Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Military Alliances of the Great Powers

 

at 9/10/24 12:00am

Historical Background For centuries, military alliances have remained a fundamental aspect of statecraft and international relations. The rise of collective security in the face of the larger powers in ancient Greece formed the bedrock of military alliances and security pacts. The earliest documented examples of formal military alliances are those of Sparta against Athenian military might during the Peloponnesian Wars. However, the majority of historical military alliances were defensive in nature; i.e., formed to deter a common enemy with greater military might in order to ensure one’s own survival. In the post-Westphalian era, kingdoms evolved into to independent nation states. The new security architecture hence became state-centric. Consequently, the formation of well-structured, treaty-based military alliances became the norm. The 19th and 20th century alliances, such as the Triple Alliances, Axis Powers and Allied Powers paved the way for more powerful and effective post-World War II military alliances, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), comprising 42 countries, was established to invade Afghanistan after 9/11. Later, multiple smaller alliances were crafted to invade Iraq and Syria, etc. The ongoing Hamas-Israel conflict in Palestine also has multiple countries supporting one side or the other. Economic, military and technological sanctions are also seen as a collective punitive approach and means to attain strategic ends through coercion. The study of military alliances has remained a fundamental part of International Relations scholarship. Scholars have often debated the nature, importance, and geopolitical and geoeconomic impact of formal military alliances on great powers contestation. Is Eurasia About to Get Its Own NATO? Fyodor A. Lukyanov The Shanghai Cooperation Organization could play an important role in a nascent security system that emphasizes total development. More   Significance, Role, Cost and Benefit of Military Alliances Alliances have remained central to power politics; they play a crucial part in maintaining peace and security. They act as a deterrence and disincentivise war. However, alliances were and are also forged to meet the alliance’s shared military-political ends by waging war against adversarial powers. States join the military alliances for diverse objectives. Stronger states, like the United States (US) often make military alliances part of their strategy of “forward defence”. The smaller states however, often join the military alliances to augment their defensive capabilities and gain economic benefits. Notwithstanding their advantages for collective security and deterrence against potential aggressors, military alliances also come with attendant consequences. Free riding, entrapment and abandonment are three major costs that the alliances often entail.  Free riding remained a central theme during Trump’s presidency. He often blamed allies for falling short with regards to the expected burden sharing. As Trump is campaigning for a second term in the White House, debates have already been had about the survivability of NATO.   Impact of NATO and Warsaw Pact Two geostrategic events vividly mark the decreasing and increasing efficacy of military alliances. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was seen as reducing the utility of military alliance among nations, as the threat spectrum shifted from inter-state wars to intra-state conflicts. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict revitalised the debate revolving around the cost and benefit of military alliances. The echoes of Cold War 2.0, have made military alliances in vogue again. However, these alliances are and shall be visibly buttressed by economic alliances. Military alliances significantly shape geopolitics, and bring increased tensions between rival blocs or states in their wake. The most aptly documented military alliances were the alliances during the two world wars, i.e., the Triple Entente, Allied Powers and Axis Powers. Cold War 1.0 also resulted in the formation of two opposing military alliances, i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact. Both alliances exemplified the division of the world into two opposing camps, fighting for global supremacy. The positive aspect of Cold War 1.0 was the continuous engagement between Moscow and Washington to control escalation, especially with respect to the nuclear domain. The end of Cold War 1.0 witnessed the end of the Warsaw Pact. Prominent IR scholars like John Mearsheimer envisaged the end of NATO as well. But fast forward to 2024, and NATO not only continues to exist but is expanding beyond its original scope. This engenders a security dilemma for non-NATO states. Such a provocative scenario induces a strategic imbalance that could lead to an arms race. It could also result in pre-emptive military manoeuvres by states that may apprehend offensive activity, like the Russian attack on Ukraine.   Contemporary Environment and Military Alliances The conflict in Ukraine has ushered in a return of power politics. IR scholarship remains divided over the causes which led to this conflict. Russia may claim it was an act of proactive and pre-emptive self-defence against NATO’s possible expansion to its borders. Ukraine, the US and allies portray it as an aggressive move to occupy Ukrainian territory. However, John Mearsheimer has debunked this myth, calling NATO’s expansion the root cause of the Russo-Ukraine conflict. [i] Chotiner, “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the US for the Crisis in Ukraine.” The most important consequence of this confrontation has been the multiple default advantages for the US and allies. NATO and the EU have been rejuvenated. The conflict has provided new life to NATO after it hit a low during Trump’s presidency. It has resulted in added intra-alliance cohesion and renewed commitments under Article 5 of NATO’s collective defence architecture. This commitment has been accompanied by increased defence budgets among the NATO partners. The US has urged NATO members to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defence. The US military industrial complex in particular, and in the world as a whole are thriving. The confrontation economy has attained strange dimensions. The Nord 1 pipeline has been damaged and Nord 2 has not been allowed to commence its gas supply, allowing the US to replace Russia as the largest gas supplier to the EU. Despite combat, Russian gas flows through Ukraine and Kiev collects royalties. The food and grain supply from Russia and Ukraine are not much affected. US sanctions on Russia are blatantly abrogated by many countries, indicating receding US coercive power as well as a compromise for strategic interests. The US sanctions on Russia, Iran and North Korea have not been able to facilitate the desired outcomes. Furthermore, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has provided NATO with the rationale to portray Russia as an aggressor and persuade neutral states like Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Despite the growing alarm over NATO’s expansion and its latent negative consequences for global stability and an amplified security dilemma for Russia, the alliance is broaching the idea of expanding to Asia to counter China. NATO has already enhanced its support to Ukraine by providing military aid, despite the fact that the country is not part of NATO. Additionally, the US maintains security partnerships like QUAD (US, Australia, India and Japan), Squad, I2U2 and AUKUS to further expand its military footprint in Asia, specifically the Asia-Pacific region. Under AUKUS, Australia is getting nuclear submarines to counter growing Chinese influence in the region. This has sparked fears of direct confrontation. It will also result in disturbing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. This development was not welcome by France as it has derailed the agreed-upon sale of nuclear submarines to Australia. Russia also maintains a security arrangement known as Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). CSTO members continue to support Russia, however, the arrangement remains weak due to internal challenges. CSTO’s cautious response to Nagorno-Karabakh also highlighted intra-organisation complexities and limitations. Aside from formal military alliances, Russia is part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Although these are economic alliances, they help enhance Russian diplomatic leverage, augment its stature and help it attain its geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. Russia can also leverage these to circumvent US sanctions and efforts to isolate it. The US-China competition has pushed the world back into a Cold War 1.0-like situation that revolves around bloc politics. While most of the smaller states are hedging in joining one bloc or the other, the major powers like the US continue to induce them by offering security guarantees through formal military alliances, economic help, diplomatic pressures, coercion through sanctions, etc. Several states like India are accruing unprecedented military and economic advantages by aligning with the US in its bid to counter the rise of China, which is seen as a challenger to the global status of the US as a predominant power. Contrarily, Beijing has opted for economic cooperation as a means to enhance its influence.   China and Formal Military Alliances China remains on the opposite side of the military alliances’ spectrum. It does not maintain any formal military alliances and isn’t part of any. China’s aversion to forging formal military alliances is rooted in the country’s historical experience, Chinese strategic culture, and aspirations woven around trade, connectivity and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. China sees the Western military alliances as tools of intervention and an effort to cement strategic control. From a strategic perspective, any formal military alliance with other states would put binding commitments of collective defence / offense on China, thereby limiting its freedom of action. It could also serve as entrapment in unwanted global conflicts which may not serve China’s national interests or aspirations. [ Resnick and Sworn, “China and the Alliance Allergy of Rising Powers.” The recently-held 70th Anniversary of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence also delineates China’s strategic culture of avoiding military confrontation and engaging through dialogue and diplomacy. Projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) testify to tge Chinese vision of engagement based on shared socioeconomic development, which they commonly refer to as win-win cooperation. China prefers less stringent partnerships and strategic engagements that allow it to manoeuvre in the foreign policy landscape without constraints. This approach also affords China greater flexibility and wider domains to engage with partner countries, adapting to the dynamic global geopolitical environment. By avoiding formal military alliances, China can project itself as a benign great power.   Conclusion While global geopolitics has undergone a massive transformation since the end of Cold War 1.0, the importance of formal military alliances remains central to the US and its allies. The expansion and strengthening of NATO and the formation of AUKUS, I2U2, QUAD, Squad etc manifest the same thought process and strategy. Contrarily, the BRICS, BRI and SCO underscore the broader engagement preferences of Russia, China and 150-plus BRI partner countries. Russia and China are gradually growing closer due to a commonality of interests. While both are unanimous in their view of the unilateralist and coercive American approach, they have avoided entering into a military alliance. Engagements based on economic cooperation remain the mainstay of Chinese foreign policy. These help portray China as a promoter of willing cooperation knit around socio-economic development. This approach also challenges the logic, efficacy and benefits of military alliances that have caused devastation through wars. The fact, however, remains that the world has been and continues to be driven by three famous elements of Realism; “self-help, statism, and survival”. Valdai Discussion Club The Tripolar World and the Bloc Triangles of East Asia Konstantin V. Asmolov, Kirill V. Babaev Although the triangles’ emergence is increasing general tension in East Asia and driving a regional arms race, a conflict of Korean origin seems less likely than a conflict over Taiwan. More

[Category: Valdai Papers]

— The Arrest of Durov Isn’t Just About Telegram

 

at 8/28/24 1:01am

The arrest of Telegram founder Pavel Durov, when he had decided to take a little trip to Paris, has caused a stir in various spheres – from the business and tech world to media and politics. We will focus on the latter, especially as the incident is becoming another milestone in a wider political reorganization. Durov comes from a niche that claims transnational status above all else. Information and communication technologies seem to have turned the world into a common space and abolished sovereign jurisdiction. The enormous influence that the IT giants have acquired has been converted into gigantic amounts of money, which has in turn increased their influence further. Transnational corporations have always existed – in areas such as mining, engineering, and finance. But despite their international character, they were still tied to particular states and their interests. The global communications industry, and its associated innovation sector, has dared to break that link. The period of globalization that lasted from the late 1980s to the late 2010s favored this sort of attitude. It encouraged the creation of a level playing field on which the most developed countries had a clear advantage. They benefited the most. The costs associated with the techno-giants’ growing ability to manipulate societies – including their own in the West – were not seen as critical. The crisis of liberal globalization has led to a change in the international reality (you could also invert that statement and say the reverse without changing the essence). Thus, the willingness to play by common rules has rapidly and universally diminished. What is fundamental is that this applies even where these laws were originally written, in the leading states of the Western community. The previous era has not disappeared without a trace. The world has become fiercely competitive, but it remains closely interconnected. Two things hold it together. The first is trade and production, the logistical chains for which were created during the globalization boom and have qualitatively transformed the economy. They are extremely painful to break. And the second is a unified information field, thanks to ‘nationally neutral’ communications giants. But there is something strange that separates us. It is not a desire to grab more of the pie – in the sense of what Lenin called the expansionist “imperialist predators” – but rather a sense of internal vulnerability that is growing in various states. Paradoxically, this is more of a factor in the bigger and more important countries, because these are the powers that are involved in the biggest game. This explains their impulse to minimize any factor that might affect internal stability. First and foremost, this pertains to the channels that serve as conduits for influence (read: manipulation), either from outside or from certain internal forces. Structures that operate transnationally – understandably – immediately look suspect. The view is that they should be ‘nationalized’, not through ownership but in terms of demonstrating loyalty to a particular state. This is a very serious shift, and in the foreseeable future this process could dramatically weaken the second pillar of the current global interconnectedness. Rise of Front and Proxy Media in 21st Century International Relations Greg Simons Where the US intends to increase troop activity, they begin by increasing media activity to pave the way informationally and cognitively for the coming new physical ‘reality.’ In the current context, the Western policymakers and practitioners have taken a self-destructive and deeply delusional ideological path, lacking the professional capability and capacity of the past. More Durov, a committed cosmopolitan liberal, is a typical representative of the ‘global society’. He has had tensions with all the countries he has worked in, starting with his homeland and continuing throughout his more recent travels. Of course, as a big businessman in a sensitive industry, he has been in dialectical interaction with the governments and intelligence services of different countries, which has required maneuvering and compromise. But the attitude of avoiding any national entrenchment persisted. Having passports for all occasions seemed to widen his scope for action and increase his confidence. At least for as long as this very global society lived and breathed, calling itself the liberal world order. But it’s now coming to an end. And this time the possession of French nationality, along with a number of other things, promises to exacerbate rather than alleviate the predicament of the accused. The ‘transnational’ entities will increasingly be required to ‘ground’ themselves – to identify with a particular state. If they do not want to, they will be affixed to the ground by force, by being recognized as agents not of the global world but of specific hostile powers. This is what is happening now with Telegram, but it’s not the first and it will not be the last such instance. The struggle to subjugate the various actors in this sphere, thus fragmenting a previously unified field, is likely to be a key component of the next global political phase. The tightening of control over everything to do with data will inevitably increase the degree of repression in the information sphere, especially since it is not easy in practice to block unwanted channels. But if relatively recently it seemed impossible to dig up the world’s information superhighway and make it unusable for travel, this no longer seems so far-fetched. The most interesting question is how the likely shrinking of the global information realm will affect trade and economic connectivity, the remaining pillar of world unity. Judging by the pace of change, there will soon be newsworthy developments there too. This article was first published by Russia in Global Affairs, translated and edited by the RT team. International “Society of the Spectacle” Stanislav O. Byshok The transformation of diplomatic efforts into a “spectacle” by no means contributes to the achievement of those goals, although it may sometimes entertain the unsophisticated general public. Postmodernism should be replaced or, at any rate, counterbalanced by more traditional—restrained and substantive—forms of international communication. More

[Category: Editor's Column]

— War on Gaza Crystalizes Israel’s Image

 

at 8/25/24 10:00pm

Modern Israel attracts much attention from analysts and the public but our ability to understand it is hindered by ideology, prejudice, and myth. Many tread carefully when discussing Israel lest they be accused of antisemitism. In an earlier article, I explained what distinguishes anti-Zionism from antisemitism. However, the fundamental difficulty lies in the habitual association of the state in Western Asia with the Jews. Should we view those who inhabit and govern Israel as Jews or have they become something else namely, Israelis?  The “nature versus nurture” debate over the relative influence of inherited traits versus environmental conditions on humans is older than many realize. It can be traced through different stages of the biblical narrative. Angry at the Israelites’ worship of the golden calf, God was ready to destroy them all and start anew with Moses. Nature was to blame, as God despaired that these “stiff-necked people” could be re-educated. In another biblical story, however, the Israelites were sent to wander in the wilderness for forty years to be reformatted before being allowed to enter the Land of Canaan. In this case, the emphasis was on nurture over nature, with the hope that the experience of benefiting from boundless generosity—such as the manna and the protective clouds of glory—would change them. This may have been the first known attempt at social engineering, even though the success was only variable. The contemporary history of the Jews presents a more daring case of such re-education. For centuries, Jewish ideals have stressed mercy, modesty, and beneficence. The abhorrence of violence is so ingrained that in many Jewish communities, knives, which could be tools of murder, must be removed from the table before reciting the grace after a meal. Blessing and violence are deemed incompatible. After centuries of being educated to strive for moral perfection, some Jews initially a tiny minority adopted a unusual role as colonial settlers—a role historically associated with European Christian civilization. Mostly atheists and agnostics, Zionist pioneers in Palestine concluded that “God does not exist, but He promised us this land.” They conveniently instrumentalized biblical commandments, such as  “You shall clear out the Land and settle in it, for I have given you the Land to occupy it.” The settlers embraced a literal and materialistic reading of the Bible abandoning the interpretative tradition developed in rabbinic Judaism. Jewish tradition reads the biblical verses that mention violence allegorically: the sword and the bow used by Jacob the Patriarch against his enemies become symbols of obedience to divine commandments and good deeds. Tradition locates Jewish heroism in the house of study, not on the battlefield. But Zionists rejected this tradition as that of “exilic weaklings.” Antisemitism and Antizionism: A Dangerous Conflation Yakov M. Rabkin Anti-Semitism is making the headlines. The Israeli Prime Minister describes as anti-Semitic the accusation that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, and even American students who are calling for a ceasefire. What Israel is doing does in fact provoke anti-Semitic acts against synagogues, Jewish schools and even individual Jews. It is therefore important to understand what anti-Semitism is, what it is not, and how it can be distinguished from anti-Zionism. More Naturally, like in other locations such as India, America, or Algeria, most inhabitants of Palestine—Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike—resented the Zionists who began colonizing Palestine in the late 19th century. Resistance emerged, and generations of Israelis grew up fighting against it. Palestinians came to be perceived as a constant source of danger. Educated in the spirit of military courage, moral superiority, and self-righteousness, the Israeli came to disdain and replace the Jew. The murder of Jacob De Haan, a Jewish anti-Zionist lawyer, by members of a Zionist militia in 1924 marked not only the onset of organized political terrorism in Palestine but also the affirmation of a new national identity. Ideals of martial valour were not only inculcated through the educational system but, more powerfully, were induced by the predicament of all colonial settlements: suppressing resistance from the colonized. Generation after generation of Israelis have participated in the violent “pacification of the natives,” forcing them to submit to discrimination, dispossession, and ethnic cleansing. The daily news of brutalities perpetrated by the Israeli military in Gaza underscores the success of the Zionist transformation of the Jew. The massive support that these acts receive from Israeli society at large strongly confirms this. The recent debate in the Israeli parliament when some Knesset members asserted the legitimacy of gang raping Palestinian detainees by Israeli soldiers reveals profound dehumanization—that is, the denial of full humanity in others, along with the cruelty and suffering that accompany it. But this also threatens the humanity of the soldier. To mitigate this, the soldier must keep a distance from his victim. This is achieved through the industrialization of murder, which began with gas chambers and carpet bombing and continued with targeted assassinations by missiles and kamikaze drones. World-renowned Israeli scientists and engineers, assisted by major American corporations, have made a qualitative advance in streamlining remote violence. In Gaza, artificial intelligence (AI) now determines targets and to destroys them. This points to an abdication not only of their ancestors’ moral values but of humanity altogether. The Israelis’ war on Gaza confirms a triumph of nurture over nature, all the while demonstrating that technological progress does not equate to progress in humanity. In fact, it normalizes amorality, which most Western governments accept because, in their view, it is Jews who commit these atrocities, whether qualified as mass murder, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. Few realize that a century of living by the sword has transformed the Jew into a ruthless Israeli. Thus, one can better understand Israel as a state and a society when it is no longer regarded as “the Jewish state”, a nebulous concept that only blurs our vision and obscures reality. Only then can the world judge Israel on merit like any other state. Israel’s War Objectives Gabi Siboni, Kobi Michael The State of Israel and the people of Israel have known many crises and have withstood difficult times. Israel can emerge victorious this time, too. It will be costly, but a historic opportunity has been created here to reshape the Palestinian and regional arenas. International pressure to reach a ceasefire will come. We must not blink in the face of the impulses of the so-called “international community.” More

[Category: Opinions]

— On Ukraine: To Understand Before Making Peremptory Judgments

 

