- — Iran Update, November 22, 2024
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at 11/22/24 7:26pmAnnika Ganzeveld, Siddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa,and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment.[1] Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passing a censure resolution submitted by the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) on November 21.[2] The resolution condemns Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA.[3] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi said on November 22 that Iran will “significantly increase” its uranium enrichment capacity in response.[4] Iran could activate some of the IR-6 or IR-2m centrifuges that it has installed at the Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities, respectively, in recent months. The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed but not yet activated eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow.[5] The IAEA also confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed 10 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[6] Iran has installed six additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz since August 2024, bringing the total number of cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to 37.[7] Only 15 out of these 37 cascades had been activated as of November 2024.[8] Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[9]Lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi threatened on November 22 that Iran would withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if the E3 triggers the “snapback” mechanism in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows its signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[10] The E3 censure resolution requires the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA and lay the foundation for the E3 to impose “snapback” sanctions.[12] UK media reported in early November 2024 that the United Kingdom is prepared to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran.[13] Iranian officials have long threatened to withdraw from the NPT, but Gharib Abadi’s warning is noteworthy given the current standoff between Iran and the E3. Gharib Abadi’s warning also comes amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[14]Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 162nd Division Commander Brigadier General Nadav Lotan as the IDF Ground Forces commander on November 22.[15] The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi appointed Lotan after the former IDF Ground Forces commander resigned in September 2024, citing personal reasons.[16] Halevi also reassigned several high-ranking IDF positions, including appointing new commanders for the 162nd Division, currently operating in the northern Gaza Strip, and the 887th Division, which operates in the West Bank.[17]Key Takeaways:Iran: Iran is activating a “substantial number” of advanced centrifuges, increasing the rate of Iranian uranium enrichment. Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors passing a censure resolution against Iran.Iran: A senior Iranian official threatened that Iran would withdraw from the NPT if the JCPOA signatories trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. The IAEA Board of Governors censure resolution could set conditions for the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran.Israel: Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz approved the appointment of a new IDF Ground Forces commander. The new commander, Brigadier General Nadav Lotan, previously commanded the IDF 162nd Division.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF killed several Palestinian fighters in the northern Gaza Strip on November 22. The IDF 162nd Division conducted airstrikes targeting Palestinian militia infrastructure, such as ammunition warehouses, in Jabalia and Beit Lahia.[18] The IDF killed five Hamas Nukhba special operations forces fighters in the northern Gaza Strip who conducted attacks on Mefalsim on October 7, 2023.[19] The IDF has also destroyed around 300 buildings rigged with explosives in Jabalia in recent weeks.[20] The IDF gathered intelligence from several detained Palestinian fighters from Jabalia to locate additional fighters there.[21]Palestinian militias claimed four attacks targeting the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip on November 21 and 22.[22] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms and anti-tank munitions targeting Israeli forces in Beit Lahia.[23] Hamas and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[24] The IDF reported on November 21 that a soldier from the 84th Infantry Brigade died in the northern Gaza Strip.[25]The IDF reported on November 22 that the commanders of its 162nd Division and 900th Infantry Brigade traveled to Beit Lahia this week and conducted a situational assessment.[26] The IDF stated that the 900th Infantry Brigade has established ”operational control” over Beit Lahia after killing several Palestinian fighters and destroying militia infrastructure there.[27] The IDF further stated that the 900th Infantry Brigade will now focus on destroying Palestinian militia infrastructure above and below the ground.[28] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade began clearing operations in Beit Lahia on November 6.[29] Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on November 22.[30]The IDF reported on November 22 that it conducted an airstrike that killed PIJ rocket unit commander Khaled Abu Daqa in Deir al Balah humanitarian zone in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF stated that Daqa was responsible for several indirect rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip targeting Israeli forces and civilians in southern Israel.[31] The IDF stated that it took steps to reduce civilian harm from the strike, including by using precise intelligence and specific munitions.[32]Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF in the southern Gaza Strip on November 22.[33] Hamas snipers shot at five IDF soldiers in a complex attack at the Salah al Din border crossing.[34] Hamas fighters then fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting an IDF Merkava tank and a bulldozer that had arrived in the area to tend to injured IDF soldiers. The IDF confirmed that the sniper attack injured one soldier from the 933rd Infantry Brigade.[35]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonThe IDF likely advanced east along the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road toward Deir Mimas on November 22. The Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road connects the Marjaayoun District, which borders Israel, to the Nabatieh District, which includes territory north of the Litani River. Geolocated images and footage posted on November 22 showed IDF armor driving north of Deir Mimas along the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road in addition to an IDF position north of Deir Mimas along the road.[36] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 22 shows cleared areas south of Burj al Muluk, indicating that the IDF likely moved through the area prior to advancing northward to the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun road. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated outlet al Akhbar reported that IDF armor was seen advancing toward the western outskirts of Deir Mimas, while IDF drones reportedly warned residents of the town to stay in their homes.[37]Lebanese media reported that certain sections of the Nabatieh-Marjaayoun Road are blocked near where the IDF is reportedly advancing. A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that an IDF airstrike destroyed part of the road near Khardali on November 21, north of where the IDF is likely operating.[38] Lebanese media also reported that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) blocked a section of the road after observing the IDF advance nearby.[39]Hezbollah claimed numerous attacks targeting Israeli forces likely advancing toward Deir Mimas. Hezbollah claimed three rocket attacks targeting the IDF near Tal al Nahhas, east of Deir Mimas.[40] Hezbollah claimed to fire rockets, mortars, and an anti-tank missile targeting the IDF north of Deir Mimas.[41]Lebanese sources reported that the IDF shelled around a cluster of towns to the west of Deir Mimas, including Arnoun and Yohmor. [42]The IDF also issued evacuation warnings to residents of neighboring towns Taybeh, Adchit al Qusayr, and Deir Seryan on November 21 before conducting airstrikes in those areas.[43]Lebanese sources reported that IDF artillery impacted around the towns of Nabatieh, Harouf, Zebdine, Kfar Tebnit, and Jabal al Ahmar for the first time since IDF ground operations began.[44] The IDF Artillery Corps crossed the border and began operating in southern Lebanon on November 17 with M-109 self-propelled guns to increase its artillery range and provide better support to ground forces in the area.[45] The IDF operates the M-109A5, which has a range of 22 kilometers.[46]The IDF 98th Division continued to operate in Khiam.[47] Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 22 showed the IDF 7th Armored Brigade in southern Khiam.[48] The 7th Armored Brigade located several Hezbollah combat compounds, anti-tank positions, observation posts, and weapons depots, containing grenades, combat equipment, and other weapons in the area.[49] Israeli forces located a camouflaged anti-tank position and discovered a Kornet missile, a drone, and a killed Hezbollah fighter.[50] Israeli forces located and destroyed several underground shafts and ammunition depots.[51] The IDF called Khiam a “significant. . . center” for Hezbollah activities.[52] Hezbollah claimed to have conducted eight rockets and drone attacks targeting Israeli forces on Khiam’s eastern outskirts.[53] Hezbollah also claimed to fire an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli armor south of Khiam prison.[54]Israeli media reported that the IDF 91st Division engaged Hezbollah fighters in Aitaroun, south-central Lebanon, for 14 hours during operations in late October.[55] Six soldiers from the IDF 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) were killed in the encounter on October 26.[56] Ynet reported that the 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) launched a raid to enter Aitaroun’s city hall, which was suspected to serve as a Hezbollah headquarters.[57] Hezbollah fighters engaged Israeli forces with small arms and grenades inside the building.[58] Ynet reported that the IDF 91st Division briefly suspected that Hezbollah had kidnapped an Israeli soldier and initiated kidnapping protocols until the soldier was found.[59]An Israeli military correspondent has visited Israeli forces in Jebbayn, southwestern Lebanon, in recent days.[60] The IDF has been operating in Jebbayn since at least November 15, and the presence of civilian journalists in Jebbayn suggests that the IDF has at least partially secured the village.[61] The correspondent reported that Israeli forces continue to locate Hezbollah staging grounds, including anti-tank positions, in Lebanese “second-line” villages.[62] A battalion commander in the IDF 188th Armored Brigade (146th Division) said that Israeli forces are tasked with removing all Hezbollah ammunition and infrastructure in these towns.[63]Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that the IDF advanced west toward Naqoura from Chama, southwestern Lebanon, on November 22.[64] Israeli Army Radio reposted the reports.[65] UNIFIL reported on November 22 that it has observed heavy shelling and ground combat near Chama and Naqoura in recent days.[66] Hezbollah claimed that it fired rockets and drones targeting Israeli forces in Chama and west of Chama.[67]Two likely Hezbollah 122-mm rockets injured four UNIFIL peacekeepers in Chama, southwest Lebanon, on November 22.[68] UNIFIL stated that the rockets struck a bunker and a logistics site, causing significant damage to infrastructure.[69] UNIFIL added that the rockets were “likely launched by Hezbollah or affiliated groups.”[70] The only non-state armed groups in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate there. This incident marks the third time in a week that Hezbollah or IDF fire has struck the UNIFIL position in Chama.[71]The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for four towns in southwestern Lebanon.[72] The IDF has previously ordered residents of all but one of these towns, Iskenderun, to evacuate north of the Awali River. The IDF stated that it would operate against Hezbollah in evacuated areas.[73] The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Beirut since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 21. The IDF issued evacuation orders on November 22 for residents in four neighborhoods in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[74] The IDF has struck at least eight Hezbollah sites, including headquarters and weapons depots, in southern Beirut since issuing the evacuation orders.[75] The IDF stated that the attacks were meant to destroy ammunition depots and weapons production sites that Hezbollah has developed over years.[76]The IDF destroyed Hezbollah Aziz regional command infrastructure in multiple waves of airstrikes on Tyre, southern Lebanon, on November 22.[77] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for residents of two neighborhoods in eastern Tyre and specific buildings in the city.[78] The IDF struck Hezbollah headquarters, intelligence infrastructure, weapons depots, observation posts, and military buildings in Tyre.[79] The IDF noted that Hezbollah‘s Aziz unit, which is responsible for Hezbollah operations along the southwest Israel-Lebanon border, is headquartered in Tyre.[80] Local sources reported at least 19 distinct IDF strikes around Tyre on November 22.[81]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 21 to 2:00pm ET on November 22. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 21.[82] Hezbollah targeted an IDF Air Force site in Haifa with a ”Nasr 2” precision surface-to-surface missile.[83] Hezbollah claims that the ”Nasr 2” carries a 140-kilogram warhead and can travel up to 150 kilometers.[84] Hezbollah first used the ”Nasr 2” on October 20.[85] An Israeli military correspondent noted that Hezbollah is firing these missiles and rockets from deeper in southern Lebanon or around Baalbek in northeast Lebanon, where the IDF will “likely never operate.”[86] Hezbollah also launched rockets targeting an IDF radar site on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights for the second consecutive day.[87] Hezbollah continued to launch rockets and one-way attack drones targeting the IDF on the Israel-Lebanon border on November 22.[88] Hezbollah also continued to target IDF sites, such as Shraga and Stella Maris base, near Acre.[89]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in southern Israel on November 21.[90]The Iraqi federal government is highlighting its efforts to halt Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel in order to try to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18, in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[91] Iraqi federal government spokesperson Basim al Awadi stated that Baghdad has made “great efforts” to reign in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in an interview with Sky News Arabia on November 22.[92] Awadi added that the federal government is prepared to take “any necessary measures” to reduce the influence of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani previously ordered Iraqi security forces on November 19 to confront any armed group that attempts to launch attacks from Iraq.[93]A high-ranking Iranian delegation is expected to travel to Baghdad in the coming days to hold indirect talks with the United States, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on November 22.[94] The source claimed that Iran seeks to end the October 7 War “as soon as possible” and that the Iranian delegation will push the United States to pressure Israel to end the war. CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran has an interest in ending the October 7 War to prevent Israel from further degrading Hezbollah and Hamas.[95] A US delegation reportedly arrived in Baghdad on November 13 to hold indirect talks with Iran aimed at “calming the situation [in the Middle East].”[96]Houthi military spokesperson Brigadier General Yahya Sarea claimed on November 22 that the Houthis fired a Palestine 2 hypersonic ballistic missile targeting the IDF Nevatim airbase in the Negev desert.[97] The IDF intercepted the missile on November 21.[98]Senior Iranian Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani emphasized Hezbollah’s resilience during an interview with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on November 21.[99] Larijani stated that the Israeli pager attack targeting Hezbollah in September 2024 was a “serious blow” for Hezbollah but argued that Hezbollah has recovered from the attack.[100] Larijani also reiterated the Iranian regime’s support for a ceasefire in Lebanon.[101] Larijani reportedly conveyed a message from Khamenei to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut that called on Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River.[102] Larijani separately called on the incoming US administration to form a “new” nuclear agreement with Iran.[103] Larijani stated that, under the proposed agreement, Iran would agree not to pursue a nuclear weapon but would retain its uranium enrichment capabilities.[104]IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami vowed on November 22 that Iran will retaliate against Israel.[105] Salami emphasized that Israel's instability and ongoing resistance movements will accelerate its collapse, calling on Islamic countries to impose an economic blockade to expedite this process.[106] Salami stated on November 8 that disrupting Israel's maritime trade, which he claimed accounts for 98 percent of its economy, by targeting its ports and making the Mediterranean Sea unsafe for commercial transit, would critically threaten Israel's existence and potentially lead to its collapse.[107] Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Brigadier General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr separately reiterated Iran’s firm commitment to retaliation against Israel, emphasizing that Iran’s pledge for “Truthful Promise III” is precise and effective.[108]Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro concluded the 10th Iran-Venezuela Joint Economic Commission in Caracas, Venezuela on November 21.[109] Iranian and Venezuelan officials signed cooperation agreements to enhance trade, industrial projects, and technology transfer.[110] Both sides emphasized joint efforts to resist global hegemony and strengthen economic ties, building on a 20-year partnership agreement signed in June 2022 during Maduro's visit to Tehran.[111] The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://farsnews dot ir/Qaysar/1732255392934220717/Iran-Activates-Advanced-Centrifuges-in-Response-to-IAEA-Resolution[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/world/europe/iaea-censure-iran-nuclear.html[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/world/europe/iaea-censure-iran-nuclear.html[4] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/22/737723/Iran-IAEA-Board-Governors-resolution-Behrouz-Kamalvandi-AEOI-centrifuges-Grossi-enrichment-[5] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf ;https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121[6] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf ;https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-enriched-uranium-stockpile-9c86e5788a8bb45eab1337d5f6c10121[7] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/11/gov2024-61.pdf[8] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/11/gov2024-61.pdf[9] https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/19/middleeast/iran-nuclear-enrichment-intl-latam/index.html[10] https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9870/[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024[13] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/11/02/britain-prepared-to-sanction-iran-nuclear-deal-breaches/[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024[15] https://www.idf dot il/250674 ; 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https://t.me/sarayaps/18840[24] https://t.me/nedalps/4522 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20097/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-412-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%BA%D9%84[25] https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC21112024238645[26] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859916146126000382[27] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859916155747725804[28] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859916155747725804[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-7-2024[30] https://t.me/sarayaps/18839 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5367[31] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859870251233820903[32] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859870256057160009[33] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4471 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8291/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AD[34] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8291/%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%B6-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%AD[35] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859949427760439373 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16740[36] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1859910061344293031; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1859936552253866213; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1859940158876926341[37] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16731; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1859895813209522613[38] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12456; https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12429[39] https://www.haaretz dot com/israel-news/2024-11-21/ty-article-live/elderly-israeli-civilian-killed-in-south-lebanon-with-soldier-after-entering-with-troops/00000193-4c96-d58a-abdf-cdd7352c0000?liveBlogItemId=931769026&utm_source=site&utm_medium=button&utm_campaign=live_blog_item#931769026; https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1859925567128162480[40] https://t.me/mmirleb/9375;https://t.me/mmirleb/9376;https://t.me/mmirleb/9387[41] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12460; https://t.me/mmirleb/9407; https://t.me/mmirleb/9398[42] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12456; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104726 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104728[43] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859811367047303404; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/122053; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104976[44] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/104728; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1859715343880683977[45] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858180992969654638 ;https://x.com/BittonRosen/status/1857846041007239351[46] https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2023/israel-defense-forces-deploys-m109a5-self-propelled-howitzers-along-gaza-strip-and-lebanese-border; https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/M109A5_American_155mm_Self-Propelled_Howitzer_(SPH)[47] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1859966966586564682[48] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1859966966586564682[49] www dot idf.il/250661[50] www dot idf.il/250661[51] www dot idf.il/250661[52] www dot idf.il/250661[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/9400; https://t.me/mmirleb/9402; https://t.me/mmirleb/9359 ;https://t.me/mmirleb/9363 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9371; https://t.me/mmirleb/9372; https://t.me/mmirleb/9373;https://t.me/mmirleb/9377; https://t.me/mmirleb/9383;[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/9392[55] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hywdycjfyl[56] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hywdycjfyl; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1850458303299453130[57] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hywdycjfyl[58] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hywdycjfyl,[59] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/hywdycjfyl,[60] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/aiming-to-enable-return-of-displaced-israelis-idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024[62] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/aiming-to-enable-return-of-displaced-israelis-idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon[63] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/aiming-to-enable-return-of-displaced-israelis-idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon[64] https://x.com/AlakhbarNews/status/1859888029147509130; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16733[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16733[66] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/9364;https://t.me/mmirleb/9394;https://t.me/mmirleb/9397;https://t.me/mmirleb/9370[68] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november[69] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november[70] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november[71] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november ; https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-artillery-shell-hits-unifil-sector-west-headquarters ; https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-19-november-2024[72] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859910732692832421[73] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859910732692832421[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859820408670679467 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859902108721394097 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859967731203785182[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859820408670679467 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859902108721394097 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859967731203785182[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859641234509398440[77] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1860009029197561868 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859961613761290569[78] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859824596515459205 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859844975946551593 ;[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859961613761290569 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859961617813016777 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859961620807790669 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1859966041213841853[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859961620807790669[81] Data available on request.[82] https://t.me/mmirleb/9361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9362 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9378 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9379 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9380 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9381 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9382 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9384 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9385 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9386 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9390 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9393 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9395 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9396 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9399 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9401 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9403[83] https://t.me/mmirleb/9386 ; https://t.me/C_Military1/66526[84] https://t.me/mmirleb/8144[85] https://t.me/mmirleb/8144[86] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/aiming-to-enable-return-of-displaced-israelis-idf-pushes-deeper-into-south-lebanon/[87] https://t.me/mmirleb/9385 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9340[88] https://t.me/mmirleb/9361 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9362 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9378 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9379 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9380 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9381 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9382[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/9401 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9403[90] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1546[91] https://x.com/gidonsaar/status/1858601207498956997[92] https://www.skynewsarabia dot com/middle-east/1756765-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%95%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%94%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%94%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%9F[93] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Iraq-takes-action-against-Israeli-threats-issues-urgent-directives-and-decisive-measures[94] https://baghdadtoday dot news/262526-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF.-3-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84.html[95] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-16-2024[96] https://baghdadtoday dot news/261958-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9.-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86.html[97] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1859953876876890161/photo/1[98] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1859676342507426128[99] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=58383[100] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=58383[101] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=58383[102] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-strikes-cease-fire.html[103] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-dialog?id=58383[104] https://x.com/gbrew24/status/1859934334184198434[105] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/02/3205041[106] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/02/3205041[107] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024[108] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/02/3204990[109] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/02/3205110https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/22/737704/Iran-defense-Nasirzadeh-Venezuela-Maduro[110] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/22/737704/Iran-defense-Nasirzadeh-Venezuela-Maduro[111] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/22/737704/Iran-defense-Nasirzadeh-Venezuela-Maduro- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 22, 2024
- at 11/22/24 7:26pmKarolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson,and George BarrosNovember 22, 2024, 6:50pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence. Putin held a meeting on November 22 with Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership, Russian defense industrial base representatives, and Russian missile developers, congratulating the Russian military for conducting a "successful" test of the Oreshnik ballistic missile in response to "those who are trying to blackmail" Russia.[1] Putin emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not a modernization of an old Soviet missile and claimed that Russian designers created it "on the basis of modern, cutting-edge developments." Putin reiterated claims that no system exists to defend against the Oreshnik and reported that Russia is already planning to serialize its production. Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces Colonel General Sergei Karakayev told Putin that the Oreshnik can strike targets across Europe and stressed that there are no analogues to the Oreshnik anywhere in the world.[2]US and Ukrainian reporting on the November 21 ballistic missile strike, however, emphasized that the Oreshnik missile is not inherently a novel Russian capability.[3] White House and Pentagon officials confirmed that Russia launched an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at Ukraine, and Pentagon Spokesperson Sabrina Singh stated that Russia based the IRBM on the existing Russian RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) model.[4] Singh also reiterated that Ukraine has already faced Russian attacks with missiles that have "significantly larger" warheads than the Oreshnik. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on November 22 that Ukraine assesses that the IRBM that Russia launched on November 21 is actually a "Kedr" missile, which Russia has been developing since 2018-2019 in an effort to update the Yars ICBM model for shorter distances.[5] GUR Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov clarified that Ukraine believes that "Oreshnik" is the codename of the missile research and development project for the Kedr missile.[6] ISW cannot independently confirm these GUR statements, but it is noteworthy and consistent with ISW's assessment that the November 21 Russian ballistic missile strike does not represent a fundamentally novel Russian capability.[7] Russia benefits from the rhetorical fanfare surrounding the November 21 strike and likely hopes that stoking concerns over the Oreshnik missile launch will prompt the West to dial back its support for Ukraine.Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect. Russian sources claimed that Russia will close part of its airspace on November 23 to 24 for a missile test, but did not specify what type of missile Russian forces are testing.[8] GUR Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi warned on November 22 that Russia likely possesses up to 10 Oreshnik missiles and that Russia will likely conduct test launches for all these missiles in the future.[9]Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and missiles in return for North Korea's provision of manpower for Russia's war effort in Ukraine. The Open-Source Centre, a research group based in the United Kingdom (UK), citing satellite imagery, told the BBC on November 22 that Russia has supplied over one million barrels (56,000 tons) of oil to North Korea since March 2024.[10] The BBC noted that the satellite imagery shows over a dozen different North Korean oil tankers arriving empty at an oil terminal in Russia's Far East and departing with nearly full tanks 43 times over the last eight months. UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy told the BBC that the oil is payment for the weapons and troops that North Korea has provided Russia for its war in Ukraine. The BBC noted that Russia's provision of oil to North Korea is a clear violation of United Nations (UN) sanctions against North Korea. South Korean National Security Advisor Shin Won-sik stated on November 22 that South Korea believes that Russia has provided unspecified "[air defense] equipment and anti-air missiles" to strengthen North Korea's air defense umbrella.[11] Shin noted that Russia has already declared its intention to support North Korea's satellite-related technology and supplied North Korea with various military technologies and forms of economic aid. Russia's provision of military equipment to North Korea also represents a clear violation of UN sanctions.The quality and type of air defense system that Russia has provided to North Korea remains unclear, however. South Korean experts theorized that Russia may have provided S-400 air defense systems to North Korea, as North Korea is capable of building shorter-range systems domestically.[12] Any Russian S-400 delivery to North Korea would be a significant inflection, however, as Russia reportedly decided earlier this year to delay the delivery of two promised S-400 air defense systems to India until August 2026 and continues to delay providing Iran with S-400 systems.[13] The decision to provide North Korea with an S-400 air defense system ahead of Iran or India would suggest a major reprioritization of Russia's alliances, and ISW has not yet observed indicators that this reprioritization is underway. Furthermore, ISW has observed indications that Russia is struggling to produce advanced air defense systems and radars at a rate rapid enough to replace the losses Russia continues to sustain as a result of Ukraine's long-range drone and missile strikes.[14] Russia has more likely provided North Korea with shorter-range missiles and systems, or possibly cannon-based air defense systems.The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on November 22 that it was investigating a report that Russian forces executed five Ukrainian servicemembers near Vuhledar on October 2, in violation of the Geneva Convention on POWs.[15] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office also reported that in total it has opened 53 criminal cases investigating Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs – 37 of which occurred during 2024.[16] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office reported that Ukrainian officials are investigating 13 cases of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs between October and November 2024 alone. ISW has extensively reported on previous footage and reports of Russian servicemembers executing Ukrainian POWs and observed a wider trend of Russian abuses against Ukrainian POWs across various sectors of the front that appear to be enabled, if not explicitly endorsed, by individual Russian commanders and unpunished by Russian field commanders.[17]Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian military leadership continue to extol the ballistic missile that Russian forces launched at Ukraine on November 21, likely in an effort to artificially inflate expectations of Russian capabilities and encourage Western and Ukrainian self-deterrence.Russia may additionally conduct test launches of the same or similar ballistic missiles in the coming days to accomplish the same rhetorical effect.Russia has reportedly provided North Korea with over one million barrels of oil and an unspecified number and type of air defense systems and missiles in return for North Korea's provision of manpower for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office opened an investigation against another instance of Russian forces executing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast.Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove, south of Chasiv Yar, south of Toretsk, northeast of Vuhledar, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka.Russia continues to build its training capacity by establishing new service academies in occupied Ukraine.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued assaults in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Darino (southeast of Korenevo) and in forested areas near Olgovka (east of Korenevo) and Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[19] The commander of a Ukrainian platoon operating in Kursk Oblast reported that Russian forces are sending wounded personnel on infantry assaults in Kursk Oblast, and a Russian milblogger noted on November 21 that poor weather conditions have set in in Kursk Oblast.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade and 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are attacking near Darino and Nikolayevo-Darino (just south of Darino).[21] Russian forces also continued assaults north of Sudzha near Pogrebki and Orlovka and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian mechanized assaults southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka and Darino.[23] Elements of the Russian BARS-Kursk volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24]Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on November 22, citing sources within the Ukrainian General Staff, that Russia has accumulated almost 60,000 troops in Kursk Oblast and that the Ukrainian General Staff currently assesses that Russian forces intend to push Ukrainian forces back across the international border into Sumy Oblast and conduct further offensive operations into Ukraine in order to create a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast.[25] The sources stated that the Ukrainian military command assesses that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from launching a major offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast in recent months.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued assaults north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.[26] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction posted footage on November 21 showing Ukrainian forces repelling a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast on an unspecified date.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Tykhe, Prylipka, and Vovchanski Khutory.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Hlyboke.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced west of Svatove amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 22. Geolocated footage published on November 22 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced into eastern Kopanky (west of Svatove).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) raised a flag in eastern Kopanky.[31] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southwestern part of Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and reached the Zaoskillya railway station in eastern Kupyansk.[32] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced two kilometers along the Oskil River from Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk) towards the southern flank of Kupyansk.[33] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on tactically significant heights near Makiivka (northwest of Kreminna), which has allowed Russian forces to advance near the settlement.[34] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove and Kolisnykivka; northwest of Svatove near Lozova; west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka and Tverdokhlibove; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Terny; west of Kreminna near Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area.[35] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using tube artillery, MLRS, and glide bombs to force Ukrainian civilians to evacuate from settlements on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk Raion and then destroy those settlements.[36] The Ukrainian battalion commander also reported that Russian forces have intensified infantry assaults in the Kupyansk direction because the Russian command is threatening to kill Russian soldiers who refuse to attack.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian aviation destroyed a pontoon bridge serving as a Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) over the Siverskyi-Donets River in the Lyman (west of Kreminna) direction.[38] Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (MMD) are reportedly operating north of Kolisnykivka and elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) reportedly continue to operate near Terny.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported on fighting in the Siversk direction on November 22. The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service reported on November 22 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a large Russian assault, consisting of 20 pieces of equipment and 100 infantrymen, in the Siversk direction, but did not specify the date of the Russian assault.[40]Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 22. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the east bank of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal northeast of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces advanced along Parkova Street in eastern Chasiv Yar and are clearing Ukrainian forces from positions west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[42] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[43] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[44] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Dyliivka (south of Chasiv Yar and northeast of Toretsk).[45]Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 22. Geolocated footage published on November 21 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced and captured windbreaks south of Yurivka (south of Toretsk).[46] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in central Toretsk and advanced in the fields north of Druzhba (northeast of Toretsk).[47] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 21 and 22 that Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[48]Russian forces reportedly continued to advance south and southeast of Pokrovsk, but ISW has not yet observed confirmation of claimed Russian advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces made marginal gains south of Pokrovsk near Hryhorivka and Pustynka and southeast of Pokrovsk in fields south of Lysivka.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Zhovte (northwest of Pustynka and south of Pokrovsk).[50] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of any of these claims, however, and has only collected evidence to currently assess that Russian forces are still over seven kilometers from the outskirts of Zhovte. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and south of Pokrovsk near Dachenske, Pushkine, Pustynka, Petrivka, and Hryhorivka on November 21 and 22.[51] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[52]Russian forces reportedly continued to advance in and near Kurakhove, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claimed Russian gains. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized all of Berestky (north of Kurakhove on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) and are advancing westward towards Stari Terny (on the northwestern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir directly west of Berestky), and Ukrainian military observer Bohdan Myroshnykov reported that Russian forces are pressuring Stari Terny from positions north of Berestky.[53] Russian and Ukrainian sources additionally reported that there is heavy fighting in eastern and central Kurakhove, especially near the Kurakhove grain elevator, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwestward within central Kurakhove.[54] Russian forces notably conducted an aerial bomb strike against the Kurakhove Thermal Power Plant in western Kurakhove, collapsing one of the plant's smokestacks.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Kurakhove itself; north of Kurakhove near Berestky; and northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka, Zorya, and Novodmytrivka on November 21 and 22.[56] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) are reportedly operating near Berestky, while elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District, [SMD]), 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the general Kurakhove direction.[57]Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 22. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (3rd AC) advanced northeast of Illinka (northeast of Vuhledar) during a platoon-sized mechanized assault.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske and Trudove; north of Vuhledar in fields north and west of Dalne; and northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka, although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[59] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Vuhledar near Trudove, Kostyantynopolske, and Rozlyv and northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka, Romanivka, and Antonivka on November 21 and 22.[60] Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Dalne; elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating north of Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar); and other unspecified elements of the 68th AC are reportedly operating near Uspenivka (northwest of Vuhledar).[61]Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka amid continued intensive offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 22. Geolocated footage published on November 22 indicates that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak southeast of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka), confirming ISW's November 21 assessment that Russian forces likely advanced to the eastern outskirts of Rozdolne.[62] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are currently fighting on the outskirts of Rozdolne and advancing in fields north of the settlement.[63] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are successfully advancing towards the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka and interdicting Ukrainian supply routes into the settlement.[64] The commander of a prominent Ukrainian brigade reported on November 22 that Russian forces are focused on efforts to capture Velyka Novosilka as part of the Russian campaign to seize Kurakhove. [65]The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on November 21 and 22.[66] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating near Rozdolne, elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and elements of the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Velyka Novosilka itself.[67] Elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are operating in the general southern Donetsk (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[68]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast, including northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky, on November 21 and 22 but did not advance.[69] The commander of a prominent Ukrainian brigade reported on November 22 that Russian forces will likely begin conducting assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future and stated the Ukrainian forces are building defenses in preparation for renewed Russian assaults.[70] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on November 22 that Russian forces continue to conduct disorganized and highly attritional infantry assaults in which one to two soldiers assault a well-fortified Ukrainian position in this direction.[71] An anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) crew of the Russian 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[72]International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported on November 21 that the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant's (ZNPP) safety and security remain tenuous as the facility lost connectivity to its only remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) external power line twice within the last week.[73] Grossi noted that the ZNPP also lost connectivity to the facility’s only 330 kV external power line twice in October 2024.Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 21 and 22, but there were no changes to the frontline.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Ukrainian forces are intensifying their use of drone strikes against Russian forces in the Kherson direction.[75] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 22 that Russian forces are using rubber boats to transport small teams of well-trained infantry to storm Ukrainian positions on the islands in the Dnipro River delta.[76] Elements of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[77]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a large series of drone strikes against Ukraine on November 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 114 Shahed drones and other unspecified strike drones (likely referring to decoy drones) from Oryol Oblast after 1330 local time on November 22.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 64 Russian drones over central and northeastern Ukraine as of 1730 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian countermeasures, likely referring to electronic warfare (EW) interference, caused another 41 Russian drones to become "lost" in Ukraine, that two drones left Ukrainian airspace into Russia and Belarus, and that four Russian drones were still in Ukrainian airspace. Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian Shahed drone struck a residential area in Sumy Oblast, killing two residents and injuring 13.[79] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces conducted two airstrikes using eight KAB-guided glide bombs in the Zaporizhia direction.[80]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia continues to build its training capacity by establishing new service academies in occupied Ukraine. Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov appeared on live television to publicly appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Alexander Bortnikov to establish a border guard training academy in occupied Crimea.[81] Several Russian milbloggers welcomed Aksyonov's initiative and applauded his statements, acknowledging the importance of incorporating experience from Russia’s war in Ukraine into border guard cadet training.[82] It remains unclear whether the Kremlin will approve Aksyonov's proposal as Ukrainian forces can strike much of Crimea with drones and missiles, placing Russian cadets at increased risk.[83] Aksyonov noted that Russian authorities will decide on this issue by the end of 2024.[84] Aksyonov's proposal is consistent with ISW's previous assessments that Russian forces will likely expand training infrastructure - including in occupied Ukraine - to support the Russian military's reconstitution and expansion efforts.[85]Russian authorities continue efforts to increase Russian irregular forces’ benefits. Russia's Ministry of Labor reportedly prepared an unpublished draft law that would raise the pension entitlements for disabled servicemen of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).[86] The draft law would provide wounded DNR and LNR servicemen benefits and compensation comparable to wounded and medically discharged regular Russian servicemen and would entitle DNR and LNR servicemen who fought in occupied Ukraine starting in 2014 access to two disability-centered pensions: one for old age and the other for length of service. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin's pivot to developing greater veteran support infrastructure is likely an effort to incentivize military service and proactively combat the risks associated with aggrieved veterans returning to civilian life.[87] The Ministry of Labor's proposed bill is a further indication of Russian authorities' efforts to allocate more resources to Russia's growing veteran population and prevent disabled veterans from forming a disenfranchised cleavage with political power within Russian society. This bill also supports the Kremlin’s efforts to formalize the DNR and LNR irregular forces and veterans and integrate them under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov in Brest, Belarus from November 21 to 22 to discuss Union State developments. Lavrov and Ryzhenkov announced a "unified Eurasian charter for a multi-polar world in the 21st century" and signed a declaration criticizing Western sanctions against Russia and Belarus and a plan for the Belarusian and Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to cooperate in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and to counter western sanctions in 2025.[88] Lavrov also announced that the Union State’s Supreme State Council would convene in December 2024 to sign several joint-security agreements, including the “Security Concepts of the Union State” and a “Russian-Belarus agreement on guarantees for security” projects, both of which will include updating and synchronizing the two states' nuclear doctrines.[89]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75623[2] https://ria dot ru/20241122/karakaev-1985273877.html; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75623[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024[4] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3975265/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/11/21/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-74/[5] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1029388.html; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3930065-rosia-moze-mati-do-10-odinic-novoi-balisticnoi-raketi-akou-vdarila-po-dnipru-gur.html[6] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1029388.html[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024[8] https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2024/11/22/general-popov-nazval-strany-nato-po-kotorym-mozhet-priletet-oreshnik.html; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19682 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19633; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20618[9] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3930065-rosia-moze-mati-do-10-odinic-novoi-balisticnoi-raketi-akou-vdarila-po-dnipru-gur.html[10] https://t.me/bbcrussian/73246 ; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjr4pr0gyyzo[11] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20241122006900315[12] https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-troops-ukraine-russia-missile-1efc0e29d5d6225fb85891ef6c822e4c?taid=674031336cc75d0001601e7c[13] https://www.iranintl dot com/en/202411171565#:~:text=Despite%20Sheikhian's%20assertion%20that%20Tehran,Moscow%20has%20yet%20to%20deliver. ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110224 ; https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/14/russia-has-one-s-500-air-defense-system-it-just-arrived-in-crimea-amid-a-storm-of-ukrainian-rockets/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2024[15] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/27560 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/22/prokuratura-ukrainy-vozle-ugledara-rossiyskie-voennye-vzyali-v-plen-i-ubili-pyateryh-bezoruzhnyh-soldat-vsu[16] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/zviryacha-zhorstokist-zbilshylas-kilkist-rozstriliv-ukrayinskyh-vijskovopolonenyh/[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062324; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2024[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23281[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/58347 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81182[20] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/poraneni-kuhariCha-j-takelazhnyky-na-kurshhyni-v-shturmy-vidpravlyayut-usih-hto-ne-vtik/ ; https://t.me/rusich_army/18673[21] https://t.me/motopatriot/29692[22] https://t.me/motopatriot/29692[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/58347[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/45997[25] https://suspilne dot media/885507-zelenskij-zaklikav-svit-reaguvati-na-eskalaciu-z-boku-rf-putin-rozpoviv-pro-ataku-oresnikom-1003-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732287038&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58347[27] https://t.me/ab3army/4902 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15231[28] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11864[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/58347 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19693 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20617[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7590; https://t.me/anna_news/73296[31] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29708 ; https://t.me/anna_news/73296 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7590 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29706 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145238 ; https://t.me/brussinf/8725 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18076 ; https://t.me/sashakots/50347 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81183 [32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19644 [33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19688[34] https://t.me/tass_agency/286712[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl [36] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/885499-rf-namagaetsa-sterti-livoberezza-kupansini-za-principom-vovcanska-urij-fedorenko-2/[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/vony-yih-vbyvayut-v-tylah-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-zhenut-vpered-yak-hudobu/[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19644 [39] https://t.me/motopatriot/29698; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18065; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024[40] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1766544267513207[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7592; https://t.me/blak93/5581[42] https://t.me/motopatriot/29702 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19643[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/46003 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19651[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145206[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7588; https://t.me/BabaYaga_152orr/233 ;[47] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19636 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60258 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29694[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[49] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29701; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29684[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19676[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81161[53] https://t.me/myro_shnykov/6528; https://t.me/motopatriot/29696; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145212; https://t.me/rybar/65589; https://t.me/dva_majors/58347[54] https://t.me/motopatriot/29696; https://t.me/rybar/65589; https://t.me/myro_shnykov/6528; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81146[55] https://t.me/motopatriot/29708 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/117325; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81179;https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60264[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/dyakuyut-za-poryatunok-tavrijski-desantnyky-vzyaly-v-polon-dvoh-rosiyan/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?ref=embed_video&v=1834274114044184; https://t.me/rybar/65589; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13012[58] https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1859870599243497798; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1859861451915366733; https://t.me/ttambyl/7232[59] https://t.me/rybar/65589; https://t.me/motopatriot/29691; https://t.me/motopatriot/29691; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81146;[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/11939; https://t.me/rybar/65589[62] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1859754182741545382; https://t.me/Baikal40ob/44; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7585; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145212; https://t.me/rybar/65591; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81132; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60260[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81170; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81132; https://t.me/tass_agency/286758; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60263[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kecOf5D6z1w ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81171[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl[67] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1859754182741545382; https://t.me/Baikal40ob/44; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7585; https://t.me/voin_dv/11942; https://t.me/voin_dv/11936[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/11938; https://t.me/voin_dv/11935[69]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kecOf5D6z1w ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81171[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/psyhodelichni-odynochni-shturmy-na-orihivskomu-napryamku-v-ataku-vidpravlyayut-samitnykiv/[72] https://t.me/wargonzo/23293[73] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-261-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine[74]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0p2fCv91DfnhusMgTeEfQ3Xydkrf3qA4fjUmcVWAKmbVNMNxrDwAymGBme8h15TVSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0X4MD8jDc7WjXH5aU1h82z8uJVc3oXHVr3cYtKUu4FxjCT98uGWASvopiZvFyzWVQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042RJD2VHWkj38NEqqr2RqDSgkQMh7keVGAGRWqut8nKbCv4FBT63FTDPBCx7riXjl[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/58316[76] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/22/shturmy-na-naduvnyh-matraczah-bilya-hersonu-rosiyany-atakuyut-dniprovski-ostrovy/[77] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15233[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/23463[79] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/885529-sahedi-atakuvali-sumi-e-zagibli/; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31596[80] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11795[81] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7313435; https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/22461701[82] https://t.me/inners_of_the_politics/140; https://t.me/dva_majors/58348; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/12280[83] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/11/21/1076466-aksenov-obratilsya-putinu[84] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2024/11/21/1076466-aksenov-obratilsya-putinu[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2023[86] https://t.me/sotaproject/90253; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/economics/articles/2024/11/22/1076621-opolchentsi-iz-dnr-i-lnr-s-invalidnostyu-poluchat-pravo-na-dve-pensii?utm_campaign=vedomosti_public&utm_content=1076621-opolchentsi-iz-dnr-i-lnr-s-invalidnostyu-poluchat-pravo-na-dve-pensii&utm_medium=social&utm_source=telegram_ved[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/previous-isw-coverage-2023; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-30-2023[88] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1983349/; https://ria dot ru/20241122/lavrov-1985205407.html[89] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/279705; https://t.me/MID_Russia/48599; https://t.me/MID_Russia/48615; https://t.me/MID_Russia/48619;
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2024
- at 11/21/24 10:36pmAngelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, and Frederick W. KaganNovember 16, 2024, 6:15pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on November 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during an interview with Ukrainian media published on November 16 that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing and equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest and rotation.[1] Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains. Zelensky estimated that Russian forces are currently losing between 1,500 and 2,000 troops per day in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces cannot maintain their rate of advance while taking losses at this scale.Zelensky's acknowledgement of morale issues and manpower constraints among frontline Ukrainian infantry suggests that Ukrainian drone operations are likely playing an outsized role in defending against and inflicting losses on advancing Russian forces. Zelensky noted during the interview that Russian advances have already slowed in some directions, and Ukrainian officials have previously observed that Ukrainian drone operations have played a role in slowing Russian advances to a foot pace.[2] A Ukrainian drone operator stated in August 2024 that Russian forces were able to advance more successfully in the Pokrovsk direction by conducting ground attacks in groups of two to four soldiers under the cover of trees, making them harder for Ukrainian drone operators to detect.[3] Subsequent Ukrainian reporting suggested that Russian forces began employing this tactic more widely throughout the Pokrovsk direction in September and October 2024.[4] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on November 16 that these small, infantry-led assaults are not the most efficient tactic for expedient advances in the rural settlements and fields near Selydove, where Russian forces have very little coverage from Ukrainian drone operations.[5] The milblogger suggested that Russian forces can currently only bring reinforcements and supplies forward when Ukrainian drone operators are engaged in another area of the frontline. The milblogger noted that unspecified "problems," possibly referring to Ukrainian drone operations or the Russian military command's insistence on conducting unnecessarily costly infantry assaults, continue to hinder Russian forces' ability to advance more rapidly along the frontline and fully exploit Ukraine's manpower constraints.Ukrainian drone operations have also been crucial in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver throughout the frontline, particularly during early Summer 2024 when Ukrainian forces were facing severe artillery shortages as a result of delays in Western security assistance.[6] Successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction in June 2024 may have played a role in the Russian military command's decision to limit mechanized assaults in this direction.[7] Ukrainian drone operations have also played an important role in repelling Russian mechanized assaults in Kursk and Donetsk oblasts and near Kupyansk.[8] Russian forces have attempted to innovate and deploy more effective drone protection systems for armored vehicles and tanks in recent months, but even the most "successful" Russian mechanized assaults that have resulted in several kilometers of gains have generated significant armor losses due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[9] Ukraine's demonstrated ability to strike Russian mechanized columns effectively has prevented Russian forces from conducting mechanized breakthroughs and exploitations at scale. ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military command may not able to accept the current scale and rate of Russian vehicle losses in the coming months and years given the constraints on Russia's defense industrial production, declining Soviet-era vehicle stockpiles, and the Russian military's failure to achieve operationally significant territorial advances through mechanized maneuver.[10] Further improvements to Ukraine's drone capabilities and continually improving integration of Ukrainian drones with ground operations remain critical to Ukraine's ability to defend against advancing Russian forces and liberate occupied territory in future counteroffensive operations. Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement — no matter the negotiating platform or mediator — that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation. Zelensky stated that Ukraine must be "strengthened by some important elements" to negotiate with Putin, emphasizing that Ukraine cannot enter negotiations from a position of weakness.[11] Zelensky stated that Putin does not want peace but would still be willing to come to the negotiating table in order to reduce Russia's diplomatic isolation and to secure concessions and Ukraine's capitulation. Zelensky stated that it is important that any negotiation platform and potential meditators remember that Russia violated Ukrainian territorial integrity and international law by invading Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 and remarked that his conversations with US President-elect Donald Trump demonstrate that Trump is "on the side of supporting Ukraine" and has listened to Ukraine's position. Zelensky concluded that Ukraine must do everything to end the war by diplomatic means in 2025. ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin is trying to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration.[12] The Kremlin has consistently demonstrated that it is unwilling to compromise on the terms of any possible negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged.[13] Any future negotiations, no matter the platform or mediator, will require Ukraine to enter talks from a position of strength that forces Putin to change his calculus, engage in good faith talks, and accept compromises.Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages of long-range strikes. The Associated Press (AP) reported on November 16 that Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones, has been producing "hundreds" of decoy drones and recently began producing drones with thermobaric warheads.[14] A Ukrainian military and electronics expert told the AP that more than half of the long-range strike drones that Russia has launched at Ukraine recently have been decoys. Acting Head of the Ukrainian Air Force Press Office Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told the AP that the decoy drones are indistinguishable from armed Shahed drones on Ukrainian radar systems, forcing Ukrainian forces to expend firepower and use electronic warfare (EW) mechanisms to down them. The AP noted that Russian forces attempt to take advantage of exhausted Ukrainian air defenses to get more powerful weapons, such as cruise and ballistic missiles, through Ukraine's air defense umbrella. The AP also noted that the decoy drones also allow Russian forces to locate Ukrainian air defense locations before Ukrainian air defenses and EW down the decoys, but that Russia is using various electronic components, including Ukrainian SIM cards and Starlink systems, to make the drone variants more resistant to jamming. The Ukrainian Air Force has increasingly been reporting that Russian forces are launching strike drones of an unknown type — likely referring to the decoy drones — during regular overnight drone and missile strikes on Ukraine.[15] The Ukrainian Air Forces has also been noting that increasing numbers of drones have become "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian EW countermeasures — suggesting that Ukrainian forces have been successful in adapting their EW to down the new Russian decoy drones. Decoy drones are cheap, however, and the longer they remain airborne in Ukrainian airspace, the more the decoys can distract Ukrainian air defenses and provide targeting for future Russian strikes. Ihnat reported that Russian forces did not use any decoy drones overnight on November 14-15 — the first instance in weeks.[16]The Ukrainian military and electronics expert stated that the thermobaric drones, which Russian forces began fielding in Summer 2024, account for between three and five percent of the long-range strike drones Russia has been launching at Ukraine recently.[17] Ukrainian military-focused sources recently reported that the thermobaric warheads on Shahed drones have 50 to 52 kilogram warheads and that Russian forces are equipping Shahed variants with ranges up to 140 kilometers longer with the warheads.[18] A weapons expert told the AP that thermobaric drones are particularly effective against buildings and could cause significant damage to Ukraine's power plants, which are particularly critical to maintaining Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) and heating the country.[19] The Kremlin will likely continue to innovate its long-range strike drones in an attempt to bypass Ukrainian air defenses and may increasingly use decoy drones and drones with larger or more dangerous payloads to increase the effectiveness of its long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in Ukraine. North Korean state news outlet KCNA reported on November 15 that Kim oversaw a test of "various types" of North Korean-produced strike drones and ordered the North Korean defense industrial base (DIB) to begin mass production of these drones "as early as possible."[20] Kim emphasized that strike drones have had notable impacts in both "big and small" conflicts and stated that North Korea is focusing on combining unmanned systems with operational plans and principles of war in its military policy. A Russian milblogger commented on blurred images of the drones from North Korean media and suggested that the drones look like the Russian "Lancet" tactical strike drones.[21] ISW cannot independently verify the extent to which the North Korean drones may be based on Russian Lancets. It is currently unclear if North Korea intends to export any of these new strike drones to Russia or other countries after beginning serial production. North Korea will likely continue to learn lessons from Russia's war in Ukraine as it increases its military cooperation with Russia, thereby increasing its own military capabilities and the credibility of its threat to the Asia Pacific region.[22]The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA] following inaccurate reports they made about alleged Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]), the 3rd CAA's chief of staff, and the commander of the 3rd CAA's 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade following widespread Russian milblogger complaints about Russian officers submitting incorrect reports to their superiors and planning "incomprehensible" assaults near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[23] The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities also removed the commanders of unspecified battalions and are inspecting the 6th and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA). Another Russian source additionally claimed that Russian authorities arrested the commander of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade for concealing losses and the "real situation" in the Siversk direction from the Russian military command.[24] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that "the system is inert" and that there was no reaction to Russian milbloggers' initial complaints about false reports of Russian advances in the Siversk direction.[25] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command became aware of the problem when higher-ups wanted to visit Bilohorivka under the impression that Russian forces had seized the settlement and that the settlement was in the Russian near rear given the alleged Russian seizures of Serebryanka and Hryhorivka (both west of Bilohorivka). The milblogger claimed that frontline Russian commanders had previously tried to stage interviews with Russian war correspondents in order to corroborate the commanders' false reports. ISW previously observed reports from July 2024 that Major General Alexei Kolesnikov is the commander of the 3rd CAA.[26] Russian command failures and the pervasive Russian military culture of exaggerating battlefield successes near Bilohorivka has become a point of neuralgia for the Russian milblogger community recently, particularly as Russian forces have repeatedly wasted manpower and armored vehicles on unsuccessful attempts to take the settlement since at least May 2022.[27] ISW also observed geolocated footage published on November 8 indicating that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions in northern Bilohorivka — further demonstrating the significance of frontline Russian commanders' false reports to the Russian military command about Russian successes in the area. The Kremlin has previously demonstrated its sensitivity to the ultranationalist Russian milblogger community and responded to their criticisms, although it is unclear if the Russian military command arrested and removed the 3rd CAA commanders in response to the Russian milbloggers' repeated outcries about issues near Bilohorivka.[28]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine must enter any future negotiations from a position of strength as Russian President Vladimir Putin is not interested in a negotiated settlement – no matter the negotiating platform or mediator - that results in anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.Russian forces are innovating their long-range strike packages to include decoy Shahed drones and Shahed drones with thermobaric warheads, likely to confuse and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses and increase the damages of long-range strikes.North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has ordered North Korean defense industrial enterprises to begin serial production of likely tactical strike drones – an example of how increasing Russian-North Korean military cooperation allows North Korea to learn from Russia's war in Ukraine.The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA] following inaccurate reports they made about alleged Russian advances near Bilohorivka and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community.Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Kreminna, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Bank has recently issued significantly more loan deferments (credit holidays) for Russian military personnel, indicating that Russian military recruitment rates may have increased.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued assaults in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 15 and 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces from positions near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha) and Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked southeast of Korenevo near Darino and Novoivanovka and east of Korenevo near Olgovka.[31] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk stated that Ukrainian forces damaged and destroyed 17 Russian armored vehicles and tanks during a recent Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area of Kursk Oblast, possibly referring to the November 12 multi-wave battalion-sized mechanized assault near Novoivanovka.[32] Elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating southeast of Korenevo, and elements of the Chechen "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[33]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Geolocated footage published on November 16 shows Ukrainian drone operators destroying the flags that Russian forces placed on a bridge across the Sudost River connecting Hremyach and Kolos (both about 1.5 kilometers south of the international border) in northern Chernihiv Oblast on November 15, indicating that Russian forces likely do not have enduring positions near the bridge.[34] A likely Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted a limited incursion across the international border into Chernihiv Oblast on November 15, but there are currently no indications that Russian forces have established an enduring presence in the area.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 15 and 16 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City) on November 16 after Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups temporarily advanced into the settlement in July 2024.[36] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Russian forces have seized Sotnytskyi Kozachok, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and north of Kharkiv City near Vysoka Yaruha and Strilecha.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting preparatory artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions west of Strilecha before intensifying assaults in the area.