- — Iran Update March 25, 2025
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at 4/2/25 10:09pmKatherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Annika Ganzeveld, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Avery Borens, Alexis Thomas, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime.[1] It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin “any diplomatic initiative,” but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would almost certainly make such a decision. Araghchi has historically taken a softer line on nuclear negotiations with the United States compared to the regime’s hardline elements. Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States “through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[2] Former President Hassan Rouhani and former leading member of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team Mohammad Javad Zarif were previously given "full authority" to advance nuclear talks during the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiations.[3]An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch. Shara announced on March 25 that the interim government will comprise 22 ministerial portfolios led by a majority of “newcomers,” suggesting that he will replace the 22 existing ministers.[4] This likely includes dissolving the office of Prime Minister Mohammed al Bashir.[5] Emirati media reported in late February that Shara’s ministerial changes are imminent and are supposed to reflect that Shara understands the concerns about his consolidation of power.[6] This follows widespread concern over Shara’s concentration of executive authority and the lack of checks and balances on the Presidency outlined in the recently announced constitutional declaration.[7]Shara’s current roster of transitional ministers is nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based, HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG).[8] At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Shara appointed shortly after coming to power in December 2024 have close ties to or deep experience working with Shara, either through the SSG or through direct participation in HTS.[9] The SSG was nominally independent of HTS but, in practice, subordinate to HTS. Men who have been deeply loyal to Shara and have worked with him since his Jabhat al Nusra days currently hold the largest and highest priority ministerial portfolios, including foreign affairs and intelligence.[10]Shara’s appointments in the coming days will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead. A bias towards non-SSG, non-Sunni, non-Islamist, and non-HTS backgrounds would indicate Shara’s willingness to form a representative government that represents all of Syria. An opposite bias towards Sunni Arabs, Sunni Islamists, or former HTS and SSG members would indicate that Shara is not willing to form a representative or inclusive government at this time and instead seeks to cement his own control. This would also likely increase the distrust of the Shara government among minority communities, including the Alawites, Kurds, and Druze communities.The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.[11] Local media reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[12] The Houthis have previously procured dual-use items for drone and missile components on the international market.[13] The Houthis smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via the Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[14] The United States sanctioned China-based electronics companies for selling dual-use components to the Houthis in October 2024.[15] The Houthis also imported hydrogen fuel cylinders from unspecified Chinese suppliers in August 2024, which were aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis’ drones.[16]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Top Iranian officials reportedly authorized Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi to "advance any diplomatic initiative in relation to the United States," according to an Iranian expert close to the regime. It is not clear who precisely authorized Araghchi to begin “any diplomatic initiative,” but such a decision would almost certainly be made by the supreme leader.Syrian Transitional Government Formation: An expected announcement of Syrian President Ahmed al Shara’s cabinet and ministerial appointments will signal how and if Shara intends to extend his personal authority within the executive branch.Houthi Arms Smuggling: The Houthis continue to supplement their Iranian-sourced weapons arsenal by acquiring additional arms and dual-use components through Russian and Chinese commercial suppliers, according to the 2025 Annual US Intelligence Community Threat Assessment report.SyriaThe Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) met in Qamishli, Hasakah Province, on March 25 to continue negotiations to form a Kurdish unity agreement.[17] The PYD is the political wing of the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which dominates the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the KNC is a minority Kurdish political coalition that is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi and US officials mediated the meeting. Abdi also mediated the previous PYD-KNC dialogue session in al Shaddadi on March 18.[18] Two senior KNC officials told Kurdish media that the PYD and KNC may conclude an agreement by the end of March.[19] The PYD and KNC are longtime political rivals. The KNC-PYD negotiations began on March 18 after several actors, including the KDP, encouraged the SDF to “unify” Kurdish parties in Syria amid negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian interim government in Damascus.[20]The SDF and SNA continued fighting along the Tishreen Dam frontlines in eastern Aleppo on March 24.[21]The IDF Air Force conducted additional strikes on Palmyra and Tiyas air bases, eastern Homs Province, on March 24.[22] The IDF previously destroyed approximately 20 aircraft hangars at the bases on March 21.[23] The IDF stated that it struck “strategic military capabilities” in the bases in its most recent round of strikes.[24] The airstrikes reportedly killed at least five Syrians.[25] Homs Province is outside the IDF-declared “demilitarized” zone in southern Syria.[26] An unspecified regional intelligence official told Reuters in early February that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Palmyra and Tiyas as part of a possible Syria-Turkey defense agreement.[27] Israeli officials have increasingly expressed concern about the rise of Turkish influence and the establishment of possible Turkish bases in Syria.[28]The IDF conducted airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting armed combatants in the southern Syrian village of Kuwaya, Daraa Province, on March 25.[29] Armed combatants, including armed villagers, attacked the IDF when Israeli forces entered Kuwaya on March 25.[30] The IDF returned fire and conducted an airstrike that killed at least four fighters of the Islamic Resistance Front of Syria-the First of the Brave, in Kuwaya.[31] The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria-the First of the Brave is an anti-Israeli militia that uses Iranian iconography common among groups affiliated with or inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The group announced its formation on January 9, 2025.[32] The IDF also shelled Kuwaya from an IDF base in Marbah village, Daraa Province, which is around 3.5 kilometers west of Kuwaya.[33] The shelling reportedly killed seven civilians in Kuwaya.[34] The IDF previously briefly operated in Kuwaya in December 2024 and withdrew after residents demonstrated against IDF presence.[35] The Syrian interim foreign ministry issued a statement that condemned Israeli operations in southern Syria.[36] The ministry called Israeli strikes in Kuwaya a “dangerous escalation” and called for an international investigation against Israeli activities in Syria.Interim government security forces seized at least 70 first-person view (FPV) attack drones from Qardaha, Latakia Province, on March 25.[37] The Public Security Directorate said that the drones were prepared to target interim defense ministry and internal security sites.[38] Qardaha is Bashar al Assad’s hometown and a former Assad regime stronghold.[39] Qardaha and its surrounding neighborhoods are likely support zones for the pro-Assad insurgency that was responsible for a spate of violence in early March. Qardaha residents demonstrated against interim government forces operating in Qardaha and called for their removal prior to the violence in early March, which suggests that the population may be sympathetic to pro-Assad insurgent cells and support their activity.[40] Insurgents in Qardaha fled to nearby hills on March 7 after interim government forces began clearing operations in the area.[41] The insurgency has continued sporadic attacks on interim government forces but has not used FPV drones in those operations.[42] The interim interior ministry said that the “Civil Peace Committee in Qardaha” agreed to turn over the drones to the government, suggesting that not all local officials support the Assadist insurgents.[43]The interim government's independent fact-finding committee investigating sectarian violence in coastal Syria issued an update on its findings in Latakia Province on March 25.[44] Syrian interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed the committee, which includes two Alawites and several competent, professional judges, on March 9.[45] The committee will also conduct assessments in Tartous, Hama, and Idlib Provinces.[46] Committee spokesperson Yasser al Farhan said that it is too early to disclose the results of the investigation and that the committee will need more than the original month it was given to complete its study.[47] Farhan noted that the committee recorded over 90 testimonies and visited nine sites as part of the investigation.[48] He stated that armed Assadist insurgents maintained a presence in the “areas surrounding” the investigation in Latakia.[49] He said that the committee aims to establish a special court to prosecute perpetrators of the violence.[50] Failure to hold perpetrators of extrajudicial killings during the recent clearing operations accountable will exacerbate fears that government forces are targeting civilians and further drive support for insurgent cells.IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi security forces arrested four Syrian nationals in Baghdad on March 24 for “promoting terrorist organizations,” including al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.[51] The Iraqi security forces may be referring to support for the Syrian government, considering that Jabhat al Nusra no longer exists, but several former Jabhat al Nusra commanders hold senior government positions. Iraqi security forces have arrested several Syrian nationals in Iraq since March 8 for promoting sectarianism and extremism.[52] The arrests follow a flare-up of sectarian violence between Alawite insurgents and Sunni interim government forces in coastal Syria since early March 2025.[53] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the risk of sectarian violence spilling over from Syria into Iraq is increasing.[54]A source affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on March 23 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-affiliated political parties will contest the upcoming parliamentary elections in separate blocs.[55] The Badr Organization will reportedly join Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Euphrates Movement, while Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun party will run independently.[56] The source added that other Iranian-backed Iraqi militia-affiliated parties will join “other lists.”[57] The Badr Organization, Sadiqoun, and other Iranian-backed militia-affiliated political parties contested the 2021 elections as the Fatah alliance.[58] This development corresponds with recent Iraqi media reports that Sudani may ally with the Badr Organization and Popular Mobilization Chairman Falah al Fayyadh’s al Ataa Movement in the elections.[59]An official from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which is the Iraqi electoral commission, told Kurdish media on March 25 that all preparations are complete to hold parliamentary elections on November 25, 2025.[60] An IHEC official told Iraqi media on March 19 that preparations for the elections remain ”on track, while Iraqi officials have repeatedly said the elections will occur in October.”[61] Iraqi electoral law requires parliamentary elections to occur at least 45 days prior to the end of the four-year legislative term, which corresponds with November 25.[62]The Iraqi Administrative Court reinstated Diyala Provincial Council Chairman Omar al Karwi on March 25 after the Diyala Provincial Council attempted to dismiss and replace Karwi.[63] Karwi is a member of Khamis al Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance.[64] The Provincial Council unanimously voted to dismiss Karwi and elected Nizar al Lahibi as Chairman on March 23.[65] Lahibi is a member of former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party.[66] Khanjar and Halbousi are longtime political rivals who compete for political influence among Iraqi Sunnis. The Iraqi Administrative Court reinstated Karwi after the Diyala Provincial Council attempted to dismiss him and replace him with Lahibi in October 2024.[67]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 12 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations in the Houthi stronghold of Saada Governorate in northern Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on March 24.[68] Senior Houthi officials stated that the Houthis will continue to target Israel in defense of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip despite CENTCOM airstrikes.[69] Senior Houthi Political Bureau Mohammad al Bukhaiti confirmed in an interview with al Jazeera on March 24 that the CENTCOM airstrikes in Yemen have caused losses but did not elaborate.[70] The Houthis also launched a combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 24.[71]The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 24.[72] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a Houthi missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[73]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 989,000 rials to one US dollar on March 24 to 1,024,100 rials to one US dollar on March 25.[74] Iran’s currency dropped to a record low on March 25, reflecting Iran’s deepening economic instability amid renewed US "maximum pressure" sanctions and diplomatic deadlock.[75]Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein held a phone call on March 25 to discuss bilateral ties and regional developments.[76] Iranian reformist outlet Entekhab News and Iraqi media outlet Shafaq reported that Araghchi informed Hussein of the contents of US President Donald Trump’s letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[77] Hussein expressed hope that the exchange of messages could help open channels for dialogue between Iran and the United States.[78] A source close to the UAE government claimed on March 21 that Trump’s letter included demands for the dissolution of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[79] If accurate, this would have implications for Iran’s regional influence, especially in Iraq.Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on March 25 in Yerevan, Armenia, to discuss bilateral ties.[80] Araghchi stated that Iran and Armenia agreed to ease transit constraints, reduce customs fees, and build a new bridge over the Aras River.[81] Araghchi separately met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and expressed support for the “Crossroads of Peace” plan and highlighted strong, growing ties between Iran and Armenia.[82] The Crossroads of Peace is an Armenian government initiative to promote regional connectivity through roads, railways, and other infrastructure based on sovereignty, equal access, and mutual control by all participating countries.[83]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1904203541356355769[2] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/04/3280493/[3] https://www.mizanonline dot ir/fa/news/17656 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna53047531[4] https://x.com/AJA_Syria/status/1904497463425438179[5] https://www.msn.com/en-ae/politics/government/syrian-cabinet-set-for-imminent-reshuffle-sources-say/ar-AA1yrUhB[6] https://www.msn.com/en-ae/politics/government/syrian-cabinet-set-for-imminent-reshuffle-sources-say/ar-AA1yrUhB[7] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/14/world/europe/syria-constitution-new-government.html ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-17-2025[8] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/12/15/what-to-know-about-syrias-new-caretaker-government[9] https://t.me/SyriangSG/1021; https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2024/12/31/syria-major-general-marhaf-abu-qasra-appointed-minister-of-defense ; 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https://www.timesofisrael dot com/fm-saar-to-us-senators-turkey-cooperating-with-iran-to-smuggle-money-to-hezbollah; https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-836707’; https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-836362[29] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904463507447234861[30] https://x.com/NavvarSaban/status/1904462855354593497; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904463507447234861 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904542191348744542[31] https://t.me/almkaomasy/280 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904463507447234861[32] https://israel-alma dot org/the-islamic-resistance-front-in-syria-is-this-a-new-potential-threat-to-israel/[33] https://x.com/MuradSyr/status/1904525962831602011 ; https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26967[34] https://x.com/MuradSyr/status/1904525962831602011 ; https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26967[35] https://x.com/abazeid89/status/1904483043017888022[36] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/592[37] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904494970649579762[38] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121192[39] https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/the-assads-domination-of-qardaha/[40] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1894796290908733891[41] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1898039753523839169[42] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1897715231083970897 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1897981922556400096[43] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53614 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23572[44] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904522894379479116[45] https://x.com/yaser_alfarhan/status/1899726150764495228[46] https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/121195[47] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684[48] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684[49] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684[50] https://x.com/SanaAjel/status/1904487315671535684[51] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A8-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9[52] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/understanding-syria%E2%80%99s-emerging-insurgency[54] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025[55] https://almadapaper dot net/399262/[56] https://almadapaper dot net/399262/[57] https://almadapaper dot net/399262/[58] https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/iraq-elections-fatah-iran-ally-blow-power[59] https://iraqtoday dot com/ar/news/88630/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A?latest[60] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/831633/%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%AA-%D9%83%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7[61] https://almadapaper dot net/399011/[62] https://auis dot edu.krd/iris/publications/iraq%E2%80%99s-provincial-elections-electoral-dynamics-political-implications[63] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%87%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83-%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89 ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/520182/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/520184/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89[64] https://al-aalem dot com/%d9%85%d8%ac%d8%af%d8%af%d8%a7-%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a%d9%84-%d8%b9%d9%85%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%88%d9%8a-%d9%88%d9%8a%d9%86%d8%aa%d8%ae/[65] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/520182/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/localnews/520184/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1HqVhWoDLLA%29-&feature=youtu.be[67] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/3110202410[68] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1904328298357772763[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AX1Tud47y4M; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3456266.htm[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AX1Tud47y4M[71] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1904318828168855616[72] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1904318828168855616;[73] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904233792044437771[74] https://www.bon-bast.com/ ;https://www.bon-bast.com/graph/usd[75] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-currency-drops-record-low-1039000-rial-dollar-bonbastcom-says-2025-03-25/[76] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/05/3280755[77] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/857632 ;https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8[78] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%81-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8[79] https://www.intellinews dot com/us-sets-six-conditions-for-iran-talks-in-trump-letter-to-supreme-leader-372915/[80] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/05/3280860[81] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/05/3280956[82] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/05/3281009[83] https://en.armradio dot am/2023/11/18/armenian-government-presents-crossroads-of-peace-project/- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 25, 2025
- at 4/2/25 9:35pmChristina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, George Barros with Nate TrotterMarch 25, 2025, 6:50 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on March 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine remains difficult. The White House issued one readout about the outcomes of the US-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia from March 24 and another about the US-Ukrainian talks from March 25.[1] The Kremlin and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov each issued separate statements for Russia and Ukraine.[2] The American, Russian, and Ukrainian statements share some commonalities but differ from each other significantly in other regards. The US readouts, the Kremlin readout, and Umerov commonly stated that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to develop measures for implementing" US President Donald Trump's, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's "agreement to ban strikes against energy facilities of Russia and Ukraine."[3] Zelensky stated that Ukraine also gave the United States a list of "strategic infrastructure objects" that Ukraine would like protected under a strikes ceasefire.[4] This list is not explicitly mentioned in the US or Russian readouts. The Kremlin later issued a list of Russian and Ukrainian facilities that Russian and American delegations agreed fall under the temporary ceasefire on strikes on the energy system.[5] The Kremlin stated that the list includes oil refineries; oil and gas pipelines and storage facilities, including pumping stations; electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, including power plants, substations, transformers, and distributors; nuclear power plants; and hydroelectric dams. It is unclear if the Russian list of objects is the same list of “strategic infrastructure objects” that Zelensky mentioned. The Kremlin stated that the temporary ceasefire is valid for 30 days starting from March 18, 2025, meaning that the ceasefire will by default expire on April 17, 2025, unless Russia and Ukraine mutually agree to renew it. The Kremlin stated that Russia and Ukraine have the right to consider themselves free from the obligations of the agreement if one of the parties violates the agreement. The mechanisms to monitor and address allegations of violations remain unclear. The Kremlin's list notably only includes energy infrastructure facilities, and it remains unclear whether discussions regarding Zelensky's list of other non-energy facilities that he wants protected under the ceasefire are still ongoing or whether the Kremlin has rejected Zelensky's proposal. Umerov also stated that Ukraine is ready to "ready to organize a separate meeting at the technical level to begin work on implementation mechanisms" for the strikes and Black Sea ceasefires and that "at this point, all parties are going to brief the relevant leadership, and we will announce the dates and times soon."[6] The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March 25.The US readouts of its bilateral meetings in Saudi Arabia and Umerov noted that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia "agreed to ensure safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea."[7] The Kremlin readout of the US-Russian talks similarly stated that the United States and Russia agreed to such measures as part of a "Black Sea Initiative," but added that there need to be "appropriate control measures through inspection of such vessels."[8] Umerov uniquely added that all Russian military vessels movement "outside of [the] eastern part of the Black Sea" will constitute a violation of the spirit of this agreement and that Ukraine will regard such movement as a violation of the commitment to ensure the safe navigation of the Black Sea and a threat Ukraine's national security.[9] Umerov stated that Ukraine will be able to exercise its right to self-defense in the event of such violations.All readouts of the March 23 to 25 bilateral meetings noted that the parties "welcome the good offices of third countries with a view toward supporting the implementation of the energy and maritime agreements" and that all parties "will continue working toward achieving a durable and lasting peace."[10] (Turkey notably helped facilitate the July 2022 grain deal by inspecting commercial vessels transporting foodstuffs in the Black Sea.)[11] The White House and Umerov stated that the United States and Ukraine "agreed that the United States remains committed to helping achieve prisoners of war (POWs) exchanges, the release of civilian detainees, and the return of forcibly transferred Ukrainian children."[12]Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement. The US readouts for both its meetings with Russian and Ukrainian delegations noted that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides" of the war must stop, "as the necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — likely in reference to the unconditional 30-day general ceasefire on the frontline that Trump and Zelensky have already agreed upon, but that Putin rejected on March 18.[13]The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[14] The Kremlin stated that unspecified actors — presumably the United States — must also reconnect Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations to SWIFT and lift restrictions on trade finance transactions. Additionally, they must lift sanctions restricting companies producing and exporting food and fertilizers and their insurance companies, lift restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions against ships operating under the Russian flag involved in trading food and fertilizer products, and lift restrictions on supplying agricultural machinery and other tools used in food and fertilizer production to Russia. The United States did not provide Russia such demanded sanctions relief when Ukraine and Russia agreed to the grain deal in July 2022.[15] The White House and Kremlin readouts of the US-Russian meetings noted that the "United States will help restore Russia’s access to the world market for agricultural and fertilizer exports, lower maritime insurance costs, and enhance access to ports and payment systems for such transactions," but the US readout notably did not include explicit language suggesting that Russia‘s acceptance and adherence to the Black Sea ceasefire would be conditional on preliminary US sanctions relief.[16] The United States will likely require European Union (EU) cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.[17] US President Donald Trump responded to a question about the United States lifting some sanctions on Russia before Russia implements measures in the Black Sea and stated that the US is considering lifting some sanctions against Russia.[18] Establishing the initial grain deal in July 2022 did not require any sanctions relief, and reinstating the grain deal likely similarly does not require preliminary sanctions relief.[19] Establishing a temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea does not require preliminary sanctions relief.The Kremlin's official statements are vague, stipulate requirements for the ceasefire that neither the United States nor Ukrainian official statements mention, and leave room for disagreement among the parties that would be involved in interpreting the agreements, lifting sanctions, and monitoring potential violations. The official Kremlin statement is vague on the specific sanctions and restrictions the Kremlin is demanding that the West preliminarily lift and the specific financial organizations and companies involved. The Kremlin statement also does not specify the actors that will interpret the parameters of these restrictions, monitor lifting these restrictions, and verify all parties' compliance. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine, Russia, and the United States issued separate statements because the US-Ukrainian meetings did not discuss US-Russian efforts to assist restoring Russian access to agricultural and trade markets.[20]Key Takeaways:US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for temporary ceasefires on strikes against energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. The details of these ceasefires remain unclear and evaluating the ceasefires’ specifics in the absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements signed by Russia and Ukraine remains difficult.The Kremlin's and Umerov's statements suggest that Russia and Ukraine may not yet be in agreement about whether the ceasefire has gone into effect or not as of March 25.Putin continues to reject Trump's and Zelensky's proposed temporary frontline ceasefire, despite agreeing to some form of ceasefire for strikes on energy infrastructure and in the Black Sea. Putin’s persistent stalling and intransigence are inhibiting Trump's efforts to secure a lasting and stable peace settlement.The Kremlin stated that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.Russian forces recently advanced in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area, near Toretsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.The Russian military continues to deny rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area amid continued attacks on limited Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast on March 25.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within and east of Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City along the international border).[21]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 25 that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[22]Russian forces attacked near Gogolevka (west of Sudzha); near the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha; and north to northeast of Sumy City along the international border near Volodymyrivka, Veselivka, Zhuravka, and Basivka on March 24 and 25.[23]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and drone operators of the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[24]Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.Assessed advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 24 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Demidovka and northwest of Popovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[25]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Demidovka and Popivka and advanced southeast of Demidovka and west of Prilesye (northwest of Belgorod City).[26] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Demidovka and that the southern part of the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[27]Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including reserve Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards from Primorsky Krai and elements of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) repelled Ukrainian attacks toward Popovka on the night of March 24 to 25.[28]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 24 and 25.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Topoli, Kamyanka (both northeast of Kupyansk), Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk), and Stepova Novosilka (southeast of Kupyansk).[30]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 24 and 25.[31]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova toward Novomykhailivka and Katerynivka and near Cherneshchyna on March 24 and 25.[32]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 25 that Russian forces seized Myrne (northeast of Lyman).[33]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Kolodyzai and Yampolivka and toward Nove and Zarichne; and east of Lyman near Torske on March 24 and 25.[34]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Daryivka on March 24 and 25.[35]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne and Dyliivka on March 24 and 25.[36]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk and central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[37] Additional geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the southeastern outskirts of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[38]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including elements of its 68th Tank Regiment, seized Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka (north of Oleksandropil).[39] A Russian source claimed that reports that Russian forces seized Oleksandropil and Panteleymonivka are inaccurate.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Toretsk, north and northwest of Toretsk, west of Leonidivika (west of Toretsk), and northwest of Oleksandropil.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka.[42]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk near Krymske on March 24 and 25.[43]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka.[44]Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Shevchenko, northeast of Pishchane, west of Uspenivka, west of Nadiivka, and within Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[46] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Uspenivka.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces occupied half of Solone, roughly half of Tarasivka, and residential areas near Kotlyne.[48]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, and Solone and toward Novoserhiivka and Kotlyarivka on March 24 and 25.[49] Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka, south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Kotlyne.[50]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on March 24 that Russian attacks in the Pokrovsk direction recently intensified after a recent brief pause but that the intensity of Russian attacks is not as high as in February 2025, likely due to large Russian personnel and equipment losses.[51] The head of the electronic and cyber warfare service of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using an average of 100 to 150 first-person view (FPV) drones per day in the Pokrovsk direction but that Russian drone usage depends on weather conditions.[52]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[53] Elements of the 506th and 589th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Uspenivka.[54] Elements of the 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division), 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), and 1453rd Regiment (1st Slavic Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Solone.[55] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[56] Drone operators of the “Vizantiya” detachment and Vanya Ivanov group are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[57]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 25 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and at least 500 meters deep and 2.05 kilometers wide near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[58]Russian forces attacked southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Ulakly, and Oleksiivka on March 24 and 25.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rozlyv and Kostyantynopil.[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynopil.[61]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, Skudne, and Novoocheretuvate; and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 24 and 25.[62] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Vesele and Vilne Pole.[63]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (east of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[64]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently advanced in the western Zaporizhia direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 and 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Stepove (northwest of Robotyne) and in southern Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 24 and 25.[66]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th VDV (Airborne) Regiment and the 108th VDV Regiment (both 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Lobkove.[67] Elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating along the Stepove-Kamyanske line.[68] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-37 Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[69]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on March 25 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the Dnipro direction on March 24 and 25.[70]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 24 and 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 139 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 78 drones and that 34 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Kyiv, Cherkasy, and Odesa oblasts and that a Russian missile damaged civilian infrastructure, including a school in Sumy City, injuring 23 children.[72]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian military continues to deny rotations to soldiers who have been fighting in the war in Ukraine for years. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting of the Council for Culture and Arts on March 25 that the Russian MoD is considering issues surrounding rotations for servicemembers who went to the front earlier in the full-scale invasion.[73] Putin stated that the "issue is acute" and vaguely claimed that Russian authorities "will proceed from the realities that are developing on the frontline." Putin claimed that many mobilized servicemembers who have not had rotations have gained so much combat experience over the years that "many of them have become professional soldiers" and work alongside personnel from professional military units, like naval infantry and airborne (VDV) elements.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Belarus may be developing military infrastructure to house Russian nuclear warheads. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Belarusian service Radio Svaboda reported on March 24 that satellite imagery showed that Belarus expanded the construction of hangars for Iskander ballistic missiles in Asipovichy, Belarus, from October 2022 to February 2025, and that construction work is in its final stage.[74] The New York Times reported in May 2024 that satellite imagery indicated that Belarus had been constructing facilities that could house nuclear warheads at the Belarusian 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base, which is located 12 kilometers away from the Iskander storage site in Asipovichy.[75] Radio Svaboda noted that Belarus is constructing a separate railway to connect the Belarusian 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base with the Iskander ballistic missile storage site in Asipovichy and a “radiation prevention” site in Malaya Garozha (6km northeast of Asipovichy).[76] ISW continues to assess that neither Russia nor Belarus seeks nuclear escalation and that their use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/[2] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526[3] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531[4] https://suspilne dot media/979369-zelenskij-ukraina-peredala-ssa-spisok-obektiv-po-akih-rf-ne-mae-zavdavati-udariv/ ; https://x.com/Mylovanov/status/1904600910866850196[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76534[6] https://suspilne dot media/979449-umerov-gotovi-organizuvati-tehnicnu-zustric-sodo-implementacii-domovlenostej-v-er-riadi/[7] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526[9] https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531[10] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531[11] https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf ; https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative[12] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025[14] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526[15] https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c4g7w7521w0t?post=asset%3Ae2e56d86-788f-473f-8baa-4cb4a1d19061; https://suspilne dot media/979433-ssa-rozgladaut-znatta-castini-sankcij-z-rf-v-obmin-na-peremira-u-cornomu-mori-tramp/[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/c4g7w7521w0t?post=asset%3Ae2e56d86-788f-473f-8baa-4cb4a1d19061[19] https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/blackseagraininitiativefulltext.pdf[20] https://x.com/Mylovanov/status/1904600919368446324[21] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1904447071035257015; https://t.me/OMBr67/2499; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8727 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1904307640689123609; https://t.me/OMBr67/2499; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1904317580573045092[22] https://t.me/sashakots/52698[23] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25903 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/979125-na-sumsini-zbilsilas-sira-zona-dani-karti-deep-state/ ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22031 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589[24] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2238 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50540[25] https://t.me/rybar/69119[26] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22639 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46430 ; https://t.me/rybar/69119 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/25495 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502 ; https://t.me/rybar/69119 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22043 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20926 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19250[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/25495 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33790 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33791 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25512 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10776 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20926 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159055 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159099[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834[30] https://t.me/tass_agency/307440; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834[33] https://t.me/mod_russia/50548[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904548988717572326; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904549129478426924; https://t.me/tytanybpla/89;[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904555048694087706; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1882911634450268476; https://t.me/azov_media/6662[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042; https://t.me/dva_majors/67560; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33824; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159109[40] https://t.me/rybar/69129[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159109; https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88706; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33794; https://t.me/dva_majors/67560[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33796[46] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33849[47] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044[48] https://t.me/yurasumy/22044; https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33807; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/rybar/69129[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/24/i-yih-menshe-i-tehniky-v-nyh-menshe-u-rosiyan-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-problemy-z-pihotoyu/[52] https://youtu.be/_fTI1PEp2DQ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/25/vid-100-do-150-fpv-droniv-na-den-vorog-namagayetsya-zahopyty-povitrya-pid-pokrovskom/[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/50546[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33797[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33840[56] https://t.me/rybar/69129; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/yurasumy/22042[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25944; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159045[58] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88720; https://t.me/voin_dv/14076[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88720[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/voin_dv/14076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33826[62] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6834; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02CbB8DdkSK7NwPiRXYQRZ9HQ1dX72FCH8nh3qnwLr7fgien4a3fZtrWQEyrKCzTK1l; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/14076; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159130[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159096;[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8733; https://t.me/armagedrontime/128; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8728; https://t.me/brigade128/1797[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22322; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22318; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02CbB8DdkSK7NwPiRXYQRZ9HQ1dX72FCH8nh3qnwLr7fgien4a3fZtrWQEyrKCzTK1l; https://t.me/dva_majors/67589; https://t.me/wargonzo/25502; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20933; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/979159-selo-mali-serbaki-zaporizkoi-oblasti-perebuvae-pid-kontrolem-zsu-sili-oboroni-sprostuvali-zaavi-sodo-okupacii/; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88742[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88742; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159128[68] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20933[69] https://t.me/tass_agency/307434[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22347[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/31391[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/31391; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/978685-armia-rf-atakuvala-poltavsinu-e-travmovani/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9019; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/34534 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/78197; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/03/25/v-den-peregovorov-s-ssha-rossiya-nanesla-udar-po-tsentru-sum; https://t.me/synegubov/13541[73] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76525[74] https://www.svaboda dot org/a/33357342.html[75] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/world/europe/russia-nuclear-weapons-belarus.html[76] https://www.svaboda dot org/a/33357342.html
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2025
- at 4/2/25 9:03pmChristina Harward, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson,Daria Novikov, and George Barros with Nate TrotterMarch 24, 2025, 5:15pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on March 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks are "more technical in nature."[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 23 that the US–Ukrainian talks discussed proposals for the safety of energy and infrastructure facilities and that the talks were "productive and focused."[2] A source familiar with the bilateral negotiations in Saudi Arabia told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the Russian-US meeting on March 24 will consider the ceasefire agreements that Ukraine agreed to on March 23.[3] The source stated that the discussions focused on moratoriums on strikes against energy facilities and civilian infrastructure and attacks in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Presidential Office Advisor Serhii Leshchenko stated that the US–Ukrainian talks concerned a ceasefire against strikes on Russian "facilities at seas and rivers" and against Ukrainian ports in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[4] Leshchenko stated that the Ukrainian delegation will hold additional discussions with the US delegation following the US–Russian talks on March 24.[5] Suspilne reported that the US delegation in the US–Russian talks includes State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton, US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and that the Russian delegation includes Russian Federation Council International Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin and Advisor to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Colonel General Sergei Beseda.[6] Saudi Arabian state-owned outlet Al Arabiya reported that US National Security Council member Andrew Peek is also participating in the US delegation in the US–Russian talks.[7] Kremlin wire TASS reported that the US and Russian delegations will release a joint statement on March 25.[8] ISW will report on the details of the various bilateral talks as information becomes available in the coming days.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area. Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[9] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced into southern Demidovka but denied that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[10] Ukrainian forces began limited attacks into northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 18 and have made marginal advances towards Grafovka (southeast of Demidovka) and Prilesye (south of Demidovka) over the last six days.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that Ukrainian forces also began attacking towards Popovka (west of Demidovka).[12] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and some armored vehicles and attacking in small infantry groups.[13] Russian sources claimed that Russia redeployed border guards, Chechen Akhmat forces, elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, and elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) to respond to the Ukrainian attacks in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.[14] ISW will not offer an assessment of Ukraine's intent behind these attacks at this time.Ukrainian forces appear to be leveraging long-range strikes to complicate Russian logistics and command and control (C2) in the area. Ukrainian forces recently conducted two strikes on Russian command posts in western Belgorod Oblast, destroying communications equipment.[15] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 24 that Ukrainian forces downed four Russian helicopters over Belgorod Oblast.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently struck a bridge near Grafovka and another bridge near Nadezhevka (east of Grafovka), likely to complicate Russian logistics in the area.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes, shelling, and HIMARS strikes are also complicating Russian forces' ability to hold some positions in the area.[18]The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war. Kremlin officials are likely attempting to capitalize on the current lack of available details about the US–Ukrainian and US–Russian discussions in Riyadh on March 23 and 24. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Ukraine of being "well-bred Nazis" who lack agency as part of Kremlin efforts to justify the Kremlin's demand of "denazification" — or regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv — as a condition to end the war in Ukraine.[19] Lavrov also reiterated claims accusing European countries of seeking to prolong the war in Ukraine, likely to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov accused Ukraine of violating the proposed moratorium on energy strikes, despite the fact that the proposed moratorium agreement and its contours are not yet finalized and are currently under discussion in Riyadh.[20] Peskov and Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova attempted to temper domestic expectations for the ongoing talks, stating that there is no need to expect breakthroughs and there is still a lot of work to do on technical issues.[21] These statements continue to signal to the domestic Russian audience that Russians should not expect a meaningful peace in Ukraine in the near term and support Kremlin condition-setting for a protracted war effort.[22]Recent statements by Russian diplomats and academics indicate that the Kremlin likely aims to prioritize bilateral discussions with the United States over talks to end the war in Ukraine and will set this expectation within Russian society. Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Vyacheslav Nikonov recently told the New York Times (NYT) that Russian President Vladimir Putin sees bilateral Russian-US relations as "more important than the question of Ukraine."[23] Other Russian officials and voices indicated to the NYT that it is more important for Russia to accomplish its goals in bilateral US–Russian relations regarding alleviating sanctions pressure, constraining NATO, and seeking a "broader deal" — which likely includes US–Russian bilateral terms — before agreeing to any ceasefire in Ukraine.[24]Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on March 23 that Russian occupation officials are forcibly converting and reconsecrating Ukrainian churches into the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) in occupied Kherson Oblast.[25] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that ROC MP priests watch Russian occupation officials torture Ukrainian Protestant Christian believers and force Ukrainian children to pray for the "Russkiy Mir" (Russian World) — a Kremlin-promoted geopolitical concept with amorphous parameters that broadly encompasses Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media. ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship.[26] ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Ukrainian Orthodox communities and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout southern Ukraine.[27]Key Takeaways:US and Russian delegations met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on March 24 following US–Ukrainian talks on March 23 about the details of temporary ceasefires on long-range strikes and in the Black Sea.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Demidovka along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks in the area.The Kremlin is recirculating existing narratives aimed at undermining support for Ukraine amid the negotiations in Riyadh and likely remains uninterested in conducting meaningful negotiations to end the war.Russia continues to persecute religious minorities, especially Evangelical Christian communities in occupied Kherson Oblast as part of a wider campaign in occupied Ukraine aimed at destroying independent Ukrainian national and religious identities.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continue to attack limited Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast on March 24 but did not advance. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east and southeast of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha) and northeast and south of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[28]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking Gogolevka (west of Sudzha) and near the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions southwest of Sudzha in Oleshnya and south of Sudzha in Guyevo and Gornal.[30] Some Russian milbloggers denied limited Russian reports that Russian forces seized Guyevo and Gogolevka.[31]Ukraine's State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on March 24 that Russia has accumulated a "significant" number of personnel and equipment in Kursk Oblast.[32]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in Kursk Oblast.[33] Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Makhnovka (southeast of Sudzha).[34] Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the Sudzha checkpoint.[35]Russian forces continued attacking into northern Sumy Oblast on March 24 but did not advance. Unconfirmed Claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Volodymyrivka and Vodolahy (north of Sumy City), southeast of Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City) and that elements of the 51st VDV Regiment are advancing northeast of Basivka (southeast of Zhuravka).[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently advanced in the field northeast and east of Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City).[37]Demchenko stated that Russian forces are trying to advance near Zhuravka and Novenke (east of Zhuravka).[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued along the Volodymyrivka-Vasylivka-Zhuravka line (north to northeast of Sumy City along the international border) and near Basivka.[39]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in northern Sumy Oblast.[40]See topline text for reports of Ukrainian activity in Belgorod Oblast.Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 24 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 23 and 24.[41]Order of Battle: Reconnaissance and artillery units of the Chechen "Akhmat” Spetsnaz “Vakha” Battalion and Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Udy (northwest of Kharkiv City near the international border).[42]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 24 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the settlement.[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 24 that Russian forces advanced in eastern and western Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Topoli, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on March 23 and 24.[45]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking less frequently as compared to two to three weeks ago (early and mid-March 2024), likely due to manpower and equipment losses.[46] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using fewer pieces of heavy equipment. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 24 that Russian infantry continue attempts to cross the Oskil River but are suffering from heavy losses and cannot conduct evacuations.[47] The spokesperson stated that there are roughly 500 Russian servicemembers dispersed in positions along the west (right) bank of the Oskil River.Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) resumed attacks near Dvorichna.[48] Elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps (AC), LMD) are reportedly operating near Ivanivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 24 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Raihorodka (east of Borova and east of Nadiya).[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Bohuslavka and east of Borova near Nadiya and in the direction of Stepove on March 23 and 24.[51]The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 23 that Ukraine’s seizure of Nadiya (east of Borova) enables Ukrainian forces to maintain fire control over the Zherebets River, Raihorodka, and Dzherelne (north of Nadiya) and to complicate Russian mechanized assaults against Kopanky (west of Nadiya).[52] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 24 that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Nadiya and conduct assaults in small squads of five to six people.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Ukrainian forces have not seized Nadiya and that the frontline is one to 1.5 kilometers west of the settlement.[54]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating near Zahryzove and that elements of the 4th Tank Division, with support from the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA, MMD), are operating near Lozova and Andriivka (formerly Pervomaiske) (both northeast of Borova).[55]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 24 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna, Novomykhailivka, Nove, and Zarichne and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on March 23 and 24.[56]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 24 that Russian forces maintain a 10-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces in parts of this direction and that Russian forces in the area are mostly well-trained soldiers who have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[57] The brigade stated that Russian forces are mostly attacking in infantry groups.Order of Battle: Mashovets stated on March 24 that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are attacking near Makiivka (northeast of Lyman) and that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are attacking near Ivanivka and Kolodyazi (both northeast of Lyman).[58]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on March 22 and geolocated on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the fields south of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[59]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 23 and 24.[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 24 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on March 23 and 24.[61]A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Russian forces are attacking in Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar with armored vehicle support.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and 331st VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[63]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street in central Toretsk and in northern Nelipivka (south of Toretsk).[64]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Darhomyzhskoho and Donetska streets in northern Toretsk, along Budivelnykiv Street in southwestern Toretsk, and along Radianska Street in northern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[65]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that Russian forces regained lost positions near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk and advanced into Krymske (north of Toretsk).[66] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northwestern Zabalka Microraion in southern Toretsk.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 24 that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced into southern Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk) and Oleksandropil.[68]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Krymske, Dachne and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 23 and 24.[69]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 24 that Russian forces are increasingly deploying fiber-optic capable drones in the Toretsk direction.[70] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces are using drones to drop explosives and incendiary devices onto Ukrainian positions in residential buildings and that Russian forces are relying increasingly on drones, particularly fiber-optic capable drones.[71] The deputy commander stated that Russian authorities dismissed the Russian commander of an unspecified division operating in the Toretsk direction as Russian forces have been unable to advance in the area and that Russian higher command is now controlling the force grouping in the area. Elements of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[72]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kleban Byk (northwest of Toretsk).[73] ISW has not previously observed elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Toretsk direction, as the brigade has been recently operating in the Kurakhove direction.[74] Elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating south of Toretsk.[75]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northeastern Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk) and southwest of Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[76]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[77]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[78] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the western outskirts of Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka and Vodyane Druhe; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud) and Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Uspenivka, Novoandriivka, Kotlyarivka, Bohdanivka, and Novoserhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on March 23 and 24.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Shevchenko, Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Solone.[81]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are assembling in several settlements and are increasing their numbers of command staff, equipment, and infantry.[82] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attacking in small assault groups and are using motorcycles to approach frontline areas.[83]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reactivated in the Novopavlivka direction and are attacking in the Nadivka-Kotlyarivka direction and the Sribne-Troitske direction (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[84] Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[85] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 24 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Andriivka, and Ulakly and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 23 and 24.[87]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil.[88]Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Vilne Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[89]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne and Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 23 and 24.[90] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have not seized Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) or Pryvilne (southwest of Burlatkse).[91]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are attacking near Burlatske, Dniproenerihya (north of Velyka Novosilka), Skudne, and Vesele.[92] Mashovets stated that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD), and 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Velyka Novosilka. Elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[93] Drone operators of 77th Reconnaissance Battalion (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) and artillery of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Burlatske.[94]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 23. Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD] or possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Polohy direction.[95]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia direction on March 24 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, and Stepove on March 24.[96]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 24 that elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are operating in the Pyatykhatky-Stepove area (northwest of Robotyne).[97]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 24. Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 23 and 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Kari.[98] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 57 drones and that 36 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, and Zaporizhia oblasts and conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure in Sumy City.[99]Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian strike campaigns are designed to destroy infrastructure, strike military targets, and terrorize the local Ukrainian population.[100] Ihnat noted that Russian forces intentionally launch a large number of drones targeting densely populated cities knowing that drone debris will damage the cities regardless of how successful Ukrainian air defense is. Ihnat stated that Russian forces are regularly modifying Shahed drones with different explosives and guidance systems.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian forces are reportedly failing to adequately provision first person view (FPV) drone units amid ongoing efforts to centralize Russian drone operations under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). A Russian milblogger claimed on March 23 that Russian FPV drone crews only receive an allotted 5-6 FPV drones per day from the Russian MoD and that these drones are often poor quality, leaving the crews with 2-3 usable drones.[101] The milblogger, who reportedly provides assistance to frontline Russian forces, claimed that drone crews ask for additional assistance and to exchange poor-quality drones with functional drones as well as parts to repair other drones. The milblogger complained that Russia is wasting federal funds on low-quality drones instead of producing high-quality drones. The milblogger suggested that the MoD could provide drone crews with 20-30 low quality drones so that drone crews can use their components to assemble roughly 10 functional drones. The milblogger also complained that the MoD sends soldiers to hidden FPV drone crew positions with new drones daily, which reveals their positions to Ukrainian forces.[102] The Russian MoD began efforts in August 2024 to centralize ad-hoc Russian drone units, and ISW previously assessed that these formalization efforts would likely degrade Russian drone effectiveness.[103]Russia continues efforts to invest in long-term drone production and innovation. The Russian Government ordered on March 20 to allocate a grant of 1.28 billion rubles (about $15.2 million) to build a research and production center for civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 2026, and will allocate a total of 21 billion rubles (about $250 million) to create a network of 16 drone research and production centers through 2028.[104]Russia continues to establish regional veterans' programs as part of long-term efforts to militarize the Russian government and establish promotion pipelines to reward veterans for their continued loyalty to the Kremlin. Omsk Oblast Governor Vitaly Khotsenko announced on March 19 the creation of the regional "Time of Heroes" program, which provides job training for Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine, called the "Movement of Heroes."[105] Khotsenko stated that the "Movement of Heroes" program's first class will accept applications until April 7 and announce participants in July 2025. The Kremlin has appointed graduates of the federal "Time of Heroes" programs to high level positions in the Russian federal, regional, and local governments -- likely to militarize Russian society and prevent veterans from becoming a disenfranchised political cleavage that could pose a risk to the Kremlin’s regime security.[106]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Russia continues efforts to increase control over Belarus through Union State integration efforts. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich stated on March 23 that the Belarusian and Russian ministries of foreign affairs (MFAs) will create an institution of special representatives to monitor the implementation of the Union State security guarantees.