Gassing the Masses, It’s dangerous and It’s deadly

[cb editor: since the writing of this story several others have been killed by the use of CS Gas. The nonlethal is a lie.]

Lethal Non-Lethal Weapons: The Deadly Effects of Tear Gas in Bahrain
By marcowenjones On July 22, 2011

Tear gas, or CS gas, has become part of the daily diet of many Bahrainis who continue to take to the streets in pursuit of their democratic struggle. The use of this so-called ‘non-lethal’ crowd control weapon has become increasingly controversial, not least because it has potentially resulted in the death of 6 Bahrainis, including 6-year-old Mohammed Farhan. More recently, however, it is believed by many to have been responsible for the death of 47-year-old mother-of-two Zainab Juma, who died last Friday following demonstrations in Sitra. If we include the death of Ahmed Farhan, who was apparently killed when a stun grenade exploded right next to his head, then about one in six people have so far died in Bahrain as a result of these ‘non-lethal’ weapons. It makes sense then to explore the nature of these weapons, who sells them, who is affected by them, and how ‘ non-lethal’ they really are.

Who has died?

Of the approximately 40 people who have died so far, the following are thought to have died from tear gas inhalation; Zainab Hassan al-Juma (47) , Sayad Adnan Sayed Hassan (44), Zainab al-Tajer, Mohammed Farhan (6), Isa Mohammed Ali Abdulla (71) & Khadija Mirza Al-Abdulhai (50). Here we can see that those killed by tear gas are not just the very young or the very old. Indeed, tear gas seems to be responsible for the death of people of all ages and both sexes. I’ll stop short of saying it affects all demographics, since I think it is safe to say that most of the dead are neither the rich nor the privileged. So why is a supposedly ‘non-lethal’ technology so deadly. Well there are a number of reasons – including the misuse of tear gas, the fact that tear gas manufacturers have a poor quality control system, the variable concentrations used by different companies and also the fact that CS (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile) is a potentially lethal chemical.

Misuse

While CS is itself a deadly chemical, it is made more deadly when those who use it are either poorly trained, incompetent, or malicious. Indeed ‘the notion that such chemical irritants are nonlethal
is based on an assumption that they are used in accordance with manufacturers instructions and not in enclosed space (1)‘. While there is considerable evidence that security personnel in Bahrain do not use it properly, it was most striking last Friday when a riot officer was seen throwing a tear gas grenade into a house and onto its roof, something which directly contradicts the manufacturers guidelines. While it is hard to tell exactly what make that particulary grenade was, it would be safe to say it was either a Triple Chaser manufactured by Defense Technology/Federal Labs, or the Triple Action CS grenade sold by the ironically named ‘NonLethal Technologies‘. Incidentally, a Triple Chaser (so called because it breaks into three pieces when used) was thrown into the compound of Nabeel Rajab – Bahrain’s outspoken human rights activist. Footage of the effects of tear gas in Bahrain can be seen in this video, which shows a woman choking after it was fired into the narrow, enclosed streets of Jidhafs. Another video appears to show someone collapse after a sound bomb exploded right next to him.

Different Companies

It is also crucial to bear in mind that Bahrain uses tear gas manufactured by a number of different companies based in a number of different countries. Indeed, many of its 40mm and 56mm tear gas projectiles are made by SAE Alsetex (click on ‘law enforcement, then ammunitions..’), a French company who attended Bahrain’s security forum and exhibition back in 2009. (See Alsetex shells in Bahrain here and here). SAE Alsetex also manufacture these particular grenades, which are also used in Bahrain. Other companies known to be selling tear gas products to Bahrain are the aforementioned US firms Defense Technology (Federal Labs) and NonLethal Technologies. It is also said that Britain have sold tear gas to Bahrain. The reason this is important is that these different companies, which operate from different countries, have no real common quality control checks or standardization of product specification.

An example of this problem was illustrated by a comparative study between CS spray use in the US and the UK. It was found that the British police, who were using CS spray manufactured by our good friend SAE Alsetex, were actually administering a dose that was 25 times higher than that administered by American forces. This was due to the design of the Alsetex Spray, and the higher concentrations of CS used by the French manufacturer. Furthermore, the lack of quality control in the ‘crowd control’ industry meant that when the UK police did spot checks on CS sprays, they found that the concentration of CS varied from 5.4% to 6.8%. Thus the lack of quality control led to a massive fluctuation in the amount of CS gas in the same product. Such laxity would never be tolerated in the pharmaceutical industry, yet it would seem that the ‘alleged non-lethality of any crowd control weapon is dependent on its purported technical specification presented by the manufacture’ (2). In other words, what the manufacturer says, goes.

What all this means is that Bahrain is using tear gas whose potency is highly variable, and thus unpredictable. There is no way of knowing that two grenades manufactured by the same company, let alone different companies, have the same concentration of CS in it. Indeed, the study that has been cited numerous times in this post suggests that the ‘manufacture, supply, distribution, brokerage and licensed production of crowd control weapons should all be licensed’(3).