[38]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Svatove and Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 16. Geolocated footage published on November 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Vyshneve (west of Svatove) and central Terny (west of Kreminna).[39] A Ukrainian military unit fighting in the Kupyansk direction stated that Ukrainian forces captured several Russian servicemembers operating in Kupyansk, and a Ukrainian outlet reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from positions in the city.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance near Kupyansk, however, including near the sugar factory in eastern Kupyansk, north of Kupyansk towards Holubivka, and south of Kupyansk towards Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into the industrial center of Kupyansk and that fighting is ongoing in the center of the settlement, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these more maximalist claims.[42] Russian forces continued assaults east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, and Berestove; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove, Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske on November 15 and 16.[43] Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Nevske.[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and Vyimka (southeast of Siversk) on November 15 and 16 but did not advance.[45] Elements of the Russian 39th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are reportedly conducting TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[46]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 16. Geolocated footage published on November 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced up to Dubrovskyi Street along a narrow salient in central Chasiv Yar.[47] Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on November 16.[48] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division and "Sever-V" Brigade and drone operators of the "Okhotnik" (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[49]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 16. Geolocated footage published on November 15 and 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Naberezhna Street and up to Promeneva Street in southern Toretsk.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced up to Havrilova Street in northeastern Toretsk and seized Krymske (northeast of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[51] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk, north of Toretsk near Dyliivka, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 15 and 16.[52]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 16. Geolocated footage published on November 16 shows a Russian flag flying in western Hryhorivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[53] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Hryhorivka, and Russian sources claimed that elements of the "Black Hussars" detachment of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) seized the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced near Novooleksiivka, Pustynka, and Yurivka (all west of Selydove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[55] Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Krutyi Yar and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Petrivka, Novooleksiivka, and Pustynka on November 15 and 16.[56] Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[57]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 16. Geolocated footage published on November 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove) and the fields northeast of the settlement.[58] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove), towards Berestky (just north of Kurakhove across the Kurakhivske Reservoir), and into central Kurakhove.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 15 that information that Russian forces had seized Novoselydivka is unconfirmed.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are accumulating personnel to storm Berestky.[61] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka, Novodmytrivka, and Zorya; north of Kurakhove near Illinka, Berestky, Novoselydivka, and Voznesenka; near Kurakhove itself; southeast of Kurakhove near Maskymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 15 and 16.[62] Drone operators of the "Kaira" Detachment (39th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[63]Russian forces are reportedly deploying equipment from rear areas in the Zaporizhia direction to the Kurakhove direction. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on November 16 that Russian forces are increasingly transporting equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and trucks carrying ammunition, from the Berdyansk or Polohy directions through occupied Mariupol towards Volnovakha (roughly 22 kilometers southeast of Vuhledar) for offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction.[64] Andryushchenko noted that Russian forces have not undertaken this level of transport activity in Mariupol for at least a year and half (since about Spring 2023) and that most of the Russian equipment moving to Mariupol or Hranitne (just north of Mariupol) came from Russia, not from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian and Ukrainian sources have recently reported on a possible increase in Russian offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction, but ISW has not observed confirmation that Russian forces had redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia direction from other sectors of the frontline nor other indications suggesting an imminent Russian offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[65] Reported large-scale Russian equipment deployments from the Zaporizhia direction could be a counterindicator of a reported possible intensification in Russian activity in the Zaporizhia direction.Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Vuhledar direction on November 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[66] A Russian source claimed that Russian positions along the O0510 (Shakhtarske-Kurahove) highway are less than one kilometer from the C051104 (Kostantynivka-Zelenivka) highway west of Uspenivka (north of Vuhledar), but ISW currently assesses that Russian forces near the O0510 highway are operating roughly 7.5 kilometers away from the C051104 highway.[67] Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka, Antonivka, Illinka, and Romanivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Sukhi Yaly and Trudove on November 15 and 16.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Trudove.[69] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the south Donetsk (Kurakhove-Vuhledar) direction; elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating near Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and Trudove; elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Illinka; and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (northwest of Vuhledar).[70]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Makarivka (south of Velyka Novosilka), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced towards Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[71] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) maintain positions in most of Makarivka but that Russian forces still need to clear the northern part of the settlement.[72] Russian forces conducted offensive operations southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 15 and 16.[73] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in unspecified areas in the Vremikva direction.[74] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vremivka direction reported on November 15 that Russian forces are trying to seize the entirety of southern Donetsk Oblast and advance northward.[75]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 15 and 16, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[76] Russian sources claimed on November 15 and 16 that Russian forces advanced roughly half a kilometer from Robotyne towards Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[77] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-3 "Rodina" Battalion (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[78]Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 16, but there were no changes to the frontline. Elements of the Russian 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly a mobilized unit) and 45th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[79] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command published geolocated footage on November 16 showing a Ukrainian strike on a Russian command post in occupied Chelburda (north of Radensk and east of Kherson City).[80]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 15-16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv Oblast with an S-300 air defense missile and launched 83 Shahed drones and "unspecified" strike drones (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[81] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 Russian drones over Cherkasy, Odesa, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and that unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures caused 30 Russian drones to become "lost."[82] Kyiv City Administration Head Serhiy Popko stated that falling drone debris damaged a residential building in Kyiv City, and Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Shahed strikes damaged critical infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City.[83]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported that the Russian Central Bank has recently issued significantly more loan deferments (credit holidays) for Russian military personnel, indicating that Russian military recruitment rates may have increased.[84] Mediazona reported, citing Central Bank data, that the bank issued nearly 54,200 new credit holidays for Russian contract and mobilized personnel in July-September 2024 after having issued fewer than 30,000 credit holidays to military personnel in July-September 2023.[85] Russian authorities passed a law in early 2023 allowing banks to offer deferments on loan payments to Russian military personnel fighting in Ukraine, likely as a financial incentive to encourage military service.[86] The significant increase in credit holidays issued to Russian military personnel comes amid indications that the Kremlin is concerned about Russia's long-term economic stability and efforts to cut the short- and long-term costs of the war by reducing certain benefits to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine.[87]The Russian milblogger Telegram channel Thirteenth, which has been heavily critical of the Russian MoD’s and Kremlin's conduct of the war in Ukraine, claimed on November 15 that a Russian court approved its main administrator Yegor Guzenko to fight in Ukraine in lieu of jailtime.[88] Russian authorities reportedly arrested Guzenko on October 5 in Stavropol Krai either for violating a prior house arrest or due to an altercation with Russian police, and the charges against Guzenko remain unclear.[89] Russian outlet Baza reported on October 10, citing its own sources, that Guzenko refused to sign a military service contract when authorities detained him because he "was more needed on the information front" but that Guzenko may change his mind.[90] The Thirteenth Telegram channel has continued to heavily criticize Russian authorities since Guzenko's arrest, particularly Stavropol Krai authorities, and stated on November 15 that the channel will publish a series of interviews with Guzenko to "smash those dogs who lied and slandered" Guzenko while Guzenko was in prison.[91]A Russian insider source claimed on November 15 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov approved a training course on "Geostrategy of Modern Society" for senior Russian military officers under the guidance of Russian state television host and propagandist Vladimir Solovyov.[92] ISW is unable to confirm this claim.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/881199-mi-povinni-zrobiti-vse-sob-nastupnogo-roku-vijna-zakincilas-ekskluzivne-intervu-prezidenta-zelenskogo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/881325-zelenskij-pro-prosuvanna-rosian-na-fronti/ ; https://suspilne dot media/881327-zelenskij-putin-ne-hoce-miru-ale-peregovori-jomu-mozut-buti-vigidni/[2] https://suspilne dot media/881199-mi-povinni-zrobiti-vse-sob-nastupnogo-roku-vijna-zakincilas-ekskluzivne-intervu-prezidenta-zelenskogo/ ; https://suspilne dot media/881325-zelenskij-pro-prosuvanna-rosian-na-fronti/ ; https://suspilne dot media/881327-zelenskij-putin-ne-hoce-miru-ale-peregovori-jomu-mozut-buti-vigidni/[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024 [4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 [5] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1722[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024 [7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024 [8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2024[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624[11] https://suspilne dot media/881199-mi-povinni-zrobiti-vse-sob-nastupnogo-roku-vijna-zakincilas-ekskluzivne-intervu-prezidenta-zelenskogo/[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111324[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111524[14] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drones-thermobaric-bombs-decoy-2f904b04fcc5de17549415a974f5a92b[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2024[16] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/vnochi-rf-atakuvala-odesu-same-udarnymy-dronamy-a-ne-imitaczijnymy-bpla-yurij-ignat/[17] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drones-thermobaric-bombs-decoy-2f904b04fcc5de17549415a974f5a92b[18] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-shahed-vyyavyly-novu-termobarychnu-bojovu-chastynu/; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/162647; https://defence-ua dot com/weapon_and_tech/termobarichna_bojova_chastina_shahediv_scho_tse_i_chomu_do_pravila_dvoh_stin_neobhidno_dodati_sche_odne-17119.html[19] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-drones-thermobaric-bombs-decoy-2f904b04fcc5de17549415a974f5a92b[20] http://www.pyongyangtimes dot com.kp/blog?page=revolutionary&blogid=6736d97a66968905a755d005; https://kcnawatch dot org/newstream/1731669020-884242398/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-performance-test-of-suicide-attack-drones-of-various-types/; http://kcna dot kp/kp/article/q/d3dab771a838053e59591fb203471d5a.kcmsf[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/23184; https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/15/asia/north-korea-self-detonating-drones-intl-hnk/index.html[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424[23] https://t.me/osetin20/9600[24] https://t.me/soldat_prav/8283; https://t.me/milinfolive/135167[25] https://t.me/rybar/65433[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110724[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092724; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23180[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19278 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857; https://t.me/rybar/65420[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19278 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857; https://t.me/rybar/65420[32] https://t.me/Pavliuk_KSV/5656 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[33] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5232 (Kursk direction); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80726 (southeast of Korenevo)[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/16/na-chernigivshhyni-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-trykolor-vstanovlenyj-vorozhoyu-drg/ ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22323; https://t.me/DPSUkr/22965[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2024[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80743 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2024[37] https://t.me/otukharkiv/2626; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl [38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19286[39] https://t.me/bbc44ombr/56; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7520 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1857778517682889126; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/616 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7532[40] https://t.me/khornegroup/2919 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/proryv-okupantiv-u-kup-yansk-zavershyvsya-yihnoyu-likvidatsiyeyu-abo-polonom/[41] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19483 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19280 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857; https://t.me/rybar/65420[42] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11815[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19280[44] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18003[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144539[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7518?single; https://t.me/bakhmutskyy/3638[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19268; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12986; https://t.me/basurin_e/15532[50] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1857749364996739187; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1857749732661067880; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1857776729189744860; https://t.me/voron1OO/92; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7533; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/81[51] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29527[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7530; https://t.me/blackhussars/3105[54] https://t.me/mod_russia/45772; https://t.me/blackhussars/3105 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80752 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144548 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29565; https://t.me/blackhussars/3105[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29565; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19487 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23180; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857; https://t.me/rybar/65420; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60159[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/11854[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7529; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=560242026747693[59] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19490; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29561; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19265; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19284; https://t.me/wargonzo/23180; https://t.me/rybar/65417[60] https://t.me/rybar/65417[61] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19482[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl[63]https://t.me/voin_dv/11856[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/16/okupanty-pochaly-zavozyty-vijskovu-tehniku-na-kurahivskyj-napryamok-nezvychnym-marshrutom/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2024[66] https://t.me/rybar/65417[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80737[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857 ; https://t.me/rybar/65420[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/11859 [70] https://t.me/voin_dv/11850; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19297; https://t.me/voin_dv/11861; https://t.me/voin_dv/11859; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144545 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11857 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11858; https://t.me/dva_majors/57849 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19491[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/45773; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857 ; https://t.me/rybar/65420[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/11855[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0324wjctmDX2TEQfWTi7jRkzhWpR6ybXCERbmRv3z3dFhchdBwdBaXP5wisimh1Fpsl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0g3iRAPCsS5p13YfjYLK5H6V8RU3HoBcvvC57ker2EUpniPpoQxrHNx2kLCD3Zegcl[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/23180; https://t.me/dva_majors/57857 ; https://t.me/rybar/65420[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/15/krov-v-obmin-na-terytoriyi-taktyka-rosiyan-povnistyu-analogichna-radyanskij/[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fmLCqXTQubdoF4To49Ki2LmC1zKJhbMZsU5z6iSZkgAcXcdyejjXq2cqsGFMSVaTl[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19277; https://t.me/tass_agency/285512; https://ria dot ru/20241116/svo-1984127858.html[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144522[79] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15054; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19492; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobi-in-russia-2[80] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/10597?single; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11770[81] https://t.me/kpszsu/22967 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027RYFDjmX52U7X1FMrDgDGXYXqNaXcU4nZCVUGtyaTYUkbhSgn2xKdF21uxT258AUl [82] https://t.me/kpszsu/22967 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid027RYFDjmX52U7X1FMrDgDGXYXqNaXcU4nZCVUGtyaTYUkbhSgn2xKdF21uxT258AUl [83] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9433; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9432; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13403[84] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/15/krediti[85] https://zona dot media/news/2024/11/15/krediti[86] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/loans-russian-soldiers-fuel-calls-european-banks-quit-2023-02-13/[87] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424[88] https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33910; https://t.me/dva_majors/57850; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80716 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144455; https://t.me/milinfolive/135109 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/15/sud-priostanovil-ugolovnoe-delo-o-nasilii-protiv-politseyskogo-protiv-z-blogera-egora-guzenko-trinadtsatyy-potomu-chto-on-podpisal-kontrakt-s-minoborony; https://t.me/astrapress/68568; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1857476515967152489 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/89896 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/20984 ; https://t.me/istories_media/8178 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/32915 [89] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2024[90] https://t.me/bazabazon/32017[91] https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33912; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33942; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33941; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33819; https://t.me/Z13_Separ/33812[92] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52544
- — Iran Update, November 16, 2024
- at 11/21/24 10:05pmAndie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[1] Two individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times on November 16 that senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani conveyed this message to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut.[2] The message emphasized that Khamenei supports “ending the war with Israel” and that Iran will help Hezbollah recover from the war.[3] It is in Iran’s interest to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to prevent Israel from further weakening Hezbollah.[4] Iran could also calculate that it could help rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after a ceasefire takes effect. Iran has historically transferred weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, which means that preventing this rearmament and reconstitution process would require some form of interdiction effort against Iran.[5] This report, assuming it is accurate, highlights the extent to which Iran lacks the capability or willingness to defend the Axis of Resistance against Israel. Iran failed to prevent Israel from defeating or severely degrading Hamas units across the Gaza Strip, and it now similarly appears opposed to helping Hezbollah fight Israel.[6]Key Takeaways:Iran Encourages Hezbollah to Accept Ceasefire: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi reaffirmed that the IDF would continue to degrade Hezbollah and that Hezbollah’s “chain of command has collapsed.”Iranian Nuclear Program: A hardline Iranian parliamentarian called for acquiring a nuclear weapon to restore Iranian deterrence with Israel.Houthi Attack Campaign: US Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante said on November 14 that the Houthis’ missile and technology production is comparable to that of advanced countries.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Beit Lahia and Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 16. Israeli forces killed multiple fighters, destroyed militia infrastructure, and located large quantities of weapons and IEDs.[7] Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting 10 militia fighters in Jabalia that posed a threat to Israeli forces.[8]Palestinian militias conducted two rocket attacks targeting an Israeli command-and-control site along the Netzarim Corridor on November 16.[9] Hamas also fired small arms targeting Israeli soldiers along the Corridor.[10]The IDF 143rd Division continued operations in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on November 16. The 933rd Infantry Brigade killed multiple fighters, destroyed militia infrastructure, and located large quantities of weapons and IEDs.[11]The IDF intercepted two rockets launched from the northern Gaza Strip targeting Sderot on November 16.[12]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonIDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi reaffirmed that the IDF would continue to degrade Hezbollah and that Hezbollah’s “chain of command has collapsed.”[13] Halevi said on November 16 that as long as Hezbollah continued to shoot at northern Israel, “we will continue to fight, we will continue to carry out plans, go further, attack in depth, hurt Hezbollah.”[14] The chief of staff made these comments on a visit to Kfar Kila where the IDF 91st Division operated in late October to clear Hezbollah infrastructure.[15] The 91st Division has now expanded clearing operations to towns deeper into Lebanon.[16] The 91st Division discovered and demolished an underground weapons warehouse on November 16.[17] The 7th Armored Brigade (91st Division) located crates of explosives, ammunition, grenades, and a mobile rocket launcher inside the warehouse.[18] Hezbollah claimed rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the southern and eastern Markaba.[19] Hezbollah claimed seven rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in eastern Tallousseh, west of Markaba on November 15.[20]The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 16.[21] Hezbollah has continued rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance from east and south of Maroun al Ras into “second line” Lebanese border towns.[22] Hezbollah attacked Israeli forces south of Hanin with one-way attack drones.[23] Lebanese media reported Israeli artillery shelling in Ain Ebal, a ”second line” town. [24]Hezbollah-affiliated sources reported that Israeli forces continued to operate in the town of Chama, approximately five kilometers into southwestern Lebanon. Israeli forces advanced to Chama on November 15.[25] A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist reported that Israeli forces “renewed” their incursion toward the outskirts of Chama under extensive artillery fire.[26] Hezbollah attacked an Israeli tank with an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) on the eastern outskirts of Chama on November 16.[27] Hezbollah claimed that the ATGM ignited the tank, killing and injuring the crew.[28] Hezbollah did not provide any evidence to substantiate these claims and has repeatedly lied about the success of its forces since this campaign began. Lebanese media reported Israeli artillery shelling in Tayr Harfa, Jebbayn, and Alma al Chaab south of Chama.[29]A dud Israeli artillery shell struck UNIFIL headquarters in Chama, southwest Lebanon on November 15.[30] UNIFIL said that the shell did not detonate, and bomb disposal experts were able to secure the area and conduct a controlled detonation.[31] The shell did not injure the peacekeepers and caused minimal structural damage.[32] Israeli forces advanced into Chama on November 15.[33]The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah weapons manufacturing and storage sites in Beirut since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 15. The IDF struck at least ten Hezbollah munitions warehouses, headquarters, and other military sites.[34] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of southern Beirut neighborhoods before striking these areas.[35]The IDF Air Force strike targeting PIJ headquarters in Damascus on November 14 killed 2 PIJ officials.[36] The strikes targeted two buildings in Damascus’ Mezzeh and Qudsaya neighborhoods and caused “significant damage” to PIJ’s headquarters and fighting ability, according to the IDF.[37] A Syrian analyst reported that the strikes killed PIJ Political Bureau member Abdul Aziz Saeed al Minawi and PIJ foreign relations official Yousef Abu Issa. [38] The strike also killed multiple PIJ fighters. The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the strike killed 15 people and injured 16.[39] The IDF said that PIJ is a key part of Iranian efforts to support Hezbollah against Israel.[40]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 15 to 2:00pm ET on November 16. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Iranian-backed actors, including Hezbollah, have conducted at least 21 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 15.[41] Hezbollah claimed 17 of the 21 attacks.[42] Hezbollah claimed three separate rocket and drone attacks targeting Israeli military facilities in Haifa and Acre.[43] Hezbollah also claimed one rocket attack targeting Yara base, in the Western Galilee.[44]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 15. The claims include the following:Two drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in Eilat.[45]A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in northern Israel.[46]Two drone attacks targeting unspecified military targets in southern Israel.[47]The IDF Air Force intercepted two drones launched from Iraq over the Red Sea on November 16.[48] The drones did not enter Israeli airspace. The IDF reported that another drone launched “from the east” crashed before entering Israeli airspace on November 16.[49]A hardline Iranian parliamentarian called for acquiring a nuclear weapon to restore Iranian deterrence with Israel. Ahmad Naderi claimed on November 16 that a nuclear weapon is necessary to “establish balance” in the Middle East.[50] Naderi similarly claimed on November 9 that possessing a nuclear weapon would create “maximum deterrence.”[51] These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks will similarly fail to restore deterrence. Naderi’s statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[52]US Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante said on November 14 that the Houthis’ missile and technology production is comparable to that of advanced countries.[53] LaPlante added that Houthi production is at “some degree of scale” during an Axios panel. LaPlante also highlighted the threat of Houthis targeting naval forces with ballistic missiles.A ballistic missile launched from Yemen set off alerts in Eilat in southern Israel on November 16.[54] The Houthis have not claimed a ballistic missile attack targeting Israel at the time of this writing.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-strikes-cease-fire.html[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-strikes-cease-fire.html[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-lebanon-strikes-cease-fire.html[4] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857838175583973380[5] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/jul/31/hezbollah%E2%80%99s-iranian-arms[6] https://www.aei.org/articles/hamas-defeat/[7] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857730152588771343[8] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857850894752084030[9] https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14984 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6231[10] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8274/%D9%82%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9[11] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857730152588771343[12] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857806182796153222[13] https://www dot idf.il/249003 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857838175583973380[14] https://www dot idf.il/249003[15] https://www dot idf.il/249003 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1850949957907554413[16] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857067365520810466[17] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857778246533689647[18] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857778252741304623[19] https://t.me/mmirleb/9116 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9135 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9144[20] https://t.me/mmirleb/9091 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9097 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9098 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9101 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9108 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9109 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9115[21] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857729965703250419 https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857729970472161404[22] https://t.me/mmirleb/9132 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9118[23] https://t.me/mmirleb/9117[24] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103032[25] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate111524 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857411257055264794[26] https://t.me/alichoeib1970/12141[27] https://t.me/mmirleb/9150[28] https://t.me/mmirleb/9150[29] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102965 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103009[30] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-artillery-shell-hits-unifil-sector-west-headquarters[31] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-artillery-shell-hits-unifil-sector-west-headquarters[32] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-artillery-shell-hits-unifil-sector-west-headquarters[33] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857411257055264794[34] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857717115576263085 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857665549108715833 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857447981974503449 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857379611509698731 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857327551837814832[35] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857717115576263085 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857665549108715833 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857447981974503449 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857379611509698731 https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857327551837814832[36] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1857713977356087511[37] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857037707467223387 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857041934776213860 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[38] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1857713977356087511[39] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid084zrgmd5R4MFvE76BEVq8up2QzuYbN9CoA9MhQdM88JAwWrpcehK7L391pi3Mjksl?__cft__[0]=AZUH-e_fyx4sab5n-S8yK8hXlV5NDJnOR8hL15p95ooTpSLfbUzX-OKSqrXWniHl7CgoibBxYm4t7hqvtlb9Jlj70uSYrZ8OJxPNqGNG-NOzTvfBCJLiAjukHVn1IKMLzjVwZJvcF3SULn2-DVGT2mtCfV2oYXBTXgDlKHwSs0Vd4050mUheDu0AHoXbzn2AJIo&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[40] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[41] https://t.me/mmirleb/9122 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9123 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9124 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9125 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9126 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9127 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9128 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9129 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9130 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9131 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9133 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9134 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9138 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9145 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9146 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9147 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9152 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857655858064232758 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857674223164014750 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857706514372309300 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857847566345363681[42] https://t.me/mmirleb/9122 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9123 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9124 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9125 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9126 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9127 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9128 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9129 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9130 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9131 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9133 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9134 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9138 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9145 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9146 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9147 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9152[43] https://t.me/mmirleb/9126 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9127 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9124[44] https://t.me/mmirleb/9125 ;[45] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1529 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1530[46] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1531[47] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1532 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1533[48] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16537[49] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857709234269360467[50] https://www.iranintl.com/202411164408[51] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/831554[52] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024[53] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/14/laplante-houthi-antiship-missiles-iran[54] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16530
- — Iran Update, November 19, 2024
- at 11/21/24 10:05pmKelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 12:30 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.CTP-ISW is publishing an abbreviated update today, November 19, 2024. We will resume our regular, full coverage of the October 7 War on November 20, 2024.Hamas and other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined force to stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates that Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip.[1] It remains unclear if Hamas distributes the aid equitably after it recovers stolen aid. Reuters reported on November 19 that Hamas and other militias created a force called the Popular and Revolutionary Committees in November 2024 to address rising Palestinian civilian anger at aid seizures and price gouging. Palestinian sources claimed that this newly created force has conducted multiple operations this month, killing several armed looters. The IDF has repeatedly said that armed groups loot humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. Armed criminal groups seized 98 out of 109 aid trucks in an incident in the southern Strip on November 16.[2] A Hamas official told Reuters that the force shows Hamas’ continued control of governance in the Gaza Strip. The reality that criminal organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid shipments indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree they did pre-war.[3] This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control over the Strip has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined organization to counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking steps to regain control over the Strip, however.Israeli media reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to discuss efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[4] Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey after Qatari officials reportedly ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Qatar.[5] Hamas and an anonymous Turkish diplomat both denied on November 18 that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[6]An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the Lebanese coast.[7] Geolocated imagery posted on November 19 showed that Israeli forces have advanced to al Bayyada Hill overlooking the Lebanese coast.[8] Hezbollah claimed two separate rocket and mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces operating on the outskirts of Chama and al Bayyada, which is consistent with reports of Israeli troop movements.[9] Al Bayyada Hill overlooks UNIFIL position 1-26 and a nearby Hezbollah military site.[10] It is not clear that Hezbollah can continue operating from this position, but CTP-ISW has observed dozens of airstrikes in the areas close to the Hezbollah military position. Al Bayyada Hill provides Israeli forces with an advantageous position to monitor Hezbollah activity along the coast. Lebanese and Hezbollah-controlled media claimed Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters continue to engage in small arms combat in Chama suggesting that elements of the 36th Division are continuing operations to secure Chama.[11]US special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the US-drafted ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut on November 19.[12] Berri is Hezbollah‘s go-between in ceasefire negotiations. Hochstein called the meeting “constructive” and noted that talks are continuing.[13] One of Berri’s aides told Reuters on November 19 that Lebanon and Hezbollah agreed to the proposal with several comments on its contents.[14] Unspecified US officials similarly characterized Hezbollah’s response to the draft agreement as a “yes, but” to Axios.[15] Hezbollah and the Lebanese government remain concerned about a clause in the agreement that says that Israel has the right to defend itself against threats from Lebanon, according to a Lebanese government source and Lebanese media.[16] Hochstein is expected to travel to Israel in the next few days depending on the progress of negotiations in Lebanon.[17]Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that a recent intensification of Israeli air operations and expansion of ground operations in Lebanon is intended to increase pressure on Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire.[18] The IDF struck over 50 targets in Beirut’s southern suburbs over the previous week and conducted at least three strikes in central and northern Beirut.[19] The IDF also recently began operating in ”second-line” Lebanese towns and villages.[20]The Lebanese Armed Force's (LAF) unwillingness to directly confront Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire agreement. The LAF would be the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon and would deploy to the south in the days following the ceasefire, according to leaked copies of the proposal in late October.[21] The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to the south to enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting Hezbollah fighters directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,” according to sources close to the army and unspecified officials talking to Reuters.[22] An unspecified diplomat said that Lebanese personnel “storming into houses looking for Hezbollah weapons” could lead to a civil war in Lebanon.[23] The LAF's unwillingness to confront Hezbollah directly would complicate its efforts to enforce the proposed ceasefire agreement. CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage toward Israel that hit a UNIFIL site in Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon, on November 19. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a barrage of rockets that hit UNP 5-42 and injured four Ghanian peacekeepers.[24] The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon. The peacekeepers were transferred to a hospital in Tyre for treatment.[25] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson said that Hezbollah launched the rocket barrage from Deir Aames.[26]Key Takeaways:Humanitarian Aid: Hamas and other unidentified Palestinian militias have formed a combined force to stop armed gangs from looting humanitarian aid, which indicates that Hamas has only limited control of the Gaza Strip. The reality that criminal organizations are capable and willing to interdict these aid shipments indicates that these groups no longer fear Hamas to the degree they did pre-war. This suggests that Hamas’ ability to maintain control over the Strip has weakened considerably. The creation of a combined organization to counter this loss of control indicates Hamas is taking steps to regain control over the Strip, however.Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli media reported on November 18 that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar met with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin in Turkey on November 16 to discuss efforts for a ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 19 that the 36th Division has advanced northwest from Chama to a hilltop overlooking the Lebanese coast.Lebanon Ceasefire: US special envoy Amos Hochstein discussed Hezbollah’s response to the US-drafted ceasefire agreement with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut on November 19. Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that a recent intensification of Israeli air operations and expansion of ground operations in Lebanon is intended to increase pressure on Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire.Lebanese Armed Forces-Hezbollah Relations: The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s unwillingness to directly confront Hezbollah in the south will complicate the success of the ceasefire agreement. The LAF will need Hezbollah’s approval to deploy troops to the south to enforce a ceasefire deal and will avoid confronting Hezbollah fighters directly to avoid “trigger[ing] internal strife,” according to sources close to the army and unspecified officials talking to Reuters.UNIFIL: Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage towards Israel that truck UN Position 5-42 near Ramyeh, southwestern Lebanon. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors” fired a barrage of rockets that hit the base and injured four Ghanian peacekeepers. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF said on November 19 that the IDF 162nd Division had killed over 1300 Palestinian militia fighters since restarting clearing operations in Jabalia on October 6.[27] The IDF had last conducted clearing operations in the area in May 2024.[28] Israeli forces have detained over 1000 Palestinian militia fighters since October 6, including from Hamas.[29] The IDF estimates that between 100 and 200 fighters remain in the area. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces and vehicles in Jabalia camp on November 19.[30]The IDF 162nd Division continued operations in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 19. Palestinian militias conducted three small arms attacks targeting Israeli forces in Beit Lahia since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 18.[31]Palestinian militias conducted two attacks targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor on November 19.[32]The National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces and vehicles east of Deir al Balah in the central Gaza Strip on November 19.[33]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces conducted a counterterrorism operation in Jenin Governorate, in the northern West Bank, overnight from November 18 to 19.[34] Israeli security forces engaged Palestinian militias, including PIJ and the Al Aqsa Martys’ Brigades, in at least thirteen locations in Jenin Governorate during the operation.[35] Palestinian militias fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces operating in the area.[36]Israeli security forces entered Qabatiya village, Jenin Governorate, on November 19 to arrest a PIJ fighter who was recently involved in shooting and IED attacks targeting IDF forces as part of its counterterrorism operation.[37] Israeli security forces conducted a “pressure cooker” operation in which Israeli forces isolated the building, attempted to encourage his surrender, and then opened fire.[38] Israeli security forces killed three fighters in the building during the operation, including the wanted man.[39] Israeli forces destroyed two IED manufacturing facilities and conducted controlled detonations of other IEDs planted under the roads.[40]Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonThe IDF 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khiam to disrupt Hezbollah’s ability to attack northern Israel. Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 19 showed the IDF operating on Khiam’s southern outskirts.[41] The IDF 7th Armored Brigade and 35th Paratroopers Brigade are currently operating in Khiam.[42] Israeli Army Radio reported that Khiam is a “major stronghold” for Hezbollah from which it directly threatens the northern Israel town of Kiryat Shmona.[43] Israeli forces are operating in the area to destroy Hezbollah’s “raiding and [projectile] launching infrastructure.”[44] CTP-ISW previously reported that Israeli forces previously conducted a brief incursion into Khiam’s southern outskirts in late October 2024.[45] Hezbollah claimed four rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel east and south of Khiam.[46] Hezbollah rocket artillery cells previously attempted to halt Israeli advances toward Khiam on November 18.[47]The IDF 91st Division has expanded clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 18. The 769th Territorial Brigade (91st Division) located a cache of Hezbollah weapons, explosives, ammunition, and Hezbollah outposts in a schoolyard at some point in the past week.[48] Israeli forces also located and destroyed rocket launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, Hezbollah documents, and various military equipment in a building near the school. The 769th Territorial Brigade also located a Hezbollah tunnel network “tens of meters long” that contained “hundreds” of weapons ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, and other unspecified materials.The 36th Division has continued clearing operations around Maroun al Ras since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 18. Hezbollah claimed it fired an anti-tank guided munition at Israeli forces operating in a house on the outskirts of Maroun al Ras on November 19.[49] Hezbollah also claimed three rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces in Maroun al Ras.[50] The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on November 18. The Israeli Army Radio stated that the IDF has struck over 150 Hezbollah targets since November 17, including weapons warehouses, leadership, and rocket launchers.[51] Lebanese media reported on November 18 that IDF conducted two airstrikes on the Ghobeiry and Chiyah areas of Beirut’s southern suburbs.[52] The IDF has not commented on these strikes at the time of this writing. The IDF has been conducting airstrikes in recent days targeting Hezbollah sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs as part of a broader air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's military capabilities.[53]The IDF conducted an airstrike on November 18 targeting the commander of Hezbollah’s medium-range rocket array, Ali Tawfiq al Dweik, in Mazraat Kfar Jouz, southern Lebanon.[54] The IDF stated that Dweik replaced the former medium-range rocket commander in September 2024 and was responsible for launching more than 300 rockets toward Israel.[55]The IDF Air Force continued its air campaign in southwestern Lebanon. The IDF struck several towns in the Bint Jbeil and Tyre governorates in southwestern Lebanon.[56] Lebanese media reported that the IDF conducted a series of seven airstrikes on the town of Hosh, southwestern Lebanon.[57] The head of Tyre District’s Medical Department stated that Israeli airstrikes on Tyre killed at least 2 people and wounded 21.[58]Hezbollah has conducted at least 22 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 18.[59] Hezbollah conducted attacks targeting multiple IDF sites in Israel.[60] Hezbollah claimed it fired a surface-to-surface missile and one-way drones targeting an IDF Military Intelligence Division base in Tel Aviv.[61] The IDF reported that Israeli air defense systems intercepted a surface-to-surface missile, breaking the munition into several pieces.[62] The broken munition fell in Ramat Gan near Tel Aviv, causing damage and inflicting casualties.[63] Hezbollah also launched rockets targeting the IDF Glilot intelligence base near Tel Aviv.[64] Hezbollah conducted multiple rocket and drone attacks targeting IDF sites in northern Israel, including the Ramat David Air Base southeast of Haifa and the Beit Lid Base east of Netanya.[65] Hezbollah stated these attacks were part of its ”Khaybar” operations, which are meant to retaliate for Israel's killing of Hassan Nasrallah.[66]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel on November 18.[67] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam, which claims to be affiliated with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, separately claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat on November 19.[68]Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to UN Security Council President Barbara Woodland on November 18 expressing concern over the “significant increase” in the frequency and intensity of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel since September 2024.[69] CTP-ISW recorded that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by approximately 148 percent between September and October 2024, claiming 31 attacks in September and 77 attacks in October. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 58 attacks in November 2024 thus far. Saar wrote that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, Ansar Allah al Awfiya, and the Badr Organization, have launched hundreds of Shahed, Ziad, and Arpad drones and several dozen Raad 351 cruise missiles at Israel since October 2023. Saar wrote that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel target both civilian areas and military bases. Saar emphasized that the Iraqi federal government is responsible for preventing militias from using Iraqi territory to attack Israel and called on the UN Security Council to ensure that the Iraqi federal government fulfills its obligations under the UN Charter and international law. Saar emphasized that Israel has the right to protect itself and its citizens against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani dismissed Saar’s letter as an “excuse to attack Iraq.”[70] Sudani claimed that Iraq has thus far refused to enter the October 7 War and that a decision to enter the war would lie with the Iraqi federal government.[71] Sudani’s government has proven unwilling or incapable of stopping attacks from Iraq targeting Israel. These attacks are launched by groups that operate under the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an armed force that nominally answers to Sudani but in reality answers to Iranian-backed militia leaders. Sudani’s Political Affairs Adviser, Sabhan al Mulla Jiyad, separately claimed that the Iraqi federal government opposes the use of Iraqi territory by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to attack Israel.[72] Jiyad stated that the Iraqi federal government similarly opposes Israeli attacks on Iraq. Jiyad claimed that the US-led international coalition would be “tasked with protecting [Iraqi] airspace” in the event of an Israeli attack on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq.Syrian media reported on November 18 that Russian forces established two new observation posts near the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria.[73] The Deputy Commander of Russian forces in Syria, General Alexandra Rodionov, stated that Russian forces have established a total of nine observation posts along the demilitarized zone in coordination with the Syrian Arab Army (SAA).[74]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Syrian Parliament Speaker Hammouda Sabbagh on November 19 in Tehran to discuss strengthening bilateral ties and regional cooperation.[75] Araghchi reaffirmed Iran's support for Syria and the Axis of Resistance while condemning Israeli strikes in Syria. Sabbagh emphasized the need to strengthen relations between Iran and Syria to address shared challenges and threats. Sabbagh also announced upcoming joint economic commission meetings in Damascus to enhance bilateral cooperation and discuss strategies to mitigate the impact of sanctions on Iran.[76]The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told IAEA member states on November 19 that Iran has offered to limit its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) abandon their resolution against Iran's nuclear program at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting this week.[77] An unspecified senior diplomat said that Iran has offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% at around 185 kg. The IAEA reported that Iran has 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% as of October 26.[78] The E3 resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities that would almost certainly confirm Iranian non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, known as "snapback” sanctions.[79] CTP-ISW will provide further details on the IAEA Board of Governors meeting and Iran's nuclear activities in the update on November 20.Houthi fighters fired ballistic and cruise missiles targeting a cargo ship in the Red Sea on November 19. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on November 19 that the Houthis launched “an appropriate number” of ballistic and cruise missiles at Panama-flagged cargo ship Anadolu S off the coast of Yemen.[80] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said that an unnamed commercial vessel reported that a missile impacted near the vessel, which was approximately 25 nautical miles west of al Mukha, Yemen, in the Bab al Mandeb Strait.[81] A second missile impacted the ocean near the vessel when it was 60 nautical miles southeast of Aden.[82] The UKMTO stated that there were no casualties or damage to the vessel.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-led-force-targets-gangs-looting-gaza-aid-convoys-2024-11-19/[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-18-2024 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-says-nearly-100-gaza-aid-trucks-looted-the-wars-worst-theft-in-terms-of-volume/[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-led-force-targets-gangs-looting-gaza-aid-convoys-2024-11-19/[4] https://news.walla dot co.il/item/3705439[5] https://x.com/kann_news/status/1858210305811054897[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-political-office-has-not-moved-turkey-qatar-turkish-source-says-2024-11-18/ ; https://asharq dot com/politics/107110/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9/[7] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16644[8] https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1858869208882335765[9] https://t.me/mmirleb/9256 ; 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https://t.me/sarayaps/18823 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7894[32] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8283/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-107-%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%89 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18830[33] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4469[34] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858855029072871564[35] https://t.me/sarayajneen/1800 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1802 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1803 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1804 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1805 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1806 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1807 ; https://t.me/sarayajneen/1808 ; 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https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024[80] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1858878165164171278[81] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1858466625495630258[82] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1858466625495630258
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2024
- at 11/21/24 9:21pmChristina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Olivia Gibson, Karolina Hird, Nate Trotter, William Runkle, and George BarrosNovember 19, 2024, 2:45pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 9:45am ET on November 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression. Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 under the incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fail to defend itself and that Russian forces would be able to seize Kyiv City and install a pro-Russian proxy government in three days.[1] One thousand days later, Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed Russian forces from their most forward points of advance in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, and Mykolaiv oblasts and continue their daily fight to liberate occupied territory in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea.[2] Russian forces are currently advancing throughout eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have recently warned about the possibility of an imminent Russian offensive operation in Zaporizhia Oblast.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin is simultaneously waging an informational war against the West, Ukraine, and the Russian population aimed at convincing the world that Russian victory is inevitable, and that Ukraine stands no chance.[4] This informational effort is born out of Putin's fear and understanding that sustained Western military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine will turn the tide of the war against Russia.Russia has accumulated a significant amount of risk and a number of ever-increasing constraints on its warfighting capabilities over the last 1,000 days. Russia began the war with a poorly organized and understaffed military comprised of contract military personnel and limited number of conscripts due to his incorrect assumption that Ukraine would fold and fear that general mobilization could threaten the stability of his regime.[5] Russia largely relied on a combination of volunteer contract servicemembers, mobilized personnel, and irregular formations (such as the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR/LNR AC], the Wagner Group, and Russian Volunteer Corps) to wage Putin's war without general mobilization.[6] This system has provided the Kremlin the manpower necessary to support operations so far, but there are mounting indicators that this system is beginning to teeter. Recent Western estimates of Russian manpower losses suggest that Russian forces are currently losing more troops per month than Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts can sustain, and open-source evidence indicates that Russia may not be able to sustain its current rate of armored vehicle and tank losses in the medium term as Russia burns through its stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment.[7] The upcoming 2025 year will only increase the manpower and materiel constraints on the Russian military if Russia attempts to sustain its current offensive tempo, and Putin continues to appear averse to such measures given Russian society's growing disinterest in fighting in Russia’s war, the Russian economy’s limitations including a significant labor deficit and high inflation, and continual aversion to bearing the burden of additional wartime costs.[8] Russia cannot maintain its current tempo indefinitely. Putin will likely need to take disruptive and drastic measures - including another involuntary call up of the mobilization reserve - to overcome these growing limitations as the war protracts.Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to improve its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in the long term. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky presented Ukraine's "Internal Resilience Plan" to the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) on November 19.[9] The plan is comprised of 10 points that establish Ukraine's strategic objectives during and after the end of Russia's full-scale invasion.[10] The core points of the plan outline Ukraine's focus on maintaining unity and cooperation with its partners; specific measures to stabilize the frontline and increase Ukrainian military's technological efficiency; the expansion of Ukraine's domestic industrial base (DIB) production capabilities and joint DIB partnerships; the establishment of an economic policy to support Ukrainian industries and businesses; the protection of Ukraine's energy infrastructure; and the establishment of a new internal and border security system. The plan also outlines a vision to create effective local administrations, improve social and veteran policies, and strengthen Ukraine's cultural sovereignty both domestically and abroad. Zelensky emphasized in his speech to the Verkhovna Rada that Ukraine has taken many steps to improve its DIB and has already produced over 2.5 million mortar and artillery rounds in 2024.[11] Zelensky added that Ukraine plans to produce at least 3,000 cruise missiles and 30,000 long-range drones in 2025 and that Ukrainian brigades should raise their own funding to appropriately supply themselves with drones without bureaucratic limitations. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced on November 19 that the Verkhovna Rada approved the 2025 defense and security budget of 2.23 trillion hryvnias (around $54 billion) and allocated a record-breaking 739 billion hryvnias (around $17.9 billion) for the Ukrainian DIB and weapon procurement.[12] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine has a chance to dramatically expand its DIB and stand on its own two feet in the future if its partners empower Ukraine now.[13]Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to 19, hitting a Russian ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast – days after obtaining permission to conduct such strikes. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff, reported on November 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian military's 67th Main Military and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal of the 1046th Logistics Support Center near Karachev on the night of November 18 to 19 and that the strike caused an initial detonation and 12 secondary explosions.[14] A Ukrainian military source told Ukrainian outlet RBK-Ukraine on November 19 that Ukrainian forces used US-provided ATACMS missiles to conduct the strike.[15] Head of Ukraine's Center for Combatting Disinformation Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated that the 67th GRAU arsenal contained artillery ammunition, including North Korean-provided shells, as well as guided glide bombs, air defense missiles, and rockets for multiple launch rocket launchers (MLRS).[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six ballistic missiles, including ATACMS, at a military facility in Bryansk Oblast and that Russian S-400 and Pantsir air defense systems shot down five missiles and damaged one.[17] The Russian MoD claimed that missile fragments fell onto a military facility in Bryansk Oblast, causing a fire, but that the strike did not cause any damages or casualties. Russian opposition outlet Astra stated that Ukrainian forces also struck the "Veza" ventilation plant and buildings in Karachev, Podsosonki, and Baykova.[18] Russian sources posted footage purportedly showing the ATACMS strike and its aftermath.[19]Western officials also provided additional clarity on Ukraine's ability to use Western-provided long-range weapons systems to strike military objects in Russia. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on November 18 that the US authorized Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons up to 300 kilometers inside Russia.[20] US Assistant Secretary of State Brian Nichols told Brazilian outlet O Globo on November 19 that US President Biden issued the authorization for Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike into Russia, stating that the authorization will give Ukraine a greater ability to defend itself.[21] ISW previously assessed that restrictions on Ukraine's ability to conduct long-range strikes into Russian territory enabled Russia to maintain sanctuary space within its near and far-rear and leverage that sanctuary space for its military operations against Ukraine.[22] Ukrainian long-range strikes against military objects within Russia’s rear are crucial for degrading Russian military capabilities throughout the theater.[23] These permissions, if as extensive as reported, are a new capability for Ukraine that may significantly degrade Russia’s war effort.Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine on November 19 in a clear response to the Biden Administration's decision to greenlight long-range strikes into Russia and as part of Putin's ongoing efforts to influence Western decision-makers into shying away from providing additional support to Ukraine. Putin signed the decree "On approval of the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear deterrence" after stating in September 2024 that Russia was adjusting its nuclear doctrine to introduce "clarifications" on the necessary preconditions for Russian nuclear use.[24] Russia last updated its nuclear doctrine in June 2020.[25] The 2024 doctrine states that Russia will exercise nuclear deterrence against states that provide "territory, air, and/or sea space and resources under their control" for the preparation and implementation of aggression against Russia; will consider aggression against Russia by any state that is part of a military coalition, bloc, or alliance as aggression by the entire coalition; and will consider aggression against Russia and/or its allies by a non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state as a joint attack on Russia.[26] The new doctrine added additional considerations to list of the "main military dangers that may develop into military threats" to Russia and against which Russia will carry out nuclear deterrence to include: the creation of new or expansion of existing military coalitions, blocs, or alliances that results in the coalition's military infrastructure "approaching" Russia's border; actions aimed at isolating part of Russia's territory, including the blocking of access to vital transport communications; actions aimed at the destruction of ecological hazardous objects in Russia; and the planning and conducting large-scale military exercises near Russia's border. The new doctrine states that Russia maintains the "possibility" of using nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Belarus or Russia's receipt of reliable information about a "massive" launch or take-off of air and space attack weapons, including strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, and hypersonic aircraft, and their crossing of the Russian state border. The new doctrine retains the same language as the 2020 doctrine describing Russia's receipt of information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking Russian territory or the territory or Russian allies as a condition "determining the possibility of Russia's use of nuclear weapons," and this language regarding ballistic missiles thus does not represent an inflection in Russia's nuclear doctrine despite some reporting suggesting otherwise. The updated doctrine no longer states that Russia regards nuclear weapons "solely" as a means of deterrence and adds that Russia will exercise nuclear deterrence against "potential" enemies.Russia’s adoption of an amended nuclear doctrine is the latest iteration of now-frequent Russian nuclear saber-rattling and does not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns cautioned Western policymakers on September 7 against fearing boilerplate Russian nuclear saber-rattling.[27] Bloomberg reported on November 19 that an unspecified US National Security Council spokesperson stated that the US sees no reason to adjust its nuclear posture and that the Russian decision to adjust its doctrine was not a surprise and is a continuation of the same "irresponsible rhetoric" that Russia has used since invading Ukraine in 2022.[28] Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated on November 18 that any Russian saber-rattling is "incredibly dangerous" and "reckless."[29] Singh stated that the US will continue to monitor Russian saber-rattling but has not seen any changes in Russia's nuclear posture. ISW continues to assess that Russia is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[30]The Kremlin has continuously attempted to use nuclear saber-rattling to deter Western military support for Ukraine, and the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to inject nuclear threats into the information space indicates that the Kremlin is concerned about the battlefield impacts of Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons. The Washington Post reported in September 2024 that the Kremlin may be reconsidering the effectiveness of its nuclear saber-rattling in influencing Western decision-making against supporting Ukraine.[31] The Kremlin, however, has continued to use its same boilerplate nuclear threats in an attempt to dissuade Western decisionmakers from lifting restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided weapons to strike legitimate military objects in Russia, indicating that the Kremlin fears the prospect of long-range Ukrainian strikes into Russia. The Kremlin has routinely intensified its nuclear saber-rattling during key Western discussions about military assistance to Ukraine but has never previously escalated against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines."[32] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the updated Russian nuclear doctrine on November 19, complaining that Western countries no longer fear the Kremlin's nuclear threats and that the West's lack of fear is "narrowing Russia's room for maneuver."[33] The milblogger attributed this Western lack of fear to the Kremlin's unresponsiveness to prior Ukrainian strikes against military objects within Russia – one of the Kremlin's prior so-called red lines.[34] Other Russian milbloggers stated that they are waiting for the Russian government to react to the Ukrainian ATACMS strike in Bryansk Oblast on November 19.[35] The Kremlin has not clearly responded to the ATACMS strike as of this writing.The contours of the Kremlin's nuclear blackmail remain unchanged despite the updates to Russia's nuclear doctrine, and factions within the Kremlin are reportedly arguing over a lack clarity about Russia’s own nuclear "red lines." A Russian insider source claimed on November 19 that Kremlin factions disagreed on the changes to the nuclear doctrine, with one faction arguing for the new nuclear doctrine to define clear "red lines" to deter the West from taking specific actions unfavorable to the Kremlin and another faction calling for the creation of a strategically ambiguous nuclear doctrine "in the fog of war" to prevent the West from being able to predict the Kremlin's response to specifications.[36] These reports, taken in the context of the Kremlin's continued reliance on vague threats of nuclear escalation without following through, suggests that Russian officials lack a clear understanding of where the Kremlin's actual "red lines" lie. The updated Russian nuclear doctrine remains vague, and actions by Russia's "potential enemies" as defined in the new doctrine will almost certainly not immediately trigger Russian nuclear weapons use. The decision to use Russian nuclear weapons lies with Putin, who has and will personally decide where Russia's "red lines" truly lie and how to respond - or not respond - to Western support of Ukraine.Ukraine only recently has started receiving the weapons systems and military capabilities necessary to wage modern large-scale combat operations, and Ukraine may be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensives in the future, provided the West reinforces building Ukrainian capabilities at scale. US officials are only now seriously evaluating depriving Russia of a sanctuary from which Russia wages war against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces only received F-16s and pilot training to operate F-16s in small quantities in 2024.[37] Ukrainian forces only received ATACMS for the first time in fall 2023 after Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive effectively culminated.[38] Ukrainian forces only received Western main battle tanks in small quantities for the first time in early 2023.[39] The systems and capabilities that Ukraine has been receiving are all necessary to wage successful multi-domain large-scale-combat operations, and Ukraine has not yet been provided an opportunity to demonstrate what Ukrainian forces can achieve when properly resourced. Ukraine’s systems integration, capabilities, and battlefield performance likely can improve, provided Ukraine and its partners continue undertaking the difficult work necessary to build Ukrainian momentum.Continued and enhanced Western military assistance remains necessary for Ukrainian forces to liberate occupied territory and inflict losses on the Russian military necessary to force Putin to rethink his calculus for this war. Ukraine must enter any future negotiations with Russia from a position of strength given the Kremlin's persistent refusal to engage in good-faith negotiations and its repeated calls for complete Ukrainian capitulation.[40] Ukrainian determination and innovation alone likely cannot bring about these conditions, and it remains in the West's interests to strengthen Ukraine's position at any potential future negotiating table.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian forces have defended against Russia's full-scale invasion for 1,000 days and continue to demonstrate incredible resilience against Russian aggression.Ukraine continues to improve its warfighting capabilities and prepare itself to be self-sustainable in the long term.Ukrainian forces conducted the first ATAMCS strike on Russian territory overnight on November 18 to 19, hitting a Russian ammunition depot in Karachev, Bryansk Oblast — days after obtaining permission to conduct such strikes.Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Russia's updated nuclear doctrine on November 19 in a clear response to the Biden Administration's decision to greenlight long-range strikes into Russia and as part of Putin's ongoing efforts to influence Western decision-makers into shying away from providing additional support to Ukraine.Russia’s adoption of an amended nuclear doctrine is the latest iteration of now-frequent Russian nuclear saber-rattling and does not represent a substantial change in Russia’s nuclear posture, doctrine, or the threat of the employment of nuclear weapons.The Kremlin has continuously attempted to use nuclear saber-rattling to deter Western military support for Ukraine, and the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to inject nuclear threats into the information space indicates that the Kremlin is concerned about the battlefield impacts of Ukrainian strikes into Russia with Western-provided weapons.Ukraine only recently has started receiving the weapons systems and military capabilities necessary to wage modern large-scale combat operations, and Ukraine may be able to conduct operationally significant counteroffensives in the future, provided the West reinforces building Ukrainian capabilities at scale.Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on November 19. Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo).[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near the Olgovka forest (southeast of Korenevo); near Olgovka and Kremyanoye (both east of Korenevo); and on the eastern outskirts of Plekhovo (south of Sudzha).[42] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo) and Sverdlikovo (northwest of Sudzha).[43] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoivanovka, Darino (southeast of Korenevo), and Plekhovo.[44] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are unsuccessfully trying to break out of a Russian encirclement near the Olgovka forest.[45] The spokesperson for the Ukrainian commandant's office in Sudzha reported on November 19 that Russian tactics have somewhat changed in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces are starting to attack at nighttime as opposed to early in the morning.[46] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 19. Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[47]US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated on November 18 that the US assesses that there are over 11,000 North Korean troops are "moving into" Kursk Oblast.[48] Singh stated that US officials stated last week that there were between 10,000 and 11,000 North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast but that the Pentagon is "a little bit more confident" that the number is on the higher end of that range. Singh stated that more North Korean forces could be on the way to Kursk Oblast but noted that the US has not observed indications of additional deployments of North Korean troops to Russia.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kharkiv City on November 19. Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced into a forested area southeast of Hlyboke (north Kharkiv City).[49] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on November 18 to 19.