[107]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/977673-rozmova-dostatno-korisna-zelenskij-pro-peregovori-zi-ssa-u-saudivskij-aravii/[2] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02eSGnryVWNUGC2WyHbjRYzktowBJsynVeXX3AfxyXVZEBWjNTQtoMa1c9HZKugxTl; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1903908261016870980[3] https://suspilne dot media/978013-ssa-ta-ukraina-provedut-se-odni-peregovori-pisla-zustrici-ssa-ta-rf/[4] https://kyivindependent dot com/us-ukraine-talks-in-riyadh-concerned-ceasefire-on-strikes-against-port-infrastructure-official-says/[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/europe/russia-ukraine-truce-talks.html[6] https://suspilne dot media/977823-u-saudivskij-aravii-rozpocalis-peregovori-ssa-ta-rosii/[7] https://english dot alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2025/03/24/russia-us-talks-in-saudi-arabia-to-start-at-0700-gmt-tass-reports[8] https://t.me/tass_agency/307388[9] https://t.me/romanov_92/46426; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1904137857612063218; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8720 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46424 https://x.com/moklasen/status/1904114252308263349; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8720[10] https://t.me/rusich_army/21993 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19246 ; https://t.me/rybar/69087; https://t.me/brussinf/9232 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144734 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22001 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88635 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67489; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21993; https://t.me/dva_majors/67500 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63049 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22620 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63053 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22624; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22625 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63055 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46421; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1903879807072346498 ; https://t.me/Voenkor_PB/38888; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25861 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88620[12] https://t.me/rusich_army/22013 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63066 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22031 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10761; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10765 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46428 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67540; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10765 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67549 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33781 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67550[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/21993 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22907 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63066 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[14] https://t.me/dva_majors/67550 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50513 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22907 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67551[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025[16] https://t.me/ukr_sof/1518 ; https://suspilne dot media/977731-sili-oboroni-znisili-4-gelikopteri-armii-rf-u-belgorodskij-oblasti/[17] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25829 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33752 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52682 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1903905926916305382 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1904041960530137408 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144768[18] https://t.me/rybar/69087; https://t.me/brussinf/9232 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22013 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88635 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67489; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758 ; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10758; https://t.me/starshii_pogrannaryada/10759[19] https://t.me/tass_agency/307306; https://tass dot ru/politika/23483163[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/307304[21] https://t.me/tass_agency/307331; https://t.me/tass_agency/307301; https://t.me/tass_agency/307302; https://t.me/tass_agency/307303[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/trump-russia-putin-ukraine.html[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/trump-russia-putin-ukraine.html[25] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6516[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023 ;[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2023[28] https://t.me/yurasumy/22019 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159021 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758[29] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67524; https://t.me/control_sigma/40196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25840; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159021 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52684[30] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67524; https://t.me/control_sigma/40196 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758[31] https://t.me/dva_majors/67478; https://t.me/gefestwar/4651[32] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/977995-rosijska-armia-prodovzue-sturmuvati-prikordonna-sumsini-dpsu/[33] https://t.me/tass_agency/307270 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50495; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88681[34] https://t.me/sashakots/52679[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25842[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33758 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33765 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25829 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25832 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63062 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159016 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52684; https://t.me/smotri_z/41500 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[37] https://t.me/yurasumy/22019[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/dyversanty-rozpovzayutsya-po-kordonu-grupy-fiksuyut-na-pivnochi-pivdni-ta-pivdennomu-shodi-sumshhyny/ ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/977995-rosijska-armia-prodovzue-sturmuvati-prikordonna-sumsini-dpsu/[39] https://t.me/rybar/69113 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63062[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88637 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33725 ;[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/rusich_army/22006[42] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5589[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33749 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33748 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770[44] https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33748; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770;[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-menshe-atakuyut-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku/[47] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/977923-vazlivi-ale-neveliki-operacii-bila-dvoricnoi-na-harkivsini-u-berezni-zvilnili-castinu-teritorii/[48] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33750; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33770[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766[52] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2025/03/23/7504151[53] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/978175-zvilnenna-nadii-v-tretij-sturmovij-rozpovili-pro-uspisnu-operaciu-na-lugansini/[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158956[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766[57] https://t.me/ombr66/1621[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2642[59] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1904200548976337263; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1904186660654358870 ; https://t.me/ombr_155/158[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25822[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25827[64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903870445557788721; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587639972548097514/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903885134249460089; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190539093704928; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190787450974334; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904190940895461508; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKsDO53G_Ek https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903886059974328363; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587642048401547725/[65] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903868902976663976 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903842881380487496; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587639972548097514/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903928292148727941; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8722 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6778 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903843165162914025; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587649004453022251/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903948510296146263; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587650955978949163/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZD4mqViE74; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903773596138209335; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158962[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25839 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159006[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158962[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33775 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63063[69] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33780 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22032[70] https://suspilne dot media/977167-delegacii-ukraini-ta-ssa-zustrinutsa-v-saudivskij-aravii-udar-zsu-po-zastavi-v-rf-1124-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1742746244&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/komandyra-dyviziyi-vidstoronyly-vid-posady-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-zhorstki-boyi-v-urbanizovanyj-misczevosti/[72] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/14051 ; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/20956[74] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/67508[76] https:// t.me/gimbatov34/4349; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1903882369393979819[77] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8717; https://t.me/kvbarmy/391[78] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33742[79] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33742[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[82] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/977819-ce-dovoli-serjozno-vijska-rf-skupcuutsa-na-kilkoh-dilankah-bila-pokrovska/[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/24/dvijka-mala-uspih-zapuskajte-shhe-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosijski-komandyry-duryat-svoyih-shturmovykiv/[84] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/67522[86] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159028[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6766[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643[89] https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8724 ; https:// t.me/ombr_31/371[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22286 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22282;[91] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643[92] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2643[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/14054[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/14056[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/14047[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22316 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/307249 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25481 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67509[97] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2644[98] https://t.me/kpszsu/31346[99] https://t.me/kpszsu/31346; https://t.me/synegubov/13527; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/978245-vibuh-u-sumah-vden-24-berezna-so-vidomo/; https://t.me/kobzarartemsn/4448; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/34525; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/24/rossiyskie-voennye-nanesli-udar-po-tsentru-sum-bolee-20-chelovek-raneny; https://suspilne dot media/977689-pidsumki-zustrici-delegacij-ukraini-ta-ssa-u-trampa-prositimut-rf-povernuti-vikradenih-ditej-1125-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1742820930&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17593 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17587 ; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/977705-armia-rf-vcergove-atakuvala-zaporizza-vinikla-pozeza/[100] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/24/zlyva-z-vorozhyh-droniv-u-povitryanyh-sylah-poyasnyly-pryhovanu-metu-nalotiv-shahediv/[101] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22621 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22622; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22623[102] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22623[103] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations[104] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7602556; https://www.idelreal dot org/a/udmurtiya-poluchit-1-3-mlrd-rubley-na-razvitie-tsentra-bpla-v-2026-godu-/33357309.html[105] https://rg dot ru/2025/03/19/reg-sibfo/vremia-novyh-vozmozhnostej.html[106] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025[107] https://belta dot by/society/view/institut-spetspredstavitelej-kto-budet-kontrolirovat-dogovor-o-garantijah-bezopasnosti-v-sg-704421-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/301560
- — Iran Update March 24, 2025
- at 4/2/25 8:30pmKatherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore,Andie Parry, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. [1] Top Trump Administration Envoy Steve Witkoff said that the proposal sought to put in place verification mechanisms and prevent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear material.[2] Witkoff added that Iran did express interest in the proposal by reaching back out via multiple intermediaries, and Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said on March 24 that Iran is open to indirect talks ”through various channels,” though it rejects direct negotiations.[3]Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic.[4] An Iranian expert close to the regime and an Iranian media outlet close to a former Iranian Supreme National Security Council secretary both said that Iran would not negotiate over its missile program.[5] The Iranian expert also added that Iranian officials could not negotiate over its role in the Axis of Resistance because its proxy and partner militias “are not proxies.”[6] This is a continuation of a long-running Iranian information operation that seeks to obfuscate Tehran’s role as the leader of the Axis of Resistance. These positions echo previous statements from senior Iranian leaders including Khamenei rejecting any measures to "set new expectations" for Iran's missile range.[7]Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives. Iran seeks to expel the United States from the region to exert itself as the regional hegemon and shape the region in its image. Its missile program forms one part of this effort. Iran uses its ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones to coerce its adversaries and provide new capabilities to its allies. Expelling the United States and emerging as a regional hegemon also requires like-minded partners and proxies that can actualize Iran’s vision in regional countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. An Iranian decision to curtail its proxy and partner network would be akin to an Iranian surrender and would require top Iranian leaders to give up on key ideological positions they have held for their entire adult lives.The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.[8] CENTCOM reportedly targeted a Houthi military base and ammunition depots in al Jawf Governorate in northern Yemen on March 22 and a Houthi storage facility in western Sanaa suburbs on March 23.[9] CENTCOM also struck Houthi ports and an airport in Hudaydah on March 22, reportedly injuring Houthi naval operations chief Mansour al Saadi, also known as Abu Sajjad.[10] US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz told CBS on March 23 that CENTCOM eliminated the Houthis’ missile unit chief.[11] Local media also reported that US airstrikes killed three Houthi commanders in Majzar, Maarib Governorate, on March 22.[12] The Houthis launched a retaliatory drone attack and a separate combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier on March 21 and 23, respectively.[13]The Houthis modified their military communication encryption codes and enhanced personal security measures for Houthi leadership in response to CENTCOM airstrikes targeting Houthi officials, according to a March 22 report in Yemeni media.[14] The Houthis have also reportedly increased security around military sites and imposed further censorship restrictions on the Yemeni population in Houthi-controlled territory, to prevent leaks showing Houthi military activities, sites, and leaders. Waltz also confirmed that CENTCOM will continue to target Houthi military infrastructure, weapons production sites, and communication lines, alongside Houthi leadership, to deter and weaken the Houthis’ capabilities to conduct attacks on Israel and international shipping.[15] Regional sources reported that CENTCOM struck the Houthis’ Communications Ministry and Postal Authority in the capital city Sanaa on March 19.[16]Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi falsely claimed on March 22 that the United States ordered the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to sail to the Red Sea because the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group failed to confront the Houthis.[17] US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered the Vinson to deploy to the Red Sea and extended Truman’s deployment by one month to maintain a continuous carrier presence in the region.[18]The Houthis separately launched two ballistic missiles targeting Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 21 and 23, respectively.[19] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both Houthi missiles before they entered Israeli airspace.[20] An Israeli war correspondent, citing an anonymous defense source, reported that the Houthis also launched a missile on March 22. The March 22 missile fell short of Israel and landed in an unidentified location in Saudi Arabia.[21]The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.[22] The Central Bank added that this move will impact the Houthis’ economy. The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the Yemeni government attempted to remove the Houthi-controlled wing of the Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa from the SWIFT system in July 2024.[23] The Saudis and Emiratis promptly and successfully pressured the Yemeni government to cease its plan to remove the Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank from SWIFT.The Houthis evacuated their headquarters in Baghdad and are considering closing their other two offices in Iraq after Iran warned the United States may strike Houthi targets, according to a Saudi news report on March 22.[24] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani reportedly warned Iraqi militia leaders that US airstrikes against Houthi facilities could ”quickly backfire on Baghdad.” Ghaani called for ”avoiding any military activity during this sensitive period.”Iran and the Iraqi federal government continue to pressure Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to “avoid all provocations” with Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria in response to US airstrikes targeting the Houthis and Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip.[25] An unspecified source told Saudi media on March 21 that Ghaani, during his visit to Baghdad on March 19, told Iranian-backed militia and Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leaders to avoid provoking the United States or Israel.[26] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein separately acknowledged in a recent interview that the federal government’s failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli attacks in Iraq.[27] A Shia Coordination Framework-affiliated politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[28] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, including some parties with Iranian-backed armed wings. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have recently taken precautions to avoid Israeli strikes in Iraq, including via the transfer of weapons and personnel from militia positions to new positions throughout Iraq and at night.[29]The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[30] The Iraqi parliament first read through the draft law, titled the “Popular Mobilization Authority Law,” in a session on March 24 and Parliament will reportedly vote on the law on April 1.[31] Iranian-backed Iraqi parliamentarians have debated the Popular Mobilization Authority Law’s components for weeks.[32] Iraqi media reported on March 12 that the Iraqi federal government sought to replace the PMF Service and Retirement Law, which has been debated in parliament several times in recent months, with a rewritten law--presumably the new Popular Mobilization Authority Law--that would integrate the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces.[33] This effort to restructure the PMF occurred as the United States pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[34]Kurdish media reported on March 24 that the draft Popular Mobilization Authority law will replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law that formalized the PMF as an independent entity reporting directly to the Iraqi prime minister.[35] The current form of the PMF law clarifies the PMF’s structure and administrative functions, including the Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman’s authorities and the number of departments and directorates associated with the PMF.[36] The Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) is formally responsible for ensuring that the militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government.[37] The draft law adds that the PMF will have a military academy like other Iraqi security institutions.[38] The draft law also prohibits PMF members from associating with any political parties, as did the 2016 version.[39]The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties. Most Iraqi political leaders instead control their parties from outside government, unlike in most parliamentary systems. This means that Iranian-backed Iraqi figures like Qais al Khazali or Hadi al Ameri—leaders of Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization respectively—could easily continue to control both their military organizations and their political organizations without technically violating this law. The law also does not make any changes that would impede Iran’s ability to command and control the PMF, which does not listen to its official commander-in-chief, the Iraqi prime minister. Many elements of the PMF instead take their orders from Iran or Iranian-backed commanders.Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam.[40] The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.[41] Some demonstrators chanted slogans such as “Urumiyeh is Turkic and will remain Turkic.”[42] An Iranian professor told Iranian media on March 23 that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to “create divergences between different Iranian groups” and “create chaos” in Iran, likely in response to the recent demonstrations in Urumiyeh.[43] This statement reflects a broader, long-standing belief among Iranian officials that Azerbaijan and Turkey seek to promote Azeri separatism in northwestern Iran.[44] The incident in Urumiyeh comes amid heightened tensions between Iran and Turkey over Turkish support for the fall of the Assad regime and growing Turkish influence in Syria.[45] Iranian police arrested 22 demonstrators in Urumiyeh for “promoting hatred and ethnic sedition.”[46] The Iranian culture and Islamic guidance minister warned on March 23 that “ethnic and religious faults in Iran should not be provoked [because] they can quickly turn into a melting and destructive flame.”[47]The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran presented new evidence on March 14 that demonstrates ongoing and systematic human rights violations by the Iranian regime in response to the protests that sparked in September 2022.[48] The report states that women are increasingly summoned to court for alleged non-compliance with mandatory Hijab laws. Penalties include fines, flogging, and bank account closure and are often based on photos or reports submitted by police or loyalist groups. The report states that Iranian authorities also rely heavily on advanced surveillance tools to monitor hijab violations. These include facial recognition systems, aerial drones, and mobile apps such as Nazer, which allows approved users to report women not wearing the hijab—even in private vehicles or ambulances. These developments reflect the Iranian regime’s broader effort to tighten control over the population by expanding surveillance and leveraging informal enforcement networks.Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions. A large crowd gathered at Iranian poet Ferdowsi’s tomb near Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi on March 20 and chanted anti-regime slogans.[49] The governor of Mashhad confirmed that 15 individuals were arrested for what he described as “subversive slogans,” and stated they would face legal consequences.[50] Citizens in Fars Province gathered at Hafezieh in Shiraz on March 20, where many women appeared without the mandatory hijab, some participants danced in celebration and chanted pro-monarchy slogans.[51] Kurdistan Province Chief Prosecutor separately reported the arrest of seven individuals on March 23, accusing them of organizing anti-state activities under the guise of Nowruz events in the province.[52] The Prosecutor claimed that the suspects had “organizational ties” and aimed to spread propaganda and insult religious sentiments. Independent human rights group Hengaw confirmed three of the arrests but noted the exact charges remain unclear.[53] The arrests during Nowruz celebrations highlight the regime’s deepening fear of public gatherings that could evolve into anti-regime protests.Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21.[54] This marked the first rocket attack from Lebanon into Israel since early December 2024.[55] The IDF intercepted three rockets, and the other three landed in Lebanese territory.[56] The IDF conducted counterbattery fire against the rocket launch site and later conducted two waves of airstrikes targeting Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, fighters, and rocket launchers across Lebanon on March 22 and 23.[57] The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) destroyed three rudimentary rocket launchers that consisted of simple wood and metal launch rails in two towns in Nabatieh District, southern Lebanon, on March 22.[58]Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[59] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now. Hezbollah released a statement on March 18 condemning the renewed Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has not said that it would resume attacks against Israel.[60]The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade.[61] Likely anti-government insurgents killed a Hayat Tahrir al Sham commander and two other pro-government fighters in separate areas of Idlib province on March 22 and March 24 respectively.[62] These attacks come after Coastal Shield Brigade commander Miqdad Fatiha stated on March 12 that the insurgency would begin to target interim government forces with improvised explosive devices and assassinations as part of the insurgency’s second phase.[63] Insurgent leaders can use public statements as a way to signal intent to their followers.[64] These attacks, combined with the discovery of two rudimentary IEDs on the Jableh-Latakia road on March 19 suggest that the insurgency may be adopting new tactics that are consistent with Fatiha’s second phase of operations.[65]Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence. Interim government forces launched a search operation in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Province, on March 23 targeting former regime members who failed to register with the interim government and arrested individuals who refused to disarm.[66] It is unclear if government forces cordoned off the area before conducting its search. Former Assad regime members previously ambushed interim government forces on February 19 along the Maarat al Numan-Khan Sheikhoun road.[67] Government forces also arrested approximately 15 individuals in Jisr al Shughur, Idlib Province, on March 24 charged with collaboration under the former Assad regime.[68] Pro-Assad insurgents killed approximately 25 individuals, primarily interim government forces, in Jisr al Shughur in the coordinated attack in early March.[69]Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state.[70] The “Syrian Equal Citizenship Alliance,” or “Tamasuk,” identified itself as an alliance that transcends ”ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and even political and ideological” affiliations that seek to encourage a "civil, democratic, and pluralistic state” during its first press conference in Damascus on March 22.[71] The Tamasuk alliance comprises at least 34 political and civil groups, including the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and other Kurdish, Christian, and Druze-affiliated groups.[72] The SDC is the SDF’s political wing. A leader from the leftist ”People's Will Party” said that Tamasuk does not see itself as an “opposition” group but a group that is willing to engage ”all forces,” including the Shara government, in dialogue.[73] The alliances’ founding statement confirmed that it seeks to work towards a ”unified Syria” under a single state and single army and called for a “just, democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.”[74] The coalition, while relatively small, is the first organized political alliance in Syria outside of the government itself since the fall of the regime.The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government. Many of these parties and groups have previously criticized the Shara government for its exclusionary organization of the National Dialogue Conference.[75] Many groups, like the SDC, have rejected Shara’s constitution for granting the executive branch “absolute powers.”[76] Tamasuk called for the writing of a new constitution that better defines the dispersion of decentralized powers in order to allow the people to exercise direct authority within their regions while centralizing affairs like foreign affairs, defense, and the economy under the central government.[77] The Shara government has so far ignored local calls from Syria’s various communities demanding decentralized powers.[78]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian officials are open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but reportedly remain unwilling to make any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance. Other Iranian sources added that the Trump letter also included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance, which Iranian sources called “unacceptable” or unrealistic. Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to achieve its strategic objectives.US Air Campaign against the Houthis: The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and leadership in several locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen since March 21.Houthi-Gulf Relations: The Houthis may calculate that they can compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to stop its air campaign by conducting attacks targeting Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa accused Saudi Arabia and the UAE of breaching the Yemeni ceasefire by pressuring Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden, which is outside of Houthi control after the United States designated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January.Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: The draft PMF law currently in discussion in the Iraqi Parliament does not address the threat that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias pose to the United States and its partners in the Middle East. The draft law in its current form will not seriously impede Iran’s efforts to capture the Iraqi security sector because most commanders of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within the PMF do not officially lead individual militia formations in the PMF, nor do they officially hold public office as a member or leader of their political parties.Ethnic Tension in Iran: Tensions between Iranian Kurds and Azeris in northwestern Iran have flared up in recent days. Shia Azeris held a ceremony in Urumiyeh, West Azerbaijan Province, on March 22 to mourn the death of Ali bin Abi Talib, the first Shia Imam. The ceremony devolved into protests against Kurdish residents in Urumiyeh for holding Nowruz celebrations and displaying Kurdish symbols during these celebrations.Iranian Social Control: The Iranian regime has intensified hijab enforcement through mass policing, surveillance technology, and state-backed vigilantism, aiming to control public behavior and suppress dissent. Iran is using mobile applications, drones, and other tactics and technologies as part of this effort.Protests in Iran: Iranian authorities arrested dozens of Iranians across at least three provinces to suppress public gatherings and anti-regime expressions.Lebanon-Israel Ceasefire: Likely Hezbollah fighters launched six rockets at Metula, northern Israel, on March 21. Hezbollah denied ”any connection” to the rocket attack on March 21.[79] Hezbollah previously claimed nearly all of its rocket attacks targeting Israel before the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement. Hezbollah has not claimed attacks in the past that go against its overall objectives, however. This could suggest that Hezbollah either did not conduct the attack or that central leadership did not approve the attack and it feels that the attack is not in Hezbollah’s own interest right now.Alawite Insurgency in Syria: The Alawite insurgency in Syria appears to be adopting new tactics that were originally outlined by the head of the pro-Assad Coastal Shield Brigade. Syrian interim government forces conducted search operations on March 23 and 24 in towns with known insurgent presence.Syrian Politics: Thirty-four diverse Syrian parties and organizations formed an alliance to unify political efforts to demand a new Syrian constitution and promote a decentralized and democratic Syrian state. The formation of the alliance, which brings together diverse groups from various Syrian communities and ideologies, demonstrates the degree to which many in Syria are frustrated with the direction of the Shara government.SyriaThe Suwayda Military Council (SMC) and other unsupported independent military bodies will almost certainly struggle with recruitment and retention. The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[80] Members of the SMC attacked the home of Military Council leader Colonel Tariq al Shoufi in Suwayda Province due to delayed salary payments on March 21.[81] Shoufi claimed that he had not agreed to pay salaries and said that the SMC has not fully formalized into a structure that would require him to compensate its members.[82] This suggests that the SMC has no foreign backers and lacks a revenue stream inside Syria that would enable it to sustain itself. The interim government later began recruiting local Suwaydawi police and security personnel and paid employees four times the standard salary that existed under the Assad regime.[83] The interim government reached an initial agreement on March 6 with prominent Suwayda-based Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, Mudafa al Karama, and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab Gathering to establish locally-led provincial security forces under interim Syrian government control.[84] Unsupported independent militias will similarly struggle with recruitment and retention unless they receive external support or find ways to generate their revenue streams.The Syrian interim government will reportedly establish committees to assume control of the oil fields in SDF-held territories of northeastern Syria.[85] The Syrian interim oil ministry announced on March 23 that these committees will survey the fields and assess their production capacity.[86] The interim government will reportedly allow the SDF to retain one-third of the total oil production.[87] SDF commander Mazloum Abdi agreed in January to transfer the oil resources from SDF-controlled areas to the interim government, provided it allocates the income fairly across Syria.[88] The interim government will also export a portion of the oil to foreign countries to generate income.[89] The interim government-SDF ceasefire agreement stipulates that the SDF must relinquish control of all border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields in its territories.[90]The Syrian Defense Ministry appointed the US-sanctioned commander of the Turkish-backed Hamza Division to lead the new Syrian army’s 76th Division.[91] Saif al Din Boulad, also known as ”Saif Abu Bakr,” commands the Hamza Division, a Turkish-backed faction that operates under the Syrian National Army (SNA). The United States sanctioned Abu Bakr in 2023 for committing serious human rights abuses against Kurds in Afrin, northern Syria.[92] The Hamza Division has been active near Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridgeheads in operations targeting the SDF.[93] The Defense Ministry has not acknowledged Abu Bakr’s appointment, but Suleiman Shah Brigades commander Abu Amsha congratulated Abu Bakr on his appointment on social media on March 23.[94] The Syrian Defense Ministry has not acknowledged any prior division-level appointments. The Defense Ministry also promoted Abu Bakr to the rank of brigadier general.[95] The 76th Division will reportedly operate in Aleppo Province, according to Syrian media.[96]The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Turkey resumed attacks on US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) positions in northeastern Syria after a four-day pause on March 22.[97] SNA forces clashed with SDF fighters along the Tishreen Dam frontlines in Aleppo Province, resulting in the deaths of six SNA fighters on March 22.[98] The SNA also launched mortar and artillery strikes on SDF positions near the dam.[99] The SDF repelled an SNA attack on March 23 along the Tishreen Dam frontlines and killed three SNA fighters.[100] A Turkish drone strike killed one SDF fighter near the dam on March 22.[101] SNA and Turkey also shelled two villages near Qara Qozak Bridge with mortar and artillery fire on March 23 and 24 that damaged civilian infrastructure.[102]An SDF first-person view (FPV) drone struck an SNA vehicle in an unspecified location in SNA-held territory of northeastern Syria on March 22.[103] SDF claimed that the drone strike was in response to a Turkish drone strike that killed an SDF fighter near Tishreen Dam on March 22.The SDF reported on March 24 that its Martyr Haroun drone units intercepted six Turkish and SNA drones that attempted to attack SDF positions in an unspecified location.[104]Israeli airstrikes struck approximately 20 aircraft hangars at Palmyra and Tiyas air bases, eastern Homs Province, on March 21. The IDF stated that it struck “strategic military capabilities” in the bases.[105] Satellite imagery from the aftermath of the strike indicates that the strikes hit approximately 20 aircraft hangars at both bases.[106] The strike destroyed at least one Russian-built Syrian Su-24 fighter jet at Tiyas airbase.[107] The airstrikes also hit an ammunition warehouse near Palmyra airbase and reportedly injured four Syrian army soldiers.[108] The IDF previously struck Syrian military positions in Homs Province on March 18.[109] Homs Province is outside the IDF-declared “demilitarized” zone in southern Syria.[110]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentSee topline section. Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripSee topline section.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelNewly appointed Lebanese Finance Minister Yassine Jaber told the New York Times on March 24 that Hezbollah “cannot” finance reconstruction efforts in southern Lebanon, likely because Hezbollah is prioritizing rebuilding its military forces over reconstruction efforts after the October 7 war.[111] The New York Times noted that Hezbollah has not yet fulfilled all its financial assistance promises to families in southern Lebanon as promised by Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem. Economic problems in Iran and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria have almost certainly disrupted Iranian financial and materiel support to Hezbollah.CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicySee topline section. The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/07/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-letter[2] https://x.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1903207340696014945?t=5179[3] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/04/3280493/[4] https://t dot co/m8UiJkokUW ; https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House's-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit ; https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-17-2025#_edn129f2f44aa71bd2039dc27abf151f11317[5] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/217575/Decoding-the-White-House's-Message-to-Iran-A-Real-Change-or-Diplomatic-Deceit[6] https://x.com/Mostafa_Najafii/status/1903173404624367902[7] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28066[8] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1903847270207893757; 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https://isw.pub/IranUpdate021925[33] https://almadapaper dot net/398498/[34] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[35] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[36] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[38] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252[39] et/arabic/middleeast/iraq/240320252 ; https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2016/11/27/%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A [40] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/deep-dive-tension-between-azeris-kurds-escalates-in-northwestern-iran[41] https://farsi.alarabiya dot net/iran/2025/03/24/%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87 ;https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iran/230320251[42] https://www.aa dot com.tr/fa/%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86/%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%88-%D8%AA%D9%8F%D8%B1%DA%A9-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF/3517205[43] https://x.com/Entekhab_News/status/1903807786384834946[44] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1008311 ;http://irdiplomacy dot ir/fa/news/2031839 ;https://basirat dot ir/fa/news/370553[45] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-11-2025[46] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4484099[47] https://x.com/S_A_Salehi/status/1903877648146747511 [48] https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index ;https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session58/advance-version/a-hrc-58-63-AV.pdf[49] https://iranwire.com/fa/news-1/139916[50] https://www.sharghdaily dot com/بخش-جامعه-220/986928-نفر-از-شعاردهندگان-به-مراکز-قضایی-معرفی-شدند[51] https://x.com/IsraelPersian/status/1770342229770444998 ;https://x.com/ManotoNews/status/1902752973358338411 ;https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1771768062032724126[52] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2041124[53] https://hengaw.net/en/news/2025/03/article-97[54] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/at-least-5-rockets-fired-from-lebanon-at-metula-idf-responds-with-artillery-fire/[55] https://t.me/mmirleb/9639[56] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1903422352227983461[57] https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1903422352227983461 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903408723042677240 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1903515870665544178[58] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1903387510874542401[59] https://t.me/mmirleb/9713[60] https://t.me/mmirleb/9708 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904218617224306821 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904233792044437771[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903463180153569595 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904212908004844020 ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1323265752211807[62] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904212908004844020 ; https://t.me/mzmgr_syria/26965 ; tps://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903463180153569595 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45958 ;[63] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1323265752211807[64] https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3058&context=parameters#:~:text=In%20the%20broadest%20sense%2C%20the%20extensive%20use%20of%20or%20reliance,on%20swarming%20tactics%20and%20operations. ; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3828857.[65] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1902308461292958156[66] https://t.me/Idlib_Gov/16451 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903892533228244994[67] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1892148685187829774[68] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53561 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1904118391192891576 ; https://t.me/Idlib_Gov/16472[69] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1898107147709284754[70] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61574403485441[71] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441[72] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441[73] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/تماسك-تحالف-سياسي-سوري-يضم-تيارات-من-مشارب-مختلفة?ocid=Nabd_App [74] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441[75] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/syria/250220253 [76] https://x.com/SDCPressT/status/1900460888781439061[77] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122101695542813449&id=61574403485441[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025[79] https://t.me/mmirleb/9713[80] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1893704565544903043 ; https://t.me/nahermedia/45125[81] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139119[82] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903560523397947556[83] https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1903431827584336288 ; https://www.facebook.com/SweidaGov1/posts/pfbid0TtqQFfrZrXJ6yHMUT8RdW6ReNVrsvNM5SSUoTv1Cwyc7vc7tSKatUjvL25v7p6Hfl[84] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1181914033301593&id=100044490217016 [85] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903778136724050015[86] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1903778136724050015[87] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139170[88] https://asharq dot com/politics/113001/%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7/[89] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139170[90] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593[91] https://x.com/abo33amsha/status/1903816904478798108; 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https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903874430952190008[107] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903535555419210126[108] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53437 ; https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1903190915113426964 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903197948629881242[109] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-19-2025[110] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-24-2025[111] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/24/world/europe/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-government-economy.html
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 29, 2025
- at 4/2/25 7:52pmAngelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelMarch 29, 2025, 6:00 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on March 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified. Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy reported on March 26 that Ukraine and the United States agreed on a list of energy facilities that Russia must stop striking during an energy infrastructure ceasefire but that the US-Ukraine list is at odds with Russia's demands.[1] The Ministry stated that Russia’s list does not prohibit strikes on Ukrainian oil and gas facilities — although the Kremlin reported that the ceasefire protects Russian oil and gas facilities from strikes. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on March 28 that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov will present US officials with evidence of Russian ceasefire violations during Umerov's upcoming trip to the United States.[2] The exact terms of the energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, as an official trilateral statement or agreement has not been released.Zelensky stated that Turkey, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States, France, Romania, and Bulgaria could act as potential ceasefire monitors, including a Black Sea moratorium, but stated that all sides “will” hold internal and international consultations regarding “readiness” to conduct monitoring.[3] US Vice President JD Vance stated on March 28 that the United States and Ukraine have “obviously” achieved an energy infrastructure ceasefire and were “almost done” negotiating a maritime ceasefire.[4] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials all appear to be under the impression that an energy infrastructure ceasefire is currently active despite the lack of a formal trilateral agreement or any apparent agreement on the exact terms of the ceasefire.[5]The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief. Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding the European Union (EU) reconnect the Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank), one of Russia's largest banks, to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to implementing a Black Sea truce with Ukraine and as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief.[6] Unspecified sources close to the Kremlin said Russia is gauging what it can secure from the Trump Administration regarding sanctions in the negotiation processes and is viewing initial success on a Russian reconnection to SWIFT as a precursor to achieving broader sanctions relief in the future. Russia appears to be exploiting the ceasefire negotiations process in an effort to extract concessions from the West, possibly as a tactic to gain leverage for future negotiations and improve its economic situation after three years of diplomatic and economic isolation from the West. Russia, the United States, and Ukraine could implement a Black Sea truce without sanctions relief — as Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey did during the Black Sea Grain Initiative in 2022 and 2023.[7] European leaders advised European countries on March 27 to refrain from lifting any sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[8]European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on March 28 that European countries agreed at the "Coalition of the Willing" summit in Paris on March 27 to expand Ukraine's access to European intelligence, relevant technologies, and satellites and that several unspecified European countries agreed to grant Ukraine an unspecified degree of access to their ammunition stockpiles.[9] Zelensky noted that Ukraine also agreed with unspecified partners on air defense production licenses, investments in Ukraine's production of drones and missiles, and to continue to work toward artillery licensing. It remains unclear whether the agreed upon licenses stipulate domestic production in Ukraine or foreign production elsewhere in Europe. Zelensky stated that the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany will organize a Ramstein meeting in April 2025. French President Emmanuel Macron pledged on March 26 to provide Ukraine with an additional military aid package valued at 2 billion euros (roughly $2.1 billion) that will include anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, air defense missiles, armored vehicles, drones, and additional Mirage fighter jets.[10] Sweden instructed its armed forces on March 28 to allocate a total of 80 million Swedish Kronor (roughly $7.5 million) to Ukraine's Demining and Drone coalitions.[11] The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 27 that Denmark pledged an additional 300 million Danish Kroner (roughly $43.5 million) to a Ukrainian innovation fund that will focus on, among other things, further developing electronic warfare (EW) and drone capabilities.[12]Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations. The Associated Press (AP), citing Ukrainian officials, reported on March 29 that Russian forces are preparing to launch a new offensive operation in an unspecified sector of the frontline in the coming weeks in order to maximize pressure on Ukraine and increase Russia's leverage in ongoing ceasefire negotiations.[13] Two diplomats from the Group of Seven (G7) countries told AP that they agree with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's recent warnings that Russia is preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[14] Two Ukrainian commanders stated that Russian forces have recently intensified reconnaissance missions along the frontline and offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov told AP that Russian forces have "recovered" after conducting a temporary operational pause in the Pokrovsk direction in early March 2025. A Ukrainian servicemember stated that Ukrainian intelligence has observed indicators of a significant Russian force grouping near Selydove (south of Pokrovsk). A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Donetsk Oblast told AP that there are concerns that Russia may redeploy forces from the Kursk Oblast to other areas of the frontline, such as the Pokrovsk direction.ISW has recently observed intensifications in Russian offensive operations in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Orikhiv directions and ongoing Russian offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast aimed at pushing Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[15] Russian forces have yet to make tactically significant advances in these directions as a result of the intensified activity, and ISW continues to observe localized Ukrainian counterattacks in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions. Russian forces have at minimum advanced within three kilometers of the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative boundary in two areas of the Pokrovsk direction, and the Kremlin will likely leverage future Russian advances into southeasternmost Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to sow chaos and fear within the information space.[16] The Russian military command is unlikely to redeploy forces from Kursk Oblast if Russia intends to conduct a concerted offensive operation to seize or advance closer to Sumy City, and Russia likely does not have enough readily deployable operational-level reserves to conduct significant offensive operations against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia cities without redeploying forces already committed to other areas of the frontline.It is unlikely that the Russian military is capable of conducting three significant offensive efforts against major Ukrainian cities even after conducting such redeployments, as Russia has suffered significant armored vehicle and personnel losses over the last three years of fighting and has not demonstrated the ability to conduct complex operations involving multiple simultaneous axes of advance since Winter 2022. The Kremlin has thus far appeared unable to generate enough new recruits via ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts to significantly increase the Russian force grouping in Ukraine or Russia's strategic- and operational-level reserves available to enter combat in Ukraine — unless Russian President Vladimir Putin chooses to conduct a deeply unpopular partial reserve call up in the near future, which currently appears unlikely.[17] ISW has not observed open-source reports of significant Russian redeployments to the Sumy, Kharkiv, or Zaporizhia directions — which would indicate preparation for a renewed offensive effort in these areas — as of this report and will continue to report on any notable Russian redeployments, though Russian forces may have conducted rotations not observed in open-source reporting. Russian forces may be attempting to advance within artillery range of these cities, however, ahead of a possible ground ceasefire in order to make civilian life in these settlements untenable or prepare for ground operations until a ceasefire is established. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin would likely use any gains into oblasts that Russian forces do not current occupy to gain leverage in future peace negotiations and justify future Russian demands for Ukraine to cede additional territory to Russia, including territory that the Kremlin currently does not demand beyond Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk oblasts.[18]Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on March 29 that Russian forces launched 172 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight on March 28 to 29.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones and that 69 decoy drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported on March 29 that Russian forces also launched ballistic missile strikes against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[20] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged a hotel-restaurant complex, houses, and buildings in Dnipro City, killing and injuring civilians.[21] ISW continues to assess that Russia is targeting Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, contradicting US President Donald Trump's stated objective of using the temporary ceasefire to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.[22]Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella. German outlet BILD reported on March 28 that Russia has intensified and adjusted its use of long-range strike drones, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainian forces to intercept them.[23] BILD noted that more Russian drones have recently been successfully breaching the Ukrainian air defense umbrella and that Russian forces have altered their tactics and are now having drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones. Ukrainian officials have yet to comment on any changes in Russian strike tactics.[24]Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced on March 28 that Ukraine's MoD and General Staff initiated a large-scale reform of aviation management and established a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff with the aim of optimizing the development of Ukraine's air capabilities.[25] Zelensky appointed Oleksandr Kozenko as Deputy Defense Minister for Aviation tasked with heading the new effort.[26] Zelensky noted that Kozenko has been involved in integrating the F-16 and Mirage aircraft into the Ukrainian Air Force. Zelensky also appointed Major General Oleksiy Marchenko as Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Aviation, Brigadier General Serhiy Holubtsov as Deputy Commander of the Air Force, and Colonel Oleksandr Dyakiv as Commander of Aviation and Deputy Commander of the Air Force. Ukrainian officials have not elaborated on the structure of the new chain of command or how it may impact interaction between Ukrainian air and ground forces in joint operations.Key Takeaways:Ukrainian and US officials continue to negotiate the terms of temporary ceasefires on Black Sea operations and energy infrastructure strikes, indicating the ceasefires are not yet fully codified.The Kremlin appears to be using the Black Sea ceasefire negotiations with the United States to test the extent to which Russia can extract concessions from the West, as the implementation of a maritime truce would not require any sanctions relief.European allies continue to provide financial and materiel support to Ukraine and agreed to expand intelligence sharing with Ukraine.Russian forces are reportedly poised to intensify offensive operations in several areas of the frontline in Spring and Summer 2025 in hopes of influencing ongoing ceasefire and peace negotiations.Russia continues to target civilian infrastructure in Ukraine amid reports of shifting and more deadly Russian strike tactics.Russian forces are reportedly employing more advanced long-range drones, complicating Ukrainian air defense operations and allowing more drones to penetrate Ukraine's air defense umbrella.Zelensky ordered Ukraine's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff to establish a new aviation chain of command within the Ukrainian General Staff and conduct widespread aviation management reform to strengthen Ukraine's air capabilities.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the launch of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.The Russian MoD claimed on March 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy facilities in Belgorod Oblast and the Sudzha gas metering station in Kursk Oblast on March in violation of the energy infrastructure ceasefire.[27] Russian sources claimed that the UK and France participated in the reported Ukrainian strike on the Sudzha gas metering station.[28] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on March 29 that Ukrainian forces shelled solar panels in occupied Kherson Oblast, which he claimed violates the ceasefire against energy infrastructure.[29]See topline text for Ukrainian statements on Russian ceasefire violations.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued assaults in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on March 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and advanced in Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[30] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Veselivka (north of Sumy City) in Sumy Oblast, and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) seized the settlement.[31]Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues near Guyevo in Kursk Oblast and along the Volodymyrivka-Veselivka-Zhuravka-Basivka line (north to northeast of Sumy City) in northern Sumy Oblast.[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, and elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[33]Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.Assessed Ukrainian Advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City along the international border).[34]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks near Popovka and Demidovka (east of Popovka).[35]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[36]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian border checkpoint along the international border near Sluchovsk, Bryansk Oblast, on March 27.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike killed 15 to 40 Russian personnel and destroyed military infrastructure and equipment that Russian forces were using to support drone strikes on civilian objects in Sumy Oblast.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 28 and 29.[38]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion and elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Udy (north of Kharkiv City).[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Stepova Novoselivka (east of Kupyansk).[40]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 28 and 29 that Russian forces seized Krasne Pershe (northwest of Kupyansk).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Russian forces advanced south of Zapadne, entered Mala Shapkivka, seized Kindrashivka, and advanced to Tyshchenkivka (all northeast of Kupyansk).[42]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 28 and 29.[43]A Russian source claimed on March 29 that Russian forces consolidated positions near Topoli (northeast of Kupyansk along the international border).[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; and southwest of Borova near Hrekivka and Novomykhailivka on March 28 and 29.[45]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction published footage on March 28 showing Ukrainian drone operators repelling an at least reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault with 13 pieces of equipment north of Lozova (northeast of Borova) on the morning of March 27.[46] The Ukrainian brigade reported that they destroyed 12 armored vehicles and one tank.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Nove, Katerynivka, and Zelena Dolyna and east of Lyman near Torske on March 28 and 29.[47]The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 29 that Russian forces are accumulating forces in the Lyman direction but have not attacked recently and are conducting costly reconnaissance missions with small groups.[48] The commander noted that Russian forces are suffering from equipment shortages in the Lyman direction.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and south of Siversk near Pereizne on March 28 and 29.[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on March 29 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Maiske; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Pretechyne, Bila Hora, and Oleksandro-Shultyne on March 28 and 29.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar, and drone operators of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Predtechyne.[52] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Shevchenko Microraion.[53]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the western outskirts of Toretsk, west of Toretsk, and north of Druzhba (immediately northeast of Toretsk).[54]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk toward Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil; and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on March 28 and 29.[55]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate) and 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Panteleymonivka and artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Toretsk and Panteleymonivka.[56]Both Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[57]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Kotlyarivka and east of Bohdanivka during an assault with armored vehicle support and seized Preobrazhenka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) participated in the advance near Kotlyarivka.[59] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the Russian assault stated that it destroyed five Russian vehicles.[60]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, Upsenivka, Preobrazhenka, Sribne, Shevchenko, and Troitske on March 28 and 29.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka.[62]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently intensified attacks in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to use first-person view (FPV) drones to isolate the battlefield and complicate Russian logistics in the area.[63] ISW observed a temporary pause in Russian offensive operations and advances in the Pokrovsk direction in late January, February, and early March 2025 as Ukrainian forces intensified counterattacks and drone operations in the area.[64] Russian forces have again intensified attacks in the area over the last three weeks (since early March 2025) and appear to be attempting to advance northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway and southwest of Pokrovsk towards the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk oblast border area. Russian forces do not appear to be focused on attacking immediately around or into Pokrovsk, however, and Ukrainian forces continue to conduct localized counterattacks immediately south of the town.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[65] Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” detachment and drone operators of the “Vizantiya” detachment reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[66]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 29 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 29 that Russian forces advanced near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and at least one milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the settlement but did not seize it.[67]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove toward Rozlyv on March 28 and 29.[68]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Skudne, and Dniproenerhiya; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Novopil on March 28 and 29.[69]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka).[70]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 29.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA), and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[71]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 29 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on March 29 that Russian forces seized Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing northwest of Robotyne toward Shcherbaky and southwest of and within Lobkove.[73]Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 28 and 29.[74] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove and Shcherbaky.[75]Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported on March 29 that Russian forces recently increased their use of armored vehicles in assaults in the "southern direction" — likely in reference to western Zaporizhia Oblast.[76]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Shcherbaky.[77] Elements of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kamyanske direction.[78]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 28 and 29 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the direction of Prydniprovske and Sadove (both east of Kherson City in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast) on March 28 and 29.[79]The "Atesh" Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on March 29 that Russian forces are transferring air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems from occupied Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast to compensate for equipment losses in the area.[80]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.[81]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Russian MoD announced the launch of the "Indra Navy 2025" exercises in Chennai, India.[82] Russian Pacific Fleet Detachment Commander Captain First Rank Alexei Antsiferov stated that the drills will test joint Russian-Indian readiness and problem-solving at sea and will begin on March 31.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian sources claimed on March 29 that Russia's Unmanned Competence Center has designed and fielded at least 30 new hand-launched "Klyuch-Fortuna" fixed-wing strike drones in Ukraine.[83] The drone reportedly costs 100,000 rubles ($1,177) to manufacture, has a range of 50 kilometers, and can carry a payload up to 1.7 kilograms. The Unmanned Competence Center is reportedly working to increase the drone's payload to 3 kilograms.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.eurointegration.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/03/26/7208054/[2] https://suspilne dot media/982071-rustem-umerov-peredast-ssa-vsi-dokazi-sodo-zrivu-pripinenna-vognu-rosieu-zelenskij/[3] https://www.eurointegration.com dot ua/rus/news/2025/03/28/7208282/[4] https://kyivindependent.com/vance-says-energy-ceasefire-in-effect-while-ukraine-accuses-russia-of-violations/; https://newsukraine.rbc dot ua/news/despite-russian-attacks-vance-believes-energy-1743250678.html[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-28/putin-tests-how-far-trump-will-go-against-europe-on-sanctions ; https://archive.ph/at49S[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strike-campaign-against-crimea; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2023[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025[9] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/news/2025/03/28/7505050/[10] https://apnews.com/article/france-uk-ukraine-russia-war-military-11b305c4073f476318ea0c4fd0c01354 ; https://www.euronews dot com/my-europe/2025/03/26/emmanuel-macron-announces-2-billion-in-additional-military-aid-for-ukraine ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-provide-2-bln-euros-extra-military-aid-ukraine-macron-says-2025-03-26/[11] https://www.government dot se/press-releases/2025/03/government-financially-supports-ukraine-in-demining-and-drone-areas/[12] https://www.fmn dot dk/da/nyheder/2025/regeringen-afsatter-300-mio.-kr.-til-innovationspulje/[13] https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-spring-fighting-offensive-ceasefire-talks-49ee814cc4a8416c444ab7deae42488c[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725 ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-spring-fighting-offensive-ceasefire-talks-49ee814cc4a8416c444ab7deae42488c[15] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025[16] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-has-failed-break-ukraine[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/31577[20] https://t.me/vilkul/10094 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/982329-vijska-rf-vdarili-balisticnou-raketou-po-krivomu-rogu-so-vidomo/[21] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20438; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/29/kadry-spravzhnogo-genoczydu-dnipropetrovska-ova-pokazala-naslidky-nichnoyi-ataky-rosiyi/; https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/82986 ; https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/82983 ; https://t.me/hyevuy_dnepr/82979 ; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1905746477311541358 ;https://t.me/andriyshTime/35360 https://t.me/region22ua/42925; https://x.com/MVS_UA/status/1905859114267230259 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/35362https://t.me/andriyshTime/35362[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025[23] https://www.bild dot de/politik/ausland-und-internationales/inferno-in-ukrainischen-staedten-putins-neue-perfide-drohnen-taktik-67e6c109ee15d54841c5bbd5[24] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025[25] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02ipKv814vnkcgd9JGZToeHm3GgGuHEzx8zE2iVYkMeGPqNiJbvT3WNPvF9qft5vtsl[26] https://www.president.gov dot ua/en/news/potriben-tisk-na-rosiyu-shob-diplomatiya-zapracyuvala-zverne-96909[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/50687 [28] https://t.me/rusich_army/22151 ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/03/28/zaharova-nazvala-prichastnye-k-atake-na-stantsiyu-sudzha-strany/[29] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/6535[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/67879 ; https://t.me/rybar/69238 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/40399 ; https://t.me/rybar/69227[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/50681 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50682 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22126 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159576 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89003 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159593[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/25600 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63189 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88955[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26149 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159512[34] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1905980890427384187; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/22704[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88958 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22155 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67879 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20952[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89011[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PQNYJxHna5maLtueYCFMkCV5LYcTezST6VQPeKJx1kBoxaMeWGBcpPQLe8QibgFEl[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl[39] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5601[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8766; https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/videos/1893028884562570[41] https://t.me/rybar/69221 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/40399 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63191[42] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63191[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl[44] https://t.me/tass_agency/308337[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl[46] https://t.me/oaembr77/727 ; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/21557[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26150[48] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/29/90-vmyrayut-po-dorozi-rosiyany-pryvyazuyut-bijcziv-do-tehniky-j-vidpravlyayut-poranenyh-na-shturmy/[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl [50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600 [51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89020[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26149; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89020; https://t.me/sashakots/52786 [53] https://t.me/t3mny/2259[54] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905910721767961086; https://t.me/ombr_28/1970; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906021934875254884; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/813; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905998207273889904; https://t.me/detones_group/30[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl; https://t.me/rybar/69227; https://t.me/wargonzo/25596; https://t.me/dva_majors/67879; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600 [56] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159546; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13609[57] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1905966856302682261; https://t.me/btr80/26332[58] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8759; https://t.me/pidrozdilshadowoficial/673; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1905934344281047252 https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8758; https://t.me/ombr72/10723[59] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89023[60] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7041; https://t.me/ombr72/10723[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63184; https://x.com/UkraineDailyUpd/status/1905815838285775318[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63184[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63184[64] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525[65] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18567; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1905934989662773707[66] https://t.me/dva_majors/67924; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26140; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26162[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63202; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159618[68] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63190[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/14125[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/14124; https://t.me/voin_dv/14135[72] https://t.me/mod_russia/50676 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50678 [73] https://t.me/tass_agency/308350; https://t.me/dva_majors/67900; https://t.me/dva_majors/67879[74] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl; https://t.me/dva_majors/67900; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26161[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/308360; https://t.me/wargonzo/25600[76] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0be8RA6K63eXVvNVFEJ4FVFYWRw8PdqUQHmspg3Hfmhg24xnK9uEMPNypzavAymsFl[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/67879 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50660[78] https://t.me/rian_ru/287443 ; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6917[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02qvGVVhZvSMawozgC62g424dSLFNaaqwpQBzbeAy74gT8RMp3VRbzrssEWxmaArKAl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0McQNSn9EvdGNzBQHauB7nNhUEJzQHGGUjWHg7qtUYfsWohxbMq4hC4XMVfmEuixql; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gxs7UZfks8BVnfEviuVxmajgXCocahJskYeLhfaRP4LTR58uUMzMMKah9UdnokBBl[80] https://t.me/atesh_ua/6622[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/67921[82] https://t.me/mod_russia/50668 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/54593 [83] https://t dot me/tass_agency/308359; https://t.me/lomovkaa/100168 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/17917
