Bahrain and the Arab Spring – An Interview with Bahrain Activist Zach Zill

Bahrain and the Arab Spring
INTERVIEW by Ahmed Mohammed – 17 July, 2012 – International Socialist Review

The small island nation of Bahrain sits in the Persian Gulf, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. When the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings toppled US-backed dictators last year, all of the region’s dictatorships trembled, including that in Bahrain. The winds of change inspired Bahrain’s downtrodden, and the country’s monarchy barely managed to maintain its grip on power. Ahmed Mohammed, a Bahraini activist visiting the United States, spoke with Zach Zill about Bahrain’s rebellion and what the future holds.

CAN YOU talk about how the movement in Bahrain unfolded last February? What brought out thousands of people to Pearl Square? What were the people calling for in the protests?

THE PROTESTS had originally aimed to make the government fulfill the promises of the king. These promises were made in a referendum the king put to the people in 2001. The referendum offered us a bargain: to turn Bahrain into a kingdom and the emir into a king. In return, the dreaded state of emergency law would be ended, and a parliament with full legislative powers would be instated. He basically offered what the opposition had been demanding throughout the uprising in the 1990s. The referendum was widely welcomed and approved.

The king reneged on his promise. On February 14, 2002, the king announced a new constitution in which he concentrated power in his own hands. The constitution did give us a parliament, but it also thoroughly rigged the system. The parliament, contrary to the promises in the referendum, has virtually no legislative powers. I call the king’s existing power a triple veto system. In order to get to parliament, one has to go through gerrymandered constituencies, which dilute opposition votes. So that’s one veto: a guaranteed progovernment majority in parliament.

Those who do beat the odds and make it to parliament (the opposition often occupies seventeen to eighteen seats in parliament) find themselves in the unfortunate position of having to collaborate with pro-government MPs to pass bills. Say a miracle happens and such collaboration successfully passes an opposition-sponsored bill. They pass it to the upper chamber of parliament—which is appointed entirely by the king. So that’s another veto.

Let’s say another miracle happens that day and the upper chamber decides to turn against their employer. They decide okay, you know what, this makes sense, screw the king, we’re going pass this—here, the king has the authority to directly veto the bill.

In response to this setup, the opposition parties boycotted the first parliamentary election in 2000. By 2006, they realized, okay, the government is not budging; they are ignoring the boycott. So they decided to run for elections. This caused a split in the opposition. It gave rise to the rejectionist camp, which recognized that political participation in such a thoroughly rigged system cannot possibly work in bringing about the desired changes.

As the years went by, the regime plotted to permanently disempower the opposition and ensure the regime’s power in the long term. This effort materialized in various forms. One way was political naturalization. A former confidant of the royal family leaked documents proving a government plan to naturalize large numbers of poor Sunni Arabs from Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and elsewhere. [Seventy percent of Bahrainis are Shia—ed.]. The regime employs a mercenary police force and a mercenary army that’s almost entirely non-Bahraini and are invited for the sole purpose of occupying these positions. So the plan was basically to create a permanently loyal quasi-mercenary constituency. That way, the regime also gets to expand its secret police, police force, and the army, in preparation for future challenges.

The effects of political naturalization are profound. First, they exacerbate the already-high level of unemployment in Bahrain. According to the Economist, unemployment in Bahrain’s villages (which are small towns but are referred to as villages) was as high as 50 percent. Second, political naturalization increases the sense of xenophobia among Bahrainis, which is convenient for a regime that’s eager to divide and conquer. Third, the sudden increase in population meant higher demand for homes—which were already becoming out of reach for the working class. Worst of all, this policy revealed the regime’s deep-seated distrust of its own people.

It appears that the royal family’s hatched long-term plans to disempower the opposition and secure its power permanently, all the while keeping the opposition weak and divided. It all fell apart as their conspiracies began to leak to the public, just as WikiLeaks did with US embassy cables. Probably the most scandalous leak of all is a document that reveals a transaction between a businessman and the king’s uncle, the prime minister. The latter, who is the world’s longest-serving prime minister and is a universally hated figure in Bahrain, bought a state-of-the-art financial development project called the Bahrain Financial Harbor for one dinar. That’s $2.65 for skyscrapers in the capital’s busiest district.

As all this became public knowledge, and as it became increasingly clear that the regime had no intentions of reforming the rigged political system, a lot of anger and resentment began building up. People within both wings of the opposition had been warning that this situation is not tenable and it would explode at some point. The government had been aggravating it with even more repression in the lead-up to February 14 [the beginning of the mass movement against the government in Bahrain—ed.].

The departure of Tunisia’s Ben Ali in January set Bahraini activists’ imagination on fire. A Facebook group was set up to mark the tenth anniversary of the hated constitution as Bahrain’s day of rage. There was about a monthlong gap between Ben Ali’s departure and February 14. What happened in between was even more exciting . . .

EGYPT.

YES, EGYPT. Mubarak fell just days before February 14. The Bahraini regime was in a panic. In a matter of hours after Mubarak’s departure, Bahrain national television (BTV) announced that the government would give a thousand dinars to every household. That’s $ 2,650. Of course, the stated reason for this sudden act of generosity was the upcoming tenth anniversary celebrations of the “reform era.”

IN THE United States, in the media at least, you often hear about how “cosmopolitan” the Bahraini ruling family is, and how it’s this model of reform compared to the other Gulf monarchies.

IT’S COMPLETELY unfounded. This is among the world’s most reactionary regimes. Where, other than the Persian Gulf, do absolute monarchies exist in the twenty-first century? The royal family runs the country as a private firm. The majority of the ministries are headed by royal family members. This portrayal is not just ridiculous. It’s also offensive to people who are suffering under their rule.

The US government rarely misses a chance to shower praise upon this royal family, too. Just a few months before the uprising of February 14, Hillary Clinton visited Bahrain. She told journalists in a press conference that she was impressed with Bahrain’s progress. When pressed to specify on which fronts she sees progress happening, she replied, “on all fronts.”

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