infrastructure have been impacted by fire of “unknown origin” in at least three incidents in southern Lebanon since October 23.[69] UNIFIL said in an October 25 statement that two UNIFIL medical evacuation teams met in Yaroun to transfer a patient on October 23. Fire of unknown origin impacted one of their vehicles and “immobilized it.” UNIFIL said that a shell or rocket hit and damaged a UNIFIL medical facility in Beit Lif on October 23. UNIFIL also said that two shells or rockets damaged living accommodations at a UNIFIL position in Kfarchouba.The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s capabilities and infrastructure on October 25. The IDF Air Force struck over 200 Hezbollah targets across Lebanon.[70] The IDF Air Force struck multiple weapons manufacturing sites, the headquarters of Hezbollah’s intelligence division, and an air defense system in Beirut.[71] The IDF issued warnings to residents of Burj al Barajneh and Hadath to evacuate at least 500 meters from Hezbollah infrastructure prior to attacking the area.[72] Local Lebanese sources reported Israeli airstrikes in Burj al Barajneh, Hadath, and Haret Hreik.[73]The IDF continued to target Hezbollah arms smuggling infrastructure on the Syria-Lebanon border on October 25. The IDF Air Force struck Hezbollah military infrastructure used for arms smuggling at the Jousieh border crossing between Lebanon and Homs Province, Syria, on October 25.[74] Lebanese and UN officials, as well as Syrian media, reported that recent Israeli strikes on the Jousieh, al Qaa, and Masnaa border crossings led to the crossings closing.[75] The Arida border crossing in northwestern Lebanon now remains the only border crossing open to Lebanese civilians fleeing to Syria.[76]An Israeli airstrike killed three journalists from Hezbollah-affiliated outlets in southeastern Lebanon on October 25.[77] The strike targeted a guesthouse in the town of Hasbaya, killing two journalists from Hezbollah media channel al Manar and Hezbollah-affiliated al Mayadeen.[78] Al Manar operates as the media arm of Hezbollah and is designated by the US Department of Treasury as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity.[79] The IDF investigated the strike and determined the guesthouse was a ”Hezbollah military infrastructure.”[80]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on October 24 to 2:00pm ET on October 25. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least sixteen attacks into Israeli since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 24.[81] Hezbollah fired one-way attack drones targeting the headquarters of the IDF 36th and 210th divisions at Philon base, east of Safed, on October 25.[82] The 36th and 210th Divisions are currently deployed in southern Lebanon.[83] The IDF intercepted at least one drone before it entered Israeli airspace on October 25.[84] This attack may be a part of a broader Hezbollah campaign to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” to defend against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon.[85] CTP-ISW assessed that Hezbollah’s attack on a training camp for the IDF 1st Infantry Brigade south of Haifa on October 13 likely also fell within this framework.[86] Hezbollah separately killed two Israeli civilians and injured at least 25 other civilians in a rocket attack targeting Karmiel on October 25.[87] Hezbollah conducted two attacks targeting civilian sites in Safed.[88] Hezbollah continued to target Israeli forces along the Lebanon-Israel border in five separate incidents.[89]US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati in London on October 25.[90] Blinken emphasized the United States remains committed to a diplomatic resolution that "fully implements” UNSC Resolution 1701 and allows both Israelis and Lebanese citizens to return to their homes.[91]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq--a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias--has claimed four attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on October 24. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel.[92]Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Eilat.[93]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel.[94]The IDF detected a drone over the Red Sea on October 24 that was approaching Israel from the east.[95] The drone fell in an open area outside Israeli territory. The IDF said that an interceptor targeting the drone fell in an open area near Eilat due to a technical malfunction, causing no injuries or damage.[96] The IDF separately intercepted a drone in the southern Golan Heights that crossed into Israeli territory from Syria on October 25.[97]Local Syrian media reported that 25 Houthi militants met with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander in eastern Syria Hajj Askar in late September 2024.[98] The militants then traveled with “local elements” to Daraa, Rif Dimashq, and Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The militants reportedly have experience in drone and missile operations.[99] Israeli media has observed an increase in Houthi militants in Syria over the past two months.[100]US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it destroyed 15 drones, land attack cruise missiles, and surface-to-air missiles fired by the Houthis and other Iranian-backed militants from October 18-24.[101] CENTCOM did not specify where it destroyed these weapons. CENTCOM determined that these weapons posed a significant risk to the United States, its partners, and civilians in the area.[102]Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi stated that Iran and Pakistan agreed to increase drone and cyber cooperation.[103] Vahedi’s statement follows an October 24 meeting with Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir in Pakistan.[104] Vahedi stated that Iran and Pakistan can exchange experiences in the field of drone training and emphasized that Pakistan has “taken good measures in the cyber field.”[105]An unidentified individual shot and killed the local Friday prayer leader in Kazeroun, Fars Province, Iran, on October 25.[106] Iranian officials emphasized that the attack was not an act of terrorism and that Iranian authorities are investigating the attack.[107] [1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack-plans.html[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack-plans.html[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack-plans.html[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2024[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/24/world/middleeast/iran-israel-attack-plans.html[6] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1849832255960568291?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet[7] https://www.barrons.com/news/hamas-sources-say-group-to-be-led-by-ruling-committee-not-new-chief-fd230274?refsec=topics_afp-news[8] www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-hamas-official-says-terror-group-told-egypt-its-ready-to-stop-fighting-if-israel-commits-to-truce/[9] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/21/gaza-egypt-proposed-israel-hostage-ceasefire-deal[10] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b[11] https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2024-004-southern-red-sea-bab-el-mandeb-strait-gulf-aden-indian-ocean-somali-basin-arabian-sea[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-provided-targeting-data-for-houthi-assault-on-global-shipping-eabc2c2b[14] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15794; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15822[15] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15794[16] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15794[17] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15794[18] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15794[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-5-2024[20] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15822[21] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15822[22] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15822[23] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15822[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-5-2024[25] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670878327386150[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849773024414711892 