[50] A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kharkiv direction reported that Russian forces are suffering disproportionate losses to make tactical gains and stated that in one attack Russian forces suffered 139 casualties while trying to seize 200 meters of terrain.[51] The Ukrainian battalion commander reported that Russian forces’ abilities to maintain a high tempo of assaults while sustaining significant manpower losses will depend on the effectiveness of Ukrainian countermeasures. Elements of the Chechen ”Zapad-Akhmat” Battalion (Southern Military District [SMD]), units of the Chechen Kurchaloevsky Raion's Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Russian 128th BARS Brigade (Russian Army Combat Reserve) Brigade, and the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[52] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued ground assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 19 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued fighting in the industrial zone in eastern Kupyansk and that Russian forces also advanced north of Kupyansk.[53] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Kupyansk stated that the Russian military command originally ordered Russian forces to enter Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) and advance to the east (left) bank of the Oskil River by November 1 and have since extended that deadline to January 1, 2025.[54] The brigade commander noted that Russian forces have a limited presence in Kruhlyakivka (southeast of Kupyansk and on the east bank of the Oskil River) and are trying to advance towards Kolesnykivka (north of Kruhlyakivka), but have not established enduring positions in the area. Russian sources also claimed that heavy Russian indirect fire has cut off Ukrainian logistics lines supporting a Ukrainian grouping near Yampolivka (northwest of Kremmina).[55] Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Lozova and Kruhlyakivka; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka, Novoyehorivka, Terny, and Novolyubivka; and west of Kreminna near Torske on November 18 and 19.[56] Russian sources claimed on November 19 that Russian forces struck Kupyansk with a new "OFZAB-500" fragmentation incendiary guided glide bomb for the first time.[57]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[58] Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on November 19 but did not make any confirmed advances.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 19 that Russian forces advanced along Dmytra Skrypnychenka and Parkova streets in eastern Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[60] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), and other unspecified elements of the Russian Volunteer Corps are reportedly operating in Chasiv Yar.[61] Russian forces continued limited offensive operation near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba, and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[62] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that they seized positions in an unspecified part of Toretsk during a surprise attack and took Russian prisoners of war (POWs).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces consolidated their positions in the eastern part of the Zabalka Microraion of southeastern Toretsk and are advancing westward, although ISW has not observed confirmation of recent Russian advances in this area.[64] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 19 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing west and northwest of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) and in northern Petrivka (west of Selydove and south of Pokrovsk).[65] One milblogger also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack west of Krasnyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[66] A Ukrainian battalion posted footage on November 18 of Ukrainian forces capturing and clearing a Russian dugout near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) on an unspecified date.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; south of Pokrovsk near Petrivka, Dachenske, and Pustynka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novooleksiivka.[68] Russian sources claimed on November 19 that Russian forces advanced north of Kurakhove, but ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to central Berestky (north of Kurakhove and on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir).[69] Russian forces reportedly continued to attack near Kurakhove itself; northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka and Voznesenka; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka and Berestky; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 18 and 19.[70] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that the Russian military command additionally transferred "Storm V" penal assault detachments from Russian training grounds along the occupied Mariupol-Berdyansk line towards occupied Volnovakha (north of Mariupol), likely for future redeployment to the Kurakhove direction.[71] Andryushchenko stated on November 16 that Russian forces are increasingly transporting equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and trucks carrying ammunition, from the Berdyansk or Polohy directions through occupied Mariupol towards Volnovakha for offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction.[72]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dalne (north of Vuhledar), Yasna Polyana, and east of Rozdolne (both northwest of Vuhledar), although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[73] Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Trudove, and Rozdolne; and northeast of Vuhledar near Yelyzavetivka, Antonivka, and Katerynivka on November 18 and 19.[74] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Trudove and elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Vuhledar area.[75]Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 19. Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized around November 13.[76] Russian forces continued attacking near Velyka Novosilka itself; south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 18 and 19.[77] Russian forces continue to pressure Ukrainian positions in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area from the south and east to support Russian efforts in the Vuhledar and Kurakhove direction and advance to the southwestern most sector of Donetsk Oblast.[78] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka and Nesteryanka and northeast of Robotyne near Novopokrovka and Bilohirya on November 19, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[79] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 19 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Robotyne towards Mala Tokmachka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[80] Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta on November 18 and 19, but there were no changes to the frontline.[81] Elements of the Russian 45th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and the BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[82] Ukrainian Crimean-based partisan group “Atesh” reported on November 18 that Russian forces recently deployed a Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Komyshova and Kozacha bays near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[83] The “Atesh” group stated that Russian forces installed the air defense system near a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) diving school, an oil depot, a Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) restricted facility for the training of combat dolphins, logistics warehouses of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (BSF, Southern Military District [SMD]), a training base for Russian tank operators, and a military airfield.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 87 Shahed and unspecified strike drones from Kursk and Oryol oblasts and occupied Crimea.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 51 drones over Chernihiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhia, and Kharkiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 30 Russian drones were lost in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that one drone remained in Ukrainian airspace as of 900 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that two Russian Shahed drones struck a residential building in Hlukhiv, killing 12 people and injuring 11.[85] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City.[86] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov stated on November 19 that Russian strikes caused heating and electricity outages in Zaporizhzhia City.[87]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian mobilization and force generation efforts today.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian technological adaptations today.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)ISW is not publishing coverage of significant activity in Belarus today.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-invaded-ukraine-and-how-war-must-end; https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1;[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-sustained-counteroffensive-denying-russia%E2%80%99s-prolongation-war ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18; 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2024[9] https://suspilne dot media/883125-zelenskij-u-radi-predstavlae-vnutrisnij-plan-stijkosti-ukraini/; https://suspilne dot media/883359-zelenskij-doruciv-priznaciti-vijskovogo-ombudsmana-najblizcim-casom/; https://suspilne dot media/883301-u-2025-roci-ukraina-vigotovit-sonajmense-30-tisac-dalekobijnih-droniv-zelenskij/ ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/19/zelenskiy-v-1000-y-den-voyny-predstavil-plan-stoykosti-10-punktov-kotorye-pomogut-ukraine-vystoyat-v-voyne ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/mi-mayemo-ne-dopustiti-shob-htos-u-sviti-zasumnivavsya-u-sti-94497; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2024/11/19/7485253/; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19562[10] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-predstaviv-plan-vnutrishnoyi-stijkosti-u-94505[11] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/mi-mayemo-ne-dopustiti-shob-htos-u-sviti-zasumnivavsya-u-sti-94497[12] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/8908[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine%E2%80%99s-long-term-path-success-jumpstarting-self-sufficient-defense-industrial-base[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/18769 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06LXaYxk8CBzTtgKTLtBAD5HfSNNCKfV2wEpwuN4YLr32q8mztKd4p3S9Cjb1tWLcl ; https://ua.krymr.com/a/news-minoborony-rf-brianska-oblast-zsu-udar-raketamy-atacms/33208282.html; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8308[15] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-vpershe-vdarila-atacms-teritoriyi-1732007549.html[16] https://www.rbc dot ua/ukr/news/ukrayina-vpershe-vdarila-atacms-teritoriyi-1732007549.html ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8308[17] https://t.me/mod_russia/45908[18] https://t.me/astrapress/68814[19] https://t.me/milinfolive/135316; https://t.me/motopatriot/29560 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/135329[20] https://kyivindependent dot com/borrell-confirms-us-authorization-for-ukraine-to-strike-deep-into-russia-with-missiles-up-to-300-km-in-range/; https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20241118-foreign-affairs-council-november-2024/146578-6-press-conference-part-6-q-a-20241118; https://meduza dot io/en/news/2024/11/19/e-u-foreign-policy-chief-confirms-u-s-authorized-kyiv-to-use-american-weapons-for-strikes-up-to-300-km-inside-russian-territory ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285986 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285987; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-polytics/3928725-kraini-es-mozut-dozvoliti-ukraini-vikoristovuvati-zbrou-proti-cilej-v-rosii-borrel.html; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/18/borrel-podtverdil-chto-ssha-razreshili-kievu-nanosit-udary-po-tselyam-v-rossii-raketami-dalnostyu-do-300-kilometrov[21] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/11/19/us-confirms-authorization-for-ukraine-to-use-long-range-missiles-against-russia-a87062; https://oglobo/ dot globo.com/mundo/g20-no-brasil/noticia/2024/11/19/uso-de-misseis-de-longo-alcance-pela-ucrania-pode-forcar-russia-a-negociar-paz-defende-lider-diplomatico-dos-eua-para-o-ocidente.ghtml; https://t.me/tass_agency/286104 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/19/v-gosdepe-ssha-ne-stali-otritsat-chto-bayden-razreshil-ukraine-ispolzovat-dalnoboynye-rakety-dlya-udarov-po-rossii[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024;[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hundreds%20of%20Russian%20Military%20Objects%20in%20Range%20of%20ATACMS%20PDF.pdf[24] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202411190001 ; http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75598; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524[25] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/bank/45562; https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/11/19/chto-konkretno-putin-izmenil-v-politike-rf-v-oblasti-yadernogo-sderzhivaniya[26] https://meduza dot io/feature/2024/11/19/chto-konkretno-putin-izmenil-v-politike-rf-v-oblasti-yadernogo-sderzhivaniya; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202411190001[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524[28] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-19/us-won-t-adjust-posture-after-russia-lowers-nuclear-threshold?embedded-checkout=true[29] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3968387/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-an-off-camera-on-the-record/[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-assessing-putin%E2%80%99s-implicit-nuclear-threats-after-annexation ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024[31] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/22/putin-russia-red-lines-nuclear-threat-retaliation/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924;[32] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091224; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-vulnerable-western-policy-masks-russian-weakness[33] https://t.me/rybar/65513[34] https://t.me/rybar/65513;[35] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18043; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20569[36] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16482[37] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101723 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092223[39] https://news.usni.org/2023/01/17/u-k-sending-14-challenger-2-tanks-ammo-to-ukraine-foreign-minister-says ; https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/british-challenger-tanks-ukraine-russia-b2309338.html[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024[41] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22443; https://t.me/pentagonkh/94[42] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29626; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076; https://t.me/motopatriot/29551[43] https://t.me/rusich_army/18583[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/58076; https://t.me/motopatriot/29551[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19428; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/19/u-zsu-rozpovily-yak-rosijski-vijska-zminyly-taktyku-na-kurshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[47] https://t.me/sashakots/50270[48] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3968387/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-an-off-camera-on-the-record/[49] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7548; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/4249[50] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144880; https://t.me/rusich_army/18584; https://t.me/dva_majors/58121 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80958; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2670; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl [51] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/19/139-vbytyh-okupantiv-u-posadczi-v-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-vtraty-rosiyan-na-harkivshhyni/[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5238[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/286053; https://t.me/tass_agency/286133; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11837[54] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/19/vorog-ne-vykonav-postavlenyh-zavdan-na-kupyanshhyni-zablokovanyj-sylamy-oborony/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19430; https://t.me/tass_agency/286068[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl[57] https://rg dot ru/2024/11/19/rv-vks-rossii-nachali-primeniat-novye-aviabomby-ofzab-500.html; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80932[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80948; https://t.me/motopatriot/29553;[61] https://t.me/motopatriot/29553; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/41570[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/18/zdalysya-v-polon-i-tomu-zhytymut-na-donechchyni-vyyavyly-rosijskyh-peremozhcziv-pryrodnogo-doboru/; https://t.me/ukrbavovna/18035[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80935[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80915; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19446[67] https://t.me/skalabatalion/442; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/18/vystavyly-na-dvi-pozycziyi-nashi-shturmovyky-vlashtuvaly-czilu-vystavu-zarady-uspishnogo-shturmu/[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/45898; https://t.me/sashakots/50263[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl;https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl; https://t.me/wargonzo/23232; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80953[71] https://t.me/andriyshTime/29609[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/58076 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23232 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29633 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/286122 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80953[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/11898 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11900[76] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7550; https://t.me/voin_dv/11908; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11904 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23232[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[79]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23232 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/58076[81]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid038BmdXY6UzH1jug8koSf8Rk4o6yiuXzqM9HmkxfGQLAmgXhfAqPc93EmPyytwMMaBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Fc4Mp31aMa9NUDn1h7RutFYrTHCMU9sniVD6vy8thVF4YFoiEzYAe9xpSpWRJ41vl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hx8MUzAKXtkjfZprMnZHQqGmu3w4C4zZUDkHFYFvdbpohge5Mw2cNzkhiJH8MpDvl[82] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19558 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58055[83] https://suspilne dot media/crimea/883117-u-sevastopoli-okupanti-vstanovili-pancir-s-1-so-zakrivae-golovni-vijskovi-obekti-ates/ ; https://t.me/atesh_ua/5783[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/23230[85] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31470; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31508 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/19/sumshhyna-pid-udarom-shahedy-zrujnuvaly-gurtozhytok-ye-zhertvy-sered-ditej/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/35239 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12444[86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80923; https://t.me/dva_majors/58073; https://t.me/dva_majors/58076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144854[87] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13537 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/13540
- — Iran Update, November 15, 2024
- at 11/21/24 8:49pmAnnika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Adiv Kuray, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months.[1] Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios on November 15 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strikes into Iran on October 25 destroyed an active, top-secret nuclear weapons research facility—Taleghan 2—at the Parchin Military Complex.[2] The Iranian regime previously used the Taleghan 2 facility to test explosives that are needed to detonate a nuclear device before the regime suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003.[3] International inspectors found traces of uranium at the Parchin Military Complex in 2015, indicating that a larger quantity of uranium was there at some point, despite Iranian officials denying that the complex was involved in nuclear activities.[4] Unspecified Israeli officials told Axios that the IDF destroyed “sophisticated equipment” dating back to before 2003 that is “needed to design and test plastic explosives that surround uranium in a nuclear device and are needed to detonate it.”[5] The officials added that due to the Israeli strike on October 25, Iran would have to acquire new equipment if it decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. CTP-ISW does not assess that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon at this time.US and Israeli intelligence began detecting suspicious research activity, including computer modeling, metallurgy, and explosive research, at the Parchin Military Complex earlier in 2024.[6] US and Israeli intelligence services obtained intelligence in March 2024 showing that Iran was running computer models and conducting metallurgical research that could support the development of nuclear weapons.[7] Iran dismissed a warning from the United States in July 2024 about its suspicious research activities.[8] Each one of these activities—computer modeling, metallurgical research, and explosive research—could theoretically have a civilian application. However, when taken together, there is no plausible explanation for these research activities other than that they are meant to support Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal.Computer modeling could reduce the amount of time it would take Iran to conduct a successful real-world nuclear test if Iran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Computer modeling would enable Iran to simulate a nuclear test before conducting a real-life test. Iran—if it decided to do so—could then build multiple nuclear weapons before a real-life test revealed that Iran had achieved weaponization. Building multiple nuclear weapons would allow Iran to test one weapon while still possessing multiple operational weapons to deter adversaries, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's long-standing assessment that Iran has developed a nuclear program that it intends to use to produce a nuclear arsenal. Iran possessed 164.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (uranium enriched up to 60 percent) as of August 2024, which is equivalent to 3.95 significant quantities.[9] The IAEA defines a significant quantity as the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.”[10]According to Axios, the IDF targeted the Taleghan 2 facility because it is not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program and Iran could therefore not acknowledge the significance of the IDF strikes on the site without admitting that it had violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[11] The IDF’s strike also avoided targeting a nuclear facility that the IAEA was actively monitoring by hitting an undeclared site.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Natanz nuclear plant and the Fordow enrichment site in Iran on November 15.[12] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi and lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Kazem Gharib Abadi accompanied Grossi.[13] The IAEA reported in August 2024 that Iran had installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[14]The Lebanese government is considering a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri confirmed to Saudi Arabia-outlet Asharq al Awsat that he received a proposal from the United States on November 15.[15] Reuters first reported that the Lebanese government received the proposal on November 14, citing two senior Lebanese political sources.[16] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the terms under negotiation. Israeli public broadcaster Kan published the same draft that it originally leaked on October 30 in its discussion of the proposal.[17] It remains unclear if Kan’s reporting reflects the current draft under consideration. Kan’s text requires Israel to withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon within seven days and stipulates that the Lebanese army would backfill IDF positions.[18] The supposed draft agreement gives Lebanon and Israel the right to self-defense if necessary and requires Hezbollah to withdraw from southern Lebanon in order to make the Lebanese Armed Forces and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon the only armed forces in the south.[19] Kan’s report would also have Lebanon commit to disarm all unofficial military groups within sixty days of signing the ceasefire.[20] The Lebanese army would supervise all weapons transport into Lebanon as well as dismantle all unauthorized weapons production facilities and unofficial military infrastructure.[21]Parliament Speaker Berri expressed reservations about the current proposal. He denied that the proposal allows freedom of movement in Lebanon for the IDF.[22] Berri also said that the text contains terms unacceptable to Lebanon, including creating a new mechanism involving Western countries to oversee the implementation of UNSCR 1701.[23] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[24] Hezbollah would likely interpret Israeli freedom to operate in Lebanon or a new mechanism to ensure security in southern Lebanon as a ”reduction” of Lebanese sovereignty.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser Ali Larijani met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 15 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.[25] Larijani emphasized Iran’s support for the Lebanese government and Hezbollah during a meeting with Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Larijani’s visit to Beirut comes as the United States continues its efforts to secure a ceasefire in Lebanon.[26] Berri has served as the main mediator between the United States and Israel and Hezbollah in those talks.The head of airport security at Rafic Hariri International Airport reportedly detained the Iranian Embassy in Beirut’s security team while it was escorting Larijani.[27] The report did not specify how long airport security held the security team. A Lebanese media outlet run by a Christian businessman claimed that Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Brigadier General Fadi Kfoury ordered the closure of all gates leading to the VIP lounge after the Iranian Embassy's security team, which was escorting Larijani, cited diplomatic immunity and refused to undergo “thorough inspection.”[28] Hezbollah-affiliated Lebanese outlet al Akhbar accused Kfoury of being close to the United States when Kfoury assumed his position, suggesting that Hezbollah is opposed to Kfoury’s role as head of airport security.[29] Kfoury’s decision to detain Larijani’s security team may indicate an increased willingness among some Lebanese government officials to challenge Hezbollah and Iran’s influence in Lebanon while the group is weakened by Israeli strikes.Israeli forces have advanced to the town of Chama, approximately five kilometers into southwestern Lebanon, as of November 15. Geolocated footage posted on November 15 shows Israeli forces operating at the Shrine of the Prophet Shimon in Chama.[30] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 14 and 15 showed that Israeli forces had advanced from Yarine and Oum Touteh northwest through Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa. Lebanese media reported Israeli artillery shelling in Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa during this time.[31] Artillery fire support is meant to “destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy” to ensure freedom of maneuver for ground forces, which could suggest that Israeli forces were maneuvering near Jebbayn and Tayr Harfa between November 14 and 15.[32] Hezbollah claimed two separate rocket and anti-tank fire attacks on November 15 targeting Israeli forces in western Tayr Harfa and Jebbayn, suggesting Israeli forces continue to operate in these areas.[33] Lebanese media separately claimed Hezbollah and Israeli forces engaged in small-arms combat between Tayr Harfa, Jebbayn, and Chama.[34]Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Seyyed Abolhasan Mahdavi, stated that the Assembly has confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for leadership succession.[35] Mahdavi asserted that this is a regular duty of the Assembly. Khamenei said on November 7 that the Assembly should select a leader who embodies the revolution and ensures its continuation to achieve the revolution's “main goal” of “implementing the religion of Islam in the country and in people's lives."[36] The current Assembly, elected in March 2024, will serve until 2032 and is expected to be responsible for selecting Khamenei's successor upon his passing.[37] Mahdavi also stated that identifying a successor within a confidential commission is not a new issue.[38]Israeli Defense Minister Israeli Katz decided that the IDF would soon begin issuing conscription orders to Israeli ultra-Orthodox.[39] Former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant decided to conscript 7,000 ultra-Orthodox before he was fired, and Katz confirmed this decision.[40] The IDF will send conscription orders to 1,000 ultra-Orthodox beginning on November 17 and will gradually send the remaining 6,000 orders over the next six weeks.[41] Katz’s decision comes after the Israeli Army Radio published data on November 14 showing that the IDF currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower it requires.[42]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program in the past year. This assessment is based on publicly reported US and Israeli intelligence about Iranian research activity at the Parchin Military Complex outside Tehran in recent months. US and Israeli intelligence began detecting suspicious research activity, including computer modeling, metallurgy, and explosive research, at the Parchin Military Complex earlier in 2024.Ceasefire in Lebanon: The Lebanese government is considering a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel. The Lebanese parliamentary speaker expressed reservations about the current proposal.Senior Iranian Official in Lebanon: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser Ali Larijani met with senior Lebanese officials in Beirut on November 15 to discuss a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah conflict. The head of airport security at Rafic Hariri International Airport reportedly detained the Iranian Embassy in Beirut’s security team while it was escorting Larijani.Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: Israeli forces have advanced to the town of Chama, approximately five kilometers into southwestern Lebanon, as of November 15.Supreme Leader Succession: Esfahan interim Friday Prayer Leader and member of the Iranian Assembly of Experts, Seyyed Abolhasan Mahdavi, stated that the Assembly has confidentially identified and prioritized three candidates for leadership succession.Israel Drafts Ultra-Orthodox: Israeli Defense Minister Israeli Katz decided that the IDF will soon begin issuing conscription orders to Israeli ultra-Orthodox.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripPalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published another scripted and coerced video of Israeli hostage Alexander Turbanov to continue degrading Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[43] Turbanov urged Aryeh Deri, the leader of the ultra-Orthodox Israeli Shas party, to convince the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire-hostage deal.[44] PIJ is likely timing the release of these videos to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[45]The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Beit Lahia and Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 15.[46] Israeli forces killed fighters and destroyed militia supplies, including explosives, small arms, and other military equipment. Palestinian militias, including Hamas, conducted six attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor in Beit Lahia.[47] Hamas also detonated an explosively formed penetrator west of Jabalia refugee camp.[48]The IDF Air Force struck and killed PIJ fire control support officer Luqman Abd al Salam Khalil Anbar in Sheikh Radwan, Gaza City, on November 15.[49] Anbar managed PIJ’s rocket attacks targeting Israel and had a central role in PIJ’s munitions production process. The IDF strike also killed several other PIJ fighters.Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces and command-and-control sites along the Netzarim Corridor on November 15.[50]The IDF 143rd Division continued operations in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip on November 15. Israeli forces directed an airstrike targeting armed fighters operating near Israeli forces in Rafah.[51]PIJ fired rockets targeting an IDF artillery position in southern Israel on November 15.[52]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonElements of the IDF 91st Division continued operating in southeastern Lebanon on November 15. The IDF reported that the 91st Division has located rocket launchers and short-range rockets, and various combat equipment during clearing operations.[53] Hezbollah claimed seven rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in the eastern neighborhoods of Tallousseh.[54] Hezbollah also claimed three rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces around Markaba, east of Tallousseh.[55] Geolocated footage posted on November 14 showed the 89th Commando Brigade advancing west from Markaba towards Tallouseh.[56]The IDF 36th Division expanded its clearing operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 15. The 36th Division destroyed underground Hezbollah infrastructure that contained rocket launch platforms, staging areas for ground operations, and various weapons.[57] The 36th Division directed airstrikes and engaged Hezbollah fighters as it advanced.[58] Hezbollah has continued indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance from Maroun al Ras into “second line” Lebanese border towns.[59]The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah weapons manufacturing and storage sites in Beirut on November 15.[60] The IDF conducted at least three separate waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah munitions warehouses, headquarters, and other infrastructure.[61] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ghobeiry, Burj al Barajneh, Hadath, and Haret Hreik, before striking these areas.[62]The IDF struck a Hezbollah Radwan special operations force headquarters in Nabatieh on November 15.[63] The IDF also struck a building used by Hezbollah’s Badr Unit to conduct attacks against Israel and Israeli forces.[64] The Badr Unit is responsible for Hezbollah’s defense north of the Litani River.This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 14 to 2:00pm ET on November 15. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 14.[65] 11 of the 14 Hezbollah-claimed attacks targeted Israeli personnel along the Israel-Lebanon border.[66] Hezbollah conducted two attacks targeting Israeli personnel at the Dovev Barracks in northwestern Israel.[67] Hezbollah fighters fired rockets at Israeli forces in Kiryat Shmona, across the border from where Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Markaba, southeastern Lebanon.[68]Israeli Army Radio reported that there Hezbollah conducted about 40 launches from Lebanon into northern Israel on November 15.[69]Hezbollah also claimed three attacks targeting IDF bases in Israel.[70] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting the IDF Tirat Carmel base in southern Haifa.[71] Hezbollah claimed it conducted an attack targeting Tel Haim, the IDF Military Intelligence Division base, near Tel Aviv.[72] Tel Haim is located 120 km from the border, making this Hezbollah’s deepest attack into Israel on November 14.[73] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this attack and do not Israeli red alerts suggest that Hezbollah successfully targeted this base. CTP-ISW was similarly unable to verify another recent Hezbollah attack that Hezbollah claimed targeted the Kirya in Tel Aviv on November 13.[74] CTP-ISW assessed on November 14 that Israeli forces have likely disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to fire deep into Israel.[75]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceA US delegation sent a message to Iran expressing concern about Iranian influence in Syria, according to an unspecified informed source speaking to Iraqi media on November 15.[76] The delegation reportedly arrived in Baghdad on November 13 to hold indirect talks with Iran aimed at “calming the situation [in the Middle East].”[77] The US delegation called on Iran to prevent Iranian-backed militias in Syria from conducting attacks on Israel.[78] The delegation also noted that the presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officers in Syria “will lead to more tensions and escalation.”[79] This message follows a series of US and IDF airstrikes in Syria in recent days.[80]The IDF Air Force struck a military target in Damascus on November 15.[81] Local sources reported that the strike targeted a military security detachment responsible for the Mezzeh area.[82] No casualties or significant material damage were reported. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility[2] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility[3] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility[4] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-military-sites-continue-haunt-nuclear-accord[5] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-nuclear-equiptment-destryoed-israel[6] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility[7] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/17/iran-nuclear-program-research-warning[8] https://www.axios.com/2024/07/17/iran-nuclear-program-research-warning[9] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-august-2024[10] https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-in-practice ;https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitoring-report-august-2024[11] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/15/iran-israel-destroyed-active-nuclear-weapons-research-facility[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-chief-visits-two-nuclear-sites-during-iran-trip-2024-11-15/[13] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2024/11/15/737286/Iran-IAEA-Natanz-Fordow-Rafael-Grossi-Behrouz-Kamalondi-Kazem-Gharibabadi-[14] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-41.pdf[15] https://english dot aawsat.com/arab-world/5082040-berri-asharq-al-awsat-us-proposal-does-not-guarantee-israeli-freedom-movement[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-strikes-hezbollah-areas-beirut-southern-lebanon-third-day-2024-11-14/[17] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/824897 ; www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/823927/ ; www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/politic/818729/[18] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/824897 [19] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/824897 [20] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/824897 [21] www.kan dot org.il/content/kan-news/defense/824897 [22] https://english dot aawsat.com/arab-world/5082040-berri-asharq-al-awsat-us-proposal-does-not-guarantee-israeli-freedom-movement[23] https://english dot aawsat.com/arab-world/5082040-berri-asharq-al-awsat-us-proposal-does-not-guarantee-israeli-freedom-movemen[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-6-2024[25] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hezbollah-lebanon-iran-ceasefire-beirut-larijani-4659bd568a65da4511852a34f54fbc17;https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/705726[26] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/705726[27] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/lebanon/816136/lbci-lebanon-articles/ar[28] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/lebanon/816136/lbci-lebanon-articles/ar[29] https://al-akhbar dot com/Politics/351749[30] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857411257055264794[31] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102253 ;[32] https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/9B9879F3-F213-4CD7-9D20-8D4520E8D38E-1397219978180/fm3_09.pdf[33] https://t.me/mmirleb/9100 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9075[34] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102656[35] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/832835[36] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=58256[37] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-1-2024#_ednf8771f050e6e6afa4ff71fb427f8cd151[38] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/832835[39] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16512 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024[40] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16513[41] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16514[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024[43] https://t.me/sarayaps/18809[44] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/palestinian-islamic-jihad-publishes-fourth-video-of-hostage-sasha-trufanov/[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024[46] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857315219275501701[47] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8269/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-4-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D8%A8%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8270/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8271/%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-3-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8272/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-4-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-D9-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%87%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%B7-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; https://t.me/sarayaps/18810 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/310962[48] alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8273/%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87-4-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9[49] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857376020376228282 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/310888[50] https://t.me/kataeb_moqawma/4466 ; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7880 ; https://t.me/darebmojahden/5349[51] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857315222580580563[52] https://t.me/sarayaps/18812[53] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857305672599109719[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/9091 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9097 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9098 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9101 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9108 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9109 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9115[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/9084 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9085 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9090[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857045945252188601 ; https://x.com/MarioLeb79/status/1857054013490913630[57] www dot idf.il/248696[58] www dot idf.il/248696[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/9089 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9107[60] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857412190866981140[61] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857407628327973044 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857480291062784362[62] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857379611509698731 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857327551837814832 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857275327065551304[63] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857305687803490806 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857320691311202399[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857305687803490806 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857320691311202399[65] https://t.me/mmirleb/9073; https://t.me/mmirleb/9074; https://t.me/mmirleb/9080; https://t.me/mmirleb/9081; https://t.me/mmirleb/9082; https://t.me/mmirleb/9083; https://t.me/mmirleb/9086; https://t.me/mmirleb/9088; https://t.me/mmirleb/9102; https://t.me/mmirleb/9103; https://t.me/mmirleb/9104; https://t.me/mmirleb/9105; https://t.me/mmirleb/9106; https://t.me/mmirleb/9112[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/9074; https://t.me/mmirleb/9082; https://t.me/mmirleb/9083; https://t.me/mmirleb/9086; https://t.me/mmirleb/9088; https://t.me/mmirleb/9102; https://t.me/mmirleb/9103; https://t.me/mmirleb/9104; https://t.me/mmirleb/9105; https://t.me/mmirleb/9106; https://t.me/mmirleb/9112[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/9103; https://t.me/mmirleb/9112[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/9074; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024[69] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857470386440425879[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/9081; https://t.me/mmirleb/9073; https://t.me/mmirleb/9080[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/9081[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/9073[73] https://t.me/mmirleb/9073[74] https://t.me/mmirleb/9028[75] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-14-2024[76] https://baghdadtoday dot news/262089-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84.html[77] https://baghdadtoday dot news/261958-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9.-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86.html[78] https://baghdadtoday dot news/262089-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84.html[79] https://baghdadtoday dot news/262089-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AB-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%84.html[80] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-13-2024 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024[81] https://x.com/SAMSyria0/status/1857423766558494985[82] https://t.me/damascusv011/25008
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2024
- at 11/21/24 8:15pmGrace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Karolina Hird, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George BarrosNovember 15, 2024, 7:00pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on November 15 and reiterated several Kremlin information operations aimed at influencing the German government and other Western states to pressure Ukraine into premature peace negotiations instead of providing Ukraine with further military support.[1] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the Scholz-Putin call "Pandora's box" and warned that the call helps Putin achieve his key goals: reducing his isolation in the international community and bringing about negotiations on Russia’s preferred terms "that will lead to nothing."[2]Putin and other senior Russian officials have recently intensified rhetoric aimed at influencing the foreign policy of the incoming US government under President-elect Donald Trump.[3] The Kremlin has also recently reiterated its unwillingness to compromise on the terms of any possible future negotiations while strongly indicating that the Kremlin's longstanding goal of complete Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged.[4] The Kremlin likely aims to take advantage of uncertainty about the future US policy regarding Ukraine by intensifying its reflexive control campaign against Ukraine's European allies.[5] Senior Russian officials, including Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, have notably used phone calls with Western political and defense officials to spread Kremlin information operations and attempt to threaten the West into making premature concessions on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity since 2022.[6]Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on November 15. Protesters in Abkhazia stormed the de facto parliament of the Russian-occupied and Kremlin-backed separatist region of Georgia, demanding the dismissal of a proposed investment agreement with Russia that would grant Russian legal entities property ownership rights in Abkhazia and Russian developers preferential tax exemptions.[7] Critics of the proposed legislation argued that the deal would inflate property prices, empower oligarchs, and undermine Abkhazia's desired autonomy.[8] The protesters, waving Russian flags, clarified their discontent was not directed at "fraternal" Russia but at the current Abkhaz government, citing the need to protect Abkhazia's "national interests."[9] The protesters also called for the resignation of the current de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.[10] The protests forced the Abkhaz parliament to postpone the vote on the agreement, with opposition leaders later announcing plans to present their demands to the current de facto Abkhaz leadership.[11]Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova urged Russians to avoid travel to Abkhazia, citing safety concerns, and warned that the crisis could deter future economic investments in Abkhazia.[12] The Russian information space reacted by calling the protesters ungrateful, and some milbloggers attributed the protests to external actors including Turkey, while others warned that the Abkhaz economy largely relies on Russia.[13]Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support via various means and platforms. French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu reported on November 14 that the Ukrainian "Anna Kyivska" Brigade has completed its training in France.[14] The Anna Kyivska Brigade is notably the first Ukrainian brigade that completed training in France and which France equipped as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in support of Ukraine.[15] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov noted that France has provided Ukraine with general and specialized military training and "state-of-the-art" equipment and weapons, including armored personnel carriers (APCs), self-propelled artillery systems, and situational awareness systems.[16]Umerov also met with Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Ghar Støre and Norwegian Defense Minister Björn Arild Gram in Oslo on November 15, during which Norway announced it would join the "Danish format" of providing support for Ukraine via financing the domestic production of Ukrainian weapons and equipment.[17] Umerov, Gram, and Støre also discussed the creation of a "Norwegian format" that would provide external investment in Ukrainian defense technology companies.[18]US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on November 15 that the US remains committed to disbursing around $7.1 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) assistance to Ukraine before President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2025.[19] Singh noted that the Pentagon plans to send military assistance packages to Ukraine on an "almost weekly" basis until the inauguration.Key Takeaways:The Kremlin is intensifying its reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing Western decision-making in Russia's favor ahead of or in lieu of possible future negotiations about the resolution of the war in Ukraine.Abkhazian oppositionists protested an agreement between the de facto government of Georgia’s Abkhazia region with Russia aimed at enhancing Russian investors’ rights in Abkhazia on November 15.Ukraine's Western partners continue to provide Ukraine with military support via various means and platforms.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar.The Kremlin continues efforts to expand its "Time of Heroes" program to create a new social class comprised of veterans loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and ideology.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationUkrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Korenevo amid continued fighting along the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 15 shows that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced within eastern Novoivanovka (southeast of Korenevo).[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in forests near Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha), Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha), and Olgovka (east of Korenevo), and another milblogger claimed that inclement weather is slowing both Ukrainian and Russian operations in the area.[21] Russian forces continued attacks along the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, including near Darino (southeast of Korenevo), on November 14 and 15.[22] Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Darino, drone operators of the Russian "Alabiya" Group are reportedly operating in Sudzhansky Raion, and elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[23]Ukrainian forces conducted a strike reportedly targeting the Krymsky Airfield in Krasnodar Krai overnight on November 14 to 15, though the damage from the strike is unclear.[24] Geolocated footage published on the evening of November 14 shows an explosion in the direction of Krymsk Airbase, which is reportedly the base of the Russian 3rd Combined Aviation Regiment (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army).[25] Krasnodar Krai authorities claimed that Russian forces intercepted 46 Ukrainian drones over Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian drones damaged residential areas in Krymsk and Krasnoarmeysk raions, and a Russian milblogger charactered the strike as the largest Ukrainian strike against Krasnodar Krai since the start of the full-scale invasion.[26]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)A likely Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group conducted a limited incursion across the international border into Chernihiv Oblast on November 15, but there are currently no indications that Russian forces have established an enduring presence in the area. Geolocated footage published on November 15 shows two Russian soldiers walking along the eastern side of a damaged bridge across the Sudost River connecting Hremyach and Kolos (both about 1.5 kilometers south of the international border), planting a Russian flag on the bridge, and returning to the eastern side of the bridge.[27] A Russian milblogger published footage of an additional Russian flag flying on an abandoned building allegedly in Muravi (east of Hremyach and Kolos), but the footage does not show Russian infantry in the area.[28] Russian milbloggers broadly claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups crossed the border and entered or seized Hremyach, Kolos, Novoselydivka (immediately east of Kolos and west of Muravi), and Muravi.[29] ISW is unable to confirm these claims and has not observed evidence indicating that Russian soldiers maintain positions in the border area. Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Spokesperson Andriy Kovalenko stated that Russian forces only briefly crossed into Chernihiv Oblast to plant the Russian flags and then withdrew and that the Russian claims of advance and seizing settlements are false and are part of an information operation.[30] Demchenko stated that the border area where Russian forces planted the flag is cut off from the rest of Chernihiv Oblast by the river and that the settlements that Russian forces supposedly seized are abandoned.[31]Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 14 and 15 but did not advance. Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City within and near Vysoka Yaruha, Lyptsi, and Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Tykhe, Starytsya, and Vovchansk.[32] A representative of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on November 14 and 15 that Russian forces north of Kharkiv City are not concentrating significant forces or mechanized equipment at scale in frontline areas due to snow and poor weather conditions.[33] The representative further noted that Russian forces’ tactics in the northern Kharkiv area of operations have not changed and that Russian forces continue to conduct assaults in small infantry groups without vehicle support. Ukrainian “Kharkiv” Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevheniy Romanov stated that small Russian infantry groups in the Kharkiv area of operations resumed conducting attacks with tank and armored vehicle support around November 13, however.[34] Romanov stated on November 14 that Russian forces continue attacking near Vovchansk, Starytsya, and Lyptsi likely in an effort to reestablish tube artillery firing positions capable of shelling Kharkiv City and reopening access to roads that could facilitate future Russian advances toward Kharkiv City.[35]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces made further advances into Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14 and 15. Geolocated footage published on November 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southward to Dzerzhynskoho Street in eastern Kupyansk.[36] Russian sources claimed on November 14 and 15 that Russian forces gained a foothold on the outskirts of Kupyansk and are establishing logistics networks in the area to enable future offensive operations in the city, which is consistent with available geolocated footage.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 14 and 15 that Russian forces are engaged in active combat with Ukrainian forces near the sugar factory and industrial zone in eastern Kupyansk.[38] A Ukrainian soldier operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on November 14 that Ukrainian forces were able to hold the defense of Kupyansk throughout June and July 2024 but that the situation became more challenging in the fall as small groups of one to two Russian soldiers pierced deep behind Ukrainian defensive lines.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 14 that Russian forces recently utilized "new" tactics in their attack on Kupyansk and assaulted Ukrainian forces in small armored groups with five to ten accompanying infantry.[40] One milblogger added that Russian forces advanced into Kupyansk along a railroad line and are continuing attempts to advance in the area. Further Russian advances into central and western Kupyansk coupled with recent Russian advances southwest of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka and Kruhlyakivka could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions within Kupyansk and from the current Ukrainian salient east and southeast of the town.Russian forces continued offensive operations elsewhere along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14 and 15. Russian sources claimed on November 15 that Russian forces advanced west of Karmazynivka (southwest of Svatove) and are exerting fire control over nearly 10 kilometers of territory west of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove), although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 and 15 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka, Pishchane Kolisnykivka, Zahryzove, Kruhlyakivka, and Lozova; and west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai, Kopanky, Pershotravneve, and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Katerynivka; and northwest of Kreminna near Nevske and Terny; and west of Kreminna near Torske.[42]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on November 14 and 15 but did not advance.[43] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR] Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk direction.[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on November 14 and 15 but did not advance.[45] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on November 15 that Russian infantry conducting assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction are attempting to use special raincoats and blankets to hide their thermal signatures from Ukrainian drones and thermal imagers.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are struggling to advance further west after capturing footholds of the west bank of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal near Chasiv Yar. Drone operators of the Russian “Okhotnik” (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk amid continued fighting in the direction on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 11 and 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern and southern Toretsk.[48] Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 14 and 15.[49] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Anastasiya Bobovnikova stated on November 14 that Russian forces recently conducted a mechanized assault near Nelipivka (southwest of Toretsk) and that Ukrainian forces inflicted 12 Russian personnel casualties and destroyed seven unspecified light vehicles.[50] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA,) reportedly continue operating in Toretsk.[51]Russian forces recently advanced south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Yurivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove) and west of Novooleksiivka (southwest of Selydove).[52] A Ukrainian military observer stated that Russian forces recently seized positions in northern Petrivka and Hryhorivka (both west of Selydove).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.3 kilometers in depth west of Novooleksiivka and advanced along Zheleznodorozhna Street and near the railway line in Petrivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[54] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Petrivka, Pushkine, Pustynka, and Zhovte on November 14 and 15.[55]Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Kurakhove, and Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Kurakhove. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Pobieda (southwest of Kurakhove) into the rear of Russian forces currently attempting to advance near Dalne (south of Kurakhove).[56] Additional geolocated footage published on November 15 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove).[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces cleared an area two kilometers wide and up to 1.5 kilometers in depth between Sontsivka and Novoselydivka (both northeast to north of Kurakhove and the Kurakhivske Reservoir) and that Russian forces advanced 350 meters in depth east of Berestky and 600 meters in depth north of Illinka (both north of Kurakhove and along the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) and in Kurakhove itself.[58] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized Dalne (south of Kurakhove) and advanced southwest of the settlement.[59] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Stepanivka (north of Kurakhove) as of November 15, although ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of November 6.[60] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka, Zorya, Voznesenka, and Sontsivka; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Novo Illinka, and Berestky; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 14 and 15.[61] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[62]Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction amid continued fighting on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar) and likely seized the entire settlement.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) participated in the seizure of Antonivka.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced north of Maksymivka (northeast of Vuhledar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[65] Russian forces continued attacking northeast of Vuheldar near Antonivka and Kostyantynivka and northwest of Vuhledar near Yantarne, Kostyantynopolske, and Trudove on November 14 and 15.[66] Elements of the Russian "Aleppo" drone detachment of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vuhledar direction; the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) near Prechystivka (west of Vuhledar); and the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) near Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[67]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 15 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced three kilometers in the direction of Novodarivka and advanced north of Rivnopil (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka), but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[68] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance on Velyka Novosilka from the east, south, and southwest in order to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in this area, which is consistent with ISW's recent assessment that Russian forces may attempt to leverage advances northwest of Vuhledar to pressure Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka.[69] Russian forces attacked south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 14 and 15.[70]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on November 14 and 15.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces increased the tempo of strikes against Ukrainian force concentrations and defensive positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast in preparation for a possible Russian offensive operation in the near future.[72] ISW has still not independently observed confirmation that Russian forces have redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia direction from other areas of the frontline, nor other indicators suggesting an imminent Russian offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[74]The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) expressed outrage in response to a November 13 interview between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and German news agency Deutsche Presse-Agentur discussing the placement of IAEA representatives at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). The Russian MFA claimed on November 14 that IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi made “unacceptable statements” about IAEA representatives remaining at the ZNPP until a possible freeze of the war in Ukraine and stressed that only the Russian government can authorize IAEA representatives to visit the ZNPP.[75] Russia has illegally occupied the ZNPP since March 2022.Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 14 and 15, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[76] Drone operators of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[77] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD], formerly Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[78] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on October 30 that Russia transferred unspecified elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade to the Pokrovsk direction, suggesting that elements of the brigade are now split between at least two sectors of the front.[79]Ukrainian naval drone strikes and poor weather conditions are forcing the Russian military to allocate a significant number of Russian air defenses from other frontline directions to occupied Crimea in order to defend critical infrastructure. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on November 15 that Ukrainian naval drone strikes on Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels decreased the number of Russian BSF vessels guarding the Kerch Strait Bridge from between 10 to 14 in 2023 to zero in November 2024.[80] Pletenchuk noted that Russian forces are utilizing rotary-wing aircraft instead of Russian fixed-wing aviation to defend the Kerch Strait Bridge as Russian helicopters can maintain the same speed as Ukrainian drones and more easily patrol the area. Pletenchuk reported on November 14 that poor weather conditions are causing Russian forces to rely on aviation instead of Russian BSF vessels to patrol the Black Sea.[81] ISW previously assessed in June 2024 that sustained Ukrainian strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea were forcing Russia to commit additional air defense assets to the area, and it appears that this pattern has continued due to the pressure of Ukrainian naval drone strikes and deteriorating weather conditions.[82]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted another series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles at Odesa Oblast from airspace over the Black Sea and 29 Shahed drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea overnight.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down one of the Kh-59/69 missiles and 25 drones primarily over Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also downed Shahed drones in Mykolaiv, Kirovohrad, and Ternopil oblasts.[84] Acting Head of the Ukrainian Air Force Press Office Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces only used Shahed drones for the November 14-15 strike and did not use any mock drones like in other recent strikes likely to complicate Ukrainian air defenses.[85] Odesa Oblast officials reported that the Russian strikes damaged port infrastructure, civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, heating systems, and religious and educational institutions in Odesa City.[86]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Kremlin continues efforts to expand its "Time of Heroes" program to create a new social class comprised of veterans loyal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime and ideology. The Time of Heroes Public Council held a meeting on November 14 to discuss expanding educational programming for select war veterans, including establishing a second cohort of graduate school master students to study public administration.[87] A Russian source asserted on November 15 that over 1,000 Russian veterans signed up within the first few hours of the enrolment period.[88] A Russian insider source claimed on November 15 that the initiative has left a positive impression on Russian authorities, who are now aiming to scale up and amplify the program at the federal level and among veterans in good standing with the Kremlin.[89] The source noted that Russian authorities’ apparent satisfaction with the Time of Heroes program suggests that the influence of Kremlin elites who lead the program - specifically First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Rector of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration Alexei Komissarov - will likely increase. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is attempting to militarize Russian society and government and to fill government positions with pro-Kremlin and pro-war veterans through the Time of Heroes program.[90]Russian forces continue to commit newly recruited servicemembers with little to no combat training to frontline combat. A Russian milblogger amplified a claim on November 15 that an inexperienced contract servicemember signed a contract on October 14 only to die in combat twelve days later on October 26.[91] The milblogger claimed that deaths resulting from expedited training are now a common occurrence. Russian forces' reduced and expedited training has contributed to higher attrition rates and cohesion problems within the Russian military.[92]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1857397107440906728; https://t.me/kryvyirih17otbr/3896; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22274; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1857115530429436362 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1857101319611248956[21] https://t.me/rusich_army/18486; https://t.me/dva_majors/57761[22] https://t.me/dva_majors/57761; https://t.me/rybar/65395; https://t.me/wargonzo/23165; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl[23] https://t.me/voin_dv/11837 ; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/4181; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11798; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144395 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19247[24] https://t.me/astrapress/68501[25] https://t.me/astrapress/68501; https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1857247710006718467; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/3411; https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1857307657956172266[26] https://crimea.ria dot ru/20241115/46-dronov-podavleny-nad-krymskim-rayonom-za-noch-1141872218.html; https://www.rferl dot org/a/kupyansk-attack-odesa-kiper-strike-trukhanov/33202942.html; https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-ataka-droniv-rf-aerodrom-krymsk/33202996.html; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/3411; https://x.com/Dmojavensis/status/1857307657956172266; https://t.me/wargonzo/23170[27] https://x.com/kromark/status/1857316698900041812; https://x.com/kromark/status/1857337763860713602; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144393; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1857348087032754545[28] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80700[29] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19468; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19223; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29517; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29517; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80700; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80698; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80687; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80704; https://t.me/milinfolive/135096[30] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2024/11/15/7484636/ ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8287; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/zagrozy-vtorgnennya-na-chernigivshhynu-nemaye-proryvu-kordonu-ne-bulo-czpd/;[31] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2024/11/15/7484636/[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcll; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/vovchansk-staryczya-ta-lypczi-pid-udarom-voroga-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-okupanty-vkotre-zaznaly-vtrat/[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/duzhe-shhilno-staly-syly-oborony-nadijno-kontrolyuyut-tankonebezpechni-napryamky-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny/[34] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/14/vovchansk-staryczya-ta-lypczi-pid-udarom-voroga-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-okupanty-vkotre-zaznaly-vtrat/[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/vovchansk-staryczya-ta-lypczi-pid-udarom-voroga-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-okupanty-vkotre-zaznaly-vtrat/[36] https://t.me/khornegroup/2919 ; https://t.me/khornegroup/2919 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7516[37] https://t.me/rybar/65395 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285350[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/57761 ; https://t.me/rybar/65395[39] https://x.com/YuriiHorskyi/status/1857077180418707940[40] https://t.me/DmitriySteshin/12099 ; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1720[41] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29521 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285323[42]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[44] https://t.me/epoddubny/21638[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/ataky-pid-kovdramy-zamist-zombi-shturmiv-vorog-zminyuye-taktyku-u-chasovomu-yaru/[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12980[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1857212549835407644; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1857212934394699988; https://www.tiktok.com/@oleksander1313/video/7435737147560283424 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1857446158957756618; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/77[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/miski-boyi-vazhka-i-brudna-robota-shhodnya-v-toreczku-minusuyut-do-sotni-okupantiv/[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/23179[52] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7513; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1655561468645990/ ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7514; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/1655561468645990/[53] https://t.me/muchnoyairborne/10893[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80676 ; https://t.me/don_partizan/6566 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144445[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80676 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[56] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22299; https://t.me/mechanized33/540[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7517; https://t.me/osirskiy/930[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19242 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144420 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144370 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29513 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285379 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80676[59] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29511 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60145 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19464[60] https://t.me/tass_agency/285374 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2024[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60134[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/57761[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/57750; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7510[64] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19472[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144370[66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/11842; https://t.me/voin_dv/11846; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144334[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144370; https://t.me/dva_majors/57761 ; https://t.me/rybar/65395 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19245[69] https://t.me/rybar/65392[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80670[73] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111224[74] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15018[75] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1981661/[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aj5vTBnWbBMzKgbJB5Y6bA45QG4Wa9AiLNufb2EHyajNsJDHpitG7iDHvsv8WSETl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0CGD7dM4GjassrzpuBJGr1JWHsVWbMyzFCavXsJhmd6BG3hueuR3JPjZQyWJHbxtcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03dbCrKMP65XWGxtHimNQmZfpuh6kGccy5Sq9YvUW2m7hxgPu6ajsVY1a5uGFYPuRl [77] https://t.me/dva_majors/57837[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60124[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2310[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/u-vms-zsu-rozpovily-yak-rosiyany-styaguyut-resursy-dlya-svogo-zahystu-v-okupovanomu-krymu/[81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024[82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-13-2024[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/22916[84] https://suspilne dot media/880307-obstril-odesi-nastupnogo-tizna-ukraincam-predstavlat-vnutrisnij-plan-stijkosti-996-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731650648&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/kpszsu/22916[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/15/vnochi-rf-atakuvala-odesu-same-udarnymy-dronamy-a-ne-imitaczijnymy-bpla-yurij-ignat/[86] https://t.me/truonline/3487; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7556; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7557; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/737 ; https://suspilne dot media/880307-obstril-odesi-nastupnogo-tizna-ukraincam-predstavlat-vnutrisnij-plan-stijkosti-996-den-vijni-onlajn/[87] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/administration/75579; https://t.me/mod_russia/45722; https://t.me/news_kremlin/4746[88] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80691[89] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16473[90] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2024[91] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1720[92] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1704730679748006156; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12606
- — Iran Update, November 18, 2024