- — Iran Update March 28, 2025
- at 4/2/25 6:57pmRia Reddy, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, Siddhant Kishore, Johanna Moore, Ben Rezaei, Parker Hempel, Rose Goldstein, Avery Borens, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[1] Iran signaled openness to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations under the current conditions. Senior Iranian officials expressing support for indirect negotiations likely aim to reassure the Iranian public that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief amid Iran's deteriorating economic situation. Senior Iranian officials have, however, heavily caveated that Iran should remain cautious in negotiations. Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on March 28 that Iran's response to Trump's letter is “restrained” and emphasized Iran's readiness to "confront" threats.[2] Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf similarly criticized US attempts to "impose [its] demands" on Iran.[3] Iranian officials have also explicitly rejected any concessions on Iran’s missile program or its role in leading the Axis of Resistance.[4] These statements likely aim to appease hardline elements within the regime that oppose negotiations with the West.Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reportedly gave Iran a June 2025 deadline to conclude a nuclear deal before the E3 imposes snapback sanctions.[5] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance by Iran of JCPOA commitments."[6] The snapback mechanism expires in October 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi asked the E3 to "reconsider its approach" towards Iran during a phone call with his British counterpart David Lammy on March 28.[7] A Wall Street Journal reporter also reported on March 28 that Iran and the E3 held "technical talks" in Geneva this week.[8] Iranian efforts to signal openness to indirect negotiations and discussions with the E3 likely aim to deter the E3 from triggering the “snapback” mechanism.Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has engaged in a concerted effort since at least January 2025 to shape US-Israeli decision-making and deter a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear program. A senior Iranian military commander warned in February 2024 that Iran could attack facilities and bases that "assist" an Israeli attack on Iran, likely referring to US bases in Iraq and the Gulf countries.[9] Ghalibaf separately stated on March 28 that US allies and bases in the region "will be as vulnerable as a powder keg" if the United States and Israel threaten Iran.[10] Iran has recently unveiled new missile bases and conducted air defense exercises around nuclear sites, likely to highlight its missile capabilities and prepare for a potential conventional conflict with the United States or Israel.[11] Iran may be signaling a willingness to engage in indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States to further shape US-Israeli decision-making and avoid a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. A senior US official stated on March 25 that Trump's letter said, "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[12] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. [13] The government-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Aden announced on March 16 that eight Sanaa-based banks will move to Aden to avoid being subject to sanctions after the United States designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2025.[14] Remaining in Houthi-controlled areas would risk these banks coming under US sanctions.[15] The Houthis have already arrested five employees at checkpoints as of March 27, according to anonymous sources talking to a Saudi news outlet.[16] The relocation of banks will likely further damage the Houthis' already unstable economy, which could lead to unrest and weaken the Houthis’ control over these areas in Yemen.A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[17] The Houthis previously threatened to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE in July 2024 if the two states did not pressure the Yemeni government to stop efforts to remove the Houthi-controlled Central Bank from the SWIFT international banking network.[18] The Houthis' threats worked, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE convinced the Yemeni government to drop their campaign. The Houthis recognize that Saudi Arabia and the UAE fear a resumption of Houthi attacks targeting key Saudi and Emirati commercial centers.US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27.[19] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes on a Houthi military base and Houthi underground facilities and communication infrastructure in the Jabal al Aswad area, Amran Governorate.[20] CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis’ military command headquarters in Sanaa City.[21] Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their capabilities in his Quds Day speech on March 27.[22] A published list of dead Houthi fighters released on March 26 indicated that CENTCOM airstrikes killed at least 41 Houthi fighters.[23] The Houthis are unlikely to report the real number of casualties in the CENTCOM airstrikes among their fighters or release the names of Houthi senior officials killed in action. An anonymous US defense official confirmed that CENTCOM has killed several Houthi leaders since the start of their airstrike campaign, according to the Wall Street Journal.[24] The Wall Street Journal also reported that Abdulmalik has ordered Houthi leadership to not carry cellphones to avoid being tracked.[25]Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes. A senior Houthi political official condemned the UAE for their cooperation with the United States, threatening to attack Abu Dhabi and Dubai in a post on X on March 27.[26]A Houthi delegation met with Egyptian intelligence officials in Cairo on March 26, at the Houthis’ request, to discuss de-escalating regional tensions, according to anonymous sources speaking to a Saudi news outlet.[27] These Egyptian officials reportedly passed on a message from the United States requesting the Houthis not to pursue an offensive campaign targeting international shipping. The source added that it was unclear if the message mentioned anything about the Israel-Hamas ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The Houthis have consistently linked their attacks on international shipping and Israel to their support for the Palestinian people.[28] The Houthis halted their attacks when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire was initially implemented in January 2025.[29]Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025.[30] Sadr called on his followers to completely boycott the elections. Sadr urged Sadrists to update their voter registration on February 19, but had refused to announce whether his movement would participate in the elections.[31] Sadr’s boycott of the elections is noteworthy given that his movement, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Mohammad al Halbousi’s Progress Party previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections to exclude Iranian-backed Shia political parties from government formation.[32] The Sadrist political bloc’s withdrawal from Parliament in 2022 enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in Parliament.[33] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr maintains significant support in the Iraqi Shia community. His return to politics could have threatened the Shia Coordination Framework’s strength in Parliament.Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Multiple parliamentarians, including from the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, the KDP, and a Turkmen bloc, called on Sadr to reverse his decision on March 28.[34] These calls follow other recent calls for Sadr to participate in the elections from senior Iraqi politicians, including Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai.[35] Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[36] Iraqi political leaders across the political spectrum are likely concerned that Sadr could call for protests against governmental corruption if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[37] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[38] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[39]Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Unknown actors in Lebanon launched two rockets at Kiryat Shmona, northern Israel, on March 28, which is the second rocket attack targeting Israel in the past week.[40] The March 28 attack did not strike Kiryat Shmona.[41] Both Hezbollah and the Lebanese president said that Hezbollah was not responsible.[42] Hezbollah’s central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel, which would risk major Israeli reprisals. Hezbollah faces serious threats to its control, including substantial reconstruction costs that it is having trouble meeting. Israeli airstrikes would only further imperil Hezbollah. The IDF conducted an airstrike that destroyed a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut, Lebanon, in response to the rocket attack.[43] The Israeli campaign in Lebanon badly weakened Hezbollah’s military wing in southern Lebanon, destroying approximately 80% of its 40-kilometer range rocket stockpiles and killing many senior commanders.[44]Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there. Hezbollah has historically maintained de facto security control over southern Lebanon and smaller armed factions operating there, and it would be able to prevent these attacks if it were not badly damaged. It has also historically maintained good command and control over its forces, as demonstrated by the carefully calibrated attack campaign into northern Israel between October 2023 and October 2024. That Hezbollah cannot control its fighters or prevent them from conducting these attacks, which risk drawing a devastating Israeli response contrary to Hezbollah’s interests, suggests that Hezbollah lacks strong commanders who can discipline their forces.Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Recent statements from senior Iranian officials about indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States may aim to appeal to several domestic audiences. Senior Iranian officials who have expressed support for indirect nuclear negotiations may be trying to avoid snapback sanctions. Some Iranian officials may also be signaling openness to indirect nuclear negotiations to deter a US-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.Houthi Economy: The Houthis recently imposed a travel restriction on all government and private banking employees to prevent them from leaving Houthi-controlled areas after Sanaa-based banks announced that they would relocate to the Yemeni government-controlled Aden, Yemen. A Houthi-controlled Yemeni Central Bank in Sanaa source claimed on March 21 that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were encouraging Sanaa-based banks to relocate to Aden and that this effort was a violation of the ceasefire, which is an implicit threat to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.US Air Campaign Against the Houthis: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 44 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 27. Some Houthi officials have already begun threatening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, likely as part of an effort to compel Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the United States to halt its airstrikes.Iraqi Politics: Nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement will not participate in the Iraqi parliamentary elections in November 2025. Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.Rocket Attacks in Lebanon: Continued rocket attacks by unknown actors in Lebanon likely reflect Hezbollah’s degradation and its lack of command and control in southern Lebanon. Rogue Hezbollah fighters or smaller armed factions may have conducted the recent attacks. Attacks from either actor would indicate that Hezbollah is badly degraded in southern Lebanon and lacks command and control there.SyriaAlawite social media pages are circulating reports of sectarian killings, which knowingly or unknowingly support insurgent efforts to undermine international confidence in the interim Syrian government. Alawite media reported that interim government forces have conducted multiple attacks on Alawite and Christian civilians in western and southern Syria.[45] Miqdad Fatiha, a key Alawite insurgent leader, said on March 18 that the insurgents sought to conduct sectarian attacks that would trigger reprisals to undermine international confidence in and support for the interim government. It is not immediately clear how many reports about sectarian killings are accurate. Syrian media watchdogs have indicated that some reports are disinformation, while CTP-ISW has verified other sectarian killings.[46]Both the disinformation and the actual killings support insurgent objectives to erode international and domestic trust in the interim Syrian government. The insurgents likely seek to erode international and domestic trust in the interim government as a way to both build local support among Alawites and limit the government’s ability to secure sanctions relief from the West. This would enable the insurgents to replace the government as a legitimate authority, at least in western Syria.[47]The Syrian interim government reportedly appointed Syrian opposition journalist Mohammad Amin as the new Minister of Information on March 27.[48] Amin previously worked for the pro-Assad newspaper al Watan but left Syria in 2011 due to his opposition to the Assad regime and support for the revolution.[49] Amin founded two of his outlets and has contributed to al Araby al Jadeed, a Qatari-funded, London-based news outlet.[50] Amin’s appointment, although not yet confirmed by the interim government, is notable given his non-HTS background. At least 18 of the 22 ministers that Syrian interim president Ahmad al Shara appointed in December 2024 have close ties to HTS or deep experience working with Shara.[51]US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the Trump administration hopes to cooperate with Turkey on Syria.[52] Turkey has recently expanded its support for the interim Syrian defense ministry ahead of a possible defense agreement between the two countries.[53] Turkey reportedly seeks to establish airbases in Syria to assist the Syrian government for training and capacity-building purposes.[54] Turkey has also transported military equipment and building supplies to construct military positions in areas of Syria held by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[55] US support for the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, the bulk of which are People‘s Defense Units (YPG) fighters, has been a serious sticking point in US-Turkey relations in Syria since the mid-2010s. Turkey has launched multiple military operations against the SDF using the SNA supported by Turkish forces.Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed cooperation with Russia to support Syrian stability in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 28.[56] Erdogan and Putin discussed the importance of Turkish-Russian cooperation to ensure Syria’s unity, stability, and territorial integrity. A Turkish state media readout of the meeting reported that Erdogan stressed that Russia and Turkey could work together in order to create “lasting peace” in Syria, including by cooperating to lift sanctions on Syria.[57] Turkey and Russia are currently the two countries publicly maneuvering to maintain an active military presence in Syria. Turkey’s significant influence within the Syrian interim government, and particularly within the growing Syrian army, will likely require Russia to at least coordinate its efforts to secure Syrian basing rights with Erdogan and Turkey.Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA did not engage the SDF on March 28.Syrian media reported that the AANES announced on March 27 that it will open the first reconciliation centers for former Assad regime members in SDF-controlled territory in northern Syria.[58] The AANES circular stated that reconciliation centers in three neighborhoods in Tabqa, Raqqa Province, and one center in Maskana, eastern Aleppo Province, will receive former regime members from April 5 to April 25.[59] The interim government has established a reconciliation program under which former regime elements are granted amnesty in exchange for disarmament and registering with the interim government.[60] These centers have also required former regime members to turn in their weapons. The opening of centers in Tabqa and Maskana in SDF-controlled territory comes as the SDF takes steps to integrate the northeast into the central Syrian state.A team from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) visited Syria between March 12 and 21 to prepare to identify and destroy remnants of Assad’s chemical weapons stockpiles.[61] OPCW stated that Syrian authorities provided all possible support and cooperation at short notice and gave inspectors unrestricted access to previously undisclosed production and storage sites.[62] An unidentified diplomatic source stated that the visit confirmed the Syrian interim government’s commitment to working with the international community to destroy any remains of the Assad regime’s chemical arsenal.[63] This visit comes amid recent reports that the United States asked Syria to destroy remaining chemical weapons stockpiles as a condition for easing US sanctions on Syria.[64]France hosted a presidential summit via Zoom on March 28 that included Syrian President Ahmed al Shara, French President Emmanuel Macron, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis.[65] The summit covered shared security challenges such as Syrian reform efforts, border security, economic sanctions, and Israeli military action.[66] Shara highlighted Syria’s security concerns on its southern border and warned that Israeli presence on Syrian territory poses a ”permanent threat to peace in the region.”[67] Shara also stressed the importance of lifting economic sanctions on Syria.[68] Macron emphasized the need to support Syrian efforts to combat terrorism.[69]Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and French President Emmanuel Macron spoke on the phone with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara during a meeting between Aoun and Macron in Paris to discuss regional developments on March 28.[70] Aoun requested French assistance in developing a plan to facilitate the return of displaced Syrians from Lebanon to Syria.[71]The Syrian and Lebanese Defense Ministers signed an agreement on March 28 to demarcate the Syria-Lebanon border following negotiations in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.[72] Lebanese media reported that the agreement also establishes specialized committees to develop security coordination mechanisms to deconflict between Lebanese and Syrian forces.[73] Syrian forces fought Hezbollah-affiliated smugglers in Hawsh al Sayyid Ali, Homs Province, on the Syria-Lebanon border between March 16 and 18.[74] Syrian forces reportedly conducted clearing operations in border towns and shelled Lebanese villages during the operations along the border.[75] The Lebanese Armed Forces have reportedly closed 17 illegal crossings on the Lebanon-Syria border since March 18.[76]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadiq said in an interview on March 27 that US President Donald Trump’s recent letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei urged Iran to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other Iranian-backed groups in the region.[77] Sadiq added that this request was “unacceptable” to both Iran and Iraq. Sadiq is a former member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force.[78] Khamenei told Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved” during a meeting in Tehran on January 8.[79] Sudani separately denied in an interview on March 27 that the US told the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF.[80] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and has reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[81] Sadiq and Sudani’s interviews come as the Iraqi parliament debates the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which designates the PMF as a ”parallel military force” alongside the Iraqi army and stipulates that senior PMF officials will receive high-level positions in the Iraqi federal government.[82]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripOmani customs detained a Yemeni citizen at Sarfait crossing on the Yemen-Omani border on March 27, attempting to smuggle three drones and drone equipment, possibly for the Houthis.[83] Yemeni media also reported on March 24 that Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis at the Sarfait border crossing with Oman in southeastern Yemen.[84] The Houthis traditionally smuggle these shipments through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and through land borders, particularly from the Omani-Yemeni border via the Yemeni government-controlled Mahra and Hadramawt governorates in eastern Yemen.[85]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelThe US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Lebanon-based individuals and three companies associated with Hezbollah’s “finance team” on March 28.[86] Hezbollah’s finance team manages numerous commercial projects and oil smuggling networks likely “in conjunction” with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force to generate and transfer revenue for Hezbollah, according to the Treasury readout.[87]CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas's military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 1,032,000 rials to one US dollar on March 27 to 1,042,000 rials to one US dollar on March 28.[88]Jaish al Adl fighters killed an Iranian Law Enforcement Command officer during a clash in Iran Shahr, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on March 28.[89] Jaish al Adl is a Salafi-jihadi Balochi armed group in southeastern Iran and Pakistan that has been behind an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.Senior Iranian officials delivered speeches on March 28 for the annual Quds Day rally, repeating anti-Israel rhetoric and framing the event as a show of internal unity and defiance against Israel and the United States.[90] Quds Day is an annual Iranian-established anti-Israel celebration that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[91] Senior officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, attended the rally.[92] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei separately stated that Quds Day shows Iran’s unity and firm support for its objectives, including supporting Palestine.[93] The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85788832[2] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1905563797579845951 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/08/3282417[3] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2042685/[4] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-24-2025-67e1e57f7311a[5] https://jewishinsider dot com/2025/02/uk-ambassador-israel-simon-walters-inss-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions/[6] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf[7] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/229997/Direct-talks-under-pressure-military-threats-meaningless[8] https://x.com/laurnorman/status/1905582286751269204[9] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/12/06/3264097[10] https://farsnews dot ir/Rahgozar_b/1743156850902814441/Iran-Parliament-Speaker%3A-Palestine-Litmus-Test-for-West's-Double-Standards[11] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-26-2025 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-4-2025[12] https://www.c-span.org/program/senate-committee/dni-director-gabbard-fbi-director-patel-and-other-national-security-officials-testfy-on-global-threats/657476[13] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5126339-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1[14] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5126339-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1; https://x.com/cby_hq/status/1901389161720062329[15] https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthis-banks-currency-economy-7ac9bcfc6f883f52573df6147db51b13[16] https://aawsat dot com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5126339-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%88%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%A1[17] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1903174027113533946 ; https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-re-designates-the-houthis-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/[18] https://al-ain dot com/article/withdrawing-swift-yemeni-central-bank-al-houthi; https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60521822; https://www.newarab dot com/news/houthis-threaten-riyadh-aerial-footage-key-airports[19] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905359288412876949;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905392449746600372;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905393705155989690;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905393705155989690;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905396251597677021;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905397127905190028;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905410947646103861;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905413935752187931; 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https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[82] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9 ; https://almadapaper dot net/399709/ ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/03/25/iraq-moves-to-give-pmf-greater-role-in-state-security/[83] https://x.com/omancustoms/status/1905300347066679304[84] https://www.sabanew dot net/story/ar/126709[85] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf; https://www dot 4may.net/news/141358[86] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0063[87] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0063[88] https://www.bon-bast.com/[89] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6419329 ;https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6419423[90] https://president dot ir/fa/158323;https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1905586923017486419 ;(https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/735224 ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/08/3282478[91] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2042527 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/07/3282137[92] https://president dot ir/fa/158323;https://x.com/KhosroIsfahani/status/1905586923017486419[93] https://www.leader dot ir/fa/content/28107
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2025
- at 4/2/25 6:27pmAngelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros with William RunkelMarch 28, 2025, 5:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11 am ET on March 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Putin reiterated longstanding boilerplate rhetoric during a visit to a Russian submarine command post in Murmansk Oblast on March 27, claiming that "Nazis" and people with "neo-Nazi views" have significant influence in the Ukrainian government and that "neo-Nazi groups" have the "actual power in their hands" in Ukraine.[1] Putin reiterated claims that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024 and additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials. The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[2] Putin claimed that "neo-Nazi formations" are ruling Ukraine in the absence of a legitimate Ukrainian government and questioned how Russia can negotiate with these groups. Putin has previously characterized the Ukrainian government as illegitimate in an effort to justify Russia's unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end the war and has consistently identified "denazification" – a phrase the Kremlin uses to make its demand for the removal of the Ukrainian government and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet regime – as a goal of his full-scale invasion since February 2022.[3]Putin repeatedly accused Zelensky of being the illegitimate leader of Ukraine ahead of Putin's February 12 phone call with US President Donald Trump, but has made these accusations much less frequently in recent weeks.[4] Putin notably implicitly acknowledged Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner for the first time in late February 2025, and Putin's March 27 statement appears to be a reintensification of his accusations designed to undermine Zelensky's legitimacy.[5] ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any agreement reached on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[6]Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war. Putin claimed that Russia is committed to ending the war in Ukraine but only if a peace agreement addresses the "root causes" of the war.[7] Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for full Ukrainian capitulation with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and commitments of Ukrainian neutrality – the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion.Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war. Putin proposed that the United Nations (UN), United States, and European countries install a temporary administration in Ukraine that would hold democratic elections to bring to power "a viable government that enjoys the people's trust."[9] Putin claimed that a temporary Ukrainian government would allow Russia to "begin negotiations [with the new Ukrainian administration] on a peace treaty" and "sign legitimate documents that will be recognized throughout the world." White House National Security Council Spokesperson James Hewitt rightly dismissed Putin's proposal to impose a temporary administration over Ukraine, stating that the Ukrainian Constitution and the Ukrainian people determine Ukraine's governance.[10] UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres also rejected Putin's proposal and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected.[11]Putin's new demand for an interim government in Ukraine as a precondition for peace negotiations demonstrates how the Kremlin continues to hold negotiations hostage and is attempting to extract additional concessions from the West following the progress made in the ongoing ceasefire negotiations. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin remains committed to its goal to prolong any negotiations for a temporary frontline ceasefire or permanent peace agreement in order to continue making incremental gains on the battlefield and establish favorable conditions to pursue Ukraine's complete capitulation.[12]The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 28 that the Russian General Staff approved a program to reorganize the Russian naval infantry forces from brigades into divisions.[13] Putin stated that two brigades, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), will become divisions in 2025, that two more brigades will become divisions in 2026, and that the final brigade will become a division in 2027. Putin also appointed the commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, Major General Mikhail Gudkov, to deputy commander of the Russian Navy on March 28. There are currently five naval infantry brigades in the Russian military: the Pacific Fleet's 40th and 155th naval infantry brigades, the Baltic Fleet's 336th Naval Infantry Brigade, the Northern Fleet's 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, and the Black Sea Fleet's 810th Naval Infantry Brigade.[14] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that Russia intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including the expansion of five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[15] Shoigu stated in January 2023 that Russia intended to only form 12 new maneuver divisions by 2026, however, and did not mention the five naval infantry formations.[16] Putin appears to be renewing this effort, indicating that Russia is likely working to form 17 maneuver divisions over several years.Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin is reintensifying efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.Putin reiterated his demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement -- a reference to Russia’s initial war demands that directly contradict US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to achieve a just and sustainable resolution to the war.Putin is attempting to inject a new demand aligned with the Kremlin's long-standing efforts to undermine the Ukrainian government's legitimacy into discussions about the resolution of the war.The Kremlin appears to be renewing efforts to reorganize Russia's five naval infantry brigades into divisions.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk and Kurakhove, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported on March 28 that overnight Russian strikes damaged Naftogaz gas production facilities in unspecified areas.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn reported on the evening of March 27 that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy facilities at least twice within the past day since March 26.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff and other Ukrainian officials reported on March 28 that Russian Shahed drones struck oil and gas infrastructure in Poltava City and other energy infrastructure in Kherson City.[19]Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against energy infrastructure in Kursk, Bryansk, and Saratov oblasts on the night of March 27 to 28. The Russian MoD and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and HIMARS strikes against the Sudzha gas metering station on the morning of March 28 and targeted an energy facility in Bryansk Oblast on the afternoon of March 28.[20] Saratov Oblast Governor Roman Busargin stated that Russian forces downed Ukrainian drones over Engels Airbase and Saratov City overnight, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces were targeting the Saratov Oil Refinery.[21] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on March 28 that Ukrainian forces were targeting ammunition and missile storage facilities at Engels Airbase – a legitimate military target not covered by a moratorium on striking energy infrastructure.[22]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in border areas of Kursk Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced to the northern outskirts of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[23]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), reiterated claims that Russian forces seized Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and advanced east of and in central Guyevo.[24]Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking in Kursk Oblast near Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha) and Gogolevka and in northern Sumy Oblast near Volodymyrivka and Veselivka (both north of Sumy City) and near Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Guyevo, Gornal (south of Guyevo), and Oleshnya.[26]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue operating in Kursk Oblast.[27] Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in border areas of Kursk Oblast.[28]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[29] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced into the outskirts of Popovka but claimed that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[30]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Popovka, Demidovka (east of Popovka), and Grafovka (southeast of Popovka).[31]Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight, citing satellite imagery and open-source data, reported on March 25 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy infrastructure between September 1, 2024 and February 12, 2025 caused at least 60 billion rubles ($658 million) worth of damage.[32] RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that at least 67 percent of the 67 verified Ukrainian long-range strikes between September 2024 and mid-February 2025 were successful and that the outcomes of the other 33 percent of the strikes are unclear. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight noted that the project only accounted for verified Ukrainian strikes and that Ukrainian forces may have conducted more than 67 strikes during this six-month period. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces most frequently targeted Russian military facilities, including ammunition depots, in early Fall 2024 and later prioritized strikes against Russian oil and gas storage and processing facilities. RFE/RL and Frontelligence Insight reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and gas production facilities at least 27 times between September 2024 and mid-February 2025 and destroyed 50 oil storage tanks and damaged 47 more tanks.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 28 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 27 and 28.[33]Ukraine's Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that Russian forces are conducting up to five assaults near Vovchansk every day and that the Vovcha River has formed a natural barrier to Russian advances in Vovchansk.[34] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces last attempted to cross the river a few weeks ago when there was ice.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 28 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 28 that Russian forces seized Krasne Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from Topoli toward the Russian bridgehead near Dvorichna (both northeast of Kupyansk).[36]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on March 27 and 28.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Russian forces launched a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with 13 armored vehicles in the Kupyansk direction on the morning of March 27 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 armored vehicles and one tank.[38]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 28 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on March 27 and 28.[39]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 28 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating northeast of Lyman seized Terny and advanced to the outskirts of Katerynivka, near Nove, north of Novolyubivka and Kolodyazi, and toward Zelena Dolyna.[40]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Myrne, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Olhivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area and in the direction of Dronivka on March 27 and 28.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 28 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Daryivka on March 27 and 28.[42]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar on March 28 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[43]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Predtechyne on March 27 and 28.[44]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[45]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 24 and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Darhomyzhskoho Street in northern Toretsk and in the Tsentralna Mine in southwestern Toretsk.[46]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka on March 27 and 28.[47]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Russian forces have lost over 15,000 Russian soldiers killed in action in Toretsk since mid-July 2024.[48] The spokesperson estimated that Russian forces have sustained over 50,000 total casualties in the Toretsk direction.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Panteleymonivka (southwest of Toretsk).[49] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Russian forces advanced over two kilometers east of Kotlyarivka and southeast of Bohdanivka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, and Preobrazhenka on March 27 and 28.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne and Kotlyarivka.[53]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 28 that Russian forces are increasing the intensity of their attacks in the Pokrovsk direction and are attempting to reach the same level of intensity as in January 2025.[54] Trehubov stated that Russian forces have changed their main direction of attack and are attempting to advance east of Pokrovsk toward the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Russian forces have recently increased their usage of armored vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[55] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction noted that Russian forces have intensified infantry and mechanized assaults and that the brigade destroyed nearly 10 pieces of Russian heavy equipment on March 27.[56] The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces recently damaged a Russian tank and eight infantry fighting vehicles while repelling a Russian mechanized assault in the area. A Ukrainian servicemember stated on March 27 that Ukrainian forces destroyed 12 Russian armored vehicles during an attempted Russian mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction.[57]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove).[59]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and in the eastern outskirts of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove), and along the T-0518 Rozdolne-Bahatyr road.[60]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 27 and 28.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kostyantynopil.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 28 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 and 28 that Russian forces advanced in Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Rozdolne, Burlatske (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka), Vesele, and Dniproenerhiya (both north of Velyka Novosilka).[63]Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka toward Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Skudne, and Burlatske and toward Komar; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on March 27 and 28.[64]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 28 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault involving one tank and four armored vehicles near Vesele.[65]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 691st Separate Howitzer Artillery Battalion (subordination unclear) and the 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Vesele.[66]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced north of Zherebyanky (northwest of Robotyne).[67]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky, and Nesteryanka on March 27 and 28.[68]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 28 that Russian forces in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions significantly increased assaults using small groups of infantry in the past few days.[69] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 28 that Russia has concentrated 70,000 to 72,000 troops, up to 320 tanks, and up to 725 armored vehicles in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that most of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) is operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast, including elements of its: 19th and 42nd motorized rifle divisions; 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade; 110th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade; 12th Missile Brigade; 291st Artillery Brigade; 67th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade; 34th Command Brigade; 4th Military Base; and 31st Engineering-Sapper Regiment.[71] Mashovets stated that up to two battalions of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), one battalion of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division), and elements of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division) are attacking near Shcherbaky and Stepove.[72] Mashovets stated that elements of the 40th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment; 47th Motorized Rifle Division (40th Army Corps [AC], 18th CAA, SMD); 22nd Special Purpose Brigade; 45th Special Purpose Brigade; three BARS detachments; and three Rosgvardia battalions are also operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russian forces may conduct an offensive operation in southern Ukraine on March 15 and 18.[74]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on March 28 but did not advance.[75]Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are trying to establish bridgeheads on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta.[76]Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) posted footage on March 27 showing recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian radar systems in occupied Crimea.[77] The GUR reported that Ukrainian forces struck one 48Ya6-K1 Podlet mobile long-range radar system, one RM-10M1E aircraft interception radar command post, one 9S32 "Imbir" radar station, one ST-68 radar station command post, one 39N6 "Kasta-2E2" low altitude radar system, and one Fyodor Uryupin tugboat.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 163 Shahed and other strike and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[78] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 drones and that 51 decoy drones became "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Kharkiv Oblast officials reported that Russian Shahed drones struck the Zolochiv Hospital and damaged a power grid in Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast.[79] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit infrastructure and other objects in Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[80]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia plans to expand its nuclear submarine fleet. Russian President Vladimir Putin virtually attended the ceremonial launch of Russia's new Perm nuclear submarine during his visit to Murmansk on March 27.[81] Putin stated that the Perm submarine is one of Russia's first submarines equipped with Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles and that the submarine will begin participating in naval operations in 2026. Putin stated during a March 27 visit to the Arkhangelsk nuclear submarine that the Russian Navy is preparing a strategy for the navy's development and the construction of surface ships and submarines until 2050.[82] Putin stated that Russia plans to build five more Yasen-M class nuclear submarines and three more Borei-A class nuclear submarines in an unspecified time period.Putin highlighted on March 27 Russia's ongoing work to cooperate with North Korea in the military-technical and military spheres.[83]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian Minister of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov stated on March 27 that the first flight of the fully import-substituted Superjet aircraft will take place in April 2025.[84] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported on March 16 that it conducted the first flight of the aircraft using a Russian-produced PD-8 aircraft engine.[85]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[2] https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/world/europe/putin-announces-a-military-operation-in-ukraine-as-the-un-security-council-pleads-with-him-to-pull-back.html ; http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121624[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025[7] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025[9] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[10] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-suggests-temporary-administration-ukraine-end-war-2025-03-28/ ; https://x.com/steveholland1/status/1905437485703836008[11] https://en.interfax.com dot ua/news/general/1059617.html ; https://x.com/michellenichols/status/1905645685187194980[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025[13] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2023[17] https://www.naftogaz dot com/news/chergova-kombinovana-ataka-vorog-obstrilyav-ob-ekty-grupy-naftogaz; https://suspilne dot media/981301-18-ta-ataka-unaslidok-kombinovanogo-udaru-rf-poskodzeno-gazovidobuvni-potuznosti-naftogazu/[18] https://x.com/dmtrltvn/status/1905373359569076484[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid042bjpGRmowgfdyEjDw7VuiSd2vCjuxbqCSuPHPs6rdKNZPFnrqc432U4fJT54a8Ll; 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https://t.me/tass_agency/308152 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/rybar/69195?single ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/22123 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25592[27] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88922 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50639 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308154[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159468[29] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7157; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8753[30] https://t.me/dva_majors/67838 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19275; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/7157 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22131 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22124[31] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63166 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67835 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22116[32] https://www.svoboda dot org/a/voda-kamenj-tochit-uron-ot-udarov-vsu-po-energetike-i-armii-rossii/33357589.html[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764[34] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/28/praktychno-cze-buv-kvytok-v-odyn-kinecz-u-vovchansku-tryvayut-boyi-na-beregah-richky-vovchoyi/[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63178 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50648 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50650[36] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12764[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml[38]https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7010 ; https://t.me/oaembr77/727[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88893; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22112; https://t.me/rybar/69191[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33927[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml; https://t.me/wargonzo/25579[45] https://t.me/dva_majors/67796[46] https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/797; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905561968343216325 ; https://www.facebook.com/150obTRO/videos/586280104571045/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905531165114560712; http://facebook.com/150obTRO/videos/675737521691481/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905531165114560712; https://t.me/BBpS_28/741; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905530649588441534[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml[48] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rl7ov8EUXuc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/na-konczert-kobzona-vidpravyly-15-tysyach-okupantiv-v-toreczku-praczyuye-velychezna-fabryka-znyshhennya-protyvnyka/[49] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159432[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13607[51] https://t.me/yurasumy/22111[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/25579 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22111[54] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/981505-armia-rf-zbilsue-intensivnist-atak-v-napramku-pokrovska-podrobici-vid-osuv-hortica/[55] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/namagayutsya-dijty-do-spoluchen-do-dorogy-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-palyly-vorozhi-kolony/[57] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1905343184697229488; https://t.me/officer_alex33/5197[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/67807; https://t.me/rusich_army/22130[59] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26810; https://t.me/immitis71/930; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8748[60] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14109 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22114 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26117[61] https://t.me/yurasumy/22114 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159391[62] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159440 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14109[64] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63176[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7006[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/14120[67] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26794 ; https://t.me/luftwaffe422/424[68]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0MGkDYJHopJbBuTq4HY9smqSnju5EASQvudpyabckgvGWri8iunHPWGFsScnZF4yjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0f66GChxEDGNBmVAFWstx3g8AyorH3PDgY6YfLjAPhEBK7ivSRZeZP8VBNr8aM2eml[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/na-ukrayinskyh-gromadyanah-trenuyut-pilotiv-fpv-droniv-okupanty-aktyvizuvalysya-na-pivdennyh-napryamkah/[70] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652 ; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid02Jmw2ULcVNHHLrkPJvhnTM2LU4SW58c3CtcZBFVJpFwLF8UnZDt8LZ3jm8R8fAVCsl[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2653[73] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2652[74] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725[75]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid06XXCoCxhkk6fCoqwUdu9wm5FC22kAGHN64p6snN12ZhJFqjVh62WFa5dUyk7DWNjl[76] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/28/na-ukrayinskyh-gromadyanah-trenuyut-pilotiv-fpv-droniv-okupanty-aktyvizuvalysya-na-pivdennyh-napryamkah/[77] https://t.me/DIUkraine/5606[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/31538[79] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/981287-sahedi-atakuvali-likarnu-na-harkivsini-ta-znisili-zitlovij-budinok/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/31538 ; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/20397; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/981287-sahedi-atakuvali-likarnu-na-harkivsini-ta-znisili-zitlovij-budinok/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/22128 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/28/unaslidok-ataky-rosijskyh-bpla-na-harkivshhyni-poshkodzheno-likarnyu/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/981269-rf-atakuvala-odesinu-bezpilotnikami-u-dsns-pokazali-naslidki-2;[81] https://t.me/tass_agency/308072; https://t.me/tass_agency/308074; https://t.me/tass_agency/308076 ; https://iz dot ru/1861261/2025-03-27/putin-prizval-podderzhivat-status-rf-v-kachestve-moshchnoi-morskoi-derzhavy ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[82] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[83] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76557[84] https://ria dot ru/20250327/superjet-2007781069.html[85] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 2, 2025