at 8/18/24 10:00pm

Although Jacques de Larosiere, a renowned world economist, the European political and financial guru, turns 95 this fall, he continues to closely monitor international events. He has kindly shared his understanding of today’s most pressing issue and of historical realities. We find it necessary to acquaint our readers with of the opinion of the respected author to show that Europeans may have an alternative view of the deepening Ukraine crisis. Ukraine has never been a unitary state, either ethnically or politically, and throughout most of its history it was a “subject” of a sovereign power—Lithuania, Poland, or Russia. Notably, under the latter’s rule, it was called “Little Russia” for 250 years— from 1654 (when the Cossack Hetmanate of Left-bank Ukraine fell under Russian protection) and up to the very end of the 19th century (the prevailing term for much of the modern territory of Ukraine controlled by the Russian Empire. In 1919, it was named the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and became a constituent union republic of the USSR after its establishment in 1922. After the Second World War, Stalin, in order to obtain an additional seat in the UN, called it a “sovereign state” (and even made some legal provisions for its formally “independent” acting in international affairs). In 1954, Khrushchev transferred control of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine (both being Soviet constituent republics) for the mere reason that it was geographically closer to the latter. These political games were in no way a recognition by Moscow of Ukraine’s real independence. It has always considered it—and so have many Ukrainians—a “brother country” intimately linked to Russia by common historical roots. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine immediately voted massively for independence, with Russia not questioning the borders of its neighbor. Three controversial issues settled through tense negotiations in the 1990s included: the question of nuclear weapons—resolved by the 5 December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by and between Ukraine, the U.S., the UK, and Russia, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal to Russia in return for recognition and guarantees of its borders; the ownership of the ex-Soviet Black Sea Feet—settled through the Partition Treaty (signed on 28 May 1997), whereby the two countries agreed to divide ships and establish two independent national fleets; the destiny of the Port of Sevastopol—also settled by the Partition Treaty that set forth conditions for basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea on a 20-year lease (later extended). These agreements, of major importance, and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation were signed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Re-elected in 1999 (when Vladimir Putin came to power), Kuchma—a pragmatist who understood the essential importance of agreement with a large neighbor—continued close collaboration with Russia.   How It All Started     What was Ukraine’s political situation like in 1991, when it gained independence? This is a crucial question for understanding what happened next. Fundamentally, the country has always been divided by its history, and its identity has always been an acute issue. One tendency, in the west of the country, was to develop close ties with Europe without cutting itself off from Russia. At that time, my friend, future President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, was representative of this trend. In 1994-1995, when he was Governor of the Central Bank of Ukraine and I was President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), he drove me around the region where his family came from. He would stop at village after village to talk about the ordeals of which his people had been victims, namely the horrors of the Stalinist famine of the 1930s that decimated 20 percent of the population (six million people). He also told me about  the courage of the nationalists and resistance fighters who had opposed the Wehrmacht’s occupation of Ukraine in 1941-1942 and fought in the ranks of the Soviet army to liberate their country (the author’s interpretation – Ed.). Radical nationalist Stepan Bandera was admired for his courage and resistance to both the Germans (who disapproved of Ukrainian nationalism) and Soviet domination, but also for his extreme rightist ideas. (Assassinated by a Soviet agent, he was proclaimed a Ukrainian “hero” in 2010, and his statues have now replaced those of Lenin in the west of the country.) We know that at least a part of the “Galician” Ukrainian nationalists, whose anti-Soviet stance was particularly strong, made common cause with the Nazis, with whom they have maintained links to this day. And then there was the question of language, which ultimately turned into a decisive divide. Curiously, this issue became a source of political division at a later date. It is worth remembering that the Donbass region voted en masse for Ukrainian independence in the 1991 referendum, although over 70 percent of its people are Russian-speaking. The desire not to be entirely under Moscow’s thumb took precedence over language affiliation. But things have changed a lot since then, taking a separatist turn. The main reason is as follows. The Donbass region was the “economic pearl” of the USSR: it was home to the coal and steel industries and innovative high-tech factories, notably in the aeronautics, armaments and space sectors, which made the reputation of the Soviet industry. But in the 1990s, following Ukraine’s independence, this paradise collapsed. The global crisis in the coal and steel industries, which   had to be restructured, literally led to ruin and mass unemployment (wages  fell by 80%) in a region that had lost Moscow’s support and fallen victim to the corruption of the Kiev oligarchs. In the absence of the Ukrainian authorities’ ability to improve the economic situation in the region, the people of Donbass, hit by an unprecedented economic crisis, lost all illusions about their “Ukrainian future.” This factor is crucial for understanding the current situation in Donbass. Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations Gordon M. Hahn Russia’s relations with its Other have gone through repeating cycles of emulative Westernization, Western intervention, Russian rebuff to the intervention, and Russia’s revival of traditional values, norms and practices with limited survival of elements borrowed from the more advanced, liberal Western cultural strains. More   How It Evolved Now let us look at how the situation evolved, proceeding from the facts and not from our pious wishes. The Donbass region gradually detached itself from Ukraine in the 1990s and the 2000s, grew increasingly pro-Russian and eventually separated from it because of the economic and social disaster that Kiev proved incapable of managing is a plain fact. The negotiations with Brussels on an association and free-trade agreement that progressed between 2009 and 2013 were wrong in that the economic issues were combined with the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership. This was bound to arouse Russia’s concern and create a division among Ukrainians. It was against this backdrop that pro-Russian President Victor Yanukovich decided, in November 2013, to suspend negotiations with Brussels, which triggered fierce popular demonstrations in Kiev’s Maidan Square, followed by his downfall. Since 2014 everything has gone from bad to worse, undermining the “unitary” elements of the past. The Ukrainian decision to downgrade the Russian language (formerly on an equal footing with Ukrainian in Russian-speaking areas) and disregard for the people who had voted in the local referendums for a federal state and decentralization at the territorial level, set off a firestorm. In an extremely fractured environment (the spectrum ranges from ex-Soviet Donbass in the east, through the more moderate central part of the country, to the radical nationalist movements of the extreme right Galicians in the west), it would have been wise to create a federation in Ukraine that would allow the different currents enough local autonomy to live together. Kiev’s refusal to act in this line proved to be a major mistake. The memory of Donbass’ past prosperity and the disgust for the corrupt central government reawakened pro-Russian sentiment in its people. Eventually, this led to a civil war between the separatist region of Donbass and Kiev. This civil war that reigned for eight years (with covert military help and lavish humanitarian aid from Russia) was extremely violent. A serious diplomatic effort was undertaken with mediation by the leaders of France and Germany to sign on 5 September 2014—just five months after the outbreak of hostilities on the Donbass border—the Minsk Protocol by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine (consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE) and by the leaders of the then self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR).[1] The document provided for an immediate ceasefire; decentralization of powers, with a degree of administrative autonomy granted to the DNR and the LNR; early elections in these two signatory republics; and withdrawal of illegal armed groups from Ukrainian territory. However, although the Minsk Protocol was a true “diplomatic masterpiece” that contained all the ingredients necessary for a reasonable solution, it was immediately violated on the ground and hostilities resumed. The Minsk Agreements II, adopted on 12 February 2015 by the same representatives[2] (with French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel supporting it in a separate declaration to provide additional international credibility to the document [3]), were no better implemented by the warring parties. In January 2022, the Ukrainian defense minister declared the Agreements unenforceable. This aroused Moscow’s ire and was one of the main reasons for its decision to start a Special Military Operation in Ukraine in February 2022 to openly fight for the people of Donbass.   The Bitter Consequences to Consider Today, after ten years of an extremely violent war between Donbass and the central government in Kiev—a war in which it would have been naive to think that Russia would have remained completely neutral—territorial reorganization of Ukraine will be decided by force of arms. At this point there are several bitter consequences of the Ukraine conflict that require earnest consideration. Firstly, Russia stands to win and return its ancestral lands, and this is not necessarily unacceptable. Indeed, it seems difficult to claim that Crimea and Donbass are more Ukrainian than Russian. Secondly, the revival of nationalism has become a commonplace geopolitical factor. It increasingly often evolves  around language, and over 70 percent of Russian-speaking people of Donbass are a clear manifestation of this trend.       Thirdly, the United States’ persistent desire to surround Russia with countries joining NATO and provide them with weapons is naturally seen by Moscow as a provocation by the West (remember Washington’s firm and immediate reaction to the Soviet Union’s desire to equip Cuba with missiles aimed at the U.S. in early 1961). The question of the so-called NATO threat to Russia, i.e., NATO’s presence in Russia’s neighboring countries, requires serious analysis and reflection, and not references to international law. The encirclement of Russia that is now taking place, with the deployment of armed forces and the creation of a “battle group” organized by NATO from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, is a further step in the escalation of war. Fourthly, instead of seeking to build an in-depth partnership with Russia—a major European power—the Europe of Brussels, exclusively focused on the agreement with Ukraine, followed the American lead and did nothing to allay Russia’s fears of hostile encirclement. At no point has the EU sought to define and enforce its essential interests, which are to work with Russia rather than to rush to impose sanctions that have spurred gas prices, thereby weakening Europe and driving Moscow into the arms of China—a feat we blindly and diligently achieved while the energy-sufficient United States could, without damage to itself, give Europe bellicose advice. Fifthly, given the political deterioration as a result of ten years of war, I do not believe that asserting Ukraine’s right over Crimea and the Donbass region is a constructive way to proceed along. To want Donbass to remain part of Ukraine after this bloody war—which the region is far from having lost—seems to me a dangerous illusion. It would be wrong to confine oneself to asserting international law where it is far from the ethnic and human realities. It is not reasonable to risk a global conflict in a bid to preserve the “Ukrainian identity” of Crimea and Donbass, which has never existed. It is not reasonable to insist on historical borders instead of deciding on a ceasefire line, as it only provides a bonus for aggression. Diplomacy is urgently needed to draw the territorial consequences of this conflict, which otherwise has every chance of dragging on indefinitely due to the passionate nature of war and the indomitable will of Donbass to no longer be part of Ukraine. Territorial adjustments are needed. It would obviously be desirable for this restructuring to be the result of an international agreement. To resolve this complex affair, the Chancelleries would need to do a bit of historical work and weigh up the nuances, avoiding pitfalls such as “Crimea and Donbass will always remain totally Ukrainian and are destined to be members of NATO.” This would be historical and linguistic nonsense, a provocation, and a major political error In short, we need a little tolerance, humility and common sense in the face of complexity, which we must make the effort to understand before making peremptory judgments. That’s the only way to make peace. “Weapon Against Russia”: Fyodor Lukyanov on the Wests Ukraine Strategy and Putins Mistakes Fyodor A. Lukyanov The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a minor part of the overall situation. The main part is what was the casus belli from the perspective of the Russian leadership: it wasn't Ukraine, it was European and American perceptions of how European security should look. And this view emerged immediately after the end of the Cold War. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, gave an interview to the Die Weltwoche weekly (Switzerland). More

[Category: Opinions]

— On Ukraine: To Understand before Making Peremptory Judgments

 

at 8/18/24 10:00pm

Although Jacques de Larosiere, a renowned world economist, the European political and financial guru, turns 95 this fall, he continues to closely monitor international events. He has kindly shared his understanding of today’s most pressing issue and of historical realities. We find it necessary to acquaint our readers with of the opinion of the respected author to show that Europeans may have an alternative view of the deepening Ukraine crisis. Ukraine has never been a unitary state, either ethnically or politically, and throughout most of its history it was a “subject” of a sovereign power—Lithuania, Poland, or Russia. Notably, under the latter’s rule, it was called “Little Russia” for 250 years— from 1654 (when the Cossack Hetmanate of Left-bank Ukraine fell under Russian protection) and up to the very end of the 19th century (the prevailing term for much of the modern territory of Ukraine controlled by the Russian Empire. In 1919, it was named the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and became a constituent union republic of the USSR after its establishment in 1922. After the Second World War, Stalin, in order to obtain an additional seat in the UN, called it a “sovereign state” (and even made some legal provisions for its formally “independent” acting in international affairs). In 1954, Khrushchev transferred control of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine (both being Soviet constituent republics) for the mere reason that it was geographically closer to the latter. These political games were in no way a recognition by Moscow of Ukraine’s real independence. It has always considered it—and so have many Ukrainians—a “brother country” intimately linked to Russia by common historical roots. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine immediately voted massively for independence, with Russia not questioning the borders of its neighbor. Three controversial issues settled through tense negotiations in the 1990s included: the question of nuclear weapons—resolved by the 5 December 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by and between Ukraine, the U.S., the UK, and Russia, under which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal to Russia in return for recognition and guarantees of its borders; the ownership of the ex-Soviet Black Sea Feet—settled through the Partition Treaty (signed on 28 May 1997), whereby the two countries agreed to divide ships and establish two independent national fleets; the destiny of the Port of Sevastopol—also settled by the Partition Treaty that set forth conditions for basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea on a 20-year lease (later extended). These agreements, of major importance, and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation were signed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Re-elected in 1999 (when Vladimir Putin came to power), Kuchma—a pragmatist who understood the essential importance of agreement with a large neighbor—continued close collaboration with Russia.   How It All Started     What was Ukraine’s political situation like in 1991, when it gained independence? This is a crucial question for understanding what happened next. Fundamentally, the country has always been divided by its history, and its identity has always been an acute issue. One tendency, in the west of the country, was to develop close ties with Europe without cutting itself off from Russia. At that time, my friend, future President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko, was representative of this trend. In 1994-1995, when he was Governor of the Central Bank of Ukraine and I was President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), he drove me around the region where his family came from. He would stop at village after village to talk about the ordeals of which his people had been victims, namely the horrors of the Stalinist famine of the 1930s that decimated 20 percent of the population (six million people). He also told me about  the courage of the nationalists and resistance fighters who had opposed the Wehrmacht’s occupation of Ukraine in 1941-1942 and fought in the ranks of the Soviet army to liberate their country (the author’s interpretation – Ed.). Radical nationalist Stepan Bandera was admired for his courage and resistance to both the Germans (who disapproved of Ukrainian nationalism) and Soviet domination, but also for his extreme rightist ideas. (Assassinated by a Soviet agent, he was proclaimed a Ukrainian “hero” in 2010, and his statues have now replaced those of Lenin in the west of the country.) We know that at least a part of the “Galician” Ukrainian nationalists, whose anti-Soviet stance was particularly strong, made common cause with the Nazis, with whom they have maintained links to this day. And then there was the question of language, which ultimately turned into a decisive divide. Curiously, this issue became a source of political division at a later date. It is worth remembering that the Donbass region voted en masse for Ukrainian independence in the 1991 referendum, although over 70 percent of its people are Russian-speaking. The desire not to be entirely under Moscow’s thumb took precedence over language affiliation. But things have changed a lot since then, taking a separatist turn. The main reason is as follows. The Donbass region was the “economic pearl” of the USSR: it was home to the coal and steel industries and innovative high-tech factories, notably in the aeronautics, armaments and space sectors, which made the reputation of the Soviet industry. But in the 1990s, following Ukraine’s independence, this paradise collapsed. The global crisis in the coal and steel industries, which   had to be restructured, literally led to ruin and mass unemployment (wages  fell by 80%) in a region that had lost Moscow’s support and fallen victim to the corruption of the Kiev oligarchs. In the absence of the Ukrainian authorities’ ability to improve the economic situation in the region, the people of Donbass, hit by an unprecedented economic crisis, lost all illusions about their “Ukrainian future.” This factor is crucial for understanding the current situation in Donbass. Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations Gordon M. Hahn Russia’s relations with its Other have gone through repeating cycles of emulative Westernization, Western intervention, Russian rebuff to the intervention, and Russia’s revival of traditional values, norms and practices with limited survival of elements borrowed from the more advanced, liberal Western cultural strains. More   How It Evolved Now let us look at how the situation evolved, proceeding from the facts and not from our pious wishes. The Donbass region gradually detached itself from Ukraine in the 1990s and the 2000s, grew increasingly pro-Russian and eventually separated from it because of the economic and social disaster that Kiev proved incapable of managing is a plain fact. The negotiations with Brussels on an association and free-trade agreement that progressed between 2009 and 2013 were wrong in that the economic issues were combined with the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership. This was bound to arouse Russia’s concern and create a division among Ukrainians. It was against this backdrop that pro-Russian President Victor Yanukovich decided, in November 2013, to suspend negotiations with Brussels, which triggered fierce popular demonstrations in Kiev’s Maidan Square, followed by his downfall. Since 2014 everything has gone from bad to worse, undermining the “unitary” elements of the past. The Ukrainian decision to downgrade the Russian language (formerly on an equal footing with Ukrainian in Russian-speaking areas) and disregard for the people who had voted in the local referendums for a federal state and decentralization at the territorial level, set off a firestorm. In an extremely fractured environment (the spectrum ranges from ex-Soviet Donbass in the east, through the more moderate central part of the country, to the radical nationalist movements of the extreme right Galicians in the west), it would have been wise to create a federation in Ukraine that would allow the different currents enough local autonomy to live together. Kiev’s refusal to act in this line proved to be a major mistake. The memory of Donbass’ past prosperity and the disgust for the corrupt central government reawakened pro-Russian sentiment in its people. Eventually, this led to a civil war between the separatist region of Donbass and Kiev. This civil war that reigned for eight years (with covert military help and lavish humanitarian aid from Russia) was extremely violent. A serious diplomatic effort was undertaken with mediation by the leaders of France and Germany to sign on 5 September 2014—just five months after the outbreak of hostilities on the Donbass border—the Minsk Protocol by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine (consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE) and by the leaders of the then self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR).[1] The document provided for an immediate ceasefire; decentralization of powers, with a degree of administrative autonomy granted to the DNR and the LNR; early elections in these two signatory republics; and withdrawal of illegal armed groups from Ukrainian territory. However, although the Minsk Protocol was a true “diplomatic masterpiece” that contained all the ingredients necessary for a reasonable solution, it was immediately violated on the ground and hostilities resumed. The Minsk Agreements II, adopted on 12 February 2015 by the same representatives[2] (with French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel supporting it in a separate declaration to provide additional international credibility to the document [3]), were no better implemented by the warring parties. In January 2022, the Ukrainian defense minister declared the Agreements unenforceable. This aroused Moscow’s ire and was one of the main reasons for its decision to start a Special Military Operation in Ukraine in February 2022 to openly fight for the people of Donbass.   The Bitter Consequences to Consider Today, after ten years of an extremely violent war between Donbass and the central government in Kiev—a war in which it would have been naive to think that Russia would have remained completely neutral—territorial reorganization of Ukraine will be decided by force of arms. At this point there are several bitter consequences of the Ukraine conflict that require earnest consideration. Firstly, Russia stands to win and return its ancestral lands, and this is not necessarily unacceptable. Indeed, it seems difficult to claim that Crimea and Donbass are more Ukrainian than Russian. Secondly, the revival of nationalism has become a commonplace geopolitical factor. It increasingly often evolves  around language, and over 70 percent of Russian-speaking people of Donbass are a clear manifestation of this trend.       Thirdly, the United States’ persistent desire to surround Russia with countries joining NATO and provide them with weapons is naturally seen by Moscow as a provocation by the West (remember Washington’s firm and immediate reaction to the Soviet Union’s desire to equip Cuba with missiles aimed at the U.S. in early 1961). The question of the so-called NATO threat to Russia, i.e., NATO’s presence in Russia’s neighboring countries, requires serious analysis and reflection, and not references to international law. The encirclement of Russia that is now taking place, with the deployment of armed forces and the creation of a “battle group” organized by NATO from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, is a further step in the escalation of war. Fourthly, instead of seeking to build an in-depth partnership with Russia—a major European power—the Europe of Brussels, exclusively focused on the agreement with Ukraine, followed the American lead and did nothing to allay Russia’s fears of hostile encirclement. At no point has the EU sought to define and enforce its essential interests, which are to work with Russia rather than to rush to impose sanctions that have spurred gas prices, thereby weakening Europe and driving Moscow into the arms of China—a feat we blindly and diligently achieved while the energy-sufficient United States could, without damage to itself, give Europe bellicose advice. Fifthly, given the political deterioration as a result of ten years of war, I do not believe that asserting Ukraine’s right over Crimea and the Donbass region is a constructive way to proceed along. To want Donbass to remain part of Ukraine after this bloody war—which the region is far from having lost—seems to me a dangerous illusion. It would be wrong to confine oneself to asserting international law where it is far from the ethnic and human realities. It is not reasonable to risk a global conflict in a bid to preserve the “Ukrainian identity” of Crimea and Donbass, which has never existed. It is not reasonable to insist on historical borders instead of deciding on a ceasefire line, as it only provides a bonus for aggression. Diplomacy is urgently needed to draw the territorial consequences of this conflict, which otherwise has every chance of dragging on indefinitely due to the passionate nature of war and the indomitable will of Donbass to no longer be part of Ukraine. Territorial adjustments are needed. It would obviously be desirable for this restructuring to be the result of an international agreement. To resolve this complex affair, the Chancelleries would need to do a bit of historical work and weigh up the nuances, avoiding pitfalls such as “Crimea and Donbass will always remain totally Ukrainian and are destined to be members of NATO.” This would be historical and linguistic nonsense, a provocation, and a major political error In short, we need a little tolerance, humility and common sense in the face of complexity, which we must make the effort to understand before making peremptory judgments. That’s the only way to make peace. “Weapon Against Russia”: Fyodor Lukyanov on the Wests Ukraine Strategy and Putins Mistakes Fyodor A. Lukyanov The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a minor part of the overall situation. The main part is what was the casus belli from the perspective of the Russian leadership: it wasn't Ukraine, it was European and American perceptions of how European security should look. And this view emerged immediately after the end of the Cold War. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, gave an interview to the Die Weltwoche weekly (Switzerland). More

[Category: Opinions]

— Could Iran and Israel Drift Into a Full-Scale War?

 

at 8/12/24 10:00pm

The situation in the Middle East, where the aspirations of Iran and Israel have once again collided, is paradoxical in that there is no way out. Both sides would like to put a stop to the other’s gallop, but this is impossible without disastrous consequences for themselves. There are many reasons for this situation, including the geographical compactness of the region, where any action echoes loudly and boomerangs erratically. More importantly, all the problems and relationships are so intertwined that to untangle them would require a colossal effort that no one is capable of. Theoretically, the cord could be cut with a powerful game-changing blow, but nobody has the wherewithal. This last statement may seem a bit controversial. Israel is pursuing an extremely aggressive policy of reshaping its entire security landscape, hoping to contain the surrounding threats for a long time to come. Iran, on the other hand, is generally seen as an actively revisionist power, managing the regional landscape sometimes directly, but especially through the use of partner groups (a sort of ‘Axis of Resistance’) in various countries. The assumption that a decisive battle is likely should be supported by the fact that the entire region is already in turmoil and external powers, including the traditionally dominant US, are merely feigning active involvement rather than knowing exactly what they want. Thus, it’s surely high time for the plucky and the determined to make the leap to a new status. But what new status? Historically, there have been successive dominant powers in this part of the world, mostly colonial masters from the West over the past few centuries. Now, for various reasons (mostly their own internal), these powers have withdrawn, perhaps permanently. This is the time for local players to assert their right to dominance, especially since some of them have the relevant traditions (Iran, Turkey), others have the military potential (Israel), and another has a lot of money and control over important religious shrines (Saudi Arabia). How Iran Perceives Turkey’s Rise in the South Caucasus Vali Golmohammadi, Sergey M. Markedonov The South Caucasus is increasingly becoming an additional source of geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Turkey, which is expected to intensify further as Turkey’s influence grows and Iran’s perception of geopolitical insecurities increases. More In earlier times, the struggle for influence would have been fierce, and of course there is still competition today. Iran, in particular, is widely suspected of trying to dominate the entire Middle East with its religious and political influence (through Shia communities and friendly political organizations). Turkey periodically juggles with the notion of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, though it carefully avoids it. But the idea of controlling security zones beyond its own borders has been implemented for decades. However, the various forms of expansion have long since ceased to be about conquering space for the sake of territorial expansion. The aim is the same: to secure a more favorable situation in terms of strategic depth, i.e. the ability to protect itself more reliably from external threats and thereby strengthen domestic security.  This is a widespread phenomenon. Some countries are blessed because they have no troublesome neighbors (Australia or the North American states come to mind, although in the latter case the US can point to Mexico and migration.) But these are very rare exceptions; in most cases such problems have to be faced. Enlargement of borders used to be the norm, now it is the exception – it is unstable (because it is impossible to legitimize) and costly. Buffer zones are more common and we see them all the time. But this method is obviously situational. Finally, there is the option of influencing the internal affairs of a neighbor to deter it from acting unilaterally. This is probably the most common form of deterrence today. More precisely, it’s desirable because it does not involve major hostilities and the risks associated with them. It doesn’t always work, however. Coming back to the Iran-Israel axis, both sides are aware of the impossibility of achieving their desired goals through a full-on direct clash. Hence, the constant brinkmanship, including extremely provocative steps, in the expectation that the response will not cross any red line. This has worked so far, although the density and intensity of the mutual jabs is rapidly increasing. In such a format of interaction, it is impossible to leave anything without a reaction, and sooner or later it may turn out that the relatively restrained forms of response have come to an end. Another problem is the ability of adversaries to anticipate the immediate consequences of their moves. It is believed that the Middle East is home to grandmasters in this field, masters of this high stakes game. But global experience shows that the level of geopolitical mastery is generally declining, perhaps because of dramatically changing contingencies. There is no reason to believe that the various actors are still capable of playing games of real strategic depth, while managing to avoid falling into a shallow tactical pool. This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, translated and edited by the RT team Hamas-Israel Dead End: The Military Dimension of the Disaster Prokhor Yu. Tebin The Hamas attack on October 7 forces us to think about what the outbreak of a major regional conflict might look like in the near future, given the experience of the operation in Ukraine and the rapid, difficult-to-predict development of new technologies.  More

[Category: Editor's Column]