- at 11/21/24 8:15pmSiddhant Kishore, Andie Parry, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells,Alexandra Braveman, Michael Weiner, Buckley DeJardin, Anthony Carrillo, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The continued looting of humanitarian aid trucks demonstrates that Hamas’ internal control remains limited and severely weakened. Armed groups looted 98 of 109 humanitarian aid trucks that entered the southern Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing on November 16.[1] It is unclear if these armed groups are affiliated with any Palestinian militia group, but the armed men were likely part of organized criminal groups that have replaced Hamas’ police forces in much of the Strip.[2] Hamas claimed that it conducted a joint operation with local family groups in which Hamas and locals killed 20 individuals who had looted the vehicles.[3] The fact that Hamas had to cooperate with these local groups indicates that Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip remains weak. Hamas has long fought local families and organized criminal groups for control over the Gaza Strip. The UNRWA spokesperson said that the aid convoys are not allowed to maintain any armed guards and that they usually attempt to drive fast to avoid ambushes by armed groups.[4] The IDF has recently taken several steps to increase the flow of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing and facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[5] CTP-ISW has not observed the IDF escorting any aid itself, however.Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that he would reject any ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that requires a full IDF withdrawal.[6] Netanyahu reiterated this position after a meeting with his security chiefs. Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, Mossad Director David Barnea, and the IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi recommended that the government agree to a ceasefire including an IDF withdrawal to return the hostages.[7] Netanyahu said that Hamas only wants a deal so that the IDF will leave and Hamas can regain power, which Netanyahu said he would not allow.[8] Netanyahu said that the IDF had not sufficiently degraded Hamas’ governance capabilities. Netanyahu further emphasized the need to maintain complete operational control over the Gaza Strip, especially the Philadelphi Corridor, to retain IDF’s freedom of movement across the strip.[9]Hamas denied that it has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[10] An unspecified Turkish diplomat also rejected claims that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[11] Israeli media reported on November 17 that unspecified Arab and Israeli sources claimed that Hamas’ political leadership had relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[12]Hezbollah responded to a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel.[13] Hezbollah officials delivered the group's response on November 17 to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is reportedly discussing the proposed changes with Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[14] Sources ”close to Hezbollah” told Al Jazeera that Hezbollah is approaching the draft in a “positive manner” and with flexibility.[15] A Lebanese government source added to Al Jazeera that the clause allowing Israel’s right to self-defense needed to be less vague.[16] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu desires a ceasefire deal that keeps Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, preserves Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon, and stops Hezbollah from re-arming through Syria.[17] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said in early November that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[18] US presidential envoy Amos Hochstein traveled to Beirut on November 18 to review the proposal.[19] US officials told Axios that Hochstein would only travel if there were ”greater clarifications about the Lebanese position,” indicating mediators think that there is progress on the deal.[20] It is unclear at the time of writing when Israel will receive Hezbollah’s response.Israel has continued air interdiction operations in the Qusayr area of Syria that are designed to disrupt Hezbollah supply lines. Satellite imagery confirms that Israeli airstrikes have destroyed 15 bridges along the Syria-Lebanon border. These 15 bridges are crucial to Hezbollah’s ground line of communication that transports weapons and fighters from Syria and Iraq.[21] The Syrian regime confirmed on November 13 that Israeli airstrikes destroyed several bridges over the Orontes River in Qusayr. [22] Local Syrian sources said that Israeli strikes destroyed all seven river-spanning bridges.[23] The IDF’s destruction of these bridges is designed to impede Hezbollah’s resupply of its depleted munitions stocks. Hezbollah and Iran could presumably use other routes, though some routes may be less optimal and more dangerous. The IDF said that its airstrikes in Syria harm Hezbollah’s weapons transfer apparatus, particularly Hezbollah Unit 4400, which works with Iran to arm Hezbollah.[24]Key Takeaways:Hamas Control in the Gaza Strip: The continued looting of humanitarian aid trucks demonstrates that Hamas’ internal control remains limited and severely weakened. Armed men, likely part of criminal organizations, looted 98 of 109 humanitarian aid trucks that entered the southern Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom border crossing on November 16.Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that he would reject any ceasefire in the Gaza Strip that requires a full IDF withdrawal. Netanyahu reiterated this position after a meeting with his security chiefs in which the chiefs argued in support of a ceasefire.Hamas Relocation: Hamas denied that it has relocated from Qatar to Turkey. An unspecified Turkish diplomat also rejected claims that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.Lebanon Ceasefire: Hezbollah responded to a US-proposed ceasefire draft to end Hezbollah’s war with Israel.Israeli Interdiction of Hamas Supplies: Israel has continued air interdiction operations in the Qusayr area of Syria that are designed to disrupt Hezbollah supply lines. Satellite imagery confirms that Israeli airstrikes have destroyed 15 bridges along the Syria-Lebanon border. These 15 bridges are important to Hezbollah’s ground line of communication that transports weapons and fighters from Syria and Iraq.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Beit Lahia and Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 18.[25] The IDF destroyed Palestinian militia infrastructure, located tunnel shafts and weapons, and killed several Palestinian fighters during fighting in Beit Lahia.[26] The IDF also conducted an airstrike targeting two Hamas fighters entering a tunnel shaft in the northern Gaza Strip.[27] Palestinian militias conducted at least five attacks targeting Israeli forces in Beit Lahia.[28]An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the IDF facilitated the evacuation of approximately 4,000 Gazans from Beit Lahia to southern Gaza City via established routes between November 17 and 18.[29] The IDF estimated that thousands of Gazans still remain in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF detained “dozens” of Palestinian fighters who were attempting to relocate south of Gaza City via the established evacuation route.[30]The IDF 99th Division likely continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 18. Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting Israeli forces east of Bureij refugee camp.[31] Hamas also claimed that one of its snipers hit IDF personnel in Gaza City.[32]The al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades fired rockets targeting an IDF position along the Netzarim Corridor on November 18.[33] The IDF 143rd Division likely continued clearing operations in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip on November 18. A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF conducted controlled demolitions of civilian infrastructure in areas in Rafah city and Khan Younis.[34]The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor in the southern Gaza Strip on November 18.[35] West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe United States sanctioned three private Israeli companies and three Israeli individuals on November 18 for violence against civilians, and the destruction or dispossession of property in the West Bank.[36] This marks the first time the United States imposed sanctions on private Israeli building companies in the West Bank.[37] The US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Amana settlement development organization and its subsidiary Binyanei Bar Amana in the West Bank.[38] The Amana settlement development organization is involved with US-sanctioned individuals and the expansion of settlements and illegal outposts in the West Bank.[39] The United Kingdom and Canada previously sanctioned the Amana organization.[40] 88 Democratic lawmakers urged the Biden administration on October 29 to impose sanctions on the Amana organization for providing loans and helping to build illegal outposts in the West Bank.[41] The US State Department also imposed sanctions on three individuals and the Eyal Hari Yehuda Company in the West Bank involved with constructing illegal West Bank settlements and outposts.[42]The 431st Territorial Brigade confiscated several M-16 rifles and arrested several wanted individuals near Zeita, Tulkarm Governorate, on the Israel-West Bank border.[43] Zeita is located in the ”seam zone” border area between Israel and the West Bank and is less than less than one mile from Israel. The 431st Territorial Brigade is the IDF brigade responsible for Jenin and Tulkarm.The IDF foiled an attempted car ramming attack against IDF troops on November 18 near al Tawani, Hebron Governorate, in the southern West Bank.[44] The IDF brought the female attacker in for questioning following the attack.[45]Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonHezbollah rocket artillery cells attempted to halt Israeli advances toward Khiam on November 18. Hezbollah claimed nine rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel south of Khiam and on the city’s eastern outskirts.[46] Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah also engaged Israeli forces with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades south and east of Khiam.[47] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces advanced along two axes towards the southern and eastern outskirts of Khiam on November 16, including by advancing from al Wazzani towards Ain Arab.[48] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks south of al Wazzani, indicating that Israeli armor operated in the area. Lebanese sources reported that the IDF fired artillery at least six separate times and conducted airstrikes in the Khiam area in conjunction with the IDF’s advance.[49]The IDF continued to operate in Maroun al Ras on November 18. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Maroun al Ras.[50] The IDF 36th Division has historically operated in Maroun al Ras.[51]The IDF 226th Paratroopers Brigade (146th Division) cleared Hezbollah infrastructure near Alma al Chaab, southwestern Lebanon.[52] Israeli forces uncovered dozens of above-ground and underground fighting positions that were stocked with multi-barreled launchers, and mortar and rocket stockpiles in rural and urban areas.[53] Geolocated footage posted on November 18 shows Israeli forces operating in Alma al Chaab.[54]Hezbollah claimed to attack Israeli forces operating in southwest Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted on November 18 shows Israeli forces operating in Tayr Harfa.[55] Hezbollah fired an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) at an Israeli tank between Tayr Harfa and Jibbain on November 17.[56] Hezbollah claimed that the ATGM destroyed the tank, killing and injuring the crew.[57] Hezbollah did not provide any evidence to substantiate these claims and has repeatedly lied about the success of its forces since this campaign began. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist also reported small arms engagements between Hezbollah and the IDF in Chama, west of Tayr Harfa.[58]The IDF has likely continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah senior leadership and infrastructure in Beirut since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 17.[59] Lebanese media reported that IDF struck a building in the Zuqaq al Balat neighborhood in northern Beirut.[60] The IDF did not immediately confirm it conducted the attack and did not issue evacuation orders ahead of the strike. Israel’s air campaign has mainly focused on sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs, including in Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, Hadath, and al Chiyah.[61] Israeli Army Radio recirculated Lebanese reports that the IDF targeted a Hezbollah operations room, but CTP-ISW is unable to confirm the target at this time.[62]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 17 to 2:00pm ET on November 18. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 17.[63] Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks targeting IDF personnel along the Israel-Lebanon border.[64] Hezbollah fighters launched two rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel in Kiryat Shmona, across the border from where Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Markaba, southeastern Lebanon.[65] Hezbollah launched an anti-tank guided missile at IDF personnel in Shtula, northwestern Israel.[66]Hezbollah conducted attacks targeting multiple IDF sites and towns in northern Israel.[67] Hezbollah fighters fired rockets targeting an IDF Golani Brigade administrative headquarters north of Acre.[68] Hezbollah also launched one-way attack drones targeting Golani Brigade training camps at the Regavim base, southeast of Haifa.[69] Hezbollah stated this attack was part of its ”Khaybar” operations, which are meant to retaliate for Israel's killing of Hassan Nasrallah.[70] Hezbollah also conducted a drone attack targeting Israeli forces at the Ya‘ara Barracks, in northwestern Israel.[71] Hezbollah claimed that it launched two rocket attacks targeting the towns of Hosen and Kerem Ben Zimra in northwestern Israel for the first time.[72]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat, southern Israel, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 17.[73] The IDF confirmed on X that ”a hostile aircraft” activated sirens in the Eilat area and the Air Force intercepted a drone from the east before it reached Israeli territory.[74] The IDF reported that one of its interceptor missiles that the IDF fired at the drone malfunctioned and crashed in the surrounding area.[75] Israeli media reported that the interceptor missile appeared to have fallen across the border in Aqaba, southern Jordan.[76] The IDF added that there were no casualties and that they are carrying out an investigation into the incident.[77]European states continue to sanction Iranian entities connected to Iranian efforts to supply Russia with arms to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK) both sanctioned Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) for transporting Iranian drones to Russia on November 18.[78] The EU also sanctioned IRISL’s director Mohammad Reza Khiabani and three Russian shipping firms—MG Flot, VTS Broker, and Arapax—for transporting Iranian weapons, including drone parts to resupply Russian troops in Ukraine.[79] The UK also implemented an asset freeze on Iran Air.[80] Iran Air is Iran's national airline and shipping carrier. US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Iran Air in early September.[81]Dutch media BNR reported that Dutch-based law firm International Law Firm Taheri (IFLT) established at least six front companies since 2020 to help the Iranian oil industry evade US sanctions.[82] IFLT set up these companies to manage oil tankers with paid intermediaries as directors to obfuscate IFLT’s ownership.[83] The US sanctioned three oil tankers registered at ILFT's office address in Suriname in October 2024 for their involvement in Iranian oil.[84] ILFT owner Masoud Taheri told BNR that he is just a service provider offering a ”solution” for a client faced with a “legal issue at an international level." BNR reported that ILFT plays an important role in Iran's “ghost fleet,” a network of illicit shipping facilitators for Iranian oil exports.[85] United Against Nuclear Iran estimated that the six tankers registered through ILFT have collectively exported 160 million barrels of oil from Iran since US sanctions took effect.[86]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s international affairs adviser Ali Akbar Velayati said that US President Donald Trump's presidency would not impact Sino-Iranian relations in a meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Iran Cong Peiwu on November 18.[87] The officials likely discussed the continuation of Iranian oil exports to China, although oil exports were not explicitly stated in the meeting summary.[88] Iranian oil exports to China are extremely important to the Iranian economy. Iran views a stable economy as an important piece of regime security because the Iranian regime believes protests are more likely when the economy is failing. This was likely in response to discussions of potential US sanctions on Iran’s energy sector in the upcoming Trump administration.[89]Likely Jaish al Adl fighters shot and killed two Basij members in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Iran, on November 18.[90] Unspecified gunmen killed the Basij members when they were returning from work in a private car. Iranian media has not reported who is responsible for the attack and no group has claimed the attack at the time of this writing. Jaish al Adl—a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group—has increased its rate of attacks targeting security forces in southeastern Iran, however.[91] Iranian authorities attributed the attack to “terrorist elements.” This activity is part of a general increase in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[92]Iranian Armed Forces General Staff deputy chief Brigadier General Mohammed Reza Ashtiani discussed the importance of bilateral military cooperation with his Azerbaijani counterpart Brigadier General Farid Aliyev during the fourth round of the Joint Commission on Military and Defense Cooperation on November 18.[93] Irani and Azerbaijani forces have held three joint military exercises this year.[94]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/large-gaza-food-convoy-violently-looted-unrwa-says-2024-11-18/[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/18/world/middleeast/gaza-aid-convoy-looted-unrwa-israel.html[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/large-gaza-food-convoy-violently-looted-unrwa-says-2024-11-18/[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/18/world/middleeast/gaza-aid-convoy-looted-unrwa-israel.html[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-9-2024[6] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/pm-says-he-wont-back-deal-that-ends-war-with-idf-leaving-gaza-so-hamas-can-return-to-power/[7] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/stance-on-ending-war-must-soften-for-hostage-deal-security-chiefs-said-to-tell-pm/ ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16586[8] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/pm-says-he-wont-back-deal-that-ends-war-with-idf-leaving-gaza-so-hamas-can-return-to-power/[9] https://www.israelhayom.co dot il/news/politics/article/16802657[10] https://asharq dot com/politics/107110/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9/[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-political-office-has-not-moved-turkey-qatar-turkish-source-says-2024-11-18/[12] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/hamas-officials-booted-by-qatar-last-week-now-hosted-in-turkey-diplomat-says/ ; 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https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20094/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-408-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88[32] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/20094/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-408-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A2%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%88[33] https://t.me/nedalps/4510[34] https://t.me/hamza20300/311608 ; https://t.me/hamza20300/311557[35] https://t.me/sarayaps/18822[36] https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-for-dispossession-and-violence-in-the-west-bank/[37] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/us-sanctions-occupied-west-bank-construction-companies[38] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2715[39] https://www.axios.com/2024/11/18/us-sanctions-occupied-west-bank-construction-companies[40] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2715[41] https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024.10.29%20Final%20letter%20to%20admin%20re%20West%20Bank%20violence%5B19%5D-compressed_1.pdf[42] https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-for-dispossession-and-violence-in-the-west-bank/[43] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858437360893005901 ; 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https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858472763503018443[54] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1858491211541017057 ; https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/1858471743691632717[55] https://x.com/ytirawi/status/1858483816341344257 ; https://x.com/Me1Ray/status/1858494680616546789[56] https://t.me/mmirleb/9187[57] https://t.me/mmirleb/9187[58] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103725[59] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103731 ; https://t.me/Aitarounmediaplatform/59067 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1858562108524315084 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16612[60] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103731 ; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16611[61] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103257;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103265;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103266;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103319;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103321;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103324;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103326;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103355;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103369;https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1858205637043233221[62] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1858562108524315084[63] https://t.me/mmirleb/9197; https://t.me/mmirleb/9203; https://t.me/mmirleb/9204; https://t.me/mmirleb/9205; https://t.me/mmirleb/9207; https://t.me/mmirleb/9208; https://t.me/mmirleb/9211; https://t.me/mmirleb/9212; https://t.me/mmirleb/9219; https://t.me/mmirleb/9221; https://t.me/mmirleb/9223; https://t.me/mmirleb/9224; https://t.me/mmirleb/9227[64] https://t.me/mmirleb/9197; https://t.me/mmirleb/9211; https://t.me/mmirleb/9212; https://t.me/mmirleb/9221; https://t.me/mmirleb/9223; https://t.me/mmirleb/9224[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-17-2024; https://t.me/mmirleb/9197; https://t.me/mmirleb/9211[66] https://t.me/mmirleb/9223[67] https://t.me/mmirleb/9203; https://t.me/mmirleb/9204; https://t.me/mmirleb/9205; https://t.me/mmirleb/9207; https://t.me/mmirleb/9208; https://t.me/mmirleb/9219; https://t.me/mmirleb/9227[68] https://t.me/mmirleb/9204[69] https://t.me/mmirleb/9227 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1858553818092355913 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1858553971838738749 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1858561341281239419; https://t.me/moriahdoron/16613 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858559772523446474[70] https://t.me/mmirleb/9227[71] https://t.me/mmirleb/9205[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/9219; https://t.me/mmirleb/9208[73] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1538[74] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858270237679837408 ;https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858273894664208625[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858283135311471041 ;https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858380164561768867[76] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/malfunctioning-israeli-interceptor-missile-appears-to-crash-in-jordans-aqaba/[77] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858283135311471041 ;https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858380164561768867[78] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/ ;https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-for-aiding-russias-illegal-war-in-ukraine-as-foreign-secretary-chairs-un-security-council[79] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/11/18/iran-eu-widens-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-iran-support-of-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-and-lists-one-individual-and-four-entities/[80] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-iran-for-aiding-russias-illegal-war-in-ukraine-as-foreign-secretary-chairs-un-security-council[81] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2570[82] https://www.bnr dot nl/nieuws/juridisch/10561155/tankervloot-die-iran-miljarden-opleverde-via-suriname-beheerd[83] https://www.bnr dot nl/nieuws/juridisch/10561155/tankervloot-die-iran-miljarden-opleverde-via-suriname-beheerd[84] https://www.bnr dot nl/nieuws/juridisch/10561155/tankervloot-die-iran-miljarden-opleverde-via-suriname-beheerd[85] https://www.bnr dot nl/nieuws/juridisch/10561155/tankervloot-die-iran-miljarden-opleverde-via-suriname-beheerd ;https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644[86] https://www.bnr dot nl/nieuws/juridisch/10561155/tankervloot-die-iran-miljarden-opleverde-via-suriname-beheerd[87] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1403082720208[88] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/iran-oil-prices-china-multi-year-high-after-exports-fall-sources-say-2024-11-05/ ;https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12267[89] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-pick-rubio-could-harden-oil-sanctions-iran-venezuela-2024-11-13/[90] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/28/3202293/[91] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-11-2024 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-2-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-2-2024 ;https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-5-2024 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-28-2024 ;[92] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-2-2024#_ednee8e71584b461ddfc1fb105bafa7ca4d61 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-31-2024[93] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/706572[94] https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/11/04/iran-azerbaijan-hold-joint-drills-in-caspian-sea; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-2-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-13-2024
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 21, 2024
- at 11/21/24 8:15pmGrace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, and George BarrosNovember 21, 2024, 8:00pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00pm ET on November 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21. Russian forces conducted a complex strike against critical infrastructure and industrial enterprises in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the morning of November 21, that reportedly included a Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ballistic missile fired from Tambov Oblast, seven Kh-101 cruise missiles fired from Volgograd Oblast, and an experimental medium-range ballistic missile with reentry vehicles – likely a modified RS-26 “Rubezh” intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) - fired from Astrakhan Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed six Kh-101 cruise missiles and that the remaining missiles did not cause significant damage.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that the strike damaged an unspecified industrial enterprise (likely Ukraine’s Pivdenmash factory that manufactures missiles and space rockets), a medical facility, and residential areas in Dnipro City, and reported that a Russian missile also damaged residential areas in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[3] Western officials told Western media that the ballistic missile that targeted Dnipro City was not an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and was more likely a ballistic missile with a shorter range.[4]Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities — a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine. Putin gave an address on the evening of November 21 claiming that Russian forces conducted a combined missile strike against Dnipro City, including with a new "Oreshnik" non-nuclear ballistic missile (which is reportedly an experimental variant of the RS-26 missile), framing the strike as a direct response to recent Ukrainian ATACMS and Storm Shadow strikes against military objects in Russia and alleged "aggressive actions" of NATO states against Russia.[5] Putin threatened to strike the military facilities of Western countries that allow Ukraine to conduct strikes into Russia. Putin's November 21 rhetoric is consistent with prior official Kremlin statements defining “red lines” that the Kremlin has attempted to use to deter Western states from supporting Ukraine. [6]Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical. Putin's recent threats against the West have centered against Western states allowing Ukraine to conduct long-range strikes into “Russian territory,” but Ukrainian forces have been striking what the Kremlin illegally defines as “Russian territory” for a long time. The Kremlin has illegally defined occupied Crimea as part of Russia since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Ukrainian forces have routinely struck Crimea with US-provided ATACMS and UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles since April 2023.[7] The Kremlin's application of its "red lines" rhetoric has been wildly inconsistent, undermining the overall Russian escalation narrative.[8] Putin consistently escalates the war on his own without regard to Western decisions and has consistently declined to retaliate every time Western states have deepened their support of Ukraine. Putin previously threatened severe retaliation if Western states provided Ukraine with rocket artillery, tanks, warplanes, and the ability to strike into Russia, and Putin has constantly shifted the goalposts every time the West has called Putin’s bluff.Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon. Russian forces fire nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles, Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable Kh-101 cruise missiles against Ukraine on a regular basis. Previous Russian missile strikes have targeted industrial and critical infrastructure including within Dnipro City that caused greater damage.[9] The only fundamentally new characteristic of the Russian strikes against Dnipro City on November 21 was the Oreshnik missile itself, which ostentatiously showcased reentry vehicles to amplify the spectacle of the strike and further imply a nuclear threat.[10][11] The West maintains credible deterrence options and Putin's nuclear saber-rattling should not constrain Western officials from choosing to further aid Ukraine. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Bill Burns cautioned Western policymakers against fearing Putin's nuclear rhetoric in September 2024, describing Putin as a "bully" who will "continue to saber rattle from time to time."[12]The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations. Ukrainian outlet Interfax Ukraine, citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 20 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) drafted a document forecasting global military-political developments until 2045 and proposing Russia's vision of the future of Ukraine — which completely erases any semblance of a free and independent Ukrainian state or Ukrainian territorial sovereignty.[13] The Russian MoD document advocates partitioning Ukraine into three different parts: one acknowledging the full Russian annexation of occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and occupied Crimea; another establishing a pro-Russian puppet state centered in Kyiv under Russian military occupation; and a third part designating Ukraine's western regions as "disputed territories" to be divided among Ukraine's westernmost neighboring countries. The document also outlines future global scenarios, prioritizing those where Russia defeats Ukraine and secures a Russian-led multipolar international order. ISW cannot confirm the existence of such a document and has not observed the content of the reported document itself, but the Interfax Ukraine report is consistent with ISW's ongoing assessments of the Kremlin's intent to impose full Ukrainian capitulation and disinterest in good-faith negotiations.[14] The content also reveals that the Kremlin, regardless of the US administration or Western actors, maintains the same uncompromising strategic objectives in its war of dismantling Ukrainian sovereignty and bringing about the waning of Western influence globally.North Korean troops are reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) stated on November 20 that the North Korean troops who have already deployed to Russia are training with Russian naval infantry and VDV formations and noted that some North Korean troops have already participated in combat.[15] Ukrainian intelligence sources previously reported on October 15 that Russia's 11th VDV Brigade was forming the dedicated "Special Buryat Battalion" staffed mainly by North Korean soldiers for combat operations in Kursk Oblast.[16] Russia's Eastern Military District (EMD) may have the mandate for training, integrating, and deploying North Korean troops—ISW previously noted that North Korean soldiers were training alongside various Russian motorized rifle formations that belong to the EMD.[17] The EMD’s chain of command includes Russia's Pacific Fleet, which is comprised of two naval infantry brigades — the 155th and the 40th — and Russia’s 11th and 83rd VDV brigades are located inside the EMD (though they are not part of the EMD’s chain of command), so the NIS' assessment suggests that North Korean troops are likely training with elements that are based physically close to North Korea.[18] ISW has observed reports that elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades are actively deployed to combat in Kursk Oblast, which is where Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence confirmed North Korean troops have initially deployed.[19] It is therefore likely that North Korean troops are currently training with elements of the 155th, 11th, and 83rd brigades in preparation for combat in Kursk Oblast. Russian VDV forces often act as partner units during multilateral military training exercises with partner states such as Belarus and Serbia, suggesting that the aforementioned VDV brigades could be training North Korean troops, as VDV forces have trained with other foreign troops.[20]North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel. ISW has assessed at length that the distinctions in quality between various Russian formations that existed prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine have become increasingly obsolete because of the way Russia is prosecuting its war.[21] Russian formations that were once considered "elite" or more specialized in terms of the tactical tasks they were associated with, such as VDV or naval infantry units, are now essentially functioning as understrength motorized rifle units, relying on infantry-led frontal assaults to make tactical gains as opposed to employing any sort of doctrinally-unique tactics.[22] Russian casualty rates on the frontline have forced the Russian military command to prioritize rushing new recruits to backfill vacancies in new units over providing them with sufficient basic, much less specialist, training.[23] These practices will likely extend to, and greatly impact, the experiences of North Korean troops fighting alongside Russian forces. North Korean troops training with VDV or naval infantry formations are likely to deploy to combat in the same way in which VDV and naval infantry soldiers deploy to combat—essentially as regular infantry forces. If the Russian command uses North Korean troops the same way that it uses Russian troops, North Korean troops are likely to face comparable rates of attrition to the rates that Russia is currently facing.[24] The losses that North Korean forces accrue in combat on behalf of Russia will dilute whatever institutional lessons the North Korean military was hoping to learn by joining Russia as a co-belligerent against Ukraine, as ISW recently assessed.[25]Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin intensified his reflexive control campaign aimed at Ukraine and its Western partners by conducting an ostentatious ballistic missile strike against Ukraine that used multiple reentry vehicles on November 21.Putin explicitly threatened that Russia may attack Western countries that support Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia and rhetorically connected the November 21 ballistic missile strike to Russian nuclear capabilities - a marked intensification of an existing Russian information operation that aims to use explicit threats and nuclear saber-rattling to discourage continued Western military support for Ukraine.Putin’s November 21 statement demonstrates that Moscow’s constant saber-rattling largely remains rhetorical.Neither the Oreshnik ballistic missile strike nor Putin's November 21 statement represent a significant inflection in Russian strike capabilities or likeliness to use a nuclear weapon.The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its full commitment to use the prospect of "negotiations" with Ukraine and the West to pursue nothing short of the total destruction of the Ukrainian state despite Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to peace negotiations.North Korean troops are reportedly training alongside Russian naval infantry and airborne (VDV) units.North Korea's ability to learn and integrate lessons from fighting alongside Russia is likely to be significantly degraded if the Russian military command uses North Korean troops in the same highly attritional infantry-led assaults that it uses most Russian personnel.Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast southeast of Sudzha.Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar. Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna, southeast of Chasiv Yar, in Toretsk, southeast of Kurakhove, northeast of Vuhledar, and likely advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka.The Russian State Duma adopted a three-year federal budget with record defense expenditures from 2025-2027. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Sudzha amid continued offensive operations in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on November 21 shows that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Spalnoye (southeast of Sudzha).[26] Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces cleared Ukrainian positions in the forests near Olgovka (east of Korenevo), entered Darino (southeast of Korenevo), are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near the settlements.[27] Elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Martynovka (northeast of Sudzha); elements of the "Aida" group of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Sudzha direction; and elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division, 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and "Phoenix" Battalion are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[28]Russian officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian drone strikes near Akhtubinsk, Astrakhan Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that the drones may have targeted the Kasputin Yar missile launch site.[29]The recent Ukrainian strike against a Russian command post in Maino, Kursk Oblast reportedly injured a senior North Korean general. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) cited a Western official that a recent Ukrainian strike against Kursk Oblast wounded a senior North Korean general, but the official did not provide details on the general's condition.[30] Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed on November 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian "Northern" Group of Forces command post in Kursk Oblast and killed and wounded security personnel but claimed that the strike did not injure commanders.[31] A Russian insider source claimed on November 21 that the Ukrainian strike killed 18 Russian soldiers and wounded 33 personnel, including three North Korean personnel.[32] The insider source claimed that LMD First Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Valery Solodchuk was at the headquarters at the time of the strike and that his status is unknown. ISW cannot confirm these claims.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 20 and 21 but did not make any confirmed advances.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 20 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack in the Lyptsi direction near Hlyboke (north of Kharkiv City).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Russian forces advanced near high-rise buildings in Vovchansk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[35] Ukrainian "Kharkiv" Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevheniy Romanov stated that worsening weather conditions are preventing Russian forces from concealing mechanized infantry movements in fields due to the loss of foliage and that anticipated snowy weather conditions will allow Ukrainian forces to monitor the tracks of Russian mechanized infantry in the snow.[36] Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in an unspecified area of Kharkiv Oblast.[37] Drone operators of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (a mobilized unit reportedly subordinated to the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vovchansk direction.[38]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 21. Geolocated footage posted on November 21 shows that Russian forces recently advanced in central Terny (northwest of Kreminna).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 that Russian forces advanced in eastern Kupyansk in an area northeast of the Zaoskillya railway station; southeast of Kupyansk on the outskirts of Hlushkivka; and in forest areas west of Stelmakhivka (northwest of Svatove).[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Zahryzove, Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka; northwest of Svatove near Lozova; west of Svatove near Zeleny Hai; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna, Novoyehorivka, and Tverdokhlibove; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Terny; west of Kreminna near Zarichne and Torske; and southwest of Kreminna near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area on November 20 and 21.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 21 that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River in the Lyman (west of Kreminna) direction.[42] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] are conducting airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in Terny, potentially to aid Russian ground assaults in the area.[43]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Siversk direction. A Ukrainian drone unit commander operating in the Siversk direction reported that weather conditions are complicating Russian infantry foot-mobile assaults, as muddy conditions are hindering soldiers’ movement and making Russian infantry easy targets for Ukrainian drone operators.[44] Footage posted on November 21 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) striking Ukrainian forces east of Pereizne (south of Siversk) with drone reconnaissance support from elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA).[45]Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar and continued offensive operations on November 21. Geolocated footage published on November 19 indicates that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) recently advanced across a section of the Siverskyi-Donets Donbas Canal west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) on November 21.[47] Russian sources reported on November 20 and 21 that intense fighting continues in Chasiv Yar and on its flanks.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Russian forces operating near Orikhovo-Vasylivka tactically advanced in the direction of Slovyansk and that Russian forces are fewer than 24 kilometers from Slovyansk.[49] Russian drone operators from the "Okhotnik" (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) allegedly continue to target Ukrainian forces near Chasiv Yar.[50] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations and made confirmed gains within Toretsk. Geolocated footage posted on November 14 and 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Toretsk.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks with air support near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[53] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces allegedly occupied over 50 percent of Toretsk as of November 21.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the high part of the city near Hrushevskoho Street and reached the Avanhard Stadium.[55] The milblogger also claimed that fierce battles continue near Nelipivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Shcherbynivka. Russian forces continued assaults in the Pokrovsk direction on November 21 but did not advance. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Pokrovsk advanced along the railway line on the eastern outskirts of Petrivka (west of Selydove), up to 800 meters near Pustynka (just southwest of Petrivka), and 1.5 kilometers west of Novoleksiivka (south of Petrivka).[56] The milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating south of Pokrovsk are also trying to advance northwest of Yurivka and from Novooleksiivka towards Pushkine (northwest of Novooleksiivka) and Ukrainka (west of Novooleksiivka).[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are intensifying assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[58] Russian forces continued assaults east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Krutyi Yar, Krasnyi Yar, and Dachenske and south of Pokrovsk near Petrivka, Yurivka, Hryhorivka, Pushkine, Zhovte, Chumatske, Pustynka, and Novooleksiivka on November 20 and 21.[59]Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 21. Geolocated footage published on November 20 and 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields south of Kurakhove and in a building in western Dalne (south of Kurakhove), indicating that Russian forces have likely seized Dalne.[60] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Dalne and that Russian forces are advancing southwest of the settlement.[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Sontsivka (northeast of Kurakhove), cleared Ukrainian forces from the northern shore of the Kurakhivske Reservoir, advanced near the grain elevator in central Kurakhove, and advanced 1.5 kilometers south of Maksymilyanivka (east of Kurakhove).[62] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are successfully advancing in the Kurakhove direction because Russian forces are successfully integrating ground activity with air and artillery support, although another Russian milblogger claimed that poor weather conditions are slowing the pace of Russian advances in this direction.[63] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kurakhove near Sontsivka and Zorya; north of Kurakhove near Berestky; near Kurakhove itself; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 20 and 21.[64] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kurakhove, and elements of the Russian 1461st "Amur" Motorized Rifle Regiment's (reportedly assigned to the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) 2nd Battalion are operating in the Kurakhove direction.[65] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) also reportedly continue to operate in this direction.[66]Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Vuhledar amid recent Russian advances northeast of Vuhledar. Geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the fields north of Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar), and geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[67] Additional geolocated footage published on November 20 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault east of Bohoyavlenka, but did not advance during the mechanized assault.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing north of Vuhledar near Trudove and advanced from Maksymivka towards Kostyantynopolske and Sukhi Yaly.[69] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces are focusing their assaults near Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), indicating that the Russian military command is prioritizing efforts to breakthrough and advanced along the C051104 highway.[70] Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka, Yelizavetivka, and Antonivka; north of Vuhledar near Trudove and Sukhi Yaly; and northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske and in the direction of Rozlyv on November 20 and 21.[71] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Antonivka.[72] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff‘s Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) and elements of the Russian 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Sukhi Yaly.[73]Russian forces likely advanced northeast of Velyka Novosilka amid continued assaults near the settlement on November 21. A Ukrainian military observer and Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated on November 20 that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) recently entered the outskirts of Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).[74] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced to the eastern outskirts of Velyka Novosilka along the O-0510 Kurakhove-Velyka Novosilka highway and that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) recently advanced in the direction of Blahodatne (south of Velyka Novosilka).[75] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east of Velyka Novosilka, near Rozdolne, three kilometers near Novodonetske (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and from Rivnopil (southwest of Velka Novosilka) in the direction of Velyka Novosilka.[76] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults of an unspecified echelon and ground attacks from Shakhtarske (east of Velyka Novosilka and northwest of Vuhledar) in the direction of Rozdolne and Velyka Novosilka and are attempting to make significant advances in the fields east of Velyka Novosilka and bypass the settlement to the north.[77] Russian forces continued assault northeast of Velyka Novosilka near Rozdolne, near Velyka Novosilka itself, and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka on November 20 and 21.[78] ISW recently assess that Russian forces may attempt to flank Ukrainian positions in Velyka Novosilka from the east and intensify pressure on Velyka Novosilka from the south in order to force Ukraine to withdraw from the settlement and enable further Russian advances towards the southwestern most edge of the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary.[79]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)A Russian milblogger claimed on November 21 that Russian forces cleared Ukrainian positions on the northern outskirts of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[80]Russian forces continued assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast north of Robotyne near Orikhiv, Mala Tokmachka, and Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Pyatykhatky on November 21 but did not advance.[81]Russian forces targeted the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of an enduring effort to throttle the Ukrainian power grid.[82] Ukraine's Ministry of Energy reported on November 21 that Russian artillery shelling damaged one of the ZNPP’s two external power lines connected to the Ukrainian power grid.[83] Kremlin newswire TASS claimed that "automatic control" caused the ZNPP’s high voltage "Dneprovska" line to become disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid.[84]Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 20 and 21, but there were no changes to the frontline.[85]Kremlin newswire TASS reported on November 21 that Russian forces shot down a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile over the Black Sea near occupied Sevastopol, Crimea.[86]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian State Duma adopted a three-year federal budget with record defense expenditures from 2025-2027. The Duma adopted the "On the Federal Budget for 2025 and for the Planning Period of 2026-2027" bill on November 21, which allocates 13.5 trillion rubles (6.31 percent of Russia's GDP and about $133 billion) to "national defense" expenditures in 2025, 12.8 trillion rubles (about $126 billion) in 2026, and 13.1 trillion rubles (about $129 billion) in 2027.[87] The Duma has designated 3.5 trillion rubles (about $34 billion) for "National Security and Law Enforcement" in 2025 which, combined with the allocated spending on defense, will account for 41 percent of the total Russian federal budget expenditures. ISW previously noted that increases in defense spending do not necessarily equate to increased military capabilities, however, especially when a significant portion of this funding is going towards social benefits for Russian soldiers, veterans, and their families.[88]Russian authorities continue efforts to coerce people into signing military service contracts with the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Russia and occupied Ukraine in order to avoid conducting another involuntary call-up of Russian reservists. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on November 21 that Russian military recruiters are forcibly taking young men from settlements in occupied Mariupol Raion to regional recruitment and enlistment offices and coercing them into signing service contracts with the Russian MoD.[89] Independent Russian-language outlet Idel Realii stated on November 21 that the Bashkortostan branch of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) paid third-party individuals 50,000 rubles (about $494) for bringing prospective recruits to sign a military service contract and that 2,300 applicants from the Republic of Bashkortostan are awaiting their contracts.[90] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported that it captured Russian prisoners of war (POWs) who claimed that the Russian MoD forced them to sign service contracts in prison and sent them into frontline assaults without weapons.[91]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russia continues to transfer military assets to Belarus while accelerating efforts to implement key aspects of the Union State Treaty. Russian and Belarusian state media reported that Russia transferred another Tor-M2 air defense battery to Belarus on November 21 to improve air defense capabilities near Minsk.[92] The Russian military will very likely integrate these new systems into the existing Russian-Belarusian regional joint air defense system, granting Moscow control over their employment. The air defense system arrived amid comments made by Russian State Duma Defense Committee Andrei Kartapolov on November 21, who stated that Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine specifically states that Russia will provide Belarus with the necessary support to defend against an attack from unspecified Western countries.[93] Belarusian state media reported on November 21 that Belarusian Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko met Russian Kirov mechanical engineering plant CEO Sergei Serebryakov to discuss the development of joint machine-building enterprises in connection with the implementation of the Union State Treaty.[94]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/23380; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1859582525208690895; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1859582705567981958; https://t.me/ukrpravda_news/53520; https://x.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/1859647866534539285; https://x.com/shashj/status/1859572972513567224; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2024/11/21/7485582/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12544 ; https://suspilne dot media/885087-putin-vikoristovue-ukrainu-ak-poligon-zelenskij-pro-udar-mbr-po-dnipru/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/21/povitryani-syly-rosiyany-zapustyly-po-ukrayini-mizhkontytentalnu-balistychnu-raketu/[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/23380;[3] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/884705-u-dnipri-prolunali-vibuhi-so-vidomo-7/; https://suspilne dot media/884665-paket-dopomogi-vid-ssa-rozstril-ukrainskih-polonenih-v-kurskij-oblasti-1002-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732167000&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://suspilne dot media/884665-paket-dopomogi-vid-ssa-rozstril-ukrainskih-polonenih-v-kurskij-oblasti-1002-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1732183949&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[4] ICBMs have ranges of over 5,500 kilometers, and Dnipro City is roughly 780 kilometers from Kapustin Yar, a known Russian missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast from which Russian sources speculated Russian forces launched the missile.https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-launched-icbm-ukraine-war-putin-rcna181131; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-launches-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-attack-ukraine-kyiv-says-2024-11-21/; https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/21/europe/ukraine-russia-missile-wwk-intl/index.html#:~:text=ICBMs%20are%20considered%20to%20have,Arms%20Control%20and%20Non%2DProliferation; https://t.me/bbcrussian/73223; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52654; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52653; https://t.me/bbcrussian/73225;[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75614[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/22/putin-russia-red-lines-nuclear-threat-retaliation/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111824; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-shoots-down-six-us-made-atacms-missiles-2024-04-30/; https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-crimea-atacms/32925212.html[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024[9] https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/40122; https://tsn dot ua/en/ato/attack-by-shaheds-and-kinzhal-missiles-on-ukraine-how-many-targets-were-shot-down-by-the-air-defense-2674989.html; https://t.me/ComAFUA/343; https://www.osw.waw dot pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-03-26/russian-forces-destroy-dnipro-hydroelectric-power-station-day-761; https://kyivindependent dot com/kinzhal-missile-downed-kyiv-patriot-may-2023/; https://x.com/EuromaidanPR/status/1773295125969473779; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-7-2024[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75614; https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924[12] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/sep/07/cia-west-russia-nuclear-threats-putin; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2024[13] https://interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1028868.html[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2024[15] https://www.donga dot com/news/Politics/article/all/20241121/130471039/2[16] https://news.liga.net/ua/politics/news/rosiia-formuie-batalion-z-pivnichnokoreiskykh-hromadian-na-bazi-buriatskoi-bryhady-dzherelo; https://suspilne dot media/858415-rf-formue-osoblivij-buratskij-bataljon-ukomplektovanij-gromadanami-kndr-dzerela-v-rozvidci/[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8105225; https://www.newsweek.com/us-update-north-korea-troops-10000-russia-ukraine-war-combat-kursk-1985001; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8098257; https://suspilne dot media/873115-dzerelo-v-specsluzbah-u-kurskij-oblasti-vidbulisa-persi-bojovi-zitknenna-z-soldatami-kndr/[20] https://sputnikglobe dot com/20240413/vdv-for-export-what-russia-has-to-gain-by-helping-other-countries-build-powerful-airborne-forces-1117915257.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-expands-unit-integration-belarusian-and-serbian[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war; https://www.businessinsider.com/russians-debate-role-of-elite-vdv-paratroopers-after-ukraine-losses-2023-2[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-10-2024;[24] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/20/takyj-sobi-pryvit-vid-kima-v-dshv-rozpovily-pro-sumnivnu-boyezdatnist-pivnichnokorejskyh-najmancziv/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications[26] https://x.com/GermanObserver1/status/1859662057127412060; https://t.me/wttheravens/44[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/23267; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243;[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/2674; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5245; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145138; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145060; https://t.me/tass_agency/286552[29] https://t.me/tass_agency/286549; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52654; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52653 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52654; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52653 ;[30] https://www.wsj.com/world/senior-north-korean-general-wounded-in-recent-ukrainian-strike-western-official-says-c138121b?st=eBUFs8[31] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75614[32] https://t.me/vchkogpu/52644[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2684[34] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/18055[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19632 [36] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/21/snizhok-padaye-stezhky-vidstezhuyutsya-zmina-pogody-bolyache-bye-po-okupantam-na-harkivshhyni/[37] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145071[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145087[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7580 ; https://t.me/ssternenko/36483[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/286488 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19596 ; https://t.me/rybar/65575[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60237[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19627[44] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/21/robysh-try-kroky-na-nozi-vidro-na-siverskomu-napryamku-rosijski-ataky-tonut-v-bagni/[45] https://t.me/epoddubny/21693; https://t.me/sashakots/50320[46] https://x.com/GPaflagonya/status/1859325977978880503; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80990[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl[48] https://t.me/wargonzo/2326; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19564[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19599[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13011[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19575[52] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1859565575749443688; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1859566281608822980; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/116 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1859557441295286509; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1859557951825969464; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3501105253703970901/#;[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl;[54] https://t.me/tass_agency/286567[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19564[56] https://t.me/rybar/65555 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19564 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145109 ;[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145109[58] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[60] https://x.com/SibirPrizrak/status/1859618510558683324; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11844 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7578; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13010[61] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81095 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145107 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/45972 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58257 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29640 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19604 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29669[62] https://t.me/tass_agency/286528 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/286579 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19590 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60230 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19564 ; https://t.me/beard_tim/21292; https://t.me/motopatriot/29659 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/21690 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29678[63] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19590 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60240[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl ; https://t.me/myro_shnykov/6523 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81075 ; https://t.me/rybar/65555 [65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19594 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145102 [66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13009 [67] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7574; https://t.me/plechomkplechy/2084 ; https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/fc2b6f16-69d8-45a0-0c88-08dd0945b046; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1859254050417410385; https://t.me/voin_dv/11920; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19549[68] https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine/fc2b6f16-69d8-45a0-0c88-08dd0945b046; https://x.com/ug_chelsea/status/1859172030605656531; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1859149857820197013; https://t.me/voin_dv/11916[69] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29678 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60230[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[72] https://t.me/dva_majors/58279[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/11923 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29650; https://t.me/voin_dv/11929 [74] https://t.me/myro_shnykov/6523 ; https://t.me/rybar/65577[75] https://t.me/rybar/65577[76] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19592; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29663 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19629 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60230 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19592 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29675 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29666 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29633 ; https://t.me/rybar/65577 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60231[77] https://t.me/rybar/65565 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60230 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/81057 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29681[78] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-defense-pokrovsk-has-compelled-russia-change-its-approach-eastern-ukraine ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/58243[81] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl; https://t.me/wargonzo/23267; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243; https://t.me/dva_majors/58243 [82] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2024[83] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/5039 ; https://t.me/energyofukraine/3235[84] https://t.me/tass_agency/286503[85] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ZK5BUrMdhB9FpLohYpaQExzmD8sKH5iVAF3boPWyuZKdf19CtMP4bn22aF42jbmjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02okiL86GrrfZwH4X7rcC57qaNkAfhZNwuFmqAV1c15SYDR7CGLcFh2Hvop8kyNnyrl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022kvHEwNbcEXqFvSbYbfGKifP3bEy8ZS7HY8QSSx6n1M3ZSGoZSweCmptxBAnqdPSl[86] https://t.me/tass_agency/286602 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19625 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145128 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/145129[87] https://sozd.duma.gov dot ru/bill/727320-8 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/21/gosduma-prinyala-trehletniy-federalnyy-byudzhet-s-rekordnymi-rashodami-na-voynu-v-2025-godu ; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/5929; https://t.me/bbcrussian/73217[88] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024[89] https://t.me/andriyshTime/29701[90] https://t.me/idelrealii/38649[91] https://www.facebook.com/79AMBUA/videos/1080904340019678[92] https://belta dot by/society/view/lukjjanovich-pribyvshaja-v-belarus-batareja-zrk-tor-m2-budet-zaschischat-nebo-nad-minskom-677221-2024/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/286609[93] https://t.me/rian_ru/269883 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/279443[94] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/279457 ; https://t.me/government_by/2279
- — Iran Update, November 20, 2024
- at 11/21/24 8:15pmRia Reddy, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) censure resolution against Iran on November 21.[1] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[2] The resolution requires that the IAEA to produce a "comprehensive report" on Iranian nuclear activities by spring 2025.[3] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the report would almost certainly confirm Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lay the foundation for the E3 to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran--known as "snapback" sanctions.[4] The censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[5] The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami responded to the censure resolution by ordering the activation of a ”large collection of new and advanced centrifuges of various types."[6] The AEOI stated that Iran will continue to cooperate with the IAEA, though it remains unclear to what extent. CTP-ISW will provide further assessments and details in the coming days.The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), prior to the IAEA Board of Governors vote on the censure resolution, called on Iran to "immediately dispose" of its highly enriched uranium stockpile on November 21. US Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate said that Iran should stop producing uranium enriched up to 60 percent and "downblend its 60 percent [enriched uranium] stockpile entirely."[7] Downblending is the process of converting highly enriched uranium into low-enriched uranium.[8] The E3 issued a joint statement similarly requesting that Iran “immediately dispose of its high enriched uranium stockpile.”[9] Iran previously offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA Board of Governors rejecting the censure resolution.[10] The E3 stated that a cap of 185 kilograms would mean Iran still "retain[s] an excessively large stockpile of high enriched uranium as well the capability to resume enrichment to 60 percent at any point," however.[11] 185 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium is enough, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[12]Lebanese officials have reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah.[13] Unspecified sources speaking to Lebanese media outlet al Akhbar claimed that Lebanese officials requested that the ceasefire agreement refer to the Blue Line—the UN-drawn provisional border—as the official Israel-Lebanon border. Lebanese officials demanded that a date for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw be announced in conjunction with the ceasefire and that the IDF conduct a “complete, simultaneous, and rapid withdrawal” from Lebanon. The Lebanese officials also demanded that the IDF release all Hezbollah fighters detained in southern Lebanon. Al Akhbar claimed that the language regarding Israel-Lebanon border and clauses on whether Israel would retain the right to respond to ceasefire violations with force in Lebanon remain sticking points between the parties. The US-proposed ceasefire agreement initially allowed Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[14] Hezbollah has rejected the possibility that the IDF retain the right to operate in Lebanon, however.[15]A senior Israeli security source said that Hamas wants ceasefire-hostage deal in the Gaza Strip.[16] Israeli military correspondents, citing the source, reported that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even if it fails to meet Hamas’ repeated demand for a permanent end to the war.[17] The source added that the deal being considered includes a 42-day ceasefire, the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, and other “heavy prices that Israel will be required to pay.”[18] This report marks the first suggestion that Hamas may break from the maximalist demands that it has maintained throughout most of the ceasefire-hostage negotiations. Hamas last reiterated its maximalist demands on November 10.[19]US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin III said on November 20 that the Houthis increasingly see themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate.[20] This framing is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is more accurately described as an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East. Iran considers itself a core part and the leader of the Axis of Resistance but does not outright command many of the other members. Rather, they often compromise and negotiate with one another. Iran does, however, frequently leverage its materiel support to the Axis of Resistance to leverage the decision-making of other members.The International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the starvation of civilians.[21] ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan submitted an application to the court to obtain arrest warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant in May 2024.[22]The ICC issued an arrest warrant for deceased Hamas military leader Mohammad Deif on November 21 for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including extermination, murder, torture, and sexual violence.[23] The ICC stated that it issued this arrest despite reports that Deif died. The IDF has stated that it killed Deif in an airstrike in the southern Gaza Strip in July 2024.[24] ICC Chief Prosecutor Khan submitted an application to obtain arrest warrants for deceased Hamas leaders Deif, Yahya Sinwar, and Ismail Haniyeh in May 2024.[25]Key Takeaways:Iran: The IAEA Board of Governors approved a censure resolution against Iran for its failure to cooperate fully with international nuclear inspectors. This resolution could lead to the reimposition of international sanctions on Iran. Iran responded to the resolution by ordering the activation of recently installed advanced centrifuges at its nuclear facilities.Lebanon: Lebanon reportedly proposed several changes to the US-proposed ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese media reported that one of the main sticking points is whether Israel will retain the right to strike Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire.Gaza Strip: A senior Israeli security source told Israeli military correspondents that Hamas wants a ceasefire-hostage agreement in the Gaza Strip. The source added that Hamas is prepared to accept a deal even a guarantee of a permanent ceasefire, which has been a continuous Hamas demand throughout talks.Yemen: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the Houthis increasingly view themselves as a partner to Iran rather than a subordinate. This characterization is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional, Iran-led alliance rather than a constellation of Iranian proxies and partners across the Middle East.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 900th Brigade (162nd Division) has killed dozens of Palestinian fighters and destroyed over 100 militia infrastructure targets in Jabalia and Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip in the past two weeks.[26] Palestinian militias have conducted two attacks targeting Israeli armor and infantry near Beit Lahia since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 20.[27] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mortared Israeli soldiers and vehicles in Jabalia refugee camp on November 21.[28] Commercially available satellite imagery posted on November 20 shows demolished buildings in Jabalia refugee camp.[29]The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting Hamas infrastructure near the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahia on November 21. Hamas claimed that the strike killed 66 Palestinians.[30] The IDF stated that it took steps to minimize civilian casualties.[31]Palestinian militias conducted two attacks targeting Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on November 21.[32]Israeli forces continued operating in the central Gaza Strip on November 21. Commercially available satellite imagery from November 21 shows tire tracks northeast of Bureij refugee camp.The IDF 143rd Division continued operating near Rafah on November 21. Commercially available satellite imagery from November 21 shows demolished buildings east of Rafah.The IDF intercepted a rocket that was launched from Rafah toward southern Israel on November 21.[33]Israeli Strategic Affairs Minster Ron Dermer and Defense Minister Israel Katz recently sent a letter to the United States emphasizing that Israel has no policy of forcefully evacuating or starving Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[34] Dermer and Katz denied that Israel seeks to forcibly displace or starve Palestinian civilians in the northern Gaza Strip in reference to current IDF clearing operations in Jabalia and Beit Lahia.[35] The Israeli officials sent the letter in response to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s October 13 letter demanding that Israel improve the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. [36]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe IDF killed nine Palestinian fighters during a two-day counterterrorism operation in Jenin Governorate on November 19 and 20. The IDF conducted a drone strike killing three Palestinian fighters who recently conducted a series of shooting attacks targeting IDF positions and Israeli settlements.[37] The IDF reported secondary explosions following the drone strike, indicating the presence of weapons or explosives near the fighters at the time of the strike.Israeli forces detained three Palestinian fighters from Hebron who planned to assassinate Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.[38] The fighters reportedly sought assistance from Hamas and Hezbollah, but it is unclear whether these militias provided assistance to them.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonHezbollah has claimed at least 13 rocket, drone, and mortar attacks targeting Israeli forces reportedly advancing in southern and eastern Khiam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 20.[39] The IDF advanced at least five kilometers from Israel toward and into Khiam during a three-day operation between October 28 and 31.[40] Hezbollah claimed that the IDF withdrew into northern Israel from Khiam on October 31 but did not provide evidence for this claim.[41] Khiam’s terrain provides an expansive view of northern Israel and would enable Hezbollah artillery observers to support indirect fire attacks into Israel. Observers can directly view a large swath of territory in the Galilee panhandle, Shebaa Farms, and Golan Heights from Khiam, including several IDF Northern Command bases.Hezbollah fighters attacked the IDF 13th Battalion (1st Golani Brigade, 36th Division) in a previously cleared historical fortress in western Tayr Harfa on November 20.[42] Two Hezbollah fighters wounded two Israeli soldiers and killed another as the soldiers entered the fortress.[43] The Hezbollah fighters also killed an Israeli civilian who was accompanying the Israeli forces.[44] Israeli forces killed the two Hezbollah fighters. Hezbollah claimed that its fighters attacked Israeli forces with direct fire from nearby positions.[45] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired anti-tank munitions and destroyed an armored personnel carrier that attempted to rescue the Israeli casualties.[46]IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi established a team to “examine and strengthen operational discipline and military culture in combat” following the death of the Israeli civilian in Tayr Harfa.[47] The team will submit an assessment to Halevi of combat forces’ adherence to “discipline, military orders and procedures, codes of conduct, and norms practiced within military units” in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Israeli Military Police have opened a separate investigation into the circumstances that enabled a retired Israeli soldier to be present in an active combat zone.[48]Israel imposed sanctions on 24 “clients” of Hezbollah’s financial arm, al Qard al Hassan, on November 21.[49] The sanctions target clients who have helped Hezbollah purchase weapons and pay fighter salaries. These sanctions are part of a broader Israeli campaign aimed at cutting funding and resources to Hezbollah to degrade its ability and willingness to continue fighting.[50]The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 20. The IDF issued evacuation orders on November 20 for residents in Haret Hreik and Ghobeiry in the southern suburbs of Beirut.[51] The IDF has struck at least 12 Hezbollah sites in southern Beirut, including headquarters and weapons depots, since issuing the evacuation orders.[52]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 20 to 2:00pm ET on November 21. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 11 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 20.[53] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting an IDF military base in Ashdod, southern Israel, for the first time on November 21.[54] Ashdod is approximately 160 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah launched rockets targeting an IDF radar site on Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights.[55] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting an IDF military base in Acre, northern Israel.[56] The IDF identified at least ten Hezbollah launches targeting the area.[57] A Hezbollah rocket killed an Israeli civilian in Nahariya, approximately 10 kilometers north of Acre.[58] Hezbollah continued to launch rockets targeting IDF forces on the Israel-Lebanon border on November 21.[59]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in southern Israel on November 20.[60]Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are threatening to respond to any Israeli strike on Iraq. Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18, in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[61] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani subsequently chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19, during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to prevent "any military activity outside the control of the state,” likely referring to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel.[62] Kataib Sarkhat al Quds—formerly known as Ashab al Kahf—warned on November 20 that it will target “all [US and Israeli] economic and military interests” across the Middle East if Israel attacks Iraq.[63] A senior leader in Harakat Ansar Allah al Awfiya separately claimed that an Israeli attack on Iraq would not deter the Islamic Resistance from Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, from continuing to attack Israel.[64] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 60 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[65]Senior Iraqi officials have discussed Russo-Iraqi relations with Russian officials in recent days. Newly-elected Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani met with Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev in Baghdad on November 19.[66] Kutrashev has met with numerous Iraqi political, military and media officials in recent months.[67] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani separately held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 21 to discuss coordination between OPEC and OPEC+ countries as well as "the unprecedented escalation of tension” in the Middle East.[68] Iraqi crude oil exports fell for the second consecutive month in October 2024 due to OPEC+ production cuts.[69] Sudani and Putin may have discussed the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iraq in response to repeated Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel.Syrian media reported on November 21 that the IDF detained a Syrian man in al Rafid, Quneitra Governorate, Syria, on the border of Syria and the Golan Heights.[70] Israeli media reported that the IDF shot the man in the leg after he crossed into Israeli territory.[71] The IDF previously detained a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border positions for Iran in an unspecified area along the Syria-Golan Heights border in July 2024.[72]Syrian state media reported that the IDF airstrike on Palmyra, Syria, on November 20 killed 36 people.[73] A US-based Syrian analyst reported on November 21 that the strikes killed 48 fighters. The strikes targeted at least three sites in Palmyra, including a military intelligence site.[74]Iran and Syria are taking steps to try to expand bilateral trade. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf announced that the Iranian Parliament passed a bill amending a 2010 free trade agreement between Iran and Syria during a meeting with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Bassam al Sabbagh on November 21.[75] The amendments reportedly include reducing customs duties to zero percent and changing the added value limit of traded goods.[76] Unspecified "experts” wrote an op-ed on the Iranian Parliament website on October 21, before Parliament voted on the bill, arguing that these amendments are unlikely to significantly increase trade between Iran and Syria because the countries lack the infrastructure necessary to implement these amendments.[77] Sabbagh separately met with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian on November 20 and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi on November 19.[78]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian traveled to Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, on November 21 amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran.[79] Pezeshkian met with the families of 10 police officers who died in a Jaish al Adl attack on October 26.[80] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran near the border with Pakistan. Pezeshkian met with Shia and Sunni clerics, including prominent Sunni Cleric Moulana Abdul Hamid, and tribal leaders. Abdul Hamid regularly criticized the regime and incited protest activity in Zahedan after Iranian security forces brutally suppressed protests in Zahedan in late September 2022. Pezeshkian emphasized his administration’s commitment to addressing underdevelopment, inequality, and social issues in the province.[81]Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with senior Venezuelan officials in Caracas, Venezuela, on November 21 on the sidelines of the 10th Iran-Venezuela Joint Economic Commission.[82] Nasir Zadeh met with the Venezuelan ministers of finance, agriculture, mines, industries, science and technology, tourism, and energy.[83]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-nuclear-watchdogs-35-nation-board-passes-resolution-against-iran-2024-11-21/[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/european-powers-pushing-resolution-against-iran-iaea-diplomats-say-2024-11-13/[3] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2024/11/21/iran-says-west-resolution-will-weaken-disrupt-iaea-interactions[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024[5] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-grossi-enriched-uranium-weapon-0525819542521d5f89bd09008f42cb2f[6] http://aeoi.org dot ir ; https://www.aeoi.org dot ir/?news/48466/318330/367303/[7] https://vienna.usmission.gov/u-s-statement-agenda-item-4-iaea-board-of-governors-meeting-november-2024/[8] https://www.directives.doe.gov/terms_definitions/down-blending#:~:text=Definition,enrichment%20of%20the%20product%20material.[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-jcpoa-november-2024-e3-statement[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-offers-cap-sensitive-uranium-stock-avoid-iaea-resolution-2024-11-19/[11] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/iaea-board-of-governors-on-the-jcpoa-november-2024-e3-statement[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaeas-grossi-hopes-irans-capping-highly-enriched-uranium-stock-holds-2024-11-20/ ; 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https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1859266863446049232[75] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/01/3204517;https://nournews dot ir/en/news/199332/Iran-MPs-pass-bill-on-free-trade-agreement-with-Syria[76] https://rc.majlis dot ir/fa/report/show/1817622[77] https://rc.majlis dot ir/fa/report/show/1817622[78] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85665867/;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/29/3203276[79] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/01/3204790[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/01/3204790https://www.iranintl.com/202410269980[81] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/09/01/3204790[82] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/707358[83] https://farsi.iranpress dot com/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%A6%D9%84%D8%A7