- at 4/2/25 5:56pmAngelica Evans, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William RunkelApril 2, 2025, 6:15 pm ETNote: The data cut-off for this product was 11:45 am ET on April 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire is in effect and that Russia is adhering to the ceasefire.[1] Peskov claimed that Ukraine has "not joined" the temporary ceasefire "essentially" and that Russia intends to discuss this with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 1 that Russia forwarded a list of Ukraine's alleged ceasefire violations to US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 2 that Ukrainian forces are "systematically" conducting drone and artillery strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[3] The exact contours of the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire remain unclear, and Ukraine and Russia do not appear to have formally agreed on the list of objects covered in the ceasefire or the types of strikes prohibited. ISW previously noted that it is unclear if the temporary ceasefire prohibits striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[4] It is also unclear how Ukraine could violate a temporary ceasefire that it has "not joined."US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. Two US officials familiar with the matter told Reuters on April 1 that senior Trump administration officials have discussed the likelihood that the United States will not be able to secure a long-term peace agreement in Ukraine in the coming months and are preparing new plans to pressure Russia and Ukraine into an agreement.[5] The sources noted that Trump administration officials acknowledged that Putin is actively resisting US efforts to accomplish a peace agreement in Ukraine and used a series of meetings and calls over the weekend of March 29-30 to discuss possible mechanisms to bring Russia to the negotiating table. A senior US official stated that the Trump administration is considering levying additional tariffs and sanctions against Russia. Another source familiar with the discussions similarly told Fox News on April 1 that US President Donald Trump believes that Putin is "slow-rolling" negotiations on a general ceasefire in Ukraine and that the Trump administration is considering increasing sanctions against Russia in order to force Putin to the negotiating table.[6] Trump recently told NBC News that he is considering additional sanctions against Russian oil and stated during a press conference on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire agreement.[7] ISW previously noted that it is not possible for the United States or the wider West to exert maximum pressure against Russia with economic tools alone as Russia's ongoing and forecasted future economic struggles are closely tied to Russian military losses on the battlefield.[8] The United States can leverage Russian vulnerabilities and achieve a stronger negotiating position by continuing — or increasing — military aid to Ukraine such that Ukrainian forces can continue to inflict significant manpower and materiel losses on Russia.CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2. Unnamed US officials and other unspecified sources familiar with Dmitriev's trip told CNN on April 1 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff later this week in Washington, D.C., and sources told CNN and CBS that the US government temporarily lifted sanctions against Dmitriev in order to grant him a visa to visit the United States.[9] Sources told CBS on April 2 that Dmitriev will meet with Witkoff on April 2, but the Trump administration has not published information about the meeting.[10] It is unclear if the meeting has occurred as of this publication. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 2 that Dmitriev's visit to Washington, D.C. is possible, and Dmitriev inconclusively responded to US reporting on his possible visit with "maybe."[11]The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 2 that the Russian military command may be reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) such that both armies would have three “motorized” rifle divisions each.[12] The 51st CAA currently includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades. The 3rd CAA also includes six motorized rifle brigades on paper: the 4th, 6th, 7th, 85th, 88th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades. Mashovets stated that some unspecified brigades in the 51st and 3rd CAAs are already staffed at levels significantly higher than a typical brigade, at least on paper.[13] Mashovets noted that the brigades are already operating at the front and have control over a number of other units – usually rifle or motorized rifle regiments and battalions – attached to the brigade. Mashovets stated that "it is assumed" that each of the new motorized rifle divisions in the 51st and 3rd CAAs will consist of two assault regiments, two "reinforcement" regiments, and an artillery regiment as well as organic logistics support units at the division-level, but that the divisions‘ are unlikely to have combat engineer or anti-aircraft missile units at the regimental level, as is normal for most Russian motorized rifle divisions. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to create the 1st, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle divisions within the 51st CAA. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command plans to form the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division on the basis of the 101st and 109th motor rifle regiments and plans to consolidate the 269th, 270th and 272nd rifle battalions into the 103rd Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that the only truly mechanized "motorized rifle" unit in the 132nd Motorized Rifle Division will be the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Mashovets stated that it is unclear if each new division will include a tank regiment and that the situation with tanks "will be very tense," likely given Russia’s shortage of main battle tanks. Mashovets stated that the Russian military command may be making these changes to improve the organizational and staff structure in the 51st and 3rd CAAs in order to "streamline" their command and control processes. Mashovets stated that these changes are unlikely to significantly increase the number of troops in the CAAs or their combat capabilities beyond that of an army corps.[14] ISW has not observed other reports of the Russian military command restructuring the 51st and 3rd CAAs.The Russian military command reorganized the 1st DNR AC and 2nd LNR AC into the 51st and 3rd CAAs, respectively, in Summer 2024 as part of wider efforts to integrate irregular forces into the Russian Armed Forces.[15] Elements of the 51st CAA are currently operating in the Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions, and elements of the 3rd CAA are currently operating in the Siversk and Chasiv Yar directions and in Belgorod Oblast.[16] The Russian military command has especially attempted to leverage elements of the 51st CAA in offensive operations in the Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions in recent months.[17] Most CAAs in the Russian military include less than three divisions, with only the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) including three divisions.[18] Mashovets’ report suggests that the Russian military does not seek to equip the divisions of the 51st and 3rd CAAs to a normal Russian motorized rifle division’s the full doctrinal end strength, suggesting that the restructuring is in response to specific command and control of force structure challenges afflicting the former DNR 1st and LNR 2nd Army Corps given their hasty reorganization into CAAs.[19]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using regulated K-51 and RG-VO grenade launchers to launch munitions containing chemical agents and ammunition containing unspecified hazardous chemicals that are banned under the CWC in March 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have used banned chemical agents a total of 7,730 times since February 2023.Key Takeaways:Russian officials are continuing to exploit the temporary energy infrastructure ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms.US officials reportedly continue to acknowledge Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwillingness to commit to a general ceasefire in Ukraine. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) Kirill Dmitriev will reportedly meet with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Washington, D.C. on April 2.The Russian military command reportedly began reorganizing the motorized rifle brigades of the 51st and 3rd combined arms armies (CAAs) such that each army would have three rifle divisions or motorized rifle divisions, likely in an effort to improve the CAAs' administrative structure, especially over larger numbers of unmechanized riflemen.The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 1 that Russian forces in Ukraine are continuing to use ammunition equipped with chemical agents prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.Russian sources continued to claim on April 2 that Ukrainian forces violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a substation near Klyukva, Kursk Oblast and shelled an energy facility in another area of Kursk Oblast on the morning of April 2.[21] Luganskgaz, a Russian-controlled energy company operating in occupied Luhansk Oblast, claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Svatove gas distribution station in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[22]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 2 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck an electrical substation in Sumy Oblast and that an artillery strike damaged a power line in Nikopil, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight from April 1 to 2 leaving almost 4,000 residents of both oblasts without power.[23]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued offensive operations along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zhuravka and near Basivka (both northeast of Sumy City).[24]Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhuravka; south of Sudzha near Guyevo and Plekhovo; and southwest of Suzdha near Oleshnya.[25]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian "Arbat" Special Purpose Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[26] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near the Kursk Oblast border.[27] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in Guyevo.[28]Russian forces continued offensive operations in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced south of Popovka and west of Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[29]Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka.[30]A Russian milblogger claimed that the area near Popovka is a contested "gray zone."[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck the Korochyanskoye Dam near Popovka to complicate Ukrainian crossings of the Korocha River.[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[33] Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment and of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[34]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 2 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[35]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 1 and 2.[36]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces have been conducting reconnaissance-in-force missions as part of efforts to resume offensive operations over the past two weeks.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kupyansk direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced to the northern outskirts of Kindrashivka.[38] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces consolidated their positions in northern Kindrashivka after seizing a stronghold near the P79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna road northeast of the settlement.[39]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka and Mala Shapivka, and east of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking in Mala Shapkivka and near Stepova Novoselivka.[41]A Russian milblogger claimed that ravines and gullies are complicating Russian efforts to move equipment in the direction of Kindrashivka.[42]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the "Kontora" Detachment (375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion, 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating north of Stepova Novoselivka.[43]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 2 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Zahyrzove, and Nova Krulyakivka and east of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novolyubivka.[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 and 2 that Russian forces advanced near Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[45]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman near Katerynivka, Nove, Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailiva; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on April 1 and 2.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces continued to attack in the direction of Nove (north of Lyman) and Katerynivka (north of Lyman).[47]Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor reported on April 2 that Russian forces have increased their assault tempo and activity in Luhansk Oblast.[48] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on April 2 that Russian forces are increasingly using mass infantry attacks for daily assaults and that Russian force are not conducting mechanized assaults as frequently as they used to in Fall 2024.[49] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces recently have been conducting ground assaults nearly daily, primarily sending penal recruits into fire to expose Ukrainian firing positions and to enable trained Russian infantry to better attack Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces conduct artillery, MLRS, air, and first-person view (FPV) drone strikes to support small group infantry attacks before assembling into larger groups of 10 to 15 soldiers for subsequent attacks. The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 2 that Russian forces are trying to seize Lyman by enveloping its flanks in order to facilitate movement to the Oskil River and establish Lyman as a Russian logistics node.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[51]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 2 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Siversk toward Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 1 and 2.[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 2 but did not make confirmed advances.[53]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Chasiv Yar.[54]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechnye and Stupochky on April 1 and 2.[55]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 215th Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[56] Elements of the "Nevsky" Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[57] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published April 2 shows Russian forces raising a flag in southwestern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[59]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk, near the Toretska Mine in northern Toretsk, northwest of Toretsk, in the southwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and near the Tsentralna mine in southwestern Toretsk.[60]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Romanivka, Shcherbynivka, and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka, Oleksandropil, Valentynivka, and Sukha Balka on April 1 and 2.[61]Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on April 1 that Russian forces are periodically trying to attack in armored columns in the Toretsk direction.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (purportedly of the 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[63] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[64]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southeast of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and southeast of Bohdanivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lysivka, northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk), northwest of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk), southwest of Nadiivka, and near Preobrazhenka (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in eastern Zelene (south of Pokrovsk).[68]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Berezivka; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe, Yelyzavetivka, Promin, and Kalynove; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Kotlyarivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, and Novoserhiivka on April 1 and 2.[69] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled a platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and an unspecified number of motorcycles in the Novopavlivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Lysivka, Shevchenko, Novooleksandrivka, and Udachne and are accumulating forces for future counterattacks.[71]A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces have started to use tanks and IFVs during assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[72] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults mainly with motorcycles, quad bikes, and buggies.[73] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are accumulating Soviet-era equipment for assaults and that Russian losses have tripled in the area since the start of negotiations (likely referring to mid-February 2025).[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a bridge near Solone.[75] A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Uspenivka is a contested "gray zone" and that Russian forces have not been able to advance past Shevchenko.[76] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drones have low altitude air superiority, forcing Russian forces have to conduct rotations on foot over 10 kilometers and causing problems with Russian supplies of ammunition, water, and gasoline.Order of Battle: Air defense elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77] Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 428th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk), and drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka.[78]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances.|Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[79]Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Andriivka and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 1 and 2.[80] Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Burlatske (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[81]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vesele and Vilne Pole (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[82]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Shevchenko, and Burlatske on April 2.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vilne Pole.[84]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Sharkhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[85]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on April 2.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and artillery elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[86]Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 2 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and advanced east and west of the settlement.[87]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced north of Mali Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[88]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 1 and 2.[89]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 2 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 2 that Russian forces advanced on Velikiy Potemkin Island (south of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian forces are attempting to use boats to cross the Dnipro River near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City) in order to land on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[90]Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Dnipro direction on April 1 and 2.[91]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[92]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 1 to 2 and a missile strike on April 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 74 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 41 drones over northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 20 drones were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that the drone strikes struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy, and Odesa oblasts and that a ballistic missile struck civilian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during the day on April 2, killing four civilians.[94]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russian authorities continued efforts to solidify their control over the Russian information space and discourage critique of the Russian military's conduct of the war in Ukraine. Russian state media reported on April 2 that the Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its first reading on criminal penalties for "discrediting" the Russian military.[95] The bill proposes that the government confiscate the property of people who accept payment in exchange for discrediting the Russian military, for calling for anti-Russia sanctions, or for working in an international organization of which Russia is not a member. Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin noted that the bill is aimed at punishing Russian citizens who fled the country after the start of the full-scale invasion or who commit treason. The Russian State Duma also adopted a bill criminalizing failures to report sabotage efforts against Russian energy and transport infrastructure.[96]Occupation governments continue to expand their analogues to the Kremlin's "Time of Heroes" program. Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on April 2 that 933 people, including 823 residents of occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, have applied to join the "Sevastopol — City of Heroes" program.[97] Rozvozhaev stated that the program will begin on September 1 and will accept 30 participants. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated on April 2 that 1,515 people recently submitted applications for the "Heroes of Kherson Oblast" program.[98] ISW has previously noted that Russian officials intend to leverage analogues to the federal "Time of Heroes" program in occupied Ukraine as part of long-term efforts to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia and militarize society in occupied Ukraine.[99]Russian officials may be attempting to address systematic issues of unprofessionalism and violence in the Russian military three years into the war. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona reported on April 2 that the Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Court stated that it sentenced two Russian commanders accused of murdering, torturing, and abusing the bodies of seven fellow Russian servicemembers in Ukraine.[100] The court sent both commanders to a maximum-security penal colony and stripped the commanders of their ranks. Russian opposition media and Ukrainian media outlets previously reported that the commanders were part of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]).[101] ISW has consistently observed reports of Russian commanders injuring, killing, or unjustly imprisoning their subordinates in Ukraine throughout the full-scale invasion.[102] Russian officials have not undertaken any significant effort to prevent or address systemic violence in the Russian military.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)The People's Front (Narodnyi Front) political coalition told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 2 that Russian forces have deployed 120 newly developed "Rubin" modular electronic warfare (EW) systems designed to protect infantry and vehicles in Ukraine.[103]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://tass dot ru/politika/23574837 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308966[2] https://t.me/tass_agency/308869; https://t.me/tass_agency/308870 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3825 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/54758[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824 [4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-officials-eye-longer-road-ukraine-peace-frustration-mounts-2025-04-01/[6] https://x.com/JacquiHeinrich/status/1907132555293581469[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125[8] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%27s%20Weakness%20Offers%20Leverage%20PDF.pdf[9] https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/01/politics/senior-russian-official-washington-visit/index.html ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694[10] https://x.com/saraecook/status/1907418670235619498 ; https://www.cbsnews.com/news/steve-witkoff-kirill-dmitriev-russia-white-house-meeting/?ftag=CNM-00-10aab8f&linkId=789427694[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/308968 ; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1907213823502696722[12] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664[13] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664[14] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2665; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2664[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-31-2024[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2025[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010525[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0QBb1y2wz7ZtA1r5BEEupBbPkphmAsjz9EN2eB6jGYXQissKV9cpSW47ZTDLtkdp9l[21] https://t.me/mod_russia/50824[22] https://t.me/luganskgaz_lnr/793[23] https://suspilne dot media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/[24] https://t.me/rybar/69327[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26317; https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rusich_army/22262; https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26338; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89221[26] https://t.me/milinfolive/145367[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/50821[28] https://t.me/rybar/69327; https://t.me/dva_majors/68111; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89210[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://t.me/rybar/69351[31] https://t.me/rybar/69351[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380[33] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89211; https://t.me/milinfolive/145380[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89230[35] https://t.me/tass_agency/308915[36]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/navit-iz-siryaka-ne-vyjshly-a-yih-vzhe-rozbyly-bezgluzdi-ataky-rosiyan-poblyzu-vovchanska/[38] https://t.me/epoddubny/22984; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311 [39] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26311; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63264[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22984[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89200[43] https://t.me/dva_majors/68179[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl[45] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31203[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl?__cft__%5B0%5D=AZWcTfmUIOxyngkNF0eTcgMV5ovkEhT2ueo5gop4wcj51A_8YcO4dBI-ZpFnH6qVOZ78HAY7X4k6nSZ-53N8xXnJJIn6ETfLuou4PDGikVBoA9ypHU1TniJmLUQ20P1vk8NgBXDyf9cloQGLjsz7F9s094UUGoBKEQxlwickn_DKLHiRpUQ77daZ4NGNST71zms&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/68155[48] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25667[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vyklykayut-na-sebe-vogon-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-pershymy-v-myasorubku-kydayut-vyazniv/[50] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/vpered-vpered-bez-urahuvannya-vtrat-kombryg-rozpoviv-navishho-vorog-atakuye-lyman/[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159964[52]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22622; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/tass_agency/308925[53] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209[54] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31209[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26329[57] https://t.me/tass_agency/308947[58] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633; https://t.me/tass_agency/308962[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907409422927663490; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1907411519396000088; https://tme/partizani68/148[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26340[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://t.me/dva_majors/68155; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl[62] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/videos/948417157133091/[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13632; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1205; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1207; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13633[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89269[65] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907191969358471538; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1907194310300148082; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4518[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8792; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/201; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907153899993063524; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1907146579103870984; https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1907427492471660719; https://t.me/moment_war/385; https://t.me/Stabikus2024/633[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63262; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276[70] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7229[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63270; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63274; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89258; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26343[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-shturmuyut-z-bronetehnikoyu-ale-bezrezultatno/[73] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDXWlQ2K0dM ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/apokaliptychna-kartyna-lyudozherska-absolyutno-rosijski-motoshturmovyky-mchat-po-tilam-pobratymiv/[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Szeuva9Fl4s ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/02/pislya-balachok-pro-peremovyny-vtraty-voroga-zrosly-vtrychi-poblyzu-pokrovska-tryvayut-intensyvni-boyi/[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26318[76] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2276[77] https://t.me/milinfolive/145308;[78] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89203; https://t.me/dva_majors/68161 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68177[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/25693; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26320[80] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl[81] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26965; https://t.me/sicariofly/15; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907122739439161456[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31212[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267; https://t.me/voin_dv/14203[84] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63267[85] https://t.me/voin_dv/14188[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/14204[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8793; https://t.me/rusich_army/22266[88] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20973[89] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql[90] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26361[91] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02mLEZbQsXy31Scmy87ayLz7VQRkPSZb3aVD5LujuyUKqU2BAZ2qPkTWXxhDxpffKXl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0xyvEUYKKDxxg8NW4qYZYWQMQPt7DJszxAk3gEDNbawVFM9VXUrHGsdvUKJZhsrzEl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0798GmTCjbqzAy6CpuZYZKbibWuh5i1LAUbFyJRSZRJC35oSFXoX4BZEvmcUsveYZl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0oBNSADXWHoKMYK4F3N46jFMSdwAcb6GrHSwKL2wphoQDbkhb3tpXrnjxmKdyevVql[92] https://t.me/dva_majors/68168[93] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768 [94] https://t.me/kpszsu/31768; https://t.me/synegubov/13654; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2296; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2297; https://t.me/synegubov/13657; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2293 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/984867-ponad-14-vibuhiv-prolunali-u-harkovi-rosiani-atakuut-misto-bezpilotnikami/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2305; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/985045-u-holodnogirskomu-rajoni-harkova-usuvaut-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-bpla/; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2307; https://t.me/astrapress/78010; https://t.me/astrapress/77999; https://t.me/astrapress/78049; https://t.me/astrapress/78054; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/985567-armia-rf-atakuvala-balistikou-krivij-rig-so-vidomo; https://suspilne dot media/985117-zelenskij-pro-obstrili-u-moskvi-znevazaut-diplomaticni-zusilla-partneriv/; https://www.facebook.com/zelenskyy.official/videos/1309292320154958/ [95] https://ria dot ru/20250402/gosduma-2008869612.html[96] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67ed15789a7947dbc713187f[97] https://t.me/razvozhaev/10903[98] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/29468[99] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-17-2025[100] https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim[101] https://zona dot media/news/2025/04/02/maly-tim; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/02/sud-v-rostove-na-donu-prigovoril-k-20-i-18-godam-dvuh-rossiyskih-komandirov-obvinyaemyh-v-ubiystve-i-pytkah-semeryh-soldat-svoey-divizii; https://suspilne dot media/796295-pidirvati-rozstrilati-spaliti-ak-rosijski-vijskovi-vbivaut-svoih-na-linii-frontu-v-ukraini/; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/16564[102] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2023[103] https://t.me/tass_agency/308937 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23572995
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 23, 2025
- at 4/2/25 5:19pmGrace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, and George Barroswith William RunkelMarch 23, 2025, 4:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on March 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea. An unnamed US official told the Financial Times (FT) on March 23 that the talks will cover the technical aspects of the temporary strikes moratorium, including monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhiy Tykhyi added that the talks will define the scope of this ceasefire.[1] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian delegation, which also includes Ukrainian Presidential Office deputy heads Pavlo Palisa and Ihor Zhovka, Deputy Energy Minister Mykola Kolisnyk, MFA State Secretary Oleksandr Karasevich, and several unspecified military officers.[2] FT reported that the US delegation includes US National Security Council member Andrew Peek and State Department Policy Planning Director Michael Anton.[3] A Ukrainian official told the New York Times (NYT) that the US and Ukrainian delegations may hold additional talks on March 24 depending on the progress of negotiations.[4] The US-Ukrainian meeting is ongoing as of this publication and ISW will report on the details of the talks in-depth on March 24.Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies. A Russian insider source claimed on March 23 that the Russian Federation Council Accounts Chamber (the Russian Federation’s highest audit body) recently initiated an audit of the Russian Central Bank to investigate its monetary policy from 2022 to 2024 and the impact of the interest rate on inflation, budget expenditures, and investment.[5] The source claimed that the investigation is "effectively" an attack on Nabiullina. The insider source claimed that a group of lobbyists from large Russian businesses seek interest rate reductions. ISW cannot independently verify this insider source's claim and has not observed other reporting about the alleged audit.Russian inflation has been rising due to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the Russian Central Bank decided in December 2024 to maintain the key interest rate at 21 percent – the highest Russian interest rate since 2003 – as part of efforts to curb growing inflation rates.[6] The Russian Central Bank‘s interest rate through 2025 has remained relatively conservative despite significant and growing inflationary pressures.[7] The Kremlin has claimed in recent months that the inflation rate is about nine to 10 percent, but these figures are likely far below the actual inflation rate, which is likely closer to 20 to 25 percent.[8] Russia's current interest rate should likely be higher, and the Kremlin likely pressured the Central Bank to keep the rate at 21 percent when the Central Bank should have increased it to curb inflation.[9]Russian President Vladimir Putin has also attempted to shift blame for the rising inflation rate on the Central Bank, and on Nabiullina in particular. This was likely in an effort to draw the ire of the Russian business community away from the Kremlin and onto her, although Nabiullina likely has not been able to exercise fully independent monetary policy. The audit on the Central Bank may be part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to apply political pressure on the bank to prevent further interest rate hikes beyond the current rate of 21 percent, manage the expectations and frustrations of the Russian business community, and further the Kremlin's narrative about Russia's economic stability. The Kremlin’s continued manipulation of the Central Bank's decisions is likely hampering the Russian government's ability to enact sound wartime monetary policies.Key Takeaways:US and Ukrainian officials are meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on the evening of March 23 to discuss the contours of the temporary moratorium on long-range strikes and a possible temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea.Unconfirmed reports suggest that there is tension between Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and the Kremlin over Russia's high interest rate and wartime monetary policies.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces conducted offensive operations to push Ukrainian forces out of their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing toward Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha along the international border).[10]A Russian milblogger claimed that it would take Russian forces at least one month to push Ukrainian forces out of their remaining positions in Kursk Oblast.[11]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[12]Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) have seized almost all of Basivka (northeast of Sumy City near the international border).[13] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Volodymyrivka (west of Basivka near the international border).[14]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near the international border between Kursk and Sumy oblasts.[15]Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in Belgorod Oblast on March 23.Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked with engineering equipment near Grafovka and Demidovka (both northwest of Belgorod City).[16] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced into southern Demidovka after Russian forces had problems with communications among units but that Russian forces then pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[17]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 23 that the Ukrainian Air Force struck a Russian command and control post in Glotovo, Belgorod Oblast (west of Belgorod City near the international border) on March 21, destroying communications devices and technical equipment.[18]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment, "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment), "Grom-Kaskad" drone brigade, and "Irlandtsy" detachment are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[19]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 23 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 22 and 23.[20]Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Pavlo Shamshyn stated that Russian forces have been attempting to cross the Vovcha River in Vovchansk but cannot transport armored vehicles across the river without pontoon crossings, which Shamshyn noted Russian forces cannot establish due to Ukrainian drone surveillance.[21] Shamshyn stated that Russian forces last attempted to cross the Vovcha River with a small infantry group a "few weeks" ago.Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[22]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 23 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 22 and 23.[23]A Russian milblogger claimed that southern Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) is a contested "gray zone."[24]Ukrainian forces recently liberated the village of Nadiya, Luhansk Oblast, in the Borova direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northeastern Nadiya (east of Borova), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently seized the settlement.[25] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces' loss of Nadiya on March 22 shows that issues in the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), including those involving commanders submitting false reports about Russian advances, remain unresolved.[26]Unconfirmed advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[27]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nadiya on March 22 and 23.[28]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) and 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Nadiya.[29]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 23 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Novolyubivka and up to four kilometers wide and up to 2.7 kilometers deep west of Ivanivka (both northeast of Lyman).[30]Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Lyman toward Nove and Novomykhailivka; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on March 22 and 23.[31]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 23 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne on March 22 and 23.[32]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on March 22 and 23.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces resumed attacks in Chasiv Yar with equipment and that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[34]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on March 23 that Russian forces continue efforts to bypass Chasiv Yar and Toretsk but effective Ukrainian defensive operations have prevented Russian forces from seizing the settlements.[35] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 23 that Russian forces recently attempted to attack in the Chasiv Yar direction with armored vehicles but were unsuccessful.[36]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[37]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Chaikovskoho Street in northern Toretsk.[38]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka. [39]Zaporozhets reported on March 23 that Russian forces will soon begin to use armored vehicles in the Toretsk direction as part of renewed attempts to seize Toretsk.[40]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian position near Oleksandro-Kalynove (northwest of Toretsk).[41] Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division, including elements of its 68th Tank Regiment and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment; 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA); 428th Tank Battalion (possibly of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA); and 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA)are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[42]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions northeast of Vodyane Druhe (east of Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[43] Additional geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Vesela Street in northwestern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[44]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk) and south of Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Sribne, though ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 5.[46]Russian forces continued ground attacks near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Vodyane Druhe and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Pishchane, Novoukrainka, Novoandriivka, Kotlyne, Udachne, Uepsnivka, Kotlyarivka, and Bohdanivka on March 22 and 23.[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk), and Shevchenko.[48]The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction and some Russian milbloggers stated that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from conducting rotations.[49] The milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian strikes are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Selydove (south of Pokrovsk) to Novotroitske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and near Karlivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 23 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 22 and 23.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynopil and that Ukrainian forces retain positions within the settlement and on its western outskirts.[52]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 22 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced-company-sized Russian mechanized assault consisting of 13 armored vehicles in the Novopavlivka (northwest of Kurakhove) direction on an unspecified recent date.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations near Velyka Novosilka on March 23 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novosilka on March 22 and 23.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Vesele and Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Shartarske direction (east of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Vesele.[57] Drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka direction (west of Velyka Novosilka).[58]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 23.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[59] Artillery elements of the Russian 38th and 64th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet-era unit) are reportedly operating in the Polohy direction.[60]Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 23 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[61]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky and north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka on March 22 and 23.[62]The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance platoon operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast reported on March 23 that Russian forces only use vehicles for logistics purposes during the day and far from the frontline and that Russian logistics usually try to bypass large settlements and use large armored vehicles are little as possible.[63]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction; and artillery elements of the BARS-32 detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and drone operators of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kamyanske (northwest of Robotyne).[64]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 23.The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 23 that the Ukrainian Air Forces struck a crossing support company of the Russian 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, SMD) in occupied Dnipriany (east of Kherson City on the east [left] bank Kherson Oblast) on March 21, destroying naval assets and technical equipment.[65]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 22 and 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[66] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 97 drones over southern, northern, western, and central Ukraine and that 25 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces used a large number of strike drones (at least 122) and a relatively small number of decoy drones (25) in the overnight strikes. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kyiv, Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Odesa, and Donetsk oblasts.[67]The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed over 1,115 air targets between March 17 and 23, including 625 Shahed drones and 250 reconnaissance drones.[68] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces launched over 1,580 guided glide bombs, almost 1,100 strike drones, and 15 missiles of various types against Ukraine in the past week (March 17 to 23).[69]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russia continues efforts to innovate long-range strike drones, including with foreign-produced components. A Russian source claimed that Russia began using Chinese-produced controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA), which are resistant to jamming, in long-range Shahed drones in order to better counter Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems.[70]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report. Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe; https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-us-teams-hold-talks-saudi-arabia-end-war-with-russia-2025-03-23/[2] https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-polytics/3973981-u-saudivskij-aravii-vidbuvsa-persij-raund-peregovoriv-storoni-pisli-na-perervu.html[3] https://www.ft.com/content/78c530bf-1614-47d2-b966-cb0c52ab7fbe[4] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/europe/russia-ukraine-truce-talks.htmlv[5] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17247[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725; https://chelny-izvest dot ru/news/ugolok-potrebitelya/ceny-vyrastut-na-20-25-cto-zdet-rynok-bytovoi-texniki; https://www.dw dot com/ru/cto-podorozaet-v-rossii-v-2025-godu/a-70955627; 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl[29] https://t.me/ab3army/5345[30] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88581; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158903[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl[32] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25797[34] https://t.me/t3mny/2251[35] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/23/osuv-hortyczya-zsu-provodyat-efektyvnu-aktyvnu-oboronu-toreczka-ta-chasovogo-yaru/[36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/23/znovu-gotuyutsya-rozvishuvaty-svoyi-ganchirky-rosiyany-nakopychuyut-tehniku-dlya-shturmiv-toreczka/[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25790[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1903844924354601274; https://www.instagram.com/stories/asp.kr/3587639046177383117/[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/23/znovu-gotuyutsya-rozvishuvaty-svoyi-ganchirky-rosiyany-nakopychuyut-tehniku-dlya-shturmiv-toreczka/[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/67474 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88607[42] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13581 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88565 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/videos/506755199155528/[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8714; https://t.me/tankova_brugada/2540[44] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1903544757944754201; https://x.com/155ombr/status/1903135068509311340 ;[45] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63045; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158903[46] https://t.me/mod_russia/50455; https://t.me/mod_russia/50456 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33713 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25816; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2025[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63045[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63045; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25793; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25796[49] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/pokrovska-anomaliya-usi-shturmovyky-yaki-zahodyat-zi-storony-voroga-jdut-v-odyn-kinecz/; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25796; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33705[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25796; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33705[51] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33718[53] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6671[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02EKRqKygF3FjPUGQPw1iHs45miEQ1V1CV7LhwFn5HsSRV1M3Dn3mMvvMqQVT7qZ31l; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/25460[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14038[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158877[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/14029[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/na-zaporizhzhi-okupanty-ne-zrobyly-zhodnogo-proryvu-ale-na-ves-svit-krychat-pro-uspihy/[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/14046[61] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20912 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460[62]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0WdxHZis6ef3vttib2tBx21MEmpDQyz5YY2M4Lax4irP4JJ3BFEpsYQ3pgrvWqKrZl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02VbCnSqkJsXUmNfxk9JvAJw3PHo8Y9NAPcYF8C3f9fvVnfv8VUZDLcQvGdxZag9Hl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25460 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67467[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/deokupacziya-dorig-na-pivdni-nashi-piloty-rozbombyly-rosijskyj-blokpost/[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14044; https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/40507 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88557 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/23/na-zaporizhzhi-okupanty-ne-zrobyly-zhodnogo-proryvu-ale-na-ves-svit-krychat-pro-uspihy/[65] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=670581925462152[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/31244[67] https://t.me/kpszsu/31244; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4335 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/26531 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9015 ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/37348 ;https://t.me/dsns_telegram/40045[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/31257[69] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13663[70] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158870
- — Iran Update April 2, 2025
- at 4/2/25 4:26pmRia Reddy, Katherine Wells, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, George Ekmekjian, Faris Almaari, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian armed forces-run Defa Press published a piece on April 2 claiming that Iran "certainly has sufficient weapons" to attack Diego Garcia Island.[1] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island.[2] The piece stated that US Air Force and Navy "strategic assets" and "4000 US soldiers" at Diego Garcia would be "at risk of complete destruction" if the United States attacked Iran.[3] There are normally roughly 400 US military personnel and 2,000 civilian contractors at Diego Garcia.[4] The article outlined the following options for an Iranian attack on US assets at Diego Garcia.Missile and drone attack: Defa Press stated that Iran could conduct a drone attack "using advanced Shahed 136 drones."[5] Iran unveiled the Shahed-136B drone in September 2024 and claimed it has a range of 4000 kilometers (km).[6] The original Shahed-136 drone has a maximum speed of 185 km per hour, which means it would take about 20 hours to reach Diego Garcia from the southernmost city in Iran. Iran previously launched about 170 drones in their April 2024 attack on Israel, none of which entered Israeli airspace, in part because the drone’s slow speed enabled allied aircraft to intercept and destroy the drones.[7] The drones launched from Iran would have taken roughly nine hours to reach Israel, though Israel had the benefit of a plethora of Israeli and allied land-based aircraft available to intercept drones.[8] Defa Press also stated that Iran could use ballistic and cruise missiles, including Khorramshahr ballistic missiles, at "close range" to Diego Garcia.[9] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles and ability to manufacture some advanced ballistic missiles have been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but Iran would presumably expend a large proportion of its remaining stockpile in the event of a strike on its nuclear facilities.[10] Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of its drones and missiles or otherwise alter the weight of the drones and missiles themselves to launch a land-based attack with sufficient range to hit Diego Garcia.Naval drone and missile attack launched from surface vessels: Defa Press also threatened that Iran could hit targets in the Indian Ocean using surface vessels, presumably its drone carriers and others, to launch cruise missiles and drones.[11] This would—in theory—allow Iranian ships to get closer to Diego Garcia. Such vessels lack the necessary countermeasures to seriously defend themselves against US naval action, however.Iran still retains a large number of short-range ballistic missiles that it could use to strike other US bases in the Middle East, however. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened in recent weeks to attack US bases and forces in the Gulf countries.[12] An unspecified Iranian official told the Wall Street Journal that "each American soldier will be an individual target" if the United States attacks Iran.[13] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Aerospace Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh similarly stated that the United States has "at least 10 bases and over 50,000 troops" near Iran that Iran could target.[14] Iran has previously attacked US bases in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and the Houthis have previously targeted al Dhafra Airbase in Abu Dhabi, which hosts US and French personnel.[15]Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah.[16] Hezbollah has probably long used its international networks to procure some weapons and drone components, though it could decide to prioritize these efforts after the collapse of Assad and the setbacks caused by Israel.[17]These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.[18] Spanish media reported that the three individuals arrested on April 1 resided on the same street as another group of Hezbollah-affiliated individuals that Spanish police detained in 2024 for producing over 1,000 drones for Hezbollah.[19] Spanish media noted that the investigation that led to the arrest of the three individuals on April 1 has also led to the arrests of an unspecified number of individuals in France and the United Kingdom.[20]The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.[21] The SDF agreed to withdraw from two historically Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 1.[22] An interim government official said that the withdrawal agreement is the first step toward the comprehensive agreement between the SDF and interim government.[23] Local sources subsequently reported that the SDF withdrew from the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge on April 2, where they have fought the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) since December 2024.[24] An anti-SDF source also claimed that the SDF would withdraw from Deir Hafer, Nasiriyah, and Maskanah south of the dam along Highway 4 after leaving Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[25] Syrian sources, including those close to the intern government, claimed that the SDF’s withdrawal was the result of “a preliminary agreement” to create a demilitarized zone around frequent engagement sites.[26] A “special administration,” possibly consisting of dam employees, will be in control of the Tishreen Dam area.[27] Dam employees were allowed to remain in the area to permit the electrical plant to continue its regular functions during the last ceasefire agreement between the SDF and the SNA in December 2024.[28] Syrian Kurdish sources have refuted the reports that the SDF withdrew from its positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[29] Official SDF and interim government sources have not commented on the rumored SDF withdrawal or agreement at the time of this writing.Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continued to threaten US bases and forces, likely to try to discourage a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid US threats to strike these facilities. Iranian media said that Iran could attack Diego Garcia using very long-range one-way attack drones or by using a naval surface combatant to launch drones and cruise missiles.Hezbollah Reconstitution: Hezbollah may be using networks abroad to help it reconstitute its military capabilities in Lebanon. Spanish security forces detained three individuals residing in Barcelona, Spain, on April 1 on suspicion of purchasing drone components on behalf of Hezbollah. These individuals are likely part of a larger, Spain-based Hezbollah cell that has been procuring drone parts through European front companies for Hezbollah since at least 2015.SDF-Syrian Interim Government Agreement: The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and interim government appear to be reaching a series of agreements to redistribute territory after signing a comprehensive ceasefire on March 10.SyriaThe Syrian interim government is attempting to address local concerns amid continued murders and violence committed by government-backed forces. Two interim Syrian government soldiers assassinated the mukhtar, or village head, of Harf al Benmira and five other men present in his home on March 31.[30] The local Syrian security force commander reported that the perpetrators were from a police unit in the al Dinsa area of Tartous and that the perpetrators had been arrested on March 31.[31] The interim government removed all those associated with the violence in Harf al Benmira from al Dinsa on March 31.[32] The group based in al Dinsa was also reportedly firing their weapons into the air and the sea, which caused fear among local residents and a breakdown in relations between the residents and local security forces.[33] The Syrian Civil Peace Commitee, which Syrian President Ahmed al Shara created after the spate of sectarian violence on the Syrian coast in early March, visited Harf al Benmira to update the community on the government‘s efforts to seek justice.[34] Committee member Dr. Anas Ayrouth, who Shara recently appointed to the Supreme Fatwa Council, told the community that the assailants have been "referred to the judiciary.”[35] Ayrouth’s statement is a positive step, but it will need to be backed by public, transparent trials that demonstrate to the local population that suspects are being held accountable.Israel reneged on its promise on April 2 to provide Israeli work visas to Syrian Druze agricultural workers.[36] Israel previously announced it would provide work visas to "dozens“ of Syrian Druze to work on various agricultural and construction projects in the Golan Heights.[37] Israel has increased diplomatic outreach to the Druze community in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime, such as by facilitating the visit of clerics from Syria to a religious shrine in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[38] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz directed the IDF on March 3 to ”prepare to defend the Druze community” in response to fighting in Syria.[39] The Druze community is highly diverse, and loyalty to a particular leader within the community varies across Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[40]Syrian General Security forces arrested two former Assad regime members who attempted to carry out an attack on a security checkpoint in Bustan al Dour, Damascus City.[41] Syrian security forces seized at least two handguns, several grenades, and forged military IDs from the two attackers.[42] A Syrian source reported that the two individuals were former members of the ”National Defense Forces” and another Baathist anti-Israel militia.[43] The ”National Defense Forces” was a Baathist paramilitary organization trained by Iran and Hezbollah that functionally became part of the Assad regime in 2014.[44]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentA Syrian Kurd militant attacked an Assyrian festival with an axe in Duhok City on April 1, injuring at least two people.[45] A video of the militant’s arrest shows that the militant shouted ”dawlat al Islam' (state of Islam), which is distinct from al Dawliya al Islamiya (the Islamic State, or ISIS).[46] A security source told Kurdish media on April 1 that the preliminary investigation indicated that the militant belongs to an unidentified armed group.[47] The militant may have been inspired by ISIS or another armed Salafi jihadi group. An organized group would very likely use small arms or a suicide bomb in an attack of this kind.Turkey continued to target Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions in Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan, on April 1 and 2.[48] Kurdish media reported on April 1 that Turkish forces clashed with PKK fighters near Matin Mountain, Amedi district.[49] The Turkish military reportedly shelled PKK positions near Miwin Valley on April 2.[50]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 22 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 1.[51] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting reported Houthi training facilities east of Mansuriyah District, Hudaydah Governorate.[52] CENTCOM also targeted Houthi sites near Hudaydah Port, including Kamaran Island, for the second consecutive day.[53] A Yemeni journalist circulated a Houthi directive on X, warning civilians in Houthi areas not to document or share information on US airstrikes.[54]The Houthis conducted three combined cruise missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea between March 31 and April 1.[55] The attack did not succeed, and CENTCOM did not acknowledge the attacks. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) separately reported that vessels in the Red Sea experienced global positioning system (GPS) interference for several hours on April 2.[56] USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group also departed Guam on March 28 and is set to replace the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea in the next two weeks.[57]Houthi spokesperson Mohammad Abdulsalam reportedly visited an unspecified location in Saudi Arabia in the final days of Ramadan at the end of March 2025, according to an unspecified source speaking to a Yemeni human rights activist.[58] CTP-ISW cannot confirm this report.The United States sanctioned four Russian-based individuals, one Turkey-based individual, and four Russian entities for facilitating arms procurement for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force-backed Houthi financier Said al Jamal’s network on April 2.[59] The Russia-based Afghan brothers Hushang Ghairat and Sohrab Ghairat procured weapons and diverted stolen Ukrainian grain from Crimea to Yemen in 2024 aboard a vessel from a Hong Kong-based shipping company. Two of the sanctioned individuals are the captains of this vessel, Russian nationals Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Vidanov and Vladimirovich Belyakov. The United States also sanctioned Sohrab’s three Russia-based companies, namely LLC Sky Frame, LLC Edison, and LLC Kolibri Group, and a Turkey-based Iranian national for laundering American dollars and facilitating payments worth millions of dollars for Jamal. The United States sanctioned Jamal in June 2021 for arms procurement for the Houthis and sanctioned his associate, Houthi operative Khaled Hussein Saleh Gaber, in March 2025.[60]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 1,035,000 rials to one US dollar on April 1 to 1,029,000 rials to one US dollar on April 2.[61]The Iranian Defense Ministry showcased new missile, drone, and air defense systems at the Latin America Aerospace and Defense (LAAD) 2025 exhibition in Sao Paulo, Brazil, on April 2.[62] This marked Iran’s first participation in the event, joining 41 countries.[63] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh also attended the exhibition.[64] Iran showcased systems across multiple defense sectors, including cruise missiles, drones, air defense systems, and short-range ballistic missiles.[65] Iran’s participation aligns with its broader aim to increase defense export revenue amid worsening economic conditions.[66] Iran’s military exports were 276 percent higher between 2019 and 2023 compared to the period between 2014 and 2018.[67] Senior Iranian officials, including Armed Force General Staff Chief Major General Bagheri, have repeatedly stated that Iran aims to export military capabilities to ”friendly” countries.[68] Iran’s push for military exports comes as the United States steps up its ”maximum pressure” sanctions, including new efforts to target Iranian oil revenues.[69]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. 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https://www.iswresearch.org/2015/05/the-regime-military-capabilities-part-1.html[45] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9 ; https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907151896563065330[46] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907151896563065330[47] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%88-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9[48] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907189831899443648 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83 ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1195341[49] https://x.com/KurdistanWatch/status/1907189831899443648[50] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D9%80%D9%80%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%88%D9%83 ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1195341[51] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907203702185713977 ; https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907161263534207037 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907161808882085942 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907166031484977472 ;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907171915774747084;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907172029540774155;https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907177897820836303;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907184563715178773;https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907187033098879484;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755[52] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907203702185713977 ;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755 ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1907408945951428755[53] https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1907161263534207037;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907171915774747084; https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1907149741986598917[54] https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1907485671855395010[55] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1907194249663127780[56] https://x.com/UK_MTO/status/1907361793543991703[57] https://news.usni.org/2025/03/28/uss-carl-vinson-departs-guam-for-middle-east-tasking[58] https://x.com/AlmuthannaSaif/status/1907143963858846205[59] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0068[60] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0068,https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0221,https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041[61] bon-bast.com[62] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/13/3284410[63] https://laadexpo dot com.br/defence/en/ ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/13/3284410[64] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6423230[65] https://x.com/IRIran_Military/status/1907176122015772949[66] https://www.wsj.com/world/irans-rise-as-global-arms-supplier-vexes-u-s-and-its-allies-6f205083 ;https://www.iranintl.com/en/202407248345 ; https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/1875433 ;https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-sends-russia-hundreds-ballistic-missiles-sources-say-2024-02-21/[67] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85543801 ; https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf (P.2)[68] https://www.foxnews.com/world/iran-prepared-wholesale-export-weapons-allies-top-general-says ;https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/215319 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/592742[69] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-02/bessent-pushes-banks-for-help-enforcing-maximum-pressure-on-iran
- — Iran Update April 1, 2025
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![[+]](img/ib-marked_nm.png "mark as new")
