Britain and its Post-colonial Politics of Contridiction

The implications of British support for the Bahraini ruling family go further than merely exposing as hollow official statements of foreign policy objectives in the Middle East in light of the Arab revolts. Certainly, it undermines and contradicts British officials’ declaratory support for civil and human rights against state authoritarianism. But it also risks placing Britain definitively on the wrong side of history. Backing autocratic states may hitherto have been a necessary evil in the messy world of inter-state relations, but in an era of freer access to and exchange of information, there are no hiding places anymore, and the gap between democratic rhetoric and authoritarian practice in British foreign policy will become progressively harder to reconcile.

Britain and Bahrain: mutual interests and the politics of protection
by Kristian Coates Ulrichsen – 01 August, 2012 – The New Left

For over a year protesters in Bahrain have demonstrated for democratic reforms, in the face of often brutal repression by the regime. British arms transfers to Bahrain continued throughout that period. This should not surprise. For nearly two centuries, Britain has been the guarantor of Bahrain’s ruling Al-Khalifa dynasty, and for much of the past century its security backbone. Time and again, British support has enabled the Al-Khalifa regime to withstand local agitation for greater political freedoms and human rights. Britain’s protectorate relations with Bahrain may have formally ended on 15 August 1971, but they live on through informal channels and personal relationships in the royal, military, and commercial spheres. These have facilitated the upholding of authoritarian misrule, and they expose the hypocrisy at the heart of British policy in the wake of the Arab Spring.

A treaty in 1820 between Britain and local notables in the Persian Gulf first elevated the Al-Khalifa family to the title of ‘Rulers of Bahrain.’ Since then, the links between the dynasty and the British have flourished and proliferated, with a protectorate declared in 1861. This lasted until 1971, during which period power over Bahraini foreign policy was transferred to the British, who also intervened regularly in Bahrain’s domestic affairs. This included deposing three rulers deemed unsuitable, in 1868, 1869, and 1923. Monarchical ties have continued to be close in the post-1971 era; the present King, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, is a Sandhurst graduate and the patron of the charitable Sandhurst Foundation.

Connections between Bahrain and the United Kingdom have also rested on a succession of powerful British ‘advisors’ to the Al-Khalifa family. Charles Belgrave was appointed personal adviser to the ruler in 1926 and remained ‘Chief Administrator’, and effectively the most powerful man in the emirate, until 1957. He was only forced out after popular anti-British fervour following the Suez crisis united Sunnis and Shiites in a cross-sectarian social movement for political and economic reform. His advisory services were resurrected less than a decade later when Ian Henderson arrived as head of state security. Prior to his arrival in Bahrain, Henderson served as a Colonial Police Officer in Kenya, and had been accused of using torture in putting down the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s. He later faced similar allegations of torturing opposition activists and political detainees during the Bahraini uprising in the 1990s. International pressure led to his removal in 1998 but he continues to reside in Bahrain as a guest of the ruling family.

It is in this context that continuing British support for the Al-Khalifa regime must be seen. Mass demonstrations in support of political reform erupted on 14 February 2011 and, at their height, saw up to one-third of the population on the streets demanding their rights. This was the highest per capita involvement in any of the protests during the Arab Spring, and the scale of the mobilisation shook the ruling family and its fellow Gulf monarchs to the core. Forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates entered Bahrain on 14 March to restore order while the government mercilessly pursued and crushed its opponents during a brutal three-month period of emergency rule that lasted until 1 June.

Although the Bahraini authorities convened a National Dialogue and commissioned what turned out to be a hard-hitting investigation into the events of the spring, their promises of reform have yet to result in any meaningful change to the structure or balance of power. The arbitrary arrest and detention of activists continues, and daily skirmishes occur between protestors and police units notorious for their use of an extremely toxic form of tear gas that has contributed to more than twenty deaths from inhalation. In late-June, the security services appeared to deliberately shoot at the leader of the largest political opposition society, while many other opposition politicians remain imprisoned. In April, the staging of the Formula One Bahrain Grand Prix was intended to mark the country’s return to the international fold but was instead marred by the death of a protestor, the refusal to grant visas to journalists from most international news organisations, and running battles with the police.

Yet, amid the ongoing unrest in Bahrain and intensifying criticism of the regime by international NGOs and the United Nations, British interests in the country have multiplied over the past year. In December, the appointment of former Metropolitan Police commissioner John Yates as adviser on police reform rekindled unhappy memories of Belgrave and Henderson. Although his contract was originally meant to last only until April 2012, he remains in place, and he accompanied the Minister of Interior on a visit to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in June. Yates has also emerged as a stout defender of the regime in the UK media through interviews and articles in which he dismisses the unrest as ‘vandalism’ devoid of political significance.

Bahrain’s troubled year has also presented opportunities to expand British commercial and trading interests. A recent House of Commons report on arms export control revealed that 97 export licenses currently exist for sales to Bahrain, ranging from small arms and sniper rifles to silencers and gun sighting equipment. In addition, a British company has provided the intelligence-gathering software to monitor social media and spy on activists, while a phalanx of consultants and PR companies have been appointed to present a polished image of the regime to the world. The British government’s policy has continued to prioritise a ‘business as usual’ approach to secure lucrative contracts, especially in the security sector, while keeping judiciously quiet about the continuing human rights abuses.

At a time of economic austerity and relentless cost-cutting at home, such a mercantilist approach may make commercial and even strategic sense; moreover, as tensions with Iran escalate, so does the strategic value of Bahrain to the British and American posture in the Gulf. Moreover, companies and governments wishing to maintain close relationships with neighbouring Saudi Arabia are unlikely to want to jeopardise these far more valuable ties by making a stand over Bahrain, given the degree of Saudi political and economic influence over the country. Hence, despite the potential for leverage accorded to US and British policy-makers by virtue of their security partnership and historic ties, little evidence exists that officials are willing to exercise it. Instead, Bahrain has become a symbol of the double-standards of Western policy toward the Arab uprisings, where the withdrawal of support for dictatorial regimes in Libya and Syria stands in contrast to the enabling of autocratic rulers in the Persian Gulf. …more