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2024
- at 11/21/24 1:06pmChristina Harward, Karolina Hird, Davit Gasparyan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson,and Frederick W. KaganNovember 18, 2024, 5:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on November 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 18 that the United States is "adding fuel to the fire" and that the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes against Russian military targets would be a "qualitatively new round of tension" and a "qualitative" change in US participation in the war.[1] Peskov reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's September 12 claims that Ukrainian strikes against Russia using Western-provided weapons would represent an escalation and directly involve Western countries in the war.[2] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also reiterated Putin's September statements and further claimed that Ukrainian long-range missile strikes on Russia would be a "radical change in the essence and nature" of the war and that the Russian response would be "adequate and tangible."[3] Russian State Duma and Federation Council deputies made similar threats, claiming that Russia would be "forced" to respond to this "escalation," including with strikes against Ukraine using unspecified "new" weapons systems, and that Russia's new nuclear doctrine will outline the consequences of this US decision.[4] Russia has not previously escalated militarily against any perceived Western violations of Russia's "red lines" — as ISW has repeatedly observed.[5]Select Russian officials and propagandists heavily emphasized that US officials have not yet formally confirmed the ATACMS strike authorization, likely in an attempt to convince the United States to back out of the decision and deny the media reports of the authorization. Zakharova stated that it is unclear if Western media outlets reporting on the US authorization are citing official sources, and Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov similarly questioned the credibility of the US media reports.[6]Neither Ukrainian nor US officials have confirmed reports of the US authorization of Ukrainian ATACMS strikes, but US officials noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces alongside Russian forces on the battlefield. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm media reports of the US authorization of limited ATACMS strikes, but stated on November 17 that "strikes are not carried out with words" and "such things are not announced," but that "the missiles will speak for themselves."[7] US Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer also did not confirm the US strike authorization but noted that Russia escalated the war with the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield and the massive drone and missile strike series against Ukrainian energy infrastructure on the night of November 16 to 17.[8] Finer directly responded to Peskov, stating that Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine "lit the fire."[9] US outlet Axios reported on November 17 that a source with knowledge of the matter stated that the Biden administration granted Ukraine permission to use ATACMS in order to deter North Korea from sending more troops to Russia for the war.[10] Axios reported that US officials hope that North Korea might reconsider its decision to deploy military personnel to Russia if Ukrainian forces strike North Korean forces in Kursk Oblast.Putin's introduction of North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an escalation in itself.French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes in Russia. French outlet Le Figaro, which ISW cited on November 17, removed phrasing from its November 17 article reporting that the ATACMS permission would extend to SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles.[11] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot noted on November 18 that France remains open to the option of allowing Ukraine to use French-provided long-range missiles to strike within Russia but confirmed that France has not yet granted these permissions to Ukraine despite initial and erroneous reporting on November 17.[12] UK outlet The Times reported on November 18 that Downing Street sources stated that ATACMS have "different military specifications" from UK-provided Storm Shadows, and other UK outlets, including The Sun and The Guardian, noted on November 18 that the United States is "still blocking" Ukraine from using SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles against legitimate targets on Russian territory.[13] The UK and France jointly produce SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles, both of which utilize American-provided technologies and targeting intelligence, so all three parties would need to agree to lift restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use either SCALP or Storm Shadow missiles in long-range strikes against targets on Russian territory.[14] Persistent restrictions on Ukraine's ability to use SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles will continue to limit Ukraine's ability to fully target the Russian rear with a broad arsenal of suitable systems, thus allowing Russia to maintain sanctuary space within its near and far-rear to which it is not entitled by any principle of international law or norms.[15]The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation. Bloomberg reported on November 18 that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan plans to submit a peace plan for Russia's war in Ukraine at the G20 summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil from November 18 to 19 that would include the freezing of the conflict along the current frontlines, a 10-year postponement of Ukraine's NATO membership alongside assurances of Western provisions of military supplies to Ukraine, the establishment of a demilitarized zone in eastern Ukraine, and the stationing of foreign troops in Ukraine.[16] Pro-Turkish government outlet Daily Sabah reported that sources in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denied reports that Erdogan would propose postponing Ukraine's NATO membership, however, but stated that the Turkish government supports diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending the war.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to the initial reports of the Turkish peace proposal, stating that "freezing" the frontline is "a priori unacceptable" for the Kremlin and that Russian President Vladimir Putin's previously stated conditions for ending the war — which amounted to full Ukrainian capitulation — remain "fully relevant."[18] ISW has routinely assessed that the Kremlin's objective of total Ukrainian capitulation remains unchanged, and Peskov's comment further demonstrates that Russian authorities are unwilling to engage in good-faith negotiations that result in compromises, even those on terms unfavorable to Ukraine, such as a freezing of the conflict. ISW continues to assess that a negotiated ceasefire on the current lines will only benefit Russia and will afford the Kremlin time to further radicalize and militarize Russian society against Ukraine and the Russian military time to rest and reconstitute, likely before conducting a future attack on Ukraine.[19]Key Takeaways:Russian officials continued to use threatening rhetoric as part of efforts to deter the United States from publicly authorizing Ukraine's use of US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets in Kursk Oblast. This US authorization, if officially confirmed, would notably be a mild response to Russia's escalatory introduction of North Korean troops as active combatants in Russia's invasion of Ukraine.Putin's introduction of North Korea as a new belligerent in his invasion of Ukraine was a major escalation. Allowing Ukraine to use US missiles against legitimate military targets in Russian territory in accord with all international laws and laws of armed conflict is a very limited response and cannot reasonably be characterized as an escalation in itself.French and British sources clarified on November 18 that the reported US permissions regarding Ukraine's ability to use ATACMS for limited strikes within Russia do not inherently extend to Ukraine's ability to use French and UK-provided SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles for long-range strikes in Russia.The Kremlin continues to state its unwillingness to accept any compromises, including those that would "freeze" the conflict along the current frontline – further demonstrating the Kremlin's insistence on complete Ukraine capitulation.Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast, in Kupyansk, west of Kreminna, and in the Siversk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar directions. The Kremlin is continuing to militarize different levels of the Russian government by expanding the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) illegally conscripted Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of Russia's Fall 2024 conscription cycle.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast amid continued fighting in the area on November 18. Geolocated footage published on November 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Malaya Loknya (north of Sudzha).[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Nizhny Klin (southeast of Korenevo), the Olgovka forest (east of Korenevo), and Martynovka (northwest of Sudzha),.[21] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Darino (southeast of Korenevo) and Nizhny Klin.[22] Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to break out of a Russian encirclement near the Olgovka forest.[23] Ukraine's Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk reported on November 18 that Russian forces are using equipment for assaults when it is available but are otherwise conducting assaults with small infantry groups.[24] Mysnyk noted that weather conditions in Kursk Oblast are limiting Russian forces' use of first-person view (FPV) and reconnaissance drones, and a Russian milblogger commented that roads in Kursk Oblast are muddy.[25] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, and the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported on fighting in Glushkovsky Raion west of the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 18.A Ukrainian servicemember operating in Kursk Oblast stated on November 17 that unspecified elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division arrived in Kursk Oblast and that Russian forces have roughly 4,000 personnel and 100 armored fighting vehicles ready to attack in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[27] It is unclear if the Russian military command newly redeployed 4,000 personnel from other sectors of the front or if these reported combat-ready 4,000 personnel are part of the already existing Russian force concentration in Kursk Oblast.[28] The Ukrainian servicemember had stated on November 11 that Russian forces were deploying additional elements of the 76th VDV Division's 104th VDV Regiment from western Zaporizhia Oblast to Kursk Oblast.[29] ISW observed claims as of November 11 that elements of the 76th VDV Division were operating in the Russian rear in the Zaporizhia direction, and the Russian military command may have withdrawn elements of the 76th VDV Division to the rear for redeployment to Kursk Oblast.[30]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Vysoka Yaruha and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 17 and 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone strikes repelled two small Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups with one armored personnel carrier attempting to cross the international border near Zhuravlevka Belgorod Oblast (just across the border from Vysoka Yaruha) on November 17.[32] Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Yevheniy Romanov reported on November 18 that Russian forces continue to assault Ukrainian positions in small groups and added that Russian forces recently increased the number of airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[33] A Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on November 18 that Russian forces near Lyptsi are assaulting Ukrainian positions under the cover of fog while employing technologically advanced camouflage systems.[34] The platoon commander noted that Ukrainian drones are struggling to identify camouflaged Russian forces but added that Ukrainian forces are employing artificial intelligence (AI) and other unspecified technologies to identify hidden targets in Kharkiv Oblast.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in Kupyansk and west of Kreminna amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 18. Geolocated footage published on November 18 but purportedly recorded on November 13 showing Ukrainian forces taking Russian prisoners along Dzerzhynskoho Street in eastern Kupyansk indicates that Russian forces advanced in the area, likely around November 13.[35] Additional geolocated footage published on November 17 shows that Russian forces also recently advanced westward in fields southeast of Yampolivka (west of Kreminna).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy fighting is ongoing in urban areas in the Zaoskillya Microraion of eastern Kupyansk, although one milblogger remarked that Russian forces have not yet secured positions in the area.[37] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian pontoon crossings across the Oskil River.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zahryzove, and Kolisnykivka; southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Cherneshchyna; and northwest of Kreminna near Novolyubivka, Hrekivka, and Terny on November 17 and 18.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russin forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction amid continued offensive operations on November 18. Geolocated footage published on November 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[40] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on November 17 and 18.[41] A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on November 17 of Ukrainian forces repelling two Russian armed vehicles in the Siversk direction on an unspecified date.[42]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on November 18 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on November 17 and 18.[43] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[44] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal southeast of Chasiv Yar.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[46] 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[47]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction amid continued offensive operations in this direction on November 18. Geolocated footage published on November 17 and 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk) and north of Petrivka (south of Pokrovsk and west of Selydove).[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 18 that Russian forces seized Novooleksiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), which ISW assessed Russian forces had seized as of November 7.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Petrivka, north of Hryhorivka, and south of Lysivka (both southeast of Pokrovsk).[50] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Krutyi Yar, and Myrolyubivka; south of Pokrovsk near Petrivka; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka,, Novooleksiivka, Hryhorivka, and Pustynka on November 17 and 18.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that Ukrainian forces recently unsuccessfully counterattacked near Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[52] Elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Hryhorivka.[53] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) and the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Novohrodivka.[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on November 18 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zorya (northeast of Kurakhove), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attempting to envelop Ukrainian forces operating north of Kurakhove and close the pocket in this area.[56] Russian forces continued attacking near Kurakhove itself; north of Kurakhove near Nova Illinka and Berestky; northwest of Kurakhove near Sontsivka and Voznesenka; and east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka on November 17 and 18.[57] A Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces conduct four to five assaults per day, including mechanized and infantry-led assaults, and that Russian forces are able to replace casualties with new forces.[58] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces are suffering high casualties and are not evacuating dead personnel from the battlefield.[59] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[60]Russian forces recently advanced in the Vuhledar direction amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 18. Geolocated footage of a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault published on November 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced just west of Dalne (north of Vuhledar).[61] Additional geolocated footage published on November 17 indicates that Russian forces advanced within southern Trudove (northeast of Vuhledar) and southwest of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar).[62] Russian forces continued attacking north of Vuhledar near Uspenivka and Dalne; northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske, Trudove, and Rozdolne; and northeast of Vuhledar near Yelyzavetivka, Antonivka, and Katerynivka on November 17 and 18.[63] Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Yelyzavetivka.[64]Russian forces continued assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil on November 17 and 18 but did not make any confirmed advances.[65]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne) on November 17 and 18.[66] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Novoandriivka from Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne and south of Novoandriivka), to the southern outskirts of Bilohirya (northeast of Robotyne), and from Novopokrovka toward Mala Tokmachka (both northeast of Robotyne) on November 17 and 18.[67] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian source claimed that fighting in the Zaporizhia direction is mostly positional but that Russian forces have increased their activity in several unspecified areas.[68] Drone operators of the Russian 1429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 17 and 18, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[70]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on November 17 to 18 and during the day on November 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces struck Sumy Oblast with two Iskander-M ballistic missiles launched from Voronezh Oblast and a Kh-59 cruise missile launched from airspace over Kursk Oblast.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Shahed drones and strike drones of an unknown type (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces downed eight drones over Poltava, Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Kyiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that unspecified Ukrainian countermeasures, likely Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, caused three Russian drones to become “lost.” Ukrainian officials stated that a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile struck a multi-story residential building in Sumy City and killed 10 civilians and injured 51 on the night of November 17 to 18.[72] Ukrainian officials stated that debris from a downed Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile damaged a multi-story residential building, a university, and an administrative building in Odesa City, killed 10 civilians, and injured 47 on the afternoon of November 18.[73]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Kremlin is continuing to militarize different levels of the Russian government by expanding the "Time of Heroes" program that aims to place veterans of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in positions in local, regional, and federal governments. The Time of Heroes program announced on November 18 that it had received 6,640 applications from veterans interested in joining the program in the first three days of the application cycle, which began on November 15 and will run until January 15, 2025.[74] The Time of Heroes program observed that 12 graduates of the program have already received government appointments, including Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Sparta” Battalion Commander and Speaker of the DNR Parliament Artem Zhoga, who became the Presidential Representative to the Ural Federal Okrug on October 2.[75] The Time of Heroes program added that the program's other alumni include former Russian State Duma Deputy and servicemember Yevgeny Pervyshov, who recently became the Tambov Oblast governor on November 4; tank commander Artur Orlov; who became the Chairperson of the Russian youth movement “Movement of the First” on September 14; and veteran Alexey Kondratyev, who became a Russian Senator.[76]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Russia continues to produce cheaply made long-range strike drones to overwhelm and distract Ukrainian air defense systems. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 18 that Russian forces are attempting to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses by deploying Gerbera drones, which are made of plywood and polystyrene and contain Western and Chinese electronic components.[77] The GUR reported that the Gerbera drones perform similar functions to the Shahed-136 drone for 10 percent.[78] The GUR reported that the Russian Gerbera drone can carry a warhead and conduct reconnaissance to detect Ukrainian air defense systems. ISW has previously reported on the Russian usage of Gerbera drones.[79] ISW assessed that Russian forces likely used unspecified decoy drones to overload Ukrainian air defenses in the November 16–17 strike series, which contributed to Ukrainian forces' below-average drone-shoot-down rate.[80]A Ukrainian source published images reportedly showing out of production Soviet P-95-300 engines on Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles, suggesting that Russian forces are not able maintain the necessary production volumes of the Kh-101's usual TRDD-50A engines and are instead utilizing missile engines from old Soviet stockpiles.[81] ISW cannot independently verify this report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) illegally conscripted Ukrainian youth in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as part of Russia's Fall 2024 conscription cycle.[82] Russian state media outlet Ria Novosti Krym published footage on November 16 reportedly showing illegally conscripted Ukrainians taking a pledge of loyalty to Russia at a military base in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian military command coerced Ukrainian youth to take the oath and is currently holding illegally conscripted Ukrainians at training grounds in occupied Crimea alongside Russian contract servicemembers.[84] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko also reported that the Russian MoD illegally conscripted Ukrainians from occupied Mariupol and Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[85] Andryushchenko stated that illegally conscripted Ukrainians from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts deployed to Bataysk, Rostov Oblast and will undergo military service as part of the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) in occupied Crimea, Rostov Oblast, and Krasnodar Krai.[86] The Geneva Convention forbids any occupying power from forcing civilians in occupied territories to serve in the occupying power’s military or auxiliary services.[87] The Russian MoD will continue to expand its mobilization reserve and coerce more Ukrainians for the Russian military if Russia retains long-term control over Ukrainian territories.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Belarusian Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin and People's Republic of China (PRC) Ambassador to Belarus Zhang Wenchuan met on November 18 to discuss increasing bilateral and multilateral military cooperation.[88]Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with Smolensk Oblast Governor Vasily Anokhin on November 18 to discuss areas of bilateral cooperation and advocate for increased freedom of movement between Russia and Belarus.[89] Lukashenko highlighted Belarus' machine tool manufacturing and microelectronics industries during the meeting.[90]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/success-story-will-kursk-breakthrough-accelerate-1723574020.html; https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/08/27/uk-backs-ukraine-use-storm-shadow-missiles-russia/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2024[15] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8b060c46ee6f49908f9fb415ad23051c; https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1828580873375023299: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-17/ukraine-war-latest-allies-are-leaning-on-zelenskiy-for-a-way-to-end-the-war?embedded-checkout=true ; https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/erdogan-to-propose-freezing-war-in-ukraine-and-postponing-nato-membership-at-g20-summit-bloomberg/ar-AA1uhuek ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/18/bloomberg-erdogan-podgotovil-plan-zamorozki-rossiysko-ukrainskoy-voyny ; https://tass.ru/politika/22429841 ; 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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/57990; https://armyinformdot com.ua/2024/11/18/vorog-otrymuye-po-zubah-syly-oborony-strymuyut-nastup-rosiyan-v-kurskij-oblasti/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM[26] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1858156160215298169; https://t.me/dva_majors/58026; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15114[27] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1858156160215298169[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111224[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2024[31]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2658 ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2658[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/58035[33]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/18/mozhlyva-aktyvizacziya-voroga-na-harkivshhyni-pobilshalo-rosijskyh-aviaudariv/[34] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/18/na-harkivshhyni-vorog-prykryvayetsya-tumanom-vyyavyty-jogo-dopomagaye-shtuchnyj-intelekt/[35] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22413[36] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22382; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/618[37] https://t.me/motopatriot/29532; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11829[38] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11829[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl[40] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1858280659397300644; https://x.com/markito0171/status/1858269641849569589[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl[42] https://mil dot in.ua/uk/news/54-ta-brygada-vidbyla-shturm-rosiyan-na-siverskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/154[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl; https://t.me/wargonzo/23214[44] https://t.me/motopatriot/29542; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19368;[45] https://t.me/sashakots/50227; https://t.me/epoddubny/21651[46]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/23227[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7543; https://t.me/egeriaznauri/26; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7544; https://t.me/groupPUMA/57[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024; https://t.me/mod_russia/45840[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80903; https://t.me/vrogov/18035; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29617; https://t.me/motopatriot/29538 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/29533[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl[52] https://t.me/motopatriot/29539[53] https://t.me/rybar/65492[54] https://t.me/skalabatalion/440 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1858260019663524016[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29617[56] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19527 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23214[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60193 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80874 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57983 ; https://t.me/rybar/65465[58] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/18/gotuyemo-syurpryzy-yak-morski-pihotynczi-zupynyayut-nakaty-rosiyan-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku/[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/18/zalyshayutsya-spaleni-groby-tehniky-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku-zhorstki-oboronni-boyi/[60] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144765; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144756[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22404; https://t.me/mechanized33/543; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7542; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1858265483666968979; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1858256097938931791[62] (Trudove) https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1858231236508127537; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7539; https://t.me/Fab_1500/183(Kostyantynopolske) https://x.com/giK1893/status/1858228260305273266; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/2321; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22397; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7541[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19534 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19527 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80874 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57983 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19533[64] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19534[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60193; https://t.me/rybar/65465 [66] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl;[67] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19510; https://t.me/tass_agency/285812; https://t.me/dva_majors/57983; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60193; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19383; https://t.me/dva_majors/57983[68] https://t.me/wargonzo/23214[69] https://t.me/sashakots/50238[70] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid037GoVzmmb3k71698p1P7mk6s4AH7D7gxrLmD75CGZZsiTb7fFLY8PiqWnJVYZFiKgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0nBCF4Y9UxWJgWcwpFWKyyaUj8Yidzu8hcCrCKoBjmNysfZwiKeyPpUuksM65KU8Nl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid032GQu7svrWkZXS5gan5SUjp7gL2sMB4nxd6FTHDVmMqadBqyqSLSYcvqtuThacjTHl[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/23153[72] https://t.me/dsns_sumy/18994; https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/44162; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31457; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31455; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/882111-vijskovi-rf-vdarili-po-kriticnij-infrastrukturi-sum/; https://t.me/kpszsu/23153; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31449; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/31289; https://t.me/sumskamiskarada/31813; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12434[73] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/31317 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/23171; https://t.me/kpszsu/23171 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7613 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7618 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/11786 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/7617 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12438[74] https://xn--b1aachba0csne6n dot xn--p1ai/news/tpost/298ex77p61-bolee-6500-chelovek-zaregistrirovalis-na; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80898[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024[76] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024; https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=953417193467638&set=a.623290673146960&type=3; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/11/05/governors-of-russias-rostov-tambov-regions-resign-kicking-off-regional-shake-up-a86903[77] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4846; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/herbery-z-fanery-ta-inozemnoi-elektroniky-detali-budovy-cherhovoho-rosiiskoho-drona.html; https://war-sanctions dot gur.gov.ua/components?f%5Bcountry_id%5D=&f%5Bmanufacturer_id%5D=&f%5Btitle_uk%5D=wgroup-329&i%5Bmarking%5D=&f%5Bsearch%5D= ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-rosijskomu-bpla-gerbera-vyyavyly-zahidni-komplektuyuchi/[78] https://t.me/DIUkraine/4846; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/herbery-z-fanery-ta-inozemnoi-elektroniky-detali-budovy-cherhovoho-rosiiskoho-drona.html; https://war-sanctions dot gur.gov.ua/components?f%5Bcountry_id%5D=&f%5Bmanufacturer_id%5D=&f%5Btitle_uk%5D=wgroup-329&i%5Bmarking%5D=&f%5Bsearch%5D= ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/u-rosijskomu-bpla-gerbera-vyyavyly-zahidni-komplektuyuchi/ ; https://t.me/rybar/65486[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2024[80] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024[81] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/rosiyany-pochaly-stavyty-zastarili-dvyguny-na-rakety-h-101/ ; https://t.me/war_home/3100[82] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/5624; https://t.me/andriyshTime/29560 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/rosiyany-provely-nezakonnyj-pryzov-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-ukrayiny/ ; https://t.me/rian_crimea/56762[83] https://t.me/rian_crimea/56762[84] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/5624[85] https://t.me/andriyshTime/29560[86] https://t.me/andriyshTime/29560[87] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51[88] https://t.me/modmilby/43276[89] https://t.me/pul_1/14418 ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/278883 ; https://belta dot by/president/view/chto-my-proverjaem-drug-druga-lukashenko-vyskazalsja-za-svobodu-peredvizhenija-cherez-granitsu-s-676293-2024/[90] https://president.gov dot by/ru/events/vstreca-s-gubernatorom-smolenskoj-oblasti-rossii-vasiliem-anohinym
- — China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024
- at 11/21/24 12:34pmAuthors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Will Pickering of the Institute for the Study of War;Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise InstituteEditors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise InstituteData Cutoff: November 18, 2024Note: ISW will pause publication of the China-Taiwan Weekly Update during Thanksgiving week. Publication will resume according to the normal schedule following the Thanksgiving holiday.The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.Key Takeaways ROC President Lai Ching-te may plan to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County.Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in areas that it has previously been noncommittal about cooperating in.The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection capability into the Pacific. Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to discuss AI safety despite previously withholding nuclear talks to punish the US for supporting Taiwan.The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement.Anonymous European Union diplomats said that the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia.Cross-Strait RelationsTaiwanReuters reported, citing anonymous sources, that ROC President Lai Ching-te plans to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.[1] The Taiwanese government did not confirm the report. Such a trip would be Lai’s first visit to the United States as president and would mirror former ROC President Tsai Ing-wen's 2017 South Pacific trip, which also transited Hawaii and Guam.[2] The South Pacific states of Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands are among the 12 countries that maintain formal relations with the ROC rather than with the PRC. Guam and Hawaii are both home to major US military bases that are likely to play a role in any US defense of Taiwan. The headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command are also in Hawaii. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that such transits violate the One China principle and will not stop the “inevitable trend” of China’s reunification. He urged the United States not to allow Lai’s transit.[3]Tsai Ing-wen will embark on a trip to Canada to give a speech at the Halifax International Security Forum from November 22-24.[4] The annual summit, organized by Washington-based institution HFX, brings together leaders in government, defense, academia, and business. The trip would mark Tsai’s second trip abroad since leaving office on May 20, following a trip to Europe last month where she met with politicians and dignitaries in the Czech Republic, France, and Belgium. Tsai received the John McCain Prize for Leadership in Public Service at the 2020 iteration of the summit, honoring her efforts to safeguard Taiwan’s democracy and resist PRC aggression. Lin Jian responded to news of her trip by urging Canada to adhere to the One China principle and warning countries with formal ties to the PRC against hosting Taiwanese “separatists.”[5]Beijing perceives meetings between high-ranking American and Taiwanese officials as steps toward formal Taiwanese independence and threats to PRC claims over the island. It started the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 when the ROC’s then-president Lee Teng-hui visited his alma mater, Cornell University, in New York. Following then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 and Tsai’s meeting with her successor, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, in Los Angeles in 2023, the PRC held extensive military drills around Taiwan, including the first Joint Sword-series exercise in 2023. It has reacted less strongly to “stopover” transits than to formal public visits, however. The PRC has greatly increased its military and diplomatic pressure on Taiwan to deter further international engagement and assert PRC sovereignty claims since Tsai took office in 2016, and even more since Lai took office in 2024.[6]The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County. The PRC detained the Penghu-registered Taiwanese fishing boat Da Jin Man 88 on July 2 for illegally fishing in PRC waters northeast of Kinmen during a PRC fishing moratorium. The CCG escorted the boat to the port of Quanzhou and detained its crew there for over a month. The incident was the first time the PRC had detained a Taiwanese vessel in 17 years.[7] The PRC released four of the boat’s crew members on August 13 but continued to hold the boat’s captain, surnamed Hong, and the boat itself.[8] The PRC released the boat and Captain Hong on November 15 following a visit by former Deputy Speaker of Penghu County Chen Shuang-chuan to Quanzhou the day before. Chen is also Chairman of the Penghu Cross-Strait Exchange Association. Chen arranged to pay 210,000 Chinese yuan (about $29,000 USD) in fines on behalf of Hong to secure his release.[9] Chen and other Penghu officials previously met with PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Song Tao on October 24 to negotiate for Hong’s release. The TAO readout framed the visit as being entirely about resuming PRC tourism to Penghu, however, even though that was only a secondary objective of the trip.[10]The PRC conducts direct negotiations with KMT party officials and local politicians such as Chen Shuang-chuan to legitimize the KMT as negotiating partners on behalf of Taiwan. The PRC released the Da Jin Man 88’s other crew members, as well as another fisherman, following negotiations with Kinmen officials of the KMT.[11] Conducting fruitful negotiations with KMT officials while refusing to publicly meet with DPP officials enables the PRC to help the DPP’s political opponents and reinforces the CCP’s message that acceptance of the 1992 Consensus, which the KMT accepts and the DPP rejects, is the requisite basis for cross-Strait relations. The 1992 Consensus is an alleged verbal agreement between representatives of the CCP and KMT that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China, though the two sides disagree over which government rightfully represents “China.”The PRC’s four-month detention of Hong may be intended to deter illegal Taiwanese fishing in PRC waters as the PRC strengthens its “law enforcement” against Taiwanese nationals. Illegal fishing in the area is common, but PRC authorities usually warn and drive away offenders rather than detaining them. The PRC may also have used its detention of Hong, his crew, and a Kinmen-based soldier named Hu detained earlier in the year to give it leverage in negotiations with Taiwan at the time. The two sides resumed stalled negotiations about the February 14 capsizing incident, in which two PRC fishermen died while fleeing a Taiwanese Coast Guard boat in Kinmen’s prohibited waters, weeks after the PRC detained the Da Jin Man 88. Local PRC authorities released both Hu and the crew of the Da Jin Man 88 soon after Taiwan agreed to return the boat and bodies of the deceased fishermen.[12] It is unclear what the PRC got in return for releasing Hong, if anything, however, other than payment of his fines. Chen said that Hong’s detention period was so long because unspecified “legal issues” had to be resolved before he could be released.[13]Four Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered restricted waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen islands in two separate incursions on November 15th. Kinmen is a Taiwanese island group located just three kilometers (1.9 miles) from the PRC’s coast, a distance that has decreased in recent years due to a new PRC land reclamation project for an airport north of the island.[14] The Kinmen Archipelago’s restricted waters extend between 1.5 and 10 kilometers from its shores.[15] The CCG ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four different points at 8:50 a.m. and left at 11:00 a.m. The same four CCG ships returned to Kinmen’s restricted waters at 2:45 p.m. the same day and left at 5:00 p.m.[16] These two incidents mark the 50th and 51st times CCG ships intruded into Kinmen’s restricted waters this year. Taiwan does not claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around Kinmen due to its proximity to the PRC but does maintain analogous “prohibited” and “restricted” maritime zones around Kinmen, where it claims exclusive rights to carry out law enforcement. The PRC claims Taiwan and all its associated waters to be PRC territory and denies the existence of any restricted or prohibited waters around Taiwanese islands.The PRC began regular CCG patrols around Kinmen and frequent incursions into Kinmen’s waters since February 2024 in response to the February 14 capsizing incident. The patrols are intended to assert PRC law enforcement control around Kinmen and likely to punish Taiwan for the election victory of President Lai Ching-te in January. Beijing considers Lai to be a dangerous separatist. The PRC has incrementally changed its incursion strategy, especially since Lai’s inauguration in May. The patrols shifted from fixed routes and formations to dispersed, less predictable maneuvers that simultaneously enter Kinmen’s waters from multiple directions.[17] These tactics serve to establish a new status quo, desensitize Taiwan to the threat to Kinmen, and strain Taiwan’s resources as it must be prepared to mobilize at any time. Normalizing these patrols increases the likelihood that Taiwan will be caught unprepared if an apparently routine incursion turns into a full blockade that isolates Kinmen and other outlying islands. It is noteworthy that these incursions are regularly occurring at locations at which the PRC would likely need to station ships to enforce a blockade. ChinaUS President Joe Biden met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on November 16 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Lima, Peru. This was Biden’s third meeting with Xi since becoming president. Xi’s rhetoric toward Biden was generally placatory while continuing to warn the United States not to escalate tensions. Xi signaled the PRC’s preparation for the US presidential transition and said that the PRC is ready to work with the Trump administration.[18] Xi warned the United States, however, not to challenge what he described as Beijing’s four “red lines:” Taiwan, democracy and human rights, the PRC’s “path and system,” and the PRC’s right to development.[19] Xi expressed the PRC’s resolve to continue asserting its “sovereignty, rights, and interests” in the South China Sea and stated that the United States should not instigate or get involved in bilateral disputes over contested land features. Xi reiterated that the PRC maintains a “fair position” on Russia’s war in Ukraine and portrayed the PRC as a mediator in the conflict, which ignores the PRC’s political and economic support to Russia. Xi also denied claims that the PRC was the perpetrator of cyberattacks, in an apparent reference to an ongoing investigation by US authorities into a PRC state-sponsored cyber operation that compromised several major US telecommunications companies.[20]Biden expressed the United States’ opposition to “unilateral changes to the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait and called for an end to the PRC’s destabilizing military activity around Taiwan, according to the US readout.[21] Biden also addressed other key issues in the bilateral relationship, including the United States’ disapproval of the PRC’s continued support for Russia’s defense industrial base and US commitment to maintaining stability and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. [22]Xi and Biden agreed not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems, signaling Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in issues about which it has previously been noncommittal. Xi and Biden agreed during their meeting at APEC that the United States and PRC would maintain human control — as opposed to AI control — over their nuclear arsenals.[23] US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan emphasized that the conversation aligned with Biden’s and Xi’s agreement to “work on AI safety and risk together” following last year’s Woodside Summit.[24] Sullivan stated that he did not foresee an “imminent risk” that either power would “hand over the control of nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence” but that the discussion took place as a long-term stabilization measure.[25]The PRC’s acceptance of the US proposal marks a shift from the PRC’s earlier reluctance to accept limits on its application of AI. US National Security Council Senior Director for Technology and National Security Tarun Chhabra stated in June that the PRC was not in agreement with the US policy that AI should not be involved with nuclear weapons launch systems, following bilateral AI risk and safety talks in Geneva in May.[26] The PRC also refrained from signing an international agreement on the use of AI in the military during the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit in Seoul on September 10.[27]The agreement signals rare cooperation from the PRC in two critical areas of competition with the US, AI and nuclear weapons, in both of which the PRC has been disinclined to accept limits that might inhibit the PRC from gaining an edge. The PRC suspended nuclear arms control discussions with the US in July, citing the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan as the primary reason.[28] The PRC has long-maintained disinterest in engaging with the US over limitations on nuclear policy, however, according to Sullivan.[29] The PRC’s unwillingness to sequester issues regarding strategic stability from the rest of the bilateral relationship calls into question the PRC’s commitment to adhere to such agreements should tensions escalate.The PRC has aimed to portray itself as a responsible nuclear power, deflect criticism of its nuclear arsenal expansion by emphasizing its no-first-use policy, and cast the United States as the destabilizing power in the bilateral relationship.[30] Xi’s agreement to limit the influence of AI over the PRC’s nuclear arsenal is consistent with the PRC’s intent to portray itself as a responsible nuclear power.The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection into the Pacific. The J-35 is a mid-size twin-engine plane intended to be a multirole fighter. There is very little information publicly available about the newly debuted fighter, but many observable features such as the aircraft shape and wing closely resemble Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighter, and this may not be a coincidence, since PRC-based hackers stole data on the F-35 project in 2007 and 2008.[31] The J-35 prototype, FC-31 V2, has smaller dimensions then the other PLA stealth fighter, the J-20, with a length of 17.3 meters, a wingspan of 11.5 meters, and a height of 4.8 meters.[32] The J-35 has two known variants, a carrier-based variant and a land-based variant; the version that made its public debut at Airshow China 2024 is the land-based J-35A.[33] The carrier-based variant has been developed to operate from the PLA’s Fujian aircraft carrier, which has yet to enter service, and other Type-003 carriers the PRC may build in the future. Photographs have shown the carrier-based J-35 to have foldable wings and a launch bar for catapult-assisted takeoff (CATOBAR).[34] The J-20 stealth jet cannot be operated from aircraft carriers, so the J-35 will thus give the PRC the ability to operate stealth combat aircraft far from its shores. The J-35 has a significantly shorter combat range than the J-20, at 750 miles and 1200 miles respectively, but this limited range is partially offset by its ability to operate from an aircraft carrier.[35] Weaponry can be mounted externally on the wings of a J-35, very likely significantly increasing its radar cross-section, or in the internal weapons bay.The J-35 is designed to be a multirole fighter jet with strong stealth capabilities, but there are some design and logistical challenges that limit the effectiveness of the plane. The J-35 has less observable control surface than the J-20, and this may indicate less maneuverability. The J-35 may have difficulties masking its heat signature due to the double engine design—the F-22 tried to solve this issue with a specially designed trapezoidal engine nozzle, but the J-35 uses a rounded shape with serrated nozzles for heat dispersion.[36]There are significant limitations to the PRC's technological development in spite of its espionage and intellectual property theft. For example, the PRC’s jet engine technology is outdated compared to Western military jets. The FC-31, the prototype of the J-35, is equipped with WS-13 engines, and the J-35 is supposed to be upgraded to WS-19 engines that are currently still in development.[37] The WS-13 Engines are based on Russian RD-33 engines with a major repair interval of roughly 810 hours and service lifespan of 2200 hours, and these intervals are significantly smaller than many Western engines.[38] The PRC has historically relied on Russian military technology and has made efforts to domestically develop its jet engines, but supply chain issues, reliability and quality control problems, and technological limitations have and will continue to hamper its ability to do so.[39] The PRC has strong manufacturing capabilities, however, and is successfully producing J-20s at scale using pulsating production lines, a capability that will likely expedite J-35 production as well.[40]The J-35 is one of many new military advancements showcased at Airshow China 2024. The PLA also debuted an upgraded Z-20 helicopter, the Z-20J, designed to provide an effective anti-submarine platform for the Navy, and a variant of the J-15 fighter jet, the J-15T.[41] The airshow also showcased the Jiu Tian reconnaissance and attack drone and the HQ-19 anti-ballistic-missile system.[42] The J-35 and the J-15T are both likely to be fielded on the Fujian aircraft carrier, and the CATOBAR system to launch and land fighter jets allows these aircraft to take off with heavier loads than are possible using the ski jumps on the Liaoning and Shandong.Southeast AsiaPhilippinesThe PRC conducted military exercises and a law enforcement patrol near the Scarborough Shoal, reinforcing its territorial claims amid its dispute over new Filipino maritime territory laws. On November 13 the PLA Southern Theater Command held naval and air combat drills and a joint patrol near Scarborough Shoal.[43] This is the second PLA joint air and maritime patrol around Scarborough Shoal in four months. On November 14 the China Coast Guard (CCG) carried out a “law enforcement patrol” near Scarborough Shoal.[44] These exercises follow the November 10 announcement by the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that demarcated the coordinates of the PRC’s territorial sea baseline claims around Scarborough Shoal. The PRC MFA stated that its claims are in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[45] The PRC’s invocation of international law likely aims to provide legitimacy to their “law enforcement” actions near disputed territory in the South China Sea.This announcement by the PRC MFA also followed the signing of the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act and Philippine Maritime Zones Act by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr on November 8.[46] The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act established a system allowing foreign vessels and aircraft to exercise the right of passage through Philippine waters. The Philippine Maritime Zones Act defined the Philippines’ internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. The Philippines’ territorial definitions include the disputed Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, claims that the PRC criticized as the illegal incorporation of PRC territory. The Philippine government stated that these two laws are intended to align Philippine domestic law with international law according to UNCLOS and the South China Sea Arbitration ruling of 2016. The ruling determined that the PRC‘s expansive South China Sea territorial claims were inconsistent with international law and rejected all PRC territorial or maritime claims determined to be part of the Philippines‘ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.[47] The PRC protested the Philippines’ “unilateral actions” and stated that the PRC will continue to defend its territorial rights by all means necessary.The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.[48] The Philippines successfully completed a rotation and resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship that acts as a Philippine military outpost in Second Thomas Shoal. The PRC released a statement that the CCG observed this resupply mission and reported that the exercise was completed “with China’s approval.”[49] This marks the third resupply mission since the provisional agreement between the PRC and the Philippines was reached. The PRC claims that it “allows” Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal to give the impression that it has legal jurisdiction over the Shoal, though the Philippines rejects this framing.The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement. On November 18 United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).[50] The text of the agreement has not been released by either government, but according to the US Department of Defense (DoD) the GSOMIA is focused on providing a legal framework for increased sharing of information and defense technology between the two states.[51] The DoD said the agreement was made after two years of bilateral negotiations and will enhance interoperability between United States and Philippine forces. This signing marked Defense Secretary Austin’s fourth visit to Manila, the most of any United States Secretary of Defense, emphasizing Washington’s view of the importance of close relations between Manila and Washington.PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian commented on the agreement during a press conference, stating that agreements “must not target third parties or harm the interests of third parties” and warning the two states against undermining regional peace and stability.[52] The semi-official state-owned newspaper Global Times cited two PRC-based experts who argued that this agreement could result in additional provocative actions from the Philippines.[53] The PRC has previously stated its concerns over Philippine and United States military cooperation and its implications for PRC maritime security.[54] OceaniaPalauan President Surangel Whipps Jr.’s reelection reinforces US naval power projection into the Pacific islands. Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. won reelection in Palau’s November 2024 election.[55] Taiwan President Lai Ching-te congratulated Whipps Jr. on social media, and Whipps made a deliberate layover in Taiwan on November 13 on his way to Azerbaijan for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP29).[56] Palau is one of 12 countries that has diplomatic relations with the ROC rather than the PRC. Whipps has remained extremely vocal in his support for Taiwan’s participation in international bodies, stating that the Taiwanese “deserve to have a voice” at the UN during an interview to Taiwanese media, and also commented on Palau’s efforts to diversify its economy amidst PRC tourism restrictions that Beijing imposed in retribution for Palau’s support of Taiwan.[57]Whipps also stated that he may ask the United States for a Patriot missile defense system again in light of the recent PLA’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in September 2024, which landed in the southern Pacific Ocean. The Palauan Senate previously rejected the proposal in 2023.[58] The US military has been working on a number of large construction projects in Palau, including defense radars in Angaur and Ngaraad state, seaport expansion in Koror, and airstrip expansion of the WWII-era runways on Peleliu.[59] Palau has a Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the United States that grants the US military permission to operate on the island in exchange for economic and military aid.[60] Palau is strategically significant because of its location in the Second Island Chain and because it is the Pacific island closest to the South China Sea that hosts important US military infrastructure. These facts would make it a prime target for the PRC in the event of war in the Pacific, and so the Patriot missile systems would act as deterrence and add a line of defense in the event of an attack.Whipps also claimed that PRC research vessels and other boats have operated in Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[61] The PRC's foreign ministry has denied the allegations. These types of incursions have historically been used to normalize PRC presence in foreign waters, especially waters where the PRC has territorial claims. The PRC also named two underwater seamounts within Palau’s EEZ with Chinese names earlier in 2024, which may indicate a preparation to assert claims in the area. [62] The PRC does not currently claim any territory in Palau’s EEZ, however. The PRC will most likely redouble efforts following Whipps’ reelection to pressure the island nation to cease its support of Taiwan and military cooperation with the United States.RussiaAnonymous European Union diplomats said the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia. An unspecified senior EU official told South China Morning Post on November 15 that intelligence sources have reported the existence of the drone factory in Xinjiang, but that the EU has yet to confirm this information, whether the drones have already been shipped, and how much PRC authorities knew about the operation.[63] EU foreign ministers met on November 18 to discuss the evidence. Several foreign ministers including Germany’s Annalena Baerbock warned that the PRC would face “consequences” if the EU finds that it is providing drone aid to Russia.[64] PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian denied the allegations, claiming that Beijing has never provided lethal weapons to parties to the conflict and has always “strictly controlled military and dual-use drones.” He claimed that the PRC’s “objective and fair” position on the Ukraine war crisis and promotion of peace talks is in “sharp contrast to the practice of some countries that have adopted double standards and fanned the flames in the Ukrainian crisis.”[65]The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned two private PRC firms in October for their involvement in producing drones for Russia, the first time the United States has accused PRC entities of sending lethal aid to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The Treasury statement said that Russia’s Garpiya-series drone was developed by PRC-based experts and produced in the PRC in collaboration with Russian defense firms. It did not mention the location of the factories, however.[66] Reuters previously reported based on European intelligence sources that one of the companies now sanctioned by the United States, Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co., collaborated with Russian firms and established a joint drone research center in Xinjiang.[67] It appears likely that this joint drone research center is the same as the Xinjiang factory the EU officials mentioned, or related to it.The PRC MFA told Reuters at the time that it was unaware of a Russia-PRC drone production project and that the PRC had strict export controls on drones. A US National Security Council spokesperson said that the United States had not seen any evidence that the PRC government was aware of the transactions or had any involvement in providing lethal aid to Russia.[68] PRC firms providing lethal assistance to US-sanctioned Russian firms or jointly collaborating with Russia to produce lethal equipment marks a significant departure from the PRC’s cautious approach to supporting Russia and undermines the PRC’s professed neutrality on the war in Ukraine.Latin AmericaPRC President Xi Jinping’s inauguration of Chancay Port before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum signals the PRC’s growing investment in Latin America. Xi’s visit to Peru featured talks with Peruvian President Dina Hercilia Boruarte Segarra, his third meeting with the Peruvian leader in one year.[69] Xi opened his visit by inaugurating Chancay Port and designating it the beginning of a “21st century maritime silk road.”[70] PRC shipping company Cosco will exclusively operate the $3.6 billion deepwater port.[71] The port will reduce shipping time to the PRC by 10 days.[72]Xi aims to link Peru, and Latin America more broadly, to global Belt and Road Initiative efforts. PRC rhetoric around Chancay and activity in Latin America more broadly aligns with the historical and cultural messaging used in other Belt and Road Initiative projects. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian spoke of the port as instrumental to the “Inca Trail of the New Era” and emphasized the ancientness of Chinese and Peruvian cultures.[73] Lin also emphasized “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness, and win-win cooperation” with regard to PRC activities in Latin America; this rhetoric closely resembles past PRC messaging around its interactions with the “Global South.”[74]The PRC has used port infrastructure as a means of advancing its economic, and at times military, security around the world.[75] Some observers have expressed concerns that infrastructure projects like Chancay pose a security threat and entrench the PRC’s influence in the region.[76] The PRC has claimed that Chancay Port exists only for commercial purposes; the port could improve the PRC’s naval power projection in the region if used militarily, however.[77] [1] 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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/[72] https://apnews.com/article/peru-apec-biden-xi-lima-china-fc2ac014b2f7314bfa1a53351b0bc3a7[73] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241115_11527073.shtml[74] https://www.fmprc.gov dot cn/fyrbt_673021/202411/t20241115_11527073.shtml[75] https://www.csis.org/analysis/responding-chinas-growing-influence-ports-global-south[76] https://www.newsweek.com/china-news-xi-megaport-chancay-warships-1985770[77] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2024
- at 11/20/24 9:11pmKateryna Stepanenko, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov, Nate Trotter,William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. KaganNovember 14, 2024, 8:15pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term. The Kremlin recently adopted several policies that aim to cut Russian government spending on wounded Russian servicemen, combat inflation, and address long-term demographic problems such as low birth rates and labor shortages. These policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as the Russian government postures. These policies also demonstrate that the Kremlin will not be able to sustain the protracted war effort for years and decades to come while shielding Russian society from economic challenges. Consistent Western and international support for Ukraine's resistance on the battlefield will further exacerbate Russia's economic problems.Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy. Putin controversially changed Russian policy guaranteeing a one-time payment of three million rubles ($30,124) to all Russian servicemen who have been wounded in combat in Ukraine since March 2022.[1] Putin signed a decree on November 13 that restricted the one-time payments of three million rubles only to servicemen who sustained serious injuries in combat, only offering one million rubles ($10,152) to lightly wounded servicemen, and 100,000 rubles ($1,015) to servicemen who sustained minor injuries on the battlefield.[2] Putin's decree generated significant backlash from the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community, and Putin attempted to placate this community on November 14 by increasing the one-time payments to four million rubles ($40,136), but still only for Russian servicemen who sustain severe battlefield injuries that result in a disability.[3] A Russian milbloggers noted that Putin's authorization to increase compensation for disabled servicemen does not alter the fact that the Kremlin is reneging on promises to thousands of Russian servicemen who joined the Russian military solely due to large financial incentives.[4] The milblogger added that Russian military medical commissions are also becoming increasingly — and often deliberately unfairly — selective in diagnosing Russian servicemen with severe injuries.Putin originally introduced the policy offering all wounded Russian servicemen three million rubles to incentivize military recruitment after he had decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022.[5] Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and the reversal of such incentives indicates that the system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin. ISW notably assessed in Summer 2022 that the Kremlin's reliance on high financial incentives for force generation was committing Russia to short- and long-term financial responsibilities to thousands of Russians, such as paying veterans pensions, compensations to families of deceased servicemen, and other state benefits.[6]The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy. The Russian Central Bank recently raised the key interest rate to 21 percent on October 25, which reportedly prompted discontent among Russian politicians, DIB CEOs, and elites. Kremlin-affiliated Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP) reported that the Russian economy is "effectively facing the threat of stagflation - simultaneous stagnation or even recession and high inflation" because of the Central Bank's tight monetary policy.[7] TsMAKP assessed that if the Russian Central Bank maintains the key interest rate at around 20 percent until mid-2025 then the composite leading indicator (CLI) for recession will exceed its critical threshold. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service similarly reported that the number of loans with a dynamic rate — which depends on a discount from the Central Bank — increased from 44 percent in late 2023 to 53 percent in late 2024.[8] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service added that high interest rates may create a shock and a decline in production, which can result in bankruptcies and corporate defaults. A Kremlin insider source claimed that the Central Bank's tight monetary policy is restraining the Russian DIB's pace of development in the long term and has already complicated several Russian export projects, despite the fact that it had not yet directly impacted Russian military-technological support for the Russian war effort.[9]The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies. Foreign Policy (FP), citing OSINT analysts, reported that Russia has been losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels per month but can only produce 20 per month.[10] FP reported that Russia will likely run out of cannon barrels in 2025 due to battlefield losses, dwindling Soviet stocks, and sanctions impacts. FP also cited OSINT estimates that Russian forces have lost at least 4,955 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) since February 2022 — about 155 IFVs per month. FP reported that Russia can only produce about 17 IFVs monthly or 200 annually. FP assessed that the Central Bank's policy of raising interest rates has made it difficult for nondefense companies to raise capital through loans, which is shrinking the civilian economy and may lead to significant post-war recession as returning Russian veterans will have a harder time finding employment.The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB. Russian state outlet RBK claimed on November 14 that the Russian government has developed a draft Strategy of Action through 2036 to address Russia's increasingly dire demographic issues.[11] The Strategy of Action aims to increase birthrates and promote the family lifestyle by improving support system for families with children and providing birth incentives; solving housing problems to increase the availability of rental, social, and new housing; creating conditions for a more successful work-family balance; improving reproductive health of the population, in particular women's prenatal and infertility care; and enhancing family-positive propaganda in media and the Russian information space. The Strategy of Action is a part of broader efforts by Russian authorities to advance policies aimed at increasing the Russian population both through concrete legislation but also through rhetoric centered on "familial and traditional" values.[12]ISW previously assessed that Russia's demographic challenges have been worsened by the war with an estimated 800,000 to 900,000 Russians — including many highly qualified workers- fleeing the country since February 2022 likely causing Russian authorities to rely more on migrant populations.[13] Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) data shows that Russia’s labor shortage amounted to 4.8 million people in 2023, a problem that has reduced Russia’s economic output.[14] Rosstat also estimated in 2023 that Russia’s population will decline naturally at a rate of more than 600,000 people per year until 2032. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged Russia's ongoing labor shortage on November 7 and admitted to Russia's heavy reliance on migrants in order to mitigate the impacts of its waning population on the broader Russian workforce.[15] Putin warned, however, that reliance on migrant populations requires systematic assimilation efforts, likely in response to continued tensions between Russian ultranationalist rhetoric and the need to keep the Russian labor force capacity afloat through migration. Migrant populations are also not likely to yield the desired outcome in Russia given continued racist rhetoric and legislation and lack of skillsets among economic migrants needed to comprise a professional working class. FP reported that the Russian "civilian economy" has experienced personnel shortages and lack of qualified workers due to concerted Russian government efforts to attract Russian laborers to its DIB leading to possible future economic turmoil resulting from labor shortages and declining population. ISW has recently observed Russian authorities revoking migrants' Russian citizenship for refusing to register for military service, an increase in migrant deportations in 2024, protests, and violence against minority communities, among other rhetorical and legal realities that have created obstacles for migrants both to enter and to advance in the Russian workforce.[16] A combination of naturally declining population and aversion to creating conditions conducive to migration and enhancement of the skilled labor workforce will possibly impair the Russian economy and consequently Russian DIB in the mid- to long-term.Russian forces recently advanced into Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the area. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows at least four Russian vehicles conducting an assault, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced southward along a railway line.[17] Russian and Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces attacked in two armored vehicle columns and that one column consisted of one tank and three armored vehicles and the other column consisted of an unspecified composition and number of vehicles.[18] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in Kupyansk and prevented Russian forces from establishing positions in Kupyansk.[19] The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) reported that Kupyansk is fully under Ukrainian control and reiterated a Ukrainian General Staff report from November 13 stating that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on the settlement.[20] ISW assessed that Russian forces likely advanced in northeastern Kupyansk but very likely do not control the area, and ISW maps currently show areas in northeastern Kupyansk where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations near Kupyansk within the last two months and ISW continues to assess that the Russian seizure of Kupyansk would generate operationally significant effects.[21] ISW is not prepared to assess whether Russian forces will be able to leverage recent tactical advances to make operationally significant gains, however. Russian forces also continued offensive operations north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Hlushkivka, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Zahryzove, Kucherivka on November 13 and 14.[22]A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war. Kremlin newswire TASS amplified a poll conducted by the Russian state-affiliated Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences on November 14 revealing that 83 percent of respondents claimed that the "Special Military Operation" did not affect their daily life or affected it only to a slight extent.[23] Patriarch Kirill, head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), claimed on October 31 that some segments of Russian society choose to "turn a blind eye" to the realities of the frontline and the hardships faced by those living in border areas near the conflict, although the war in Ukraine represents the "most urgent threat" to Russia.[24] Kirill condemned Russians who are unwilling to sacrifice their personal comforts, instead relying on "superficial distractions" to avoid confronting the hard realities of the war. ISW assessed that Kirill's remarks likely reflect underlying concerns among Russian authorities, as they suggest possible waning public support for the war effort, potential difficulties in future recruitment efforts, and a growing societal divide between portions of the Russian population most directly affected by the war and those largely insulated from its impacts.[25]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."[26]Key Takeaways:The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy.The Kremlin's efforts to combat inflation and high interest rates are also reportedly impacting the expansion of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and prospects for mobilizing the economy.The Russian DIB is unlikely to match the production rate necessary to replace Russian weapons losses under these monetary policies.The Kremlin is also adopting policies aimed at bolstering the domestic population in the long term, signaling mounting concerns over declining demographics and labor shortages that could threaten the sustainable operations of the Russian DIB.Russian forces recently advanced into Kupyansk during a likely roughly company-sized mechanized assault, although ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the area.A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war.Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on November 14 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is personally dealing with issues concerning Ukraine and that he requires no special envoys, likely in response to reports that US President-elect Donald Trump will "soon" appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war."Russian forces advanced in the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast, west of Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion, in the Chasiv Yar direction, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.Russian sources are speculating that North Korea may have provided North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery systems to Russia. Russian milbloggers published images showing a train transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced within the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault south of Zelenyi Shlyakh (southeast of Korenevo) and indicates that Russian forces advanced in the area.[27] Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet, Southern Military District [SMD]) launched mechanized attacks near Maryevka, Pogrebki, Orlovka, and Novaya Sorochina (all northwest of Sudzha), and advanced to the southern part of Novaya Sorochina.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian rate of advance had slowed down; that Russian forces seized some positions between Pogrebki and Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo); and there are no confirmations that Russian forces entered Kurilovka (south of Sudzha).[29] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that fighting continued east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; south of Korenevo near Nikolayevo-Darino; southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Leonidovo, and Darino; northwest of Sudzha near Novaya Sorochina and Malaya Loknya; and south of Sudzha near Plekhovo.[30] Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), and 106th VDV Division reportedly continued to operate in the Kursk direction.[31] Assault elements of the Russian "Arbat" Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Plekhovo.[32]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian field commanders are deliberately producing false reports, which exaggerate Russian advances within the Ukrainian main salient in Kursk Oblast and contribute to Russian losses on the battlefield.[33] The milblogger stated that Russian military command is committing elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade to daily unprepared assaults and that Ukrainian defenses are further destroying the brigade. The milblogger added that elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are still fighting for Orlovka, Pogrebki, Novaya Sorochina, and Staraya Sorochina (immediately southwest of Novaya Sorochina), and that Ukrainian forces encircled and eliminated one of the brigade's two groups. The Kremlin is beginning to face some limited protests from Russians residents in Kursk Oblast's border area, and the problem of Russian field commanders misreporting the extent of the Russian advances in Kursk Oblast is likely a symptom of the Kremlin's demands to decisively repel the Ukrainian incursion.[34]Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Ukraine's main salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Novy Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[35]Belgorod Oblast-based outlet Pepel reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military equipment storage area in Belgorod City on November 14.[36] Pepel reported that an unspecified Ukrainian missile struck the roof of a building where Russian forces store several "Ural" trucks and other military equipment, and that the strike injured several conscripts.Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13 and 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Official Ukrainian sources reported that fighting continued north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk.[37] Ukrainian sources also reported that Russian forces conducted likely cross-border raids near Vysoka Yaruha (directly south of the international border and about 20km north of Kharkiv City).[38] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on November 14 that the worsening weather conditions are complicating Russian forces' movement and both Russian and Ukrainian troops' ability to use drones.[39] The Ukrainian official further reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of the lack of Ukrainian drones in the area to replenish their reserves in the area.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)See topline text for updates on the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 14, but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced west, south, and east of Pershotravneve (west of Svatove), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[40] Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Svatove near Zelenyi Hai and Pershotravneve; and northwest of Svatove near Pishchane; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna, Novoyehorivka and Druzhelyubivka; northwest of Kremmina near Novomykhailivka, Makiivka, and Katerynivka; and west of Kremmina near Zarichne, Nevske, Torske, and Terny on November 13 and 14.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on November 14, but did not advance.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced south of Siversk near Rozdolivka, but ISW has not confirmed confirmation of this claim.[43] A Ukrainian brigade reported on November 13 that Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful platoon-sized mechanized assault near Spirne (southeast of Siversk).[44] Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic (LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[45] Elements of the Russian 39th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[46]Russian forces recently advanced south of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in this direction on November 14. Geolocated footage posted on November 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Bila Hora (south of Chasiv Yar).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[48] Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Stupochky on November 13.[49] Elements of the Russian Ivanovo Airborne (VDV) Formation (98th VDV Division) and the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on November 14, but did not make confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 13 that Russian forces advanced in southern Krymske (northeast of Toretsk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[51] Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; immediately west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka on November 13 and 14.[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian forces continued attacking east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Krutyi Yar, Sukhyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Hyrhorivka, Pustynka, Petrivka, Novooleksiivka, Yurivka, Dachenske, Pushkine, and Zhovte on November 13 and 14.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on November 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications (Stratcom) stated on November 14 that Ukrainian forces control Illinka and that fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of the settlement.[54] ISW assessed that Russian forces likely seized Illinka as of November 13 due to geolocated footage published on November 13 showing elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) raising a flag over central Illinka (northeast of Kurakhove).[55] ISW does not assess that Russian forces control the settlement, although Russian forces likely occupy it. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Voznesenka (north of Kurakhove).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within eastern Kurakhove and north of Illinka (north of Kurakhove).[57] ISW has not observed visual evidence of these claims. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction published footage on November 13 showing Russian forces conducting a roughly reduced company-sized mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Kurakhove direction.[58] Russian forces continued attacking within Kurakhove; northeast of Kurakhove near Zorya and Sontsivka; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Berestky, Illinka, and Kreminna Balka, Voznesenka; and west of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka on November 13 and 14.[59] The spokesperson of Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults using tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, motorcycles, and buggies and are attempting to reach Uspenivka (southwest of Kurakhove and northeast of Vuhledar).[60] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 14 that the Russian military has concentrated roughly 70,000 personnel from its Central, Southern and Eastern groupings of forces in the Kurakhove direction.[61] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 1st, 5th, 110th, 114th motorized rifle brigades (51st CAA) are operating north and northeast of the Kurakhove near Novooleksiivka, Ukrainka, Novodmytrivka, and Solntsivka.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 14 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Dalne (north of Vuhledar) and advanced northeast of Vuhledar near Antonivka and Maksymivka.[63] Russian forces continued attacking north of Vuhledar near Dalne; northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka and Antonivka; northwest of Vuhledar near Yantarne, Kosyantynopolske, and Trudove on November 13 and 14.[64] Elements of the Russian "Astra" artillery unit of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Maksymivka.[65] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Dalne; elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Antonivka, Katerynivka, and Yelyzavetivka (all northeast of Vuhledar); elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating west of Trudove; elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in the direction of Rozlyv (northwest of Vuhledar).[66]Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 14. Geolocated footage published on November 11 and 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Rivnopil and north of Levadne (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka). [67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novodarivka, although ISW has not observed visual evidence of this claim.[68] Russian forces continued attacking south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka, Rivnopil, and Novopil on November 13 and 14.[69]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces reportedly recently advanced in the Hulyaipole (far eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) direction. Russian sources claimed on November 14 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hulyaipole near Marfopil and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 14.[71] Sniper elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[72]Russian forces reportedly recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast amid continued fighting on November 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further north of Robotyne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[73] Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Novoandriivka on November 13 and 14.[74] A Russian milblogger downplayed recent speculations that Russian forces may intensify assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast in the near future.[75] ISW has still not observed any reports confirming that Russian forces have redeployed forces to the Zaporizhia direction from other areas of the frontline. Artillery elements of the Russian ”Viking” Detachment (22nd Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[76]Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 13 and 14, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[77] Elements of the Russian BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Army Combat Reserves) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[78]A road bridge on the Dzhankoy-Maslove (both northeast of Simferopol) highway in occupied Crimea collapsed overnight on November 13 to 14, prompting some Russian information space concerns about Russian military logistics from occupied Crimea to elsewhere in occupied southern Ukraine. Russian occupation officials reported that the bridge collapsed due to an oversized truck driving across the bridge and that the bridge collapsed onto railway tracks, temporarily stopping civilian and freight railway traffic between occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia Oblast.[79] Russian occupation officials claimed that the railway tracks remain operational and resumed railway traffic during the day on November 14.[80] Russian occupation authorities reported that restoring the roadway bridge will take three to four months. Russian milbloggers expressed concern about Russian railway logistics, claiming that the affected railway is the only railway connecting occupied Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast and that the collapse temporarily cut off Russian logistics to Russian forces in occupied Kherson Oblast.[81]Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on November 14 that Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels are no longer operating in the Black Sea due to poor weather conditions and are instead increasing aviation operations over the Black Sea.[82]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 14 that Russian forces launched 59 Shahed drones and unspecified strike drones from Kursk Oblast.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones over Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Kyiv oblasts and that 38 drones were ”locally lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Sumy Oblast Military Administration reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces downed 11 Shahed drones over Sumy Oblast.[84]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian sources are speculating that North Korea may have provided North Korean-produced 170mm M1989 "Koksan" self-propelled artillery systems to Russia. Russian milbloggers published images showing a train transporting alleged North Korean 170mm M1989 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai.[85] Russian milbloggers claimed that the North Korean “Koksan” self-propelled artillery systems are mounted on Russian T-54 or T-62 tank chassis, have a fire rate of one to two shots per five minutes, and have a range of 40 to 60 kilometers.[86] A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger celebrated the alleged weapons transfer and speculated that North Korea could provide Russian forces with higher-caliber weapons and allow Russia to significantly expand its military capabilities.[87] Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) reported that Russian forces may use the “Koksan” self-propelled artillery system to replace recent losses of Russian 2S7 Pion 203mm self-propelled artillery systems in challenging operational areas.[88] ISW is unable to independently confirm reports of North Korea providing Russian forces with artillery systems.Russian milbloggers expressed continued concern over poor Russian medical care to Russian soldiers who fought in Ukraine amid recent Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to posture as providing effective care.[89] Russian milbloggers complained on November 14 that the Russian MoD failed to properly develop distribution and logistics networks to supply the Russian military with medical supplies at the army, divisional, and regimental levels after nearly three years of war despite having sufficient supplies in storage.[90] The Russian milbloggers claimed that the shortfalls in the MoD's medical supplies have forced volunteer organizations and other medical units not tasked with obtaining supplies to fill the gaps in medical stores but that these efforts are insufficient for Russian needs. Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on November 14 showing Russian soldiers of the 35th Management Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD] rioting following a confrontation with Russian military police officers over being denied medical care and being misled by commanding officers in Novosibirsk City.[91]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)Russia may be struggling to create a coherent and unified federal-level occupation strategy for Ukraine and is instead relying on loyal Kremlin insiders to adjudicate control over occupied areas. A Russian insider source claimed on November 14 that the Kremlin has reportedly abandoned its previous plan to create the "Novorossiya" Federal Okrug (federal district) in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts until at least the end of the active phase of military operations in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin's administrative control of occupied Ukraine remains fairly ad hoc and de-centralized.[92] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky first publicly announced the plan to create the Novorossiya Federal Okrug in June 2024.[93] A Russian insider source previously claimed that the okrug project, if Russian authorities had proceeded with it, would have showcased the Kremlin's pivot toward developing the economic prospects of occupied Ukraine and streamlining its integration with Russia.[94] The Kremlin's apparent abandonment of the project may then be an indicator of increasing constraints on Russia's ability to administer the occupation of Ukraine due to ongoing domestic economic struggles. The Russian insider source further claimed that Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko's recent visit to Ukraine is a strong indicator that the Kremlin will likely continue to rely on Kiriyenko to lead federal-level initiatives in occupied Ukraine following the de-prioritization of the Novorossiya Federal Okrug project.[95] ISW has previously assessed that Kiriyenko is one of the main Kremlin officials directly involved in administering the occupation of Ukraine.[96] Kiriyenko will likely continue to personally oversee occupation efforts in the absence of a larger okrug-level administrative body to oversee the occupation. Kiriyenko's personal bandwidth to do so is likely limited, however, as he also oversees many of the Kremlin's internal machinations, including the veteran-focused "Time of Heroes" program.[97]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Russian and Belarusian authorities continue to increase legal cooperation through unified border control standards. The Belarusian Ministry of Industry stated on November 14 that Russian and Belarusian authorities signed a temporary agreement to streamline border controls and the exchange of electronic passports for exports between Russia and Belarus, as well as establish a groundwork for a permanent electronic passport system by the end of 2024.[98]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/putin-podnyal-vyplatu-za-ranenie-povlekshee-invalidnost-do-chetyreh-millionov-rubley-posle-togo-kak-nakanune-poruchil-sokratit-vyplaty; https://t.me/rybar/65367[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/45691; https://t.me/milinfolive/134998 ; https://t.me/rybar/65367; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024[4] https://t.me/tretyakov_n/1406[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-and-battalions[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-and-battalions[7] http://www.forecast dot ru/_ARCHIVE/Mon_MK/2024/macro53.pdf; https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-economy-outlook-stagflation-recession-inflation-gdp-growth-ukraine-war-2024-11[8] https://szru dot gov.ua/news-media/news/rosiyu-ochikuyut-masovi-bankrutstva-ta-korporatyvni-defolty[9] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16469[10] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/14/russia-war-putin-economy-weapons-production-labor-shortage-demographics/[11] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/rbk-v-pravitelstve-razrabotali-demograficheskuyu-strategiyu-vlasti-predlagayut-povysit-effektivnost-vyplaty-alimentov-i-nagrazhdat-mnogovnukovyh-babushek; https://www.rbc dot ru/economics/14/11/2024/673477059a79475403f0341e [12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024; [13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-kremlins-occupation-playbook-coerced-russification-and-ethnic-cleansing[15] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/75521[16]https://rus.azattyk.org/a/33194051.html; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/979681; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024[17] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7502; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20712; https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1857055007427764550; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857058508467814786; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857058664147718361; https://t.co/IaZpE6Kx1d[18] https://t.me/bbcrussian/72889 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20712 ; 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https://t.me/tass_agency/285240[27] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22249; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2439[28] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22238; https://t.me/brigade95/1528; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1856960458390999245 ; https://t.me/brigade95/1528[29] https://t.me/rybar/65362; https://t.me/dva_majors/57728[30] https://t.me/rybar/65362; https://t.me/mod_russia/45690; https://t.me/dva_majors/57682; https://t.me/dva_majors/57728[31] https://t.me/rusich_army/18462; https://t.me/dva_majors/57682; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11798[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/285222[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/57728; https://t.me/yurasumy/19150[34] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/prosim-vas-zakonchit-etu-proklyatuyu-voynu-bezhentsy-iz-kurskogo-sela-olgovka-ostavshiesya-bez-zhilya-obratilis-k-putinu; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/vlasti-kurskoy-oblasti-otchitalis-o-vydache-dvuh-sertifikatov-na-zhilie-posle-protestov-zhiteley-prigranichnyh-sel-poteryavshih-svoi-doma; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/rt-i-mash-glavu-esche-odnogo-prigranichnogo-rayona-kurskoy-oblasti-otpravili-v-otstavku; https://t.me/mash/59191; https://t.me/shot_shot/74129; https://t.me/vchkogpu/52506; https://t.me/tass_agency/285229[35] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/3398; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1857061406564057203; https://x.com/TuiteroMartin/status/1857071977908818086; https://x.com/budeshta/status/1857070131886559642[36] https://t.me/belpepel/8399; https://t.me/astrapress/68456[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2611[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2611; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl[39] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-prychynu-yaka-uskladnyuye-vorogu-peresuvannya-na-harkivshhyni/[40] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29486[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl[43] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29477[44] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22250; https://t.me/rubizh3018/807[45] https://t.me/epoddubny/21613[46] https://t.me/epoddubny/21608[47] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7509; https://t.me/luhanskdpsu/400 [48] https://t.me/sashakots/50132[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19155; https://t.me/dva_majors/57723; https://t.me/sashakots/50147[51] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29447[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l ; https://t.me/rusich_army/18458 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57682[54] https://t.me/AFUStratCom/26876[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2024[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/45689[57] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29467; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80628[58] https://t.me/mechanized33/539 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/14974[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23143 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144303[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/vid-tankiv-do-motoczykliv-na-kurahivskomu-napryamku-vorog-kydaye-v-bij-vsyu-nayavnu-tehniku/[61] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2348[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2345[63] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29473[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l [65] https://t.me/voin_dv/11830[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2345 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2346[67] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1856818677976633794; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1856818681202024863; https://t.me/orb131/1297 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7501; https://t.me/skarlatop/4050 [68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19184[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l[70] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29483; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144331 [71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl[72] https://t.me/voin_dv/11829 [73] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29492[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l [75] https://t.me/wargonzo/23143; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/11836; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/35041[77] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02zu1peN3CPjrEt1PK526hNmdXFegsjTGm4fxdrxpVbXig1zj7mk7pjd5oxoxroS79l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aEoKSE2gTmbyokFYEr232Z9L1sLjeo9dimagLghcHDarTwUSK3AP5GG3WLLUPpEcl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0hrfUJCwtEqd81u3DgqqP9Gy3G3LAeLiNequfeypKZir8BoDCEp4mcbaD6qxdviMQl[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/57713[79] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/14/v-krymu-obrushilsya-most-vlasti-anneksirovannogo-poluostrova-zayavili-chto-on-ne-vyderzhal-vesa-bolshegruznogo-avtomobilya[80] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/22405967; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6735208a9a79478497dfda89; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7298779[81] https://t.me/rybar/65355 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57675[82] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/14/vms-zsu-vorozha-aviacziya-peretvoryla-chorne-more-na-siru-zonu/[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/22872[84] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31351 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31350[85] https://x.com/archer83able/status/1857075934274171021; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1857026675428479481; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1857064906861789265; https://t.me/milinfolive/135026; https://t.me/war_home/3052; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/v-rosiyi-pomityly-korejski-dalekobijni-sau-m1989-koksan/ ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/20470; [86] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80638; https://t.me/rybar/65382; https://t.me/sashakots/50149 [87] https://t.me/rybar/65382[88] https://t.me/istories_media/8160[89]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20November%2013%2C%202024%20%28PDF%29_0.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[90] https://t.me/dva_majors/57687 ; https://t.me/vrachivyneodni_channel/7208 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57715 [91] https://t.me/astrapress/68440[92] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16468[93] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[94] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[95] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/16468[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy [97] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024[98] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/278211 ; https://belta dot by/society/view/belarus-i-rossija-budut-vremenno-obmenivatsja-svedenijami-iz-sistem-elektronnyh-pasportov-tehniki-675454-2024/
- — Iran Update, November 14, 2024
- at 11/20/24 9:11pmRia Reddy, Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens,and Nicholas CarlInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and have decreased by half in the past week.[1] The IDF also reported that it is targeting stockpiles of observed and unobserved indirect fire systems that are difficult to reach with airstrikes.[2] The IDF added that approximately 60 percent of Hezbollah indirect fire launches use small single- or triple-barreled launch systems.[3] The stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced citizens safely to their homes in northern Israel requires stopping Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel. The recent relaxation of IDF restrictions for gatherings in northern Israel indicates the reduced threat of Hezbollah rocket fire.[4] The IDF reported that Hezbollah has also struggled to conduct large, coordinated rocket attacks into Israel, suggesting that Hezbollah is cannot easily communicate across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.[5] Israeli forces continue to exploit this disruption and have expanded clearing operations up to five to six kilometers into “second line” of Lebanese towns.[6]Unknown gunmen shot at a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol in southern Lebanon after the patrol discovered an ammunition cache on November 14.[7] UNIFIL stated that its forces informed the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and shortly thereafter came under fire from two or three individuals.[8] UNIFIL requested that Lebanese authorities fully investigate the incident.[9] The LAF would be responsible for enforcing the disarmament of Hezbollah during a ceasefire with Israel, according to a leaked US-proposed draft.[10]The IDF reported that it is facing a severe shortage of soldiers.[11] The IDF published data showing that it is currently has only 83 percent of the combat manpower that it requires. The IDF accordingly urged the government to increase the required time for mandatory IDF regular military service to three years, a jump from the current requirement of two and a half years for men and two years for women.[12] The IDF also urged the government to approve a service extension law. The IDF added that recruitment of ultra-Orthodox soldiers has increased in recent years but that it still fell short of the IDF goal of recruiting 1,300 ultra-Orthodox Israelis in the July-October 2024 recruitment cycle. The IDF reported that combat unit reservists served an average of 136 days in 2024 and are projected to serve an average of 70-72 days in 2025. The IDF data revealed that approximately 40,000 reservists in combat and combat-support roles did not respond to reserve duty call ups during an unspecified period. Senior Israeli officers previously attributed the fall off in participation to burnout after over a year of war.[13] Israeli media reported that the failure of the Israeli government to enact policy to draft the ultra-Orthodox Israeli population contributed to the reduced reservist responses to the call ups.[14]Iranian leaders appear concerned about the possibility of the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggering international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. Unspecified diplomats told Reuters that the E3 are drafting a resolution to present at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in Vienna from November 18 to 22 to “pressure Tehran over its poor cooperation” with the IAEA.[15] The resolution would require the IAEA to produce a “comprehensive report” on Iranian nuclear activities in addition to its regular quarterly ones. The report would likely lay the foundation for the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions because the report would almost certainly confirm--as previous IAEA reports have already--Iranian noncompliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments.”[16] The sanctions would target Iran’s nuclear and missile program and arms transfers.[17] The most recent IAEA report in August 2024 concluded that Iran continues to develop its nuclear program outside the parameters of the JCPOA.[18] The IAEA report stated that Iran possesses 164.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, marking a 22.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since May 2024.[19] The report also verified that Iran has installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow and 10 out of 18 planned cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.[20] Iran also continues to severely limit the ability of the IAEA to conduct various verification and monitoring activities related to the JCPOA.Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program since the IAEA published its last verification and monitoring report in August 2024. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on November 14 that high resolution satellite imagery from October 2024 shows new construction at a former Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Golab Dareh.[21] The imagery reveals new trench excavations and cabling that can be used to implement new security measures at the site, including alarms and surveillance cameras. ISIS previously reported renewed activity at another Iranian nuclear site at Sanjarian, citing imagery from September 2024.[22]Iran’s clear and explicit violations of the JCPOA could prompt the E3 to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran. Telegraph reported on November 2 that the United Kingdom is “prepared” to trigger snapback sanctions against Iran due to Iranian noncompliance with the JCPOA.[23] Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Director Mohammad Eslami stated that “any resolution on Iran’s nuclear affairs will face Iran’s immediate response” during a press conference with IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi, likely referring to the E3 resolution and sanctions.[24] An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would send a message to the E3 through Grossi about Tehran's seriousness to resolve its nuclear standoff, likely to try to convince the E3 not to trigger the snapback mechanism.[25] Senior Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, similarly emphasized Iran’s willingness to cooperate with the IAEA during separate meetings with Grossi on November 14.[26]The United States sanctioned on November 14 a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force and Houthis.[27] The sanctions targeted 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the al Qaterji Company.[28] The company finances and maintains a militia in Syria and is connected to Hezbollah Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling.[29] The IDF killed one of the company’s founders in an airstrike in July 2024.[30] The United States previously designated al Qaterji Company as a terrorist financing entity in 2022 after it facilitated trade between the Syrian regime and Islamic State.[31] The United States stated that al Qaterji Company executives met directly with senior IRGC Quds Force officers as well as a sanctioned Iranian-backed Houthi financial official, Said al Jamal.[32] The United States previously sanctioned al Jamal and affiliated companies facilitating Iranian oil trade to support the funding of Iranian proxy and partner militias.[33]Key Takeaways:Lebanon: The IDF has likely disrupted the ability of Lebanese Hezbollah to fire into Israel. Hezbollah is struggling to conduct coordinated, large-scale attacks into Israel, suggesting challenges communicating across tactical units or operational-level headquarters.Iran: Iranian leaders appear concerned that the E3 could trigger international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 has expressed concern, as Iran has continued to expand its nuclear program in violation of the JCPOA.Syria: The United States sanctioned a Syrian network involved in selling oil to the Syrian regime and China and generating revenue for the IRGC Quds Force and Houthis. Some of the designated entities are tied to Syria militias and Lebanese Hezbollah arms smuggling.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 14. The IDF engaged and killed Palestinian fighters in Beit Lahia and Jabalia.[34] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade killed Palestinian fighters who launched anti-tank munitions targeting the IDF.[35] Commercially available satellite imagery published on November 14 and local Palestinian reports indicate that the IDF 84th Infantry Brigade demolished several buildings around Jabalia refugee camp.[36]The IDF continued clearing operation in Gaza City on November 14. A Palestinian journalist reported IDF gunfire in areas north and south of Gaza City.[37] Hamas mortared the IDF north of Gaza City.[38]The IDF 143rd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on November 14.[39] The IDF conducted an airstrike targeting a weapons warehouse, killing a Palestinian fighter.[40] The IDF separately conducted an airstrike targeting a loaded rocket launcher in the al Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip.[41] The IDF stated that the launcher was aimed at Israel and posed an imminent threat to Israeli forces and civilians. The IDF observed secondary explosions following the airstrike targeting the rocket launcher.[42] The IDF issued warnings to Gazans in the area to evacuate ahead of the airstrike and used precision munitions to avoid civilian casualties.[43] The airstrike killed one civilian and injured 20 others, however, according to the New York Times.[44]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIsraeli forces killed a Palestinian militia leader near Tulkarm on November 14.[45] The IDF stated that the fighter was involved in attacks and recruiting fighters.[46] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) mourned the loss of three fighters in Tulkarm on November 14.[47] The IDF stated that its operation there was part of a larger counterterrorism effort in the northern West Bank.[48]Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonElements of the IDF 91st Division continued operating in southeastern Lebanon on November 13.[49] The 91st Division directed airstrikes targeting Hezbollah headquarters and ammunition depots.[50] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade (91st Division) conducted clearing operations in mountainous terrain to destroy hidden Hezbollah indirect fire launch sites.[51] The 89th Commando Brigade uncovered one launch platform that supported 32 launch tubes pointed toward Israel.[52] Geolocated footage posted on November 14 showed the 89th Commando Brigade advancing west from Markaba towards Tallouseh.[53] The IDF 769th Territorial Brigade also located and destroyed rocket launch sites, anti-tank positions, storage facilities, and military buildings.[54] Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces operating in Markaba.[55]The IDF 36th Division expanded its clearing operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 14.[56] The 188th Brigade uncovered a Radwan weapons depot containing rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), sniper rifles, ammunition, and various combat equipment.[57] The 188th Brigade and 1st Golani Brigade also located underground infrastructure, mortar shells, and indirect fire launch pads aimed at Israel.[58] Hezbollah has continued indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance from Maroun al Ras into “second line” Lebanese border towns.[59]The 226th Brigade (146th Division) deployed into southwestern Lebanon on November 14 to conduct clearing operations.[60] The 228th Brigade directed airstrikes and artillery strikes on Hezbollah munitions warehouses and other Hezbollah military buildings.[61]The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah weapons manufacturing and storage sites in Beirut on November 14.[62] IDF Spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that the IDF has struck 40 Hezbollah targets in Beirut in recent days.[63] The IDF stated on November 12 that it had destroyed most Hezbollah ammunition depots and weapons manufacturing sites in Beirut as part of its effort to degrade Hezbollah capabilities.[64] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Ghobeiry, Burj al Barajneh , Haret Hreik, Choueifat, and al Amrousieh before striking these areas.[65]The IDF has conducted around 300 airstrikes in Lebanon over the past week.[66] Lebanese sources reported over 100 separate strikes since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on November 13.[67] The IDF struck Hezbollah sites in Nabatieh after issuing evacuation orders for specific buildings in the city.[68]The IDF Air Force struck two PIJ headquarters in Damascus on November 14.[69] Social media accounts reported that the strikes targeted two buildings in Mezzeh and Qudsaya neighborhoods of Damascus.[70] The IDF noted that the strikes should cause “significant damage” to PIJ’s headquarters and fighting ability.[71] At least seven PIJ fighters have been killed in Israeli airstrikes since the IDF intensified its air campaign in southern Lebanon in September 2024.[72] These Syrian and Palestinian fighters traveled from Syria to fight alongside Hezbollah.[73] The IDF stated that PIJ is a key part of Iranian efforts to support Hezbollah against Israel.[74] The IDF also stated that the Bashar al Assad regime enables PIJ to operate in Syria.[75] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the strikes killed 15 and injured 16 others while causing ”significant material damage to private property.”[76] The IDF conducted a second round of airstrikes targeting a bridge in al Qusayr, Syria, on November 14 that Hezbollah uses to smuggle weapons into Lebanon.[77] The IDF Air Force first targeted the bridge on November 13.[78] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported after the first strike that several bridges in Qusayr are closed to traffic.[79] Hezbollah has a prominent presence in al Qusayr, and Iran frequently transfers weapons to Hezbollah through the area.[80] The IDF stated on November 14 that it would ”attack every attempt to transfer weapons from Syria to Hezbollah” and strike all infrastructure in Syria “used to produce or transfer weapons for Hezbollah.”[81]IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Amir Baram confirmed that Israel is building a “ground barrier” along the Golan Heights-Syria border to strengthen security.[82] Baram said that the IDF 210th Division is “working hard to change the security reality” on the border.[83] The 210th Division has operated adjacent to the Golan Heights in Lebanon since the start of IDF ground operations on October 1.[84] Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[85] Baram’s acknowledgement of the IDF activity along the Syrian border comes a day after the IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria in order to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. The spokesperson acknowledged the activity in response to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).[86] Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[87]Hezbollah has conducted at least 21 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 13.[88] Hezbollah claimed several attacks targeting IDF sites, including the Stella Maris naval surveillance base north of Haifa and Eliakim base south of Haifa.[89] Hezbollah stated that these two attacks were part of its ”Khaybar” campaign, which is meant to retaliate for Israel killing of Hassan Nasrallah.[90] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting a IDF 146th Division logistical site near Nahariya.[91] The IDF last acknowledged that the 146th Division operated against Hezbollah in southwestern Lebanon on November 5.[92] Hezbollah also claimed multiple attacks targeting Israeli towns and IDF personnel along the Israel-Lebanon border.[93] Hezbollah fighters fired rockets targeting an IDF border post in Jal al Alam, northwestern Israel.[94] Hezbollah conducted two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces and civilians in Yiron, across the border from where Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Yaroun, southwestern Lebanon.[95] Hezbollah attacks targeting IDF personnel and sites near the border are likely meant to degrade the IDF ability to conduct effective ground and air operations into Lebanon, though it is unclear whether Hezbollah attacks have had any meaningful effect.Hezbollah claimed that it used a Fateh-110 ballistic missile to attack Israel on November 6.[96] The Fateh-110 is an Iranian short-range ballistic missile that has a range of approximately 300 kilometers.[97]IRGC-affiliated media reported on November 14 that this attack marked the first time that Hezbollah has used a Fateh-110 ballistic missile to attack Israel in the October 7 War.[98] Hezbollah claimed that it fired the Fateh-110 missile at an IDF base in Tzrifin, south of Tel Aviv.[99] IRGC-affiliated media claimed that Hezbollah fired a "significant number" of Katyusha rockets at the base to "confuse” Israeli air defenses before firing a single Fateh-110 missile at the base.[100] CTP-ISW cannot verify what kind of projectile Hezbollah used in the attack. If Hezbollah did indeed fire a Fateh-110 missile at Israel, it could have done so as part of a ”reconnaissance-in-force" operation against Israeli air defenses. Reconnaissance-in-force operations are “designed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information.”[101]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed seven attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 13. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat.[102]Six drone attacks targeting unspecified “vital target[s]” in northern Israel.[103]The IDF Navy intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Eilat on November 13.[104] The IDF Air Force separately intercepted two drones launched from Iraq before they entered Israeli airspace on November 13.[105] The IDF Air Force also intercepted a drone launched “from the east” in Syrian airspace on November 13.[106] The drone did not enter Israeli airspace.An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 14 that the IDF intercepted around 90 percent of the approximately 70 drones that Iranian-backed militias have fired at Israel since October 31.[107] The correspondent stated that a “significant” portion of the drones were launched from Iraq. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed over 55 attacks targeting Israel since October 31.Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani, traveled to Damascus and met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on November 14.[108] Assad pledged Syrian support for Palestinians and Lebanon “by all means,” according to official readouts. Larijani also met with the Syrian Parliament Speaker Hammouda Sabbagh and separately unnamed Palestinian militia leaders at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus.[109] Larijani is next set to meet Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri in Beirut.[110]Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik claimed on November 14 that the Houthis conducted 29 attacks on military and commercial vessels in the Red Sea between November 7 and 14, using drones and ballistic and cruise missiles.[111] Abdulmalik confirmed the Houthi’s complex attack on two US destroyers on November 11, which was confirmed by the US Department of Defense.[112] Abdulmalik also reiterated the Houthi claim of an attack on the USS Abraham Lincoln, which the United States has denied.[113]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856996336324763925 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856944537840550249 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856870660422729772 ; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856812044663570432 ;[66] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857129571826475067[67] Data available on request.[68] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857108863662653667 ; https://t.me/bintjbeilnews/120125 ; https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1857042654212583594 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102399[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857037707467223387 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1857041934776213860[71] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[72] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170[73] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838604474090196998; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1838884955243372680; https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1853150218226905170[74] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[75] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857072120963932328[76] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid084zrgmd5R4MFvE76BEVq8up2QzuYbN9CoA9MhQdM88JAwWrpcehK7L391pi3Mjksl?__cft__[0]=AZUH-e_fyx4sab5n-S8yK8hXlV5NDJnOR8hL15p95ooTpSLfbUzX-OKSqrXWniHl7CgoibBxYm4t7hqvtlb9Jlj70uSYrZ8OJxPNqGNG-NOzTvfBCJLiAjukHVn1IKMLzjVwZJvcF3SULn2-DVGT2mtCfV2oYXBTXgDlKHwSs0Vd4050mUheDu0AHoXbzn2AJIo&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[77] https://x.com/QalaatM/status/1857128714896646410 ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/102543[78] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0KZj4i4HB7QxvuoYFzAskZnCA2bsJEWP7UjWAYF9jKwg7sYshxpLm78fmquBNjUiml?__cft__[0]=AZUF3U5f7gvKlf_pVuZ3D_QXqTeQkoWTm3x4ZlUEzPzJXEwatyKy0LHOff54rXI8P03J0oXR_Chb48bJqdoj82XLa7HJB-6Cz4IBrpcAapBLgaQ7sJYTxW90IbJ5_LJvRKKy05ok4d7Lvz1z44VQP0_6CnpNI8Gxd3oeT1W81lkDJ1MEHSYnSYnCU-7cPqzRlUU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[79] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0KZj4i4HB7QxvuoYFzAskZnCA2bsJEWP7UjWAYF9jKwg7sYshxpLm78fmquBNjUiml?__cft__[0]=AZUF3U5f7gvKlf_pVuZ3D_QXqTeQkoWTm3x4ZlUEzPzJXEwatyKy0LHOff54rXI8P03J0oXR_Chb48bJqdoj82XLa7HJB-6Cz4IBrpcAapBLgaQ7sJYTxW90IbJ5_LJvRKKy05ok4d7Lvz1z44VQP0_6CnpNI8Gxd3oeT1W81lkDJ1MEHSYnSYnCU-7cPqzRlUU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[80] https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-5-2024#_ednb17f68bd5697f4998787c6a9764de21a81[81] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857130554870689792[82] https://www dot idf.il/248358[83] https://www dot idf.il/248358[84] https://www.idf dot il/246162[85] https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-09-24/ty-article/.premium/while-idf-attacks-degraded-hezbollah-it-remains-a-major-threat-to-israeli-home-front/00000192-25a9-dff0-a5f7-3fbf15ad0000[86] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cpwrvw7x8j9o[87] https://t.me/damascusv011/24465[88] https://t.me/mmirleb/9039; https://t.me/mmirleb/9042; https://t.me/mmirleb/9043; https://t.me/mmirleb/9044; https://t.me/mmirleb/9045; https://t.me/mmirleb/9046; https://t.me/mmirleb/9047; https://t.me/mmirleb/9048; https://t.me/mmirleb/9049; https://t.me/mmirleb/9050; https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9054; https://t.me/mmirleb/9055; https://t.me/mmirleb/9056; https://t.me/mmirleb/9057; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://t.me/mmirleb/9059; https://t.me/mmirleb/9060; https://t.me/mmirleb/9063; https://t.me/mmirleb/9071; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072[89] https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072; https://t.me/mmirleb/9042; https://t.me/mmirleb/9046; https://t.me/mmirleb/9043[90] https://t.me/mmirleb/9052; https://t.me/mmirleb/9072[91] https://t.me/mmirleb/9043[92] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1853761771913277475; www dot idf.il/245331[93] https://t.me/mmirleb/9039; https://t.me/mmirleb/9056; https://t.me/mmirleb/9047; https://t.me/mmirleb/9048; https://t.me/mmirleb/9050; https://t.me/mmirleb/9054; https://t.me/mmirleb/9055; https://t.me/mmirleb/9057; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://t.me/mmirleb/9059; https://t.me/mmirleb/9060; https://t.me/mmirleb/9063; https://t.me/mmirleb/9071[94] https://t.me/mmirleb/9042[95] https://t.me/mmirleb/9071; https://t.me/mmirleb/9058; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2024[96] https://t.me/mmirleb/8765[97] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/[99] https://t.me/mmirleb/8765[100] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3199813/[101] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/adrp/3-90/adrp3_90.pdf, Section 5-2.[102] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1520[103] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1521 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1523 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1524 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1525 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1526 ;https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1527[104] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856790269343006730[105] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856918677301395892[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856819357671690580[107] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16470[108] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/224439/President-Assad-Iran-s-leader-adviser-discuss-bilateral-ties[109] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6288149;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/24/3200279[110] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/199493[111] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm[112] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024 ;https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3962926/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/[113] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3396513.htm;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024 ;https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3962926/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/
- — Iran Update, November 17, 2024
- at 11/20/24 9:11pmKelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The IDF killed the head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, in central Beirut on November 17.[1] The IDF conducted a strike targeting Afif in a residential building in Ras al Nabaa, a neighborhood in central Beirut.[2] Hezbollah confirmed Afif’s death.[3] Afif was reportedly visiting a Syrian Ba’ath Party in Lebanon branch office at the time of the strike, according to the office’s head.[4] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported the strike killed one and injured three others.[5]Afif’s killing is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.[6] Afif had served as Hezbollah’s spokesperson since 2014 and facilitated Hezbollah’s news coverage and media relations.[7] Afif managed Hezbollah’s attack claims and documentation related to attack claims and coordinated Hezbollah‘s messaging with Lebanese media.[8] Afif played a role in Hezbollah’s October 19 drone attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's house in Caesarea.[9] He was a close adviser to Nasrallah and had become the highest-ranking Hezbollah official to hold public conferences in Beirut over the past month.[10] Afif’s killing is likely intended to further disrupt Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures and its attempts to rehabilitate those structures by having other officials step into previous commanders' roles.The IDF’s ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes. Israeli operations in Lebanon have done this by reducing the threat of anti-tank fire and other munitions to northern Israeli towns. Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year.[11] The IDF’s re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.[12] An unspecified IDF official told Israeli Army Radio that civilian movement in the north is ”free” because of the ”IDF’s control of Lebanese territory.” The IDF has disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to conduct direct fire—including anti-tank fire—and observed indirect attacks targeting northern Israel by seizing key terrain north of the border. Hezbollah's rate of anti-tank fire attacks has significantly dropped since the IDF began ground operations on October 1, suggesting that Israeli operations successfully pushed Hezbollah fighters back from the immediate border and disrupted Hezbollah’s ability to conduct these attacks.[13] Hezbollah may still be able to conduct attacks with direct line-of-sight into Israel from further back from the Israel-Lebanon border, however. Israeli forces are currently operating in ”second-line” Lebanese villages to prevent additional attacks from longer range.Re-opening northern roads is a part of the IDF‘s efforts to prepare for the return of northern residents to their homes.[14] The IDF also plans to soon withdraw IDF soldiers based in northern towns and return them to IDF outposts and bases.[15] This is consistent with recent comments from unspecified senior IDF officers that said that the IDF was considering returning displaced civilians to the north even without a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah.[16]Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16.[17] UNIFIL reported that an armed group prevented a patrol of French and Finnish peacekeepers from conducting a patrol in Bedias, Tyre District. The patrol continued along its planned route into the village of Maarakeh. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors“ fired upon the patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon. Some patrol vehicles had bullet impacts but no peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL said it is unacceptable that peacekeepers are routinely targeted while conducting UN Security Council-mandated tasks. UNIFIL stated that it is the responsibility of Lebanese authorities to ensure that UNIFIL peacekeepers can carry out their mandated tasks without fear or threats.The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on November 17 that the IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year.[18] The IDF has activated multiple reserve brigades several times since October 7, with at least one brigade serving for more than 200 days out of the year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused ”burnout” among IDF reservists.[19] This has caused a decrease in the number of reservists reporting for duty. These changes to the IDF’s policies regarding reserve call-ups presumably seek to address this burnout and make a longer war more sustainable for the force.Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.[20] Qatar previously ordered Hamas’ political leadership to relocate from Doha, according to US officials and Israeli media.[21] The United States reportedly pressured Qatar to expel Hamas’ political leadership after the group rejected the latest ceasefire-hostage agreement proposed by international mediators.[22]Key Takeaways:Israeli Air Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF strike that killed Hezbollah media chief Mohammad Afif is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.Israeli Ground Campaign in Lebanon: The IDF’s ground operation in Lebanon has enabled the IDF to begin taking steps to return Israelis to their homes. The IDF has removed all military checkpoints and roadblocks on roads near the Israel-Lebanon border that have been closed to civilians over the past year. The IDF’s re-opening of roads along the border indicates that the IDF has assessed that Israeli operations have significantly reduced the threat of anti-tank fire and other short-range munitions enough to allow civilians to return to previously targeted areas.UNIFIL: Likely Hezbollah fighters fired at UNIFIL peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on November 16. UNIFIL said that “likely non-state actors“ fired upon a patrol about 40 times. The only non-state armed groups operating in southern Lebanon are Hezbollah and groups that Hezbollah permits to operate in southern Lebanon.IDF Reserve Policies: The IDF is changing the length of time it activates reserve forces. This change appears designed to enable the IDF to sustain a longer war. The IDF is planning to standardize the service duration of IDF reserve brigades to one period of 70 consecutive days every year. The long and repeated call-ups to meet the needs of the IDF during the October 7 War has reportedly caused ”burnout” among IDF reservists.Hamas Moves to Turkey: Israeli media reported on November 17 that Hamas’ political leadership has relocated from Qatar to Turkey.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Beit Lahiya and Jabalia in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 showed that the IDF slightly expanded its clearing operations in eastern Jabalia refugee camp. The IDF also conducted controlled demolitions of civilian infrastructure west of Beit Lahiya.[23] Palestinian militias claimed three attacks targeting Israeli forces west of Beit Lahiya on November 17.[24] The IDF reported on November 17 that two IDF soldiers from the 900th Infantry Brigade died in the northern Gaza Strip.[25] A Palestinian sniper shot and killed one of the soldiers in Beit Lahiya.[26]The IDF conducted an airstrike that reportedly killed at least 70 Palestinian civilians in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17, according to “medics and residents” speaking to Reuters.[27] Reuters reported that the IDF airstrike struck a multi-story residential building in Beit Lahiya.[28] The IDF reportedly conducted overnight artillery shelling in Beit Lahiya before the airstrike, according to a resident.[29] The IDF also issued evacuation orders for Gazans to evacuate Beit Lahiya and relocate to western Gaza City.[30]The IDF Air Force commander Major General Tomer Bar visited Jabalia and conducted a situational assessment of the IDF’s ground and air campaigns in the northern Gaza Strip on November 17.[31] Bar emphasized the importance of coordination between the IDF air and ground forces to achieve operational success in the northern Gaza Strip.[32] The commander of the IDF 162nd Division, Brigadier General Itzhak Cohen, said during Bar’s visit that airpower is important to the IDF’s operation in Jabalia.[33]The IDF 99th Division likely conducted clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on November 17. A Palestinian journalist reported the movement of Israeli vehicles and artillery fire in northeastern areas of Bureij refugee camp.[34]The IDF conducted an airstrike that killed five Palestinians escorting an aid convoy in Qizan al Najjar, in the southern Gaza Strip on November 17.[35] These Palestinians were responsible for monitoring aid trucks entering Rafah to avoid theft by criminal groups, according to a Palestinian journalist.[36] It is not clear if these escorts were affiliated with any armed or criminal groups themselves.Hamas claimed responsibility for the rocket attack targeting Sderot in southern Israel on November 16.[37] The IDF intercepted two rockets targeting Sderot on November 16.[38Ultra-Orthodox Israelis protested against the IDF after it issued 1,000 draft orders on November 17.[39] Ultra-orthodox Israelis blocked the Route 4 highway near Bnei Brak in central Israel.[40] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz recently announced that the IDF will send conscription orders to 1,000 ultra-Orthodox beginning on November 17 and will gradually send the remaining 6,000 orders over the next six weeks.[41]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNothing significant to report.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonIsraeli forces likely advanced towards Khiam on November 16. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks south of al Wazzani, indicating that Israeli armor operated in the area. Commercially available satellite imagery also showed flattened terrain and vehicle tracks west of Ain Arab, indicating that Israeli armor advanced into the area from south of al Wazzani. This advance is consistent with Hezbollah-affiliated reports of an IDF advance towards Khiam.[42] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported that Israeli forces advanced along two axes towards the southern and eastern outskirts of Khiam on November 16, including by advancing from Wazzani towards Ain Arab.[43] Lebanese sources reported that the IDF fired artillery and conducted at least seven airstrikes in the Khiam area in conjunction with the IDF’s advance.[44]The IDF issued a new closed military zone in Metula and Kfar Yuval, northern Israel, on November 16.[45] Metula and Kfar Yuval are the closest Israeli towns to Khiam. Hezbollah claimed it fired rockets targeting Israeli forces in southern Lebanon north of Kfar Yuval on November 16.[46]Hezbollah claimed six rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel south of Khiam and on the city’s eastern outskirts.[47] Lebanese sources reported that Hezbollah also fired small arms and anti-tank missiles targeting Israeli personnel and armor advancing towards Wata al Khiam.[48] Hezbollah previously claimed its highest rate of attacks during the IDF’s first advance into Khiam around October 28, although Hezbollah does not provide evidence for these claims.[49]The IDF likely advanced east from Markaba towards Tallousseh, southeastern Lebanon. Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 17 shows flattened terrain and destroyed buildings in eastern Tallousseh, indicating that Israeli tanks or bulldozers operated in the area. Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Markaba on November 16.[50]The IDF 228th Infantry Brigade (Res.) continued operations in southcentral Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 17 showed that the 228th Infantry Brigade destroyed underground infrastructure and weapons depots on a hillside in southwestern Aitaroun.[51] The IDF reported that the 228th Infantry Brigade located weapons, ammunition, and a motorcycle within the underground shaft that the IDF said ”was prepared for an invasion” into Israel.[52] Hezbollah conducted several attacks targeting Israeli forces operating near Chama, southwestern Lebanon, since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 16. Hezbollah claimed it fired machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Chama.[53] Small arms and RPGs are relatively shorter-range munitions than Hezbollah has typically employed in its defense of southern Lebanon.[54] Hezbollah also mortared Israeli forces on the southwestern outskirts of Chama. Israeli forces advanced to Chama on November 15.[55] The IDF Artillery Corps crossed the border and began operating in southern Lebanon for the first time since the beginning of Israel’s ground campaign in Lebanon in late September.[56] The IDF announced that elements of the 282nd Artillery Brigade crossed the border with its self-propelled M-109 self-propelled guns to increase its artillery range and provide better support for ground forces in the area.[57] The IDF operates the M-109A5, which has a range of 22 kilometers.[58] IDF artillery had been operating from northern Israel.[59] The IDF added that the 282nd Artillery Brigade has shelled thousands of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon from northern Israel, including weapon depots, command centers, and rocket launching sites, and killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, since the start of their offensive.[60]The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 15 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on November 17.[61] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River. The spokesperson said that the IDF will act “forcefully” against Hezbollah activities in the areas of these specified towns.The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah senior leadership and infrastructure in Beirut since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 16. Lebanese media reported that IDF struck at least 11 sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs, including in Haret Hreik, Burj al Barajneh, Hadath, and al Chiyah.[62] The IDF Arabic spokesperson issued several evacuation warnings to Dahiyeh residents before the strikes.[63] The IDF also conducted an airstrike targeting an electronics store in Mar Elias, south of Hamra in central Beirut.[64] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF targeted the head of Hezbollah’s operations in the south.[65] Israeli Army Radio reported that this unnamed commander assumed a senior leadership role after a previous leader was killed.[66] The IDF has not acknowledged the attack or the target as of this writing.The IDF said it has struck about 50 Hezbollah targets in Dahiyeh over the past week, including 15 munitions warehouses and over 20 headquarters.[67] The IDF said it struck a house yesterday that had previously belonged to former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and had been used since by Hezbollah fighters.[68]The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Hezbollah infrastructure in Tyre, southern Lebanon on November 17.[69] The IDF said that many of the assets attacked belong to the Aziz unit, which is responsible for firing rockets from southwestern Lebanon into Israeli territory and other attacks.[70] The IDF said it took steps to reduce civilian harm, including calling on Lebanese civilians to evacuate the area.[71]The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) said that two LAF soldiers were killed in an Israeli airstrike on an LAF position in al Mari-Hasbaya, east of Khiam, on November 17.[72] The LAF announced the soldier’s deaths on X (Twitter) and said that Israel targeted an LAF position, injuring at least two others.[73] Lebanese Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati said that 36 LAF soldiers have been killed by Israeli airstrikes since the beginning of the IDF air campaign.[74]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 16 to 2:00pm ET on November 17. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Iranian-backed actors, including Hezbollah, have conducted at least six attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 16.[75] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting IDF personnel along the Lebanon-Israel border.[76] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting IDF troops and infrastructure in northern Israel in two separate attacks on November 17.[77] The IDF identified one barrage of at least fifteen rockets launched from Lebanon on November 17.[78] The IDF stated some rockets were intercepted and some fell in open areas. Hezbollah rockets slightly injured one Israeli in the upper Galilee region on November 17.[79]Hezbollah published a graphic depicting a circle of fire around Haifa, Israel, with the caption “vortex of Hell” in Hebrew and Arabic on November 17.[80] This is likely part of a Hezbollah media campaign to message that it still maintains the capability to seriously threaten Israeli strike targets as Israeli ground operations threaten Hezbollah’s munition stockpiles. Israeli forces have likely disrupted Lebanese Hezbollah’s ability to fire into Israel.[81] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the daily rate of Hezbollah attacks have declined on average over the “past few weeks” and attacks have decreased by half in the past week.[82] Hezbollah launched only one attack targeting the Haifa area on November 17.[83]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceThe Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two drone attacks targeting an unspecified “military target” in northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 16.[84] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Saraya Awliya al Dam, which claims to be affiliated with the Islamic Resistance of Iraq, separately claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat, Israel, on November 17.[85] The IDF intercepted a drone that crossed into Israeli territory ”from the east” on November 17.[86] The drone triggered sirens in towns southeast of Tel Aviv.[87] Footage posted to X (Twitter) showed a cloud of smoke over an antenna farm near Rehovot, central Israel, apparently following the drone interception.[88]The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed a drone attack targeting an unspecified target in Tel Aviv, Israel, for the first time on November 17.[89] This marks this group’s sixth attack on Israel and its first attack on Tel Aviv since it began claiming attacks on October 25.[90]Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani in Iran on November 17.[91] Amani sustained injuries during the September 17 Israeli attack targeting pagers used by Hezbollah members.[92] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry previously announced that Amani will return to his post in Lebanon after recovering from his injuries. The ministry expects him to recover in the near future.Iranian hardline Parliamentarians are increasingly calling for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon to establish Iranian deterrence with Israel. Hardline Parliamentarian Behnam Saeedi and Parliament’s National Security Commission member stated in an interview with Iranian media that any possible change to Iran’s defense doctrine will “revise and strengthen” Iranian defense abilities.[93] Saeedi stated that the development of Iranian defense capabilities, including missile, air, and sea capabilities, is “necessary” to establish tools of deterrence.[94] Hardline Parliamentarian representing Tehran Province Mahmoud Nabavian stated that Iran must ”equip itself with all the weapons” its adversaries, including Israel and the United States, possess.[95] This is likely an implicit reference to nuclear weapons. These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks will similarly fail to restore deterrence. These statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.[96]Iranian officials continue to meet with Syrian leaders to discuss Iranian-Syrian cooperation. Iranian Defense Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Syrian officials in Damascus on November 17 at the invitation of the Syrian Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas.[97] Nasir Zadeh and Abbas discussed regional developments and the Axis of Resistance.[98] Nasir Zadeh discussed expanding Iranian-Syrian cooperation on regional ”counterterrorism” efforts with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[99] Nasir Zadeh separately met with Syrian Arab Army Chief of Staff Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim and attended a reception at the Syrian Defense Ministry.[100]Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that Houthi launched an unspecified number of drones at “military and vital targets” in the Tel Aviv area and Ashkelon in Israel on November 17.[101] The IDF said that they were unaware of any drones launched from Yemen on November 17.[102] Sarea separately claimed responsibility for a ballistic missile attack on Eilat. CTP-ISW reported on this attack on November 16.[103]|Yemen map The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262828110520543; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-beirut-kills-hezbollah-media-relations-chief-security-sources-say-2024-11-17/[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-strike-beirut-kills-hezbollah-media-relations-chief-security-sources-say-2024-11-17; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/17/israel-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/#link-EA3FFFBXLBHI7LKQTPV5VRRQWE[3] https://t.me/mmirleb/9190[4] https://t.me/damascusv011/25041[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/17/israel-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine/#link-EA3FFFBXLBHI7LKQTPV5VRRQWE[6] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16583; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262835769581610[7] https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1435857/who-was-mohammad-afif-nabulsi.html; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-11-2024 [8] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262835769581610; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262842912440481[9] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858262839439356289[10] https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1435857/who-was-mohammad-afif-nabulsi.html; 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-30-2024[50] https://t.me/mmirleb/9154[51] https://x.com/TwistyCB/status/1858123831770009709[52] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858102805841494353; www dot idf.il/249247[53] https://t.me/mmirleb/9162[54] https://t.me/mmirleb/9170[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858180992969654638[57] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858180992969654638 ;https://x.com/BittonRosen/status/1857846041007239351[58] https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2023/israel-defense-forces-deploys-m109a5-self-propelled-howitzers-along-gaza-strip-and-lebanese-border; https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/M109A5_American_155mm_Self-Propelled_Howitzer_(SPH)[59] https://x.com/BittonRosen/status/1857846041007239351[60] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858180992969654638[61] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858043433723568404[62] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103257;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103265;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103266;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103319;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103321;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103324;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103326;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103355;https://t.me/channelnabatieh/103369;https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1858205637043233221[63] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858008218309476583; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858105569451680154; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858052783242346839[64] https://today dot lorientlejour.com/article/1435867/recap-beirut-struck-twice-and-its-suburbs-under-three-waves-of-evacuations.html; https://x.com/Lebanon24/status/1858205637043233221; https://x.com/fatimadaoud/status/1858214403096695179[65] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16587[66] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16587[67] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857888431935991986[68] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1858112406209126889[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1857877812679467042[70] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857878797716009293[71] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1857878797716009293[72] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1858232690878656777[73] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1858149068645478425[74] https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1435868/mikati-mourns-army-soldiers-killed-by-israel-urges-international-action.html[75] https://t.me/mmirleb/9153 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9156 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9163; https://t.me/mmirleb/9169 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9172 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9177[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/9153[77] https://t.me/mmirleb/9163 ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9172[78] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858160100583624760[79] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858161733501616306[80] https://t.me/mmirleb/9183[81] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-14-2024[82] https://t.me/moriahdoron/16490 ; https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1857093800507683293[83] https://t.me/mmirleb/9169[84] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1535 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1536[85] https://t.me/awlialdm/141[86] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858056538557956201[87] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1858056538557956201[88] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1858057380920983933[89] https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/11[90] https://x.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1850195344576913453 ; https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/5 ; https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/6; https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/7 ; https://t.me/Almoqawamabeladalharamaen/9[91] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/27/3202045/[92] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/224574/Iran-ambassador-to-Beirut-meets-with-Leader[93] https://www.ilna dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/1556845-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86[94] https://www.ilna dot ir/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-3/1556845-%D8%AA%D8%BA%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%DA%A9%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%86%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86[95] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411174580[96] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2024[97] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/706028[98] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/27/3201473/[99] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/706231; https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/899384405671780[100] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/videos/898297265344371/[101] https://x.com/AmeenHa2024yan/status/1858196311016677862[102] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/houthis-claim-to-launch-several-drones-at-israel-idf-unaware/[103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-16-2024 ;https://x.com/AmeenHa2024yan/status/1857854986660753594
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2024