at 4/1/25 7:09pmKelly Campa, Alexandra Braverman, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, Victoria Penza, Maryam Sadr, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad.[1] The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1.[2] A Lebanese security source told Reuters that Badir was a mid-ranking commander whose responsibilities included the "Palestinian file."[3] Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.”[4]It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack. Hezbollah and Iran may have planned the attack to impose a heavy cost on Israel to try to increase pressure on the IDF to withdraw from the five remaining IDF positions in southern Lebanon.[5] It is also possible that hardline Hezbollah elements who disagree with Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s position of inaction vis-a-vis Israel independently planned this attack.[6] Qassem has repeatedly stated that the Lebanese state, rather than Hezbollah, is responsible for responding to Israeli operations in Lebanon.[7] It is unclear if Hezbollah's central leadership approved the attack plan. It is further possible that Hezbollah and Iran calculated, after suffering significant losses throughout the past year, that they must change their strategy and conduct external terror attacks. The Israeli National Security Council warned on April 1, ahead of the Jewish Passover holiday, that Iran, either directly or through its proxies, may try to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad against the backdrop of renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip.[8] Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security."[9] Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.[10] Hardline Iranian Parliamentarian Ahmad Naderi separately stated on March 31 that the United States "wouldn't dare threaten to bomb" Iran if Iran "had an atomic bomb."[11] Naderi previously made similar statements in November and December 2024.[12] Larijani and Naderi's comments echo recent calls from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials for the Supreme Leader to allow the development of a nuclear weapon.[13] The recent Iranian threats come after US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[14]Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site.[15] This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.[16] Middle East Eye reported that negotiations for the defense pact have "quietly” continued since December 2024.[17] One of the sources said that Turkey plans to deploy Hisar air defense systems and surveillance and attack drones to provide air cover for the base while construction is underway. The Hisar-A and Hisar-O systems are Turkish short- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, respectively.[18] A second unspecified source claimed that the presence of Turkish drones and air defense systems at the base would “likely deter Israel” from conducting strikes in the area.[19] The IDF recently struck “strategic military infrastructure” at Tiyas Airbase on March 21 and 25.[20] The strikes destroyed at least one Su-24 fighter jet and rendered the airstrip unusable.[21] An unspecified Israeli defense official told Israeli media that the IDF conducted these strikes to send a message to Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara that Israel will not tolerate any reduction of its “freedom of action” in Syrian airspace.[22] An unspecified Israeli security official stated on March 31 that a Turkish airbase in Syria would undermine Israel’s freedom to operate in Syria and that Israel would view such a base as a “potential threat.”[23] The location of Tiyas Airbase in the central Syrian desert would allow Turkey to establish “aerial control” over the area and support Turkish counter-ISIS efforts, according to one of the sources speaking to Middle East Eye.[24]Turkey and the Syrian interim government have begun construction efforts at the Menagh Airbase, near the Syria-Turkey border in Aleppo Province, in recent weeks.[25] Turkey may deploy air defense systems and fighter jets to the Menagh Airbase once renovations are complete, according to Syrian media.[26]Key Takeaways:Thwarted Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian Attack: The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) thwarted a Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian plan on April 1 to conduct a “major” attack targeting Israelis abroad. The IDF killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir, who was a member of Hezbollah Unit 3900 and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, in an airstrike in Beirut on April 1. Israeli media reported that Badir, in collaboration with Hamas, had planned an “imminent, large-scale attack abroad” that could have killed “hundreds of Israelis.” It is not immediately clear what Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran sought to achieve by conducting such an attack.Iranian Weaponization Threats: Senior Iranian officials are continuing to threaten nuclear weaponization, likely to try to deter a potential US or Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike these facilities. Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Larijani stated on March 31 that a US or Israeli strike on Iran would "force" Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to "defend its security." Western media reported in January 2025 that Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.Turkish Military Bases in Syria: Turkey reportedly plans to deploy air defense batteries and drones to protect Turkish construction at Tiyas Airbase in central Syria from Israeli airstrikes. Two unspecified sources told the Middle East Eye on April 1 that Turkey has “begun efforts to take control” of Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province and has developed construction plans for the site. This report follows rumors that Turkey seeks to establish airbases at Tiyas Airbase and Palmyra Military Airport as part of a potential defense pact with the Syrian interim government.SyriaThe Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to withdraw its forces and allow Syrian Interim Interior Ministry forces to deploy to Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 1.[27] The SDF has maintained control over these two Kurdish neighborhoods since the fall of the regime. Three representatives from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh’s Civil Council met with the director of the Aleppo Security Directorate on April 1 and agreed that the SDF will withdraw its fighters from the city to areas east of the Euphrates River.[28] The Syrian Interim Interior Ministry will take over security responsibilities in the two neighborhoods and set up two checkpoints in each neighborhood.[29] Kurdish media reported that members of the SDF’s Internal Security Forces (also known as Asayish) from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh will integrate into local police forces under the Interior Ministry.[30] A Kurdish journalist argued that the integration of Asayish members into local police forces will keep the two Kurdish neighborhoods effectively "under Kurdish control.” It is unclear if the Asayish members will command the police units in these neighborhoods. The agreement also stipulates that both the SDF and the Syrian interim government will exchange prisoners who were detained after Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) forces took over Aleppo in December 2024.[31]Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh’s integration into Aleppo City marks the first instance in which the SDF has ceded territory to the Syrian interim government since signing an integration agreement on March 10.[32] The integration process in Aleppo City will likely inform future integration efforts. The April 1 agreement allows Kurdish residents from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh to move freely throughout Aleppo City and stipulates that Kurdish institutions cannot be discriminated against in municipal organizations.[33] There have been numerous security incidents between residents, government forces, and SDF fighters in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh in recent months, and lingering tensions among the population could contribute to instances of friction as the integration unfolds.[34]Syrian media reported that Turkish aircraft struck an SDF position near Tishreen Dam on March 31.[35] This attack marks the first reported Turkish strike on an SDF position since March 23.[36]Alawite and Christian media are circulating reports of attacks that interim government forces have allegedly committed in Christian neighborhoods across Syria. Several social media accounts claimed that unspecified gunmen fired on homes and vehicles in al Qusayr, Homs Province, on March 29.[37] Social media accounts accused interim government forces of conducting a campaign to drive Christians out of the town.[38] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the claims that government forces conducted these attacks. Interim government forces have conducted counter-smuggling operations in al Qusayr since January 2025. Alawite media circulated footage on April 31 that appears to show a convoy of interim government forces driving through al Qassaa, Damascus.[39] Alawite media claimed that the convoy was intended to intimidate civilians in the area.[40] The informational effect generated by these reports supports pro-Assad insurgency efforts to undermine confidence in the Syrian interim government.Southern Syrian media reported that Israeli forces advanced to Mantara Dam, Quneitra Province, on April 1.[41] Israeli forces established several military outposts at the dam. Israel has operated in southern Syria since December 2024 to confront perceived threats to the Israeli state.[42]US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce reiterated on March 31 the United States’ conditions for granting Syria partial sanctions relief.[43] Bruce stated that the Syrian interim government must bar “foreign terrorist fighters” from holding government positions.[44] Bruce added that the interim government must “renounce and suppress terrorism,” prevent Iranian efforts to exploit Syrian territory, destroy any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, and assist efforts to find missing US citizens in Syria.[45] This list of conditions is consistent with the conditions US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi reportedly gave to Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[46] CTP-ISW previously noted that Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him.[47]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentAn Iraqi parliamentarian who reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias submitted a draft proposal to the Iraqi Parliament on April 1 to amend the Iraqi electoral law in a way that would advantage smaller political parties.[48] The Iraqi Parliament has frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections.[49] The draft proposal would alter how the Saint Lague system, which is the electoral system Iraq uses in parliamentary elections, allocates seats to Iraqi political parties.[50] The draft proposal would also divide Basra, Mosul, and Baghdad into two districts but would otherwise maintain the number of electoral districts that Iraq currently has.[51] The Saint Lague system that Iraq used during elections between 2014 and 2020 allocated seats to Iraqi political parties in a way that often disadvantaged smaller parties.[52] Iraq adopted a majoritarian system in 2021 that enabled smaller parties to win more seats in parliament.[53] Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law in 2023 to return Iraq to the previous Saint Lague system, likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the November 2025 elections.[54] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki has called for changing the Iraqi electoral system to a “hybrid” system that would combine multiple electoral districts with the Saint Lague system.[55] The submission of the draft proposal comes after nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia Nationalist Movement would not participate in the November 2025 parliamentary elections.[56]Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara emphasized the need to enhance Iraq-Syria border security during a phone call on April 1.[57] Sudani affirmed Iraq’s support for Syria’s stability and the formation of a new Syrian government, while Shara said that Syria is committed to developing stronger bilateral relations with Iraq.Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani emphasized that Iraq rejects any threats to Iran during a phone call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on April 1.[58] This phone call follows US President Donald Trump’s warning on March 30 that “there will be a bombing” if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[59] This phone call also follows reports that Trump’s recent letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei demanded that Iran dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[60] The PMF is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem al Sadiq said on March 27 that Trump’s demand to dissolve the PMF is “unacceptable” to both Iran and Iraq.[61]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripThe Yemeni Media Minister in Aden, Muammar al Eryani, claimed on March 26 that hundreds of Houthi fighters have formed the “Nasrallah Battalion” in Iraq.[62] Eryani claimed that the battalion is comprised of around 700-1,200 Houthi fighters who fled from Syria to Iraq after the fall of the Assad regime. The director of the Canada-based Iraqi Observatory for Rights and Freedom similarly stated on April 1 that the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) is integrating Houthi fighters from the “Nasrallah Battalion” and Houthi drone and missile experts into PMF units in Diyala, Baghdad, and Jurf al Sakhr.[63] The director was likely referring to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF. Jurf al Sakhr is a previously Sunni town south of Baghdad that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah occupied after committing acts of sectarian cleansing against the previous residents. A CENTCOM airstrike in Jurf al Sakhr in July 2024 killed a Houthi drone expert.[64]These reports, if accurate, would be consistent with the growing Houthi cooperation with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in recent months. The Houthis reportedly operate three offices across Iraq and a training camp in a town controlled by Kataib Hezbollah in Diyala Province, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).[65] RUSI noted on March 19 that PMF fighters have reportedly deployed to Yemen in recent months to train Houthi fighters in combat technology. Iraqi politicians have claimed that the Iraqi federal government seeks to limit Houthi military activity in Iraq out of concern for potential US action against the Houthis in Iraq.[66]US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 27 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 31.[67] CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting the Houthis’ al Dailami Airbase near Sanaa International Airport.[68] CENTCOM also targeted Houthi sites near Jabal al Nabi Shuyab in Bani Matar District, Sanaa Governorate, and on Kamran Island, Hudaydah Governorate.[69]The Houthis claimed on March 31 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone between Majzar District, Marib Governorate, and al Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate, in northeastern Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen.[70] The Houthis claimed that they have shot down 16 US drones since the start of the October 7 War.[71] The Houthis published footage that purportedly shows the debris of the intercepted drone.[72] CTP-ISW cannot verify the Houthis’ claim.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 1,033,000 rials to one US dollar on March 31 to 1,035,000 rials to one US dollar on April 1.[73]The United States sanctioned six entities and two individuals based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and China on April 1 as part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.[74] The United States sanctioned these entities and individuals for procuring components for Iranian companies involved in the Iranian drone and missile programs, including Qods Aviation Industries and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group.The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. 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https://x.com/idfonline/status/1904373127896805728; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/139671; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1903535555419210126[22] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-848349[23] https://www.jpost dot com/middle-east/article-848349 [24] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-moves-take-control-syrias-strategic-t4-air-base-sources[25] https://x.com/clashreport/status/1901562987992752248 ; https://npasyria dot com/208096/[26] https://x.com/clashreport/status/1901562987992752248 ; https://npasyria dot com/208096; https://x.com/thiqanewsagency/status/1897595848059388302[27] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714[28] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714; https://www.rudaw dot net/turkish/kurdistan/010420253 [29] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714[30] https://x.com/ScharoMaroof/status/1907008948479074600; https://www.rudaw dot net/turkish/kurdistan/010420253 [31] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714 [32] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/593[33] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23714 [34] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1875549511730524572; https://x.com/Charles_Lister/status/1907091041557029175; https://x.com/DeirEzzore/status/1883482361473433947; https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1898866796511604958[35] https://x.com/SOHEB2019/status/1906860993365352826[36] https://x.com/SiyamandAli/status/1903747611082764775[37] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1907051652705591773 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122113569512800443&id=61574013302761 ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=650448781049469&id=100082530592402 ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906978455519981806 ; https://www.facebook.com/CoastSyrian24/posts/122115609530795072 ;[38] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1907051652705591773[39] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906804541196251618[40] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906804541196251618[41] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1577524586296852 ; https://www.facebook.com/EremNewsME/posts/989071390046002[42] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-wont-allow-hts-forces-southern-syria-netanyahu-says-2025-02-23/[43] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-31-2025/#post-622133-SYRIA [44] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-31-2025/#post-622133-SYRIA [45] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-31-2025/#post-622133-SYRIA [46] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/ [47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-26-2025 [48] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/521029/%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7 ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/coordination-framework-militias-pass-new-anti-lgbtq-legislation[49] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate[50] https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1195220[51] https://baghdadtoday dot news/271166-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A7%D8%AA-(%D9%88%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%82.html[52] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate[53] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate[54] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqs-endless-electoral-law-debate[55] https://almadapaper dot net/397838/[56] https://x.com/salih_m_iraqi/status/1905319183518150830 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7[57] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9[58] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/521039/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B2%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6-%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/12/3284220/[59] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing[60] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1905388077448638524[61] https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1905388077448638524[62] https://www dot sabanew.net/story/ar/126833, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiwQEEZ-kCI)[63] https://x.com/adl_alkhza/status/1907058553698869379[64] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/08/05/us-strike-iraq-houthi-drone/[65] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/19/houthi-yemen-trump-iran-hezbollah-assad-gaza-airstrikes/[66] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B6%D9%8A%D9%87[67] https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1906785120515686652;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906777425213595890;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906855668725731365;https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3459280.htm[68] https://x.com/Alhadath_Ymn/status/1906785120515686652[69] https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3459280.htm ; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906777425213595890[70] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906822000657437018/photo/2 ; https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1906836082542485884[71] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906822000657437018/photo/2[72] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1907100648208007670[73] bon-bast.com[74] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0066 - — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2025
- at 4/1/25 5:42pmAngelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Anna Harvey, Karolina Hird, and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate TrotterApril 1, 2025, 5:45pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:30 am ET on April 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity.[1] Sybiha stated on April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times.[2] The ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes.[4] US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited to longer-range weapons.[5] Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting "some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the war.[6] Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the resolution of the war.[9] Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).[10] US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary administration" in Ukraine.[11] Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March 18.Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself.[12] Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novolyubivka).[13] Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right) bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last three months.[14] Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east (left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations.[15] Russian milbloggers and Mashovets have consistently credited elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with making the initial advances onto the west bank and then expanding this bridgehead.[16]Russian forces appear to be leveraging a significant manpower advantage to make advances in the area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 31 that Russian forces have almost exclusively conducted infantry assaults in the area since January 2025 and rarely use armored vehicles in the area.[17] ISW has also not observed footage of any notable Russian mechanized assaults in the area in 2025. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on March 31 that Russian forces intensified infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and have significantly more infantry in the area, mostly including well-trained contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[18] Another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on March 24 that Russian forces have a 10-to-one manpower advantages over Ukrainian forces in some areas of this direction.[19] The Russian military command appears to be reinforcing and replacing manpower losses among frontline units of the 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions, as these formations have been in the area since at least 2023 and do not appear to have withdrawn for rest and reconstitution at any point.[20]Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months. Russian forces initially focused on advancing from Ivanivka towards Kolodyazi (southwest of Ivanivka) in the general direction of Lyman but recently appear to have refocused their efforts on advancing northwest of Ivanivka towards Nove and Katerynivka in the general direction of Borova.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 that Russian forces are attempting to connect their bridgehead near Novolyubivka with a smaller bridgehead on the west bank near Makiivka (approximately eight kilometers away).[22] Russian forces may be attempting to unite these bridgeheads to create a stable salient to support attacks southeast of Borova. Russian forces have recently struggled to advance east and southeast of Borova after advancing northeast of the settlement in January 2025, and the Russian forces may be creating the salient northeast of Lyman to support future offensive operations against the southern tip of the Novoserhiivka-Druzhelyubivka-Novyi Myr line (east to southeast of Borova).[23] The Russian military command may attempt to outflank Ukrainian defenses in these settlements in order to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw and enable Russian advances east of and into Borova in the coming months.Russian forces may also attempt to leverage the expansion of the bridgehead on the west bank of the Zherebets River near Ivanivka to support future Russian operations to seize Lyman. Russian forces may attempt to advance toward Karlivka from Nove and toward Drobysheve from Kolodyazi in an effort to establish defensible positions along the Karlivka-Shandryholove-Drobysheve line (on the east bank of the Nitrius River). Russian forces could attempt to leverage such advances along the Nitrius River to challenge Ukrainian positions in Lyman from the northeast. Russian forces may also simultaneously attempt to intensify offensive operations near Torske (east of Lyman) to push on Lyman from the east. Further Russian advances towards Borova and Lyman are part of an enduring Russian effort to push Ukrainian forces from positions on the east bank of the Oskil River and attack further into western Kharkiv Oblast and set conditions to attack the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the north.[24]Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have been trying to seize the last one percent of Luhansk Oblast (about 266 square kilometers) since late November 2024. Russian forces first seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast on July 3, 2022, but Ukrainian forces later pushed Russian forces back from the Luhansk Oblast administrative border during Ukraine’s Fall 2022 counteroffensive.[25] Russian officials have long cited the seizure of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a goal of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and have repeatedly demanded international recognition of Russia’s annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as a condition of peace, although Russian forces do not fully control any of these oblasts.[26] The Kremlin would likely exploit the second seizure and retention of Luhansk Oblast to gain leverage during ongoing ceasefire negotiations and future peace negotiations, which ISW continues to assess as a key motivating factor for Russian forces recently intensified ground activity in Ukraine.[27] The Kremlin could also leverage the seizure of Luhansk Oblast as a significant victory to its domestic audience and to justify years of brutal personnel losses in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are intentionally stalling the ceasefire and peace negotiations in hopes of gaining more territory to leverage during future peace negotiations.[28]Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.[29] The delayed salary increase in 2026 likely seeks to further secure loyalty from regional leaders amid Russia's continued uncertainty about Russia’s future, in particular, Russia’s sustained war efforts and the Russian economy’s macroeconomic health. The decision to implement this change in 2026 as opposed to immediately could provide the Kremlin time to rebalance its budget and gather resources to sustain the spending increase, as the Russian government already approved Russia’s 2025 budget in late 2024. Putin signed a decree in December 2024 approving the 2025 federal budget and the 2026–2027 draft federal budget, which would prioritize spending on Russia's national security and defense.[30] Putin did not sign such a decree sooner likely due to Russia's ongoing economic strain from the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues to face staggering costs required to maintain its war effort against Ukraine, with mounting economic strain, labor shortages, and systemic corruption threatening the sustainability of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).[31]Key Takeaways:Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months.Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on April 1 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in Novohorivka, occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and Smorodino, Belgorod Oblast on March 31.[32]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border amid continued Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[33]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 that Russian forces seized Guyevo (south of Sudzha), Kursk Oblast, and Veselivka and Volodymyrivka, Sumy Oblast (both north of Sumy City). [34]Russian sources claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Basivka and Zhuravka and south of Sudzha near Guyevo on April 1.[35]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[36]Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[37]Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 that fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[38]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on April 1 but did not advance.[39]An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 1 that Russian forces have become more active near Vovchansk in the past three weeks (since roughly March 11), likely because Russian forces recently transferred new reinforcements to the area.[40] The officer stated that Russian forces have been conducting mechanized assaults using armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and tanks. The officer also noted that Russian forces recently intensified guided glide bomb strikes on Vovchansk.A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on March 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk air defense system in Kharkiv Oblast on an unspecified date between March 23 and March 29.[41]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 1 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced into Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) and Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Fyholivka and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 31 and April 1.[43]A Ukrainian deputy regimental commander stated on April 1 that Russian forces are attempting to build pontoon crossings and transfer equipment to the west bank of the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[44] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces have increased guided glide bomb strikes on Kupyansk in an attempt to strike Ukrainian personnel and equipment concentrations and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area.Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlaykivka and east of Borova near Nadiya on March 31 and April 1 but did not advance.[45]See topline text for reports of Russian activity in the Lyman direction.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 that Russian forces advanced 300 meters near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[46]Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 31 and April 1.[47] Ukraine's Luhansk Group of Forces reported on March 29 that Russian forces recently conducted a series of assaults using civilian vehicles and a dozen motorcycles with armored vehicle support in fields east of Ivano-Darivka and west of Zolotarivka (east of Siversk).[48]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 1 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on March 31 and April 1.[49]Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 that Russian forces advanced northwest and southwest of Novomarkove (north of Chasiv Yar).[50]A commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 31 that Russian forces are attempting to move around the area via pipelines.[51] The commander also noted that Russian forces only conduct assaults with armored vehicle support during foggy or rainy conditions, when Ukrainian forces' ability to use drones to detect moving armored vehicles is inhibited.A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on April 1 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault comprised of at least three armored vehicles, 18 motorcycles, and two other vehicles.[52]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on April 1 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 and April 1 that Russian forces advanced north of Toretsk near Druzhba, near the Tsentralna Mine in southwestern Toretsk, and to the outskirts of Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk).[54]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk in the direction of Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka, Oleksandropil, and Valentynivka on March 31 and April 1.[55]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 31 that Russian forces are intensifying assaults on the northern flank of Toretsk.[56]An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 1 that small Russian infantry groups are attempting to advance as far as possible within Toretsk and consolidate their positions.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[58]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Bohdanivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that southern and northwestern Uspenivka are contested "grey zones," that Russian forces advanced southeast of Bohdanivka, and that elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) advanced near Kotlyarivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[60]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Oleksandropil; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Promin, Kalynove, and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Serhiivka, Shevchenko, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Preobrazhenka, Uspenivka, Udachne, Sribne, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, Horikhove, and Bohdanivka on March 31 and April 1.[61] Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shevchenko.[62]Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault west of Preobrazhenka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[63]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 1 that Russian forces are focusing their attacks east of Pokrovsk and shifting away from efforts to envelop the town from the west.[64] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Pokrovsk and are using motorcycles, buggies, and electric scooters to make up for armored vehicle shortages. Trehubov also stated that Russian forces are using electric scooters, Soviet-era T-55 tanks, and civilian cars to transport personnel to the frontline in order to minimize personnel losses due to Ukrainian drone strikes.[65] The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 1 that Russian forces do not use armored vehicles in the direction, instead attacking on foot and with various drone types.[66] The battalion commander stated that Russian forces have a five-to-one artillery advantage compared to Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[67]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[68]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 31 and April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and that Russian forces recently seized Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized regiment) with the seizure of Rozlyv.[70]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 1 that Russian forces recently advanced near Bahatyr and Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove).[71]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 31 and April 1.[72]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Zorya (northwest of Kurakhove).[73]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 1 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Dniproenerhiya (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and east and south of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[74]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske and Dniproenerhiya; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and Novopil on March 31 and April 1.[75] Geolocated footage published on March 31 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a platoon-sized mechanized assault with three armored vehicles southeast and east Skudne (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) but did not advance.[76]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 1 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 and April 1 that Russian forces advanced northwest of Robotyne near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Lobkove, Kamyanske, and Stepove.[77] A milblogger claimed that positional fighting near Kamyanske is turning into meeting engagements, suggesting that the combat has recently become more active.[78] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in southern Lobkove and southwest of Stepove toward northern and central Lobkove.[79] The milblogger also claimed Russian forces are pushing Ukrainian forces out of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne) toward Novoandriivka (northwest of Robotyne).[80]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 31 and April 1 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Stepove.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 and April 1 that fighting continued near Kamyanske and toward Lobkove.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 1 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked Russian forces near Stepove and Lobkove.[83]Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on April 1 that Russian forces recently are increasingly moving military equipment towards the frontline via occupied areas of Zaporizhia Oblast, particularly Melitopol.[84] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on March 15 and 18 that Russian forces may conduct an offensive operation in southern Ukraine, and the movement of military equipment to the Melitopol area may be an indicator of preparations for such offensive operations.[85]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction but did not advance.Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 31 and April 1 that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Dnipro direction.[86]A Russian milblogger posted footage on April 1 purportedly showing Russian forces using fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near the Antonivka Road Bridge that runs between Oleshky (southeast of Kherson City on the east bank of the Dnipro River) and Antonivka (directly east of Kherson City on the west bank of the Dnipro River).[87]Order of Battle: Elements of the 337th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[88]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 31 to April 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles in the Zaporizhia direction.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed both missiles. This is the first Russian overnight strike series in months that did not include any Shahed or decoy drones.Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russian forces conducted twice as many long-range drone strikes against Kharkiv City in March 2025 compared to February 2025.[90] Terekhov added that Russian forces started using swarms of Shahed drones to strike residential areas, critical infrastructure, and business facilities in recent weeks, followed by “double tap” strikes targeting first responders.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/6995[2] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/984327-rf-vdarila-po-energoobektu-u-hersoni-bez-elektriki-zalisilis-45-tisac-ludej-sibiga/[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925[4] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13545[5] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-russia-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/03/outcomes-of-the-united-states-and-ukraine-expert-groups-on-the-black-sea/ ; https://x.com/rustem_umerov/status/1904549709349339531; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76526 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76534[6] https://interaffairs dot ru/news/show/50973 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308849 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308850[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/indicators-and-thresholds-russian-military-operations-ukraine-andor-belarus[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2025[11] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-31-2025/#post-622133-RUSSIAUKRAINE[12] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8788; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/1724;[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2025[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis[17] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/31/prosto-v-sportyvnyh-shtanyah-bigayut-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-masovo-utylizuyut-svoyih-pihotyncziv/[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7163[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2025 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22182 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/68062[22] https://t.me/yurasumy/22182[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2025[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-winter-spring-2024-offensive-operation-kharkiv-luhansk-axis ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625[25] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignJuly3; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102422; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct3[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010925[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar033125; 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https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26292[47]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAsL35JfXMpUUyfVXaw3NxHsBBevbdh1dYFEoKHnrgAaK3Dgg9VpJrYyG9cRKVFHl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26292 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22180 ;[48] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26939 ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/575[49] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAsL35JfXMpUUyfVXaw3NxHsBBevbdh1dYFEoKHnrgAaK3Dgg9VpJrYyG9cRKVFHl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216[50] https://t.me/yurasumy/22180[51] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/31/distayut-rosiyan-navit-u-trubah-drony-na-optovolokni-pokazaly-svoyu-efektyvnist-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku/[52] https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1906969901333729729 ; https://www.facebook.com/5th.SAB/videos/636552925832232/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/01/proryv-v-odyn-kinecz-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-znyshhyly-18-motoczyklistiv/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=636552925832232 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7217[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26282; https://t.me/mod_russia/50784[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/68062; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159853; https://t.me/yurasumy/22178[55] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216; https://t.me/yurasumy/22178; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KAsL35JfXMpUUyfVXaw3NxHsBBevbdh1dYFEoKHnrgAaK3Dgg9VpJrYyG9cRKVFHl[56] https://suspilne dot media/983089-tramp-rozlucenij-na-putina-u-nyt-rozpovili-pro-reakciu-ssa-na-potoplenna-moskvi-ta-kursku-operaciu1132-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1743445193&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/31/mozhlyvo-boyatsya-shturmuvaty-v-lob-u-toreczku-vorog-atakuye-pivnichni-kvartaly-mista/[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/01/stara-vagnerivska-taktyka-shho-maskuyut-rosiyany-pid-guchnoyu-nazvoyu-shturmy/[58] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18633 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1906951198978003193[59] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907110727292182854; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/201; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907112092630384804[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26273; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33964; https://t.me/yurasumy/22176[61] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216; https://t.me/yurasumy/22176[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89187[63] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907087383050289222; https://t.me/BULAVA72b/201; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907104287907270988; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1907110727292182854[64] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/01/bajkerskyj-klub-yakyjs-na-shidnomu-fronti-rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-vse-bilshe-ekzotychnoyi-tehniky/[65] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/984173-ce-skorise-vid-vidcau-comu-armia-rf-vikoristovue-elektrosamokati-na-doneccini-poasnenna-vid-recnika-osuv-hortica/[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/01/vorozha-taktyka-myasa-rosiyany-suiczydnyky-ta-prynczyp-bojovogo-trykutnyka-intervyu-kombata-pro-pokrovskyj-napryamok/[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/01/vorozha-taktyka-myasa-rosiyany-suiczydnyky-ta-prynczyp-bojovogo-trykutnyka-intervyu-kombata-pro-pokrovskyj-napryamok/[68] https://t.me/milinfolive/145308[69] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1907018345594929465v; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1907013744175010050; https://t [dot] me/WarArchive_ua/26918; https://t.me/oaembr46/1422; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1906789009725997314; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1906757788996685834; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1906789009725997314; https://x.com/creamy_caprice/status/1906757788996685834; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1906775199086997940; https://t.me/voin_dv/14172; https://x.com/albafella1/status/1906782215700095060; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1906891296503112069; https://t.me/mod_russia/50793[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/50793 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50795 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50797[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/22175[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7216[73] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13617[74] https://t.me/yurasumy/22175[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ZQpqf5GLDSQtX54fnBLu5QofvuqydEAj7ZSWeE8PEqYTTyabGahLcxWbi9d8337Sl[76] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26919; https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/973[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/68062 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63239 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26282[78] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63239[79] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63239[80] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63239[81] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ZQpqf5GLDSQtX54fnBLu5QofvuqydEAj7ZSWeE8PEqYTTyabGahLcxWbi9d8337Sl https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63239; https://t.me/wargonzo/25662[83] https://t.me/dva_majors/68062[84] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17910[85] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032725[86] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Jcm5VVQvanXVrtfcdpuTqD6kUpqaQe71QtaZ1W2yXffiE8ezeQd411GNdJ9W9DmQl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0YWx5Pa8HPxF6BmGMx57bbFYUrED7aU7h1gg2bLXn29B8ghFqbxi1B7z5DGXzXtwKl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0ZQpqf5GLDSQtX54fnBLu5QofvuqydEAj7ZSWeE8PEqYTTyabGahLcxWbi9d8337Sl[87] https://t.me/milinfolive/145305[88] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2266[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/31730[90] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/984333-rf-obstriluvala-harkiv-u-berezni-vdvici-castise-aniz-u-lutomu-ak-rosiani-zminili-taktiku/ ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2292
- — Iran Update March 27, 2025
- at 3/31/25 7:24pmRia Reddy, Siddhant Kishore, Kelly Campa, Annika Ganzeveld,Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Katherine Wells,Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Alexis Thomas, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations.[1] Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Trump sent a letter to Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran's nuclear program, and Iran responded to the letter via Oman on March 26.[2] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran is open to indirect talks with the United States, though it rejects direct negotiations under the current US “maximum pressure” campaign and US-Israeli threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard stated on March 25 that Trump's letter to Iran proposed "direct talks" and emphasized that "there would be military consequences if there were no direct negotiations."[3] It is unclear if Iran's openness to indirect negotiations will fulfill US conditions to grant sanctions relief or avoid military action against Iran's nuclear program.This likely suggests that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has approved indirect negotiations with the United States. Araghchi said that Iran conducted such indirect talks under former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Adviser Kamal Kharazi, have also recently expressed willingness to engage in indirect negotiations with the United States.[4] That Kharazi spoke to state media may suggest that Iranian officials are concerned about internal unrest over Iran’s economic situation and want to signal to the Iranian population that the regime is willing to take steps to secure economic relief.[5]The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors (see graphic below). A media official from the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria told Lebanese media on March 27 that the group does not receive “internal or external” support from Iran or Iranian-backed actors in the region.[6] The official described the group as an “integrated organization” with political, social, military, and legal offices.[7] There is no evidence that the group has any affiliations with external actors, but it is unclear why an independent local actor would decide to use iconography that many Syrians and people in the region and the world widely associate with Iran and its proxies and partners.[8] The group initially established itself on January 8 as the "Southern Liberation Front” and used red, green, and black text over a grey map of Syria as its logo until January 12, when it changed to the current logo.[9]The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria said it communicated with the Coastal Shield Brigades, a sectarian Alawite insurgent group in western Syria, but broke off communications after the Coastal Shield Brigades launched its military offensive in early March.[10] The media official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria opposed the killing of any Syrians, indicating that the group is attempting to present itself as cross-sectarian. The official also referred to the current government as an ”internal enemy,” suggesting that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria is opposed to the current government and may hold Assadist views.[11] The official said that the Islamic Resistance Front in Syria cannot conduct many operations due to the interim government’s ”movements.” Fourteen members of the group have been killed in operations against the Israelis, however.[12]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran responded on March 26 to US President Donald Trump's letter proposing nuclear negotiations. Iran signaled it is open to indirect nuclear negotiations with the United States but rejects direct negotiations under the current conditions. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has likely approved indirect negotiations with the United States but rejected direct negotiations.Anti-Government Militias in Syria: The Islamic Resistance Front in Syria, which is an anti-Israel militia, claimed that it is an independent Syrian militia. It is abnormal that an independent militia would use iconography widely associated with Iranian-backed actors. This group also referred to the interim government as an “internal enemy” and communicated with other anti-government insurgents in western Syria before early March.SyriaTwo Syrian journalists reported that Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara is expected to appoint some Syrian minorities as ministers in his transitional government in the coming days. Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi reported on March 26 that Shara’s appointments will include members of Syria’s Arab, Kurdish, Sunni, Alawite, Christian, and Druze communities.[13] Another Syrian journalist reported that Shara has appointed Hind Qabawat as Minister of Social Affairs.[14] Qabawat is a Christian who has spent years promoting interfaith tolerance, women’s rights, and conflict resolution in Syria.[15] The journalist reported that the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade will be Nidal al Shaar, who formerly served in the position under Assad until 2012.[16] Syrian White Helmets head Raed al Saleh will reportedly lead a department dedicated to emergency response and reconstruction.[17] Shara is expected to announce all 22 ministers before March 30.[18] Shara’s appointments will be a strong indicator of the sort of government and state Shara intends to lead.A Damascus-based outlet reported on March 27 that Shara will also soon announce the members of a fatwa council.[19] Syrian outlet Voice of the Capital reported that Shara will announce his five appointments to the council when he announces the other ministerial appointments.[20] The Syrian constitutional declaration does not define the fatwa council‘s role within the state, though it establishes that the country’s laws will be based on Islamic jurisprudence.[21] Shara’s rumored appointees include several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun and Mazhar al Wais.[22] Both Atun and Wais have been affiliated with Shara and HTS since at least 2017.[23] Voice of the Capital also reported that Shara will appoint National Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim, who previously led the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s (SNA) Moral Guidance Department and recently swore allegiance to Shara at the January 29 Victory Conference.[24] Sheikh Osama al Rifai is also expected to join the council.[25] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[26] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[27] HTS established a High Council of Fatwa in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[28] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will remain unclear until he officially announces the council’s members.The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Air Force reportedly struck Syrian military infrastructure in Latakia Province on March 26.[29] The IDF reportedly conducted six consecutive airstrikes targeting military sites, including weapon depots, in the al Bayda Port.[30] Syrian media reported that the IDF also struck the 110th Naval Brigade in Ras Shamra, northern Latakia Province.[31] The IDF previously struck al Bayda Port on December 10 and 11 and destroyed Syrian naval vessels and anti-ship missiles.[32] The IDF has not commented on these airstrikes at this time of writing.The Syrian government is probably engaging China to secure Chinese support for the transition. Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed bilateral relations with a Chinese delegation led by the Chinese Ambassador to Syria Shi Hongwei in Damascus on March 26.[33] The delegation reaffirmed China’s support for Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence during the meeting. Shaibani expressed his interest in enhancing cooperation with China.[34] This is the second official visit by a Chinese delegation to Syria since the fall of the Assad regime.[35]Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) did not engage the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on March 27.The SDF claimed that Turkey began to build additional military bases in northern Syria on March 27.[36] The SDF said that Turkey has transported military equipment and building supplies to construct watchtowers, tank and artillery fortifications, and headquarters in areas of Syria held by the SNA.[37] The SDF said that the bases are near southeast of Manbij and near Qara Qozak along the Euphrates River.[38] CTP-ISW has not yet observed any construction in these areas. A Turkish Defense Ministry spokesperson said that Turkey may establish a military base in Syria to assist the Syrian government.[39] This likely refers to a base for training and capacity-building rather than a firebase designed to support SNA operations against the SDF.The interim Interior Ministry detained several Lebanese Hezbollah cell members in Sayyida Zainab, Rif Dimashq Province, on March 27.[40] The Interior Ministry said that the Hezbollah cells planned to conduct “criminal operations” in the area.[41] It is unclear if “criminal operations” refers to drug trade or insurgent anti-Damascus activity. Iranian-backed militias and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps controlled the Sayyida Zainab Shrine area during the Assad regime, making it unsurprising that some Hezbollah personnel remain in the area. The interim government took control of the Sayyida Zainab Shrine in December 2024.[42]Likely Alawite insurgents attacked an interim government security checkpoint near Salnafah, Latakia Province, on March 26.[43] Alawite insurgents previously attacked a security forces checkpoint near Salnafah on March 9.[44]Syrian security forces seized a large quantity of weapons and combat equipment from pro-Assad insurgents in old Damascus City on March 26.[45] The seized weapons and equipment included rockets, explosives, night vision equipment, communication devices, and ammunition.[46] Security forces also arrested several individuals affiliated with the Assad regime during the operation.[47] Security forces have consistently conducted operations against Assadist insurgents in Damascus and its surrounding areas since January 2025.[48]IraqAxis of Resistance Objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentThe Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, which is led by a member of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, called for removing the Popular Mobilization Authority Law from the parliamentary agenda.[49] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law differs from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Service and Retirement Law, which Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew from the parliamentary agenda on March 12.[50] The PMF Service and Retirement Law requires Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh to retire, while the Popular Mobilization Authority Law allows Fayyadh to continue serving as PMC chairman for “an indefinite period” and grants Fayyadh a ministerial rank.[51] Promoting Fayyadh to a ministerial position would put him on par with other senior Iraqi security officials who hold a ministerial rank, such as the defense minister.The Popular Mobilization Authority Law also reportedly stipulates that unspecified senior PMF officials will receive deputy minister posts in the Iraqi federal government.[52] The PMF includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The appointment of PMF officials to senior government posts could, therefore, further increase Iranian influence in the Iraqi federal government. The Popular Mobilization Authority Law designates the PMF as a “parallel military force” alongside the Iraqi Army and allows Iraqi Army officers to be appointed to senior and mid-ranking positions in the PMF. Sudani and future prime ministers could use this provision to rein in the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the PMF by appointing individuals not affiliated with or loyal to the militias to senior PMF positions. It is unclear if senior PMF officers could also be appointed as commanders in the Iraqi Army.An Iraqi militia formed in January 2025, Kataib Awliya al Haq, threatened to strike US “allies, bases, and embassies” if the US struck Iraq.[53] Iraqi Foreign Minister Faud Hussein acknowledged in an interview on March 22 that a failure to reach an agreement with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, purportedly to avoid striking Israel or US forces in Iraq and Syria, could lead to US or Israeli strikes in Iraq.[54] A Shia politician told Iraqi media on March 19 that the militias may resume unspecified activities due to regional developments, likely in reference to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip or US airstrikes targeting the Houthis.[55] Kataib Awliya al Haq claims to be a part of the “Islamic Resistance,” which is a term typically used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[56] The group’s logo closely resembles other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Saraya Awliya al Dam.[57]Kataib Awliya al Haq announced on January 22 that it would begin unspecified military activities in Iraq and threatened to respond “harshly” to US actions against its fighters.[58] Kataib Awliya al Haq said on January 25 that it would begin military operations and enter Syria to protect Alawites “as soon as possible.”[59] Multiple Iraqi groups have recently formed in response to sectarian violence in Syria.[60] It is not clear if these groups are connected to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 23 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 26.[61] The Houthis conducted a combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 26.[62] The attack did not succeed, and CENTCOM did not acknowledge the attacks.The Houthis launched two separate ballistic missile attacks at Ben Gurion Airport and at unspecified military targets in Tel Aviv on March 27.[63] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted both ballistic missiles before they entered Israeli territory.[64]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelIDF strikes in southern Lebanon suggest that Hezbollah has continued to plan future attacks and rebuild military capabilities in southern Lebanon. The IDF conducted three airstrikes on March 27 that killed multiple Hezbollah fighters, including a Radwan Force battalion commander, in three separate towns in southern Lebanon.[65] The IDF reported that the Radwan Force battalion commander continued to plan operations against Israel after the start of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement in November 2024.[66] The IDF separately reported that one strike targeted Hezbollah fighters transporting weapons approximately 5 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border.[67] Likely Hezbollah fighters launched rockets at northern Israel on March 22.[68]CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 1,026,000 rials to one US dollar on March 26 to 1,032,000 rials to one US dollar on March 27.[69] US Strategic Command reported on March 26 that Iran's nuclear breakout time is "presumably less than one week."[70] This is consistent with the Institute for Science and International Security's assessment, citing International Atomic Energy Agency data from May 2024, that Iran’s breakout timeline for producing a nuclear weapon is about one week.[71]At least some Iranian oil tankers en route to China have slowed or stopped, likely due to US "maximum pressure” sanctions that have targeted Iranian entities and vessels involved in the trade.[72] At least 11 sanctioned tankers carrying nearly 17 million barrels of oil in total now sit idle or are moving very slowly off the coast of Malaysia, according to a Bloomberg report on March 27.[73] Bloomberg also reported that the current backlog is the largest since August 2024. The slowdown highlights growing logistical challenges in Iran’s covert oil trade. The sanctions and the shipment slowdown damage the Iranian economy, which relies heavily on energy exports and revenue.Three thousand light and heavy vessels, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy warships, Fast Attack Crafts, Basij forces, and civilian vessels, participated in the naval parade for Quds day on March 26 in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.[74] The bulk of these vessels were small craft. Quds Day is an annual Iranian-established anti-Israel celebration that occurs on the last Friday of Ramadan.[75]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.[1] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85788832[2] https://www.axios.com/2025/03/07/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-letter ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85788832[3] https://www.c-span.org/program/senate-committee/dni-director-gabbard-fbi-director-patel-and-other-national-security-officials-testfy-on-global-threats/657476[4] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404010702954 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/04/3280493/[5] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404010702954[6] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9[7] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9[8] https://t.me/almkaomasy/241 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-4-2025[9] https://t.me/almkaomasy/29; https://t.me/almkaomasy/3[10] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9[11] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9[12] https://www.annahar dot com/arab-world/arabian-levant/204758/%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A3%D8%B3-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A9[13] https://x.com/ibrahimhamidi/status/1905044730188087439[14] https://x.com/THE_47th/status/1905165627511181810[15] https://crdc.gmu.edu/hind-kabawat/ ;https://www.mei.edu/profile/hind-kabawat ;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20150513/103454/HHRG-114-FA00-Bio-KabawatH-20150513.pdf[16] https://x.com/THE_47th/status/1905165627511181810; http://www.sana dot sy/eng/article/233.htm; https://syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5f4c40830010460001d79fd4[17] https://x.com/THE_47th/status/1905165627511181810[18] https://x.com/ibrahimhamidi/status/1905044730188087439; https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/story/832008/damascus-to-announce-new-syrian-government-on-saturday?__cf_chl_tk=rjit.W2D8D6Ls7ai2iaMvwGCM1ZsvfLpt8s6JtyDV84-1743103616-1.0.1.1-Hgac7Z8VWJcULTxATmt7x7UHFlCP.JEEpST9MVk4eGE[19] https://t.me/damascusv011/30023[20] https://t.me/damascusv011/30023 [21] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/623[22] https://t.me/damascusv011/30023 [23] https://www.syrianmemory.org/archive/figures/5cdbf100e2bb8f000177a78c [24] https://x.com/dughaimk/status/1889496826371309971; https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/09/two-movements-in-national-army-consensus-only-in-statements-eyes-on-tahrir-al-sham/ [25] https://t.me/G_CSyriaa/623 [26] https://www.syria dot tv/%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A; https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2024/10/28/%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%a7%d9%85%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a-%d9%87%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d9%84%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b9%d8%a7%d8%a9[27] https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2014/03/damascus-preachers-and-the-armed-rebellion?lang=en ; https://nordicmonitor dot com/2022/03/pro-erdogan-grand-mufti-of-syria-set-up-a-foundation-in-turkey-to-run-schools-including-university/[28] Drevon, Jerome & Haenni, Patrick. 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https://t.me/IqXXrE41gMT8bhiXSDJglU/50026[44] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1898843906550202773[45] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23607 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905011011448426811[46] https://t.me/syrianmoi/23607 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905011011448426811[47] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1905011011448426811 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23598 ; https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/53720[48] https://x.com/HalabTodayTV/status/1876558180215648393 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1876729903397175749 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/135010 ; https://t.me/HalabTodayTV/120448 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/23598[49] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A9 ;https://www.miqpm dot com/Madarik/Memberships_Result.php?ID=3&Committee_ID=42 [50] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86[51] https://almadapaper dot net/399709/[52] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/03/25/iraq-moves-to-give-pmf-greater-role-in-state-security/[53] https://t.me/awlia_alhaq/1180[54] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ar/story/831319/%D9%81%D8%A4%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A1%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A3-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4MaW9AI2yQU[55] https://almadapaper dot net/398982/[56] https://t.me/awlia_alhaq/1166[57] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/01/29/continued-chaos-in-syria-iraqi-militias-and-an-alawite-insurgency/[58] https://t.me/awlia_alhaq/1157[59] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/01/29/continued-chaos-in-syria-iraqi-militias-and-an-alawite-insurgency/[60] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B8%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B8%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%88-2020 ; https://t.me/krarftaah6666/146 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138168[61] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1904982449144078461;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1904983167217353126;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1904984496547516706;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1904984606601793562;https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1904989368500047914;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905041852413141418;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905106943942803508[62] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1905241280822849884[63] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905243862605373639[64] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905221347304669554[65] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905152472571609432 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905187931783823790 ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905293866770497905[66] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905187931783823790[67] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905152472571609432[68] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/at-least-5-rockets-fired-from-lebanon-at-metula-idf-responds-with-artillery-fire/[69] https://www.bon-bast.com/[70] https://www.stratcom.mil/2025-Posture-Statement/[71] https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Analysis_of_May_2024_IAEA_Iran_Verification_Report_May_31_2024_Final.pdf ; https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/06/gov2024-26.pdf[72] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0056 ;https://www.state.gov/sanctions-on-irans-oil-minister-and-shadow-fleet-to-exert-maximum-pressure/ ;https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-entities-purchasing-and-transporting-iranian-oil-to-further-impose-maximum-pressure-on-iran/ ;https://www.state.gov/sanctioning-additional-entities-that-have-traded-in-irans-petroleum/[73] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-27/iran-oil-filled-tankers-build-up-off-malaysia-as-sanctions-mount[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/07/3281751 ;https://sepahnews dot ir/fa/news/24576[75] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2042527 ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/07/3282137
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2025