— BRICS as an Alternative Rule Maker in Global Governance

 

at 8/8/24 10:00pm

The West, led by the US, has been the main global rule-maker for decades. However, the “Rest” have not been satisfied with the global rules made by the West. In order to address how we must develop an alternative world order, we need to understand the shortcomings of the one which currently exists. The main problems with the present international order are not with its values or institutions, but with how they are practiced and managed. What the US calls a rules-based international order, in practice, has mostly been an order based on US rules and interests, not based on the UN or global rules. From a strategic point of view, the US+ (by plus I mean the West in general and G7 in particular) have divided Europe, the Middle East and East Asia. After the Cold War, the US and its partners tried to engage Russia economically and in the energy sector in order to stabilise global energy markets; however, they excluded Moscow from European security mechanisms. Russian exclusion and the undermining of its security led to the Ukraine conflict. In the Middle East, they excluded Iran for more than four decades from any mechanism and targeted Tehran using economic, political, and, indirectly, military means. US allies in the Middle East also tried to impose their security costs on the US by engaging Washington in regional and domestic conflicts; consequently, they destabilised the whole region. In East Asia, they are doing the same with China. The US benefits from the Chinese market and engages with China economically; however, in order to benefit from China’s rising military power, they need to compete with Beijing. That’s why, when it comes to security, China is defined as a “threat”. Emphasising this Chinese threat helps the US limit Beijing’s economic power and influence. There are others who benefit from this approach, too. Construing Russia, Iran and China as threats helps the US battle its own budget at home, control allies abroad, and undermine rivals. By fabricating “enemies and rivals”, it’s much easier to pass more than 800-billion-dollar military budgets at home every year and convince the people that “we are defending the country” against “enemies” (who in fact do not exist). By outlining “enemies” in regional or global contexts, the US tries to control and influence its allies and partners. Without such an approach, US allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia would be much more interested in pursuing strategic autonomy and independent foreign policies. Manipulating allies and partners helps the US undermine its rivals (Russia, Iran and China). By concentrating on “threats”, the US rivals will not be able to utilise opportunities and realise their economic and strategic potential. Geographically, the US has been far removed from regional and global wars and conflicts. For the US establishment, war is a business by other means. More than 2.5 million people work for MICs in different US states, and approximately the same number of people work in military-related businesses in countries, which are US allies and partners. For that reason, supporting the wars in Ukraine, Gaza and other regions are a component of domestic politics and the war business. Those who benefit from conflicts and instability are not interested in ending them, and it was partly the business aspect of conflicts that prolonged them in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, the Korean peninsula... That’s why the US has been engaged in wars around the world more than any other country, because the costs are paid by others. Consequently, North America benefits from peace and prosperity and other parts of the world are engaged in regional and domestic conflicts. Politically, double standards are the most important shortcoming. The Unites States preaches about the rules-based international order, but when we look at the US and its allies’ behaviour in Ukraine and the greater Middle East (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Syria, Libya, Palestine etc.), we see that they do not practice what they preach. Violations of human rights, international and humanitarian laws; occupation, invasion, the development of nuclear weapons and even committing genocide are all allowed if it is done by the US and/or its allies and partners. The Rise of BRICS John Gong The architects of the current global governance system have failed the world. Not only didn’t they redeem the sins of their ancestors, but we now have the leaders of the richest club in the world convening every year preaching to the rest of the planet about the rules-based order, while the rules are treated like tissues from a Kleenex box, usable at times but discarded when inconvenient. More Reliance on destructive power and burden-sharing is another shortcoming of the current international order. During the past three decades, the US has not tried enough to engage others (sometimes even its allies) in making important decisions regarding wars and conflicts. The US makes small coalitions and launches war by using its destructive power first and then Washington tries to organise an international conference for “peace-building” and “burden-sharing”; and whenever others are not ready to cooperate, and/or the conflicts are too costly, the US leaves the conflicts for others to suffer. Afghanistan was the latest case, and it imposed huge costs on the region, especially on Iran. The last, but not least, problem the US rules-based order is the weaponisation of finance and business as a new tool; it has left many countries, and even Western companies, dissatisfied. Since direct conflicts have become too expensive and Western societies are not interested in paying, the US and its allies have turned more and more to economic and financial sanctions to impose their positions and undermine those who “are not with them”. These are some of the shortcomings of current world order – in fact disorder – that has made many countries, companies and societies dissatisfied and interested in looking for alternatives at regional and global levels. The alternative order needs to be globally acceptable and respectable. Such an order should be based more on the UN and global values and interests, including non-intervention, respect for international and humanitarian law and human rights; multi-polarity; indivisible security; peaceful development; peaceful coexistence; opposition to unilateral coercive measures; cultural diversity, etc. These values, supported by BRICS member states, are more global and inclusive. However, having common values is not enough. Words should have weight. Are the BRICS member states strong enough to push forward an alternative order based on the UN and global values? Yes. Militarily, almost all BRICS member states are able to defend themselves. There are three nuclear powers among each grouping (the US, UK and France in the G7 and Russia, China and India in BRICS). Although the G7 members may have access to more advanced technologies, these have not helped them win most of the important wars since the Vietnam War. The US failed in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel, with all the advanced weapons provided by the US, has not been able to win a war against a small group in Palestine; and NATO’s provision of advanced technologies for Ukraine has not helped the county achieve decisive victories on the battlefield. In purchasing power parity terms, the BRICS+ GDP has surpassed that of the G7: in 2023, BRICS’ share of global GDP was 32%, while that of the G7 was 29%. Based on IMF statistics, in 2024 emerging markets and developing economies’ (mostly look for reform in global governance) share of global GDP will be 59%, while the developed economies’ share will be 40%. BRICS in total have bigger markets, more natural resource and mostly enjoy younger, educated populations and a greater economic growth rate than advanced, developed countries. Geographically, BRICS+ is more global and more inclusive than G7. Aside from Japan, the G7 members are all Western countries, while BRICS range from China in the Far East to Brazil in South America and from Russia in the north to South Africa; recently, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the centre joined the group. BRICS+ has the capacity to create a global network that is very important in making global rules. However, to play as an alternative rule maker engaged in global governance, there are some shortcomings that BRICS+ need to find a solution to. Some of them include: Financial mechanisms: The US/EU sanctions are effective, I think, mostly because of the effectiveness of existing financial institutions, which force companies and countries alike to comply and sometimes over-comply with them. BRICS needs to develop its own financial and legal mechanism to be able to defend member states, their companies and other companies that work in/with BRICS member states against the extraterritorial laws and regulations of the US/EU. Synergy: The level of cooperation and coordination among BRICS member states, in comparison with G7, are not sufficient yet. As long as BRICS member states observe US/EU unilateral/multilateral coercive measures against other countries, willingly or not, they strengthen the current US-dominated international order and the Rest will not regard it as an alternative. Connectivity: Connectivity is the third important component of an alternative competitive global governance system. Corridors play a key role in this regard; especially developing corridors in the regions that the US has less control over, like the Silk Road and the North-South Corridor connecting India as well as the Arab and African countries to Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia through Iran. Comprehensive/indivisible security: Security cannot be limited to the military and intelligence. Economic, social and cyber security are also very important; BRICS needs to concentrate and invest more on economic and social development in West Asia, Central Asia, Africa and South America. By connecting different developing regions around the world, BRICS can really present itself as an alternative rule-maker in global governance, based on UN rules. Valdai Discussion Club Not Against, but Beyond the West Fyodor A. Lukyanov The confrontation between Russia and the West is intensifying but not changing in quality. Major changes have occurred in the part of the world that is not involved in the conflict but affected by it. The World Majority becomes increasingly convinced that the influence of those who have long dictated the rules in the international arena is declining. More

[Category: Valdai Papers]

— Contemporary Challenges to International Humanitarian Law: The ICRC Perspective

 

at 8/4/24 10:00pm

Bodies of men covered the battlefield; corpses were strewn over roads and ravines. The fields were devastated, wheat and corn flat on the ground, orchards ruined The villages bore the scars left by bombs, rockets, grenades and shells. Houses were riddled with holes, shattered and ruined, and their inhabitants, who had been crouching in cellars without light or food for nearly twenty hours, were beginning to crawl out, looking stunned by the terrors they had endured. Memories of Solferino, by Henry Dunant (edited quote)   This year marks two important anniversaries: 160 years of the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field and 75 years since the adoption of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the only treaties universally ratified. Together with other treaties and norms, they are the bedrock of international humanitarian law (IHL), a branch of public international law regulating the conduct of hostilities and protecting those who do not or no longer participate in hostilities. Pierre Kraehenbuehl, Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross[1], in his article addresses the challenges that IHL faces in contemporary armed conflicts.   IHL relevance and universality of the aspiration for humanity in war The ICRC was born on a battlefield, where the foundations of IHL as we know it today were laid. In 1859, Henry Dunant, a citizen of Geneva, found himself amidst the harrowing aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in Northern Italy, where he witnessed the terrible suffering of wounded soldiers. This experience stirred Dunant into action, sparked by a profound outcry and a refusal to being indifferent towards the plight of people affected by war. Solferino holds a significant place in history for the transformative actions that Dunant undertook. First, moved by compassion, he organized local civilians to provide aid to the injured and the dying. Subsequently, upon returning to Geneva, Dunant wrote A Memory of Solferino, recounting his observations of the horrific battle and posing critical questions. He pondered the possibility of establishing relief societies to tend to wartime casualties, laying the groundwork for the ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Additionally, he raised the necessity of creating laws to improve the conditions of injured combatants, ultimately leading to the adoption of the First Geneva Convention in 1864, a pivotal moment in the evolution of modern international law. The innate human instinct to reject the inevitability of suffering during times of conflict is a universal sentiment that transcends cultural and societal boundaries. Throughout history, various civilizations have demonstrated a recognition of the need to mitigate the atrocities of war. From the ancient proclamation by King Hammurabi of Babylon (“prevent the strong from oppressing the weak”) to the compassionate directives of Hazrat Abu Bakr during the Islamic conquest of Syria (ordering not to deceive, mutilate, kill children, the elderly or women), or the Somali traditional behaviors listed in the “biri-ma-geydo” (aimed at protecting those not involved in the fighting), norms were established to protect the vulnerable and uphold principles of humanity in times of armed conflict. Even in contemporary times, the significance of humanitarian principles remains evident. The St Petersburg Declaration of 1868, prompted by the concerns raised by Russian War Minister Count Dmitry Milutin regarding the use of explosive bullets, which highlighted the need to contain “barbarous methods for which there is no excuse in the requirements of warfare” and exemplifies the enduring insistence on military necessity at times needing to yield to considerations and imperatives of humanity. This historical context emphasizes the importance of upholding moral standards in warfare, underscoring the enduring relevance of International Humanitarian Law irrespective of the circumstances or justifications for engaging in conflict. While instances of violations of these laws persist globally and we often witness lack of respect and lack of enforcement the foundational principles of IHL serve as a beacon of guidance derived from the collective experiences of past conflicts. There is nothing abstract or theoretical in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. They were not drafted by naive idealists but by individuals who had witnessed and survived the horrors of World Wars I and II, and who needed no reminder of humankind’s unlimited capacity for unspeakable cruelty against other human beings. These agreements reflect the stark realities of historical atrocities, from the Holocaust to Stalingrad, from Coventry to Hiroshima and beyond, and underscore the imperative need to regulate behavior in war in adherence to agreed international standards.   Challenges Faced by IHL   Compliance One of the key challenges facing IHL today is non-compliance. This issue stems from a variety of factors including the lack of political will, ignorance, or distorted interpretations of the law for opportunistic or politicized reasons. Despite the existence of agreed and established norms, the primary cause of suffering during armed conflicts, as highlighted and experienced by the ICRC, is the failure to uphold these norms rather than any inadequacy in the existing rules themselves or a lack of rules. Civilians are overwhelmingly the most affected victims of the disregard of IHL by both State and non-State armed groups.[2] They are frequently and often deliberately targeted, caught in the crossfire, and forcibly displaced, while the essential infrastructure necessary for civilian survival is destroyed. Such instances, as those witnessed in Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Israel and the occupied territories, Syria, Somalia and in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, occur frequently with insufficient regard for the binding principles of proportionality[3], precautions[4] and distinction[5]. Prisoners of war (and detainees in non-international armed conflicts) are at high risk of abuse, ill-treatment, and even summary executions. However, under IHL, they are entitled to protection from all forms of violence, intimidation, insults, and public scrutiny. Despite these provisions, the prevalent use of social media has led to the dissemination of photos and videos of captured combatants, undermining their rights and dignity. The ICRC plays a critical role in advocating for the humane treatment of PoWs and detainees through confidential dialogues with both the detainees and the authorities detaining them. It is imperative that all parties to conflicts grant the ICRC access to all PoWs and detainees to uphold their rights and well-being. Indeed, PoWs in an international armed conflict have a right to being visited by the ICRC under the Geneva Conventions and withholding such visits is a breach of the obligations of parties under IHL. The protection of medical infrastructure and personnel remains a significant concern, as they are frequently targeted in conflicts. Whether the injured treated in hospitals are civilians or military personnel makes no difference: medical installations must be preserved and the wounded and sick must be respected and cared for. The misuse of the red cross and red crescent emblems continues, and this is unacceptable. In an increasingly polarized world, the politicization of IHL undermines its fundamental purpose of protecting individuals from the effects of violence, irrespective of their affiliation or the justifications for conflict. Double standards and selective condemnation of violations by parties further impede the proper implementation of IHL, risking reciprocal politicization and misinterpretations with detrimental consequences for all involved. It is sometimes stated that respecting IHL makes fighting wars more difficult. It is the firm view of the ICRC that waging war without respecting the rules of IHL leads down a path to moral failure and makes the ultimate prospects for peace and reconciliation even more elusive. New Technologies The evolving landscape of armed conflicts, with over 120 conflicts classified by the ICRC worldwide, has seen a significant surge in the past three decades. Emerging technologies are reshaping conflict dynamics and adding new complexities to warfare. Cyber operations, autonomous weapons, and artificial intelligence are altering the conduct of conflicts, presenting both perceived military advantages and substantial measurable risks.[6] While new technologies offer enhanced capabilities, such as rapid decision-making and operations in communication-restricted environments, they also pose significant dangers. Incidents like cyber-attacks on hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic have disrupted vital healthcare services, underscoring the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and the need for stronger safeguards. The ICRC has experienced cyber breaches compromising the personal data of vulnerable populations, emphasizing the urgent need for digital protection measures, such as a proposed digital emblem concept to safeguard individuals in cyberspace during armed conflicts. The deployment of autonomous weapons and AI systems introduces unpredictability and accelerates operational tempo beyond human control, amplifying the challenges in adhering to IHL standards. The ICRC advocates for the prohibition of autonomous weapons targeting humans and underscores the indispensable role of human judgment in decisions affecting lives and dignity, even in AI-supported military operations. Urbanization of warfare Gone are the days when battles were fought on traditional battlefields like Kosovo Polje, Kulikovo field, Solferino, or the Somme. Today, conflicts increasingly unfold in urban areas, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence in cities such as Aleppo, Gaza, Khartoum, and Mariupol. Military operations in urban settings present unique challenges due to the complex nature of fighting in such environments. The proximity of civilians poses significant obstacles for distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, impacting the ability of attacking forces to identify military targets accurately while minimizing harm to civilians. Moreover, the use of artillery and aerial bombardments in urban areas further complicates efforts to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure while targeting military objectives.   The ICRC recognizes that modern armed conflicts, particularly asymmetric ones, pose serious challenges to upholding the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality in IHL. It is imperative to confront those challenges and uphold the rules that safeguard civilians, who often suffer the most in conflict settings. Terrorism and counterterrorism Acts of terrorism fundamentally violate the principle of humanity and contradict the core tenets of IHL. The ICRC unequivocally condemns all such acts, regardless of their perpetrators, and irrespective of whether they occur within the context of an armed conflict or not. While states have a legitimate duty to ensure the security of their populations, there exists a concerning misconception that IHL either does not apply or applies incompletely to individuals or groups labeled as terrorists and their families. This ambiguity is further compounded in the context of the war on terrorism, where the legal status of captured fighters often requires intricate case-by-case evaluation. The ICRC has expressed significant humanitarian concerns regarding the treatment and prospects of foreign fighters and their families. The perceived threats and stigmatization associated with these individuals elevate their vulnerability to rights violations. The plight of women and children among foreign fighter populations is often overlooked and demands careful attention on a case-by-case basis. The ICRC emphasizes the imperative of treating foreign fighters and their families humanely and in accordance with international law, despite the complexities involved in resolving their status during or after armed conflict. Warfare in a New Epoch: The Return of Big Armies Vassily B. Kashin, Andrei A. Sushentsov The threat of a direct military clash between great powers and nuclear war will persist and, perhaps, become even more acute than during the Cold War. The key goal of diplomacy in this new world will be to develop a toolkit that will make it possible to endure decades of turbulence without nuclear bombardment. More   Challenges to operational response   The states party to the Geneva Conventions have entrusted the ICRC with a distinct mandate as an impartial, neutral, and independent organization dedicated to protecting the lives and dignity of conflict victims, as well as promoting and upholding international humanitarian law. Nevertheless, contemporary armed conflicts present several operational challenges to the ICRC’s mandate. Ensuring access to affected populations and detainees remains a critical challenge for the ICRCs operational response, with restrictions imposed by states, sanctions, or counterterrorism measures impeding humanitarian aid delivery. Despite advocating for humanitarian exemptions and dialogue on multiple fronts, the ICRC encounters obstacles in gaining adequate access to populations in need. The security of ICRC personnel is equally paramount, encompassing physical protection from attacks and legal safeguards to shield them from prosecution for their humanitarian work, regardless of the operational context. Recent experiences have demonstrated that targeted measures can carve out humanitarian space even within counterterrorism frameworks, leading to the adoption of humanitarian exemptions in some instruments. Yet, there remains a critical need for comprehensive policy and legal measures that uphold principled humanitarian action across all contexts. Criticism and doubts regarding the ICRCs neutrality frequently arise in conflict environments where parties seek endorsement of their narratives and objectives. It is important to understand that ICRC staff was not born neutral. But, in order to fulfil our mandate, we do not take sides in a conflict, because we believe that is the only way possible to work in highly polarized environments. Maintaining consistent neutrality enables the ICRC to operate and facilitate humanitarian actions on all sides of a conflict. We cannot be neutral in one conflict and not neutral in another. Upholding principled neutrality is fundamental to the ICRCs mission of alleviating suffering and supporting those affected by conflicts across the globe. Being neutral is sometimes misunderstood as being indifferent. In the case of the ICRC, it could not be further from the truth. It is our neutrality that allowed us to play a crucial role in the release of hundreds of Yemeni prisoners, Israeli hostages, and Palestinian detainees, just as we facilitate the transfers of mortal remains of fallen soldiers in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in our role of neutral intermediary. Misinformation, disinformation, and hate speech pose significant challenges to humanitarian operations, with the ICRC often targeted by false accusations (espionage, money or weapons transfers, involvement in organ trafficking) in conflict zones. These baseless campaigns not only endanger the humanitarian workers striving to provide aid but also jeopardize their capacity to protect and assist populations affected by conflict, ultimately impacting the lives of those in need. More importantly, the impact of harmful information is directly felt by the people affected by the conflict. Misinformation exacerbates polarization, promotes dehumanization, and fosters the harmful practice of labeling entire communities as others. Such falsehoods create an atmosphere of extreme danger and violence for civilians in conflict zones.   Conclusions   The question often arises as to whether IHL remains relevant in todays world. The media usually portrays instances of grave atrocities where IHL is violated and there is no denying their existence. However, what often goes unnoticed is the countless lives saved through the application of the Geneva Conventions and the suffering that is avoided. Every day, ICRC colleagues diligently visit prisoners, trace missing loved ones, and reunite families globally, among many other humanitarian activities. Their success in these endeavors stands as a testament to the indispensable role of these conventions. Remarkably, numerous instances of demobilizing and socially reintegrating thousands of child soldiers have taken place in countries like CAR, Colombia, Chad, DRC, Nepal, the Philippines, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Sudan over decades. The fate of missing persons has been resolved and the deceased honored in countries such as Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Peru, and the UK. Detainees have been released in Yemen, Indonesia, Libya, Nepal, Niger, and the Philippines, all because warring factions were willing to adhere to IHL. In coordination with Ukraine, Russia and the UN, the ICRC facilitated three safe passage operations for civilians out of Mariupol and its environs. More than 550 wounded and ill individuals received assistance through transportation and medical evacuations from areas severely affected by conflict, including the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mykolayiv regions. NATOs International Security Assistance Force established the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell in 2008 to monitor casualties in Afghanistan, leading to revised tactical directives and a decrease in civilian casualties caused by pro-government forces the year after. Following the armed conflict between Colombia and the FARC, multiple agreements were brokered between the parties to facilitate the efficient search, identification, and repatriation of individuals missing within the conflicts context. While challenges persist, substantial achievements have been realized. Thus, we urge everyone to continue embracing these conventions as they serve a vital purpose. There is an urgent need to build a culture of compliance and to emphasize the way in which applying IHL sets the foundation for a resumption of dialogue between parties. Every peace process begins with small humanitarian steps. As we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions this year, we emphasize that even in warfare, there exist boundaries that must be respected. An Age of Wars? Article Two. What Is to Be Done Sergei A. Karaganov There will be no polycentric and sustainable future world order without nuclear multilateralism. More

[Category: Opinions]

— Will NATO Attack Russia?

