The Saudi response to the ‘Arab spring’: containment and co-option
Saudi Arabia’s response to the ‘Arab spring’ has been an attempt to co-opt movements for change in a bid to maintain the status quo. Madawi Al-Rasheed talks to Deniz Kandiyoti about the contradictions of a ruling elite that promotes a conservative Islam, that threatens women’s existing rights abroad – as in Tunisia and Egypt – while it poses as the emancipator of women at home.
The Saudi response to the ‘Arab spring’: containment and co-option
by Madawi Al-Rasheed, 10 January 2012 – Open Democracy
About the author – Madawi Al-Rasheed is professor of the anthropology of religion at Kings College, London. Her books include Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (C Hurst, 2008); and A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2011).
Deniz Kandiyoti: You have written eloquently about the battle for the soul of the “Arab spring”. I would like us to explore a critical question with significant implications for the future of pluralism and gender equality in the Middle East and North Africa, namely the policies of Saudi Arabia. How do you evaluate Saudi reactions to the events of the “Arab spring”?
Madawi Al-Rasheed: In January 2011 the Saudi regime was very apprehensive about the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and feared his abandonment by their major ally – the United States. The Saudis supported Mubarak and provided financial backing to make up for the loss of American aid in order to weather the storm. In Tunisia, they had close security and intelligence links with the Ben Ali regime- links that were exposed during his fall. Ben Ali was offered refuge in Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, which is much closer to home and has a Shiite majority linked to their Saudi counterparts in the Eastern province, the idea of democracy or majority rule could not be tolerated. With the support of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Saudis sent troops to help the al-Khalifa rulers against the pro-democracy movement, consolidating Sunni rule and rolling back what they saw as Iranian influence. The Bahraini regime was also propped up financially. This triggered a reaction across the border in Saudi Arabia. Playing up sectarianism became a Saudi pre-emptive counter-revolutionary strategy that exaggerates religious difference and hatred and prevents the development of national non-sectarian politics.
Protests at Sadi and Bahrain Embassies in london Russell Pollard/Demotix. All Rights Reserved
This put Saudi Arabia firmly in the counter-revolutionary camp. However, as they realised that they could not stop the change they attempted to co-opt it. The irony is that they backed change in Libya, under the umbrella of the Arab League and supported military intervention, whilst in Yemen they supported Al Saleh and attempted, at the same time, to develop an alternative leadership with patronage ties to the Saudi regime. In short, the Saudis worked on the maintenance of the status quo over democratic change in every way, except when change was in line with their perceived interests. The protests in Syria were seen as an opportunity to win Syria back to the Arab fold, after President Bashar Assad increasingly drifted towards Iran. …more