- at 3/31/25 7:24pmNicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter and William RunkelMarch 27, 2025, 5:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea. Zelensky stated on March 26 that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia must still resolve unspecified "technical" issues related to the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea but did reach agreements on these ceasefires during talks in Saudi Arabia on March 24 and 25.[1] Zelensky added that that the Ukrainian, US, and Russian technical teams have not yet determined the monitoring mechanisms for temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea, which makes it difficult to assess Russia's compliance.[2] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on March 25 that Ukraine regards any movement of Russian military vessels outside of the eastern part of the Black Sea as a violation of the "commitment to ensure safe navigation of the Black Sea."[3] The Kremlin, however, said on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[4] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio acknowledged on March 26 that the European Union (EU) must be involved in lifting sanctions on Russia.[5] European Commission Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia only if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[6]Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated on March 27 that neither Ukraine nor Russia struck each other's energy facilities since March 25, although the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire agreement on the nights of March 25 to 26 and 26 to 27.[7] The temporary ceasefire does not include protections for civilian or non-energy critical infrastructure, and Russian forces have intensified strikes against these objects in recent days.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that on the night of March 26 to 27, Russian forces launched an Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 86 Shahed and other drones from Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones and that 26 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro, Sumy, and Kharkiv cities.[10] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 24 that Russia is intentionally targeting populated cities with drones in order to destroy infrastructure and terrorize the local civilian population.[11] Russian forces have repeatedly conducted large strikes against civilian areas in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Dobropillya, Donetsk Oblast; and Zolochiv, Kharkiv Oblast and port infrastructure in Odesa City since early March 2025 amid discussions of a temporary ceasefire.[12] The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary general ceasefire (which Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly rejected) as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement.[13] Continued Russian strikes on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, even under the conditions of an alleged ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes, will be detrimental to the establishment of a sustainable peace in Ukraine.The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 27 that the Ukrainian drone strike destroyed 96 air-launched cruise missiles and that Russian forces intended to use these missiles in at least three separate strike series against Ukraine on unspecified dates in March and April 2025.[14] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted on March 20 that the Engels Airbase stored Kh-101 cruise missiles, suggesting that many or all of the 96 destroyed missiles were Kh-101s.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Engels Airbase drone strike also destroyed significant aviation fuel reserves that supplied Russian forces operating in Ukraine.[16] Russian forces have frequently used Kh-101 cruise missiles in overnight strike series against Ukraine and notablyhit the Okhmatdyt Children's Hospital in central Kyiv with a Kh-101 missile in July 2024.[17] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi told Ukrainian state news outlet Ukrinform on March 26 that Russia is producing high numbers of Kh-101 and Kaliber cruise missiles and Iskander ballistic missiles to replenish its stockpiles and augment their strike packages with more accurate missiles with higher payloads.[18] Skitbitsky reported that Russia is also producing Kinzhal ballistic missiles and Zirkon hypersonic missiles.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Zelensky told French outlet Le Figaro on March 26 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to delay ongoing peace negotiations to buy time for an offensive against Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in Spring 2025.[19] Zelensky noted that Russian forces wanted to conduct these offensive operations in Fall 2024 but that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024 spoiled this plan. Zelensky warned on March 15 and 18 that Russian forces may be preparing for intensified ground operations in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts, although Ukrainian officials have expressed doubts about Russian forces' ability to conduct successful offensive operations in these areas, particularly against Sumy City.[20] Sumy City had a population of 256,000 in 2022 and is roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline. Putin also recently told Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to "think in the future about creating a security zone" along the Ukrainian-Russian international border, including in Sumy Oblast.[21] Russian forces have been conducting intensified ground assaults within northern Sumy Oblast since early March 2025 as part of their effort to push Ukrainian forces from remaining positions in Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi visited Ukranian forces in Sumy Oblast on March 27 and reported that Russian attacks have intensified in recent days.[22] These Russian assaults are not part of a new offensive effort in Sumy Oblast, although Russian forces could use new positions and momentum gained in the Sumy Oblast border area to support a potential spring offensive operation in northern Sumy Oblast. Russian forces remain unlikely to conduct a successful offensive operation to seize Sumy City but would likely leverage future offensive operations into Sumy Oblast and other oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy to demand that Ukraine cede additional territory to Russia, particularly amid discussions of a potential future peace in Ukraine.[23]Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.[24] Leaders and representatives from 30 countries including the UK, Ukraine, France, and Germany discussed strengthening Ukraine's military and defense industrial base (DIB) to deter future Russian aggression and ensure Ukraine is in the strongest possible position amid ongoing negotiations with Russia.[25] French President Emmanuel Macron stated that coalition members are developing a plan to send "reassurance forces" to "strategic locations" in Ukraine in the event of a peace treaty with Russia.[26] Macron stated that these forces will aim to deter potential Russian aggression against Ukraine and help train Ukrainian forces but will not serve as peacekeepers or be stationed on the frontlines to monitor possible ceasefires.[27] Macron stated that France and the UK will soon send a joint military delegation to Ukraine to assist in long-term Ukrainian military planning.[28] Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reiterated that European countries should not lift sanctions against Russia as Russia continues to occupy and wage war against Ukraine.[29]Key Takeaways:Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated on March 26 that discussions are ongoing about the details of the temporary ceasefire agreements on energy infrastructure strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea.Russia continues to strike Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure under the cover of the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes — which is not in line with US President Donald Trump's goal of using the temporary ceasefire to facilitate a lasting peace in Ukraine.The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the March 19 to 20 Ukrainian drone strike against Russia's Engels Airbase destroyed a large number of cruise missiles and strategic fuel reserves as Ukrainian officials reported that Russia is prioritizing the production of high-precision missiles.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing for a spring offensive in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.Ukraine's European allies met in Paris for a Coalition of the Willing summit on March 27 to discuss their ongoing support for Ukraine, a monitoring system to ensure ceasefire compliance, and the possible deployment of a "deterrent force" in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts; near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk; and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort — Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort — Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and northern Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that elements of the Russian 51st and 137th airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 106th VDV Division) recently seized Gogolevka, Kursk Oblast (west of Sudzha) and the Sudzha border checkpoint (southwest of Sudzha on the international border).[30] Additional geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Basivka, Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[31]Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian advanced southwest of Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha), into northern Guyevo (south of Sudzha), and towards Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized positions near Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy City).[33]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Oleshnya and Gornal (southwest of Guyevo) and that fighting continues in Kursk Oblast near Gogolevka and Oleshnya and in northern Sumy Oblast north of Sumy City near Volodymyrivka and Veselivka and northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Basivka.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Guyevo.[35]South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported on March 27 that the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that North Korean forces suffered 4,000 casualties from the 11,000 troops originally deployed to Russia and that North Korea sent at least 3,000 additional troops to Russia in January and February 2025.[36] Yonhap News Agency reported that North Korea is sending additional missiles, shells, and artillery systems to Russia, including a "considerable amount" of short-range ballistic missiles and roughly 220 170mm artillery systems and 240mm rocket launchers. South Korean news outlet JoongAng reported on February 27, citing multiple sources familiar with the matter, that North Korean forces deployed 1,000 to 3,000 additional personnel to Kursk Oblast between January and February 2025.[37]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a Russian battalion command post of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near Vikorovka and Uspenovka (west of Sudzha).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike killed the commander of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment's 1st Battalion and other unspecified battalion personnel.Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in Belgorod Oblast on March 27 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced within and west of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[39]Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka) and that Ukrainian forces continue to operate near Grafovka (southwest of Demidovka) and Prilesye (south of Demidovka).[40]Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Ukrainian forces struck bridges in Grafovka and Annovka (southwest of Demidovka) to complicate Russian efforts to transfer reinforcements to the area.[41]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[42]Russian Main Effort — Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 — Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 27 but did not advance.[43]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Vovchansk direction and destroyed five Russian armored vehicles.[44] A Russian source claimed on March 27 that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kharkiv direction.[45]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are using networks of underground basements, tunnels, sewer passages, and heating ducts which run two-to-three meters below ground to mass infantry before assaults and store ammunition.[46] The spokesperson added that Russian forces constantly assault Ukrainian positions in the Vovchansk direction.[47]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 — Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 27 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on March 26 and 27.[48]Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Borova direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 showing elements of the Russian 12th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) striking Ukrainian positions indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova).[49]Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka on March 26 and 27.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Cherneshchyna (southeast of Borova).[51]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Nove (northeast of Lyman).[52]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lyman near Myrne, north of Novolyubivka, and into Katerynivka.[53]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Myrne, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Olhivka; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Dronivka on March 26 and 27.[54]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[55]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 — Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 27 but did not advance. Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 26 and 27.[56]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 27 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Ozaryanivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne and near Bila Hora on March 26 and 27.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[58]Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[59]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23, 26, and 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk, in central Toretsk, and along Sormovska Street in southern Toretsk.[60]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are clearing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil (both southwest of Toretsk).[61]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; east of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 26 and 27.[62]A deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported on March 27 that Russian forces continue to use small infantry groups to attack and bypass Toretsk.[63] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces prefer to attack during the day and strike Ukrainian logistic routes at night.Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[64]Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on March 24 and geolocated on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Lenina Street in southeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[65]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Pokrovsk in a forested area northwest of Uspenivka; along Stepova Street in eastern Novooleksandrivka; in the fields southeast of Bohdanivka; and up to 600 meters toward Kotlyarivka from Nadiivka.[66]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Promin, Vodyane Druhe, and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Novooleksandrivka, Novoserhiivka, Nadiivka, Bohdanivka, Troitske, and Preobrazhenka.[67] A Russian miblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[68]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 27 that Russian forces recently attacked with 40 motorcycles in the Novopavlivka direction (southwest of Pokrovsk) and noted that the terrain has a large number of open areas where Russian forces can attack on motorcycles and buggies.[69] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are trying to gain a foothold in the Ukrainian rear and using motorcycles and light equipment to transport infantry and advance through small barriers and engineering formations while avoiding Ukrainian drones. Trehubov reported that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones; scaling up protection measures, including anti-drone nets, to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes; and increasingly using fishing boats to cross water features and other civilian vehicles to advance across open fields in the area. A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian drones are complicating Russian forces' logistics in the Pokrovsk direction despite Russian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed on February 27 that Russian forces are leveraging foggy weather conditions in the area to advance, as Ukrainian forces cannot effectively operate drones in such conditions.[71]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced to a windbreak southeast of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[72]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced in the fields north of Andriivka and to the eastern outskirts of Oleksiivka (both west of Kurakhove).[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.5 kilometers toward Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove), and another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Rozlyv and consolidated positions in the eastern part of the settlement.[74]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 26 and 27.[75] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynopil and Oleksiivka.[76]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 27 that Russian forces advanced in Vesele and west of Burlatske (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Pryvilne to Vilne Pole (both west of Velyka Novosilka) and up to 500 meters near Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[78]Russian forces attacked near Velyka Novosilka itself; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, Novopil, and Rivnopil on March 26 and 27.[79] A Russian miblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dniproenerhiya (north of Velkya Novosilka).[80]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[81]Russian Supporting Effort — Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced to central Shcherbaky (northwest of Robotyne).[82]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 26 and 27.[83]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 26 and 27 but did not advance.[84]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF), which promotes patriotic and military education and has been involved in Russian volunteer recruitment efforts, elected Denis Dobraykov as the new DOSAAF Chairperson on March 27.[85]A Russian insider source claimed that the Kremlin plans to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine as the heads of several Russian regions in Fall 2025. A Russian insider source claimed on March 25 that the Russian Presidential Administration plans to appoint veterans of the war in Ukraine as the governors of the Mari El and Udmurt republics and Vladimir and Ryazan oblasts.[86] Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced the "Time of Heroes" initiative in Spring 2024.[87] This initiative aims to appoint Kremlin-selected Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine as regional and local government officials, in an effort to militarize Russian society and maintain a cadre of loyal regional officials.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://suspilne dot media/980217-zelenskij-ocikuemo-so-ssa-zabezpecat-bezumovnu-tisu-v-cornomu-mori/[2] https://suspilne dot media/980259-zelenskij-udariv-rf-po-energetici-vnoci-ne-bulo-a-ukraina-ne-vidpovidala/[3] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid03VoQ8B2veedYQehFn1Zg44eYfo2EHmi9Pqj91vynk3wQ7d4yULUKzsn4ngWNhPPul[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525[5] https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-and-jamaican-prime-minister-andrew-holness-at-a-joint-press-availability/[6] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025[7] https://t.me/KyivIndependent_official/43439; https://t.me/mod_russia/50606[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025[9] https://t.me/kpszsu/31486[10] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9031 ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2245 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13557 ; https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/1904992415334977585 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13566 ; https://t.me/synegubov/13562 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/980269-armia-rf-vdarila-po-civilni-infrastrukturi-konotopa/ ; https://t.me/SemenikhinArtem/4744[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22395 ; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9032 ;[15] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9002[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22395[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025[18] https://www.ukrinform dot ua/rubric-ato/3974645-rf-pidtrimue-visokij-riven-virobnictva-raket-skibickij-skazav-akih-same.html ; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5600[19] https://www.lefigaro dot fr/international/volodymyr-zelensky-au-figaro-notre-victoire-sera-de-ne-pas-appartenir-a-la-russie-et-a-sa-vision-du-monde-20250326 ; https://archive.ph/wJQJs[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22413 ; https://t.me/osirskiy/1108[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025[24] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-allies-meet-with-new-aid-security-assurances-mind-2025-03-27/[25] https://president.gov dot ua/news/u-parizhi-rozpochalasya-zustrich-lideriv-shodo-pidtrimki-ukr-96877[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/27/world/europe/european-leaders-ukraine-support.html ; https://t.me/tass_agency/307908 ; https://www.lemonde dot fr/international/live/2025/03/27/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-le-sommet-de-la-coalition-des-volontaires-pour-soutenir-l-ukraine-s-est-termine_6584822_3210.html; https://kyivindependent dot com/plans-for-european-reassurance-force-in-ukraine-gain-traction-as-coalition-of-the-willing-meets-in-paris/[27] https://suspilne dot media/980917-v-ukrainu-virusit-franko-britanska-misia-aka-pracuvatime-nad-posilennam-ukrainskoi-armii-makron/; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/27/world/europe/european-leaders-ukraine-support.html[28] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-allies-meet-with-new-aid-security-assurances-mind-2025-03-27/[29] https://t.me/bbcrussian/78300; https://t.me/bbcrussian/78301; https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/27/world/russia-sanctions-europe-ukraine-intl/index.html[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8741; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26069 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22096 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63147 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/145015 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/145011 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159359 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88876; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88879 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22938 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22940 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22677[31] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1904922847941657019; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/2774; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1904892481184931961[32] https://t.me/wargonzo/25547 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/307853 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159346 ; https://t.me/rybar/69185[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26058[34] https://t.me/rybar/69185 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63125 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88853 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159346 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22098 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25547[35] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63125[36] https://en.yna.co dot kr/view/AEN20250327002251315[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22392[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88815 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26051 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33924[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88815 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25547 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22676 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26051 ;[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88857 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144997[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26051[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl[44] https://www.facebook.com/brtrokh/videos/1340070670378117 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/26/zamist-nastupu-kladovyshhe-tehniky-pid-vovchanskom-znyshheno-pyat-vorozhyh-mt-lb/[45] https://t.me/tass_agency/308018[46] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/980555-u-vovcansku-rosijski-vijska-nakopicuut-osobovij-sklad-u-pidzemnih-komunikaciah-brigada-gart/[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/27/u-radiusi-pyaty-metriv-nichogo-zhyvogo-u-vovchansku-ukrayinski-drony-polyuyut-na-bronovani-traktory/[48] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl[49] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1905034413643305031; https://t.me/tigri1212/880[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159351[52] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26783; https://t.me/OMIBr_60/925; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8740[53] https://t.me/yurasumy/22090 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26070 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88859 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159346[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63128 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88859[55] https://t.me/milinfolive/144981[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25547[58] https://t.me/epoddubny/22932[59] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904957454556749959; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904953098528784656; https://t.me/svo_3tb/105; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88805[60] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905252429840421241; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/772; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905273071616811460; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905273423502151816; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1905280080307183981; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159322[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/25547; https://t.me/rybar/69179; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26061; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159346[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736[63] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/27/vorog-namagayetsya-perebyty-logistyku-poblyzu-toreczka-rosiyany-hochut-prosochytysya/[64] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1905244931884515625; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1905232818998821204; https://x.com/RALee85/status/1905245680924262457; https://youtu.be/Hb7EfugZN8k?si=IYnb2EenDNqdJYE9; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8743[65] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1904912942681772416; https://t.me/moment_war/376 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1904892481184931961[66] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63140 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33924 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22085 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159355[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63140 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159355[68] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26040[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/980461-armia-rf-zastosuvala-40-motocikliv-dla-atak-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku/[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26040[71] https://t.me/yurasumy/22086[72] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1904952504200184118; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1904917043532509654; https://x.com/fGr6JW3waJ1FKMN/status/1904648965808943397[73] https://t.me/yurasumy/22085[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/25547 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22085 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736[75] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159355[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159355 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25547[77] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88855 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159346[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/67736 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88882[79] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Paxt8uad76VJHq9mX4E9Y5eM9Pk2EkncRAPNmTCxskkARLdK1mqh6cnsBrWZrxYql ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26065[80] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88855[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/14093 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159344[82] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8746; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6909[83] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid028foRXPJxy3N7ifc7TjnuXeJhqgqdhsbp5KgE6BhtTf8k2V2WcFr2bbgxpGqqu1s4l; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Paxt8uad76VJHq9mX4E9Y5eM9Pk2EkncRAPNmTCxskkARLdK1mqh6cnsBrWZrxYql; https://t.me/dva_majors/67736[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22397; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02SzJfxfr7Q4QiE9CgMMApy9eNnrgtPWDP36UDwE7aPoGznBLurWkoLBBeLwuzvivkl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0Paxt8uad76VJHq9mX4E9Y5eM9Pk2EkncRAPNmTCxskkARLdK1mqh6cnsBrWZrxYql[85] https://t.me/mod_russia/50612[86] https://t.me/Taynaya_kantselyariya/12165 ; https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/17277[87] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024
- — Iran Update March 31, 2025
- at 3/31/25 7:24pmKelly Campa, Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Katherine Wells,Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, Andie Parry, Avery Borens,and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal.[1] Trump added that he would impose secondary tariffs on Iran if Iran makes no progress towards a deal.[2] Secondary tariffs would impose sanctions on countries that trade with Iran. US officials have previously threatened military action against Iran if there were no direct negotiations.[3] Iranian officials have said they are open to indirect negotiations, though they reject direct negotiations with the United States.[4] Senior Iranian officials have also repeatedly threatened to strike US interests in the region since at least January 2025, likely to shape US decision-making and discourage a US or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program.[5] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told the Telegraph on March 29 that Iran would attack any base "used by Americans" to attack Iran.[6] Iranian threats to attack US allies in the region may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation.Iranian officials have recently threatened the following responses to a US-Israeli strike on Iran. These courses of action are not mutually exclusive.Attack US bases and forces: Iranian officials have repeatedly explicitly threatened to attack US bases and forces in the region in recent months.[7] An unspecified senior Iranian military official told Western media on March 29 that Iran would target Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean if the United States attacked Iran.[8] The United States has recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island, according to commercially available satellite imagery.[9] An anonymous official also told Tehran Times that Iran's missile launchers at its underground bases are loaded with missiles and "ready for launch."[10] Iran's reported current maximum missile range is 2000 kilometers (km), and its reported maximum drone range is around 2500km.[11] Diego Garcia Island is located about 3700km from Iran's southernmost city, Pasabandar. Iran would need to significantly decrease the payload of the warhead on its medium-range missiles or otherwise decrease missile weight to launch a successful attack on Diego Garcia. Iran could target other US facilities in the region if it chose to do so. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh threatened on March 31 that US bases in the region are “sitting in a glass house" near Iran.[12]Disrupt international trade: IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri suggested on March 29 that Iran may close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States and Israel attack Iran.[13] Tangsiri also threatened to seize ships if Iranian ships were seized.Conduct a direct attack on Israel: Senior Iranian military commanders have recently resurfaced threats to conduct another missile attack on Israel.[14] Iran unveiled its latest precision-guided ballistic missile called the “Etemad” in February 2025.[15] Iranian media referred to the missile as the “Israeli ballistic missile” because it can reportedly hit key targets across Israel.[16] Iran's stockpile of medium-range missiles, or missiles that can reach Israel, has been severely depleted following the April and October 2024 Israeli airstrikes on Iran, however.Iranian officials have publicly stated that they are unwilling to make concessions to reach a new nuclear deal with the United States under President Trump's desired timeline or terms. Iranian sources stated that Trump’s March 5 letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei included demands that Iran curtail its missile program and its role in supporting its proxies and partners in the Axis of Resistance.[17] A senior Iranian military official stated on March 29 that Iran will "never negotiate” on its missiles or the “capabilities” of the Axis of Resistance.[18] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to agree to curtail its missile program or the Axis of Resistance because to do so would cause it to lose the primary means with which it seeks to expel the United States from the region and establish itself as the regional hegemon. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told a UK-based, Gulf-linked outlet that Trump's letter refers to the "zero enrichment" approach.[19] It remains unclear if Iran is willing to reverse significant progress on its nuclear program to meet the terms. Western media also reported in mid-March that Trump's letter set a two-month deadline to reach a new nuclear deal.[20] Prior negotiations for the 2015 nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), took 20 months to negotiate.Iran is likely rebuilding its solid-fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024.[21] The sanctioned Iranian cargo vessel Jairan, which is carrying sodium perchlorate, a chemical used to make solid missile fuel, arrived near Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, around March 29.[22] Marine Traffic and Maritime Executive confirmed that the Jairan, one of two Iranian Shipping Lines (IRISL) vessels sanctioned for transporting missile materials, is waiting near the Gheshm and Hormoz islands. Western officials told The Financial Times in January 2025 that Golbon and Jairan would deliver over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate to Iran.[23] The IRGC’s Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), which partially oversees Iran’s missile research and development, received most of the shipment offloaded by Golbon on February 13.[24] Israeli strikes in October 2024 damaged three major long-range missile production sites in Iran, including the Shahroud Military Site in Semnan Province and the Khojir and Parchin complexes in Tehran Province.[25] The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to one of these locations would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.Iran continues to coordinate with Russia and China on nuclear issues. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi met with Russian Ambassador to Iran Alexey Dedov in Tehran on March 31 to discuss nuclear talks and sanctions relief.[26] Gharibabadi said Iran, Russia, and China will continue trilateral meetings and that Russia invited him to a UN Charter group meeting in Moscow in mid-April. The meeting follows a March 14 joint statement from Russia, China, and Iran that condemned US sanctions and described Iran’s nuclear activities as “peaceful.”[27] It remains unclear what Iran hopes to gain from this coordination or how Russia and China plan to support Tehran under growing US pressure. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Russia is unlikely to secure US interests through mediation, particularly in talks on Iran’s nuclear program and support of the Axis of Resistance.[28]Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara announced the appointments of 23 transitional ministers to his cabinet during a press conference on March 29.[29] These ministers are expected to remain in power until the transitional government cedes power to a new, elected government after a five-year interim period.[30] Shara replaced the majority of former interim ministers with new appointments and appointed one woman, one Christian, one Alawite, one Druze, and two Kurds to lead ministries within his government.[31] Shara also appointed nine ”independent” ministers, including various professionals, former activists, and former Assad-era ministers who served in their positions before the civil war.[32] He also dismissed the former interim justice minister, who was an ex-Jabhat al Nusra official.[33] These are undoubtedly positive steps towards a representative transitional government, but Shara still prioritized maintaining his control over key ministries such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice by appointing Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated officials or former HTS-controlled Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) officials to these posts.[34] He also appointed former HTS and SSG officials to the less important ministries of energy, local administration and environment, public works and housing, youth and sports, and administrative development.[35] The decision to expand his transitional cabinet to include minorities and “newcomers” follows widespread concern that Shara is personalizing power and appointing loyalists while blocking opportunities to represent Syria’s various minority communities in the transitional government.[36] Shara previously appointed a cabinet nearly entirely composed of bureaucrats that formerly served in the Idlib-based SSG.[37]Shara’s appointments of long-time loyalists to key positions suggest Shara hopes to continue to maintain his own and HTS’s influence within the transitional government. Shara has appointed or reappointed close advisers and allies from HTS to oversee portfolios directly concerning internal security and state stability. Shara has retained two of his most trusted advisors, Major General Marhaf Abu Qasra and Asaad al Shaibani, as ministers of defense and foreign affairs, respectively.[38] Former al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al Nusra member Anas Khattab has transitioned from intelligence chief to Interior Minister, where he will oversee the state’s General Security Services, border control, and intelligence services.[39] The United States and the UN sanctioned Khattab in 2012 and 2014, respectively, for his association with AQI.[40] It is not clear if or who Shara will appoint to directly oversee Syrian intelligence services, given the expansion of Khattab’s role. Shara also appointed “key HTS ideologue” and Sunni scholar Mazhar al Wais as his Justice Minister.[41] Arab media has reported that Wais has served as a ”senior legal figure” in HTS and has accompanied Shara to numerous high-level meetings without having been appointed to an official role.[42] Shara’s decision to position these loyalists in these roles will enable him to shape the trajectory of the Syrian government and its security services, which could allow him to maintain his rule well into the future. Qasra, Shaibani, Khattab, and Wais’s appointments suggest that Shara intends to maintain significant control over ministries that directly concern internal security and state stability, and it could enable him to sideline rivals as he did during his rule of Idlib.Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.[43] These ministries—particularly education—can be used to remake the next generation of a country by altering textbooks. The Assad regime and other Middle Eastern autocratic regimes—like the Houthis in Yemen and ISIS—have created educational materials to brainwash the next generation. Shara probably recognized that placing loyalists or ideologues in these roles would have earned him significant international blowback and created more challenges for his effort to remove sanctions. Shara could still employ a “supervisory” system in which deputy ministers make the decisions and hold the real power while the minister serves as a figurehead.Shara’s new transitional government is unlikely to assuage fears from minority communities about the future of minority representation in the transitional government and the trajectory of Shara’s rule. Shara’s clear preference for Sunni Arabs, the very few minorities, and the lack of appointees from other strong Syrian parties like the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) or Kurdish National Council (KNC) has already led several minority-dominated groups to condemn his “one-party government.”[44] The Alawite community, for its part, remains deeply fearful of the new transitional government after the recent coastal massacres. The SDC decried the new government as “largely homogenous.”[45] A KNC official told Kurdish media that the KNC ”will not participate in a government that does not recognize the rights of the Kurdish people.”[46] The official warned that the Kurds have been ignored for the ”third time,” likely referring to widespread Kurdish criticism over exclusion from the National Dialogue Conference, the drafting of the constitutional declaration, and the recent appointments.[47] Fear among key Kurdish powerbrokers that Shara will continue to exclude their parties from a voice in his government’s formation risks disrupting the Syrian interim government’s efforts to integrate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the Syrian state.The separatist Druze-majority Suwayda Military Council (SMC) also rejected Shara’s “one-color" government during a press conference on March 30.[48] The group called on Shara to form a government that ”represents all Syrian components.”[49] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime.[50] A Western analyst recently reported that it is ”well known” within the Druze community that the SMC has connections to Israel through members of the Israeli Druze community.[51] It does not appear that the SMC represents a majority of the Syrian Druze population. That multiple camps across Syria continue to reject Shara’s transitional government will not help grow the government’s legitimacy, however.Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28.[52] Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.[53] The Supreme Council of Fatwa will rule on decisions by majority vote, and Shara will vote as a tiebreaker if needed.[54] HTS established a Supreme Fatwa Council in Idlib in 2019 that Shara effectively controlled and used to sideline his hardline Islamist rivals.[55] Shara’s ability to use the council against his rivals will depend on his level of influence over a majority of its council members. Several notable HTS-affiliated scholars, including Sheikh Abdul Rahim Atun, former HTS-backed Supreme Fatwa Council member Anas Ayrut, and new Minister of Justice Mazhar al Wais, sit on the new council.[56]Shara appointed Sheikh Osama al Rifai as the council’s chairman.[57] The Syrian Islamic Council, which was a body of Sunni Islamic scholars that opposed the Assad regime, appointed Rifai as the Grand Mufti in Syria in 2021 after the regime abolished the office.[58] Rifai has connections to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood.[59]Key Takeaways:Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran continues to threaten the United States with military action to dissuade the United States from a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities amid new US threats to strike the nuclear facilities. US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that “there will be a bombing" if Iran does not make a new nuclear deal. Iranian officials also threatened to attack US allies enabling a strike, may aim to discourage allies from allowing the United States to use their facilities out of fear of Iranian retaliation. Iran has explicitly identified three possible responses to an attack on its nuclear facilities: retaliation against US bases and forces in the region, disruption of international trade in the Straits of Hormuz, and another attack on Israel.Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Iran is likely rebuilding its solid fuel propellant stocks after Israeli strikes damaged key production sites in October 2024. Iran will presumably need to transport new solid fuel precursors to its production facilities. The transfer of the Jairan’s cargo to a production facility used to product long-range missiles would suggest that Iran is trying to rebuild its long-range missile production capabilities after the Israeli strikes. Iran could also transfer the sodium perchlorate to a facility that produces short-range ballistic missiles.Syrian Transitional Government: Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara appointed loyalists to key cabinet positions in the new transitional government while nominally broadening his ruling coalition by appointing several minorities and technocrats to less-critical ministries. Shara notably did not place visible loyalists in ministries that would allow Syrian Islamists to remake Syrian society in their image. Shara has allowed non-HTS officials to lead ministries that directly influence Syrian society, including education, information, communications, and religious endowments.Syrian Supreme Fatwa Council: Shara appointed fifteen members to the Supreme Fatwa Council via presidential decree on March 28. Shara’s decree said that the council would issue new fatwas on new developments, explain Sharia rulings on cases that are referred to the council, appoint muftis and fatwa committees in Syrian provinces, and supervise fatwa centers in the provinces.SyriaThe SDF and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army have continued limited engagements in northern Syria since March 28. The SDF reportedly attempted to advance on SNA positions along the western bank of the Euphrates River near Tishreen Dam on March 29.[60] The pace of engagements has declined between Turkish-backed forces and the SDF along these lines of contact since early March. Turkish airstrikes targeting the SDF have also declined. A Democratic Union Party (PYD) foreign relations co-chair said on March 30 that ”serious efforts” are ongoing to reach a ceasefire between the SDF and Turkey.[61] The SDF and Syrian interim government reached an initial ceasefire in early March that would place the SDF under the Defense Ministry.[62] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 28 that he supports integrating the SDF into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[63]The Suwayda Military Council (SMC) announced its objectives and various units on March 30, indicating that the SMC is developing a formalized, organized structure.[64] The SMC is a group of Druze fighters who were previously aligned with the Assad regime, and some Druze sources in Suwayda claim that Israel is supporting the SMC.[65] An unspecified SMC commander announced on March 30 that the SMC is comprised of sixteen units, including a Special Tasks Brigade, a Political Bureau, an Artillery Department, an Administrative and Financial Department, an Organizational Department, and an Anti-Terrorism Battalion.[66] The unidentified commander stated that the Military Council‘s tasks are “clear and fixed,“ including ensuring security in Suwayda, preserving unity, establishing a safe environment that guarantees freedoms, and coordinating with all national and international forces that ”seek to achieve the interest of Syrians.”[67] This announcement follows the March 21 attack by SMC members on Military Council leader Colonel Tariq al Shoufi’s home in Suwayda Province due to delayed salary payments.[68] Shoufi stated that he did not agree to pay salaries and that the SMC has not fully formalized into a structure that would require him to compensate members.[69] The SMC does not have a formal relationship with the interim Syrian government and rejected the interim government cabinet announced on March 29.[70]Pro-Assad insurgents have continued attacks on interim Syrian government forces since March 28. Former Assad regime members attacked a police station in Latakia City on March 29.[71] Former Assad regime members separately attacked a Syrian security force patrol in Najha, south of Damascus, on March 30.[72] Security forces killed two of the attackers.[73] Interim Syrian government forces then executed a cordon-and-search operation in Najha.[74]Intelligence from local informants enabled a government raid targeting a weapons and explosives storage site in al Waer, Homs City, suggesting that the insurgents have little to no support in al Waer.[75] Forces acting on the tip from locals raided a weapons warehouse used by pro-Assad insurgents.[76] Forces seized small arms ammunition and RPGs that insurgents could have used in an attack.[77] The Assad regime besieged al Waer during the Syrian Civil War, so, unsurprisingly, local residents would be unwilling to support insurgents who support the former regime or its structures. Accurate, actionable intelligence from the locals suggests that al Waer is a relatively non-permissive environment for the insurgents, who would need to secure at least tacit acquiescence to their activities to establish a base of operations. The insurgents’ ability to investigate the leak and track down the informant will be a strong indicator of their relative power in western Homs City.The insurgents may have been using al Waer as a temporary way station to move weapons into the city rather than a long-term stockpile. The seized cache was relatively small, and al Waer is located on the western outskirts of Homs City just north of the M1 Highway that connects Homs and the Alawite-majority coastal provinces. This would make it a logical waypoint between the Alawite-majority areas and Homs City’s center, and the small cache is likely reflective of a small shipment designed to be moved quickly.Counterproductive government operations could threaten to drive support for insurgents in Talkalakh, Homs Province. Syrian government security forces deployed to Talkalakh, west of Homs City, on March 30 in response to an insurgent attack that killed two Syrian soldiers.[78] Local footage circulated on Syrian media appeared to show individuals who had been beaten or killed by government forces during clearing operations in Talkalakh.[79] Pro-Assad insurgents have conducted attacks on interim government forces in Talkalakh since the Assad regime fell in December 2024.[80] Heavy-handed operations will further alienate and inspire fear within the local population. Insurgents very likely seek to trigger violent government reprisals to generate support for the insurgency.Reports of violence against Alawites continue to permeate across Syrian media, fueling distrust and fear among the Alawite community. These reports will continue to fuel support for the majority Alawite insurgent movements regardless of their veracity. Two interim Syrian government soldiers assassinated the chief of Harf al Benmira and five other men present in his home on March 31.[81] The local Syrian security force commander reported that the perpetrators were from a police unit and that they had been arrested.[82] Arrests are insufficient to maintain the trust of the population unless the perpetrators are also charged and imprisoned through a fair and transparent judicial process. Locals separately discovered the bodies of 11 executed Alawites dumped in the Jouber River, Baniyas City, Tartous Province, on March 31.[83] Pro-Alawite media accused interim government forces of the sectarian attack.[84] The informational effect generated by these reports fuels a cycle of distrust among the Alawite community, which discourages cooperation with the interim government. This would enable the insurgents to replace the government as a legitimate authority, at least in western Syria.[85]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentSeveral Iraqi Shia tribes have announced that they will boycott the November 2025 parliamentary elections after Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia National Movement would not participate in the elections.[86] The Bani Tamim, Bani Kaab, Bani Lam, and al Sawaed tribes, among others, announced on March 28 and 29 that they would boycott the elections.[87] Some of these tribes, including Bani Tamim and Bani Kaab, previously participated in pro-Sadr demonstrations in Baghdad in August 2022.[88] Sadr withdrew from politics in August 2022 amid political deadlock after the October 2021 parliamentary elections.[89] CTP-ISW previously assessed that some Iraqi politicians are concerned that Sadr’s boycott of the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq.[90]The leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, Qais al Khazali, called on the Iraqi federal government to confront the “events in Syria,” likely referring to recent sectarian violence in coastal Syria.[91] Khazali was likely referring to attacks committed by Syrian interim government forces against Alawites, although the recent sectarian violence in Syria was committed by both Alawites and Sunnis and began when pro-Assad insurgents attacked interim government forces in early March 2025.[92] Khazali claimed that Israel, the United States, and an unspecified Arab country seek to divide Syria and warned that the situation in Syria poses a “direct and dangerous threat” to Iraq.[93] CTP-ISW previously assessed that sectarian violence in Syria could spill over into Iraq.[94]Khazali separately criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani for removing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Law from the parliamentary agenda on March 12, describing the removal of the law as a “crime.”[95] The PMF Law would remove Popular Mobilization Committee Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh from his post. Khazali accused Sudani of removing the law from parliament to protect Fayyadh.Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 62 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 28.[96] CENTCOM conducted at least eight airstrikes targeting three reportedly new Houthi military bases and ammunition depots in Sanhan District, Sanaa Governorate, on March 28.[97] CENTCOM also targeted the Houthis’ government complex in Hazm City, al Jawf Governorate, on March 28.[98]CENTCOM likely killed Houthi leaders in an airstrike that targeted a vehicle in the Hajjah government on March 30. An airstrike targeting a lone vehicle is usually intended to eliminate a significant enemy leader rather than individual low-ranking fighters. CENTCOM struck the vehicle on the N5 highway in al Tour, Hajjah Governorate, northwestern Yemen, reportedly killing two unidentified individuals.[99]Senior Houthi officials recently acknowledged that CENTCOM airstrikes have killed Houthi fighters but also denied that CENTCOM’s airstrikes have impacted their missile and drone production capabilities.[100] The Houthis conducted three combined missile and drone attacks targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea between March 29 and March 30.[101] The attack did not succeed, and CENTCOM did not acknowledge the attacks.The Houthis launched a ballistic missile at Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on March 30.[102] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted the missile before it entered Israeli territory.[103]The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza StripRebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelHezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem implicitly threatened to resume attacks targeting Israel or Israeli forces in a speech on March 30.[104] Qassem has previously failed to attack after making threats against Israel. Qassem reiterated that the Lebanese state is responsible for implementing the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement but warned that Hezbollah’s patience with Lebanon’s diplomatic efforts “has a limit.”[105] Qassem warned that when that limit is reached, Hezbollah will ”have no choice but to resort to other options.” Qassem may be speaking to appease hardline Hezbollah elements who feel that Hezbollah needs to act in response to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrike on March 28 that targeted a Hezbollah drone storage facility in Beirut.[106] Qassem previously implicitly threatened Israel, but Hezbollah has not fulfilled those threats.[107] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Hezbollah's central leadership is unlikely to approve any attacks targeting Israel at this time as it would almost certainly risk major Israeli reprisals.[108]CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas's military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial appreciated from 1,042,000 rials to one US dollar on March 28 to 1,033,000 rials to one US dollar on March 31.[109]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed future opportunities for economic cooperation in a phone call on March 29.[110] Pezeshkian expressed a willingness to discuss various unspecified regional and international issues to strengthen relations between the two countries. This phone call follows recent statements from other senior Iranian officials in which they criticized Turkish regional policy, especially in Syria.[111]Approximately 100 Iranian farmers protested over water shortages in Esfahan Province on March 29 and 30.[112] Anti-regime media circulated footage of Iranian security forces firing tear gas at protesters in Esfahan Province on March 30.[113] The same outlet also published a video that showed that protesters had set fire to a water pumping station that diverts water from the Zayandeh Rud River before the water reaches Esfahan.[114] The Zayandeh Rud River, which is one of the main sources of water for Esfahan Province, runs dry for the majority of the year due to water extraction before the water reaches Esfahan.[115] Iranian farmers previously protested water scarcity in Esfahan for over two weeks in 2021 before Iranian security forces cracked down on the protests.[116]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. 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https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1906425690582298625 ; https://t.me/ALMHARAR/75841[79] GRAPHIC: https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906500981375762440 ; GRAPHIC: https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906528776013422722[80] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1872346261388722649 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/5419 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1883097186357137741 ; https://t.me/syria_mukawama/6031[81] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1906661783152038103 ; https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221 ; [GRAPHIC] https://x.com/Sy_intelligence/status/1906695118494589396[82] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1906768620476322221[83] https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906609276942266534 ; https://www.facebook.com/100093260989904/videos/9737315626289752/?__cft__[0]=AZXQA9BLnfIcmo78htWRBeXTHuhk9D6kE1YTacBHjNFPOx5e5IYwzEXGD0Rk-waMTsGRk218IVAsCejwhHJ5aOzFAueZ8Gpl2GetO7yZ88Efw45uKwjId6hby9IdU3uDLe69hPaUBF3aorkkzWFMM-ljFWALkUJC9FEOfywtjqXDZ6Mb3gny71swHUmwhZPOo6B0Rono3YUXaq0QSkFhNT0j&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/SyriansInBritain/videos/1642231056661804/?__cft__[0]=AZXlCoFhZtNFGwlPkV2FDfhrrXfwBJGk3nodoeM37t2BKuqIUI6lhZavNKTpC7kF--O-EqRqZbaaF05R2vWAigK2UKUSzZu3P0EvDCbA40kOPKdUFnYph07mskjRLfmSQPQ0roFdZ5ArciS5BBNPBFvcjVuRdiegrwGuWJ8pdM-sXqlEij3kKvrU64pOLQnbxq13m0bTT6ZMLxdW_AU0dMIJ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R[84] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=122123723222700456&id=61571013687250&__cft__[0]=AZVp6e6ZmWxEPyag8br1Ox0WBxCydaBPXbsMQ9NKbakviv5oI0tlhe_A4lcm5oY6PO0Zyj2t1Jj93ky83cheGpHuR1qqLWrPSyfhCIhU9CaTsUHQcqs7dn8RbwSKDfmHhDwyY_q3B2oTctHA-TAlECk4&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=636854039118984&id=100083831813099&__cft__[0]=AZVABv2K-0IRQGD45h8uQt8rSuCL_T4R9-a51fGL8SrOkfmTwZs4dRFj91TLikAVBQR7AYbJQ7uH6Gd0hdHb7XXsWq62XFkGIFIpJcaD0nPI7GJhfAO2ESeDW6iBzecIn-MZ52vl1xvAV6czZWfSPyKNqZXdfVciSvydlZgSPGzDFb6g-X21V6tzcSg7Amyb97vbHQeRtRp_lWKM0j5ONcyi&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://x.com/AlawiteMediaLab/status/1906748592280445146[85] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf[86] https://thenewregion dot com/posts/1895 ;https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/290320252[87] https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33364 ;https://thenewregion dot com/posts/1895 ;https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33367 ;https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33356 ;https://t.me/almanesr_MSA/33350[88] https://www.facebook.com/Timimsajad/videos/-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A-%EF%B8%8F-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%AA/596258382210190/ ;https://www.alhurra dot com/hl-hqa/2022/08/03/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%A9%D8%9F[89] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-cleric-sadr-announces-full-withdrawal-political-life-twitter-2022-08-29/[90] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2025[91] https://almadapaper dot net/399832/[92] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025[93] https://almadapaper dot net/399832/[94] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-12-2025[95] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B0-%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%84[96] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905702114581733877;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905703002415267974;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905703116970086518;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905708350471545118;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905728655374037329;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906083246271570280;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906101670896922964;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906102815694487897;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906102991272522090;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906112117905772695;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906368882765386010;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1906404193402748952;https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1906650166192476651[97] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905702114581733877; https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1905716790220787714[98] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1905708350471545118[99] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1906650166192476651[100] https://x.com/TheMediaOfficee/status/1906360558556729740; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3457591.htm; https://www.saba dot ye/ar/news3458980.htm[101] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906223523476934675[102] https://x.com/army21ye/status/1906286695743377595[103] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1906252197861396706[104] https://mediarelations-lb dot org/post.php?id=19180[105] https://mediarelations-lb dot org/post.php?id=19180[106] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1905589040583184476[107] https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/761456/قاسم-في-تشييع-نصر-الله-وصفي-الدين-المقاومة-لم-تنته ; https://www.almanar dot com.lb/13102762 ; https://nna-leb dot gov.lb/ar/سياسة/764600/قاسم-من-حق-المقاومة-أن-تستمر-وبدون-الإعمار-لا-يوجد[108] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025[109] bon-bast.com; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025[110] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/01/09/3283039/[111] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-4-2025[112] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202503301875[113] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1906372888938107295[114] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1906402544034709522[115] https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-14031700 ; https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/497549/Dry-river-sinking-city-urgent-measures-needed-to-save-Isfahan-s ; https://www.iransafar.co/zayandeh-rud/[116] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/26/world/middleeast/iran-protests-water-shortages.html
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2025