 

at 8/1/24 10:03pm

The issue of a major war in Europe is more pressing today than at any point since the mid-20th century. Western analysts have discussed a variety of potential conflict scenarios, and officials openly speculate about its likelihood and have even discussed specific time horizons. In a recent speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the actions of Western governments have brought the world “to the point of no return.” At the same time, the prevailing belief in domestic discussions is that the United States and its allies are aware of the catastrophic risks of a direct military clash with Moscow, and following the instinct of self-preservation, will try avoid it. Such judgments are based on the assumption that the West, despite its aggressiveness and arrogance, is guided by the rational correlation of benefits with costs, starting from the existing balance of power. Meanwhile, previous experience does not convince us of the ability of the United States and its allies to pursue a balanced, calculated course of action. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, they repeatedly got involved in military adventures, from which they painfully searched for a way out. Suffice it to recall the example of interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Of course, in all these cases, the risks for the West remained significantly lower than in the case of a hypothetical war with Russia. But the rates were noticeably lower. The recent admission of US President Joe Biden is indicative: “If we ever let Ukraine go down, mark my words: youll see Poland go, and youll see all those nations along the actual border of Russia, from the Balkans and Belarus, all those, theyre going to make their own accommodations.” It can be stated that the good old “domino theory” has re-established itself in the minds of Western strategists.   The split consciousness of the West The growing bitterness of Western countries towards Russia is consistent with the logic of ‘preventive war’ in the initiation of armed conflicts. Rather than linking interstate confrontations with aggressive opportunism, this model views escalation as a product of fears about the future. The conviction that the situation will worsen over time encourages states to take increasingly more adventurous steps, even using force. Throughout history, major wars, as a rule, became the product of precisely this preventive logic – the desire to strike in advance of an expected weakening. Thus, the disintegration of the continental blockade system prompted Napoleon to attack Russia. German concerns about the prospects for modernising the Russian army acted as a trigger for the First World War. A similar dynamic is observed today in the politics of the West, which has invested significant resources in the confrontation with Russia. The fact that it does not want to lose, but on the contrary is gradually moving towards achieving its goals, cannot but cause frustration in the United States and among its allies. Washington pushes not towards reconciliation, but towards the search for more potent means. Due to the failure of the West’s plans to destroy the Russian economy through restrictive measures and inflict a strategic defeat on Moscow using Kiev as a proxy, it is moving ever closer to the brink of direct military conflict with Russia. At the same time, it has demonstrated a decreasing sensitivity to the possible consequences of such a scenario. It is like how casino players in the United States and their allies raise their stakes more and more with each successive game. The growing adventurism is clearly visible in the debate over the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Moreover, thehysterical European leaders speaking out on this topic have been joined by seemingly more responsible American generals. Thus, Charles Brown, the head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, concluded that sending NATO troops into the country is an inevitable prospect. Western countries willingness to take risks is reinforced by a contradictory, if not schizophrenic, view of Russia. They never tire of repeating that Moscow’s potential was previously greatly overestimated, and as a result of the special military operation it was weakened even more. At the same time, without any awareness of the dissonance, they justify the build-up of their own forces by citing the increased Russian threat. The inconsistency also manifests itself in the portrayal of Russia as an insatiable expansionist bent on conquering its neighbours, coupled with its belief in its reverence for Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which guarantees mutual assistance to NATO member states in the event of an attack on one of them. The portrayal of Russia as a “paper tiger” - an aggressive but weak player - lays the foundation for preventive escalation in order to reverse the trends in the development of confrontation that are unfavourable for the West. Moreover, they can be undertaken beyond Ukraine. Evidence of this is the idea periodically introduced into Western discussions to limit Moscow’s access to the Baltic, ignoring the inevitable response to threats to Kaliningrad.   Quo Vadis? So far, Western politicians have not directly voiced the idea of an armed attack on Russia. Currently, we are talking about raising the issue on the assumption that Moscow will not dare to respond. Moreover, the thesis continues to be heard that NATO and its member states do not want a direct military confrontation. These assurances fail to eliminate two types of dangers. First, counting on the reliability of nuclear deterrence, the West may play too much to pursue a provocation that will force Moscow to defend its vital interests by all available means. The aforementioned projects for closing the Baltic Sea promise to evoke just such a response. Second, the established trend of increasing adventurism paves the way for a further shift in the boundaries of what is acceptable for the United States and its allies. The logic of confrontation works to increase rates, including due to the accumulation of costs already incurred. As a result, the available means begin to dictate the goals pursued. An additional factor that increases the risks of confrontation is the collective nature of the West. In domestic discussions, it is customary to emphasize the unequal nature of relations in NATO, due to the unambiguous dominance of Washington. Meanwhile, it is the vassal status of European states that increases their interest in escalation. Americas’ allies are terrified by the prospect that Washington, preoccupied with competition with China, will lose interest in them and refocus on Asian affairs. The embodiment of this horror story is the figure of Donald Trump, but in Europe there are fears that this scenario will be realised regardless of the personality of a particular leader. US allies assume that time is against them. Accordingly, the confrontation with Russia takes on an instrumental function, in helping to justify keeping Washington’s attention on the European agenda. Already the disputes in the US Congress regarding the financing of Kiev in early 2024 have served as an alarm bell, demonstrating that the United States is immersed in its own kitchen. Following the logic of pre-emption, European NATO members might conclude that provoking a confrontation now, while the United States remains involved in the conflict in Ukraine and containing Russia, would be a preferable scenario to the prospect of bearing the burden of confronting Moscow alone in the future—a scenario which they do not rule out. It is not surprising that the European politicians have been the ones who have made the most irresponsible and radical proposals, such as sending troops to Ukraine or extending NATO guarantees to territory controlled by Kiev. Internal dynamics within the West encourage competition for the status of the most intransigent fighter against Russia.   From plans to practices In practical terms, NATO member states are really preparing for a military clash with Moscow. The new model of the alliance’s forces, approved by the Madrid 2022 summit, and the regional plans prepared on its basis involve the deployment of a significant group of 300 thousand people within 30 days in addition to the troops already stationed along Russia’s borders. The basis of the latter is the actively expanding and modernising contingents of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland is especially different in this regard; it claims the status of the main NATO bastion, the same that that the Bundeswehr held in the second half of the 20th century. The increase to 300,000 people is intended to turn its armed forces into the largest land army of the alliance among the European member states. NATO members are openly practicing combat scenarios in potential theatres in Eastern and Northern Europe. Great emphasis is placed on mastering the lessons of the armed struggle in Ukraine. For this purpose, a special centre is being created in Bydgoszcz, Poland, designed to ensure the regular exchange of experience between Western and Ukrainian militaries. For a long time, the weak link in Western efforts was the limited capabilities of the military industry. However, NATO member states are paying increasing attention to overcoming this limitation. It would be reckless to expect that over time they will not be able to increase production, including by strengthening the ties between European companies and the American military-industrial complex. Characterising the intermediate results of Western efforts, experts from the influential Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies in a recent report summarised that NATO is ready for a future war. This loud conclusion was accompanied by a clarification that the alliance still needs to work to prepare for a protracted confrontation and a clash with Russia. Such inconsistent expert conclusions are clearly dictated by political expediency the desire to confirm the correctness of the chosen course to contain Moscow, but at the same time the need to mobilise the member states of the alliance to prepare for further efforts in the military sphere. They once again reinforce the logic of the game to increase the stakes.   Search for the “golden mean” In relation to the question in the title, the analysis shows that with a high probability the answer may be positive. In this regard, Russia faces the difficult task of containing escalation amid conditions of low receptivity of the West to the signals sent to it. Attempts to convey the seriousness of the situation are either brushed aside or interpreted as manifestations of Russian aggressiveness. In the face of such indoctrination, there is a danger of slipping into a similar exaltation, trying to force the enemy to abandon his adventurous line with even more risky demonstrations of determination. So far, the Russian leadership has managed to overcome these temptations. Of course, Western attempts to raise stakes must be responded to. At the same time, it is worth focusing the damage on the NATO member states themselves, and not just their proxies (this is where the emphasis should be on the notorious “decision-making centres”). Statements about the possible transfer of long-range weapons to US opponents, as well as the visit of Russian ships to Cuba, are logical steps in this regard. Perhaps the range of responses could also include the defeat of drones conducting reconnaissance for Ukraine over the Black Sea. Moreover, the latter circumstance legitimises the announcement of a direct ban on their flights in adjacent waters. Russian measures of deterrencecould also be complemented by holding manoeuvres in the Baltic, Mediterranean or North Atlantic together with other states that have earned the status of adversaries of the West. At the same time, the calculation of intimidating actions should be weighed against historical experience, which shows that the reaction to them is often bitterness, rather than concessions. This, in particular, calls into question the validity of the previously expressed proposal for nuclear strikes for demonstrative purposes. Such actions are more likely to lead to consequences opposite to those assumed by their instigators they will hasten, rather than delay, a direct military clash with NATO. Valdai Discussion Club As a Man Is, So Is His Company Igor A. Istomin The return of great power rivalries revives the almost forgotten practice of defensive alliances. As Russia adheres to the vision of a multipolar world, it should not abandon the crucial tool for managing security threats in this sort of international system. More

[Category: Valdai Papers]

— Trump and NATO: Global Perspectives on the 2024 NATO Summit and America

 

at 7/18/24 10:00pm

Leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) gathered in Washington, DC, on July 9–11 to mark the alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary and discuss security assistance for Ukraine, taking a more strategic approach to Russia, and other global challenges. Council of Councils experts react to the NATO commitments made at the summit for this CoC global perspective series, and the future of the alliance given the uncertainty of the upcoming U.S. election. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), is among them.   NATO’s Security Dilemma NATO faces two difficult dilemmas. The first is a choice between a closed and an open bloc. The second, which follows from the first, is a choice between being a global player acting for the sake of universal security and an armed group of countries that are united by similar ideas and interests but make up a clear minority on the planet. The summit in Washington makes it appear that NATO is trending toward the latter of both choices. That would recreate a classical Cold War style framework. At the same time, NATO keeps the clear intention to operate beyond its formal zone of responsibility. After the Cold War, NATO de facto proclaimed itself the source of European security (the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and then Russia were unhappy, but did not strongly oppose it). This implied that the bigger NATO was, the stronger the security, hence the maximum openness to expansion. But enlargement reached its limit when a major player in this part of the world—Russia—went to arms to protect itself from what it perceived was a growing threat from encirclement by NATO, which was supposed to include neighboring Ukraine. One can agree with the Russian argument or not, but the fact is that the expansion of the alliance did not lead to increased stability, but to a violent military conflict. On the eve of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia’s main demand was the following: let NATO officially refuse further expansion and close its doors. The demand was unequivocally rejected. The alliance still proclaims openness, although the consequences are now clearer. After the end of the Cold War, NATO claimed to be a global, not regional, player capable of carrying out security tasks in the interests of all. Now, NATO is extending its activities beyond its original area of responsibility, not as a universal guarantor, but as an instrument of a standoff. NATO’s value-based rationale automatically encourages conflict with countries of a different political and strategic culture inspired by other sets of values. Accordingly, NATO reproduces the original structure of the Cold War — the bloc confrontation based on ideological opposition. But contrary to that period, NATO’s adversary is not an opposing bloc, but a large number of completely different states with diverging goals and interests. Basically, they do not seek confrontation, but their own security and development over the value barriers. The NATO approach doesn’t serve this goal. NATO will remain an organization of the political West, aimed at its protection. But unanswered remains the question of the nature of this protection—whether it is unlimited expansion, as in the last thirty years, or a method of fixing its clear zone of responsibility. Depending on which option will prevail, all should primarily improve readiness for a hot or a cold war. Council of Councils Global Memos are briefs by the Council of Councils that gather opinions from global experts on major international developments. The BRICS Summit 2023: Seeking an Alternate World Order? Fyodor A. Lukyanov The BRICS will move toward the alter-West rather than the anti-West. The BRICS space can be developed as a tool for diversifying the world and moving away from Western domination toward a far more multifaceted scenario. It will be further enhanced and strengthened in the process, albeit a long process. More

[Category: Editor's Column]

— “Weapon Against Russia”: Fyodor Lukyanov on the West’s Ukraine Strategy and Putin’s Mistakes

 

at 7/17/24 10:00pm

Any crisis like the current one cant be resolved overnight. We understand the depth of the problem. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a minor part of the overall situation. The main part and the most important aspect is what was the casus belli from the perspective of the Russian leadership: it wasnt Ukraine, it was European and American perceptions of how European security should look. And this view emerged immediately after the end of the Cold War. Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs magazine, gave an interview to the Die Weltwoche weekly (Switzerland) WATCH THE VIDEO The interview is available via this link.   Moving With History? Fyodor A. Lukyanov On May 16-17, freshly re-inaugurated, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first state visit to China. With all sides having passed their points of no return, where is history heading? Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, gave an interview to Oksana Boyko, Worlds Apart. More

[Category: Interviews]

— Is Eurasia About to Get Its Own NATO?

 

at 7/14/24 10:00pm

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization could play an important role in a nascent security system that emphasizes total development. Both of the world’s current major conflicts – Ukraine and Palestine – are continuing with no end in sight. In the leading countries of the West, there are internal cataclysms that may significantly influence future behavior. Across the world, from Latin America and Africa to the Pacific, we see very lively processes signaling major shifts. No one doubts that the world is undergoing systemic restructuring. The question is whether the contours of a future order that will ensure a sufficient level of international sustainability are already emerging. In this context, this week’s meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) leaders is of particular interest. In particular, talk of an Eurasian security system, so to speak, is in the air. The SCO is unique. It is a full-fledged institution, i.e. a fairly formalized structure with its own bodies and rules (unlike, for example, the BRICS, the nature of which has not yet been clearly clarified). However, it is an institution that has emerged in an era when such associations have generally either not been formed or have proved to be opportunistic and short-lived (it is enough to recall the mass of acronyms that appeared and disappeared in the former USSR). The system of governance based on international organizations is a feature of the second half of the twentieth century, when a solid international framework was built. It was preserved after the Cold War, but its internal content changed. It quickly became apparent that the established institutions were not working in the same (relatively effective) way as before, because the global situation had changed. Does this mean that old organizations need to be replaced by new ones, or has this type of ordering of the international system simply lost its relevance? At the beginning of this century, many people tended to think the former. Yes, the old institutions had served their time, and new ones would emerge to perform different tasks, but organized in a similar way to the old ones. Over time, however, the approach began to shift towards the second. The world is so complex and diverse that it is simply impossible to fit it into stable and fixed forms. The interests of states are not necessarily contradictory but are rather very different, and their fulfillment requires flexible approaches. And flexibility does not mix well with the rigidity of classical institutions, especially when it comes to bloc structures bound by commitments and discipline. At some point, the optimal form of interstate organization began to appear as ad hoc groups of states that needed to solve a specific problem together. This was the beginning of the SCO. After the collapse of the USSR, the new Central Asian states and Russia had to resolve border issues with China. Thus was born the Shanghai Five. The problem was solved so successfully that it was decided to preserve and develop this successful format. Over the years, the forum has grown to include India, Pakistan and Iran, while Belarus will be attending this year’s event. The summits are usually attended by the leaders of other powers important to the Eurasian region, such as Turkey and the Persian Gulf monarchies. Enlargement adds solidity to an organization, but whether it increases efficiency is debatable. And not just because, for example, relations between China and India and between India and Pakistan are, to put it mildly, complicated. This is an obstacle, of course, but not the only one: the main thing is to find an agenda that requires a real joint effort and is of interest to all participants in an applied sense. This is difficult, given the diversity of SCO members. We should probably start by understanding Eurasia’s role in the world. The major Eurasian powers are now emerging as leaders in international economics and politics. But the natural summation of potential that is often made when talking about the SCO or BRICS is of little use. What is more important is that this vast area cannot be bypassed or ignored; all the processes taking place around the globe depend on it or are linked to it. It is not by chance that Eurasia is traditionally called ‘the core’. And belonging to it unites all the states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which determines both the opportunities and the risks. They are linked to the increased attention paid to Eurasia by powerful extra-regional players, which is not always for the good, to say the least. The idea of a Eurasian security system is in the air. China, the Central Asian countries, and India have approached it from different sides. Recently, the Russian president launched such an initiative. Eurasian security, unlike European security, is not a military-political phenomenon, but a model for the comprehensive development of the space and the realization of its enormous potential. The SCO has its shortcomings, but it is an ideal platform for formulating the principles of this great project. This article was first published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, translated and edited by the RT team. Putin Is Back for Another Six Years, This Is What His Foreign Policy Will Look Like Fyodor A. Lukyanov When he first took office, the Russian president was trying to integrate with the West, now the whole ball game has changed. More

[Category: Editor's Column]

— Russia And The World In Vladimir Putin’s Next Term

 

at 7/12/24 12:00am

How has Putin been a transformative force in Russias rise? What does Putins new term mean for Russias role in the world order? How is the Ukraine war likely to play out? What will Russias relationship with the Middle East look like going forward? Russia in Global Affairs Editor-in-Chief Fyodor Lukyanov spoke about that in Strategic Wisdom podcast with Andrew Jose. Listen to the podcast Слушайте Russia And The World In Vladimir Putins Next Term with Fyodor Lukyanov на Яндекс Музыке Russia And The World In Vladimir Putins Next Term with Fyodor Lukyanov by Andrew Jose Vladimir Putins next six years as President of Russia could significantly impact the global security environment Read on Substack   The podcast is also available via Yandex.Music and this link.   In this episode For this episode of Strategic Wisdom podcast, Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs and Research Professor at Moscows Higher School of Economics (HSE University), sat down with Andrew Jose to discuss how Putins fifth term as President of Russia will influence the countrys long-term strategy and Russia’s foreign policy. During the discussion, they looked at different questions many have regarding Putin and his new term. Strategic Wisdom with Andrew Jose “What has been discussed in Geneva is not about the world order, its rather about very practical things in European security.” Fyodor A. Lukyanov Russia in Global Affairs Editor-in-Chief Fyodor Lukyanov took part in Meduza's podcast The Naked Pravda on Russia's peacekeeping mission in Kazakhstan and security demands in Europe. More

[Category: Podcasts]

— “Nuclear escalation may open Pandora’s box, but it will also free the world from the 500-year-long Western yoke”

 

at 7/1/24 10:00pm

Sergei A. Karaganov, Professor Emeritus, Dr. hab. in History, Academic Supervisor of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs, Higher School of Economics, speaks in an exclusive interview with Ukraina.ru — What are your impressions from the discussion with Vladimir Putin on the nuclear issue at a SPIEF panel session? — Unfortunately, the time was limited and we could not discuss all topics, but I and I hope all of us got answers to many questions. As for the discussion [on the nuclear issue], I think it was quite productive. Vladimir Vladimirovich elaborated and clarified his position on several issues, specifically on the upcoming updating of the nuclear doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. We had provided relevant suggestions earlier. So, let’s wait and see. In any case, the dialogue was another step, very peaceful and low-cost, up the ladder of nuclear deterrence. We suggest calling it fear inspiring. Let’s see how the adversary will react. Hopefully, sooner or later―better sooner―it will crawl away.    —  You have written that global war can only be prevented through greater reliance on “nuclear deterrence-fear inspiring-sobering up.” You insist that this will require lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in our doctrine as soon as possible and convincing ourselves and our adversary that we are ready to launch multiple nuclear attacks against a number of European countries that act most aggressively in supporting Kiev. Could you elaborate on how this can work in practice? — First of all, it’s very good that we have finally come to understand one simple thing. The United States are a hundred times more vulnerable than we are in the use of any type of weapon, including nuclear ones. The President spoke about this. Therefore, the use of non-nuclear weapons by someone against American targets abroad is one of the stages of escalation. Incidentally, there are several more stages of escalation before this step is taken, if necessary. This will be translated into a specific policy one way or another. Secondly, I believe that the nuclear threshold will be lowered granting our president the right, not just formal but real, to order any retaliatory strikes if any weapon is used against Russia, is common sense. I repeat, I strongly hope that such amendments to our nuclear doctrine will be made. They are not only possible but even likely. The president mentioned it. — Theoretically, as some experts suggest, we could demonstratively detonate a bomb, for example, over the Arctic Ocean, without great risks for ourselves or people in other countries. Will this affect Ukraine’s resistance and the West’s aggression? — We are at war not with Ukraine and the unfortunate and stupefied Ukrainians, who have been thrown by their corrupt elites and their masters into the meat grinder. We are at war with the West. Of course, we will continue to strike at the Ukrainian army, because it is basically a mercenary army, but our main goal is to sober up the West and make it retreat strategically. The best way to do that is to give the West, at least the Americans, a chance to retreat without losing face. Otherwise, they will have to flee in shame or/and suffer huge losses. The Ukrainian people have put themselves in the position of cannon fodder in the conflict between the West and Russia. We feel sorry, of course, for our close relatives. They made a mistake just as Andriy Bulba once did. But he at least did that because of his love for a beautiful Polish woman. Now this is just a wild goose-chase after a lecherous old woman with a brilliant past in pursuit of her wealth, which is rapidly diminishing. It’s their trouble but also their fault. I hope that the situation will change, the sooner the better. The faster the Kiev junta is crushed, the better it will be for future generations and those who live in Ukraine today. — So, do you think Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons against NATO or is it not? Or we just won’t dare? — I think we need to watch the situation and NATO’s actions for another year or two. If the bloc and its mercenaries in Kiev keep throwing new hundreds of thousands of people into this meat grinder and supplying them with new weapons, then we will have to move faster up the escalation-deterrence ladder. In this case we might be forced to deliver nuclear group strikes on countries that are helping them. But naturally, there will be other preliminary steps first, including, perhaps non-nuclear strikes. I hope, I pray, I work so that it never comes to a nuclear strike, and our distraught Western neighbors sober up, because the use of nuclear weapons entails heavy moral damage, including to ourselves, even if justified and even advantageous from a strategic point of view. Besides, stepping over the nuclear threshold can open Pandora’s box for the world. A Difficult but Necessary Decision Sergei A. Karaganov Russia and its leadership seem to be facing a difficult choice. It becomes increasingly clear that a clash with the West cannot end even if we win a partial or even a crushing victory in Ukraine. More — America and the Soviet Union (and then Russia) concluded a number of treaties on the limitation of strategic and offensive weapons. Looking back from today, how effective were they? — They are gone. They were useful from a political point of view but their usefulness was limited from a military-technical point of view in that they saved little and, on the contrary, often actively spurred the arms race in some areas. Politically, these agreements calmed people down and made the situation more predictable. But when the Americans felt that they were losing their global leadership, they decided to dump all restrictions in the hope of restoring military superiority, the foundation upon which the West’s dominance in other areas had rested for five centuries, and most importantly the possibility to syphon off world wealth. But it didn’t work out, and it won’t. Russia’s hypersonic, Poseidon and other systems have ruined these hopes. They abandoned the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles [the treaty between the USSR and the USA, signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan on 8 December, 1987 during a Soviet-American summit in Washington]. They unilaterally renounced the Russia-NATO Founding Act, the ABM Treaty, and so on. Instead they have got a war that they will lose either in disgrace or otherwise. It’s regrettable that we will have to sacrifice our men for that However we will ensure our security and sovereignty, and we will also free the world from the 500-year-long Western yoke. I hope we will stop at nothing to make sure that the threat of war never comes from Europe again. Europe is the spawn of evil for the whole world. This is where both world wars started, during the life of one generation, the sin, which has long been forgotten by the Europeans, who are also apparently losing their mind on top of it all. Europe’s current ruling circles bring the feeling of disgust and disdain. Let’s hope new ones will come to take their place. — European countries are debating whether or not to allow Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike inside “old” Russia. Elections to the European Parliament have taken place. Is there any hope that the EU unity in supporting Ukraine will falter? — No. Nothing will change there in the foreseeable future. This is quite obvious. The European elites forgot God first. Then they forgot the fruits of the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason. We will have to revive their belief in hell but hopefully without suffering moral losses because innocent people will die as well. — You have pointed out in your writings that the high nuclear threshold clears the way for the use of cyber weapons, biological and genetic weapons. How soon will we have to prepare for such conflicts? — Such conflicts are already brewing and taking place in all areas. Cyber and biological weapons are becoming more effective. Have you noticed how much the world is afraid of the next pandemic? Fears are being deliberately whipped up. A new pandemic is being prepared, although the previous one turned out to be double-edged. But the main thing is different. If we block the theoretical possibility of victory in a possible war, then there will most likely be none. It is pointless to try to build up the potential of biological, cyber or conventional weapons, if you know that you will face complete destruction by nuclear weapons in return. Nuclear weapons have a large number of functions, and one of them is to block a conventional and other non-nuclear arms race. We have weakened this function because of our rather lightweight and carefree doctrine. But it has also been weakened by objective factors. When the nuclear threshold is lowered, a potential adversary will begin to understand that a conventional arms race cannot be won. In other words, you win a conventional arms race but get a nuclear strike. So it makes “race” useless. — The United States intends to make its nuclear program more aggressive — Let them upgrade it and see where they will get with it. In general, we are interested in establishing a multilateral nuclear deterrence system in the world. So I am personally not worried by the emergence of new nuclear powers and the strengthening of old ones simply because reliance on people’s reason doesn’t work. There must be fear. Conflict in Ukraine and Nuclear Weapons Dmitry V. Trenin The “nuclear bullet” must necessarily and demonstratively be put into the “revolver drum” the U.S. leadership is recklessly playing with. To paraphrase a now-deceased American statesman, we can say: Why do we need nuclear weapons if we refuse to use them in the face of an existential threat? There is no need to scare anyone verbally. It is necessary to prepare for a possible use practically. More — Finland suggests blocking the Baltic Sea for Russian tankers. Do you think the Baltic can become the arena of a new war? — This is a pure casus belli―the reason to start a war. One can only imagine what will happen to poor Denmark or Sweden if they try to block our entrance to the Baltic Sea. They will most likely cease to exist. But I do hope that, despite all the madness that has engulfed modern European elites, it will not come to that. — What, in your opinion, should be a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian issue that will not be disgraceful for the United States to accept and that will fully meet our interests? — I think that the best option for the United States would be to refuse to further finance the Kiev junta due to, for example, fiscal, tax, or financial restrictions. After that, we will be able to achieve our goals with fewer losses. Eastern, central, and southern Ukraine (that is, the original Russian lands) will return to Russia. The rest will become a fully demilitarized and correct state. Some parts may go to Poland, Hungary, and Romania. — Will our victory in Ukraine help solve fundamental issues? Or are we heading for a real world war as the only way to get out of the crisis, and whoever wins, will write new rules? — The Ukrainian issue is just one of the symptoms. Unfortunately, we are heading for a real world war, a full-blown war. The foundation of the old world system is bulging at the seams, and conflicts will break out. It is necessary to block the way leading to such a war. Frictions will always arise between new and old powers over climate or water, for example. New large-scale migration processes will most likely begin, and so on. That is why I dared to say in an interview with Vladimir Vladimirovich that he is faced with the task of not only winning the war and saving Russia but also saving the humanity. This is a more difficult task than the one he and we faced 25 years ago. — In your article “The Age of Wars? Article Two. What Is to be Done?” you say that the UN is “a dying breed, saddled with the Western apparatus and therefore unreformable.” Well, let it remain. But we need to build parallel structures. How do you see the prototype of the future UN? Will we be able to use it to contain the West? — I think we should build parallel systems by expanding BRICS and the SCO, developing their interaction with ASEAN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, Latin American Mercosur, etc. It is possible and necessary to create food funds within BRICS in order to support Africa or within the SCO to support Asian countries. The SCO and/or BRICS could create an organization to prevent and respond to man-made and natural disasters. There is no such organization yet. It is quite easy to do that. Joining forces and preparing for this work is all it takes. Natural and man-made disasters will inevitably grow in number. Therefore, by creating such an organization we will be able to significantly improve the situation of all countries, including the poor ones, and the lives of billions of people. There are five or six more areas, including economic ones, where parallel structures should be created. Let me say this again: there is no need to disband the UN, because this is so far the only organization in the world where all states are represented. Someday, in 20-30 years from now, the West will calm down perhaps and take a modest but worthy place in the world system. And then I would not rule out the UN’s renewal. After all, global problems (climate change, environmental pollution, food and drinking water shortage, forest degradation) are multiplying, but there are no solutions yet. Moreover, the climate initiatives proposed by the West are no more than an attempt to solve the problem at the expense of developing countries. Suffice it to say that they are trying to shift the cost of combating climate change and carbon dioxide emissions to producing countries (which are mainly developing countries) but not to consumers, the main, “fat,” of whom are in the West. — You said that the Special Military Operation (SMO) had several implicit goals. This is not only a war against the West for security and against NATO’s expansion. We are rebuilding Russian society and reviving it spiritually, and we are also getting rid of pro-Western elements in our elites. How much has society changed amid the SMO? —  Yes. Society is changing very quickly. I am sure that the SMO had undeclared goals, and they are being reached. Society has become more patriotic, more united. The traitors have fled not as a result of repression but of their own free will, which is enjoyable. Good riddance. People’s mentality is changing. They begin to understand that they often lived and believed in illusions. We are moving away from one-sided Westernism, which has long become a sign of intellectual squalidness and backwardness. We are becoming who we should be―ourselves. We are a great northern Eurasian multicultural power and civilization open to the world. That’s who we are―Russian people in the broad sense of the word. Naturally, not everyone is ready for this, and there is still some resistance in society. But I think we should not force people as this is an educational process. It is very important that we are getting rid of one-sided and meaningless economic dependence on the West. Previously, we received very expensive Western goods in exchange for our natural resources. Now less expensive Asian products are taking this niche. But what is even more important is that mechanical engineering is reviving due to the growth of the military-industrial complex, and engineers and skilled workers are in demand again; they are the real elite of the country. Also, by drawing the West’s fire upon ourselves, we are doing away with the comprador bourgeoisie and the intellectual stratum serving it. Compradors are a contemptuous name: this is how Portuguese colonialists called tradesmen in Southeast Asia who served them. Our class of tradesmen was huge because of unsuccessful reforms. Now Russia is getting rid of it with the West’s hands as it is knocking out our people and their property abroad. Capital outflow is decreasing sharply. I think such an outflow should be banned for some time altogether. But this is the next step to take.   The interview was originally published in Russian on Ukraina.ru website (“Russia Today”) on June 21, 2024. URL: https://ukraina.ru/20240621/1055753580.html. American Globalism Is a Disease. Meet the Doctor Sergei A. Karaganov Why is even speaking of negotiations with Ukraine dangerous for us? Who is better―Trump or Biden? Why is Europe worse than America? What are the real goals of the special military operation (SMO)? How can the use of nuclear weapons save the world from World War III? Sergei Karaganov speaks with Argumenty Nedeli Editor-in-Chief Andrei Uglanov on this and many other topics. More