Effects of CS

While CS is often marketed as being ‘nonlethal’ or ‘lesslethal’, it is anything but. Some of its effects include but are not limited to; chemical pneumonitis and pulmonary edema (victims die by drowning in their own lung fluids), new onset asthma, gastroentiritus with perforation, contact dermatitis and skin blistering. Even at low concentrations CS can cause a rise in blood pressure, making it particular dangerous to those ‘over 30, under physical strain or having an undetected aneurysm’. While these conditions highlight the impact of the short term effects of tear gas, they say nothing of the long term effects, which have not been studied extensively. CS has been shown to disrupt chromosomes, and it also has the ‘facility to cause inheritable genetic changes in organisms’. A study on the potential cancer-causing effect of CS was inconclusive, though it said that more long term studies were essential (4). With the almost daily use of tear gas in Bahrain’s villages, both the short term and long term effects of CS exposure need to be researched.

Regulation of Arms Sales

While Bahrain is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which seeks to limit the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, the convention has an unusual approach to CS gas. Indeed the substance, which falls under the ‘riot control’ category, is actually banned – but only as a weapon of warfare against another country. It is not, however, banned for the purpose of suppressing the local population (termed domestic law enforcement). It is difficult to express in words how absurd it is that CS can not be used against other nations, but it can be used by a state against its own people.

While this convention is useless when it comes to the export of CS gas, the EU has in place a ‘Code of Conduct for Arms Exports‘. This expressly states that Member States are ‘determined to prevent the export of military technology and equipment which might be usedfor internal repression‘. There is even a common list of weapons that should be subject to the code of conduct, and it includes tear gas. Indeed, if the code of conduct was adhered to, companies like SAE Alsetex would have stopped selling weapons a long time ago to Bahrain, a country whose human rights record was dismal before the Code of Conduct came into play in 1998. Furthermore, the common list of weapons is somewhat irrelevant when one considers that the ‘EU Common Military List shall act as a reference point for Member States’ national military technology and equipment lists, but shall not directly replace them.’ What this means can be summed up by the following.

It would appear that France does not classify certain crowd control weapons, namely tear gas, as
military equipment but has a 7th Category weapon classification that is reported to be exempt from the requirements for either export licences or firearms ownership licences.388 Therefore if, as occurred in 1997/8, the United Kingdom rejected export licence applications for tear gas and other riot control equipment to Kenya because of human rights concerns, a French company, or UK citizen brokering a deal through a French company, could export the tear gas without breaching the EU Code of Conduct(5)

Anyway, what use are weak Codes of Conduct and Chemical Weapons Conventions when they either do not result in the banning of tear gas sales, or they are undermined by people outside the jurisdiction of them, such as the United States, whose exporting of weapons falls under their own set of regulations termed ‘International Traffic of Arms Regulations’.

In Summary

The inherent deadliness of so-called non lethal weapons such as tear gas is a serious cause for concern, both in terms of their short term and long term impact. The fact that the manufacturers of the Triple Chaser CS grenade actually state it may cause serious injury or death is an indicator of the lethality of such weapons. Not only that, but in Bahrain there have also been a number of incidents in which CS grenades have led to fires and the subsequent destruction of properties. Again, the manufacturers stipulate this possibility, stating that the product ‘may cause serious damage to property’.

Before anyone starts getting indignant and feels that I’m victimizing Bahrain, I would like to underline my arguments against the use of non-lethal weapons by pointing out that they have been responsible for death and destruction elsewhere. A recent example includes the death of Jawaher Abu Rahmeh, whose death was believed by many to be caused by tear gas. Another notable case was the death of 5 people in Peru, who were killed when a tear gas grenade was set off in a nightclub. Even flashbangs (or sound bombs) have killed – I’m thinking particularly of the case of the SWAT officer who died when one accidentally exploded near his chest. The New York Police Department actually banned them when one was thrown into the wrong flat, causing its inhabitant to die of a heart attack.

It would therefore seem that Bahrain needs to adopt a stricter approach in terms of both importing such weapons and training its security forces in their use. Ideally they would be banned altogether, and the despicable companies who profit from the misfortune of others held to account – but we all know that’s not going to happen anytime soon. In the meantime, let us hope that the Bassiouni and Co investigate these tear gas deaths.

For further reading I suggest Wilfred Owen’s poem Dulce et Decorum est – which provides a graphic account of the effects of gas in the First World War. Bear in mind I am not equating tear gas with other more deadly substances, I just wish to illustrate how far we’ve come in banning such dreadful substances. With that in mind, it is not unreasonable to hope that we go that extra mile and ban the use of CS completely.

Many thanks to those on Twitter who sent the photos of the various weapons used by security forces in Bahrain. Also thanks to CAAT UK for identifying the SAE Alsetex products. …source