- at 3/31/25 7:24pmNicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, and George BarrosMarch 31, 2025, 6:15pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:50am ET on March 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West. Trump responded to a question on March 30 about whether there is a deadline for Russian President Vladimir Putin to agree to a ceasefire for land warfare and stated that "it's a psychological deadline."[1] Trump added that "if I think [Russia] is tapping [the United States] along, I will not be happy about it."[2]Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated on March 30 that he proposed April 20 as a potential deadline for a "full ceasefire without any conditions" during his meeting with Trump on March 29.[3] Russia is unlikely to agree to a "full ceasefire without any conditions" within three weeks given that Russia has demanded that the West provide some sanctions relief as a precondition for a temporary Black Sea ceasefire. The Kremlin stated on March 25 that it will not implement the agreed ceasefire in the Black Sea until the United States lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade, and Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia is demanding that the European Union (EU) reconnect the Rosselkhozbank to the SWIFT international banking system as a precondition to implementing a Black Sea ceasefire as a test to determine whether the United States will engage with Russia's demands and encourage European partners to support sanctions relief.[4] The United States and Ukraine proposed on March 11 temporary ceasefires on energy infrastructure strikes and in the Black Sea, and Ukranian and US officials have continued to negotiate the terms of these ceasefires in the three weeks since March 11 — indicating the ceasefires’ terms are not yet fully codified.[5] It is also unlikely that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia could negotiate the terms of a general ceasefire within the next three weeks.Russian officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russian rare earth mining projects. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 31 that US companies are interested in joint rare earth metals mining projects with Russia and that these projects are the first step to improving bilateral relations, although the United States and Russia have not yet signed any documents concerning rare earth metals.[6] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia on March 31 that Russian and US officials have started discussions about joint rare earth mineral projects.[7] Dmitriev also told the BBC’s Russian Service on March 30 that US-Russian economic cooperation should be a primary focus if the United States wants to end the war in Ukraine but that such cooperation would only begin after the conclusion of peace negotiations.[8] The Kremlin is attempting to undermine the Trump administration’s objectives of linking US and Ukrainian economic interests through the US-Ukraine mineral deal by presenting Russia as a rare earth commodities trader superior to Ukraine. The Trump administration seeks to use the US-Ukrainian deal to establish concrete US economic interests in Ukraine as part of US efforts to transition Ukraine from solely a military aid recipient to also an economic partner.[9] The kind of economic cooperation that Russia seeks with the United States would not deter Russia from invading Ukraine again in the future and will fail to advance the Trump administration's objectives of economically linking the US and Ukraine. Such cooperation would also accelerate Russian military reconstitution faster than it would otherwise. Russia’s access to minerals in occupied Ukraine will likely augment the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) ability to access Ukraine’s minerals. Russia has notably partnered with the PRC to extract Russian rare earth commodities since at least 2005.[10] Russian companies are also involved in current and potential deposit exploration projects in various African countries.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia is using economic incentives that are unrelated to the war in Ukraine to extract concessions from the United States about the war in Ukraine.[12] These concessions would give away leverage that is crucial to US President Donald Trump’s stated objective of achieving an enduring and mutually beneficial peace in Ukraine.The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between the United States and Europe. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused "almost the entire European West" of attempting to prolong the war in Ukraine and contributing to the "rehabilitation of Nazism," and continued to falsely portray the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazis during an interview on March 30.[13] Lavrov claimed that Europeans "unleashed" "all the tragedies of humanity before 1939, including World War II" and that elites currently in power in most European Union (EU) and NATO countries retain the "instincts" to bring about these tragedies. Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Organizations Department, Kirill Logvinov, reiterated to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 31 that Russia continues to view a European peacekeeping contingent in Ukraine as unacceptable and criticized ongoing UK and French efforts to create such a contingent.[14] Logvinov similarly blamed European countries, specifically European elites, of causing the war in Ukraine and seeking to extend the war. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly criticized European countries for alleged "Russophobia" about the war and threatened Europe with Russian missiles.[15] Medvedev routinely makes extreme statements aimed at persuading Western states to act according to Russia's interests.[16] These statements are part of the Kremlin's broader efforts to falsely portray European countries as seeking to prolong the war in contrast to ongoing US efforts to secure interim ceasefires and eventually a full peace in Ukraine. This rhetoric is aimed at undermining Western unity in supporting Ukraine.[17]Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine. The Dutch Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that the Netherlands is allocating 500 million euros (roughly $541 million) for Ukraine's Drone Line project that aims to integrate drone and ground operations in the Ukrainian military.[18] The Dutch MoD stated that this package is part of the Netherland's two billion euros (roughly $2 billion) accelerated support package in 2025. Sweden announced on March 31 its largest military aid package to Ukraine to date, worth roughly 16 billion Swedish kronor (roughly $1.6 billion) to strengthen Ukraine's air defense, artillery, satellite communications, and naval capabilities.[19] The package includes 9.2 billion Swedish kronor (roughly $920 million) for the supply of materiel from the defense industrial bases (DIBs) of Sweden, other Nordic states, and European states; over five billion Swedish kronor (roughly $500 million) in financial donations to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group; and roughly 500 million Swedish kronor (roughly $50 million) worth of materiel donated from the Swedish military.Key Takeaways:US President Donald Trump stated on March 30 that there is an unspecified "psychological deadline" for Russia to agree to a general ceasefire amid continued Russian efforts to hold the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea hostage to stall efforts toward a general ceasefire and extract additional concessions from the West.Russian officials continue efforts to undermine the proposed US-Ukrainian mineral deal by promoting potential US-Russian rare earth mining projects.The Kremlin continues efforts to sow division between the United States and Europe.Ukraine's European allies continue to provide financial and military aid to Ukraine.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Sumy oblasts and near Kupyansk, Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka.Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire Violations Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on March 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a facility of the Bryanskenergo electric and thermal power generation company in Bryansk Oblast and its nearby transformer substation on March 30.[20]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced along the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border amid continued Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Veselivka, Sumy Oblast (north of Sumy City).[21] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published footage on March 31, which ISW geolocated, indicating that elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) advanced in central Gogolevka, Kursk Oblast (southwest of Sudzha).[22]Russian forces attacked along northeast of Sumy City near Novenke and Zhuravka; southwest of Sudzha near Oleshnya; and south of Sudzha near Guyevo on March 31.[23]Russian forces continued assaults in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 31 but did not make any confirmed advances.Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 that fighting continues near Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[24]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly pirating near Popovka.[25] Drone operators of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reported operating in Belgorod Oblast.[26] Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies expert Viktor Kevlyuk stated on March 31 that the Russian military command transferred elements of the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), and 88th and 85th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) to Belgorod Oblast from the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, and Siversk directions.[27] Kevlyuk added that Russian authorities also transferred Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards from Primorsky Krai to Belgorod Oblast.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 31 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 30 and 31.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the P-79 Kupyansk-Dvorichna highway and in fields northeast of Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[29]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk) and made additional gains northeast of Kindrashivka.[30]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Kamyanka and Krasne Pershe, north of Kupyansk toward Radkivka, east of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 30 and 31.[31]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating north of Kupyansk.[32]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 31 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Bohuslavka and east of Borova near Nadiya on March 30 and 31.[33]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating near Kolisnynivka (northeast of Borova) and Zahryzove; that elements of the 4th Tank Division and 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 1st GTA) are operating along the Lozova-Pershotravneve line (east of Borova); and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are operating near Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[34]Russian armed forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northeast of Lyman).[35]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Nove, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna, and Novomykhailivka and east of Lyman near Dibrova and Torske on March 30 and 31.[36]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults in the area and that Russian forces are rarely using armored fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers as compared to 2024.[37] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces stated on March 31 that Russian forces intensified infantry attacks in the Lyman direction and have significantly more infantry in the area, mostly including well-trained contract servicemembers (kontraktniki).[38]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, MMD) are operating along the Ivanivka-Nove-Zelena Dolnya line (northeast of Lyman) and that elements of the 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 19th Tank Regiment (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 31 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[40]Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 30 and 31.[41]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly fighting southwest of Bilohorivka.[42]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 31 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechnye and Bila Hora on March 30 and 31.[43] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian mechanized counterattack near Chasiv Yar on March 31.[44] A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault with at least three vehicles east of Stupochky on March 29.[45]A soldier in a Ukrainian anti-aircraft artillery platoon operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on March 31 that Russian fiber-optic drones are the largest issue for Ukrainian forces both in the Chasiv Yar direction and elsewhere along the frontline.[46] The soldier stated that Russian drones employ fiber-optic cables upon encountering Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) to hit their targets. Drones piloted via fiber-optic cables are resistant to EW interference. The soldier stated that Ukrainian forces can only protect themselves from Russian fiber-optic drones by employing anti-drone nets along ground lines of communication (GLOCs).Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and drone operators of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[47]Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[48]Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces recently seized Panteleymonivka.[49]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; and east of Toretsk near Krymske on March 30 and 31.[50]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) and the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly fighting southwest of Toretsk on the Novoselivka-Oleksandropil and Niu York-Panteleymonivka lines.[51] Drone elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), and elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Panteleymonivka.[52]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 31 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Bohdanivka (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[53]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and Oleksandropil, east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Promin, and Kalynove and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Serhiivka, Shevchenko, Novoserhiivka, Novooleksandrivka, Upsenivka, Udachne, Sribne, Kotlyarivka, Troitske and Bohdanivka on March 30 and 31.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Upsenivka and Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[55]Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka and Sribne-Troitske directions (southwest of Pokrovsk).[56]Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[57]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced farther into eastern and western Rozlyv.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy roughly one-half to two-thirds of the settlement.[59] ISW has only observed confirmation that Russian forces occupy roughly four percent of Rozlyv.Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 30 and 31.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces occasionally unsuccessfully counterattack on the Andriivka-Kostyantynopil line.[61]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 110th and 114th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, MD) are operating near Rozlyv.[62]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka).[63]Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele, Burlatske, and Dniproenerhiya; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne and Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on March 30 and 31.[64]The Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 31 that Russian forces conducted 39 more assaults from March 24 to 30 than from March 16 to 23 and that Russian forces are attempting to leverage rainy weather conditions to advance, likely because rainy conditions degrade the effectiveness of drones.[65]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD), 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) are operating north of Velyka Novosilka along the Mokri Yaly River.[66] Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Division (29th CAA, EMD) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[67]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 31.Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 31 that Russian forces are accumulating forces and means for limited and small attacks in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.[68] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces aim to take control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area. Voloshyn stated on March 31 that Russian forces conducted 530, including first-person view (FPV) drone strikes, on March 30 — a significant increase from the running daily average of 450 to 470 strikes per day.Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 31 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Robotyne near Novodanylivka and northwest of Robotyne near Mali Shcherbaky, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, Kamyanske, and Stepove on March 30 and 31.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove.[70]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems do not always function properly in the Zaporizhia direction.[71]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 417th Reconnaissance Battalion, 1455th and 71st motorized rifle regiments, (all of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka.[72]Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on March 31 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Sadove (east of Kherson City) on March 30 and 31.[73]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Kursk Oblast and 131 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones over northern, eastern, and central Ukraine and 45 drones were “lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian official sources reported that strikes affected Sumy, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[75]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia is reportedly struggling to restore what few tanks remain in its stocks. Ukrainian research outlets Resurgam and Viskovyi Vishchun published an analysis of satellite imagery on March 28 and concluded that Russia has 3,463 tanks at its main open air storage bases and 1,253 tanks at armored vehicle plants and that restoration rates have dropped from 120 tanks per month in 2022 to 30 to 35 tanks per month in early 2025.[76] The analysis estimated that Russia has an additional 2,000 tanks in closed (not open-air) storage warehouses. The analysis determined that Russia could restore roughly 1,200 of these tanks more quickly than newly producing them and that Russia would likely source spare parts from the remaining tanks for existing tanks. The analysis concluded that Russia has likely pulled all tanks most suitable for restoration from its existing stores and will have exhausted its stocks of tanks in "satisfactory condition" for restoration by the second half of 2025. The analysis stated that Russia will likely only be able to compensate for a maximum of 30 percent of its total tank losses since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 at its current loss rates and will likely field fewer armored vehicles due to shortages. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) in 2024 and that Russia could theoretically sustain these losses until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing Soviet-era tanks, though it is unclear if Russia could sustain these loss rates with a significantly slowed refurbishment rate.[77] Russia may not be willing to sustain these increased armored vehicle loss rates and has been conducting fewer mechanized assaults thus far in 2025.[78]Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on March 31 authorizing Russia's regularly planned semi-annual military conscription, which will conscript 160,000 Russians between April 1 and July 15.[79] The decree states that men aged 18 to 30 are subject to a 10-month conscription and that conscripts will not serve in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, or Kherson oblasts and will not conduct "special military operation tasks." The decree exempts men in 54 raions of Russia's far north due to inclement weather. Russia continues gradually increasing the number of men conscripted in its spring conscription cycles. Putin previously signed decrees conscripting 134,500 Russians in Spring 2022, 147,000 in Spring 2023, and 150,000 in Spring 2024.[80] Russia conscripted 133,000 Russians in the Fall 2024 conscription cycle.[81]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the March 31 Russian Occupation Update.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bq69K-uKYM ; https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5222868-trump-theres-a-psychological-deadline-for-putin-to-agree-to-ceasefire/[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8bq69K-uKYM ; https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5222868-trump-theres-a-psychological-deadline-for-putin-to-agree-to-ceasefire/[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/finlands-stubb-says-he-told-trump-deadline-needed-ukraine-ceasefire-2025-03-30/[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-11-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/308665 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308666[7] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1906386194545434989 https://iz dot ru/1862486/2025-03-31/dmitriev-rasskazal-o-diskussiah-s-ssa-po-redkozemelnym-metallam; https://iz dot ru/1862462/kirill-fenin-alena-nefedova/dobycnye-dela-rf-i-ssa-nacali-peregovory-po-redkozemelnym-metallam ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67991 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/31/kirill-dmitriev-zayavil-chto-rossiya-i-ssha-nachali-diskussii-o-proektah-po-redkozemelnym-metallam ; https://t.me/astrapress/77876[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xsNGsyeILlU[9]https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/03/remarks-by-president-trump-on-investment-announcement/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/02/press-gaggle-by-president-trump-aboard-air-force-one-en-route-joint-base-andrews/[10] https://weldex dot ru/ru/media/news/2024/may/29/rossiya-kitaj-sotrudnichestvo/; https://rosnedra.gov dot ru/press/news/rossiya_i_kitay_planiruyut_sovmestnuyu_rabotu_po_geologicheskomu_issledovaniyu_mirovogo_okeana/; https://dvp-audit.com/blog/sovmestnyye-predpriyatiya-rossii-i-kitaya; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6594013; https://trends.rbc dot ru/trends/industry/665439809a7947f47f2527e2; http://ru.china-embassy dot govcn/rus/zewlzxdt/202202/t20220203_10638562.html; https://web.archive.org/web/20210619154105/https://economy.gov dot ru/material/departments/d16/mezhpravitelstvennaya_rossiysko_kitayskaya_komissiya_po_investicionnomu_sotrudnichestvu/[11] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/990933[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525[13] https://www.mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2006186/ ; https://archive.ph/h8xbP ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/54667[14] https://tass dot ru/interviews/23549763[15] https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/574 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/23554145 ; https://t.me/medvedev_telegramE/61[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725[18] https://x.com/DefensieMin/status/1906413647326269823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021025; https://www.defensie dot nl/actueel/nieuws/2025/03/31/nederland-financiert-drone-project-van-500-miljoen-voor-oekraine[19] https://www.government dot se/press-releases/2025/03/biggest-support-package-to-ukraine-so-far-increases-swedish-support-to-sek-29.5-billion-for-2025[20] https://t.me/mod_russia/50746[21] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1906428776319529059; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1906272655071736223; https://x.com/johnspectator/status/1906268319335805218; https://t.me/yurasumy/22126[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/50752[23] https://t.me/tass_agency/308620 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22217 ; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/983233-rosijska-armia-namagaetsa-zalucati-mali-sturmovi-grupi-po-napramku-novenkogo-ta-zuravki-na-sumsini-recnik-dpsu/[24] https://t.me/dva_majors/67985 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25647 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22220[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89099[26] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159767[27] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/31/slona-slid-yisty-chastynamy-shho-zavadylo-rosiyanam-pid-chas-nastupu-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny/[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8773; https:// t.me/answertime1/112; https:// t.me/boris_rozhin/159821[30] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31192 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159821[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2658[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[34] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2658 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659[35] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[37] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/983367-armia-rf-na-limanskomu-napramku-zastosovue-taktiku-malenkogo-postijnogo-tisku-60-ombr/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8[38] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7163[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2659[40]https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26244; https://t.me/motopatriot78/34015[41] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/2252; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985[42] https://t.me/motopatriot78/34015[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89135[45] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/26868; https://t.me/Phoenix_ORKOhub/158[46] https://suspilne dot media/983741-droni-na-optovolokni-najbilsa-bida-zaraz-artileristka-runa/[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/50747; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89141; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20961; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159764[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906458876985147573; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906458619303850036; https://www.instagram.com/stories/nikolay_burmant/3599723563855553201/[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2660[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2660[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159774[53] https://t.me/rybar/69271 ; https://t.me/rybar/69270[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89091 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985 ; https://t.me/rybar/69271[55] https://t.me/rybar/69271[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661[57] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8776 ; https://t.me/hunterfpv/69[58] https://t.me/rybar/69270 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63228 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985[59] https://t.me/rybar/69270 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63228[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/rybar/69270 ; ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25647 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63230[61] https://t.me/rybar/69270[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661[63] https://t.me/Petliura_NOVA/121 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8774[64] https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02oraGp3f8d8f23sRVvR2jeHEfibni6xSDe8q8jcdvRUZy6UbFJqrM8wqS6SDec6tVl?__cft__[0]=AZVuOvJVYuH4vN_dayGhVL2iTfomLXNWQ87r83N6eiTBtCcAo-b36TGwi2ipu-2Kuv2d9fzh6bJa9GQNkyQPQ5Fi-M25HQEbtV8zlbQ-31BpR-T8pFyG970E_qJXdOn42wkNFdszh2nTXx4yaSRUfHUwYoSRYufVUz3yOIwCSPOcj13bDLafJWhqvfnwpSCI58I&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14169 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63230[65] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7180[66] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2661[67] https://t.me/voin_dv/14154[68] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/31/cze-ne-nastup-a-taktychni-diyi-na-pivdni-vorog-nakopychuye-syly-lyshe-dlya-nevelykyh-shturmiv/[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523; https://t.me/dva_majors/67985; https://t.me/wargonzo/25647[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26267[71] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12787[72] https://t.me/ZS42MSD/2533; https://t.me/dva_majors/67975; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26248[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KVDRUepboubEaywQvrUYwv9Wv6hVhMBbgdgag4yzidiZ46JNEi9XfwG5SnQd2yEdl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22526 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22523[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/31711[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/31711 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/983129-vnoci-u-harkovi-prolunalo-sist-vibuhiv-rosia-sahedami-atakuvala-misto-vinikla-pozeza/[76] https://www.vishchun dot com/post/tanky_bazy_ta_zavody_moskovii_stanom_na_pochatok_2025[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025[78] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2025[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/50756 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50758 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50759 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50762 ; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202503310001; https://tass dot ru/politika/23557497 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/308701 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/31/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-vesennem-prizyve-v-armiyu-zaberut-160-tysyach-rossiyan;[80] https://tass dot ru/politika/23557497[81] https://t.me/mod_russia/50761
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 30, 2025
- at 3/30/25 4:21pmOlivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Daria Novikov, and George Barros with William Runkel and Nate TrotterMarch 30, 2025 4:15 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10:45 am ET on March 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future. Trump stated during a phone call with NBC News on March 30 that he is "angry and pissed off" at Putin for disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's legitimacy as the leader of Ukraine.[1] Trump stated that if the United States and Russia are unable to "make a deal" – possibly referring to a general ceasefire or long-term peace in Ukraine – then the United States will place secondary sanctions on all "oil coming out of Russia." Trump stated that the United States will put a "25 percent tariff on all oil, a 25- to 50-point tariff on all [Russian] oil." Trump stated that the United States will not allow companies or countries that purchase Russian oil to "do business" in the United States and that the United States could begin imposing secondary sanctions within the next month if Russia, Ukraine, and the United States do not conclude a ceasefire agreement. Trump stated that he will speak with Putin at an unspecified time later this week. Putin reiterated long-standing Russian claims that Zelensky is the illegitimate leader of Ukraine on March 28.[2]ISW previously noted that the Kremlin's ongoing effort to characterize the Ukrainian government as an illegitimate negotiating partner casts serious doubt on the Kremlin's willingness to negotiate in good faith about a settlement of the war and sets informational conditions for Russia to violate any future peace agreement on the grounds that the Ukrainian government had no legal right to conclude it.[3]A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Russian Permanent Representative to the European Union Kirill Logvinov presented a detailed plan to Kremlin newswire TASS on March 30 that supports Putin's recent demand for the UN, United States, and European countries to establish a temporary government in Ukraine in the near future.[4] Logvinov argued that the UN should reach an agreement between the parties to the conflict following the implementation of a ceasefire, either directly or indirectly through intermediaries, on the appropriate transfer of power to the UN. Logvinov suggested that one of the parties, mediators, or the UN Secretary General should submit an official appeal that the UN establish a temporary internal administration in Ukraine. Logvinov specified that the UN Security Council (UNSC), particularly its permanent members, must support the mandate and that any UNSC member can submit a draft proposal on the composition and funding of the temporary government. Logvinov stated that the UN Secretary General should then prepare a report on the temporary administration, particularly noting staffing and budgetary guidelines, after which the UNSC should consider any proposals and submit a final decision on the interim government. Logvinov noted that the final proposal must also "receive the support of the members of the [UNSC], namely the permanent ones." Logvinov's proposal would notably allow Russia (a permanent member of the UNSC) to submit a proposal on the interim Ukrainian government and to veto any proposal that Russia considers unfavorable and would bar Ukraine from any role in the final approval process.Logvinov and TASS are supporting Putin's recent effort to inject a new demand into discussions about the resolution to the war that is consistent with the Kremlin's long-standing effort to ensure the installation of a government friendly to Russia in Ukraine. The Kremlin is also attempting to dictate the sequencing and processes surrounding the demand while holding the ceasefire negotiation hostage to extract additional concessions from the West. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres rejected Putin's proposal to establish a temporary administration in Ukraine and stated that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected on March 28.[5]Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 111 Shahed and decoys from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[6] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 65 drones over northern, southern, eastern, and central Ukraine and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian Shahed drones struck a military hospital and civilian buildings in Kharkiv City.[7] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger agreed on March 29 with a recent report from German outlet Bild that Russian forces have altered their long-range drone strike tactic and now have drones loiter several kilometers from their targets at high altitudes before conducting synchronized strikes with multiple drones.[8] The milblogger further speculated that these tactics have facilitated recent Russian drone strikes on Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.[9] The Ukrainian MoD stated that the Space Policy Department will serve as a single point of contact for domestic and foreign developers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and international partners. The Ukrainian MoD announced a ten-year roadmap to develop the space sector that includes conducting an audit of space infrastructure to identify Ukraine's critical needs and developing domestic satellite and space technology capabilities to integrate into and augment existing Ukrainian defense systems.Key Takeaways:US President Donald Trump expressed willingness to introduce additional sanctions targeting Russian oil and secondary sanctions against buyers of Russian oil if Russian President Vladimir Putin does not make progress towards a general ceasefire, including a ceasefire for land warfare in the near future.A Russian diplomat provided additional details following Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent thinly veiled demand for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN).Russian forces struck a military hospital and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City on the night of March 29 to 30.The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 30 that it will establish a Space Policy Department.Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusAlleged Ceasefire ViolationsUkraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed without evidence on March 30 that Ukrainian drones struck a substation near Podvyote (along the international border south of Bryansk City), Bryansk Oblast.[10]Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued assaults in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on March 30 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers reiterated claims on March 30 that Russian forces advanced to the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha and near Guyevo and Gogolevka (south and southwest of Sudzha).[11]Russian sources claimed on March 30 that Russian forces attacked southwest of Sudzha near Oleshnya and south of Sudzha near Guyevo in Kursk Oblast and northeast of Sumy City near Basivka in northern Sumy Oblast.[12]Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov stated on March 29 that Russian forces are advancing in several unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast and expanding their salient into northern Sumy Oblast in order to support further advancements.[13] A Ukrainian source affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne on March 29 that Russian forces are attempting to advance near Veselivka (north of Sumy City) and Basivka (northeast of Sumy City).[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces are attempting to advance toward Yunakivka (south of Basivka).[15]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 137th Regiment, are reportedly operating in Gogolevka (southwest of Sudzha) and elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly advancing near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[16] Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Guyevo.[17]Russian forces continued assaults in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on March 29 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 29 that Russian forces gained a foothold in eastern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[18]Russian milbloggers claimed on March 30 that fighting continues near Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[19]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Popovka and elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.[20]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City near Zolochiv and Kozacha Lopan, north of Kharkiv City near Lypsti, and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 29 and 30.[21]An officer for a Ukrainian brigade operating near Lyptsi stated on March 29 that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from conducting mechanized assaults and operating within ten kilometers of the frontline.[22]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 30 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kupyansk near Mala Shapivka and northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, Kamyanka, and Topoli.[23]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 29 and 30.[24]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian mechanized bridge over the Oskil River near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[25] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces noted that Russian forces are using older armored vehicles, including T-55 tanks, to move personnel to forward positions in the area.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Zahryzove and west of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky on March 29 and 30.[26]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 30 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman).[27]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Olhivka, Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Nove, Katerynivka, and Novomykhailivka; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near the Serebryanske forest area on March 29 and 30.[28]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on March 29 and 30.[29]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 29 that Russian forces conducted an assault using up to 18 motorcycles in the Siversk direction.[30]Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar towards Mayske; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and toward Bila Hora and Oleksandro-Shultyne; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on March 29 and 30.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces recently unsuccessfully counterattacked in southern Chasiv Yar.[32]Zaporozhets stated on March 29 that Russian forces recently conducted an assault with armored vehicle and motorcycle support near Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[33]Russian forces recently advanced in and near Toretsk.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 28 and 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk and in central Toretsk.[34]Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Krymske and Dyliivka, and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil on March 29 and 30.[35]The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction stated on March 30 that fighting is intensifying in the area and that Russian forces are attacking along Toretsk's flanks.[36]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk), and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[37] Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[38]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Shevchenko (southwest of Pokrovsk).[39] Geolocated footage published on March 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[40]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced in and near Novooleksandrivka, Bohdanivka, Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Solone (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[41]Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Novotoretske, Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Kalynove and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Zelene and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Novoserhiivka, Udachne, Novooleksandrivka, Uspenivka, Sribne, Zvirove, Shevchenko, and Kotlyarivka on March 29 and 30.[42]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 30 that Russian forces seized Zaporizhzhia (southwest of Pokrovsk), but ISW assessed that Russian forces seized the settlement as of February 28.[43]Order of Battle: Drone elements of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff [GRU]), the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[44] ISW has most recently observed elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction, although a Russian milblogger recently claimed that elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade were operating in the Toretsk direction.[45] The 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade may be in the process of a redeployment, or different elements of the brigade may be deployed across several areas of operation in Donetsk Oblast. ISW has recently observed elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating near Velyka Novosilka, and has not observed further indications that this unit has deployed to the Pokrovsk direction.[46] Elements of the 75th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Kotlyne.[47] Elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Novoserhiivka.[48] Elements of the 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Kotlyarivka.[49] Drone elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Sribne.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced in central Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[51]Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bohdanivka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove toward Rozlyv on March 29 and 30.[52]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 30 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault of five armored vehicles near Rozlyv and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one armored vehicle.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction.[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Skudne and toward Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka and toward Novopil on March 29 and 30.[55]Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian "Baikal" detachment of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Fedorivka (north of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Drone operators of the 43rd Separate Spetsnaz Company, 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (both of the GRU), 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[57]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russian forces advanced east of Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all northwest of Robotyne) toward Orikhiv (north of Robotyne).[58]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanske, Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on March 29 and 30.[59]A Russian milblogger claimed on March 30 that Russia is concentrating personnel near and on the outskirts of Kamyanske for a future assault against the settlement.[60] Russian forces conducted offensive actions in the Kamyanske direction – possibly reconnaissance in force tasks – in October 2024.[61]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 29 and 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the direction of Prydniprovske and Sadove (both east of Kherson City on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast) on March 29 and 30.[62]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Nothing significant to report.Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Nothing significant to report.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1906340755351675125 ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-angry-putin-zelenskyy-iran-sanctions-rcna198729 ; https://x.com/RapidResponse47/status/1906337060698399090[2] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025[4] https://t.me/Logvinov_opinion/883 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825[5] https://x.com/michellenichols/status/1905645685187194980[6] https://t.me/kpszsu/31628[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02aVWWBF2QJiEeTQafpSm9Qk1cV15o43FfdJAgx1YDTP6kM5ZaVCC5Dz12RZmUkynwl ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/982601-u-harkovi-prolunali-tri-vibuhi-misto-pid-atakou-sahediv/?anchor=live_1743287076&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2275 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1906295546081661244[8] https://t.me/rybar/69250 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2025[9] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/ministerstvo-oboroni-stvorilo-upravlinnya-kosmichnoyi-politiki-katerina-chernogorenko[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/308538[11] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20954 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67940[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/308499 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159718 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19285 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22149 [13] https://t dot me/tass_agency/308464[14] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/982561-armia-rf-namagaetsa-zajti-u-veselivku-na-sumsini-deepstate/[15] https://t.me/yurasumy/22149 [16] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26181 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19285[17] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89083[18] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26183[19] https://t.me/wargonzo/25615 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67940[20] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89036 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89065[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105; https://t.me/otukharkiv/5236; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12780[22] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/29/vidignaly-vazhku-tehniku-na-harkivshhyni-vorozhi-tanky-znahodyatsya-za-10-kilometriv-vid-liniyi-frontu/[23] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31180 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/26198 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22148[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/30/cherez-kipish-generaliv-okupanty-namagayutsya-znovu-zahopyty-selo-zvilnene-tyzhden-tomu-tretoyu-shturmovoyu/[25] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[26] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[27] https://t.me/yurasumy/22147 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/31183[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[29] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/29/ataka-motoczykletnoyu-lavoyu-na-siverskomu-napryamku-polyuvaly-na-dva-desyatky-vorozhyh-dvokolisnyh/[31] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[32] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89024 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159657 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159639 ; https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/6600 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22146 ;[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/29/ataka-motoczykletnoyu-lavoyu-na-siverskomu-napryamku-polyuvaly-na-dva-desyatky-vorozhyh-dvokolisnyh/ ; https://t.me/OTU_Luhansk/575 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/30/daly-skazhenogo-maksa-bozhevilna-ataka-zs-rf-na-motoczyklah-i-bagi-zakinchylasya-provalom/[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906313962561401078; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/814 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1906320380832133475; https://t.me/SOF_Genius_drones/431[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[36] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/30/otrymaly-pidkriplennya-okupanty-kydayut-na-toreczk-dodatkovi-syly/[37] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13613 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13610 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13612[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13613[39] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1906328191662219607; https://x.com/small10space/status/1906322071262552460[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8767; https://t.me/osirskiy/1114[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89061; https://t.me/rybar/69258; https://t.me/yurasumy/22137[42]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105; https://t.me/rybar/69258 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159729[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/50701; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025[44] https://t.me/voin_dv/14142; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18581; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1905986605921304816; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/89038[45] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025[46] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025[47] https://t.me/wargonzo/25629[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159685[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33964[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/25626[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159704[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[53] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[54] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/18596; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1906278055368077732[55]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid06rrRrnU7bZWjb8m5ErfVv55t5GqfS52HRLkkHtrxxzrWYwTw2zqDgCZ1RX16Royvl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/7105[56] https://t.me/voin_dv/14150[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/14141; https://t.me/voin_dv/14148; https://t.me/voin_dv/14153[58] https://t.me/dva_majors/67940[59]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25615[60] https://t.me/yurasumy/22134 [61] https://isw.pub/UkrWar100624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar100924[62] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0mKuVjrJsRG9hufQwsojv97HKhajxfx2m1KBj51tnzYnQDJEUhTj71RrDYyzEcps9l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid059gxqXXeoAEFZPCtV33k5F1DaMKdxU9NTyVJf8BCNx9ZMk1JZCQQz46Yixet1Nnjl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gmwgbYaLH1Z78HSjQzaRK6pCYMYbJV9izxYEqD3fMMkCMgDV4bTgXUKiWPawJRkxl
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 26, 2025
- at 3/30/25 12:39amNicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, and Kateryna Stepanenko with Nate TrotterMarch 26, 2025, 6:30pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear to agree that a ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March 25, but US and Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that technical negotiations are ongoing.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still working to develop monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements on March 25 jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy infrastructure ceasefire.[2] Palisa stated that both ceasefires on Black Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March 25.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 26 that Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March 18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes.[4] The absence of officially published joint texts of the agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating the specifics of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms remain unclear.[5]Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to strike energy infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25, gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25 to 26, and electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff responded on March 26 and denied the Russian MoD's accusations.[7] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein, Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz notably did not report Ukrainian drone strikes in their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike infrastructure in their regions. Ukrainian Presidential Communications Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18, when Putin claimed to have ordered the Russian military to stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities.[8] Ukrainian officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have damaged civilian infrastructure across Ukraine almost every night since March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged energy infrastructure.[9]Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March 19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or control over it to Ukraine or any other country is "impossible" and that the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country is "unacceptable."[11] The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd" to allow any international organization to help operate the ZNPP. The Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree legally brought the ZNPP under Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia is not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States.[12] The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the only safe operator of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces occupied the area in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably stored military equipment near the ZNPP reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin also routinely accuses Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea. European Commission's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March 26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against Russia if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and "unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[16] Hipper's statement is likely a response to the Kremlin's recent demand that it will not implement the terms of the ceasefire in the Black Sea with Ukraine until the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[17] The United States will likely require EU cooperation in order to lift some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and fertilizer markets.Key Takeaways:The details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.Russian officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).The European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk.Russia continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF). We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued attacks in Kursk Oblast and the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area. Assessed advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[18]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements advanced near Veselivka (northeast of Sumy City along the international border).[19]Russian forces attacked west of Sudzha near Gogolevka, near the Sudzha checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha, and northeast of Sumy City along the international border near Veselivka and Zhuravka.[20]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), the "Arctic" Battalion of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 22nd and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[21] Elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka.[22]Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast. Assessed advances: Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[23]Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in Demidovka and Popovka (west of Demidovka).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that the intensity of fighting in the Belgorod international border area has decreased due to unfavorable weather conditions.[25]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) and "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating near Popovka (west of Demidovka).[26] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has deployed elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 88th and 85th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD), and unspecified elements of the 6th CAA (LMD) to Belgorod Oblast.[27] Mashovets added that the Russian military command already moved a part of its 6th CAA (LMD), 20th CAA, and 3rd CAA reserves to Belgorod Oblast from Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk-Chasiv Yar directions, respectively.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 26 but did not advance.Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 26 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault with four armored vehicles toward Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored vehicles and damaged one armored vehicle.[28] Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on March 25 and 26.[29]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the outskirts of Mala Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[30]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk along the Zapadne-Kalynove line; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Sahunivka, and Holubivka and toward Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on March 25 and 26.[31]Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a column of Russian armored vehicles, likely attempting to dismount infantry, in the Kupyansk direction on March 25 and that Russian forces lose up to 50 armored vehicles per week.[32] Trehubov reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction regularly use armored vehicle columns to transport infantry to the frontline rather than to conduct mechanized assaults. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova towards Olhivka, Nove, and Katerynivka on March 25 and 26.[33]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 500 meters near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[34]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne on March 25 and 26.[35]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 26 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 25 and 26.[36] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 26 but did not advance.Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, and near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and Dyliivka on March 25 and 26.[37]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[38]A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on March 26 that Russian forces have increased the number of guided glide bomb and fiber-optic drone strikes in the area.[39] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian personnel operating in the area are poorly trained and that Russian forces usually attack in smaller groups.[40]Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Odeska Street in northwestern Toretsk and along Darhomyzhskoho Street in northern Toretsk.[41]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and westward along the O0524 highway northwest of Toretsk.[42]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.5 kilometers west of Niu York (south of Toretsk), in northern Toretsk, and toward Avanhard Stadium in central Toretsk, and in the Fomikha Mine waste heap (northern Toretsk).[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are clearing Olesksandropil and Panteleymonivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[44]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk near Krymske; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on March 25 and 26.[45]A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on March 26 that Russian forces use green tape identification marks to mimic identification marks used by the Ukrainian military in order to prevent Ukrainian drone operators from easily identifying and striking them.[46] Such deceptive tactics may amount to acts of perfidy - a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[47] The Geneva Convention defines perfidy as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, recently claimed that Russian forces similarly used blue electrical tape identification marks - which he claimed Ukrainian forces also use - during an attack in Kursk Oblast to "prevent the Ukrainian military from understanding what was happening."[48]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 238th Artillery Brigade (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) and in northwestern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novopavlivka, and Vidrodzhennya (fomerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka, Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Novoserhiivka, Pishchane, and Novooleksandrivka on March 25 and 26.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lysivka, Solone, and Uspenivka.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of a tank battalion of the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and 1.5 kilometers near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[55]Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyanynopil and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 25 and 26.[56] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Rozlyv.[57]A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting in the Kurakhove direction is more active since the seizure of Kostyantynopil has allowed Russian forces to press on Rozlyv from the north and south.[58] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kostyantynopil as of March 9.[59]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60] Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, and Skudne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on March 25 and 26.[61] Ukrainian sources reported on March 25 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a reduced company-sized mechanized assault near Velyka Novosilka.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[63]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 26.Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Polohy direction.[64]Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 Vasylivka-Orikhiv highway in western Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 26 that Russian forces, including elements of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division), advanced north, west, and east of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and within central Lobkove.[66]Russian forces attacked north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and Kamyanske on March 25 and 26.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove, Lobkove, and Shcherbaky.[68]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kamyanske direction.[69]Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[70] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and that 49 were ”lost,” likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts and conducted the largest Shahed strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast since the start of the war in February 2022.[72]Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported on March 26 that Russian forces are preparing new Shahed launch sites and expanding Shahed crews to increase the number of Shahed strikes against Ukraine.[73]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Russia continued to reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force (USF). Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin announced on March 25 that Russian authorities have reorganized the BARS-Sarmat Detachment into the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.[74] Rogozin also noted that the BARS-Sarmat Center added two new combat testing battalions. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts to establish a separate branch for unmanned systems within the Russian Armed Forces in mid to late 2024 by reorganizing informal drone detachments into MoD-controlled units.[75]The Kremlin continues efforts to militarize Russian youth as part of long-term force generation efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the board of the “Movement of the First” youth military-patriotic organization on March 26 and claimed that 11 million people have joined the organization since its founding in 2022.[76] The Kremlin uses the Movement of the First to militarize society in Russia and occupied Ukraine, particularly among children, and Movement of the First's Board Chairperson Artur Orlov stated that the organization aims to attract up to 18 million participants by 2030.[77]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian drone designer VVZ Drones stated on March 26 that it developed the "Sifa" first-person view (FPV) drone, which can strike helicopters and other drones.[78] VVZ Drones claimed that the Sifa drone has a payload of up to 0.7 kilograms and a flight speed of over 225 kilometers per hour.Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025[3] https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/pfbid02DqN3gqGZojFHnPyHFJxjhSRKkRf5TNhYCRj3YT3Ef41XofWqn61Y9t9BQ9kEbJpWl?rdid=liOa5JELmSNyLabK[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/307689[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/50573[7] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22384 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031AbZGpscTy486rb6L34FK5jSkYCw68um12zMeSVhnHQt52baxQZ8JEppGR65Kxbml[8] https://x.com/dmtrltvn/status/1904620272247845159[9] https://t.me/kpszsu/31391 ; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/03/25/v-den-peregovorov-s-ssha-rossiya-nanesla-udar-po-tsentru-sum ; https://t.me/synegubov/13541; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4335 ; https://t.me/kyivoda/26531; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17504; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13648; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12277 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/masovana-ataka-rf-v-odesi-poshkodzhenyj-torgovyj-czentr-i-bagatopoverhivky-postrazhdaly-pidlitky/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9105; https://t.me/synegubov/13505; https://t.me/synegubov/13503 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39828 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144490 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144493 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13603 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1902120683699626108 ;[10] https://www.state.gov/statement-from-secretary-rubio-and-nsa-waltz-on-call-with-zelenskyy/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/world/europe/trump-ukraine-nuclear-plants.html ; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-ceasefire-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-d45fa1cfde7790f0a8c19e4e997c605c[11] https://t.me/MID_Russia/54347[12] https://ria dot ru/20250326/novak-2007531565.html[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8[14] https://www.ans.org/news/article-6015/ukraine-releases-video-of-russian-kamikaze-drones-flying-near-nuclear-plant/; https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/32001; https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/19/europe/ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-russian-vehicles-intl-hnk/index.html; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-weaponizes-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/;[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025[16] https://www.ft.com/content/f5fee89e-be92-4ca3-9e3c-01078b8a2b64; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-says-unconditional-withdrawal-russia-ukraine-is-precondition-amend-sanctions-2025-03-26/[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8735; https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/876[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33867[20] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/67684[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33867[23] https://t.me/romanov_92/46438; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63112[24] https://t.me/rusich_army/22072 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22073 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/22063; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25957; https://t.me/wargonzo/25529 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46439; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88803; https://t.me/dazbastadraw/7919; https://t.me/dva_majors/67662[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63112[26] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44713; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88803; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20936[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2646[28] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885; https://t.me/dva_majors/67662; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/26/broneyu-abo-na-chomus-duzhe-shvydkomu-vorog-vyprobovuye-varianty-proryvu-pozyczij-syl-oborony/[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;[34] https://t.me/tass_agency/307624[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885; https://t.me/rybar/69159[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25981; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159234[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/26/dalnist-do-20-kilometriv-chasiv-yar-masovo-atakuyut-optovolokonnymy-dronamy/[40] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/25/slabo-pidgotovleni-mozhut-jty-natovpom-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-praczyuye-malymy-grupamy/[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904917840991265095 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904916107376337391; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13581 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904918883846230033; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13581[42] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1904848254363181316; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904838046517723156; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1043322721034906&rdid=y1Cu7JFNGd4chRLF; https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8738; https:// t.me/voron1OO/133 https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904826400286122267[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25996[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33878[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885[46] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/979801-hocut-vijti-na-kostantinivku-ak-vijska-rf-sturmuut-na-toreckomu-napramku/ ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/26/vorog-zajshov-v-budynok-pihota-rubalas-v-toreczku-boyi-jdut-za-kozhnu-stinu/[47] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-37[48] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13595[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973[51] https://t.me/rybar/69150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6856[53] https://t.me/rybar/69150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973[54] https://t.me/milinfolive/144892[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25998; https://t.me/voin_dv/14091[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/14091; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522 [58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25998[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8737 ; https://t.me/ombr_31/383[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25999 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14091[62] https://mil.in dot ua/uk/news/na-donechchyni-syly-bezpilotnyh-system-znyshhyly-bronetankovu-kolonu/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?mibextid=wwXIfr&v=1284084132692095&rdid=LstJiqMno4yPB4pA[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/14091[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14077; https://t.me/voin_dv/14088[65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8734; https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/643826108348335/; https://t.me/Zabolocini; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1904662479914872997[66] https:// t.me/tass_agency/307636; https:// t.me/motopatriot78/33864; https:// t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117; https:// t.me/yurasumy/22064[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035qSLdScgpZtLhM4Npqt6mxyXkVJmoP24hhC5aGqATKqgF5PneVFqDkTLspmd5UsTl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522; https://t.me/yurasumy/22064; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117 [68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33866; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117[69] https://t.me/vrogov/19705; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6906 [70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12300; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035qSLdScgpZtLhM4Npqt6mxyXkVJmoP24hhC5aGqATKqgF5PneVFqDkTLspmd5UsTl [71] https://t.me/kpszsu/31433[72] https://t.me/kpszsu/31433; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13693 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1904822986655363390; https://t.me/vilkul/10047; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/26/kryvij-rig-perezhyv-najmasovishu-z-pochatku-vijny-rosijsku-ataku-dronamy/; https://t.me/vilkul/10045; https://t.me/police_su_region/26816; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25462 [73] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9028[74] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6903[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations[76] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76536 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76542[77] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23513109[78] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23502987
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2025