[Category: Interviews]

— Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Hahn, G.M., 2024. Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 10–30. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-3-10-30   Tsymbursky’s Cycles Theory According to Tsymbursky, the cycles in Russian-Western relations have consisted of five “moves” or stages. Move A sees Russia becoming a second-tier or “reserve” ally, the strategic rear for one of two or more European geopolitical contestants or groupings of states. Russia might change sides but remains in a secondary role. Move B results from failures in Russia’s European involvement, leading to an invasion of Russia by Western forces, threatening its sovereignty, even survival. Move B comes in one of two forms: (1) the invasion by a major Western power with hegemony in Europe that seeks to define or terminate Russia’s role in European politics, or (2) two or more sides in the European conflict extend the dispute into Russia, with each trying “to acquire its own allies and agents in (Russian) political and military circles.” Move C begins with Russians overcoming this “crisis” and going on the offensive. Striving to “catch the aggressor in his lair,” Russians cross through Eastern Europe to invade and seize or attempt to seize as a protectorate some territory of the European “Roman or Germanic states.” Russia then uses this in order to influence—“present its own project for”—Europe’s internal development. In Move D, the West consolidates its forces and pushes the Russians back to, or even behind, the Baltic-Black Sea line dividing it from its eastern Other. Russia’s political influence in Europe falls “catastrophically,” and a buffer zone isolates “Asiatic Russia” in the barbarian East where it “rightfully belongs.” The cycle-ending Move E is what Tsymbursky calls the “Eurasian intermedia” or Eurasian interval. Russia turns its energies east and south, the “enormous spaces from the Caspian Sea to the Pacific Ocean, encompassing both the entire classical heartland and Far Eastern Primorye.” It “builds itself in this large expanse outside of the Western world, though finding a certain correlation with this world.” But even in this period of retreat and isolation from the West, Russia continues referencing the West as its standard, even goal and destiny. The attention of Russia’s strategists in this period to the regions of the East and South offers opportunities for exerting indirect strategic pressure on Euro-Atlantic governments and societies. This phase ends when another opportunity arises for Russia to come forward as an ally of one of the Western powers contending for European supremacy, and a new five-move cycle begins (Tsymbursky, 2016, pp. 73-77). Tsymbursky’s three cycles entail the periods of 1726-1906, 1907-1939, and 1939-early 21st century (Tsymbursky, 2016, pp. 77-88). Cycle 1 stretches from the period after the Napoleonic Wars ending in 1906 after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. The second cycle extends from 1907 and the intensification of geopolitics that ended in World War I to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939. The third cycle encompassed the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War through the 20th century’s end to post-Soviet Russia.   The Domestic Component of Russian-Western Relations’ Historical-Relational Cycles Tsymbursky’s cycles regard only the strategic relationship between Russia and the West. Bringing in Russia’s domestic affairs into the delineation of Russian-Western historical-relational cycles, my cycles naturally configure somewhat differently. In my most recent book, The Russian Dilemma: Security, Vigilance, and Relations with the West from Ivan III to Putin, I argued that there are shifts between more traditionalist periods, in which Russian political and strategic culture emphasize political solidarity, struggle against pluralism and dissent, more authoritarian systems of rule, and more experimental periods allowing for pluralism, system liberalization, and Westernization, and that these cycles approximate to a considerable degree but do not replicate the shifts between the cycles and their internal ‘moves’ or phases in relations with the West proposed by Tsymbursky (Hahn, 2021). It is important that an examination of the development of Russia in relation to the West can take into account both Russians’ complex processing of Western influences on, as well as Russia’s processing of Western policies towards the Russian state, people, and culture. With the incorporation of the internal dynamics of relations with the West—including colluders with Western powers and other forms of Western influence inside Russia as well the perception of, and political reaction to these on the part of the leadership—any cycle contending to describe Russia’s overall ‘relationship’ with the West must include these aspects of the relationship. Shifts from one orientation to another also depend on whether Western actions respect or challenge Russians’ sense of honor abroad and how they impact the struggle between competing schools of thought at home (Tsygankov, 2012, pp. 2-4, 264-265). The elite’s interpretation of Russia’s honor and thus its interests in any given period is a function of foreign actions’ impact on Russian domestic cultural developments and political struggles in defining Russian honor, interests, and then policy. Russia’s policy produces foreign responses, which in turn again re-shape Russia’s honor and interest perceptions and policy, and the cycle begins anew (Tsygankov, 2012, pp. 222-224, 259). Russian elites have a fundamental requirement for the maintenance of Russia’s honor abroad and their own at home: security from threats to the homeland emanating from abroad and political destabilization from within. This is not a unique state-society contract. What is unique is that over the centuries the main threat to both Russia’s external security and internal stability, in fact, came and so began to be perceived in Russia as emanating from the West. Thus, we should be asking, among other questions, whether the Russian norm of honor might have developed in response to the Western offence of that honor by posing external and internal threats to its national sovereignty and cultural identity. Russia’s honor norm is also a direct function of the historical Western threat to its “ontological security.” Mitzen defined ontological security as “security not of the body but of the self, the subjective sense of who one is, which enables and motivates action and choice” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 344; Steele, 2008). It refers to “the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in order to realize a sense of agency” (Mitzen, 2006, p. 342). In other words, ontological security for states is the imperative to preserve the integrity of the country’s national culture and identity since these form the prism through which the state will define its national interests and when the malleable undermine the state’s purposefulness in foreign affairs. Zarakol focused on the desire to protect the integrity but also the continuity of the country’s identity, highlighting the consequences of the stigma of not having one’s identity affirmed by other states, perhaps being designated an uncivilized, backward, or rogue state for not fully adhering to Western-defined international and domestic norms. The “internalization of a foreign worldview” could have a negative effect on a state’s ontological security: “the incorporation of the modern worldview created a rupture in the traditionally self-centered worldviews of agrarian empires and forced them to re-articulate their new state identities around the anxiety of ‘demonstrable’ inferiority and the goal of catching up to the West by following its ‘standards’” (Zarakol, 2011, p. 62). Russia’s complex, often catastrophic relations with the West or some Western states brought or heightened, respectively, concerns about not only the country’s military and political security but also its ontological security. As domestic unity, tranquility, and often stability might be ruptured by Westernization with encouragement from elements in the West, so too would the country’s sense of possessing an integral culture and self-identity. The West has not only influenced Russia but sought to redefine Russia’s culture and identity in its own image, often purely for purposes of self-aggrandizement. When the West or elements within it have grown sufficiently powerful and frustrated with Russia’s efforts to become Western and submit to not just Western values, norms, and institutional practices but its geopolitical ambitions as well, Westerners have meddled and intervened politically and even militarily. Thus, Russia’s relations with its Other have gone through repeating cycles of emulative Westernization, Western intervention, Russian rebuff to the intervention, and Russia’s revival of traditional values, norms and practices with limited survival of elements borrowed from the more advanced, liberal Western cultural strains. Most importantly, this repeating cycle reinforces the Russian security norm of special vigilance against its Western foes, domestic Westernizers, and collusion between them, as it has been precisely one or more of these threats’ actualization that put Russian culture, identity, and sovereignty in danger. During Westernizing and liberalizing displacements, security vigilance as a dominant cultural value or norm tends to become more recessive. Western ideas are no longer regarded as manifestations of dissent or opposition, since dislocation of some Russian values by European ones is encouraged by the regime and occurs with some regularity. Initially at least, the West welcomes the new policy, obviating the need for nudging, pressuring or intervening into Russia in order to “civilize” it. The Russian regime’s desire to borrow from the West requires comity in relations with it. Therefore, anti-Western propaganda campaigns, witch hunts for colluders, and foreign policy tensions are unnecessary and inexpedient. But once the West intervenes politically or invades militarily, the security vigilance value is reactivated and returns as a dominant strain in Russia’s political and strategic cultures—a security vigilance norm or culture in and of itself. This strain maintains dominant status along with the return to more traditional domestic governance patterns and more contentious relations with the West until the next round of Westernizing displacement. My four Russo-Western ‘relational cycles’ are: (I) 1505-1630 from Ivan III’s establishment of the Principality of Moscow, through the Time of Troubles to the establishment and consolidation of the Romanov dynasty in 1613-1630; (II) 1630-1825 from Mikhail I’s restorative recovery (1613-1630) to Nicholas I’s defeat of the Decembrist revolt and movement; (III) 1826-1922 from Nicholas I’s reign to the end of the Russian Civil War, marking the consolidation of Bolshevik rule); and (IV) from 1922 to approximately 2008.[1] With Putin’s third term (2012-2018) or the reincorporation of Crimea in 2014, a new cycle, Cycle V, in Russo-Western relations began. I delineate four phases (moves) in each of the first four cycles in the history of Russian-Western relations. Phase 1 begins with the establishment or re-establishment of the traditional or a neo-traditional Russian system, including authoritarianism of one sort and degree or another, state patrimonialism, Russian traditional cultural values: Christian or some other communalist and universalist ‘orthodoxy,’ Russian exceptionalism in the form of messianism, and suspicion or antagonism towards the West. Phase 2 consists of a Westernization process, usually liberal, that challenges one or more aspect of the traditional Russian system. Phase 3 sees a Western military invasion or other operational measures—perceived by Russia as aggressive—in order to either further Russia’s Westernization process, subvert Russian stability and sovereignty, and/or seize, subsume or otherwise destroy Russia, the Russian nation, or Russian civilization. Phase 4 ends the cycle. Russian undertakes military counteroffensive and/or political and other countermeasures to defeat Western aggressive measures. Russia recovers, and its systems and ‘traditional,’ usually dominant security-vigilance strategic culture and patrimonial authoritarian political culture are restored and consolidated in the next cycle’s Phase 1. The “new” Russian authoritarian system is akin to, and to one extent or another shaped by the previous pre-liberalized, pre-Westernized traditionalist status quo. The second variation of Tsymbursky’s Move B is most important, indeed pivotal, in particular regarding the anti-Russian Western powers’ attempt “to acquire their own allies and agents in (Russian) political and military circles” (Tsymbursky, 2016, p. 75). It is even more central to my cycles, given their greater inclusion of Russian domestic affairs and Western endeavors to shape them in the service of broader goals. Western attempts to acquire colluders can be confirmed for each of Tsymbursky’s strategic cycles. For example, in the first cycle (1726-1906), we find Napoleon supporting the Poles’ independence from St. Petersburg, and the Western powers in the Crimean War supporting the separation of the Caucasus from Russia. In the second cycle (1907-1939), the Germans financially and otherwise backed the Bolsheviks in order to weaken or terminate Russia’s role in World War I. In the third cycle, the West supported Soviet dissidents. In the post-Soviet period, there has been episodic support for Chechen separatists and pro-Western, pro-democracy opposition in Russia and its neighbors. These episodes of foreign antagonism and internal subversion reinforce cultural values learned from episodes reaching at least as far back as the beginning of the 17th century and the Vatican-inspired and Poland-organized effort to invade Russia, establish a puppet regime in Moscow, and Catholicize the country under False Dmitry. The ensuing, “rich” history of similar events has constructed and reinforced among Russians a leery or at least ambivalent attitude towards, and obsessive-compulsive focus on the West. In my relational cycles too, Western actors are shown to have attempted ‘to acquire their own allies and agents in Russia.’ In three of four of my cycles, the West was able to acquire colluders to help in its efforts to undermine Russia’s political stability, state sovereignty, territorial integrity and/or its very survival as a state and, in the case of the Nazi invasion, Russians and other Slavs as a ‘race.’ In the second cycle, although the West found no direct colluders, the Decembrists functioned as indirect or accidental colluders in attempting to begin a pro-democratic revolution from above by military putsch. Moreover, in each cycle’s second Westernizing phase there is a decline in the dominance of the security norm of vigilance against external and internal threats emanating from the West into a recessive strand. This cultural strain is reactivated during the third and fourth phases. Its re-consolidation as a dominant strain marks Russia’s return to traditionalism to be consolidated in the early stages of the next relational cycle. In each of my four cycles, periods of Westernization in Russia are seen to be followed by military advancement against Russian territory either by direct or indirect invasion intended to transform fundamentally the Russian state and society or by expansion of a powerful military alliance to Russian borders in tandem with such demands for change in Russia and, as Tsymbursky phrased it, Western attempts “to acquire their own allies and agents in (Russian) political and military circles” in order to facilitate that change. In each of the cycles, Western invasion or military encroachment plays a major, if not the major role in aborting Russian Westernizing and liberalizing reforms.   CYCLE I: 1505-1630 Cycle I began from the ‘gathering in’ of numerous Russian principalities by the Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan III or the Great, in the late 15th century. With a national culture only just emerging, the national security political and strategic values of vigilance against foreign military threats and domestic dissidents, respectively, are also just being formed, but their embryos lie in the growing aversion to the Catholic Church and Poles and the pre-Smuta destruction of religious dissidents like the strigolniki, Judaizers, and non-possessors. These earlier ontological security threats were a prelude to Cycle I, if not part of it, and were indirectly tied to external Western threats, having been born in, influenced by, or having come to Russia from the West, in particular Poland-Lithuania. These values become clear to see as a result of the Smuta’s Poles and False Dmitry as important symbols of the threat from the West in Russian culture in later periods of its history. We can designate Muscovite Rus’ as it existed as of Ivan III’s death in 1505 as the beginning of Cycle I, with the formation by then of a sui generis Russian condition, emerging national culture rooted in Orthodox Christianity, and authoritarian state. Cycle I’s second phase begins with Godunov’s 1598-1603 Westernizing reforms. Those reforms are followed by the third phase with the Vatican-supported and Polish-organized invasion of Russia in 1604 by a mercenary Polish-Cossack force headed by the false pretender to the throne, the apparently murdered Dmitry Ivanovich, Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s son. False Dmitry gathers Russian, at first largely peasant support, then boyar support and marches to Moscow, taking the throne. This war, Dmitry’s assassination in 1606, and the emergence of new False Dmitry prolongs this period of direct foreign meddling and invasion, sparking civil war, social upheaval, and famine—the Smuta. In the process, the Poles seize Moscow, as chaos and various Cossack bands rule the roost outside of Moscow. Cycle I’s fourth phase begins in 1611 when Russians re-group, and the 1612 insurgency rises up, which eventually expels the Poles from Moscow and subdues the Cossack bands and later Polish expeditions by the 1620. A broad-based land assembly, zemskii sobor, elects Mikhail Romanov, the new Tsar, in 1613, establishing the Romanov dynasty and eventually bringing the end to Cycle I and the Smuta. As a result of the Smuta, anti-Westernism and xenophobia, particularly focused on Poland and Poles, developed as part of the growing association between Western military threats and internal division, opposition, and dissent. Things Polish, including icons of the Time of Troubles, emerged as symbols of evil and vice. Marina Mniszech became a synonym for “witch,” and the Polish mazurka danced at the wedding of Dmitry and Marina in the Kremlin represented the “decadent foreigner” in Mikhail Glinka’s opera Life for the Tsar set in the Smuta (Billington, 1970, p. 106). A firm belief emerged among Russian elites and over time in much of society as well in a deep connection between internal dissent and foreign threats became an important strain in Russia’s political and strategic culture. Internal division and therefore opposition and dissent as well came to be seen as the handmaiden of foreign designs on the Russian state and had to be controlled. Klyuchevsky’s quote, the most cited in Russian historiography regarding the Smuta, reflected and provided further cache to the message: “The Smuta, having fed on the antagonism of the land’s social classes, was put to an end by a struggle of all the land with the alien forces which had been interfering in the internal strife” (Klyuchevsky, 1993, p. 310).   CYCLE II: 1630-1825 Cycle II’s first phase can be considered to have begun from Tsar Mikhail I’s reign (1613-1645) or alternatively by circa 1630 when much of the pre-Smuta order had been restored. The second phase is a long period of deepening Westernization which begins under Mikhail’s successor and son, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the ‘Quiet Tsar.’ He allowed a creeping Westernization to seep into Moscow, the Kremlin, his court, and even his family. This Westernization process is systematized, institutionalized, and coercively enforced by Alexei’s son, Peter the Great, and continues through the reign of Catherine the Great in the late 18th century (which includes several Western involvements in Russian palace coups) and the first half of Alexander I’s reign. The reign of Peter the Great brings Russia and the West together in both foreign relations and Russia’s internal development culturally, politically, administratively, socially, and economically. In foreign affairs, Peter the Great’s foreign policy overturned the old European order in which Russia was an object—the target of Vatican, Polish and other Europeans’ designs. Petrine and especially post-Petrine Russia was now a subject—a player and a major one—in European geopolitics beginning a repeating cycle of alliance followed by alienation in Western-Russian relations. Under Peter, Russia’s relations with the West were already becoming an entangled web of contradictions and ambiguity. Many would begin counseling the strictest vigilance against the West and Westernization, questioning the advisability of borrowing in such large-scale fashion from your foreign foes. Russia’s first major diplomatic play in Europe—the creation of a European alliance to fight the main threat to Europe’s Christian civilization at the time—was rejected by Europeans. Instead of a grand alliance against the Porte, Europeans sought to commandeer Russia for war against other Europeans. Paraphrasing Platonov: “Peter brought with him to Europe the idea of running the Turks out of Europe but returned from Europe with the idea of a struggle with Sweden for the Baltic Sea” (Platonov, 1993, p. 493). This presaged ‘Move A’ in Tsymbursky’s cycles of Russo-Western strategic relations, in which one European force recruits Russia as a junior partner to fight other Europeans. It also might be a source of what Morozov concludes is a Russian tendency to divide good and bad, ‘true’ and ‘false’ Europes, differentiated in terms of Moscow’s relations with European powers (Morozov, 2009, pp. 277-294, 375, 446-447). For the first time in Russian history, we meet the curious contradiction in which Russia simultaneously is both Westernizing and at war with a Western power. Peter’s travels to the West inspired his reforms but also his war against European power Sweden. Ironically, just as Peter was waging war against Sweden to some extent on behalf of other Western powers, he was adopting Sweden’s organizational system of kollegii for administration in the Russian state in addition to other Western institutions such as the burgmisterskie palaty. Peter’s war with Sweden contradicted his accommodation with Protestants at home, where his ‘right hand’ in religious affairs was Protestant-influenced Feofan Prokopovich, and the Holy Synod granted Orthodox Christians the right to marry Protestants (and Catholics). At the same time, as anti-Catholicism was growing, Peter allied with, and did the bidding of Catholic Poland against Sweden. From Peter forward some Russians favored power alliances with one or another Western faction. Others questioned whether Russia should ally with any European faction at all. Deep division over the menu of domestic and foreign policy choices would forever shape the structure of internal political action in Russia. The Petrine, Russian Enlightenment century following Peter’s death in 1725 is marked by expanding Westernization and growing Russian involvement in the European geopolitical game of conflict, alliances, and war. Consequently, Russia becomes the target of Western machinations to intervene and direct Russia’s domestic politics through a mix of Westernizing influences and participation in Russian power struggles and palace coups. Weakening Western influence involved Western-Russian collusion, with Peter the Great’s ontological ‘collusion’ having given way to outright collusion with Westerners by Russia’s German and pro-German empresses. In the century after Peter’s death, Western powers intervened in the court intrigues and found willing Russian takers during Anna Ioannovna’s succession of Peter II in 1730 and provided subsidies and other assistance for three palace coups: Elizabeth I’s succession of Ivan VI in 1742, Catherine the Great’s coup that left her husband and Elizabeth’s nephew Peter III dead; and Alexander I’s coup that left his father, Paul I, dead (Gordin, 1994, p. 320; Pavlenko, 2018, pp. 28-29).[2] The 18th century of guards’ coups and Western collusion with the plotters, capped off by the guard officers-led Decembrist revolt, would lead to a revival of the security vigilance norm in strength under the Nicholaevan bureaucratic-police state. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 begins Cycle II’s third phase, which lasts through Russia’s expulsion of Napoleon’s army from Russia and the Decembrist revolt by Russian officers, who had liberated Europe from Napoleon, smelled the free air in the West, and returned home as de facto, though certainly not actual, ‘colluders’ with the West—ontological colluders assisting not specific Western actors as agents but conduits of Western culture and systems threatening the Russian autocratic tradition. Cycle II’s fourth phase sees Nicholas I’s crushing the Decembrist revolt and the trial, exile and execution of the Decembrists. This was followed by a retrenchment against the Alexandrian Westernized liberalism and the re-consolidation of the traditionalist autocratic order, now symbolized by colluders such as Hetman Mazepa, who went over to the Swedes in the Great Northern War, and Tsarevich Alexei, who turned to the Holy Roman Empire, the invading European Grand Army and its promoter of ‘liberty, equality, and brotherhood’ Napoleon, and the Decembrists all became eternal symbols of the Western external and internal threat that drives Russo-Western historical-relational cycles.   CYCLE III: 1826-1922 In Cycle III, the legacy of Napoleon’s invasion, Western influence on the Decembrists, and suspicions of Western involvement in their failed coup laid the foundation for worsening relations with much of the West. The cruelty of executions, lashings and exiles gives birth to Nicholas I’s era of the gendarme state. Nicholas I reconstituted a neo-traditionalist Russia in the form of a modern bureaucratic police state of the kind Napoleon had pioneered and Russia’s European allies, Prussia and Austria-Hungary, had adopted. Anti-Westernism and anti-liberalism were increasingly institutionalized in the new official state ideology, Official Nationality, based on the anti-liberal and anti-Western formula: Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality. Francophobia on the tsar’s part and in the secret police accompanied the Official Nationality. The anti-Western retrenchment during his reign defined much of the cycle’s first phase. Nicholas suspected that the Decembrists had been working with Western embassies in St. Petersburg and ordered investigators to pursue the question during the interrogations of the arrested coup plotters. Revolution and reform were postponed in Nicholaevan Russia, but another war with Europeans was not. The Russian-led and -enforced Concert of Europe initially strengthened St. Petersburg’s relations with the ‘Other’ of old traditionalist monarchical Europe, but Russia found itself increasingly alienated from the other ‘Other,’ the emerging new Europe represented by democratic-nationalist revolutions Russia was obliged to suppress under the Concert’s Holy Alliance. Soon, the Holy Alliance became weakened and dissolved, and geopolitical competition intensified in Europe in which Russia was now a leading power. The Crimean War that resulted would prompt another phase of Russian Westernization under Nicholas I’s son and successor,  ‘Tsar-Liberator’ Alexander II. Alexander’s Westernization and liberalization under the Great Reforms, including the emancipation of the serfs, mark Cycle III’s Phase 2. Westernization proceeds much more slowly under Alexander’s successors Alexander III and Nicholas II. Westernization continues in separate, non-political spheres, above all, in industrial and state capitalist development and the socialist and anarchist radicalization of the intelligentsia, youth, and emerging working class. The European philosophical roots of Russian socialism and anarchism are striking. Cycle III’s Phase 3, sees the West begin to protect and even support Russian revolutionaries in exile and at home. The onset of World War I, in sparking which Russia plays a secondary role compared with Germany and Austro-Hungary, marks the next Western military intervention into Russia. The German government’s financing of Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks and the intervention by Western troops in Russia’s Civil War continues the pattern of Westerners partnering with Russian colluders to undermine Russian sovereignty. Neither World War I, German support for the Bolsheviks and other radicals, nor the Western intervention in the Civil War were aimed at Russia’s Westernization per se, but rather were the strategic goal of one or another Western party to the war to either terminate or prolong Russia’s prosecution of the war. With the October coup and the Civil War’s start, Cycle III’s Phase 4 begins. The Bolshevik Red Army’s march to victory over the Tsarist ‘White’ army and Lenin’s consolidation of power against competing revolutionaries lead to a new anomalously autocratic ‘status quo’ under the steel-fisted rule of Soviet commissars of Cycle IV.   CYCLE IV: 1922-2012 Cycle IV begins with Stalin’s gradual rise to power starting  with his assumption of the general secretaryship in 1922 and recovery from the 1917 revolution and wars beginning with NEP in 1921. Russian traditionalism devolves into communist totalitarian overdrive. The Soviet era saw a vigorous resurgence to cultural dominance of security vigilance hyper-focused on Western external and internal threats as never before, after its decline into recession, beginning with the Tsar-Liberator’s Westernizing Great Reforms and ending in World War I to some degree, with Russia allied with the Entente. The commissars supplemented the security vigilance culture with class content and intensified and instrumentalized it to a degree unknown under the tsars in the form of mass prosecution, blatantly false charges against supposed colluders, and mass terror. An anomaly is an invasion from the West by Nazi Germany with no preceding liberalization. To the contrary, Hitler’s Wehrmacht comes in the wake of Stalin’s Great Terror—the apex of high Stalinism. Cycle IV’s Phase 1 continues after 1945 with the full restoration of the Stalinist regime’s sovereignty over the USSR and establishment of socialism in some East European countries, the onset of the Cold War with the West abroad, and an attempt to re-start terror at home, which is aborted by Stalin’s death. Cycle IV’s Westernizing Phase 2 can be demarcated from Khrushchev’s thaw evolving from political and cultural liberalization, which is rolled back, into the consumerization, embourgeoisement, and détente of the Brezhnev era. The robustness of the security vigilance value and its manifestation in policy declines in the post-Stalin era beginning with the thaw, but it remained a dominant strain of Soviet political and strategic culture as demonstrated by the persecution of Soviet dissidents until the perestroika era. Full-blown Westernization blossoms fully with Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. Phase 2 intensified in 1986-1987 with the spread of glasnost, the rise of de-Stalinization, and minor economic and political reforms, all of which deepened with full-fledged perestroika in 1988-1991 and more so in the 1990s after the Soviet collapse. In this period, the security vigilance value collapsed into recession, fully abandoned by the top leadership and forgotten by most of the public in lieu of the old party-state agitprop. Cycle IV’s Phase 2 lasts at most two decades, 1987-2008 approximately. Yeltsin’s subsequent revolution from above in 1990-1991 through the mid-1990s marks the high point of Phase 2. Throughout this phase the West again found a host of domestic allies who pushed for greater reforms, nationalist separatism in the Baltic and other republics, all of this ending in institutional chaos and breakdown and the collapse of the Soviet regime and state. As Yeltsin’s revolution from above began to meet the challenges of political and especially economic transition in the early 1990s, the West offered little in the way of assistance and instead embarked on discussion and eventually implementation of the expansion of NATO, in violation of promises made to Gorbachev after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and during the process of German reunification that world history’s most powerful military alliance would “not expand one inch” beyond reunified Germany. Cycle IV’s Phase 3 began not with military invasion, but other operational and/or aggressive action as perceived by Russia’s elite: NATO expansion without Russia and against Russia’s security preferences as well as aggressive Western policies targeting Russia’s allies of Yugoslavia and then Serbia and its neighboring states beginning in the late 1990s. The 1997 inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO marks the beginning of my Phase 3 in Cycle IV. The bombing of Serbia in 1999 marks a more kinetic beginning of Phase 3 consistent with the purist Tsymbuskian cyclical model stipulating Western aggression against Russia or Russian interests. The onset of Phase 3 is perhaps symbolized by Primakov’s turnaround over the Atlantic away from Moscow and back to Moscow in reaction to NATO’s bombing of Serbia. Three waves of NATO expansion brought the American-led Western alliance right up to Russia’s border with the Baltic states and envisioned the incorporation of Ukraine and Georgia as well. Prospects remained during Putin’s first term and perhaps even during the ‘interregnum’ of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency for Russian-Western rapprochement and even a return to democratization domestically, but they were never realized. Thus, Cycle IV’s Phase 4 begins with Russia’s August 2008 rebuff of Georgia’s bid to join NATO and invasion of Tbilisi’s breakaway region of South Ossetia as part of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s effort to reunite Georgia and thus resolve its “stateness problem” or sovereignty conflict that was hindering its NATO bid. With its defeat of the Georgian army, Moscow had undertaken its first post-Soviet military response to NATO expansion in an effort to block any further Western encroachment along its borders. Phase 4, kicked off by the Georgian-Ossetian/Russian War, has continued with Russian efforts to block Ukraine’s entry into NATO and rollback the February 2014 ultranationalist Maidan putsch first by annexing Crimea, then by supporting the Donbass separatists, and finally by invading Ukraine in February 2022. Cycle IV’s Phase 4 overlaps the inauguration of a new cycle, Cycle V, in the history of Russian-Western relations and cycles.   CYCLE V: 2012-present  Cycle V’s Phase 1 was signaled by the reactivation of the Russian tradition of authoritarian rule and security vigilance in relation to the West in the so-called New Cold War implemented by Putin since his return to the Kremlin as president in May 2012. The invasion of Ukraine demonstrates that at the same time Cycle IV’s Phase 4 is peaking and will soon reach an unknown dénouement. That dénouement is likely to consist of a full transition into Cycle V’s Phase 1, with the consolidation of a less soft version of the Russian tradition of authoritarianism extant in the early period of internal retrenchment in Cycle IV, Phase 4. It also appears that Cycle V will see significant Russian isolation from the West—an isolation prepared for by Putin’s ‘pivot to Asia’ and his creation of international structures without any connection to the West: the EES, the SCO, and BRICS—in addition to an increasingly close partnership verging on outright allied relations with the 21st century likely new superpower, China. Much will depend on the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war now in full spate. The outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war is difficult to predict. Possibilities range from a Ukrainian quagmire for the Kremlin, a Russian victory attaining all its goals (Ukraine’s neutral status, the independence of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions from Ukraine, and denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine), a Russian defeat represented by the failure to achieve some or all of the goals of the special military operation, a European-wide Russian-NATO war, World War III, and thermonuclear war and annihilation. A quagmire could lead to the fall of Putin’s system which could result in a further authoritarian retrenchment or Cycle V’s Phase 2 and a new period of Westernization. A Russian victory would likely ‘justify’ the authoritarian retrenchment and Asian pivot, intensifying the dynamic of global bifurcation in the New Cold War, pitting the West against the Rest—a Sino-Russian-led coalition of many of the Rest. Questions that remain open are: (1) whether Putin’s pushback in Ukraine will be as far as the New Cold War goes; or (2) whether a Western-backed war to once and for all transform Russia in the Western image or to destroy it will ensue; or (3) whether the confrontation generated by Cycle IV has gone as far as it needs to. Putin may have ‘restored Russian sovereignty’ and begun Cycle V, but another Westernization likely looms somewhere over the horizon. If history and Tsymburskian-type cycles of Russian-Western relations still hold some key to understanding those relations, then a new Westernizing Phase 2 in Cycle V will set in sooner or later.   *  *  * What is perhaps most striking about our cycles is the consistent way in which the transition from each cycle’s second to third phase—from the Westernizing, liberalizing/democratizing second phase to the Western invasion/encroachment third phase—was characterized by Western action undermining a Russian Westernizing, liberalizing impulse. In Cycle I’s Phase 2, the Westernizing, liberalizing Godunov began to tighten his rule and sink into paranoia and repression in response to rumors of a threat from Poland to his rule. After his death, the Poles indeed organized a regime change invasion by False Dmitry, ushering in the Smuta. In Cycle II, Alexander I’s attempt to introduce constitutional rule in Russia was interrupted at least twice by Napoleon’s wars and invasion of Russia. In Cycle III, the potential of a republican transition after the February Revolution under moderate  Trudovik faction leader Alexander Kerensky was aborted by the combination of the ongoing German-inspired world war and German-sponsored radical revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. In Cycle IV, NATO expansion undermined Russia’s pro-republican wing and the republicanizing regime under post-Soviet Russian President Boris Yeltsin. As a result of NATO expansion and NATO’s bombing of Serbia, the inner circle of the already ailing Yeltsin searched for a successor among those wearing epaulettes, eventually settling on Vladimir Putin. Continued NATO expansion during Putin’s first term and the threat of more to come in Georgia and Ukraine doomed what was left of Russia’s post-Soviet republican experiment by 2012, if not by 2008. This is the most revealing conclusion from applying Tsymburisky’s cyclical approach to the history of Russian-Western relations in a way that emphasizes Russia’s domestic transformations together with developments in Russian-Western relations. Coming Full Circle Fyodor A. Lukyanov The latest changes in the international arena, including the new Russia-DPRK relationship, are returning us to pre-liberal international practice. The first Cold War’s victors have so far been unsuccessful in their attempts to regain dominance. The world has come full circle. More