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/305015[27] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15837[28] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15837[29] https://x.com/NemoAnno/status/1849776864102932549 ; https://x.com/MOSSADil/status/1849161308601475102[30] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670878327386150[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670881364111832[32] https://t.me/hamza20300/304931[33] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670884065210713[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670884065210713[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849514922931114452[36] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849514926169260421[37] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849555160927961388[38] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1675[39] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1675[40] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1675[41] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670874745426337[42] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670874745426337[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670874745426337[44] https://t.me/mmirleb/8295; https://t.me/mmirleb/8296; https://t.me/mmirleb/8309; https://t.me/mmirleb/8316; https://t.me/mmirleb/8318; https://t.me/mmirleb/8325; https://t.me/mmirleb/8333; https://t.me/mmirleb/8337; https://t.me/mmirleb/8339; https://t.me/mmirleb/8340; https://t.me/mmirleb/8341; https://t.me/mmirleb/8342[45] https://t.me/mmirleb/8325; https://t.me/mmirleb/8316[46] https://t.me/mmirleb/8339; https://t.me/mmirleb/8340; https://t.me/mmirleb/8341; https://t.me/mmirleb/8296; https://t.me/mmirleb/8295; https://t.me/mmirleb/8296[47] https://t.me/mmirleb/8333[48] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670853035753871[49] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670863974482394[50] https://t.me/moriahdoron/15816[51] https://t.me/mmirleb/8320[52] https://t.me/mmirleb/8320[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/8337[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/8296[55] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95462[56] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670874745426337[57] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849746950796493094[58] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849746950796493094[59] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849746950796493094[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849746950796493094[61] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849746950796493094[62] https://t.me/mmirleb/8303; https://t.me/mmirleb/8302[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/8303[64] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024[65] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024[66] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024[67] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024[68] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024[69] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-25-october-2024-0[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849670863974482394[71] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849779830310506836[72] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1849553649724244244[73] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/95473 ; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1849571536354619664 ; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1849580153409507550[74] https://x.com/IAFsite/status/1849755301391585500[75] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-25-24-intl-hnk#cm2or85cg00003b6q0mqd53zx ; https://t.me/damascusv011/24640[76] https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-lebanon-gaza-war-10-25-24-intl-hnk#cm2ombave000m3b6nia94qmj7[77] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/25/lebanon-strike-journalists-gaza/[78] https://apnews.com/article/journalists-killed-lebanon-israel-c89cf1109daaf3e6e7b766584710234d[79] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/js4134[80] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/25/lebanon-strike-journalists-gaza/[81] https://t.me/mmirleb/8298 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8299 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8300 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8301 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8304 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8305 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8308 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8311 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8312 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8313 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8314 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8315 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8317 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8326 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8329 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8332[82] https://t.me/mmirleb/8315[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-24-2024[84] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849841507123040684[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[86] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-14-2024[87] https://t.me/mmirleb/8313 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/15842[88] https://t.me/mmirleb/8314 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8332[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/8299 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8301 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8308 ; ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8317 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/8329[90] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/10/25/israel-iran-war-news-gaza-hamas-lebanon/[91] https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-meeting-with-lebanese-caretaker-prime-minister-mikati-3/[92] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1398[93] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1400 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1401[94] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1403[95] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849572293850136969[96] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849817878133932129[97] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1849735726302150879[98] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/index.php/ar/news/2024/10/24/12149[99] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/for-the-first-time-houthi-militia-arrives-in-deir-ezzor/[100] https://www.terrorism-info dot org.il/app/uploads/2024/09/E_197_24.pdf;https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel-at-war/artc-houthis-deploying-forces-in-syria-prelude-to-new-escalation[101] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3945704/us-central-command-weekly-update/[102] https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3945704/us-central-command-weekly-update/[103] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/700695[104] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4363571[105] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/700695[106] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/700782/[107] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/827928 ;https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/700782/
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