- at 11/20/24 9:11pmNicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. KaganNovember 17, 2024, 4:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:00 am ET on November 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast. The NYT and Washington Post reported on November 17 that unspecified US officials expect Ukrainian forces to initially conduct strikes against Russian and North Korean forces within Kursk Oblast and that the Biden Administration could expand this authorization to use ATACMS against targets elsewhere in Russia in the future.[1] The US officials stated that the US authorized these limited Ukrainian strikes in response to the deployment of North Korean forces to the battlefield in Kursk Oblast to deter North Korea from deploying more forces to Russia. The US officials stated that the partial lifting of restrictions aims to generate a "specific and limited" battlefield effect and will not change the course of the war. French outlet Le Figaro reported on November 17 that France and the United Kingdom (UK) have authorized Ukrainian forces to use French and UK-provided SCALP/Storm Shadow missiles to strike within Russia.[2] Le Figaro did not state if France and the UK had authorized Ukraine's SCALP/Storm Shadow usage only within Kursk Oblast. The partial lifting of restrictions on Ukraine's use of Western-provided long-range weapons against military objects within Kursk Oblast will not completely deprive Russian forces of their sanctuary in Russian territory, as hundreds of military objects remain within ATACMS range in other Russian border regions.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk Oblast.[4]Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed and strike drones of an unspecified type (possibly referring to decoy drones) from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Kursk and Oryol oblasts.[5] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 120 missiles, including one Zirkon 3M22 hypersonic cruise missile, eight Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, 101 Kh-101 and Kalibr cruise missiles, one Iskander-M ballistic missile, four Kh-22/Kh-31P cruise/anti-radiation missiles, and five Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 42 drones and one Zirkon, seven Kinzhal, 85 Kalibr and Kh-101, two Kh-22/31P, and five Kh-59/69 missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian F-16 pilots shot down roughly 10 aerial targets during the strike.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 41 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian airspace, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Russian-occupied Ukrainian airspace. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that air defense was active in almost all Ukrainian oblasts. Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo stated that Russian strikes damaged energy facilities in several oblasts and noted that energy recovery work is ongoing in Odesa, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian missile strike caused a fire at an infrastructure facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, damaged critical infrastructure in Rivne Oblast, and targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[8] Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated that Russian strikes seriously damaged an unspecified DTEK thermal power plant (TPP) and noted that this was the eighth mass strike on a DTEK energy facility in 2024.[9] Ukrainian Energy Minister Herman Halushchenko stated that the strikes caused power outages in many areas of Ukraine.[10] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi stated that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities forced Ukrainian authorities to reduce the energy production levels of several nuclear power plants (NPPs).[11] Grossi reported that Russian strikes damaged several electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs, although the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Grossi stated that six out of the nine reactors at the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs are currently operating at reduced capacity. Ukrainian state railway company Ukrzaliznytsia reported that Russian forces struck a railway depot in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and that Russian strikes de-energized sections of several railway lines in southern, western, and northeastern Ukraine.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian infrastructure in Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Rivne, and Odesa oblasts.[13]Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses. Russian forces notably included Kalibr cruise missiles in the strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.[14] Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted that Ukrainian forces are able to down Kalibr cruise missiles, and Russian forces have rarely included Kalibr missiles in strike packages in recent months.[15] Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated in August 2024 that Russian forces only launch sea-based Kalibr missiles during combined strikes in order to overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[16] ISW recently observed reports that Russia is increasing its use of decoy drones that resemble Iranian-provided Shahed drones during combined long-range strikes and assesses that Russia will likely continue to use decoy drones and experiment with varying strike packages to increase the effectiveness of long-range strikes against Ukraine ahead of and during the winter.[17] Russian forces likely used decoy drones to additionally overload Ukrainian air defenses in the November 16-17 strike series, which contributed to Ukrainian forces' below average drone shoot down rate.Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17. Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov claimed that a drone crashed on the morning of November 17, causing an explosion at a factory workshop in Izhevsk at the address Lenin 101.[18] Russian opposition outlets noted that the Kupol Electromechanical Plant is at this address.[19] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that "unknown" drones struck the Kupol Electromechanical Plant that produces Tor air defense systems, radars, and components.[20] Local residents reportedly stated to Russian opposition outlet Astra that the Kupol factory also produces drones.[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not claim that Russian forces shot down any drones in the Udmurt Republic on November 17, and Russian state media noted that this is the first time Russian authorities have reported drone "crashes" in the republic.[22]North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited. Financial Times (FT), citing Ukrainian intelligence sources, reported on November 17 that North Korea has supplied Russia with weapons, including 50 170mm "Koksan" self-propelled howitzers and 20 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[23] FT's source observed that these systems, which Russian forces reportedly deployed to Kursk Oblast, will offer North Korean forces an opportunity to test their capabilities and weapons systems in real combat scenarios. Bloomberg reported on November 17 that North Korea may deploy up to 100,000 North Korean troops to Russia in future waves if bilateral relations between the two countries continue to deepen.[24] Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk claimed that North Korean forces are less combat experienced than Russian forces but that a North Korean deployment to fighting alongside Russian forces would alleviate pressure on Russian forces and Russian recruitment efforts and delay a potential decision for another partial involuntary reserve callup.[25] Zvinchuk also observed that North Korean forces deployed to fight alongside Russian forces will likely learn to conduct drone warfare, which North Korean forces would use in future operations elsewhere. The development of North Korea's ability to use drones, in addition to the already-announced decision to start serial drone production in North Korea, could pose a significant challenge to South Korea and Japan.[26]ISW has repeatedly observed efforts by Russian authorities to delay highly unpopular involuntary reserve callups, and the gradual deployment of 100,000 North Korean personnel could help alleviate some of these concerns in the short term while increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces.[27] A gradual deployment of 100,000 North Korean troops, however, will likely not address the eventual need for another Russian involuntary reserve callup as the reported number of North Korean personnel will not be sufficient to offset the current high Russian casualty rates. The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) previously reported that Russian forces suffered a record high average daily casualty rate of 1,271 troops per day or about 38,130 casualties total in September 2024, and the US Department of Defense (DoD) assessed that Russian forces have suffered an estimated 80,110 casualties in September and October 2024.[28] The deployment of roughly 100,000 North Korean personnel would only replace Russian losses for less than three months. Such a limited deployment would also fail to address Russia's broader shortages of millions of workers due to demographic crises and the war and the resulting mid- to long term shortcomings in Russian defense industrial base (DIB) operations.[29]Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints. Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk stated during an interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI on November 16 that Russian forces will seek to concentrate fighting in "populated areas and not in open fields" during Winter 2024-25 and offered Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove as examples of towns and cities where Russia will prioritize advances this winter.[30] Zvinchuk claimed that Russian forces are preparing to begin the fight for Pokrovsk and will approach Pokrovsk from the south and southeast now that Russian forces have seized Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk). Zvinchuk is a prominent voice within the Russian information space with ties to the Kremlin and may be privy to insider information about Russia's frontline objectives and campaign design. Russian forces have recently made advances into eastern Kupyansk and central Chasiv Yar, and such advances may be part of a concerted effort to advance into frontline cities in preparation for offensive operations in Winter 2024-2025.[31] ISW has previously assessed that the seizure of Kupyansk or Chasiv Yar would have operationally significant impacts on the geometry of the frontline and threaten major Ukrainian defensive positions in their respective directions, and recent Russian advances into the cities would put Ukrainian defenses in both directions at higher but not immediate risk.[32]Zvinchuk claimed that Russian forces will also look to increase their combat capabilities during Winter 2024-2025, particularly Russian drone capabilities because of the importance of the "drone war" in winter.[33] Zvinchuk noted that Russian forces have an artillery advantage over Ukrainian forces, but that Russian forces currently cannot advance due to Ukrainian drone operations. Zvinchuk suggested that better trained and equipped forces may be able to advance more effectively against Ukrainian drone operators. ISW has previously noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be trying to centralize control over informal Russian drone units, and Zvinchuk's comments likely refer to this ongoing effort and indicate that the MoD may intend to intensify this effort during Winter 2024-2025.[34] ISW recently assessed that Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower and materiel constraints.[35] The Russian military command may assess that urban combat is preferrable for Russia's current infantry-led style of fighting as multi-story buildings could provide Russian infantry with better cover from Ukrainian drone operators than trees in open areas. The Russian military command may also prefer to engage in urban combat to avoid prolonging the cost that advancing in rural fields and settlements imposes on Russian armored vehicle usage and reserves.[36] The Russian military command has likely assessed that offsetting Ukraine's drone advantages and reducing Russian armored vehicle losses through urban combat is worth the large numbers of Russian casualties that will come from grinding, attritional advances in frontline towns and cities.Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated on November 17 that his recent phone conversation with Putin showed that "little has changed" in Putin's views on the war in Ukraine and that this is "not good news."[37] Mikhail Zvinchuk in his November 16 interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI responded to a question about the conditions under which Russia could agree to peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.[38] Zvinchuk claimed that first Russia must gain full control of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, including the areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy - a demand that Putin first made explicitly in June 2024.[39] Zvinchuk added that Ukraine must unblock the road through Odesa Oblast to Transnistria, the pro-Russian breakaway republic in eastern Moldova, so that Russia can have "communication with Transnistria and the Russian people there." Zvinchuk also called for Russia to gain access to the Danube River, the mouth of which lies on the Ukrainian-Romanian border, and for the creation of a "buffer zone" in border areas in which weapons will be prohibited. Zvinchuk notably did not mention what Russia would compromise on during potential peace talks in order to achieve these proposals, but claimed later in the interview that Russia laying claim to only the four illegally annexed oblasts is in and of itself a compromise - further demonstrating how the Russian ultranationalist community, one of Putin's key constituencies, is not supportive of good faith negotiations with Ukraine. Russian access to Transnistria and the Danube River would essentially allow Russia to operate in and off the coasts of Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts even if Russian forces did not occupy these territories.[40] Kremlin officials have long called for Russia's occupation of all of southern Ukraine, including Odesa City, and Zvinchuk appears to be proposing a new framing of this same demand.[41] Russian access to Transnistria, areas near Odesa City, and the northwestern Black Sea would allow Russian forces to conduct a future attack on southern Ukraine and Odesa City after resting and reconstituting during a potential ceasefire.Russian access to Transnistria and the Danube River would pose military threats to Ukraine and NATO as well. Ukrainian strikes have pushed Russia's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) out of the northwestern Black Sea, but Russian access to the Danube would allow Russia to again operate in the area.[42] Russian control of Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts would deny Ukraine access to the Sea of Azov, and Russian access and possible control of the northwestern Black Sea would essentially landlock Ukraine. Russian access to the Danube River and to the road to Transnistria may also enable Russia to establish lines of communication to Transnistria - and possibly even Gagauzia in southern Moldova as Moldova has a port along the Danube River at its southernmost point at Giurgiulesti - to build up forces and means in Moldova for future military operations against Moldova, southeastern Ukraine, or Romania.[43] NATO is also currently constructing what will be its largest base near Constanta in southeastern Romania less than 100 kilometers from the mouth of the Danube River.[44]Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania. The opposition initially stormed the de facto Abkhazian parliament building on November 15 demanding the dismissal of a proposed investment agreement with Russia that would grant Russian legal entities property ownership rights and privileges in Abkhazia but has ultimately expanded the scope of its demands to call for the resignation of Bzhania.[45] Bzhania stated on November 16 that he would resign and appoint a vice president as interim head of state before snap elections if the opposition left the premises of the parliament, but the protesters refused his demands and called for his unconditional resignation.[46] Bzahnia called the protest an attempted coup, claimed that it is impossible to find compromise with the opposition, and refused to step down, prompting the opposition to continue the protests and propose the formation of an interim government.[47]Key Takeaways:The New York Times (NYT) and Washington Post reported that US President Joe Biden has authorized Ukrainian forces to use US-provided ATACMS in limited strikes against Russian and North Korean military targets within Kursk Oblast.Russian forces damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the largest missile and drone strike since August 2024 on the night of November 16 to 17.Russian forces continue to innovate their long-range strike packages and likely included relatively ineffective sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles in the November 16 to 17 strike package as decoys to distract and exhaust Ukrainian air defenses.Ukrainian forces struck a defense industrial factory in the Udmurt Republic for the first time on the morning of November 17.North Korea reportedly continues to provide military support to Russia, including the provision of rocket and artillery systems and potential additional troop deployments, which is likely to impact Russia's military operations in the short term, but its long-term benefits likely remain limited.Russian forces will likely focus on seizing frontline Ukrainian towns and cities during Winter 2024-2025 through urban combat amid efforts to offset Ukrainian drone advantages and possible Russian armored vehicle constraints.Russian President Vladimir Putin's maximalist objectives demanding full Ukrainian capitulation remain unchanged, but a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger appears to be trying to repackage longstanding Kremlin territorial claims to southern Ukraine as less severe "peace proposals" that would actually militarily threaten Ukraine, Moldova, and NATO.Abkhazian oppositionists continued protests on November 17 calling for the resignation of the de facto Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania.Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar .Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in Belarus|Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued offensive operations in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 17 that Russian forces successfully encircled Ukrainian forces near the Olgovka forest (east of Korenevo) and struck Ukrainian forces attempting to break out of the encirclement.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian forces recently advanced east of Korenevo near Kremyanoye; southeast of Korenevo near Darino and Novoivanovka; and south of Sudzha near Kurilovka and Plekhovo.[50] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims. Elements of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction; elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near the Snagost river dam (south of Korenevo); and elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Darino (southeast of Korenevo).[51] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 17 that the Russian military redeployed elements of the 69th Separate Covering Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the Hulyaipole direction to Kursk Oblast at the end of September to beginning of October.[52] ISW observed reports on November 16 that elements of the 69th Covering Brigade were operating in the south Donetsk (Kurakhove-Vuhledar) direction, and the brigade may be split between various sectors of the front.[53] Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Strilecha and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on November 16 and 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.[54] Elements of Rosgvardia's 116th Spetsnaz Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Vovchansk.[55]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced south of Kupyansk amid continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 17. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Kolisnykivka (south of Kupyansk) and occupy a roughly 3-3.5 kilometer area along the east bank of the Oskil River.[56] Russian forces continued assaults east of Kupyansk near Pishchane; southeast of Kupyansk near Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove near Kopanky and Nadiya; southwest of Svatove near Tverdokhlibove, Hrekivka, Cherneshchyna, and Makiivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny on November 16 and 17.[57] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating in the Kopanky (west of Svatove) area and that elements of the 254th and 283rd motorized rifle regiments (both 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating near Nevske (northwest of Kreminna) and Terny (west of Kreminna).[58] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Siversk direction near Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk) on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[59] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) operating in the Siversk direction have roughly 110-112 combat-ready tanks and 315-318 serviceable armored fighting vehicles for combat operations.[60]Russian forces recently partially closed a pocket southeast of Chasiv Yar amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 17. Geolocated footage published on November 17 shows that Russian forces recently advanced into the pocket and levelled part of the frontline southwest of Andriivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the pocket also advanced 2.5 kilometers along the railway between Andriivka and Zelenopillya (south of Andriivka) and 1.5 kilometers in depth near Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar and north of Andriivka).[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar), cleared an area south of the refractory plant within central Chasiv Yar, seized part of the Stupky-Holubivske 2 nature reserve (southeast of Chasiv Yar), reached the Druzbha forest south of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), and advanced in forests south of Chasiv Yar, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[63] Elements of the Russian "Sever-V" Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps), 78th "Sever-Akhmat" Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and the "Okhotnik" (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) reportedly continue to operate in the Chasiv Yar direction.[64] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on November 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced within central and southern Toretsk.[66] Russian forces reportedly advanced south of Pokrovsk amid continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 17. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 17 that Russian forces advanced within and later seized Yurivka (south of Pokrovsk), advanced towards Zorya (south of Yurivka), and advanced in a forested area two kilometers wide and one kilometer in depth west and south of Novooleksiivka (southeast of Yurivka), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[67] Russian forces also continued ground attacks east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Krutyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Yurivka, Petrivka, Pustynka, and Novooleksiivka on November 16 and 17.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack near Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk).[69] Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade 41st (CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Novohrodivka.[70] Geolocated footage published on November 16 shows Ukrainian drone strikes destroying a Russian Borisoglebsk-2 electronic warfare (EW) station in Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) on November 15 or 16.[71]Russian forces recently advanced on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir (north of Kurakhove) amid continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on November 17. Geolocated footage published on November 15 and 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the northern outskirts of Kurakhove on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and likely seized Nova Illinka (north of Kurakhove).[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Nova Illinka and advanced in northern Berestky (north of Kurakhove, on the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir) and eastern Kurakhove.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in an area up to 3.3 kilometers wide and 1.5 kilometers in depth south of Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove).[74] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are gradually withdrawing from the northern bank of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and noted that Russian forces' pace of advance appears to have slowed south of Kurakhove.[75] Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are attacking the Ukrainian pocket north of the reservoir from the north and that elements of the 51st CAA are attacking the Ukrainian pocket from the east. Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka, Voznesenka, Sontsivka, and Zorya; north of Kurakhove near Novoselydivka, Nova Illinka, Illinka, and Berestky; near Kurakhove itself; east of Kurakhove near Maksymilyanivka; and south of Kurakhove near Dalne on November 16 and 17.[76] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[77]Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 17. Geolocated footage published on November 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Kostyantynopolske (northwest of Vuhledar) along the O-0510 highway.[78] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Antonivka (northeast of Vuhledar), one kilometer in a forest area east of Bohoyavlenka (north of Vuhledar), and 2.7 kilometers west of Maksymivka (northwest of Vuhledar).[79] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attacking Uspenivka (north of Vuhledar) from the north near Dalne and the south near Bohoyavlenka.[80] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are unsuccessfully attacking near Sukhyi Yaly and that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly attacking near Yelizavetivka (northeast of Vuhledar).[81] Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Vuhledar near Katerynivka, Antonivka, and in the direction of Romanivka; north of Vuhledar near Trudove and in the direction of Yantarne; and northwest of Vuhledar near Sukhyi Yar on November 16 and 17.[82] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Trudove, and elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, EMD) are reportedly operating near Shakhtarske (northwest of Vuhledar).[83] Russian forces continued assaults in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Novodarivka and Rivnopil (both southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on November 16 and 17 but did not make confirmed advances.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in depth north of Rivnopil and continue to advance in the direction of Novodarivka, but ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.[85] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17. Elements of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) direction.[86] Limited fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in the fields north and west of Novopokrovka (northeast of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim.[87] Ukrainian sources posted footage of a Ukrainian HIMARS strike against a Russian personnel and equipment concentration near occupied Tavria, Zaporizhia Oblast (southwest of Robotyne).[88]Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 17 but did not advance.[89] Elements of the Russian "Khabr" Group (18th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly operate in the Kherson direction.[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a naval drone raid near gas fields in the Black Sea west of occupied Crimea on the morning of November 17.[91] The milblogger claimed that this is the first such Ukrainian naval drone raid against these fields since September 2024. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed four Ukrainian naval drones in the Black Sea, and the milblogger claimed that a fifth drone withdrew from the gas fields.[92]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text for Russian air, missile, and drone strikes against Ukraine.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian milbloggers continued to applaud their reported role in removing frontline 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) commanders after the commanders submitted false reports about Russian advances in the Siversk direction.[93] One milblogger praised Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's team for "repeatedly demonstrating its readiness for feedback" and claimed that former Russian Defense Minister and current Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu would have "hushed up" the situation despite public outcries on the internet.[94] Another milblogger highlighted the milblogger community's alleged role in resolving the situation in the Siversk direction and claimed that milbloggers have brought other problems in the Russian military to light in the past.[95]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/us/politics/biden-ukraine-russia-atacms-missiles.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/17/ukraine-russia-north-korea-atacms/[2] https://www.lefigaro dot fr/international/joe-biden-aurait-donne-son-accord-a-l-ukraine-pour-frapper-la-russie-en-profondeur-avec-des-armes-americaines-20241117 ; https://www.pravda.com dot ua/eng/news/2024/11/17/7484978/[3] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8b060c46ee6f49908f9fb415ad23051c; https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1828580873375023299: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias[4] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/8b060c46ee6f49908f9fb415ad23051c; https://x.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1828580873375023299: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias[5] https://t.me/kpszsu/23111[6] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/12432[7] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/3449[8] https://suspilne dot media/881667-kndr-peredala-rosii-artileriu-ilon-mask-vismiav-slova-zelenskogo-pro-nezaleznist-ukraini-998-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731840344&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/3731; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/881969-uskodzeno-ponad-147-kvartir-so-vidomo-pro-raketnij-udar-po-rivnensini/ ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/746[9] https://t.me/dtek_ua/1934[10] https://t.me/severrealii/28348[11] https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-260-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine[12] https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6256 ; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/6255[13] https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9458; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/17/raketnyj-udar-po-kyyevu-v-pecherskomu-rajoni-goryt-pyatypoverhivka/ ; https://suspilne dot media/881695-masovanij-obstril-ukraini-vlucanna-po-zitlovomu-sektoru-u-mikolaevi-golovni-novini-ranku-17-listopada/ ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/3731; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/881969-uskodzeno-ponad-147-kvartir-so-vidomo-pro-raketnij-udar-po-rivnensini/ ; https://t.me/odesa_prokuratura/746[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/23111[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2024[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[18] https://t.me/brechalov/5609; https://t.me/brechalov/5611[19] https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/17/dron-atakoval-oboronnoe-predpriyatie-v-izhevske-eto-pervaya-ofitsialno-podtverzhdennaya-ataka-bespilotnikov-na-udmurtiyu; https://t.me/idelrealii/38534[20] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8295;[21] https://t.me/astrapress/68629[22] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/17/11/2024/67396f7c9a79477cc189baca[23] https://archive.is/dwTkc; https://www.ft.com/content/83ad844b-8ebd-45a9-9c12-9c4c8506e25b; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-world/3927948-pivnicna-korea-peredala-rosii-blizko-50-samohidnih-artsistem-i-20-rszv-ft.html[24] https://archive.ph/jlAmK ; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-17/north-korea-may-end-up-sending-putin-100-000-troops-for-his-war[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2024[28] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1843198787097124968/photo/1 ; https://lordslibrary.parliament dot uk/war-in-ukraine-update-october-2024/; https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024[30] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024 [33] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074 [34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110324[35] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[36] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924[37] https://suspilne dot media/881965-vin-ne-zminiv-svoei-dumki-pro-vijnu-v-ukraini-i-ce-pogana-novina-solc-pro-dzvinok-putinu/; https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-latest-putin-trump-moscow-zelenskyy-kyiv-live-sky-news-12541713[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121423; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[44] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections[45] https://civil dot ge/archives/635655; https://oc-media dot org/protesters-storm-abkhazias-parliament-as-anger-over-controversial-investment-law-boils-over/; https://www.rferl.org/a/abkhazia-protesters-storm-parliament-russia-deal/33203385.html; https://apnews.com/article/georgia-russia-abkhazia-protest-parliament-ae03ce7d8335e6a20316a95d0f7acc84; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/protests-erupt-outside-parliament-breakaway-georgian-region-tass-says-2024-11-15/; https://t.me/tass_agency/285383; https://t.me/tass_agency/285411 ; https://t.me/istories_media/8177; https://thehill.com/homenews/ap/ap-international/ap-protesters-in-separatist-georgian-region-occupy-government-buildings-calling-for-leaders-ouster/[46] https://www.dw.com/en/abkhazia-leader-ready-to-quit-if-protesters-exit-parliament/a-70802086[47] https://t.me/tass_agency/285767 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285760 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/17/prezident-abhazii-zayavil-chto-ostaetsya-na-svoem-postu-ranee-aslan-bzhaniya-govoril-chto-gotov-uyti-v-otstavku-na-fone-protestov; https://t.me/tass_agency/285759; https://t.me/tass_agency/285747; https://t.me/tass_agency/285748; https://t.me/tass_agency/285745; https://t.me/tass_agency/285739[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[49] https://t.me/mod_russia/45817; https://t.me/tass_agency/285768 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285769[50] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29575; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29578[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144574; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5233[52][53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[55] https://t.me/motopatriot/29520[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2350[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57904 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19503 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144596[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2350[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29585[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2352[61] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22359; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22360[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80769[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144633; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29588; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19344[64] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5235; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144606 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144607;[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29572[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144554; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144657[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80801[69] https://t.me/btr80/22268 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80804[70] https://t.me/skalabatalion/440; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/17/novogrobivka-dlya-ro; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/15088[71] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1857818090853249045; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1857894070582128687; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857832394734162160; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1857832394734162160[72] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7538; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20728 ; https://x.com/strategicbakery/status/1858120060558057645; https://t.co/LdT3AjCeaK[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144554 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19333 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19505[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80773[75] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2351[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/57964[78] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7537; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=540527615523311[79] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80807 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144626[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19346[81] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2351 [82] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql [83] https://t.me/voin_dv/11868 (Trudove) ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144593 (Shakhtarske)[84] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02wB7EadVAN4htr5KmQtrdBzfBrXP6Z98oPYkGEuAQcaEndSQSukAsnnj74sf4n7SBl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[85] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80807[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/11864[87] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29597[88] https://t.me/gnilayachereha/20702 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1858037648901759200; https://t.me/gnilayachereha/20702 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1858037648901759200[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0kPzQsnHMoqUmEufA6BAeuhSdUxrBqPtLyUY9uMCAeMnh3RyYS1vrjnyVPHp4E8THl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0EvR4TDfM7G3ABHsiyK1Qx9QG2m25YfGkJrxW2rFBmq5txarY79BkpNWCAnp4J1zql[90] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/11816[91] https://t.me/rybar/65453[92] https://t.me/rybar/65453; https://t.me/mod_russia/45807; https://t.me/mod_russia/45803[93] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144573 ; https://t.me/rybar/65435; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44562 ; https://t.me/rybar/65436 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57905 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44563; https://t.me/dva_majors/57908 ;https://t.me/Pragmatic_Sol/3345 ; https://t.me/rybar/65437; https://t.me/Pragmatic_Sol/3345; https://t.me/dva_majors/57907; https://t.me/dva_majors/57906 ; https://t.me/rybar/65440[94] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/44563[95] https://t.me/dva_majors/57906
- — Iran Update, November 13, 2024
- at 11/20/24 8:23pmKelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however. Iran conducted two major strikes on Israel on April 13 and October 1.[1] Iran used 30 ballistic missiles in the April 13 strike and 180 ballistic missiles on October 1. Israel’s October 25 strikes targeting Iranian ballistic missile production facilities severely damaged Iran’s ability to produce long-range ballistic missiles, according to an Israeli intelligence assessment quoted by a Netanyahu-leaning Israeli outlet.[2] These Israeli assessments are consistent with previous reports that the IDF destroyed mixing equipment used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[3] The assessments also estimate that Iran still has “several hundred long-range missiles” and that Iran is “unlikely to launch all of the missiles at Israel simultaneously.[4] Iran will likely seek to preserve the remainder of its diminishing ballistic missile stockpile rather than further depleting this stockpile by launching another large-scale missile attack on Israel, assuming the Israeli assessments are accurate.US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[5] Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer recently met with US Special Envoy for Lebanon Amos Hochstein and US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.[6] An unspecified US official said that Dermer’s meetings with Hochstein and Sullivan were “productive” and narrowed the gaps between US and Israel on the language of the ceasefire proposal and a “side letter” that would guarantee US support for Israeli freedom of military action against threats from Hezbollah.[7] Hochstein told Axios on November 12 that he believes "there is a shot" of securing a ceasefire deal in Lebanon soon.[8] Hochstein is expected to travel to Beirut to discuss the proposal draft with Lebanese officials once US and Israeli negotiators have finalized the proposal and side letter’s language.[9]Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal. Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks and stated that Hezbollah would require the “full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction” in negotiations.[10] This suggests that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate. If indirect negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel break down, the IDF is likely to continue its air and ground campaign, as Israeli military and political officials have indicated in recent days.[11]Hezbollah may choose accept Israel’s ceasefire terms in order to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began. The ceasefire terms, if consistent with current US and Israeli discussions, would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah fighters and targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the LAF fail to enforce the ceasefire’s terms.[12] Hezbollah may calculate, however, that agreeing to a ceasefire soon would allow it to preserve its forces and infrastructure north of the Litani, enabling it to rebuild its forces and ensure its survival in the long term. It is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The details of the speed of the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon following a ceasefire are reportedly still up for discussion, with Lebanese sources indicating that the LAF may not be able to deploy as quickly as the US would prefer.[13] Slow LAF deployment would only make it more difficult for the LAF and UNIFIL to support any ceasefire.Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.[14] Lavrentyev said that monitoring Iranian-backed efforts to transfer materiel is the responsibility of Lebanese and Syrian authorities.[15] These authorities are fully unwilling and unable to block these Iranian-backed and Hezbollah-enabled efforts. Lavrentyev’s comments follow Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s recent visit to Russia to discuss a ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.[16] Israeli Army Radio reported on November 12 that Israel is seeking for Russia to guarantee that the Syrian regime will prevent Iranian-backed networks from transferring weapons through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.[17] It is unclear why Russia would prevent Hezbollah from rearming given that Russian forces in Syria have enabled Hezbollah to arm up to this point by allowing Iranian material transfers through Syria to Lebanon.[18]Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Russian hostage Alexander “Sasha” Turbanov urged Israelis to demonstrate weekly against IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in the video that was filmed under PIJ coercion.[19] The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.[20] Gallant identified his support for a ceasefire deal that would return the hostages as one of three reasons that caused Netanyahu to dismiss him. Gallant‘s firing caused an initial, short wave of protests, and 55% of Israelis opposed Netanyahu’s move to fire Gallant.[21] An earlier Netanyahu attempt to fire Gallant during the 2023 Judicial Protests failed after protesters demonstrated in support of Gallant. Hamas has previously released propaganda videos of hostages to trigger domestic Israeli pressure on Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire with Hamas by reinforcing that Israel can only secure the release of living hostages through negotiations rather than military operations.[22] PIJ is likely releasing this video now to capitalize on the renewed Israeli domestic discontent over the lack of a ceasefire-hostage deal after Netanyahu’s dismissal of Gallant.[23]An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria.[24] The IDF spokesperson was responding to statements from the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). UNDOF’s Chief Mission Support Bernard told the BBC on November 12 that Israel had dug two major lines of trenches along the Israeli border with the demilitarized zone.[25] UNDOF said that some of the trenches cross into the demilitarized zone and that Israeli armor and personnel had crossed into the zone during the construction of the trenches.[26] Commercially available satellite imagery confirms UNDOF’s characterizations of the Israeli construction. Syrian media claimed on October 15 that four Israeli tanks, excavators, and about 50 IDF personnel have been operating within the demilitarized zone near al Asbah and al Rafid in Quneitra Province since October 2024.[27]Israeli media reported in September 2024 that Israeli defense officials were concerned about a potential Iranian-backed attempt to launch a ground attack into Israel from Syria.[28] Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting such attacks. The IDF recently captured a Syrian man who was collecting intelligence on Israeli border arrangements during a ground raid in southern Syria.[29] This Iranian-led intelligence effort was likely an attempt to gather information on Israeli border security that Iranian-backed militias could use to conduct small-scale infiltrations into the Golan Heights.[30]Key Takeaways:Iranian Retaliation Against Israel: The damage caused by Israel’s October 25 strike targeting Iran’s ballistic missile production facilities combined with Iran’s decreased missile stockpile makes another Iranian large-scale ballistic missile attack targeting Israel unlikely. Iran could use a smaller number of long-range systems combined with a larger number of shorter-range systems fired from Iraq, however.Lebanon Ceasefire Talks: US and Israeli officials are in the "final stages” of drafting language for a ceasefire proposal to end the fighting in Lebanon, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials. Israel will likely need to compel Hezbollah to agree to the US-Israeli proposal.Hezbollah’s Ceasefire Considerations: Hezbollah may outright reject Israel’s terms or refuse to join negotiations altogether. Hezbollah’s ceasefire demands are directly at odds with Israel’s insistence that the IDF retains the ability to act militarily in Lebanon to thwart Hezbollah threats. Hezbollah may choose to accept Israel’s ceasefire terms to preserve its forces north of the Litani River, given the damage Hezbollah has suffered throughout Lebanon since the Israeli campaign began.Russia in the Middle East: Russia refused to block the transit of Iranian supplies to Hezbollah via Syria. The Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria, Alexander Lavrentyev, told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on November 13 that Russia could not guarantee that it would block the transit of Iranian materiel to Hezbollah through Syria.Ceasefire-Hostage Negotiations in the Gaza Strip: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) published a video of an Israeli hostage giving coerced testimony to degrade Israeli public support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. The video is almost certainly timed to exploit Israeli domestic discontent after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on November 5 for Gallant’s support of a ceasefire with Hamas.Syria: An IDF spokesperson said that Israel is digging berms along the demilitarized zone between the Golan Heights and Syria to protect Israel against Iranian-backed infiltration attempts from Syria. Iranian-backed groups have previously shown interest in conducting ground attacks into Israel, and a recent Israeli raid captured a Syrian man who had been collecting intelligence on Israeli border security along the Israeli-Syrian border.Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 13. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in Jabalia refugee camp.[31]Israeli forces conducted clearing operations in Gaza City on November 13. The IDF Air Force struck and killed several Palestinian fighters, including a fighter who participated in the October 7 attacks, near Gaza City on November 13.[32] Palestinian militias, including Hamas, have conducted four attacks targeting Israeli forces near Gaza City since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12.[33] Elements of the 252nd Division have operated in Zaytoun at least since November 2.[34]Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired rockets targeting Israeli forces near the Netzarim Corridor on November 13.[35]The PFLP fired rockets targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis on November 13.[36]Palestinian militias have conducted multiple indirect fire attacks targeting southern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12. PIJ fired rockets targeting unspecified southern Israeli towns on November 12.[37] The IDF intercepted one rocket that crossed into southern Israel from the northern Gaza Strip on November 12.[38] The IDF said that another rocket launched from the Gaza Strip fell in an open area near Erez in southern Israel on November 13, causing no casualties.[39] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired rockets targeting Nir Am in southern Israel.[40] The IDF said that one rocket fell inside the Gaza Strip after sirens went off in Nir Am.[41]US Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized on November 13 that Israel needs to continue improving the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[42] Blinken acknowledged that Israel has fulfilled 12 of the 15 steps that he and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin urged Israel to take in a letter to senior Israeli officials on October 13.[43] Blinken stated on November 12 that the United States will not alter its assistance to Israel because Israel has taken enough “important steps” to address the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[44] Blinken told reporters on November 13 that Israel still needs to implement “extended pauses” of fighting to facilitate humanitarian aid deliveries, allow commercial trucks into the Gaza Strip, and rescind evacuation orders for areas where the IDF has finished operating to enable Palestinian civilians to return to their homes.[45]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelAn unspecified individual fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint in Deir Qaddis in the central West Bank on November 13.[46] The IDF reported that the attacker conducted the shooting attack from inside a vehicle and that the attacker fled the scene of the shooting. The IDF is searching for the attacker.Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonElements of the IDF 91st Division continued operating in southeastern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 12.[47] The IDF 282nd Artillery Brigade and the IDF 769th Territorial Brigade raided several areas in southern Lebanon.[48] Lebanese media claimed that the IDF conducted artillery shelling near Wadi al Saluki, which is located approximately 2.5 kilometers west of Houla in Marjeyoun District, southern Lebanon.[49] Israeli forces have been advancing westward through Houla as early as November 2.[50] Artillery fire support is meant to ”destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy” to ensure freedom of maneuver for ground forces.[51]The IDF 36th Division expanded its clearing operations in southcentral Lebanon on November 13.[52] The IDF 1st Golani Brigade located a Hezbollah tunnel with living quarters and equipment storage areas.[53] The 188th Brigade (36th Division) has advanced toward the outskirts of the ”second line” of Lebanese towns in southern Lebanon in recent days. Hezbollah fighters ambushed the 51st Battalion (1st Golani Brigade, 36th Division) as troops cleared a building.[54] Hezbollah fighters in nearby buildings also fired anti-tank munitions at the Israeli forces inside the building. Six Israeli soldiers died during the firefight. An initial IDF investigation found that Hezbollah fighters likely sheltered in a tunnel entrance in the building while Israeli forces fired at the building and emerged to ambush Israeli infantry. Lebanese media claimed that the 51st Battalion was attempting to advance toward Aainata when Hezbollah fighters ambushed it.[55] Hezbollah has continued indirect fire attacks targeting Israeli forces attempting to advance into “second line” Lebanese border towns.[56] Hezbollah claimed two rocket attacks targeting Israeli forces east of Maroun al Ras.[57] Hezbollah claimed a separate rocket attack targeting Israeli forces advancing northeast from Yaroun.[58] The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities and infrastructure in Beirut on November 13. Israeli media reported that the IDF Air Force struck at least 16 buildings throughout the southern suburbs of Beirut.[59] The IDF struck Hezbollah weapons warehouses, headquarters, command posts, and a missile battery in Beirut’s southern suburbs.[60] Western media reported that the Israeli strike on Baalchmay killed at least eight people.[61] The IDF stated that these strikes are part of its efforts to target Hezbollah’s operational capabilities by destroying its weapons production and storage sites in Beirut.[62] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued warnings to residents of Laylaki, Haret Hreik, and Ghobeiry before attacking these areas.[63]The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in Aramoun, south of Beirut, on November 12.[64] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported that the strike killed at least six people and wounded at least 15.[65]The IDF conducted an airstrike on November 13 targeting bridges in al Qusayr, Syria, that Hezbollah uses to smuggle weapons from Syria into Lebanon.[66] The Syrian Defense Ministry reported that the bridges are currently out of service.[67] Al Qusayr is a stronghold for Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran frequently transfers weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via al Qusayr.[68] The IDF has conducted multiple attacks in recent months to reduce the transfer of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah via Syria.[69] The IDF stated that attacking the bridges in al Qusayr would degrade the ability of Hezbollah unit 4400, which is responsible for transferring weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, to operate.[70]The IDF Navy has struck Hezbollah and Hamas targets in Lebanon over the past few weeks in support of the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon.[71] The IDF Navy killed Said Alaa Naif Ali, a senior member of Hamas in Lebanon. The IDF reported that Ali recruited fighters in Lebanon to join Hamas. The IDF Navy conducted a separate strike targeting Ali Barkhat, a key member of Hezbollah’s air unit, Unit 127. IDF Navy fighter jets also struck a Hezbollah naval unit base in Beirut. Hezbollah used the base to store naval vessels and conduct training exercises simulating attacks into Israel.This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 12 to 2:00pm ET on November 13. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah claimed a missile and drone attack targeting the IDF's headquarters at the Kirya in Tel Aviv for the first time on November 13.[72] There is no evidence that the attack occurred. Hezbollah claimed that it conducted the drone attack at 1530 local time.[73] Israeli media did not report any sirens near Tel Aviv around that time.[74] The IDF said that it intercepted two drones over the Western Galilee and Upper Galilee.[75] It is unclear if these drones were part of Hezbollah’s attack on the Kirya. Hezbollah also claimed that it launched several Qader-2 surface-to-surface missiles at the Kirya several hours later.[76]Hezbollah conducted at least 17 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12.[77] Hezbollah claimed several attacks targeting weapons manufacturing sites in Israel, including a factory south of Haifa and an Israel Weapon Industries site in Ramat Hasharon near Tel Aviv.[78] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting the IDF military headquarters in Glilot, north of Tel Aviv.[79] The IDF said that it intercepted five rockets following sirens in northern and central Israel.[80] Hezbollah said that it fired drones targeting Amos base, south of Haifa, for the first time.[81] Hezbollah said that several of its attacks were part of its “Khaybar” campaign, which is meant to respond to Israel's killing Hassan Nasrallah.[82] Khaybar attacks often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel. Iran and the Axis of ResistanceA US delegation arrived in Baghdad on November 13 to hold indirect talks with Iran, according to an unspecified informed source speaking to Iraqi media.[83] The talks aim to “calm the situation [in the Middle East],” according to the source. A US delegation recently traveled to Iraq in late October 2024 to hold indirect talks with Iran, but the talks were postponed after the IDF killed Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in the Gaza Strip.[84] The arrival of the US delegation in Iraq is noteworthy given recent reports that Iran might launch an attack against Israel from Iraqi territory.[85]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 12. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified location in central Israel.[86]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel.[87]The IDF intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Mitzpe Ramon in southern Israel on November 12.[88] The IDF also intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Ramat Magshimim in the southern Golan Heights on November 12.[89] The IDF separately reported on November 13 that it intercepted four drones that were heading toward Israel “from Lebanon and the east.”[90] It is unclear whether this report included the drones that the IDF intercepted on November 12.Iraqi Fatah Alliance member Ali al Fatlawi claimed on November 13 that the United States is “procrastinating” the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.[91] The Fatah Alliance is headed by Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri.[92] Fatlawi added that the United States seeks to “impose complete control” over Iraqi airspace. Fatlawi may have made this statement in response to the IDF using Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.The IRGC Ground Forces have killed four likely Jaish al Adl fighters and arrested seven others in Sistan and Baluchistan Province over the past 48 hours.[93] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group that operates in southeastern Iran near the border with Pakistan. The IRGC Ground Forces killed and arrested the fighters as part of the "Martyrs of Security" exercise, which began on October 31 in response to the killing of ten Law Enforcement Command officers in Taftan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on October 26. Jaish al Adl claimed responsibility for the October 26 attack.[94]US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted airstrikes targeting an unspecified Iranian-backed militia’s weapons storage and logistics headquarters facility in an unspecified location in Syria on November 12.[95] CENTCOM conducted the strikes in response to a recent rocket attack targeting US personnel at al Shaddadi in Hasakah Province, Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media claimed that unspecified fighters conducted two rocket attacks targeting US forces at al Shaddadi and at Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor, Syria, on November 12.[96] Syrian media reported that the US airstrikes killed five Iranian-backed fighters in Albu Kamal on the Syria-Iraq border.[97] CENTCOM recently conducted strikes targeting nine Iranian-backed militia targets in Syria on November 11.[98]US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on November 13 it conducted airstrikes targeting several Houthi weapons storage facilities in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen on November 9 and 10.[99] Houthi media reported three US-UK airstrikes in al Faza neighborhood, al Tuhayta district, southern al Hudaydah Governorate, on November 11.[100] Houthi media also reported a US-UK airstrike targeting a “civilian car” in al Sawmah District, western al Bayda Governorate, on November 12.[101] Local anti-Houthi media reported on November 12 that the strike targeted a car carrying members of the Houthi’s “missile force.”[102] CENTCOM has not confirmed this strike at the time of this writing.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. 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https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856691745834033605; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856599096867348850; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856692159732203763[61] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c86q5qeqxldo ; https://t.me/channelnabatieh/101908 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-airstrikes-hit-beirut-suburbs-2024-11-12[62] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856691745834033605; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856597108368855146[63] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856451825685102959; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856465390047768917; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856474140393558423; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856603760979534241; https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1856604028655784385[64] https://t.me/channelnabatieh/101953 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/13/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine[65] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/13/israel-iran-war-news-hamas-gaza-palestine ; https://x.com/mophleb/status/1856606517669077244[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793273420968420[67] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid02P7NFdDuXxiKzzUbbPxvwodPJaTL1LaoSDUtzvq5Wtq2y5zpP8r7suMcbyeVd5zDsl[68] https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-conflict-hezbollah-syria ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-november-5-2024#_ednb17f68bd5697f4998787c6a9764de21a81[69] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793273420968420[70] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856793276525023670[71] www dot idf.il/248261[72] https://t.me/mmirleb/9012[73] https://t.me/mmirleb/9012 [74] www.jpost dot com/israel-news/article-829029; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-says-it-launched-attack-military-base-tel-aviv-no-sirens-heard-city-2024-11-13/[75] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856688650857119853[76] https://t.me/mmirleb/9028[77] https://t.me/mmirleb/8992; https://t.me/mmirleb/8993; https://t.me/mmirleb/8995; https://t.me/mmirleb/8996; https://t.me/mmirleb/9005; https://t.me/mmirleb/9006; https://t.me/mmirleb/9009; https://t.me/mmirleb/9010;https://t.me/mmirleb/9012; https://t.me/mmirleb/9017; ; https://t.me/mmirleb/9018; https://t.me/mmirleb/9019; https://t.me/mmirleb/9020; https://t.me/mmirleb/9021; https://t.me/mmirleb/9028; https://t.me/mmirleb/9029; https://t.me/mmirleb/9030[78] https://t.me/mmirleb/8994; https://t.me/mmirleb/9029[79] https://t.me/mmirleb/9021[80] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1856732551928574360[81] https://t.me/mmirleb/9015[82] https://t.me/mmirleb/8994; https://t.me/mmirleb/9015 ;[83] https://baghdadtoday dot news/261958-%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9.-%D9%88%D9%81%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86.html[84] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-18-2024[85] https://www.axios.com/2024/10/31/israel-iran-planning-attack-iraq[86] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1516[87] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1518[88] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856424639217422527[89] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1856490085492969808[90] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1856645299797639594[91] https://baghdadtoday dot news/261966-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%82-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%83%D9%84.html[92] https://ina dot iq/eng/34695-al-hakim-and-al-ameri-renew-the-call-to-stop-the-war-on-gaza.html[93] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/08/23/3199144[94] https://www.iranintl dot com/202410269980[95] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856506687890276620[96] https://english.almayadeen dot net/latestnews/2024/11/12/al-mayadeen-s-correspondent--a-rocket-attack-targeted-the-tw[97] https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1856608357546692919 ; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2024/11/13/12251[98] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856088134028558467[99] https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1856780067231469739 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-10-2024[100] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1856119112306409778 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-12-2024[101] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1856253340436386190[102] https://x.com/almasdaronline/status/1856338310190244055 ;https://x.com/saeedalBatati/status/1856341216679375043
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2024
- at 11/20/24 8:23pmNicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. KaganNovember 13, 2024, 6:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 13 that Western officials are lying about their interest in peace in Ukraine and that "peace" can only be achieved when the West stops providing military assistance to Ukraine.[1] Zakharova's statement indicates that Russia continues to assert that the West must end all provisions of military assistance to Ukraine as a prerequisite for peace negotiations.[2] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also claimed on November 13 that the start of Trump's presidency would not fundamentally change the US position on Ukraine and that any proposals to freeze the frontline are "even worse" than the Russia-favorable Minsk Agreements that followed Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014.[3]Lavrov's pre-emptive rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024.[4] Zakharova's and Lavrov's statements also undermine Putin's recent efforts to feign interest in a willingness to "restore" US–Russian relations with the new US presidential administration and instead indicate that Putin likely is taking for granted that the Trump administration will defer to the Kremlin's interests and preferences without the Kremlin offering any concessions or benefits in return.[5] Russian officials notably made these statements against the backdrop of reports that the Trump administration intends to appoint a "Ukrainian peace envoy to lead negotiations on ending the war" and announcements of multiple Trump national security cabinet picks, suggesting that Russia will maintain its goals in Ukraine regardless of the make-up of the incoming Trump administration.[6]Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in occupied Crimea on November 13. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on November 13 that sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) stated that the SBU conducted a successful special operation in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea and planted an explosive on the car of the BSF's 41st Missile Boat Brigade Chief of Staff Captain First Rank Valery Trankovsky.[7] Trankovsky died from his injuries after the explosion.[8] SBU sources noted that Trankovsky ordered Russian cruise missile strikes from the Black Sea at civilian objects in Ukraine in 2022.[9] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev reported that a car exploded in Sevastopol on the morning of November 13, killing a Russian servicemember, but did not identify the deceased.[10] Razvozhaev claimed that Russian authorities did not rule out sabotage — suggesting that the Russian occupation administration will likely further crackdown against those it deems to be pro-Ukrainian in retaliation for the attack. Geolocated footage shows the aftermath of the car explosion in occupied Sevastopol.[11] Likely Ukrainian partisans have conducted three assassinations of Russian occupation and military officials since late September 2024.[12]Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 13, citing unspecified "people," that Russian President Vladimir Putin shot down the proposal to merge Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft, state-affiliated Rosneft, and independently owned Rosneft.[13] FT's sources attributed the proposed merger to Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, the husband of Putin's cousin and Russian State Secretary — Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva. Former Russian oil executives told FT that, while the merger would have given Gazprom Neft and Rosneft access to Lukoil's UAE-based trading arm, concerns over the ability to circumvent Western sanctions and temporarily reduced oil production also contributed to Putin's rejection of the proposed merger. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) first reported on the proposed merger on November 9 but noted that the Kremlin and Rosneft denied the talks while Gazprom Neft and Lukoil did not comment.[14]Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives. FT reported that Tsivilev attempted to utilize his family connection to Putin to promote the deal but that Russian energy executives also had the political leverage to oppose the proposed merger.[15] Rosneft Head Igor Sechin and Gazprom Head Alexey Miller are both longtime friends and supporters of Putin, and Putin reportedly rejected Tsivilev's proposal on their behalf despite reportedly desiring more direct Kremlin control over Russian oil production and his family connection to Tsivilev.[16] The initial reports of a merger may have been intended to weaken Sechin in particular. The WSJ reported that Sechin was a "main player" in the merger talks and was a possible, but not definite, candidate to lead the resulting company, though Rosneft rejected notions that "Evil Sechin" had "insidious intentions to take over the assets" of other oil companies."[17]South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast. South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed on November 13 that it "assesses that the North Korean troops deployed to Russia" are already participating in combat after having completed their training and gradual battlefield deployment over the past two weeks.[18] US State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel stated during a briefing on November 12 that over 10,000 North Korean troops deployed to eastern Russia, most of whom have now moved to western Kursk Oblast "where they have begun engaging in combat operations with Russian forces."[19] ISW assessed on November 5 that North Korean troops had entered combat in Kursk Oblast, citing reports by Ukrainian intelligence and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov.[20]Key Takeaways:The Kremlin is attempting to dictate the terms of any potential "peace" negotiations with Ukraine in advance of US President-elect Donald Trump's inauguration. The manner in which the Kremlin is trying to set its terms for negotiations strongly signals that Russia's objectives remain unchanged and still amount to full Ukrainian capitulation. The Kremlin does not appear any more willing to make concessions to the incoming Trump administration than it was to the current administration.Lavrov's pre-emptive rejection of the potential suggestion to freeze the current frontline further indicates that Russia is not interested in softening its approach or demands in negotiations and maintains its objective of total Ukrainian capitulation, which Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly outlined in June 2024.Ukrainian security services reportedly assassinated a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) official in occupied Crimea on November 13. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian oil executives reportedly rejected a proposal to merge Russia's three largest oil companies. Contradictory reporting on the proposed Russian oil merger highlights a possible factional struggle between close affiliates of Putin and Russian energy executives.South Korean and US intelligence separately confirmed that North Korean troops have deployed into combat alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast.Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and Ukrainian forces recently regained positions near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces continue to heavily rely on refurbished tanks and armored vehicles pulled from storage to replace vehicle losses during ongoing combat operations, but likely will not be able to sustain these losses in the long term. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian continued ground attacks within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed on November 12 and 13 that Russian forces advanced southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Zeleny Shlyakh, and Darino; south of Sudzha near Kurilovka; and southeast of Sudzha near Plekhovo, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[21] Russian forces continued attacking southeast of Korenevo near Novoivanovka, Leonidovo, Darino, Nikolayevo-Darino, and Malaya Loknya.[22] A Ukrainian soldier operating in Kursk Oblast stated on November 13 that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) attacked his brigade's positions in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian soldier stated that Russian forces are conducting daily roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assaults using four to six armored fighting vehicles. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted attacks within the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast on November 13. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo near Alexandriya, Nizhniy Klin, Novaya Sorochina and Novoivanovka.[24]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 12 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and Special Operations Forces struck the Oskolneftesnab fuel depot near Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast, causing a fire.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that destruction of such facilities creates logistical problems for Russian forces. Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed on November 12 that a Ukrainian drone struck an oil depot near Stary Oskol and caused a fire at an oil tank.[26]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[27]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 12 and 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters wide to a depth of 200 meters towards Moskovka (just northwest of Kupyansk); 600 meters wide to a depth of 200 meters towards Borova (south of Kupyansk); north, west and east of Kruhlyakivka (southeast of Kupyansk); north of Vyshneve (southeast of Kupyansk); near Pershotravneve (west of Svatove); and 400 meters wide to a depth of 400 meters towards Torske (west of Kreminna).[28] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction consisting of four waves and a total of 15 armored vehicles, including tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and an UR-77 demining vehicle.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all of the Russian vehicles and that Russian infantry resorted to perfidy by dressing in Ukrainian uniforms, a war crime under international law.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that parts of Kolisnykivka (southeast of Kupyansk) are contested "gray zones" because Russian forces cannot gain a foothold in the ruins of the settlement and because Ukrainian forces maintain positions in forested areas to the north.[31] Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Kupyansk near Lozova, Kolisnykivka, Kruhlyakivka, and Zahryzove; west of Svatove near Pershotravneve; southwest of Svatove near Cherneshchyna; northwest of Kreminna near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka; and west of Kreminna near Terny, Zarichne, and Torske.[32] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasingly counterattacking near Torske and are occasionally conducting mechanized assaults of an unspecified echelon with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles near Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk)[33] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 13 that Russian forces are using TOS-2 thermobaric artillery systems to strike Ukrainian defenses in order to create "corridors" for Russian assault groups operating in the Kupyansk direction.[34] A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 13 that Russian forces are increasingly conducting mechanized assaults, especially near Borova, instead of pure infantry assaults.[35] The officer stated that seasonal weather is preventing Russian forces from using buggies and other civilian vehicles. A Russian milblogger, however, claimed on November 12 that there has been dry weather for a few days, facilitating vehicle movement across partially dry roads.[36] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[37] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a large Russian mechanized assault in an unspecified area in the Siversk direction, but ISW has not seen additional reporting to confirm the echelon, location, or date of the reported Russian mechanized assault.[38] Drone operators of the Russian "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Soledar (south of Siversk).[39]Ukrainian forces regained lost positions in the Chasiv Yar direction amid continued Russian offensive operations in the area on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Chasiv Yar) and in a mine east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar and that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar.[41] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims, however. Russian forces conducted offensive operations south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on November 13.[42] Drone operators of the Russian ”Okhotnik” (Hunter) Spetsnaz Detachment (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) and elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[43] Elements of the Russian "Irbis" detachment ("Redut" private military company [PMC], reportedly subordinate to the Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating near Orikhovo-Vasylivka.[44] Russian forces recently advanced within central Toretsk amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows that Russian forces advanced up to Enhelsa Street within central Toretsk.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy about 70 percent of Toretsk, but ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim and currently assesses that Russian forces occupy about 23.1 percent of Toretsk.[46] Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk itself, Shcherbynivka (immediately west of Toretsk), and Nelipivka and Sukha Balka (both southwest of Toretsk) on November 12 and 13.[47] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on November 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pokrovsk along a railway line between Petrivka and Pustynka and southwest of Novooleksiivka, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[48] Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Krutyi Yar; and south of Pokrovsk near Hyrhorivka, Pustynka, Petrivka, Novooleksiivka, and Yurivka on November 12 and 13.[49] Russian forces made additional advances northeast of Kurakhove amid continued offensive operations in this direction on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 13 showing elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) raising a flag over central Illinka (northeast of Kurakhove) indicates that Russian forces have likely seized the entire settlement.[50] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a strike against a bridge on Zaporizkyi Prospekt in Kurakhove (likely referring to the bridge over the Dovha Gully in northern Kurakhove) in order to complicate Ukrainian logistics in and around the settlement.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are fighting and advancing within eastern Kurakhove itself, and a German reporter claimed that Russian forces occupy 15 percent of Kurakhove.[52] ISW currently assesses that Russian forces currently occupy just over 14 percent of Kurakhove. Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces have seized all of Novoselydivka (north of Kurakhove), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces in the western part of the settlement.[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Kurakhove near Illinka; north of Kurakhove near Berestky, Novoselydivka, and Voznesenka and northwest of Kurakhove near Novodmytrivka on November 12 and 13.[54] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly supporting ground operations of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) in the Kurakhove area.[55] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are also operating in the Kurakhove direction.[56]Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Vuhledar amid continued offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows that Russian forces advanced to a windbreak northeast of Bohoyavlenka (northwest of Vuhledar).[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields east of Bohoyavlenka, southwest of Shakhtarske, northwest of Yasna Polyana, and northwest of Maksymivka (all northwest of Vuhledar) although ISW has not yet observed confirmation of these claims.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control most of Dalne (northeast of Vuhledar), which is consistent with ISW's control of terrain assessment in the area.[59] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued heavy fighting northeast of Vuhledar near Dalne, Antonivka, Katerynivka, Maksymilyanivka, and Yelyzavetivka, and northwest of Vuhledar near Kostyantynopolske and Trudove on November 12 and 13.[60] Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Maksymivka; elements of the "Moly" group of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are operating north of Bohoyavlenka; and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are conducting strikes against Ukrainian positions near Sukhy Yaly (northwest of Vuhledar).