[Category: Issues]

— Two Years of Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Ten Lessons to Learn

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Wang, Y. and Duan, M., 2024. Two Years of Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Ten Lessons to Learn. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 87–92. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-87-92   On 24 February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out. Now, two years on, it still rages. The war has caused numerous casualties and colossal economic losses and left a far-reaching impact on the geopolitical environment of Europe. So far, it has claimed the lives of about 70,000 Ukrainian soldiers, according to official United States estimates, more than the number of U.S. soldiers who lost their lives during the Vietnam War. In 2022, Ukraine saw its gross domestic product shrink by around 30%; the country has suffered levels of damage not seen in Europe since World War II. From the outset of the war, the West has imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia and provided continuous aid to Ukraine. The U.S. has donated the largest amount of military aid to Ukraine, followed by European Union institutions. However, Western aid has not guaranteed a “quick win” for Ukraine: Despite its “EU candidate status,” a significant part of Ukraine’s pre-1991 territory is now controlled by Russia. Now the conflict has entered a stage of positional warfare and attrition warfare. On the second anniversary of this geopolitical conflict, one should look at what lessons we can learn from the perspective of forms of warfare, the international order, and wartime narratives. Forms of warfare and national development may not evolve linearly, and the combination of old and new forms of war adds uncertainties to regional security. Although cyber warfare, information warfare and drones have been widely applied during the war, the West is far from overtaking Russia in high technology the way it expected. Conventional war forms still feature heavily in the conflict. The Western military aid to Ukraine still mainly relies on tanks, anti-tank weapons and third-generation fighter jets, with no significant difference from the World War II model. On a macro level, the Western-centric mindset has taken a hit during the conflict. While claiming themselves to be the most advanced, the Western countries have yet failed to defeat Russia (the so-called “authoritarian country”) in a short period of time. A Cold War mindset is at the root of a hot war, and the pursuit of “absolute security” has led to a security dilemma. The Cold War mindset is one of the root causes of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which in essence is a proxy war waged by Western countries. Thus far, 45 sovereign countries have provided aid to Ukraine. By January 2024, the value of bilateral aid commitments to Ukraine from EU institutions, the U.S., and Germany had reached approximately €84 billion, €68.7 billion, and €22 billion, respectively. This has been so voluminous that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken even publicly claimed that Ukraine’s defensive war against Russia would be at risk without U.S. aid. As the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century, the conflict may be regarded as an episode during the evolution of the Westphalian system. Ethnic tensions are intertwined with state tensions, and there is a gap between the sovereignty doctrine and a lack of autonomy in reality. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West has, recalling its memories of the Cold War and even World War II, described the war as imperial expansion by Russia and regarded it as a battle between “democracy and autocracy.” Nevertheless, the binary democracy-autocracy narrative may not be able to explain the complex ethnic tensions behind the conflict. Moreover, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has exposed the fact that some sovereign countries are incapable and have long been manipulated by major powers, highlighting a rift between nation-states and sovereign states. The à la carte (picking and choosing) diplomatic approach the West takes is based on realist power politics. The West has orchestrated color revolutions against other countries, including Ukraine, in the name of freedom and equality to export its values, only to harm European security in the end. Similar situations are a common sight in the Middle East. Now through the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West has again turned to geopolitics and major-power games, taking “de-risking” and the “new Cold War” as their diplomatic narrative. It should be noted that the essence of the European countries’ “à la carte” approach is a lack of autonomy and of a comprehensive and stable judgment of international politics. This often leads European countries’ foreign policy to follow trends blindly and drift between two extremes. Despite the importance of wartime narratives, the narratives of Western countries seem untenable. At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, European countries launched propaganda campaigns from the so-called moral high ground yet failed to persuade the Russian people. The fundamental reasons for this failure boil down to three aspects: narrative, action, and capability. Firstly, with Western systems losing their sway, European narratives are neither consistent nor convincing. Secondly, even Western countries themselves are publicly divided with regard to a number of issues such as energy decoupling, economic sanctions, and military aid, leaving them unable to deter other countries. Thirdly, the European countries find it hard to pursue self-reliance with respect to defense. Some even argue Europe is more reliant on American security today than it was in 1999, during the Kosovo War. Combined, these factors have contributed to a lack of confidence in European wartime narratives. The phenomenon of “industrial hollowing-out” damages the foundations for defense; “decoupling” and “de-risking” pose more threats to peace and stability. A successful wartime narrative involves both capability and morality. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has underlined the vulnerability of Europe’s defenses, which means it lacks the foundation on which it could build “strategic autonomy.” In reality, the European defense industry has long been unable to keep up. European firms do not have the supply to match the wartime demand, and it will be hard to rebuild industry through a single war. Even smaller orders have been going abroad, to places like the U.S. and even South Korea. In order to enhance strategic autonomy, Europe has attempted to decouple from Russia in terms of energy, but the results have been minimal: Europe’s imports of natural gas from Russia have increased at higher prices, making an energy transformation even more difficult. To rebuild its military industry, Europe must achieve energy autonomy and have complete industrial chains. For now, Europe still has a long way to go. The expansion of a military and political alliance may bring risks to regional security. The expansion of NATO is the immediate external factor behind the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In an article in The New York Times, George F. Kennan stated that “expanding NATO would be most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era” and such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic tendencies in Russian opinion. Similar views were echoed by Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and political scientist John Mearsheimer. After the Cold War, NATO has undergone five rounds of eastward expansion. With Russia excluded from its collective defense, European security has de facto been divided. As the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) failed to fulfil its functions, Russia’s security was not safeguarded, resulting in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. One can conclude that as a military alliance, NATO could only maintain its internal peace, but has brought about adverse impacts on the overall security of the European continent. The global strategic imbalance which emerged after the Cold War is a crucial reason why the Russia-Ukraine conflict is still going on today. Globally, the U.S. became the only superpower in the world; regionally, most European countries joined NATO, and the balance in Europe was broken following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The conflict should be regarded as a consequence of a global and regional strategic political imbalance. Active efforts should be made to rectify such an imbalance. To do so, developing countries should work together to make a contribution to building a new global balance. The binary thinking and double standards practiced by some countries are worth attention. Western countries have repeatedly violated the principle of national sovereignty of the United Nations Charter over the past few decades, but when it comes to Russia, they accused it of doing the same thing in turn. At the end of the past century, NATO neglected the security needs of Russia in multiple conflicts although they had reached an agreement on the Partnership for Peace program. In the face of security threats, Europe always demonizes its opponents, but rarely reflects on the consequences of its own deeds. Now European countries may be starting to re-examine regional and global security, as the Munich Security Report 2024 released in February focuses on lose-lose dynamics. Still, the binary thinking pattern continues in the report. Countries throughout the world should promote the building of a community with a shared future for humankind, which represents the fundamental path to long-lasting peace. The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a multi-lose situation for Russia, Ukraine and Europe. International politics should discard the Cold War mindset where “a single country’s security comes first” and instead pursue the vision of building a community with a shared future. To resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict, countries should revive the Helsinki Spirit of 1975, recognize that security is indivisible, and create a comprehensive and integrated regional security framework. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has not ended. In the past two years, the conflict has caused numerous civilian casualties in Ukraine. A survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) has shown that most Europeans support Ukraine in the war but only 10 percent of the respondents believe the country will win; and most Europeans deem it necessary to end the conflict with a “compromise settlement.” Europe is at a crossroads: How can it cope with the grave security challenges posed by the (potential) collapse of Ukraine and the return of Donald Trump? In the short term, enhancing defense autonomy is a top priority on the agenda; in the long run, Europe should change its thinking pattern and look for a suitable ultimate solution to the conflict.   This article is an edited version of the paper written for the Valdai Discussion Club. The original copy is available at: https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/two-years-into-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/   Bristling States in Search of an Antidote to Foreign Interference Alexei A. Chesnakov, Daniil A. Parenkov Interference is commonplace today and will likely become only more so, especially as it has become possible in “endoscopic” form. Channels and instruments are hidden, and external interests can exert themselves from within the sovereign political space. More