- at 3/30/25 12:09amChristina Harward, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with William RunkelMarch 22, 2025, 5:30 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on March 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21. Witkoff told American media personality Tucker Carlson in an interview published on March 21 that Russia "100 percent" does not want to invade Europe and that Russia "does not need to absorb Ukraine."[1] Witkoff stated that Russia "reclaimed" five regions in Ukraine — Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — and that Russia "has gotten what [it] wants" and will not want more. The Kremlin has repeatedly and falsely claimed that Crimea and these four oblasts are Russian territory contrary to international law, and Witkoff's statement about Russia "reclaiming" these areas (which Russia has illegally occupied and annexed) amplifies the Kremlin's justifications for its expansionist territorial demands and multiple invasions of Ukraine.Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences. Surkov previously served as a long-time close advisor to Putin and organized protests in Crimea against the Ukrainian government in 2014.[2] Surkov also oversaw the Kremlin's 2014-2015 project to promote the creation of "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) in eastern Ukraine.[3] Putin relieved Surkov of his duties as Presidential Aide in February 2020.[4] Surkov stated in an interview with French outlet L'Express on March 19 that a Russian victory in Ukraine would be the "military or military and diplomatic crushing of Ukraine" and the "division of this artificial quasi-state into its natural fragments."[5] Surkov stated that Russia will achieve this strategic objective — which Surkov stated has not changed since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — even if there are "maneuvers, slowdowns, and pauses along the way." Surkov stated that the return of Ukraine to Russia's desired and self-defined sphere of influence has been a Russian objective since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Surkov claimed that "Ukraine is an artificial political entity" consisting of "at least" three regions — the "Russian" southern and eastern Ukraine, the "Russian-non-Russian" central area, and the "anti-Russian" west. Surkov claimed that Russia's war in Ukraine "will separate the Russians and the anti-Russians" and will "confine" the "anti-Russians" to their "historical territory" such that they "stop spreading across Russian soil." Surkov claimed that "perhaps" Ukraine will exist as a "real state" in the future but as a much smaller entity. Surkov implied that Europe will be involved in the future partitioning of Ukraine, claiming that "a balanced division of Ukraine will have to include a share for Brussels." Surkov responded to a question about how he sees Russian borders, stating that the ideology of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) "has no borders" and exists "everywhere there is Russian influence," including cultural, military, economic, ideological, or humanitarian influence. Surkov claimed that Russia's influence varies across regions in the world, but "is never zero." Surkov claimed that Russia "will spread out in all directions." The Kremlin has repeatedly used the idea of the Russian World to justify Russian military interventions into former Soviet states and to claim that areas of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire are historical Russian territories.[6] Surkov's statements about Russia's claims over southern and eastern Ukraine and the future expansion of Russkiy Mir are in direct contrast to Witkoff's statement that Russia has no territorial ambitions beyond Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.Surkov's statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence. Senior Russian officials have recently reiterated that any future peace settlement must address the "root causes" of the war, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov defined as recently as March 10, 2025, as the alleged "threats to Russia's security from the Ukrainian and Western directions in general" that are due to NATO's eastward expansion and the Ukrainian government's alleged "extermination" of everything that is "connected with Russia and the Russkiy Mir," including Russian language, culture, Orthodoxy, and media.[7] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko acknowledged on March 17, 2025, that Russia's demands for Ukrainian neutrality and NATO's refusal to allow Ukraine into the alliance are the same demands that Russia made in 2021 before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[8] Putin's 2021 demands also stipulated that NATO commit to not accepting any countries as new members and that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; would ban any NATO military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; would ban deployments of intermediate-range missiles in areas that could reach Russian or NATO state territory; and would ban the United States from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[9] The Kremlin has used the "Russkiy Mir" narrative for decades to justify Russian aggression in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova and to set conditions to influence independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire.[10] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly propagated pseudo-history to deny Ukrainian statehood and nationhood and have falsely asserted that Ukraine's Western neighbors have legitimate claims to Ukrainian territory in an effort to sow division between Ukraine and Europe.[11] Putin has recently reamplified Russia's territorial demands that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces do not currently occupy, amid ongoing bilateral US-Russia negotiations.[12] Putin and other Russian officials have also recently reamplified Russian narratives that "Novorossiya," which Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, is an "integral" part of Russia.[13] Putin has used the term "Novorossiya" to refer to eastern and southern Ukraine since 2014 to set informational conditions to justify Russia's occupation and territorial ambitions and claimed in 2023 that Odesa City, Crimea, and the entire "Black Sea region" have nothing "to do with Ukraine."[14]Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian territories that Russia illegally occupies. Witkoff claimed during the March 21 interview that Russian-occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts are "Russian-speaking" and that "there have been referendums [in these regions] where the overwhelming majority of people have indicated that they want to be under Russian rule."[15] Russia has long used similar claims to justify its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, having used the claim that Russia needs to "protect Russian-speakers" in eastern Ukraine to justify the launch of its full-scale invasion in 2022.[16] Russia has routinely undermined its own myth of "protecting Russian speakers" in Ukraine, however, destroying predominantly Russian-speaking cities in eastern Ukraine, killing Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and deporting Russian-speaking Ukrainian children to Russia in violation of international law.[17] The Russian invasions of Ukraine have never been about protecting Russian speakers.[18]The assertion that the "overwhelming majority" of Ukrainians living under Russian occupation want to be under Russian control is also demonstrably false. Russian manipulations and coercive control tactics in occupied Ukraine are inconsistent with the claim that all residents of occupied Ukraine "want" to be part of Russia. Russia staged sham referendums in Crimea and parts of Donbas in 2014 and then in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 in an attempt to claim that most of the population "voted" to be annexed by Russia.[19] These referendums were all conducted under an intense Russian military presence and without legitimate election observers, and Russian authorities likely falsified attendance statistics and manipulated ballots.[20] Annexation referendums in 2022 did not account for the millions of Ukrainians who fled their homes to avoid living under Russian occupation.[21] Russian forces used physical intimidation to force Ukrainian civilians to vote for annexation during the 2022 referendums, with reports from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast suggesting that Russian occupation authorities instituted "at-home" voting in order to allow Russian security forces to enter the homes of Ukrainians and threaten them into voting for annexation at gunpoint.[22] Russian occupation officials also made their provision of humanitarian aid and basic necessities contingent on Ukrainians voting for annexation in the 2022 referendums.[23]Russian demographic manipulations and mass indoctrination in occupied Ukraine are also at odds with the claim that Ukrainians living under occupation want to be under Russian control. Russian occupation administrators have had to institute coercive measures to force residents into obtaining Russian passports, threatening to deny Ukrainians access to basic services and medical care — demonstrating that there is no mass support in occupied Ukraine for Russian citizenship offers.[24] The extent of Russian pressure on populations in occupied areas is another strong indicator that residents of these areas do not want to be part of Russia but must be coerced to "Russify" — something that should be unnecessary among people who already identify as Russians. Russia has also embarked on a state-directed effort to deport Ukrainians from occupied Ukraine and to import Russians to live in occupied Ukraine, using manipulated demographic data to create the impression that there are more people willingly living in occupied areas.[25] Russia would not have to forcibly deport millions of Ukrainians to Russia if these Ukrainians actually wanted to be part of Russia.[26]Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe. Trump has said that the United States will try to return as much territory to Ukraine as possible.[27] Trump also recently stated that the United States is interested in taking control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can take control of the ZNPP.[28] Witkoff's March 21 presentation of Russia's territorial demands for the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including areas of these four oblasts that Russian forces do not currently occupy — undermines Trump's efforts to achieve a resolution to the war favorable to US interests. Ceding territory in these four oblasts to Russia — either along the current frontlines or along the oblasts' administrative boundaries – would not provide Ukraine with the defensible lines required to reliably defend against renewed Russian aggression in the future, hindering Trump's stated objective of securing a lasting, sustainable peace in Ukraine.[29] Witkoff also claimed that Ukrainian officials have "conceded" that Ukraine will not be a member of NATO — a preemptive US concession to Russia on one of the Kremlin's main demands as Russia continues to make no concessions in return. Witkoff's statements appear to yield to multiple Kremlin demands before the start of official negotiations for a peace settlement, ceding valuable US and Ukrainian leverage over Russia in future negotiations that the United States will need in order to achieve Trump's desired end to the war.Key Takeaways:US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff uncritically amplified a number of Russian demands, claims, and justifications regarding the war in Ukraine during an interview on March 21.Vladislav Surkov, a former close adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, recently reiterated a number of longstanding Kremlin claims and ambitions that directly contradict Witkoff's assertions in an interview with French media aimed at Western audiences.Surkov's statements are consistent with those made by Putin and senior Russian officials, who have recently and repeatedly stated that Russia intends to bring Ukraine under Russian control and establish suzerainty over neighboring countries in order to weaken the West and strengthen Russia's global influence.Witkoff uncritically repeated several inaccurate Russian claims regarding the status of the Ukrainian territories that Russia illegally occupies.Witkoff's statements undermine US President Donald Trump's stated desired end state for the war in Ukraine that achieves an enduring peace and is in the best interests of the United States, Ukraine, and Europe.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.The Kremlin continues to innovate new ways to leverage conscripts to increase the pool of servicemembers eligible for military service in the future.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continue attacks against limited Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblasts but did not advance.Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are attacking toward Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha along the international border).[30] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have stopped Russian advances along the Gogolevka-Guyevo line (west and south of Sudzha), where Ukrainian forces occasionally counterattack.[31]A Russian milblogger continued claims that Russian forces are trying to create a "buffer zone" in Sumy Oblast along the international border.[32]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[33]Ukrainian and Russian forces continue limited ground attacks in Sumy Oblast.Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have stopped Russian advances along the Zhuravka-Basivka line (just across the international border in Sumy Oblast), where Ukrainian forces occasionally counterattack.[34]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[35]Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in Belgorod Oblast.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to the outskirts of Grafovka (northwest of Belgorod City) from Prilesye (southwest of Grafovka) are unconfirmed.[36]Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked along the Demidovka-Repyakhovka line (northwest of Belgorod City along the international border).[37] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near Prilesye and south of Demidovka.[38]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have begun conducting raids after recent attacks with armored vehicles in the area were unsuccessful.[39] Other Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian military command redeployed reinforcements near Demidovka.[40] A Russian insider source claimed that there is conflicting information about Ukrainian forces entering the Russian near rear of Grafovka and Demidovka.[41]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment, BARS Belgorod, and Orlan detachment are reportedly operating in Belgorod Oblast.[42]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 21 and 22.[43]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 22 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[44]Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka, north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 21 and 22.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted successful counterattacks near Synkivka (northeast of Kupyansk) and that half of the settlement is now a contested "gray zone."[46]Head of the Kupyansk City Military Administration Andriy Besedin reported that Russian forces have conducted over 3,000 strikes against Kupyanskyi Raion since the start of March, including 57 glide bomb strikes.[47]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 22 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along Tsentralna Street in central Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova).[48]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya on March 21 and 22.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Nadiya and advanced near Zelenyi Hai (east of Borova) after Russian forces retreated.[50]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Zahryzove.[51]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 22 but did not advance. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Nove (north of Lyman).[52]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Kolodyazi, Ivanivka, and Zelene Dolnya and toward Novomykhailivka and Nove and east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova on March 21 and 22.[53]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction. [54]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[55]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka on March 21 and 22.[56]Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on March 22 that Russian forces operating in the Siversk direction began requesting additional motorized vehicles, possibly due to shortages of armored vehicles or because the terrain in the area is more open.[57]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 22 but did not advance. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division pushed Ukrainian forces from the Zakhidne neighborhood (western Chasiv Yar) and advanced in Shevchenko Microraion (southern Chasiv Yar).[58]Russian forces continued attacking near and within Chasiv Yar itself; south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne; and southeast of Chasiv Yar toward Andriivka on March 21 and 22.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Shevchenko Microraion.[60]Zaporozhets stated on March 22 that Russian forces are conducting the most intense shelling in the Kramatorsk direction (northwest of Chasiv Yar) and are less intensely shelling Ukrainian positions in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on March 22 but did not advance.Russia forces attacked near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on March 21 and 22.[63]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reconstituted Soviet-era unit) and elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[64]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Nadiivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[65]Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northern Shevchenko (southwest of Pokrovsk) and south of Sribne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces completely seized Shevchenko and Upsenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[67] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bohdanivka and Zaporizhzhia (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[68]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, Vodyane Druhe, and Kalynove; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Uspenivka, Preobrazhenka, Nadiivka, Zaporizhzhia, Novoandriivka, and Bohdanivka and in the directions of Kotlyarivka and Novooleksandrivka on March 21 and 22.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Uspenivka and Solone (southwest of Pokrovsk).[70]The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated on March 22 that Russian forces conduct assaults on motorcycles and only conduct assaults with armored vehicles once or twice per month in the area.[71] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces conduct drone and artillery preparation before conducting motorcycle assaults from several directions at once. The deputy commander also noted that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones with fiber-optic cables to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 22 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andrivka, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr and Rozlyv on March 21 and 22.[72]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 22 but did not advance. Russian forces continued attacking west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko, Vilne Pole, and Pryvilne; and north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya on March 21 and 22.[73]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[74]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on March 21 and 22.[75]Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on March 22 but did not advance.[76]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 179 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhatarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 100 drones over southern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 63 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts.[78]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)The Kremlin continues to innovate new ways to leverage conscripts to increase the pool of servicemembers eligible for military service in the future. The Russian State Duma passed a bill in its first reading on March 21 that grants military registration and enlistment offices the right to take conscripts into military service up to one year after the conclusion of a conscription period.[79] The proposed bill also allows Russian federal subjects (regions) to create a unified recruitment point analogous to the one that currently exists in Moscow Oblast. The proposed bill will only impact compulsory military service and not the mobilization reserve.[80] The bill would expand the types of decisions military registration and enlistment offices can make about conscripts and allow these offices to expedite the dispatch of conscripts to military service without having to undergo the standard psychological and medical evaluations. The bill would expand the purview of military registration offices to send personnel to military service, thus increasing the size of the Russian armed forces. ISW has observed other indicators that Russia is unwilling and unprepared to demobilize its military, even in the event of a potential ceasefire in Ukraine.[81]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) continues efforts to expand Russia's air defense capabilities. The Kalashnikov Concern, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, announced on March 19 that it presented a fully functional model of the "Krona" short-range air defense missile system.[82] The Kalashnikov Concern first presented a "Krona" model in early February 2025 and noted that this system is designed to protect strategic government and infrastructure facilities in the Russian rear from medium-range drone strikes.[83] The Kalashnikov Concern confirmed that the "Krona" is equipped with 9M340 and 9M333 guided anti-aircraft missiles.[84]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acvu2LBumGo[2] https://eur-lex.europa dot eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R1267&qid=1714067858465[3] https://static.rusi.org/201907_op_surkov_leaks_web_final.pdf ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725[4] http://www.kremlin dot ru/catalog/persons/2/events/62818[5] https://www.lexpress dot fr/monde/europe/exclusive-vladislav-sourkov-the-kremlins-wizard-russia-will-expand-in-all-directions-as-far-as-god-WWIE5OJMPVHJ5KTTAHNLE4WPME/?cmp_redirect?cmp_redirect=true[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042724 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/223308; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73035[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-poses-long-term-threats-moldova%E2%80%99s-european-integration-beyond-october-elections ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/17541447 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2023[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/21388299 ; https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/67a9f33d9a79475efa1b9da7 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/22105019[14] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/20796[15] https://kyivindependent dot com/i-dont-regard-putin-as-a-bad-guy-witkoff-says-on-negotiations-with-russia/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acvu2LBumGo; https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/witkoff-sparks-controversy-with-statement-1742632966.html[16] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843; 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https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-3[21] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/02/ukraines-fight-its-people/ukrainian-refugees-and-their-shifting-situation[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7[23] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/4814[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-imposes-its-passport-on-occupied-ukraine-coercing-hundreds-of-thousands-into-citizenship; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67427840[25] https://2021-2025.state.gov/russias-filtration-operations-and-forced-relocations/; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf[26] https://ukraineworld.org/en/articles/analysis/deported-russia[27] https://nypost.com/2025/02/26/us-news/trump-says-us-will-try-to-get-ukraine-as-much-land-back-as-possible-but-zelensky-can-forget-about-nato/ ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2025/02/26/7500326/[28] https://www.state.gov/statement-from-secretary-rubio-and-nsa-waltz-on-call-with-zelenskyy/; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/world/europe/trump-ukraine-nuclear-plants.html[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625[30] https://t.me/rybar/69053[31] https://t.me/yurasumy/21971; https://t.me/rusich_army/21952[32] https://t.me/rybar/69053[33] https://t.me/milinfolive/144659[34] https://t.me/yurasumy/21971; https://t.me/rusich_army/21952[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88504[36] https://t.me/rybar/69044[37] https://t.me/rybar/69044; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88502[38] https://t.me/rusich_army/21945; https://t.me/rybar/69044[39] https://t.me/rybar/69044[40] https://t.me/dva_majors/67367; https://t.me/yurasumy/21971[41] https://t.me/vchkogpu/55539[42] https://t.me/dva_majors/67371; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/12712; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367[43]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/otukharkiv/5068[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33671[45]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/tass_agency/307025 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21980[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33671[47] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/976891-za-persi-20-dniv-berezna-rosiani-zavdali-po-kupanskij-gromadi-ponad-tri-tisaci-udariv-besedin/[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33675[49]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33667[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33675[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33670 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88520[53]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l[54] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19231[55] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1903149551747473871 ; https://t.me/SOF_Genius_drones/428[56]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33687 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88520[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/22/boyi-v-toreczku-vorog-namagayetsya-obijty-syly-oborony-z-flangiv/[58] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63030 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25446 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21979[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63030 ;[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/25446[61] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/22/boyi-v-toreczku-vorog-namagayetsya-obijty-syly-oborony-z-flangiv/[62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25746 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/22892[63] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21978[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/50418 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144663[65] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1903373569708487076; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88460[66] https://x.com/Map_Hargoo/status/1903380714453705111; https://t.me/blackraven93ua/363 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8708; https://t.me/BaluHUB777/17750[67] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63025 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21977[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63025 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63025 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25446 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367 ;[70] https://t.me/yurasumy/21977 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33658 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33693[71] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/22/zasidky-bezpilotnykiv-i-drony-na-optovolokni-yak-rosiyany-shturmuyut-desantnykiv-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku/[72] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21976 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25446[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21975[74] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1903388754468814998 ; https://t.me/Ronins44_65/477[75]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid08oShk9ZeWUNdgrgmy83sMu95QiiQhP3so3ScsqrdtmLTAvP8UbhQHYBZZGytCVzAl ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67367 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25446[76]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02DySeqevPJqKSTvHBvhEyPL9h9sQNrNcRWZTuPDnWV8ahGboUh7tBmZjVAtzciKbml ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vrcWHyj64vCz4Dsfjs9qmhmoQ7231oG5ApvsVQbvox9cXZdRe61gLfxSjnkEQ9Y3l[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/31185[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/31185; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/938 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17504[79] https://sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/840357-8; https://www.currenttime dot tv/a/otpravka-srochnikov-v-armiyu-spustya-god/33355365.html; https://meduza dot io/cards/deputaty-gosdumy-rasshiryayut-prava-voenkomatov-teper-srochnikov-smogut-otpravlyat-v-armiyu-dazhe-spustya-god-posle-prizyvnoy-kampanii[80] https://meduza dot io/cards/deputaty-gosdumy-rasshiryayut-prava-voenkomatov-teper-srochnikov-smogut-otpravlyat-v-armiyu-dazhe-spustya-god-posle-prizyvnoy-kampanii[81] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans[82] https://kalashnikovgroup dot ru/news/kalashnikov-_predstavil_noveyshiy_zenitnyy_raketnyy_kompleks_-krona-_zakazchiku; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/03/19/kalashnikov-predstavil-kronu-zakazchiku/; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/03/19/v-rossii-predstavili-novyy-zenitnyy-raketnyy-kompleks-na-chto-on-sposoben-i-zachem-nuzhen/[83] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025[84] https://kalashnikovgroup dot ru/news/kalashnikov-predstavil_noveyshiy_zenitnyy_raketnyy_kompleks-krona-_zakazchiku
- — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 21, 2025
- at 3/29/25 11:23pmGrace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. KaganMarch 21, 2025, 7:15 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on March 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 21 that Ukrainian forces blew up the Sudzha gas distribution station in Kursk Oblast while withdrawing on the night of March 20 to 21 in order to discredit Russian President Vladimir Putin's "peace initiatives" and to provoke Russia.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff denied the Russian MoD's claim and stated that Russian forces shelled the station, causing a fire.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff warned that Russian authorities are attempting to mislead the international community and discredit Ukraine. Footage published on March 21 shows a fire at the station, although ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the fire.[3] Russian officials seized on the fire to claim falsely that Ukrainian forces violated the proposed 30-day ceasefire banning Russian and Ukrainian strikes on civilian and energy facilities, which is not yet formally in effect and terms of which remain disputed.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russian forces are "implementing" an order from Putin to refrain from striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure in accordance with the US ceasefire proposal.[5] Russian milbloggers observed that the ceasefire proposal has not come into force yet, however, and acknowledged that Russia has continued nightly strikes on Ukraine, including Ukraine's port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, in recent days.[6] Founder of the Kremlin-awarded Rybar telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, recently published a video of himself mocking US officials for believing that Russia is currently or intends to commit to the proposed temporary ceasefire in the area.[7] The exact contours of Putin's supposed order or a future moratorium on energy and infrastructure strikes between Russia and Ukraine remain unclear as of this report.Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience. Peskov claimed in reaction to the Sudzha gas distribution station fire that Ukraine's denial of blowing up the station "shows how much one can believe and trust" Ukrainian officials.[8] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova asked how the United States will "manage" Ukraine given Ukraine's alleged violation of the moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes (that has yet to be finalized and implemented).[9] Zakharova's and Peskov's comments are an effort to revive the narrative that Ukraine is the aggressor in this war, that Ukraine only acts under guidance or pressure from the West, and that the war in Ukraine is an existential risk to the Russian state to which Russia must respond.[10] Russian authorities have also revived narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of targeting Russian nuclear power plants and committing war crimes against Russian civilians to undermine Ukraine's credibility and heighten the invented existential threat to domestic audiences. The Russian Investigative Committee published a summary on March 21 of ongoing criminal investigations, cases, and convictions of Ukrainian soldiers and high-level commanders for allegedly targeting the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and civilians in strikes.[11] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin was preparing to intensify narratives accusing Ukrainian forces of war crimes in Kursk Oblast to discredit the Ukrainian military, erode Western support for Ukraine, and spoil or delay talks about temporary ceasefire proposals.[12]The Kremlin has pushed these narratives consistently throughout the war in an attempt to distract from Russia's actions. Russian forces have committed numerous war crimes on the battlefield and in occupied Ukraine and have endangered the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP) by militarizing it, and a Russian long-range Shahed drone struck the containment structure of the Chornobyl NPP's Reactor No. 4 on February 14.[13] The Kremlin may seek to leverage its narratives falsely portraying Ukraine as recklessly endangering Russian NPPs and being an unsafe operator of the ZNPP to spoil US-Ukrainian bilateral talks, given recent US and Ukrainian official statements about possible US involvement in Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including the Russian-occupied ZNPP.[14]US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Kellogg stated during an interview on March 20 that US technical teams will conduct "proximity talks," which Kellogg described as "shuttle diplomacy between rooms," in Riyadh with Ukrainian and Russian delegations.[15] CBS Senior Correspondent Jennifer Jacobs reported on March 21 that sources familiar with the matter stated that US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz will not attend the upcoming discussions in Riyadh.[16] Jacobs reported that US technical teams intend to meet with the Ukrainian delegation on March 23, the Russian delegation on March 24, and may meet with the Ukrainian delegation again later on March 24 if there is significant progress. Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministry representatives will also not participate in the Riyadh meetings.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 21 that the Ukrainian delegation will present a list of Ukrainian facilities that the strikes moratorium should protect.[18] US and Russian officials previously stated that the March 24 Riyadh meeting will focus on achieving a temporary maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea and laying the groundwork for a "full ceasefire."[19]Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu traveled to North Korea on March 21 and met with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, likely to discuss Russian-North Korean ties.[20] US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce condemned North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine on March 19, noting that North Korean support to Russia fuels and exacerbates the war in Ukraine.[21] Ukrainian and other Western officials have also continuously noted that North Korean involvement in Russia's offensive operations in Kursk Oblast and broader cooperation with Russia has particularly enhanced North Korea's military capabilities, posing potential security risks in the Asia-Pacific region.[22]Russian officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov met with PRC Security Minister Wang Xiaohong in Beijing on March 21 to discuss Russia-PRC bilateral relations.[23] Wang noted that the PRC is prepared to support multi-level meetings between Russian and Chinese law enforcement agencies and security services and to strengthen partnership in the fight against terrorism and transnational crime. ISW has observed that the PRC has supported Russia's war effort in Ukraine through sanctions evasion, rhetoric, and even direct military aid while posturing itself as a neutral actor and mediator to end the conflict.[24]Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian Strategic Industries Minister Herman Smetanin announced on March 20 that an unspecified Ukrainian defense enterprise signed an agreement with Norwegian-Finnish ammunition manufacturer NAMMO to deepen bilateral defense industrial cooperation and create a joint venture for 155mm artillery shell production in Ukraine.[25] Deutsche Welle (DW) reported on March 21 that Germany's Bundestag Budget Committee and both houses of parliament approved an additional 3 billion euros (roughly $3.3 billion) in military aid for Ukraine, in addition to Germany's pledged amount of 4 billion euros (roughly $4.3 billion), for Ukraine in 2025 and 8.3 billion euros (roughly $8.9 billion) pledged from 2026 to 2029.[26]Key Takeaways:The Kremlin is weaponizing ongoing ceasefire negotiations and deliberately misrepresenting the status and terms of a future ceasefire agreement in order to delay and undermine negotiations for a settlement to the war.Kremlin officials are leveraging narratives about Ukrainian strikes and combat operations in Russian territory to justify rejecting peace negotiations with Ukraine and continuing the war to a domestic Russian audience.US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg stated that US officials will conduct "shuttle diplomacy" to engage bilaterally with both Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Russia continues to strengthen its bilateral relations with North Korea, despite growing warnings from the US against deeper Russian-North Korean cooperation.Russian officials also continue to deepen ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC).Ukraine's European allies continue efforts to provide Ukraine with military assistance and bolster Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB).Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian and Western defense officials estimated that the Russian monthly casualty rate is between 20,000 and 35,000 servicemembers. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignRussian Mobilization and Force Generation EffortsRussian Technological AdaptationsActivities in Russian-occupied areasSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continue to attack limited Ukrainian positions in Kursk Oblast, although Russian advances have slowed in recent days. Russian milbloggers recently noted that intensified Ukrainian HIMARS strikes are complicating Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their remaining positions south of Sudzha.[27]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Tiger" Volunteer Detachment are reportedly operating near the H-07 Sudzha-Yanikivka highway.[28] Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on March 12 and geolocated on March 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Zhuravka (north of Sumy City), but this advance did not occur in the last week.[29]Russian forces continued to attack Basivka (northeast of Sumy City) on March 21.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Yunkivka (south of Basivka).[31]Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Belgorod Oblast.Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger published a map on March 20 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces advanced in the fields southwest of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City along the international border).[32]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced and are consolidating positions on the outskirts of Demidovka and Prilesye (south of Demidovka).[33] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have not advanced into Demidovka as of March 20.[34]Russian milbloggers claimed that small groups of Ukrainian infantry are attacking near Demidovka, Grafovka (southeast of Demidovka), and Prilesye.[35]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are operating in the border area of Belgorod Oblast.[36] Maxar satellite imagery collected on March 21 indicates that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged an ammunition and weapons storage area at Engel's Airbase in Saratov Oblast (see embedded imagery below). Ukrainian forces struck Engels Airbase on the night of March 19 to 20, and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko reported that the Ukrainian strike destroyed a large number of Russian Kh-101 cruise missiles.[37] Ammunition depot at Engels Airbase on December 7, 2024. Source: Satellite image ©2024 Maxar Technologies Ammunition depot at Engels Airbase on March 21, 2025. Source: Satellite image ©2025 Maxar Technologies Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on March 20 and 21.[38]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 44th Army Corps (AC) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction, and drone operators of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[39]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk).[40]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the northern outskirts of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[41]Russian forces attacked northwest of Kupyansk near Mala Shapkivka, north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Lyman Pershyi and Dvorichna, east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 20 and 21.[42]Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 21 that Ukrainian forces repelled an at least reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Kupyansk direction on the morning of March 20 and destroyed two tanks, two infantry fighting vehicles, and one armored personnel carrier.[43]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Antagonist" drone group are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 21 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove, and east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya; and southeast of Borova in the direction of Novomykhailivka and Katerynivka on March 20 and 21.[45]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 21 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed on March 21 that Russian forces advanced near Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[46]Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka, Zarichne, and Ivanivka and toward Zelene Dolnya and Nove and east of Lyman near Torske on March 20 and 21.[47]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[48] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Zolotarivka (east of Siversk) and north of Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk).[49]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 20 and 21.[50]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups with motorcycles and civilian vehicles in the Siversk direction.[51] The spokesperson noted that Russian commanders tell their soldiers to buy these vehicles with their own money or walk five to 10 kilometers to the contact line before conducting combat missions. The spokesperson added that Russian forces first attack with elderly, injured, and disabled soldiers and then send better trained infantry to attack in subsequent waves.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 21 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division seized several streets in Shevchenko Microraion in southwestern Chasiv Yar.[52]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Dyilivika, Predtechyne and in the direction of Oleksandro-Shultyne on March 20 and 21.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[54] Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar.[55]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Enhelsa and Mykhaila Hrushevskoho streets in central Toretsk.[56]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dachne, east of Toretsk near Druzhba, and south of Toretsk near Panteleymonivka on March 20 and 21.[57]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within southwestern Tarasivka (east of Pokrovsk) and eastern Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[58]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pishchane (south of Pokrovsk) and in western Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[59]Russian forces continued ground assaults near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole, Tarasivka, Yelyzavetivka, Novotoretske, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka, Nadiivka, Zaporizhzhia, and Bohdanivka and in the directions of Muravka and Kotlyarivka on March 20 and 21.[60] A Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Uspenivka and Preobrazhenka.[61]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Tarasivka, and elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly fighting in Uspenivka.[62] Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novobakhmutivka.[63] Elements of the Russian "Medvedi" drone battalion are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov inspected the Russian Central Group of Forces on March 21 and heard reports from Russian Central Military District (CMD) commander Colonel General Andrei Mordvichev and field commanders.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kostyantynopil (west of Kurakhove).[66]Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Kostyantynopil, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 20 and 21.[67]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on March 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novosilka (west of Velyka Novosilka), 1.5 kilometers near Vilne Pole, and 500 meters near Vesele (both northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[68]Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka, northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole, and north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhirya on March 20 and 21.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Vesele and near Novodarivka (southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Vilne Pole.[70]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 30th Spetsnaz Company (reportedly of the 36th CAA, EMD) and artillery elements of the 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[71] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 21 but did not make any confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 71st and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced north and northeast of Robotyne, that Russian forces advanced northwest of Pyatykhatky, that Russian forces seized Zherebyanky (northwest of Robotyne), and that elements of the 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) seized southern Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne).[72]Russian forces attacked northwest of Robotyne near Lobkove, Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky on March 20 and 21.[73]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated that the Orikhiv direction is the most active area in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces have conducted 150 assaults in the area since the "start of spring."[74] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are attempting to advance to within artillery range of the eastern and southern suburbs of Zaporizhzhia City and major Ukrainian logistics routes between Zaporizhzhia City and eastern Ukraine.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the western Zaporizhia direction.[75]Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on March 21 but did not advance.[76]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 214 Shahed and other drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[77] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 Shahed drones and that 81 drones were "lost," likely due to electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones hit Khmelnytskyi, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts and civilian and port infrastructure in Odesa City.[78]Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for Reconstruction Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against Odesa City as Czech President Petr Pavel met with Kuleba in the city on March 21.[79]Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)Ukrainian and Western defense officials estimated that the Russian monthly casualty rate is between 20,000 and 35,000 servicemembers. A Ukrainian drone brigade commander stated on March 20 that Russian forces deploy between 30,000 and 35,000 additional Russian soldiers to Ukraine monthly and that Ukrainian forces remove 20,000 Russian soldiers from the battlefield per month.[80] The commander attributed high Russian casualties to poor training and a “low” degree of familiarity with the weapons Ukrainian forces use against Russian units. The commander added that Russian forces are unable to sustain multi-pronged offensive operations, which may indicate that Russian forces are unable to fully staff their military units. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense (UK MOD), citing data from the Ukrainian General Staff, estimated on March 21 that Ukrainian forces have killed 250,000 Russian soldiers since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and that Russian casualties have reached over 900,000 troops in total.[81] The UK MOD added that 35,140 Russian troops were killed and wounded in February 2025 alone, for an average of 1,255 daily casualties. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi echoed these estimates on March 21, adding that Russian forces have lost over 540,790 casualties since the beginning of 2024.[82]Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize society in Russia and in occupied Ukraine by integrating veterans into military-patriotic education programs. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Europa reported on March 21 that Russian schools have hosted an average of 93 veterans' lectures on “lessons of courage” per day for schoolchildren as young as kindergarten since January 2025.[83] Novaya Gazeta reported that Russian schools have already taught almost 40,000 such lessons since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that at least 99 Russian schools employed Russian veterans to teach ”basic military training, first aid procedures, methods of protection against weapons of mass destruction, and basic drone operations” to Russian schoolchildren. Novaya Gazeta estimated that at least 200 Russian schools are expecting veterans to become teachers upon their return from the frontlines. Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported on March 21 that Russian occupation officials recently held qualifying sessions of the “Zarnitsa 2.0” games in occupied Luhansk Oblast, which force Ukrainian children to participate in tactical and combat training and to learn Russian military history.[84] Russian state media outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda announced on January 31, 2025, that applications for the "Zarnitsa 2.0" games in occupied Luhansk Oblast opened and described the program as the flagship project of the “Movement of the First” youth military-patriotic organization.[85]Russian officials continued their efforts to downplay problematic trends in the Russian economy. The Russian Central Bank voted on March 21 kept the key interest rate at 21 percent, and Russian Central Bank head Elvira Nabiullina claimed that the “likelihood of a further increase in the key rate has decreased."[86] The Russian Central Bank estimated the Russian annual inflation rate to be approximately 10.2 percent as of March 17 and predicted that levels will fall to 7 or 8 percent in 2025, and down to 4 percent in 2026.[87] These claims are likely part of an ongoing Russian narrative aiming to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, despite increasing inflation and a lack of viable long-term sanctions mitigation techniques.[88]Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine) Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian government on March 19 to accelerate Russia’s drone production in an effort to “achieve technical leadership by 2030.”[89] Putin ordered the Russian government to create a unified system for real-time drone identification and to simplify conditions for domestic drone operations by developing a new Russian airspace (likely setting aside low altitudes in some areas) for drones by June 1, 2025. Putin also ordered the establishment of a government system to oversee unmanned aviation and to simplify regulations on the experimental use of drones to facilitate drone use in different economic fields. Putin instructed Russian officials to organize and report the conclusions of an international forum on drones by September 1, 2025. Putin also ordered the allocation of extra funds for the development of low-orbit satellite systems for drone communications and operation.Russian forces are continuing to innovate drone capabilities. Russian milbloggers claimed on March 20 that the Russian "Malye Kosmicheskie Apparaty" (Small Spacecraft) research center began the development of “Kolibri” satellite communication terminals to remotely control drones via Russian spacecraft.[90] The research center currently produces similar communications systems, namely the “Dolphin" system, to support marine and ground communication stations. A Ukrainian source posted photos on March 20 and 21 purportedly showing an experimental Russian heavy bomber drone with 8 rotor engines.[91] The source speculated that this “octocopter” drone would be difficult to stabilize in the air due to its excess of engines — unlike Ukrainian Mavic and Vampire drones.[92]Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/tass_agency/306939 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306940 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50400[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid022SRQLsmvGzRZVdqNgxrTgX4Yo5TrdCaER6PX5Cr4aeg1qDVWHh882KWXj47aVasTl[3] https://x.com/war_monitor_ua/status/1902853183602561146 ; https://x.com/MThingguy/status/1902867759391793639[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/306926 ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/03/21/kreml-obvinil-ukrainu-v-narushenii-usloviy-30-dnevnogo-peremiriya/ ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306929 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306834; https://dzen dot ru/a/Z9yQm2VrjVU7PL6a[5] https://t.me/tass_agency/306926 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23466319[6] https://t.me/olegtsarov/25561 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21947 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/67263[7] https://x.com/seip73373/status/1903096911369736544; https://t.me/ToBeOr_Official/17438[8] https://tass dot ru/politika/23470361; https://t.me/tass_agency/306993 ; https://t.me/zarubinreporter/3796[9] https://t.me/tass_agency/306834[10] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-17; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-update-1; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2024[11] https://t.me/tass_agency/306889 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306891 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306892 ; https://t.me/sledcom_press/19843[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025[15] https://x.com/glennbeck/status/1902796626088939715[16] https://x.com/JenniferJJacobs/status/1903111583900852406[17] https://suspilne dot media/976303-kontaktiv-z-rosianami-u-saudivskij-aravii-ne-zaplanovano-mzs/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2025[18] https://suspilne dot media/976383-ukraina-ocikue-vid-zustrici-iz-ssa-rezultatu-akij-nablizit-nas-do-pripinenna-vognu-zelenskij/[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025[20] https://t.me/tass_agency/306863 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306867 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306869 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306943[21] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-march-19-2025/#RUSSIAROKDPRK[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine-operational-and-strategic-implications; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025[23] https://ria dot ru/20250321/bortnikov-2006397391.html ; https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/03/21/25363178.shtml ; http://www.news dot cn/politics/leaders/20250321/8c71292afaeb4ac4b968a9e0f35de788/c.html; https://t.me/tass_agency/306906[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-7-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates-june-1-september-30-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2024; https://www.iswresearch.org/2024/04/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_26.html[25] https://t.me/herman_smetanin_msp/364; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/20/ukrayinska-ta-norvezka-kompaniya-stvoryat-spilne-pidpryyemstvo-z-vyrobnycztva-155-mm-snaryadiv/[26] https://www.dw dot com/en/germany-approves-3-billion-in-military-aid-for-ukraine/a-72001265 ;[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2025[28] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158586[29] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8703; https://www.facebook.com/100092260697855/videos/1990448018143530; https://x.com/sirdo_/status/1902774020505780238[30] https://t.me/wargonzo/25424[31] https://t.me/yurasumy/21943[32] https://t.me/yurasumy/21939[33] https://t.me/rusich_army/21906 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/21943 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22590[34] https://t.me/notes_veterans/22588; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22589[35] https://t.me/dva_majors/67254 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/21906 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88483 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/25424 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63004 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33638 ; https://t.me/sashakots/52638; https://t.me/smotri_z/41379 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/22590[36] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88476[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626 ;[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158593 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5582[40] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1903083870821425317; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1903086526961000898; https://t.me/ngu_3005/3139[41] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25721[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158557[43] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6628 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-zsu-vidbyly-shturm-bronetehniky-rf/[44] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158655; https://t.me/sudoplatov_official/4440 [45] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l[46] https://t.me/tass_agency/306884 [47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626[48] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19217[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25708[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/shturmy-ubogyh-staryh-invalidiv-na-siverskomu-napryamku-rosijski-oficzery-minusuyut-balast/[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33644[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626[54] https://t.me/IronHelmets/4151 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44588 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/13576[55] https://t.me/EnotHersonVDV/6532 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/13999[56] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1902807319613734957; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/766; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/767; https://t.me/CopsontheFrontline/31; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1902778314374173114 [57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626[58] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1902985302118957150; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1902663428461703662; https://t.me/DIUkraine/5535; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8704; https://t.me/dva_majors/67261;[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158656; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33643[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6607; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6626; https://t.me/dva_majors/67268; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33642 [61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33642; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33643[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/67261; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33643[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/67293[64] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88460[65] https://t.me/tass_agency/306900 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/50391[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/25424; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25714[67] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YH[68] https://t.me/voin_dv/14008; https://t.me/yurasumy/21942; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158656; https://t.me/wargonzo/25424;[69] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YH; https://t.me/dva_majors/67268;[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25714; https://t.me/dva_majors/67268; https://t.me/voin_dv/14008[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/14003; https://t.me/voin_dv/14005; https://t.me/voin_dv/14005[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33637; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33632; https://t.me/motopatriot78/33632 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158667[73] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0PYSzrN712w59m6o3eJ3etfj7ieCGdxZAUboXgbBHmHRJwFcJEnNZxRvbovLG3MF8l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0a2XkJpU8CMRdUwUspZRyTBAmT97YgHYswmN5qN7JoufFatgoQazazcyh2N5aW9YHl; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid03se65J9FHdJehuKqef95Yt2R4pmtbogrqHTdSiUTRwm7sptmJumCjPDm4yi53vHbl; https://t.me/wargonzo/25424; https://t.me/dva_majors/67268[74] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/placzdarmy-dlya-obstriliv-zaporizhzhya-vorog-pragne-zahopyty-panivni-vysoty-na-pivdni/[75] https://t.me/dva_majors/67279[76] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02MwBYU4fJmvB9D2gnvm5tZJdn1U6RuvuttUb4QzgGAqABxmeZLbiKLvZykdcf9FG1l[77] https://t.me/kpszsu/31115[78] https://t.me/kpszsu/31115; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12277; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/masovana-ataka-rf-v-odesi-poshkodzhenyj-torgovyj-czentr-i-bagatopoverhivky-postrazhdaly-pidlitky/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/9105; https://t.me/kyivoda/26447[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/prezydent-chehiyi-v-odesi-zustrivsya-z-komanduvachem-vms-zsu-pid-chas-vizytu-rosiya-zapustyla-udarni-drony/ ; https://suspilne dot media/975699-rosia-atakuvala-dronami-odesu-ta-zaporizza-ssa-planuut-provesti-neprami-peregovori-miz-rf-ta-ukrainou-1122-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1742541414&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/03/21/30-35-tysyach-osobovogo-skladu-vorog-zakyduye-shhomisyachno-madyar-pro-bojovi-vtraty-hrobachoyi-pihoty/; https://youtu.be/91UIs_ugYnw?si=7VgFRTmn9Wxgy0so[81] https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1903091767412658283[82] https://t.me/osirskiy/1104[83] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2025/03/21/voina-plokhomu-ne-nauchit[84] https://t.me/sprotyv_official/6504[85] https://www.lugansk.kp dot ru/daily/27659.5/5043454/[86] https://www dot cbr.ru/press/pr/ file=21032025_133000key.html; https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-nabiullina-decision-leave-key-rate-unchanged-2025-03-21/[87] https://www dot cbr.ru/press/pr/?file=21032025_133000key.html; https://t.me/sotaproject/95435; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/03/21/bank-rossii-ostavil-klyuchevuyu-stavku-na-rekordnom-urovne-21[88] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-1-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage[89]https://t.me/tass_agency/306948 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306949 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306952 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/306956 https://www.rbc dot ru/business/21/03/2025/67dd68159a7947c85bd34a7e; http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/assignments/orders/76506[90] https://t.me/bes_pilot/3231; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/158622[91] https://t.me/LandminesAndCoffee/1950; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1903060009530859792[92]https://t.me/LandminesAndCoffee/1950
- — Iran Update March 26, 2025
- at 3/29/25 10:52pmCarolyn Moorman, Kelly Campa, Ben Rezaei, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff 2:00 pm ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters.[1] Unspecified US and Syrian sources told Reuters on March 25 that US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Levant and Syria Natasha Franceschi gave a list of US conditions for partial sanctions relief to Syrian Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani in Brussels on March 18.[2] The conditions reportedly include counterterrorism cooperation between the US and Syrian governments, the destruction of any remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, the appointment of a liaison to assist efforts to find missing US citizen Austin Tice, and the prevention of foreign fighters’ appointments to “senior roles in Syria’s governing structure.”[3] The United States is considering extending an existing sanctions exemption by two years and possibly issuing another sanctions exemption if the Syrian interim government fulfills these conditions, according to six unspecified US and Syrian sources.[4] The United States would also reportedly issue a statement expressing support for Syria’s territorial integrity.[5]Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. “Foreign fighters” likely refers to non-Syrian fighters whom Shara has promoted within the ranks of the Defense Ministry since coming to power. These fighters include Abdul Rahman al Khatib, a Jordanian, and Omar Mohammad Ciftci, a Turk.[6] Khatib and Ciftci are HTS fighters who are loyal to Shara and have fought alongside Shara for over a decade.[7] Shara recently appointed Khatib and Ciftci to command the Republican Guard and Damascus Division of the new Syrian army, respectively.[8] These positions are key to maintaining security in Damascus and protecting Shara and the interim government, underscoring Shara’s trust in both men to protect his nascent rule over the country. Shara will likely oppose dismissing Khatib and Ciftci from their posts and appointing other, potentially less trusted, commanders to their posts. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. These militias include elements that operate outside of the PMF.[9] “Informed political sources” told Iraqi media on March 25 that the Shia Coordination Framework has reached a “preliminary agreement,” with Iranian approval, to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the PMF.[10] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which are backed by Iran. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq.[11] The agreement also stipulates that PMF brigades and units can only carry out orders that the Iraqi prime minister gives them. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.[12] The integration of militias into the Iraqi security establishment must be predicated on a commitment by the militias to stop abiding by Iranian orders and a commitment by the Iraqi federal government to respond to any militia attack on US or allied interests in the Middle East. CTP-ISW previously assessed that the integration of militias into the security establishment in a way that does not meet these criteria would harm US interests in the region.[13]This agreement comes amid US pressure on the Iraqi federal government to dissolve and disarm the PMF and reported plans to sanction PMF leaders.[14] This agreement also comes as the Iraqi parliament is debating the Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which is meant to replace the 2016 PMF Commission Law and clarify the PMF’s structure and administrative functions.[15]Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25.[16] This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.[17] The facility contains both solid- and liquid-fuel ballistic missiles, including Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, Sejjil, Emad, and Haj Qassem missiles. Iran used Kheybar Shekan, Ghadr, and Emad ballistic missiles during its April and October 2024 attacks on Israel.[18] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri claimed on March 25 that the new facility includes enough missiles for Iran to conduct an attack “dozens of times” greater than its October 2024 attack on Israel.[19]Open-source reports suggest that the United States recently increased its military presence at Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.[20] Commercially available satellite imagery shows that B-2 Stealth Bombers, KC-135 refueling tankers, and a C-17 cargo plane recently arrived at Diego Garcia Island.[21] The United States has not confirmed the arrival of these aircraft at the time of this writing. The military buildup comes amid the US air campaign targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Yemen.[22]Key Takeaways:US Sanctions Relief for Syria: The United States has asked the Syrian interim government to curtail foreign fighters’ influence in the Syrian government in exchange for partial sanctions relief, according to Reuters. Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara will likely oppose the condition to bar foreign fighters from senior government positions given that this condition would require him to sideline individuals who are deeply loyal to him. Shara’s likely reluctance to dismiss foreign fighters may complicate the interim government’s efforts to secure sanctions relief from the United States and would indicate that Shara prioritizes protecting his own power over securing economic relief for Syria.Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias’ Integration into the PMF: Iraqi Shia political parties have reportedly reached an agreement to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Such an agreement will likely further facilitate the Iranian capture of the Iraqi security sector. The agreement reportedly requires the militias to refrain from attacking US interests in Iraq and conducting attacks outside of Iraq. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that are part of the PMF currently answer to Iran, not the Iraqi prime minister, and it is unclear whether the agreement includes an enforcement mechanism other than “security surveillance” to prevent militias from conducting activities outside of the state.Iranian Deterrence Efforts: Iran is continuing to try to deter a potential Israeli strike by highlighting its missile capabilities. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) unveiled a new underground missile base in an unspecified location on March 25. This base is the third underground missile base that Iran has unveiled since January 2025.SyriaThe pro-Assad Syrian Popular Resistance claimed on March 25 that it conducted a “biological weapon” attack targeting Syrian interim government forces.[23] The Syrian Popular Resistance claimed that it poisoned government forces’ food and water supply using the highly toxic chemical botulinum. The group’s claim is likely false given that CTP-ISW has not observed any reports of poisonings, which would be expected if the group actually conducted such an attack. The number of attacks that the Syrian Popular Resistance has claimed has decreased since early March. The claim about a biological weapon attack may therefore be an attempt by the group to maintain relevancy within the broader anti-government insurgency movement.Pro-Alawite media circulated reports of sectarian-motivated attacks on Christian communities in Homs Province.[24] Alawite media reported on March 26 that Syrian government forces seized homes, vandalized religious sites, and harassed locals in Fayrouzah, Qattinah, Zaydal, Rableh, and al Damina.[25] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify many of these attacks. The informational effects generated by these reports feed into insurgent efforts to delegitimize the Syrian interim government and its ability to protect the population.[26]The Syrian interim government deployed forces to Sahnaya, Rif Dimashq Province, on March 25 following clashes between Druze militias and individuals from Deir ez Zor Province.[27] Individuals from Deir ez Zor clashed with members of the Men of Dignity Movement in Sahnaya after Men of Dignity Movement members reportedly harassed two Deir ez Zor residents in the area.[28] Interim government forces deployed to Sahnaya to restore order and took control of a checkpoint that the Men of Dignity Movement previously controlled.[29] Deir ez Zor tribal leaders reportedly met with Druze militia leaders in Sahnaya on March 26 to negotiate a reconciliation agreement.[30]The Syrian Interim Defense Ministry reportedly appointed a defector of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Colonel Khaled Omar, as the Chief of Staff of the Aleppo-based 80th Division.[31] Omar defected from the SAA in 2012 and later joined Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki, which is an Aleppo-based militia that HTS co-opted and subordinated to itself.[32] Omar will serve under former Harakat Nour al Din al Zenki commander Ahmed Rizk, who currently commands the 80th Division.[33] Omar’s appointment is part of the Syrian interim government’s efforts to appoint individuals loyal to HTS leader Ahmed al Shara to senior military positions.[34] The Syrian Interim Defense Ministry has not officially announced Omar and Rizk’s appointments at the time of this writing.Daraa residents demonstrated against Israeli operations in southern Syria on March 25 after Israeli artillery shelling reportedly killed seven civilians in the village of Kuwaya, Daraa Province.[35]IraqAxis of Resistance objectives:Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and societyHarden the Iraqi government against internal dissentIraqi media reported that Turkey struck a Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) position in Amedi District, Duhok Province, on March 25.[36]Arabian PeninsulaAxis of Resistance objectives:Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areasDestroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of YemenErode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza StripUS Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 14 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 25.[37] The Houthis conducted a combined missile and drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier and US destroyers in the Red Sea on March 25.[38]The Houthis separately launched an unspecified number of drones at unspecified military targets in Tel Aviv on March 25.[39] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has not confirmed the drone attack at the time of this writing.The Palestinian Territories and LebanonAxis of Resistance objectives:Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza StripReestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern LebanonEstablish the West Bank as a viable front against IsraelCTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria. Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign PolicyThe Iranian rial depreciated from 1,025,000 rials to one US dollar on March 25 to 1,026,000 rials to one US dollar on March 26.[40]The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy. [1] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-gave-syria-list-conditions-partial-sanctions-relief-sources-say-2025-03-25/[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-30-2024[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30; https://x.com/MohammedHawaidi/status/1873751629888905559 ; https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5097443-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%B7-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%A5%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9[8] https://x.com/ALBADIA24/status/1889296890627272975 ; 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