[61] Russian forces recently advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued offensive operations in the area on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novodarivka (in far eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 13 that Russian forces seized Rivnopil (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), although a milblogger stated that this claim is likely premature.[63] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of Russian forces operating in Rivnopil. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on November 13 that Russian forces are attacking south of Velyka Novosilka in order to "wedge" themselves into Ukrainian defenses.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novopil and south of Velyka Novosilka near Makarivka on November 12 and 13.[65] Tank elements of the Russian "Altai" battalion of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Pryyutne (southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and drone operators of the Russian "Storm" detachment of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the general Vremivka direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area).[66] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently unsuccessfully launched a mechanized assault northeast of Hulyaipole and continued assaults north of Robotyne on November 13. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault north of Stepove (northeast of Hulyaipole).[67] Russian forces reportedly continued assaults near Novodanylivka (north of Robotyne) and Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne).[68] Ukrainian Center for Combating Disinformation Head Andriy Kovalenko stated on November 12 that Russian forces are preparing to launch tactical assaults near several unspecified settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast but do not have enough strength to directly attack Zaporizhzhia City with ground forces.[69] Kovalenko added that Russian officials are leveraging milbloggers to amplify rumors about potential Russian ground assaults on Zaporizhzhia City in an effort to generate panic in the Ukrainian information space.[70] Positional fighting continued in the Dnipro direction in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on November 13, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline.[71] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two S-300 missiles from Kursk Oblast at Sumy Oblast; two Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over the Caspian Sea; two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh Oblast; and 90 Shahed drones and unspecified strike drones from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai and Oryol and Kursk oblasts.[72] The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Ukrainian forces downed two Kh-101 cruise missiles, two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles and 37 drones over Kyiv, Poltava, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Cherkasy, Zaporizhia, Chernihiv and Kirovohrad oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 47 drones were "lost" in Ukrainian air space, likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and that two drones flew into Russian and Belarusian airspace. Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project stated on November 13 that the night of November 12 to 13 was the fourth consecutive night that Russian drones flew into Belarusian airspace.[73] Kyiv City Head Serhii Popko stated that the November 12-13 strikes were the first combined missile and drone strikes against Kyiv City since September 1 [74] Ukrainian officials stated that a missile strike and debris from downed targets damaged a building and started a fire at a warehouse in Brovarskyi Raion, Kyiv Oblast.[75] Kharkiv City Emergency Services Head Bohdan Hladikh stated that Russian forces struck Saltivskyi Raion, Kharkiv City, with Molniya-1 drones, which have quiet electric motors and are hard to detect using conventional anti-drone means[76] The Sumy Oblast Administration stated Russian forces struck critical infrastructure facilities in Shostka Hromada with Shahed drones, causing heating outages in Shostka City[77] Private Ukrainian energy enterprise DTEK stated on November 13 that Russian strikes and cold weather have forced Ukraine to limit business' electricity consumption in Kyiv City[78]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian forces continue to heavily rely on refurbished tanks and armored vehicles pulled from storage to replace vehicle losses during ongoing combat operations, but likely will not be able to sustain these losses in the long term. Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies expert Viktor Kevlyuk stated on November 13 that Russian forces continue to manufacture and refurbish about 150 to 160 new tanks per month — roughly 1,920 tanks per year — about equal to the current replacement rate of Russian vehicle losses.[79] Dutch open-source project Oryx reported that Russian forces have lost about 3,558 tanks since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.[80] Kevlyuk stated that about 30 percent of all Russian tanks produced per year (or about 567 of a total 1,344 tanks produced per year) are newly-manufactured tanks, and that Russian forces pull the remaining 70 percent from storage, noting that recent estimates from UK intelligence suggest that Russia will deplete its stores of tanks and armored fighting vehicles by Fall 2025 if Russia continues to pull these vehicles from storage at this rate.[81] The British International Institute for Stategic Studies (IISS) assessed in February 2024 that Russian forces will likely be able to sustain about 3,000 annual vehicle losses for at least the next two or three years by reactivating vehicles from storage.[82] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously assessed that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce about 250–300 new tanks and repair an additional 250–300 tanks per year.[83]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues claim that it is providing effective medical care and compensation to Russian soldiers injured in combat, but some milbloggers noted that these measures remain insufficient. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on November 13 establishing one-time payments to Russian soldiers injured in Ukraine: three million rubles (about $30,456) for serious injuries, one million rubles (about $10,152) for minor injuries, and 100,000 rubles (about $1,015) for all other injuries.[84] The decree also determined the criteria for each category of injury. Russian milbloggers complained about this compensation system, blaming Russian State Secretary and Deputy Defense Minister Anna Tsivileva for proposing an "unfair" system that does not account for discrepancies in injuries from the same source, such as shrapnel embedding in different parts of the body, and complained that the decree does not provide enough compensation to pay for medical treatments in the case of serious injuries.[85Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine A Russian milblogger claimed on November 13 that Russian forces are operating first person view (FPV) strike drones with fiber optic wires in Kursk Oblast.[86] Russian forces recently began integrating fiber optic wires into Russian drones to mitigate Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming and have also reportedly fielded these drones in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[87]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. 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https://suspilne dot media/crimea/878955-v-sevastopoli-likviduvali-kerivnika-stabu-raketnih-korabliv-cf-rf-trankovskogo-dzerela/; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/878805-u-sevastopoli-vibuhnulo-avto-z-rosijskim-vijskovim-vin-zaginuv/; [9] https://suspilne dot media/878637-u-ssa-zalisilosa-ponad-7-mlrd-na-dopomogu-ukraini-urad-dozvoliv-perevedenna-vijskovih-onlajn-994-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1731492850&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/878955-v-sevastopoli-likviduvali-kerivnika-stabu-raketnih-korabliv-cf-rf-trankovskogo-dzerela/; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/878805-u-sevastopoli-vibuhnulo-avto-z-rosijskim-vijskovim-vin-zaginuv/;[10] https://t.me/razvozhaev/8757[11] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1856633930968924461; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1856633932810240296[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024[13] https://www.ft.com/content/eb0b86c6-f60e-4519-ad1c-3dacbc869204[14] https://www.ft.com/content/eb0b86c6-f60e-4519-ad1c-3dacbc869204[15] https://www.ft.com/content/eb0b86c6-f60e-4519-ad1c-3dacbc869204[16] https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/11/putins-favorite-project-managers-could-become-a-risk-to-the-regime?lang=en; https://www.proekt dot media/en/investigation-en/gazprom-aleksey-miller-en/; https://theins dot ru/en/society/274188; https://www.vox.com/world/2017/2/8/14539800/igor-sechin-putin-trump-sanctions-oil-rosneft-tillerson-secretary-of-state-kremlin; https://www.forbes.com/sites/giacomotognini/2022/05/02/how-rich-is-putins-right-hand-man-inside-the-murky-fortune-of-igor-sechin-the-darth-vader-of-the-kremlin/[17] https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/russia-explores-plan-to-merge-oil-giants-into-mega-producer-80a6aa6b; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/11/12/kovarnye-namereniya-sechina-po-pogloscheniyu-nenuzhnyh-aktivov-sorvany-rosneft-prokommentirovala-sluhi-o-sliyanii-s-lukoylom-i-gazprom-neftyu; https://rosneft dot ru/press/releases/item/221093/[18] https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8105225[19] s://www.newsweek.com/us-update-north-korea-troops-10000-russia-ukraine-war-combat-kursk-1985001[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2024; https://news.kbs.co dot kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8098257; https://suspilne dot media/873115-dzerelo-v-specsluzbah-u-kurskij-oblasti-vidbulisa-persi-bojovi-zitknenna-z-soldatami-kndr/[21] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29434 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29437 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29411 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57566 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57616 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/18441 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19078 ; https://t.me/rybar/65321[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/45647 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57616 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/18441 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/23122[23] https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1856722697738178662[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/45647 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57566[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02eLmThNKPhc2opRmpCG64pc5JxAqeNh677XJ51xAfkbwMD99Gd3yUFGFWvJXfkYi4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/18611[26] https://t.me/vvgladkov/10691[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://t.me/otukharkiv/2608[28]https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19431; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19433 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29424 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29424[29]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02w1PNLR7iYJPKN77ZSAN83j3F5ZC2C3HZyug9AaYDFY79iz7eS1SVd6gGA4BJrSgGl[30] https://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144089; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80553[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl[33] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19433; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144089[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19102 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/19433[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-pro-aktyvni-vorozhi-ataky-na-kupyanshhyni/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144089[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl[38] https://t.me/svoboda_army/2449; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/ponad-50-odynycz-tehniky-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vidbyly-odyn-z-najbilshyh-rosijskyh-shturmiv/[39] https://t.me/tass_agency/284956[40] https://t.me/dro_irbis/3244; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1856527249190859254; https://t.me/mobilizirovan2022/5364; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1856542562263445736 [41] https://t.me/tass_agency/285016; https://t.me/wargonzo/23122; https://t.me/sashakots/50132 ; https://t.me/sashakots/50126;[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/57631; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12967[44] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1856527249190859254; https://t.me/dro_irbis/3244[45] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/22213; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/55; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7494[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80559[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVglb; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/kydayut-velycheznu-masu-myasa-shhob-vysnazhyty-nas-vorog-naroshhuye-kilkist-atak-na-toreczkomu-napryamku/[48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29420[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://t.me/rybar/65322[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7495; https://t.me/mo114rf/75; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29427[51] https://t.me/rybar/65325; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12966 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144147[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/80532 ; https://x.com/JulianRoepcke/status/1856367829043347533; https://t.me/dva_majors/57566; https://t.me/rybar/65325; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/60084; https://t.me/rybar/65322[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/57566; https://t.me/tass_agency/284957[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl [55] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12966 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144147[56] https://t.me/dva_majors/57599 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/57663[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7490; https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/9753; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1856433818602783021, https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/9753; https://x.com/small10space/status/1856648358028308907 [58] https://t.me/z_arhiv/29408; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29439; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29439; https://t.me/z_arhiv/29439[59] https://t.me/rybar/65325; https://t.me/tass_agency/284957; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/19139[60] https://t.me/rybar/65325; https://t.me/dva_majors/57566;l https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/11813 (Maksymivka); https://t.me/voin_dv/11811 (Bohoyavlenka); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144083 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/11800 (Sukhy Yaly)[62] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7498; https://t.me/skarlatop/4061 [63] https://t.me/voin_dv/11809[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/11/13/hochut-vbyty-klyn-u-zaporizkij-oblasti-vidbyvayut-ataky-voroga/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg[65] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02muFDf5aX6zhn5FQyskHqerDny1KfyCSF12Gau5ed4LdPbQQE3ZRESWFgffzs9TVgl [66] https://t.me/voin_dv/11816; https://t.me/voin_dv/11785; https://t.me/voin_dv/11818[67] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/7491 ; https://t.me/romedronen/212; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1856493955128430628[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl [69] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8271[70] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/8271[71] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid034q3Z54eR9bRMQyhi3v5ZM1SJmwNRgo4PbfQiaFpRP5rY69DMDW2fMNop7uuvmMdRl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02j4ZGPTSP8899RmfVYqXU4VqEKJrA9Jpv49fEXfnrYwbEofvov6NkQwHdqWHiRkJKl [72] https://t.me/kpszsu/22844[73] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8214[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/vpershe-za-73-dni-rosiya-zavdala-raketno-dronovogo-udaru-po-kyyevu/; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/9403 [75] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/34919 ; https://www.facebook.com/RuslanKravchenkoKyiv/posts/pfbid0GRLvZ8bM46s8b54z2bAjtfvaQoyeEH3eLDC66f6rVWUC9GKjC4vgmEvQ1vugs8X9l; https://t.me/kyivoda/22365; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/naslidky-raketnogo-udaru-na-kyyivshhyni-ulamky-raket-poshkodyly-budivli-ye-postrazhdali/[76] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/879055-rf-vdarila-po-harkovu-bezpilotnikami-molnia-1-13-listopada-miskrada/; [77] https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/31303[78] https://t.me/dtek_ua/1924[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/dali-mabut-kavaleriya-velosypedy-ekspert-pro-zapasy-vijskovoyi-tehniky-v-rf/[80] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html[81] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/11/13/dali-mabut-kavaleriya-velosypedy-ekspert-pro-zapasy-vijskovoyi-tehniky-v-rf/; https://kyivindependent dot com/as-russian-tank-losses-in-ukraine-continue-to-mount-heres-what-you-need-to-know/[82] https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/02/equipment-losses-in-russias-war-on-ukraine-mount/[83] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1607[84] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7298470; https://t.me/mod_russia/45646 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/45650 ; https://t.me/government_rus/16747 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/285071; https://t.me/tass_agency/285024;[85] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1704; https://t.me/tretyakov_n/1397; https://t.me/philologist_zov/1706[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/144150[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2024l https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2024
- — The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine
- at 11/20/24 8:22pmAngelica EvansExecutive Summary: Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023. Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian defensive operations, based on the integration of successful Ukrainian drone innovators and operators with ground forces combined with constraints on Russia's strategic and operational-level manpower and materiel reserves have forced the Russian military command to abandon its original campaign design of a frontal assault on Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is currently attempting to envelop Pokrovsk from the southwest via Selydove and to even out the frontline west of Kurakhove and north of Vuhledar. Russian forces recently seized Selydove and are currently leveraging the seizure of Vuhledar to advance towards Kurakhove, but Russian advances have come at very high costs in troops and armored vehicles and months of time. Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints. Ukraine’s ability to stave off the seizure of Pokrovsk thus far and force the Russian military to divert its efforts to advances in arguably the least operationally significant sector of the frontline is a positive indicator of Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting this war despite the challenges Ukraine faces and the setbacks it has suffered.Russian forces are currently attempting to conduct two simultaneous and supporting offensive operations to seize Pokrovsk through a turning maneuver via Selydove and to level the frontline from Pokrovsk to Yasna Polyana in order to collapse the Ukrainian salient west of Donetsk City and set conditions for future, possibly more operationally significant gains in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have consistently been advancing in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions since March 2024, but have yet to make operationally significant advances in either direction. ISW distinguishes between tactical gains, which are relevant at the tactical level of war in the near vicinity of fighting, and operational gains, which are significant at the operational level of war and affect large sectors of the entire frontline. Ukrainian defenders have, thus far, successfully diverted Russian forces from a direct assault on Pokrovsk and convinced the Russian military command to expend manpower, equipment and time on less operationally significant gains in western Donetsk Oblast. Recent Russian advances near Selydove, the recent seizure of Vuhledar, and subsequent Russian advances north of Vuhledar are not yet operationally significant gains and have cost the Russians tremendous manpower and materiel losses. Russian forces will eventually make operationally significant gains if Ukrainian forces do not stop the ongoing Russian offensive operations, although Ukraine’s ability to inflict notable manpower and materiel losses on the Russian military continues to depend on the provision of sufficient and regular Western military assistance. Significant Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove directions would be but one step in Russia’s ongoing offensive campaign to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and would not portend the immediate collapse of the frontline in Donetsk or throughout Ukraine.Ukrainian drone operations continue to be the backbone of Ukraine's war effort, particularly in western Donetsk Oblast where successful Ukrainian drone operations contributed to forcing the Russian military command to reorient its primary operational effort for 2024. Ongoing Ukrainian manpower constraints and morale issues are currently creating vulnerabilities in Ukraine's defensive lines, and Ukrainian drone operations are likely playing an outsized role in defending against and inflicting losses on advancing Russian forces.[1] Ukrainian drone operators have also played a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and repelling platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults throughout the frontline and in Kursk Oblast in 2024.[2] Ukrainian aerial and naval drone operators have played a critical role in undermining Russia’s ability to facilitate and conduct its invasion of Ukraine on land and sea, and Russia has consistently underestimated the impact and influence of Ukraine’s asymmetric drone capabilities and innovations throughout the war, to Russia’s detriment.[3]Russian President Vladimir Putin’s articulated theory of victory assumes that Russian forces will be able to make and sustain gradual creeping advances indefinitely but does not appear to account for the possibility that Ukrainian forces could inflict losses sufficient to stall or stop future Russian offensive operations.[4] Recent Western estimates of Russian manpower losses suggest that Russian forces are currently losing more troops per month than Russia’s ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts can sustain, and evidence is mounting that Russia cannot sustain the current rate of armored vehicle and tank losses in the medium term.[5] Ukrainian drone operators, particularly in the Pokrovsk direction, have successfully degraded Russian forces’ mechanized capabilities and have slowed Russian forces’ ability to make gains by forcing Russian infantry to advance primarily at foot pace.[6] The integration of Ukrainian drone operations with sufficiently resourced artillery and committed Ukrainian infantry units is and will remain essential in defending against Russian advances throughout the frontline. CampaignThe seizure of Pokrovsk and leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast are two subordinate efforts of the Kremlin's wider campaign to seize the remainder of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Putin identified the complete seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a priority goal of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and Russian officials have reiterated this goal over the past three years.[7] Western and Ukrainian sources assessed in 2023 and 2024 that Russia intended to seize the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2024.[8] Russian offensive operations in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka directions are currently all aimed at seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces intensified localized assaults in the Velyka Novosilka and Siversk directions in October and November 2024 respectively, but it remains unclear if the Russian military command is willing to allocate the manpower necessary to launch a more concerted offensive operation or make operationally significant advances in these lower priority directions.[9] Russian advances near Chasiv Yar have largely stalled in 2024, and Russian forces have yet to advance into the center of the settlement, although the settlement remains at high risk. ISW has previously assessed that the Russian offensive effort to seize Chasiv Yar offers Russian forces the most immediate prospects for operationally significant advances in Donetsk Oblast as the seizure of Chasiv Yar would likely allow Russian forces to launch subsequent offensive operations against Ukraine’s fortress belt – a group of major cities that form a significant defensive belt in Donetsk Oblast.[10] The Russian military command has, however, opted to prioritize offensive operations in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, which provide Russian forces with less direct paths to operationally significant Ukrainian objects. Russian forces have yet to make operationally significant advances in exchange for notable manpower and materiel losses in 2024.Russian forces seized a little over 2,000 square kilometers in Ukraine between October 1, 2023 and October 5, 2024, mostly in fields and small settlements and towns. They must seize an additional 9,322 square kilometers including several large urban areas in order to take the remainder of Donetsk Oblast as of November 14, and the seizure of Pokrovsk will likely only result in several tens of additional square kilometers. Assessed Russian positions south of Pokrovsk near Vyshneve and Sontsivka are currently Russian forces’ closest positions to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, or Kurakhove directions and are roughly 22-23 kilometers from the boundary as of November 14. Russian advances in the Toretsk direction have been slow in 2024, as Russian forces have largely spent the last five months struggling through highly urbanized areas, and Russian forces’ rate of advance is unlikely to increase significantly in this sector until Russian forces advance through Toretsk and its more urbanized suburbs. Russian gains in the Kurakhove pocket will result in additional territorial advances, but these gains do not shift Russian positions significantly closer to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries than Russian forces' current closest assessed point of advance. Russian forces could attempt to connect the Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk-Kurakhove efforts in the future by trying to advance north from Pokrovsk towards Toretsk and to force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from positions in Toretsk, although it would likely take the Russian military months to make gains of this scale at its current rate of advance.[11] It remains unclear if Russian forces would be sufficiently combat capable to conduct such an operation without an operational pause to reconstitute after evening out the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast and seizing Pokrovsk.Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk during Spring 2024 following the seizure of Avdiivka and at a moment when Ukraine's manpower and materiel constraints reached their peak. Russian forces intensified offensive operations in Pokrovsk Raion in October 2023 when they began the four-month-long battle for Avdiivka and maintained a consistent tempo of operations in the area until seizing Avdiivka on February 17, 2024 – at which point Russian forces temporarily paused offensive operations.[12] The Russian military command tasked the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and 51st Combined Arms Army (formerly the 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]) with exploiting the seizure of Avdiivka to make further gains west of the settlement.[13] The Russian Central Grouping of Forces resumed a high tempo of assaults several days later and began the offensive operation aimed at seizing Pokrovsk through a frontal assault in late February and early March 2024.[14] Russian forces in this area benefited from Ukrainian manpower and materiel constraints, partially driven by delays in Western-provided military assistance, between March and June 2024 and made consistent gains west of Avdiivka in the direction of Pokrovsk.[15] Ukrainian officials and frontline servicemembers consistently warned about an increasing disparity between Russian and Ukrainian artillery use during this time and suggested that Ukrainian forces were increasingly husbanding ammunition and relying on drone operators to defend against Russian infantry and mechanized assaults.[16]Russia’s likely intended primary offensive effort for Summer 2024 was a direct assault on Pokrovsk following the railway line west of Avdiivka and the seizure of both Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. The Avdiivka-Ocheretyne-Zhelanne-Novohrovika-Pokrovsk railway line proved to be an advantageous path for Russian advances during Spring and Summer 2024, as settlements along the railway line were critical lynchpins in Ukraine’s defensive lines in this direction. Russian forces advanced northwest from Avdiivka along the railway line and west from Avdiivka towards Ukraine’s main defensive line along the Berdychi-Orlivka-Vodyane line in March and April 2024, and elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces reportedly exploited a bungled Ukrainian rotation to make a narrow penetration near Ocheretyne in late April 2024.[17] The Russian exploitation force, mainly comprised of Central Military District [CMD] brigades and elements of the 51st CAA, continued to advance west of Ocheretyne in May and June 2024 and forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from the Berdychi-Orlivka-Tonenke to more defensible positions along the Prohres-Skuchne-Karlivka line on the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River.[18] Russian materiel advantages peaked during May and June 2024, and Ukrainian officials identified “overwhelming [Russian] air superiority” and a 20-to-one Russian artillery advantage as main contributing factors to the Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.[19] Ukrainian officials noted in May and June 2024 that Russian forces were mainly advancing via infantry assaults using ATVs or motorcycles and conducting very few mechanized assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed in early June 2024 that specialized Ukrainian drone units were heavily targeting and destroying unprotected Russian armored equipment in the Pokrovsk direction, inhibiting Russian offensive operations in the area – and more effective Ukrainian drone operations in this direction likely played a role in the Russian military command’s decision to limit mechanized activity in this direction moving forward.[21Further Russian advances east of Pokrovsk near Prohres and later Zhelanne during July and August 2024 notably drove Ukrainian back from the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River towards the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka-Selydove line (east to southeast of Pokrovsk) as Russian forces prioritized advances along the railway line and advanced more slowly through the fields and small settlements west and southwest of Avdiivka.[22] Russian forces conducted two successful turning maneuvers around Hrodivka and Novohrodivka by advancing along the railway line in late August 2024 and largely forced Ukrainian forces to retreat from the settlements without having to conduct costly, frontal assaults.[23] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 29 that likely Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups advanced into the southeastern outskirts of Myrnohrad (immediately east of Pokrovsk) and began small arms combat with Ukrainian forces in the town, but ISW has yet to observe confirmation of Russian forces operating in Myrnohrad.[24] These reports, if accurate, suggest that Russian forces may have temporarily advanced into Myrnohrad and that Ukrainian forces later pushed Russian forces from the town and have consistently defended against Russian advances into the town since late August 2024. Russian advances along the Novohrodivka-Hrodivka-Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk line stalled as of September 2024 as the Russian military command increasingly devoted manpower and resources to offensive operations along the Selydove-Hirnyk line and in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions.Russian forces also renewed offensive operations aimed at seizing Toretsk and intensified offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City in June 2024. The Russian military command redeployed some elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces and 51st CAA, including the CMD’s 27th Motorized Rifle Division, from the Pokrovsk direction to renewed assaults in the Toretsk direction in mid-June 2024.[25] The decision roughly doubled the length of the Central Grouping of forces area of responsibility (AOR) and drew some units away from the CMD’s exploitation force in the Pokrovsk direction.[26] The Russian military command likely intended to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in the Toretsk direction to deny Ukrainian forces the ability to shell rear Russian areas of the Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk directions, but Russian forces have yet to make gains significant enough to deny Ukrainian artillery operations in the area as of November 2024.[27] Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction have been characterized by infantry-heavy assaults in highly urbanized areas that have slowed Russian advances – as Russian forces have historically struggled with urban combat in Ukraine.[28]Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted in mid-June 2024 that Russian forces were also concentrating efforts and assault units in the Kurakhove direction, and ISW observed a minor intensification in Russian activity in the Kurakhove direction at this time.[29] Russian forces began consistently conducting platoon- and company-sized mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast in June 2024 and further intensified mechanized activity when Russian force began to conduct occasional battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the area in late July 2024.[30] Russian forces did not begin to make significant advances in the Kurakhove direction until July and August 2024 and have continued to make advances in this area in recent months.The Russian military command amended its Summer 2024 campaign design likely after assessing that Russian forces were unlikely to seize Pokrovsk in a frontal assault and decided instead to attempt to envelop Pokrovsk from the south via Selydove and to intensify offensive operations west of Donetsk City and near Vuhledar in order to eliminate the Ukrainian salient in western Donetsk Oblast along the Hirnyk-Kurakhove-Vuhledar line. ISW observed reports that elements of the CMD’s 90th Tank Division – a formation heavily involved in the CMD’s exploitation force - conducted a reinforced battalion-sized mechanized assault southwest of Donetsk City in late July 2024.[31] The further expansion of the Central Grouping of Forces AoR into both the Toretsk and Kurakove directions in June and July 2024 indicated that the Russian military command had likely re-tasked the CMD from acting as an exploitation force to being responsible for the bulk of Russia’s main offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast.[32] The Russian military command likely reassessed its campaign design and determined that Russian forces were unlikely to make rapid tactical gains in this direction or successfully seize Pokrovsk in an attritional, frontal assault. At this point, the Russian military command decided to attempt a turning maneuver via Selydove in order to avoid fighting through more built-up Ukrainian defenses immediately east of Pokrovsk and reprioritized leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command likely identified the seizure of Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove and leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast as desired prerequisites for launching an intensified offensive effort against Pokrovsk itself. Shortening and leveling the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will free up Russian troops currently attacking all along the Ukrainian pocket north and south of Kurakhove to redeploy to the Pokrovsk effort and will secure Russian forces’ southern flank for a renewed assault on Pokrovsk.The Russian military command’s new campaign design sought to take advantage of the most effective tactics in each respective frontline sector. A Ukrainian drone operator told the Associated Press (AP) in August 2024 that Russian forces had been relatively successful in the Pokrovsk direction because they were conducting ground attacks in groups of two to four soldiers under the cover of trees, making them harder for Ukrainian drone operators to detect.[33] An official in a Ukrainian brigade operating near Selydove reported in mid-September 2024 that Russian forces began moving in small infantry groups and using windbreaks and buildings for cover instead of conducting head-on frontal assaults with larger groups.[34] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted on November 16 that small, infantry-led assaults are not the most efficient tactic for expedient advances in the rural settlements and fields near Selydove, where Russian forces have very little coverage from Ukrainian drone operations.[35] The milblogger suggested that Ukrainian drone operations are constraining Russian forces' ability to bring reinforcements and supplies to forward positions. Russian forces’ ability to utilize windbreaks and forested areas as cover against Ukrainian drone operators and advance into vulnerable Ukrainian positions has been a critical aspect of their ability to advance in the Pokrovsk direction in recent months, particularly since Russian forces have not widely utilized armored vehicles in this area.[36] Russian forces may increase their use of armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction if muddy ground conditions begin to significantly constrain infantry movement, however.Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has been notably more successful than in the Pokrovsk direction or other sectors of the frontline, and more effective mechanized activity has facilitated marginally more rapid Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast. ISW observed a notable intensification in Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in October 2024, when Russian forces began conducting regular platoon- to battalion-sized mechanized assaults in these directions.[37] Russian mechanized assaults in this direction have been significantly more successful than in other frontline sectors. Russian mechanized assaults frequently fail to result in advances and typically only result in armored vehicles losses in most sectors of the frontline, but Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions has repeatedly resulted in several kilometers of advances. Russian forces notably advanced several kilometers to the outskirts of Hostre (northeast of Kurakhove) in September 2024, and Russian mechanized activity has been the foundation of Russian advances north and northwest of Vuhledar in October and November 2024.[38] Russian mechanized activity in these directions is not indicative of a substantial improvement in Russian forces’ ability to conduct the kind of rapid mechanized maneuver that would be necessary to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield at scale, however. The most successful Russian assaults in this area still result in high armored vehicle losses in exchange for a few kilometers of gains, but the increased efficacy of Russian mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions is still notable. Recent mechanized assaults in September and November 2024 also resulted in tactically significant Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction, and the Russian miliary may be looking to replicate the conditions that have increased the efficacy of mechanized activity in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions in other areas of the frontline.[39]Russian forces also continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction during late Summer and Fall 2024, but the pace of Russian advances has remained slow as Russian forces have largely relied on infantry to make advances in this direction.[40] Ukrainian forces have consistently and successfully counterattacked in the Toretsk direction more than in any other sector of western Donetsk Oblast, and successful Ukrainian counterattacks have helped limit the scope and rate of Russian advances in the area.[41] ISW assessed that Russian forces have seized 23.1 percent of Toretsk itself as of November 13 and Russian forces have advanced fewer than 10 kilometers in this direction from the June 2024 frontline as of November 14. Russian forces in Toretsk do not currently pose any significant threat to Ukrainian positions west of Toretsk and have likely taken notable manpower losses in exchange for these marginal gains as in other frontline sectors.The Russian military command’s new campaign design also may have sought to minimize the impact of increased Russian manpower constraints caused by the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian authorities were reportedly aware of the threat of a Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in the months leading up to August 2024, but the incursion has undoubtably tested Russia’s ability to generate and redeploy forces in response to an unexpected attack.[42] ISW has observed indications that the Russian military command redeployed forces from almost all sectors of the frontline, including elements of one unit from the Pokrovsk direction, to Kursk Oblast to address the incursion.[43] Russian forces have redeployed elements of several elite formations to Kursk Oblast, including: the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 98th, 104th, and 7th airborne (VDV) divisions, and 11th and 83rd VDV brigades.[44] The Russian military command generally regards VDV and naval infantry elements as more “elite” forces (despite the fact that these forces have been degraded and misused during the war) and tends to deploy these forces to prioritized directions.[45] The Russian military command would have likely redeployed these forces to reinforce efforts in the Pokrovsk direction if Ukrainian forces had not launched the Kursk incursion in August 2024.Ukrainian officials noted in September 2024 that the incursion “slowed” Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast and complicated Russia’s plans for offensive operations, including in Russia’s “main direction” – likely referring to the Pokrovsk direction.[46] Russian forces notably launched their offensive operation in northern Kharkiv Oblast in mid-May 2024 several months before the incursion, and the operation has also placed increased pressure on Russia’s manpower reserves by committing forces that could have otherwise fought in the Pokrovsk offensive.[47] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in October 2024 that the Russian military command originally intended to commit most of Russia's manpower reserves to the Kharkiv and Pokrovsk-Toretsk directions during late Summer and Fall 2024, but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and slowing Russian advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast complicated this plan.[48]Recent Russian advances and Russian forces’ ability to exploit the recent seizure of Selydove and Vuhledar could force Ukrainian forces to withdraw to more defensible positions in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces have not turned north towards Pokrovsk following the seizure of Selydove but rather have continued to advance south as Russian forces operating southeast of Selydove intensified offensive operations along the Tsukuryne-Hirnyk-Kurakhivka line[49] Russian forces operating southeast of Selydove currently appear to be attempting to eliminate the Ukrainian salient north of the Kurakhivske Reservoir and to envelop Kurakhove from the reservoir’s northwestern edge. Russian positions in Sontsivka (south of Selydove) are currently four kilometers from the northwestern edge of the reservoir, and it remains unclear how long Ukrainian forces operating east of the Sontsivka-Stary Terny line will be able to hold positions in this small salient. Russian forces have also successfully exploited the seizure of Vuhledar to make tactically significant advances south of Kurakhove, and recent Russian advances in the area may force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the fields southeast and south of Kurakhove to more defensible positions further west[50]A more level frontline in western Donetsk Oblast will provide Russian forces a more easily defensible flank should they turn north and attempt to envelop Toretsk from the west and attack Kostyantynivka and Ukraine's fortress belt from the south, but the leveling of the frontline does not immediately portend such advances. Russian forces could also attempt to advance further towards the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries along the Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City H-15 highway or conduct an assault on Velyka Novosilka from the east. Russian forces are unlikely to be sufficiently combat effective to undertake a major offensive effort without conducting at least a temporary pause for rest and reconstitution, and several settlements west of Kurakhove could afford strong defensive positions for Ukrainian forces. In the unlikely event that Russian forces could advance to the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary west of Kurakhove, current Russian positions in the Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk directions are still roughly 70 kilometers from the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary at their closest point. Russian forces remain unable to conduct the kind of rapid mechanized maneuver necessary to make advances to that magnitude with the kind of speed or surprise that could collapse Ukraine’s defenses in Donetsk Oblast.ConclusionThe seizure of Pokrovsk remains an important operational and informational goal for the Kremlin, and Russian forces will likely pursue the seizure of Pokrovsk in Winter 2024-25. Ukrainian officials have repeatedly identified Pokrovsk as Russian forces’ primary operational objective for the Summer-Fall 2024 campaign.[51] Kremlin-awarded founder and director of the prominent Rybar Telegram channel and social media project Mikhail Zvinchuk acknowledged in an interview with Russian-language diaspora-focused channel RTVI on November 16 that the Russian military intends to advance on Pokrovsk from the south and southeast this winter now that Russian forces have seized Selydove.[52] Zvinchuk noted that the Russian military intends to prioritize advancing in urban areas such as Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove and improving Russia's drone operations during Winter 2024-25, as Russian forces currently "cannot advance" due to Ukrainian drone operations. The Russian military command will likely task Russian forces with seizing Pokrovsk should Russian forces successfully level the frontline between Selydove and Yasna Polyana (northwest of Vuhledar) in the coming weeks and months, although Russian forces may have to conduct a short operational pause to redeploy, rest, and reconstitute before beginning the assault on Pokrovsk. The Russian military command is unlikely to abandon the seizure of Pokrovsk as a major objective as control over Pokrovsk would provide Russian forces with a defensible position that could support Russia’s envisioned new defensive line in western Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin is also unlikely to support abandoning the seizure of Pokrovsk given how many lives and how much materiel Russia has expended in pursuit of the town, and the Kremlin likely intends to exaggerate the importance of seizing Pokrovsk to domestic and international audience as part of Putin’s ongoing narrative about the inevitability of Russian victory in Ukraine. Russia’s offensive effort to seize Pokrovsk and level the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast is emblematic of Putin's theory of victory. The Russian military command appears to have willingly abandoned its original campaign design and intention to make the CMD a rapid exploitation and maneuver force and accepted of the realities of positional warfare and slower Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Vuhledar directions.[53] It is too soon to judge the impact of this decision on the war’s eventual resolution. The Russian military command’s decision to embrace and exploit the characteristics of positional warfare are based on the assumption that Russia’s war machine, with support from its allies in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea, can outlast Ukraine and its Western allies. ISW has recently observed indications to the contrary, however. Russian forces lost roughly 80,000 troops during September and October 2024, but likely only recruited an estimated 60-70,000 into military service– indicating that the Russian military’s recruitment rates have begun to fall behind Russia’s previous one-to-one loss replacement rate.[54] Ukrainian and Western assessments repeatedly place Russian domestic production rates of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems far below estimated rates of loss for these systems in Ukraine.[55] Apathy towards the war and resistance to greater social and economic hardship also appears to be growing within Russian society as the war drags on – suggesting that it is also in the Kremlin’s interest to resolve the war as soon as possible in order to avoid exacerbating domestic discontent.[56]Putin’s theory of victory does not account for these issues nor for the impact of Ukraine’s increasing asymmetric capabilities. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment and ability to develop and employ alternative and asymmetric capabilities, namely drones and long-range strikes, to partially counter Russia's artillery advantage in Ukraine and to defend against Russian mechanized and infantry assaults, often generating outsized effects considering the inexpensive systems Ukrainian forces are employing. Ukrainian drone operators have played a key role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver in western Donetsk Oblast and Russian infantry assaults throughout the frontline in Ukraine.[57] Ukraine’s long-range drone strikes against Russian oil depots and warehouses storing military equipment continue to complicate Russian logistics, force Russia to reallocate air defense assets, and burden Russia’s war chest.[58] Russian defeat, and Ukraine’s future success, rests on Ukraine’s ability to further leverage these asymmetric capabilities to support successful ground operations and directly challenge Russian forces’ control over the theater-wide initiative.[59]Ukrainian forces have stalled Russia's main offensive efforts for the Summer-Autumn 2024 campaign and forced the Russian military command to expend significant resources and valuable time on advances that have not brought Russian forces geographically closer to their main operational objective. Ukraine’s ability to trade space for time undermines the Kremlin's theory of victory and narrative of an inevitable Russian victory in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have successfully stalled Russian forces near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk for many months and continue to complicate Russian offensive operations in the Siversk and Lyman directions. Russian forces are currently exploiting localized Ukrainian vulnerabilities to advance in the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions, but Ukrainian forces are attempting to counterattack into the flanks of advancing Russian forces in these directions.[60] The leveling of the frontline in western Donetsk Oblast does not bring Russian forces substantially closer to their main operational objective of seizing Pokrovsk and only brings Russian forces several kilometers closer to their longer-term objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces have inflicted significant losses on the Russian military but must completely stop Russian advances in western Donetsk Oblast or risk Russian forces eventually advancing into more operationally significant areas of Donetsk in the medium- to long-term, however.Ukraine’s ability to defend against more operationally significant Russian advances is still largely dependent on the delivery of timely Western aid and Ukraine's ability to overcome its manpower constraints. Ukraine will have an opportunity to contest the initiative following the future culmination of Russian offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine receives sufficient and proactive Western military assistance. Previous delays in Western security assistance undermined Ukraine’s Summer 2023 counteroffensive effort and Ukraine’s ability to defend itself in Spring, Summer, and Fall 2024.[61] Delays and hesitation in Western aid only further convince Putin that his theory of victory is valid and embolden Putin to further escalate his war of aggression towards Ukraine and preparations for his future envisioned war against NATO. The West must fulfill its current pledges to Ukraine and proactively arm Ukraine in preparation for future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025 and beyond or face the risk of encouraging Putin’s aggressive and expansionist desires and the possible future where those desires turn further westward. [1] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0[4] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2024[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024 ; https://suspilne dot media/836927-udar-po-harkovu-i-anonsovanij-paket-dopomogi-vid-ssa-936-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1726479483&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russia-likely-pursue-phased-invasion-unoccupied-ukrainian ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033023[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar121523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101324[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar043024[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021824[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021724 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-27-2024[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041024[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2024[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024[20] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2024[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082724[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082924[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024[28] https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/2023/01/13/russias-response-to-the-challenges-of-urban-warfare-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/ ; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/04/russia-ukraine-urban-warfare-kyiv-mariupol/[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2024[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2063[32] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2024[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2024[34] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[35] https://t.me/philologist_zov/1722 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024[36] https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-12-2024[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024[42] https://isw.pub/UkrWar092024[43] https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081124 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar082624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083124[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2023[46] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091324[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051024[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2024[49] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar101824 ;[50] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111124[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2024[52] https://t.me/rybar/65439 ; https://t.me/rtvimain/104838 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uN99eOO1074[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/assessing-significance-current-russian-and-ukrainian-operations-course-war[54] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2024[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024[56] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar083024[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2024-0 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2024[58] https://isw.pub/UkrWar101024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092424 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-22-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-21-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-9-2024[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine%20and%20the%20Problem%20of%20Restoring%20Maneuver%20in%20Contemporary%20War_final.pdf[60] https://isw.pub/UkrWar111524[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/how-delays-western-aid-gave-russia-initiative-ukrainian-counteroffensive-kharkiv
- — Iran Update, November 12, 2024
- at 11/20/24 8:22pmKatherine Wells, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Rezaei, Alexandra Braverman and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission.[1] Katz made these comments during a meeting with the IDF General Staff. Katz replaced Yoav Gallant as defense minister on November 8 and was formerly foreign minister.[2] Katz affirmed that Israel would “continue to hit Hezbollah with full force” to capitalize on past successes like the killing of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and “realize the fruits of victory.”[3] He stressed that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own,” in addition to other war aims of disarming Hezbollah, forcing a Hezbollah withdrawal north of the Litani River, and returning northern Israeli residents safely home.[4] Katz’s vision is largely consistent with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has said that Israel needs to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River “with or without an agreement” and that any agreement must include measures to prevent Hezbollah’s reorganization and rearmament.[5]Israel’s limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s outlined goals. The IDF has especially focused on degrading the Hezbollah Radwan special operations forces during the clearing operations.[6] Eliminating the threat of ground attacks is critical to achieving the stated Israeli war aim of returning displaced civilians safely to their homes in northern Israel. Eliminating the threat of ground attacks will not move Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River or prevent rocket attacks from longer-range systems, however. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[7] An Israeli journalist reported that Israel recently informed the United States that its operation in southern Lebanon is “coming to an end” and that Israel is interested in reaching an agreement within a few weeks.[8] US special envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein also said on November 12 that "there is a chance to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon soon."[9] Hezbollah does not yet appear willing to agree to a ceasefire on terms desirable to Israel, however. Hezbollah leadership would moreover likely experience command and control challenges and struggle to enforce a full ceasefire, withdrawal, and disarmament terms among its rank-and-file members—many of whom live south of the Litani River.[10]A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[11] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[12] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[13] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[14]Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced on November 11 that Iran and Russia have implemented a new interbank network to circumvent the SWIFT system, which is based on the US dollar.[15] Iran’s Shetab interbank network now works with Russia’s Mir system, which means Iranians can now use Iranian bank cards and withdraw money in Russia.[16] The Shetab-Mir network will also enable Iranians to make online purchases in Russia. Iranian state television channel IRINN stated that this plan will be implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey as well.[17] The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The New York Times published an article on growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus that included an interview with the Iranian ambassador to Armenia.[18] The ambassador argued that Iran and Russia ”are not allies” and that they have ”some differences” and ”some mutual interests.” This is in part a reference to the disagreements between Russia and Iran over the Zangezur Corridor project, which is a Turkish project that seeks to connect Azerbaijan proper and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[19] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia at a time when Iran hopes to expand trade with Armenia and Europe.[20] This disagreement is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties, however. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.Key Takeaways:Israeli War Aims in Lebanon: Newly-appointed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will continue its operation in Lebanon until it accomplishes its mission. Katz said that Israel would not agree to any ceasefire agreement that does not “guarantee Israel’s right to enforce and prevent terrorism on its own.” Israel’s currently limited operation in frontline border towns of southern Lebanon will not alone accomplish Katz’s vision.Iran-Russia Relations: Iran and Russia have taken the first steps to create a banking network that circumvents international sanctions. The creation of this network and its emphasis on reducing dependence on the US dollar is part of a broader Iranian effort to mitigate sanctions and bolster the Iranian economy by building relations with regional and international states.Iran and Russia in the Caucasus: Growing Russo-Iranian tensions in the Caucasus represent fissures in the bilateral relationship, but both states will likely attempt to prevent the Caucasus issue from derailing wider Iranian or Russian policy objectives. The disagreements between the two countries over the Caucasus is unlikely to derail broader Iranian and Russian efforts to deepen bilateral ties. Iran would certainly prioritize sanctions mitigation through a stronger Russo-Iranian relationship over secondary policy objectives like the Zangezur Corridor. Iran views sanctions mitigation as a way to enhance regime security by improving its economy.Hezbollah Attack Campaign in Israel: A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties. One-way-attack drones are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Gaza Strip:Axis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripThe IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip on November 12. Hamas and other Palestinian militias conducted multiple attacks targeting Israeli forces and armor within and near Jabalia camp.[21]The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade destroyed several rocket launch tubes prepared to target Israeli towns during operations in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip over the past week.[22] Israeli forces located Hamas uniforms, military equipment, rifles, and various weapons components. Israeli forces also killed Palestinian militia fighters who attacked Israeli forces from buildings in Beit Lahia. The IDF said that the 900th Brigade has killed “dozens” of Palestinian militia fighters since the brigade deployed to the northern Gaza Strip on November 2.[23] The IDF said that four Israeli soldiers from the 900th Brigade died in battle in Beit Lahia on November 12.[24]Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the National Resistance Brigades mortared Israeli forces along the Netzarim Corridor on November 12.[25]Two US officials reported on November 12 that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the United States would not alter its assistance to Israel after Israel took “important steps” to address the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[26] This decision follows Blinken and US Secretary of Defense Loyd Austin warning senior Israeli officials on October 13 that the US would withhold military assistance to Israel, among additional unspecified steps, if aid was not delivered to non-combatants in the Gaza Strip.[27] Blinken met with Israeli Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on November 11 to discuss the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.[28] The Israeli security cabinet approved a series of humanitarian measures for the Gaza Strip on November 11, including increasing the number of aid trucks entering Gaza.[29] The IDF re-opened the Kissufim border crossing near Khan Younis for aid delivery on November 12.[30]US President-elect Donald Trump selected former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee as the new US Ambassador to Israel.[31] Trump said that Huckabee will work to “bring about peace in the Middle East.” Western media has noted Huckabee’s long-standing support for Israel, including for Israeli settlements in the West Bank.[32]West BankAxis of Resistance objectives: Establish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelTwo Palestinians conducted a car-ramming attack targeting Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint in al Khader near Bethlehem in the West Bank on November 11.[33] The attack injured two Israeli soldiers.[34] The suspects initially fled but later turned themselves over to the Israeli police.[35] The decision to turn themselves in to police suggests that these Palestinians were not committed militia fighters. Committed militia fighters would be more likely to remain in hiding or be killed at the scene.Israeli forces thwarted a stabbing attack near Dayr Sharaf in the West Bank on November 12.[36] A Palestinian individual attempted to stab Israeli forces, who killed the individual at the scene.Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fired small arms targeting Israeli military equipment and observation posts on the outskirts of the Shaked settlement in the West Bank on November 12.[37] PIJ last fired small arms targeting Israeli forces near the Shaked settlement on November 3.[38]Northern Israel and LebanonLebanese Hezbollah objectives:End Israeli operations in the Gaza StripSurvive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over LebanonIsraeli forces have continued clearing operations in southeastern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's data cut off on November 11.[39] The 769th Territorial Brigade (91st Division) destroyed a Hezbollah military building and confiscated weapons in surrounding civilian buildings. The 769th Brigade has operated south of Khiam in recent weeks.[40] Hezbollah claimed that its fighters launched rockets at elements of the 91st Division operating on the eastern outskirts of Houla.[41] Hezbollah also claimed that it fired anti-tank guided missiles at 98th Division bulldozers and an armored personnel carrier advancing from Kfar Kila.[42] The 36th Division continued clearing operations around Maroun al Ras and Yaroun in southcentral Lebanon on November 12.[43] The 188th Armored Brigade and 1st Golani Brigade located rocket launchers prepared to fire into Israel and other various weapons and military equipment. The 282nd Artillery Brigade and IDF Air Force also conducted strikes on Hezbollah targets. The 36th Division has been operating in Maroun al Ras in recent weeks.[44] The IDF reported that the 36th Division has reached ”new [Hezbollah] targets” during its clearing operation in southern Lebanon.[45]Hezbollah posted a summary on November 12 of recent activity in which it claimed that it conducted over 24 rocket and one-way drone attacks on Israeli forces attempting to advance from Maroun al Ras.[46] Hezbollah claimed that its forces also ambushed 36th Division troops attempting to advance from Maroun al Ras and Aitaroun towards Aainata.[47] Hezbollah also claimed its fighters ambushed Israeli forces attempting to advance from Yaroun towards western Maroun al Ras.[48] Commercially available satellite imagery captured on November 9 showed demolished buildings along the main road leading northeast from Yaroun towards Maroun al Ras, suggesting that Israeli forces have advanced along this road. An advance northeast would be consistent with Hezbollah attack claims in this area.The IDF continued its air campaign to degrade Hezbollah's capabilities and infrastructure on November 12. The IDF conducted approximately 100 airstrikes across Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 11.[49] The IDF reported it struck a Hezbollah military site in the Bekaa Valley that included underground rocket launchers and tunnels.[50]The IDF reported on November 12 that it has destroyed “most” missile warehouses and ammunition depots in Dahiya, southern Beirut.[51] The IDF stated Hezbollah stored ”hundreds” of missiles and rockets in facilities under civilian buildings in Dahiya. The IDF identified a missile production facility located under five residential apartment buildings in the al Choueifat neighborhood, in southern Beirut. The IDF reported that the missiles produced in the underground facility could reach all of Israel’s territory.The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson called on civilians to evacuate immediately from 14 towns and villages in southern Lebanon on November 12.[52] The spokesperson told residents that they should head north of the Awali River.[53] Most of the towns from which the IDF asked Lebanese civilians to evacuate are located along the first and second lines of villages along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF has previously ordered all but one of these towns to evacuate. The spokesperson said that the IDF will act ”forcefully” against Hezbollah activities in these towns.[54]This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 11 to 2:00pm ET on November 12. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.Hezbollah has conducted at least 14 drone and rocket attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's data cutoff on November 11. [55] Hezbollah attacked two IDF Air Bases, including Tel Nof Air Base near Tel Aviv, with ”high quality” rockets.[56] Hezbollah conducted the air base attacks under its ”Khaybar“ campaign. The Khaybar campaign seeks to respond to Israel for killing Hassan Nasrallah. Khaybar operations often target deeper and more militarily significant sites in Israel than standard Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces near the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah also launched one-way attack drones targeting an IDF 146th Division logistics base near Nahariya.[57] The IDF last acknowledged that the 146th Division operated against Hezbollah in southwest Lebanon on November 1.[58] Hezbollah also attacked Israeli forces with rockets in towns near the IDF axes of advance into southern Lebanon.[59]A likely Hezbollah drone struck a kindergarten in the Haifa suburb of Nesher on November 12. The drone struck outside the kindergarten while the children were in a bomb shelter and did not cause casualties.[60] Israeli journalists reported that the IDF alert system did not sound in Nesher but did activate in neighboring areas.[61] Hezbollah did not claim a drone attack at the same time or area as the strike, nor did it explicitly acknowledge the strike. Hezbollah similarly did not claim its rocket attack that struck a soccer field of Druze children in Majdal al Shams on July 27.[62] It is more likely that Hezbollah’s Majdal al Shams strike was unintentional and caused by technical failures inherent to rockets. One-way-attack drones, however, are much more accurate than rockets. Drones can still suffer failures and miss their intended targets as a result of electronic warfare or a partial interception. Hezbollah’s decision in early 2024 to transition from less-sophisticated rocket and anti-tank guided missile systems to more advanced and deadly rockets, one-way attack drones, and anti-tank guided missile systems increased the risk that a Hezbollah attack would cause significant Israeli casualties, either intentionally or due to a miscalculation.[63]Iran and the Axis of ResistanceIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Iran’s October 1 ballistic missile attack on Israel cost Iran $2.3 billion in an English-language video addressed to the Iranian people.[64] Netanyahu stated that Iran’s attack caused only ”marginal damage“ to Israel. Netanyahu claimed that another Iranian attack on Israel would ”simply cripple” the Iranian economy.International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Rafael Grossi emphasized the urgency of finding diplomatic solutions to resolve outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program.[65] Grossi, speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, said that the international situation is limiting the ability of the IAEA and others to devise diplomatic solutions to influence Iran’s relationship with the IAEA. The IAEA has continuously reported that Iran has hindered its ability to monitor the Iranian nuclear program, which has jeopardized trust between the two parties. Grossi’s reference to the international situation is probably a reference to the ongoing Israel-Iran escalation. The ongoing tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel has changed the way that Iranian officials are talking about the development of nuclear weapons, with some Iranian officials speaking increasingly openly about the development of these systems. Grossi will travel to Iran on November 13 to discuss the March 2023 joint statement with senior Iranian government officials.[66] The March 2023 joint statement refers to an Iranian agreement to reinstall IAEA monitoring equipment at its nuclear sites and grant IAEA inspectors access to three previously undeclared nuclear sites.[67]Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji continued to meet with senior Iranian security and military officials in Tehran on November 11. Araji discussed Israel and the United States’ “misuse” of Iraqi airspace during the October 25 IDF strikes into Iran in separate meetings with Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian and IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[68] Ahmadian and Salami likely emphasized Israel’s use of Iraqi airspace to try to compel the Iraqi federal government to allow Iran to attack Israel from Iraq if the Iranian regime were to decide to conduct such an attack. The Iranian regime almost certainly recognizes that Araji, and the Iraqi federal government generally, cannot prevent Israel from using Iraqi airspace to strike Iran. They therefore more likely sought to pressure the Iraqi federal government to tolerate a combined Iranian and Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attack against Israel. CTP-ISW previously noted that a direct Iranian attack against Israel via its proxies in Iraq would underline the extent to which Iran has increased its military and political control over federal Iraq.[69]Araji separately discussed the implementation of the March 2023 security agreement between Iran and Iraq with Ahmadian and Salami.[70] This agreement requires Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups away from the Iran-Iraq border.[71]US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski met with newly-elected Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani on November 11.[72] Mashhadani’s office reported that he and Romanowski discussed “enhancing cooperation” between the United States and Iraq.[73] Mashhadani is backed by the Shia Coordination Framework, which is a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi political parties.[74]The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed three attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 11. The claims include the following:A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in southern Israel.[75]A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in northern Israel.[76]A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in northern Israel.[77]The IDF reported on November 11 that it intercepted a drone launched “from the east” over the southern Golan Heights.[78]The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, an Iranian-backed militia claiming to operate in Saudi Arabia, claimed a drone attack targeting Eilat on November 11.[79] This attack marks the fifth time that the Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques has claimed an attack targeting Israel since October 25.[80] The IDF intercepted a drone launched “from the east” near Wadi Araba on November 11.[81] Wadi Araba is a region that extends from the southern end of the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba and is divided between Israel and Jordan.[82] The IDF announced the interception approximately 30 minutes before the Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques claimed the attack on Eilat.[83]Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on the sidelines of the emergency Organization of Islamic States (OIC) and Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 11, to discuss Israeli operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and cooperation.[84] Aref and Mohammad bin Salman discussed opportunities for bilateral cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure the “development of stability and security in the region.” Salman reaffirmed Saudi Arabia's commitment to deepening ties with Iran by March 2025, likely to placate Iran without promising concrete action against Israel. Aref extended an invitation to Salman to visit Iran.Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Senior Adviser for Policy Ali Asghar Khaji held a meeting with Syrian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ayman Raad on the sidelines of the 22nd International Astana meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on November 12.[85] Khaji emphasized Iran's support for regional efforts to “stand up” against Israeli operations. Khaji and Raad discussed expanding cooperation between Iran and Syria to limit regional escalation. The Astana talks aim to end the Syrian conflict and negotiate Syrian-Turkish normalization.[86] Khaji expressed his support for “rapprochement and restoration ties” between Turkey and Syria.Iranian Artesh Air Force Commander Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi visited the Chinese International Aviation & Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai on November 12.[87] Vahedi evaluated J-10 capabilities, highlighting Iran's interest in advanced military technologies. General Vahedi also met with People's Liberation Army Air Force Commander, General Chang Dingqiu, and discussed potential areas for cooperation.[88] Iran has increasingly focused on modernizing its air force through advanced fighter acquisitions and domestic technology development. Iran likely reached an agreement with Russia in late 2022 to acquire Su-35 fighter jets, potentially as part of a trade involving Iranian military support for Russia's actions in Ukraine.[89] Iranian officials have denied reports suggesting an imminent delivery of Russian Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, however.[90] Egypt also recently signed an agreement with China to acquire Chengdu J-10C fighter jets in August 2024, aiming to replace its aging fleet of American-made F-16s.[91]IRGC Quds Force Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Eraj Masjedi met with the interim Friday Prayer Leader and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's representative in Khorasan Razavi, Ahmad Alam Al Hoda on November 12.[92] Alam Al Hoda praised the Quds Force for its role in safeguarding Iran’s security and supporting the Axis of Resistance. Masjedi also delivered a report on nationwide public support for the Axis of Resistance.[93]The United States and the United Kingdom continue to conduct airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen according to Houthi media. Houthi media reported three US-UK airstrikes in the al Faza neighborhood in the al Tuhayta district, southern al Hudaydah governorate late on November 11.[94] Houthi media also reported a US-UK airstrike on a ”civilian car” in al Sawmah District, western al Bayda governorate, early on November 12.[95]The Houthis conducted a complex drone, ballistic, and cruise missile attack targeting two US Navy destroyers near the Bab al Mandeb on November 11. A US Defense Department spokesperson said that the US Navy destroyers intercepted at least eight drones, five ballistic missiles, and three cruise missiles targeting the two ships on November 11.[96] The Houthi military spokesperson claimed the attack.[97] The spokesperson also falsely claimed a second attack targeting the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier.[98] The US Defense Department clarified that it had no knowledge that any such attack occurred.[99]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/7866 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8265/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B9-D9-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B0%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-105-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9 ; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85/8258/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%81%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%84-10-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B5%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7[22] https://www.idf dot il/247915[23] https://www.idf dot il/247915[24] https://idfanc dot activetrail.biz/ANC1211202448410 ; 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