[Category: Issues]

— The Tripolar World and the Bloc Triangles of East Asia

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Asmolov, K.V. and Babaev, K.V., 2024. The Tripolar World and the Bloc Triangles of East Asia. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 142–158. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-3-142-158   At the beginning of this decade, the world entered a period of great turmoil. Such transitional moments, inevitable during the collapse of obsolete international systems and the emergence of new ones, happen with increasing frequency (1618-1648, 1792-1815, 1914-1919, 1938-1945, 1988-1992). The current transitional period is characterized by the following processes. Firstly, developing countries are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the world order in which the U.S. and the “collective West” dictate their will to others. The Western “rules-based order” is perceived as imposed by Washington, and international organizations—which ought to act as arbitrators—are instead seen as passing off Western sanctions and military interventions as the will of the international community. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “The global majority, representing 85 percent of the world’s population, advocates a more equitable distribution of global resources and respect for cultural diversity, as well as consistent democratization of international affairs” (Lavrov, 2023). U.S. President Joe Biden also speaks of a new system: “I think we have an opportunity to do things, if we’re bold enough and have enough confidence in ourselves, to unite the world in ways that it never has been. We were in a post-war period for 50 years where it worked pretty damn well, but that’s sort of run out of steam. … It needs a new—a new world order in a sense, like that was a world order” (Biden, 2023). Secondly, ongoing de-globalization, i.e. the appearance of economic divisions based on political ones. The common political, economic, and information space is disintegrating into blocs (different from the Cold-War-era military alliances). The current division is probably deeper than that in the 20th century, when economic interaction between the two main military-political blocs did not stop. Thirdly, war has returned as an acceptable way to resolve political disputes. An armed conflict as a solution to problems, which was previously employed mainly by some Third World countries, is no longer taboo for the great powers, especially after the events in Yugoslavia in 1999. This increases the likelihood of global war. The main centers of power today are Russia, the United States, and China, whose relations form the “strategic triangle.” Each pursues its own goals by various means. In East Asia, they are forming the military-political alliances of Washington-Tokyo-Seoul and Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang, which will shape the region’s landscape in the short and medium terms. This paper utilizes the systemic, historical, and genetic approaches to the study of international relations; scenario forecasting (Akhremenko, 1999); situational analysis (Primakov and Khrustalyov, 2006); and the theory of self-fulfilling prophecies, according to which “public definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments” (Merton, 1948, p. 195).   The tripolar world and its actors’ basic strategies A tripolar world is quite common in history. For example, the USSR, Germany, and Great Britain became the three centers of power in Europe (for a very short period of 1939-1941): a temporary bloc between the former two strengthened them, but its destruction and the subsequent alliance between the West and the USSR led to the defeat of the Third Reich. The fall of the Eastern Bloc at the end of the Cold War was partly due to the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting tripolarity of the 1970s and 1980s. Feng Shaolei calls “trilateral relationships” a “fairly basic category” in international history. “Behind any bilateral or multilateral relations, there is a shadow of one or several countries as ‘a third party’” (Feng, 2019). If a bipolar world can be likened to scales, then a tripolar world is a three-dimensional rotating system of checks and balances. As in a bipolar world, each actor gathers junior allies to form defensive alliances, or softer associations based on “smart power” or value hegemony. Allies often try to secure strategic autonomy in areas important to them, as in the case of the two East Asian triangles. There are several strategies for “politics-a-trois.” First. “Weight on the scales”: The third actor is much weaker than the other two, so the world order seems bipolar. However, the two main rivals are unable to win or capitalize on success without the third’s help, so they try to win it over, sometimes in exchange for a degree of strategic autonomy or discretion outside the main confrontation. Often, the third actor builds up its power through skillful maneuvering, after which the model changes. Second. “Friendship against,” or “balancing.” Two actors join forces against the third, whose increased potential poses a common threat. Such an alliance is often pragmatic and may bring together unnatural partners. For example, the forced cooperation between the Anglo-American bloc and the Soviet Union against the Third Reich in World War II, expressed by Winston Churchill as: “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable reference of the Devil in the House of Commons” (Nagorski, 2007, pp. 150-151). Such alliances may have an ideological basis, but once the external threat is gone, internal problems return to the fore, and yesterday’s allies become enemies. Third. The stratagem “sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight,” optionally then finishing off the weakened winner. As Harry Truman put it: “If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious under any circumstances” (McCullough, 1992). An “ideal” strategy incorporating elements of all the others is extremely rare in pure form. It implies consensus regarding spheres of influence, the rules of the game, and the means of dispute resolution. This was the model adopted after World War II, when all the victorious powers, including China, became permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power. However, as competition intensifies or rules are abused, this model stops working. Within the strategic triangle, Russia combines elements of each of these strategies, since, given a volatile balance of power, one strategy is easily replaced by another.   The balance of power in the Russia-China-U.S. triangle Russia-China-U.S. relations are in balance. In the case of Russia and the United States, whose nuclear capabilities significantly exceed China’s, nuclear parity limits the probability of a conflict. The U.S.-China balance is based on enormous economic interconnectedness and interdependence; reducing dependence on Chinese imports has become an important element of Washington’s preparations for a potential conflict. The Russia-China relations are based on shared goals and a common threat from the United States, which neither Russia nor China can effectively counter alone. China’s economic dominance is counterbalanced by its difficulties in building relations with other major players in the developing world and its need for Russia as the core of BRICS and as a more acceptable partner for countries like India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brazil, and Turkey. “Russia is virtually the only major partner and ally for China” (Babaev, 2023a). Beijing and Moscow seek to contain Washington in order to oppose its preservation of its previous political hegemony (Lukin, 2023). Relations between Moscow and Beijing are traditionally seen as a partnership. But it remains unclear whether this is a strategic partnership, or a tactical alliance driven by a common threat. The Russian political elite are seeking to build a “friendship against,” but also to avoid excessive involvement in the U.S.-China conflict as the latter’s junior partner. As Yevgeny Primakov pointed out, “one of the main directions of Russian foreign policy should be staying away from an alliance with China against the United States and from an alliance with the United States against China, but building relations with the two superpowers on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation” (Ivanova, 2016, p. 117). A monograph by the Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences argues: “If a military-political alliance is created, China and Russia will inevitably face the ‘master/slave’ problem, which could exacerbate existing disagreements. This is why both countries adhere to the principle of comprehensive strategic partnership rather than the principle of allied relations” (Morozov and Batyuk, 2022, p. 523). As confrontation with Washington intensifies, relations between Moscow and Beijing will strengthen, but the U.S. will also step up efforts to divide the two, in several areas. Firstly, as one of the authors has noted (Asmolov, 2007), the Russian political elite dislike the West, but at least they know it well enough, whereas they have very limited knowledge of China, and the unknown always frightens. The U.S. and Europe are accordingly using liberal-minded academics and anti-Maoist veterans to generate Russian fear of an alliance with China. However, familiarity with China is growing within the Russian government and managerial class. The second thrust of the U.S.’s policy is to seek the defeat of its opponents in detail, and to create problems for Moscow that prevent it from helping China against the U.S. This is, in fact, Washington’s main geostrategic goal in the Ukraine conflict. Even if Russia successfully completes its operation in Ukraine and the current Ukrainian regime surrenders, Russia will have to spend enormous resources to rebuild the new territories. Finally, there is the potential for conflict between Beijing and Moscow, although both sides are trying to stifle it. For instance, an official Chinese map of the PRC, printed in 2023, marks the Russian half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island as also belonging to China. In a different situation, this would have caused an uproar, with Moscow accusing Beijing of making territorial claims, but instead the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized that “the border issue between our countries has been resolved once and for all,” and Russian sinologists hurried to say that it was a misunderstanding due to a technical error (DVhab, 2023). In 2019, Feng Shaolei (2019) drew attention to the “shallow” relations in the China-U.S.-Russia triangle. Feng believes that China-U.S.-Russia relations differ from the Cold War in that they lack a conflict of ideologies or grand strategies. He notes that NATO’s eastward expansion, regardless of Russia’s interests, forced Moscow towards Beijing, and that more generally all steps by China and Russia were taken under external pressure. Also in 2019, Zhao Huasheng pointed out that a Sino-Russian alliance would entail openly designating the U.S. as an enemy. An alliance reduces the common threat, but the designation of a great power as an enemy is itself a source of enormous strategic pressure. This is why “not allowing a partner to turn into an enemy” would be a great strategic success for China, as Beijing “rejects the Cold War mentality” and the “zero-sum game.” Zhao argues a formal Sino-Russian military-political alliance is very unlikely unless Sino-American and Russo-American relations continue to deteriorate (Zhao, 2019).   East Asia’s Western Triangle: towards an analog to NATO Russia, China, and the United States can tentatively be called part of “Greater East Asia.” Their two triangles—provisionally “Eastern” (Russia-China-North Korea) and “Western” (U.S.-Japan-South Korea)—border one another at the Korean Peninsula’s 38th parallel. The “Western” triangle has by far surpassed the “Eastern” one in institutionalizing its alliance. A trilateral summit at Camp David in 2023 became an important step in this regard (see: Camp David Principles, 2023; Joint Statement, 2023b). A system of interaction, consultation, and information exchange is already operational, and the “Commitment to Consult” among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States is enshrined in a special document (Commitment, 2023). The “Camp David Principles” reaffirmed  the two countries’ commitment, expressed in an April 2023 joint statement by J. Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol, to creating a “unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace” (Joint Statement, 2023a), which implies specific measures to contain China and, in our opinion, the actual elimination of North Korea’s sovereignty. Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo have set up a security hotline to provide round-the-clock voice and video communication between their leaders and top officials (KIR, 2023a). Exercises, during which the “southern side” will practice the use of nuclear weapons, are slated for 2024 (Yonhap, 2023a). The bloc has also been substantiated ideologically: it “will continue to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific based on a respect for international law, shared norms, and common values” (Camp David Principles, 2023). It is clear that the “Western” triangle in East Asia is not a direct analog to NATO, but the new century may prompt a revision of Washington’s military-political guarantees to Seoul and Tokyo, currently made in separate documents. Contacts between South Korea and NATO are also evolving (KIR, 2023b). Republican Congressman Mike Lawler has introduced a bill establishing a Task Force on the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization (IPTO) (Yonhap, 2023b). So talk about an “Asian NATO” is not unfounded, to put it mildly (Green, 2023). South Korean media suggest that its creation is urgently necessitated by the deepening cooperation between Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang, hinting at secret agreements between them. The Korea Herald said straightforwardly that “confrontation between the free world and authoritarian dictatorships seems to be growing acute on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea, China and Russia are revealing their solidarity plainly” (Korea Herald, 2023). And InsideOver (2023) called the rapprochement between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow a “triangle of death.”   East Asia’s Shallow Eastern Triangle The Russia-China-North Korea triangle, just like the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership, has been brought about by the threat from the U.S. and opposition to it, but has not been institutionalized. In fact, there is an agreement on military assistance between Beijing and Pyongyang, but there is no formal military alliance between Russia and North Korea. Although the exchange of visits in 2023 spurred various rumors, there are no official documents that could compare to those signed at Camp David. Different predictions have been made regarding future Russia-DPRK military cooperation, depending on the further collapse of the existing world order (Asmolov, 2023), but these are just predictions. Russia and China pursue common goals on the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, they are committed to resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue by political and diplomatic methods, trying to freeze the issue and curb tensions as much as possible. North Korea’s nuclear doctrine is similar to Russia’s, and therefore fits the image of a responsible power. Secondly, Russia is interested in the existence of North Korea not only as a buffer, but also as one of its few ideological allies (Asmolov and Zakharova, 2023). Moscow and Pyongyang jointly oppose the U.S.’s efforts to demonize, isolate, and eventually destroy North Korea. On 19 October 2023, Sergei Lavrov noted that “the progressive development of bilateral relations [with the DPRK] meets the interests of our states and contributes to strengthening peace and security in Northeast Asia. The development of our relations with the People’s Republic of China serves the same purpose” (Lavrov, 2023). In practice, this yielded efforts by Russia and China to mitigate anti-DPRK sanctions, which Moscow and Beijing argue should reflect Pyongyang’s moratorium on nuclear tests and ICBM launches. Unfortunately, the Biden administration consistently torpedoed such initiatives, causing Pyongyang to resume ICBM launches in 2022. Also, in 2022, Russia and China blocked U.S. attempts to impose new sanctions against North Korea through the UN Security Council and to otherwise use the body for propagandistic purposes against Pyongyang. On 26 May 2022, Russia and China vetoed the draft U.S. sanctions resolution (UN, 2022), and subsequent sanctions proposals have not even reached a vote. On 28 March 2024, Russia vetoed the extension of the UN expert group’s mandate to monitor anti-DPRK sanctions’ implementation. (It must be said that a number of Russian experts believe that Moscow’s decision to join the 2016-2017 sanctions was a mistake (Zhebin, 2023), and its continued adherence to them “raises many questions.”) On 25 August 2023, Russian and Chinese diplomats at the UN Security Council barred an open discussion on human rights in North Korea, which could have led to an accusatory resolution. The Russian representative made it clear that the Security Council is not authorized to deal with human rights issues (Nebenzia, 2023). North Korea is also strengthening ties with China and Russia. Its relations with Beijing are largely based on China’s status as its main trading partner, and in 2018, the two countries declared that their friendship is a continuous process, sealed with blood shed during the Korean War of 1950-1953, based on the socialist ideology upheld by fraternal parties, and invulnerable to contemporary disturbances. When either country celebrates an important holiday or event, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un exchange telegrams (KCNA, 2023a, b) or verbal messages (KCNA, 2023c), including statements that “China and the DPRK are the friendly neighbors linked by the same mountain and rivers,” and “the traditional China-DPRK friendship has weathered the trials of the changed international situation for a long time, constantly maintained the trend of its development and got stronger with the passage of time” (KCNA, 2023b). North Korea and Russia are also developing their relations, including with: a visit to Pyongyang by Russian officials led by then Defense Minister  Sergei Shoigu (late July 2023); Kim Jong Un’s six-day trip to Russia (12-18 September 2023); Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Pyongyang (October 2023); Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako’s visit (December 2023). As Artyom Lukin points out, Pyongyang realizes that its nuclear weapons can provide “deterrence against direct aggression, but they are useless in most other crisis scenarios.” The emergence of the “Western” triangle makes the situation even more disturbing. South Korea greatly surpasses North Korea in conventional strength, and regionally-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons could neutralize North Korea’s (Lukin, 2024). Only strategic allies can make the difference. “China will stay on as Pyongyang’s main economic benefactor and diplomatic protector while Russia plays the role of the North’s main military partner. Moscow will be happy with such a role if only because it has little to lose with Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo” (Lukin, 2023). There are plenty of problems within the “Eastern” triangle. For example, unlike North Korea, China does not openly support Russia in the Ukraine conflict, as it wants to avoid encouraging secession. There are also disagreements over a route for Chinese ships along the Tumen River to the Sea of Japan, and mutual jealousy arises over Central Asia and Mongolia. North Korea pursues its own security policy and does not always listen to Moscow and Beijing’s recommendations, to put it mildly. Although North Korea is heavily dependent on Chinese raw materials and aid, security always takes priority. It remains unclear whether Pyongyang is delaying a new nuclear test at Beijing’s request. The members of the “Eastern” triangle are more equal than their Western counterparts, as they lack any suzerain/vassal relationship. We believe there are several reasons for that: all three countries share borders with each other but have no unresolved territorial issues (the aforementioned media mini-scandal around the cartographic incident with Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island is due rather to journalists’ inclination towards sensationalism than some real political friction), all three possess nuclear weapons, and all three have no historical claims to each other. What are the prospects for an “Asian Warsaw Pact” in response to an “Asian NATO”? Stephen Walt argues that “balancing behavior is not triggered directly by the power of others, but rather by a perceived threat” (Walt, 1985, pp. 8-9). Western fear of the “triangle of death” could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.   Triangle standoff: what to prepare for War is in the air. According to the Near Global Survey 2023 (Yonhap, 2023c), 15 percent of surveyed Western experts believe that a military clash between Beijing and Washington is likely within the next five to ten years, and another 10 percent expect it within five years. “None of the experts forecast a compromise between the two countries within the next five years, signaling a ‘prevailing sense of uncertainty’ in diplomatic relations” (Ibid). There are three places where tensions between the East Asian triangles may come to a head (Babaev, 2023b): the Korean Peninsula; Taiwan pushed by the West into formal secession from China; and the South China Sea marked by conflicting island and maritime claims by China (PRC), Taiwan (Republic of China/ROC), Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. However, in our view, a large-scale Korean conflict is becoming less likely. Formally, tension is rising, with the parties openly warning of nuclear war and incorporating nuclear strikes in their exercises. The U.S.-South Korea Freedom wargames in August 2022 featured nuclear-capable strategic bomber raids and a response to a nuclear attack (TASS, 2023), while North Korean wargames have practiced the use of tactical nuclear weapons (Izvestia, 2023). However, hawks are not in power in the North or South. The South Korean military understands that the North’s military-industrial capabilities will not permit an easy victory over it, and that an advantage over Pyongyang can be attained only through military modernization and/or by deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea. As experts have repeatedly noted, if an armed conflict occurs, both sides would be incentivized to strike immediately at maximum strength, including with nuclear weapons (Lobov and Polenova, 2017). The North would target decision-making centers, strategic facilities, military bases, and logistics hubs in Japan and South Korea. The prospect of such damage is likely unacceptable to the Western coalition. Nevertheless, “irrational” sources of conflict remain: for example, a loss of nerves, miscommunication, or a deliberate provocation by ultraconservative forces like Fighters For a Free North Korea, which at one point seriously considered sending coronavirus-infected  objects to North Korea (Hankyoreh, 2020). In this case, the North would have to react, and the South would have no choice but to respond. And yet a conflict of Sino-American origin is much more likely. Perhaps over the disputed islets in the East China Sea, which were mentioned in the Camp David accords, or over Taiwan. The Chinese leadership has repeatedly spoken of the need to prepare for a military operation in Taiwan (Pomfret and Pottinger, 2023), and the United States has reaffirmed its readiness to enter into an armed confrontation with China (CBS News, 2022). The situation has not changed after Taiwan’s election on 13 January 2024. Most likely, neither Korea would want to get overly involved in a Sino-American confrontation unless it threatens their interests. Seoul’s most likely reaction to a Taiwan war would be diplomatic support for Washington or non-lethal arms supplies to Taiwan. Anything more would make it a target for Chinese attacks. North Korea is even less likely to intervene on China’s behalf, as Juche does not require North Korea to sacrifice its interests for the sake of a senior partner, and Beijing may itself prefer a minimum of North Korean assistance, as Taiwan is an internal affair of China. The South China Sea is even further removed from the interests of either Korea.   *  *  * The U.S.-China-Russia strategic triangle is of global importance. Moscow and Beijing stand united, but Russia should refrain from excessive involvement in the Sino-American conflict, which does not directly affect its interests, and avoid becoming a “junior partner.” The limits of involvement might be defined in alliance negotiations. “Minor” triangles—Russia-China-North Korea and U.S.-Japan-South Korea—are forming in East Asia. The “Western” bloc is much more institutionalized and is likely to continue consolidating until at least the spring of 2027, when South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s term ends. Although the triangles’ emergence is increasing general tension in East Asia and driving a regional arms race, a conflict of Korean origin seems less likely than a conflict over Taiwan. In the medium term (or at least until 2027), the two Koreas will continue to raise tensions, while seeking to avoid an armed conflict that could be fatal for both. International “Society of the Spectacle” Stanislav O. Byshok The transformation of diplomatic efforts into a “spectacle” by no means contributes to the achievement of those goals, although it may sometimes entertain the unsophisticated general public. Postmodernism should be replaced or, at any rate, counterbalanced by more traditional—restrained and substantive—forms of international communication. More

[Category: Issues]

— International “Society of the Spectacle”

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Byshok, S.O., 2024. International “Society of the Spectacle”. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 130–140. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-3-130-140   A decade ago, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recounted how his then U.S. counterpart, John Kerry, had advised him to ignore President Barack Obama’s public statements equating Russia with international terrorism and Ebola. For traditional diplomacy, there is nothing scandalous if harsh words addressed to the public differ from substantive conversations behind closed doors. But what happens when those symbolic doors become transparent or are even dismantled altogether? In 1967, Marxist philosopher and activist Guy Debord’s instant best-seller Society of the Spectacle was published in Paris. According to the author, late capitalism is a stage in the development of production relations in which not only labor relations, but all relations among people and between the state and its citizens undergo alienation. Every country becomes “an immense accumulation of spectacles” (Debord, 1970, p. 8), i.e. of images and roles, where representation—a picture—replaces live, non-alienated interaction. Under late capitalism, “the specialization of images of the world is rediscovered, perfected, in the world of the autonomized image” (Ibid, p. 8). Endlessly repeating, the multitude of spectacles provides “for a constant reinforcement of the conditions of isolation of ‘lonely crowds’” (Ibid, p. 17)—i.e. of ordinary citizens. In modern terms, the issue on the agenda is information bubbles or echo chambers, quite autonomous and capable of sustaining themselves indefinitely. The actor of the spectacle is “the opposite of the individual; he is the enemy of the individual in himself as obviously as in others” (Ibid, p. 34). The system of alienation “personifies itself” in its actors (Ibid, p. 34). The concept of ‘society of the spectacle’ was introduced by Guy Debord in his 1967 work of the same name, as well as in his detailed commentary on it in 1988. Like critical theory or poststructuralism, it was not intended for analysis of international relations. However, the current global situation prompts us to try to apply this methodology not only to the individual states of late capitalism (as Marxist authors have done since the 1960s), but also to the system of diplomatic communication in the hypothesized period of transition to (early) multipolarity (MFA, 2023). Alongside the general belief that the “end of history” has been postponed indefinitely, there is also a widespread belief that contemporary diplomacy and the world order in general are in deep crisis. As Guy Debord put it, “a world division of spectacular tasks” (Debord, 1970, p. 33) is an accomplished fact.   Diplomacy as a calling and profession What are the role and place of diplomacy in this volatile world—and what were they before, in more stable eras? “Filled with nostalgia, we look at the 19th century or the second half of the Cold War era as a period of the triumph of diplomatic art” (Bordachev, 2022, p. 39). The Vienna system envisioned a Concert of Europe, an agreement by great powers to maintain the current world order. The Yalta-Potsdam system was an agreement to at least avoid destroying the world order, by adhering to designated spheres of interest. However, as Timofei Bordachev notes, “the foundation of this order began to crumble due to the evolution of its constituent living organisms—states.” When rules and procedures cease to operate, diplomacy “yields the leading role to politics” (Ibid, p. 39). The role of diplomacy diminishes “at each new round of history,” and it is national leaders, acting as diplomats, that have “to assess the extent of permissible injustice with regard to everyone’s claims that creates an order which is accepted by all states of significance.” (Ibid, p. 39). Once the political leaders have resolved the new problems, professional diplomats get back to work in a changed environment. Until then, diplomats have to lock themselves within the community of friendly countries that will agree with the basic theses of your foreign policies or, at least, not publicly oppose them. It is common belief that diplomats are much more frank, straightforward, and cynical (in the sense of calling things by their proper names) behind closed doors than they are in public, where different rules of communication apply (Mearsheimer, 2011). Today, amid the growing transparency of political processes to the general public (WikiLeaks being the clearest example), the question arises whether it is possible in principle to maintain diplomacy’s original seclusiveness. If we accept the new transparency of international communication as a norm to be reckoned with, then we will have to build our dialogue with our negotiating partners accordingly. For one, some Western leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French Presidents François Hollande and Emmanuel Macron, in describing their one-on-one conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, have lamented that his private explanations of Russia’s position regarding the Ukraine crisis do not fundamentally differ from his public ones. The Western leaders perceived this as disrespectful and contrary to the traditional frankness and value of face-to-face high-level communication, instinctively rejecting even the partial alignment of public and private conflict messaging. Spectacle, according to Guy Debord, “would be merely the excesses of the media” (Debord, 1990, p. 7). Whenever the boundary between the confidential and the public disappears, publicity instantly fills the space that was private a moment ago. When a procedure, as a set of norms and principles of interstate interaction, is questioned by negotiators, “its performance easily turns into a public and theatrical action” (Bordachev, 2022, p. 50). Hence the live broadcast on French TV of part of Macron’s confidential (according to the official protocol) telephone call to Putin, or the military threats publicly declared and then disavowed with equal ease. Whereas classical diplomacy is the art of governing contradictions, the logic of a spectacle, or a political talk show as one of its manifestations,  is based on the play of emotions and the emphasis of contradictions. In talk shows, dialogue often turns into two parallel monologues, which can eventually degrade into a vulgar brawl. This vaguely resembles international relations in crisis, but talk shows differ fundamentally in the presence of a moderator recognized by all the participants, and of security guards behind the scenes. In the real world, there is rarely a moderator—a concrete actor or even a set of commonly recognized rules—and there are no security guards, even theoretically.   Concentrated theatricalization In discussing the current Russia-West confrontation, Dmitry Trenin writes that the fundamental feature of the present is that “the main battlefield of the ongoing struggle is inside the country—where the main object of confrontation is located” (Trenin, 2022). Based on this securitizing vision of reality (security is arbitrarily interpreted as broadly as possible, with the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy blurred), it is necessary to clearly establish and divide, according to Carl Schmitt (2007), ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ within the country—with the corresponding conclusions and decisions made regarding the latter. The foe’s opinion in this case is no longer perceived as a statement acceptable in public discussion, equal in status to any other point of view and worthy of free discussion, and is instead seen as a potentially criminal offence. “Wherever the concentrated spectacle rules, so does the police” (Debord, 1970, p. 36). Securitization, with its tendency to form an imagined internal loyalist majority, is justified by the specifics of the foreign policy situation. The Schmittian ‘state of emergency’ is not formally imposed, but discursively implied. The pursuit of society’s ideological homogenization, and of its patriotic-defensive consolidation, somewhat undermines the notions of  struggle against the ideological and political hegemony of the United States and its allies, of a transition to multipolarity, worldview pluralism, and the blooming complexity of different civilizational patterns. The connection between intrastate and interstate democracy, or lack thereof, is a matter for a separate discussion. According to Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s “tradition of awareness of itself in the worldis based on a dialogue with the surrounding states and peoples,” and Russian thinkers describe “a world free of ideological and other extremes, [where] spiritual freedom, economic development, and social and geopolitical values are established not through exploitation of other peoples, but on the basis of an equitable dialogue” (Tsygankov, 2022, p. 21). Ivan Timofeev points to Russia’s “historically inherent” “empathy in the dialogue with very different cultures and lifestyles” (Timofeev, 2023). Sergei Karaganov writes about “the need for preserving the freedom of discussion and intellectual creativity” within the country and the imperative to “speak the truth to ourselves, society, and the authorities” (Karaganov, 2022, p. 16). He also calls for the “qualitative strengthening of the feedback system between the government and society, the administrative apparatus and intellectual elites” (Ibid). Given that, according to Trenin, “Russia today is a country at war and will remain so in the foreseeable future” (Trenin, 2022), expanding or even simply preserving the space for a real intra-national dialogue may be a highly problematic task. As for the spectacle, however, the matter is simpler, because it represents “the uninterrupted conversation which the present order maintains about itself, its laudatory monologue” (Debord, 1970, p. 14).   Reality and discourse Large-scale confrontation with the West dictates its own logic, which depends on many factors, above all, on the openness to cooperation of countries located in other regions. In this context, anti-colonial rhetoric, which is often used by Russia’s foreign policy officialdom, may have some applied value in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It should be borne in mind that the accepted historiographies of a number of post-Soviet states treat Russia as a colonial power. Moscow can be part of the post- or anti-colonial trend only in regions that were never under the direct or indirect control of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. In the latter case, an anti-colonial dialogue is hardly possible—instead one will hear antagonistic anti-colonial monologues aimed at building or maintaining new/old national/civilizational identities. Within the framework of such ‘society of the spectacle’ a neutral examination of its foreign policy in terms of history, political science or philosophy has no intrinsic significance. The humanities lose their autonomy and are instrumentalized “to immediately justify everything that happens” (Debord, 1990, pp. 39-40). Dmitry Trenin writes that Russia needs to “consistently build elements of a new system of international relations together with the non-Western countries, form a new world agenda in cooperation with them, and consistently promote it” (Trenin, 2022). The non-Western countries that wish to develop cooperation with Moscow are interested in energy supplies, joint infrastructure projects, and cooperation in the military-technical sphere, but are unlikely to be eager to collectively promote an agenda to protect traditional values. The more so, since these values, which are themselves a modern construct, seriously differ in Iran and Brazil, China and South Africa, Russia and Pakistan. The spectacle of traditionalism “has the right to contradict itself, to correct its own past” (Debord, 1990, p. 28). The past is reinterpreted—or reinvented—for the sake of coping with current tasks. The highly successful Immortal Regiment project dedicated to the commemoration of the ancestors who fought in WWII is a tool of cohesion of Russians and Russian-speakers, no matter where they live, but it does not extend beyond the ecumene of Russian culture. Moscow’s defense of the Russian interpretation of the common struggle against the aggression of Nazi Germany and its allies is increasingly seen in many countries, not only post-Communist ones, as an attempt by the Kremlin to privatize the subject for its own interests. “Reasoning about history is inseparably reasoning about power” (Debord, 1970, p. 74).   From tradition to postmodernity One element of the hybrid war between the West and Russia is interference in diplomats’ work. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian diplomats “often have to work under extreme conditions, occasionally with a risk to their health or life” (MFA, 2022). Collective “expulsions” are motivated either by diplomats’ activities allegedly “incompatible with their status” or used in retaliation for similar actions by the opposite side. The space for traditional diplomacy is shrinking, but at the same time, paradoxically, the diplomatic discourse is becoming increasingly public “Media status has acquired infinitely more importance than the value of anything one might actually be capable of doing” (Debord, 1990, pp. 10-11). Ksenia Shilikhina notes that, although interstate dialogue is “neither election campaigning nor parliamentary debates,” the “competitive nature of diplomatic communication” is becoming increasingly visible (Shilikhina, 2021, p. 77). This competitive nature does not imply the presence of an arbiter recognized by both sides, and the very criteria for winning the rhetorical battle are unclear and do not correlate with the achievement of the country’s foreign policy goals. In a situation of normal interstate relations, “diplomatic texts…are as explicit and formally unemotional as possible,” which “reduces the [potential] conflictogenity of communication.” But in aggravated relations, “the balance between the rational and emotional in public diplomacy…is upset” (Ibid, p. 78). Shilikhina points out that the tendency towards “carnivalization of communication” is clearly present in the diplomatic discourse of recent years, and the frequent use of irony—in order to “lower the authority of opponents, thus showing the untenability of their position and its inconsistency with international standards of diplomacy”—increases “the conflictogenity of the speech act” (Ibid, pp. 79-80). In the resulting spectacle, says Guy Debord, “false archaic oppositions are artificially reborn; [including in the image of] regionalisms or racisms” (Debord, 1970, p. 35) that confirm one’s identity via sharp and direct opposition to the Other. Irony that is aimed at the Other, and downgrades its status, should be distinguished from other types of humor, including self-irony, which is intended to ease tensions. Presenting oneself as a nonideological beacon of sanity, and one’s negotiating partner as short-sighted, incompetent, and dogmatic, may win approval from a loyal domestic audience or immediate superiors, but certainly will not improve international relations.  In the absence of a universal order recognized as legitimate by the main actors, even the very language of normal diplomatic communication is ruined. Separate languages of interstate communication remain “only in narrower regional communities such as liberal democracies united within NATO and EU institutions, a special system of relations between Russia and China, the post-Soviet space, and other associations” (Bordachev, 2022, p. 43). Meetings between representatives of communities that have essentially adopted different languages often end in mutual accusations of lack of good will, unwillingness to hear the opponent, and reluctance to compromise. Each side successfully finds examples to illustrate the Other’s dishonesty, and not necessarily within today’s reality or the current century: “You vowed that your troops would not cross the borders of Ukraine.”—“And you promised Gorbachev not to expand NATO.” As a result, there emerges a situation in which “all communication is joyously proclaimed absent” (Debord, 1970, p. 104)—always through the fault of counterparts who have lost touch with reality.   From postmodernity to tradition It is impossible to conduct diplomacy when many of the most important actors refuse in principle to communicate, citing the current state of bilateral relations. The lack of trust between countries extends to the perception of diplomats, whose main functions include the establishment and maintenance of trust. Their restricted ability to conduct professional activities, coupled with the impossibility of even minimal long-term planning, breeds psychological and professional frustration. Statements like “it seems expedient to methodically reduce diplomatic contacts with the continental European and Anglo-Saxon communities” (Sushentsov, 2022) are easy to understand in such a situation. At a time of political mobilization, the cost of an individual’s error soars immeasurably. Amid uncertainty, focusing on the end goal may seem risky, and often gives way to action that is more formalized (and thus safer for the individual actor)—up to and including the verbatim quoting of official documents. Responsible countries ought to move somewhat against current trends, using training and meritocracy to preserve their own diplomatic and expert resources (through a system of training and meritocracy-based selection) in a condition necessary for coping with the traditional tasks of meaningful international dialogue. According to the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, the foreign policy of the state is aimed at ensuring the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, creating favorable external conditions for its development, and strengthening Russia’s position as one of the responsible, influential, and independent centers of the modern world (MFA, 2023). The transformation of diplomatic efforts into a “spectacle” by no means contributes to the achievement of those goals, although it may sometimes entertain the unsophisticated general public. Guy Debord’s postmodernism should be replaced or, at any rate, counterbalanced by more traditional—restrained and substantive—forms of international communication. According to Antoine Pecquet’s classic 18th-century text on the art of official negotiation, “the members of the diplomatic corps, who constitute a kind of independent community,” should “treat each other according to the relationship between their sovereigns, but always with courtesy and decency, even when their lords are at war” (Pecquet, 2007). Returning to this kind of tradition does not threaten backwardness, but rather promises to renew a history of successfully resolving international conflicts. As for spectacles, even the most spectacular ones, the truth is that “no one really believes the spectacle” (Debord, 1990, p. 60). The Crescent over the Hagia Sophia and the Serbian Cross Dmitry V. Yefremenko, Daniil O. Rastegaev Like Russia, over the past century, both Turkey and Serbia have gone through historical upheavals, the collapse of the previous model of statehood, and a “re-assemblying” of the nation. More

[Category: Issues]

— Bristling States in Search of an Antidote to Foreign Interference

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Chesnakov, A.A. and Parenkov, D.A., 2024. Bristling States in Search of an Antidote to Foreign Interference. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 71–86. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-3-71-86   Rapid technological, social, and cultural changes in the last two decades have dramatically complicated international interactions. One of their consequences was the growth and diversification of external influence in spheres that had been considered sovereign, which caused states’ hurried institutional responses to this threat. A marked transformation of the international environment and the arrival of new actors are mainly responsible.   The Shift Technological change has made political phenomena increasingly extraterritorial. Advancements in communications and logistics, especially digital advancements, have blurred the traditional boundaries of political action. Previously, foreign threats were clearly associated with actions by states or their direct proxies. The erosion of cultural, normative, informational, technological, and resource boundaries makes the source of a threat difficult to identify. National governments face a real threat of losing their monopoly on decision-making. New types of political activity have emerged in traditionally state-controlled spheres, and a number of technological and communicative processes have acquired political significance but remain beyond state control. IT giants claim the right to the autonomous use of digital force. Transnational digital platforms control targeted-advertising algorithms and can convert their users into a special kind of social capital. Communication mechanisms have entered into computer games and entertainment streams. Politicians as opinion leaders compete with influencers for audiences. Kanye West’s political manifestos and election campaigning on Twitch have heralded the erosion of familiar institutional frameworks. There has emerged a vast gray zone in which political action is possible outside the existing rules. Legal lacunae have formed in the areas most open to external influence. Transnational corporations, international organizations and programs, cross-border social movements, and even individuals now potentially generate political risks. A digital political action or position needs not rely solely on supporters physically within the national borders. In effect, there has emerged an unlimited “online constituency,” in which one can compete for supporters regardless of their citizenship. For example, ‘likes’ from Pakistan and Puerto Rico, regarding solutions to environmental issues, can just as easily influence Scandinavian public opinion. Interstate and nongovernmental organizations have also played a role. Driven by expansive interpretations of their mandates and missions, and responding to growing doubts about the role and effectiveness of international organizations, some increasingly dismiss state borders and undertake contentious actions. Some states have reasonably interpreted this as an open challenge to their own sovereignty and considered protective mechanisms. The 2020 amendments to Russia’s Constitution established its priority over the decisions of international organizations and courts, and Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (2023) mandated “countering the use of human rights issues as a tool for external pressure, interference in the internal affairs of states and destructive influence on the activities of international organizations.” The social situation has transformed qualitatively. Face-to-face communication and common everyday practices are no longer needed for the formation of group identity. Social identities have transcended state borders and can be ‘remotely verified’ through inclusion in a common, transnational communicative space. Identities, based solely on virtual experience, have become widespread. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sociologists noted the spontaneous unification of people—even those who had never been to New York—around the idea that “we are all New Yorkers.” The formulas “all of us,” “I/we,” “me too,” etc. have been repeatedly used to create subjective and situational politically-colored identities. A number of identities (gender, race, etc.) have received external backing from foreign and international actors. Dual political loyalty—to nation-states and to transnational groups—has become common for such identities. States perceive the transnationalization of group identities as a potential threat. The political priorities of some groups obviously presage conflict with national (civil) identity. Hardline solutions to the problem, through bans or cancelation of some group identities, tend to complicate things, as they trigger identities’ compensatory function to provide solidarity and belonging in the context of social alienation (Bilgrami, 2006). When some social identity is perceived as deviant or exposed to pressure, its bearers can seek support outside the state. In the past, retention of civic identity, with its accompanying rights and freedoms, typically took precedence over political emancipation. Now, connection with a large supranational group, and the support expected from it, may ease such fears, facilitating defection to the state’s opponents. Another source of change is the unresolved or poorly resolved problems caused by the geopolitical crises of the 1990s. A short-lived delusion of inevitable openness was fueled by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and inflated expectations of rapprochement between former adversaries within the context of globalization. Even open interference in domestic politics was often perceived as a necessary part of fitting a country into the new world order. For example, in 1992, the U.S.-government-supported National Democratic Institute held a series of working meetings on the development of Russia’s electoral and party system with the authors of the relevant draft legislation (McFaul and Mendelson, 2000). However, with a growing awareness of the realities of the new world order (including the limited opportunities for integration into the global Western project), Russia, China, and other non-Western powers reassessed their places in the world and the limits of their own sovereignty. They recognized not only the opportunities but also the threats posed by interaction with their foreign counterparts. In the West, Russia’s and China’s rejection of Western democratization was perceived as continued ideological confrontation. The ‘democracy-authoritarianism’ dichotomy produced skepticism of actual or perceived non-democracies. It was in the 1990s that the topic of interference gained particular prominence in academic research. “Foreign political engagement” was defined as “the calculated action of a state, a group of states, an international organization or some other international actor(s) to influence the political system of another state (including its structure of authority, its domestic policies and its political leaders) against its will by using various means of coercion (forcible or non-forcible) in pursuit of particular political objectives” (Geldenhuys, 1998, p. 6). Foreign interference is “targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces” (Regan, 1998, p. 756).   Stage One: perception Initially, interference was the domain of the powerful and usually manifested itself as overt military interventions and coups: “almost everything scholars know about the subject… is based on… powerful states meddling in weak ones” (Wohlforth, 2020). Over time, however, the phenomenon took on more pervasive and complex forms. Major powers’ perception of the threat posed by external interference prompted a more meaningful analysis of the problem. Previously, they were primarily interested in legitimizing their own actions (hence the concept of  ‘humanitarian interventions’), while the targets of interference were struggling for political survival, lacked the necessary intellectual resources, and were excluded from the discourse. This changed with the emergence of new actors and new roles. Historically, the Soviet Union and the U.S. certainly tried to influence each other but did so within clear ideological frameworks and an unwritten but stable code of covert actions. The Soviet Union’s support for foreign Communist parties was dictated more by the ruling party’s ideology than by the state’s interests. The 7th Congress of the Communist International, held in 1935, accordingly emphasized the need for “proceeding from the specific conditions and peculiarities of each country and avoiding, as a rule, direct interference in the internal organizational affairs of Communist parties” (Titarenko et al., 2007, p. 669). In 1943, Stalin explained that the Comintern was being dissolved partly because “the Communist Parties belonging to the [Comintern] are falsely accused of being alleged agents of a foreign state, and this hinders their work among the broad masses. With the dissolution of the [Comintern] this trump card is knocked out of the hands of the enemies. The step taken will undoubtedly strengthen the Communist parties as national labor parties and at the same time strengthen the internationalism of the masses, the base of which is the Soviet Union” (Adibekov, 2004, p. 812). In the case of the United States, as Igor Istomin writes, “although the Soviet Union represented the most significant strategic target for the United States, it was subject to relatively modest subversion in contrast to that against less capable states” (Istomin, 2022). Liberal democracies saw intervention and interference as suitable tools for influencing “weak states of a non-liberal character” (Doyle, 1983). Since the end of the Cold War, major powers have used interference against each other on a new scale and in new ways. In many countries, the intelligence community is actively involved in conceptualizing foreign interference and in doing so draws a clear line between it and espionage. Whereas espionage is one of the many means of obtaining information and thus an advantage over a rival, intervention aims to “influence, disrupt or subvert target’s national interests.” Such a distinction is proposed in the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service’s report entitled New Zealand’s Security Threat Environment 2023 (NZSIS, 2023). Just like diplomacy, espionage is part of established norms and a recognized toolkit. CIA Director William Burns has aptly remarked that “espionage has been and will remain an integral part of statecraft” (Burns, 2024). Interference, on the other hand, is seen as something that is outside the established rules of the game. Even in the rare cases where espionage is categorized as interference, its routine nature is emphasized and contrasted to more novel forms of influence. For example, the French parliamentary delegation on intelligence described espionage as a “classic” form of interference (Rapport Relatif, 2023). The targets of interference have not upheld these semantic distinctions. In Russia, rethinking the threat of interference began in the 2000s, prompted by disappointment with integration into the West, by increasingly obvious attempts at external influence on Russian domestic politics, and by a series of “color revolutions” and coups near Russia’s borders. The latter began with the Rose Revolution in Georgia and Orange Revolution in Ukraine. This prompted openly hardline official rhetoric and debate about national sovereignty within growing globalization. In 2006, Russia enacted its first legislation regulating foreign-funded NGOs. In Western publications, this innovation is often regarded as the beginning of restrictions, around the world, on foreign involvement in NGOs. However, it was actually just one part of a global trend. For example, a similar measure was introduced in India in 2006 and passed in 2010, completely banning foreign funding of political activities (FCRA, 2010). The issue was brought to a head by the Arab Spring, which brought uprisings, regime change, and civil war to almost all of North Africa. Interference drew growing attention from both policymakers and experts. However, in the perception of both policymakers and experts, the political goals of interference are often blurred by the accompanying social and informational processes. In Russia, mass protests in December 2011-February 2012, fueled by heavy foreign funding, had a considerable impact on views of the Arab Spring. The authorities opted for a hardline approach to managing interference risks. On 13 July 2012, the State Duma amended the law “On Non-Profit Organizations,” introducing the status of ‘foreign agent’ for Russian NGOs engaged in political activities in Russia and receiving foreign funding. Later, in 2015, the concept of ‘undesirable organization’ was added to the legislation. Discussions of foreign interference received a new impetus with the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, to which the topic was central. Attention to the issue has since become far more systematic around the world, including in official doctrines and legislation. Administrative and criminal legislation establishes the corpus delicti of crimes related to foreign interference, and specialized institutions are created to counter interference attempts. By 2018, more than 50 states had restricted or entirely banned foreign funding of political activities (Mayer, 2018), not to mention other counter-interference mechanisms. The topic’s discussion has been complicated by its politicization within the U.S., and it is torn between the extremes of justification versus harsh restrictive measures. It is also burdened and obfuscated by obsolete terminology. For instance, the term ‘foreign agent’—whether used negatively to mean association with foreign intelligence services, or neutrally to mean action in the interest of the principal—refers to the practices of previous eras. In fact, the actors now defined by this concept have vague political loyalties that vary depending on the domestic environment and external influences. Not all act consciously. However, all bear hybrid worldviews and act as channels for the import of values. The authorities see them as dangerous annoyances and proponents of foreign interests. Even if these interests do not necessarily contradict the interests of the rest of society, they are still implicitly hostile as products of another political system, another “symbolic universe” (Berger and Luckmann, 1990).   Stage Two: reaction The threats stemming from technological, social, and geopolitical changes and regulatory imbalances could not be left unanswered. Political systems had to equalize internal pressure with that of the external environment. Initial efforts at self-defense were naturally chaotic. An in-depth analysis of interference countermeasures is complicated by the asynchronous nature of states’ adaptation to the threat. Each state has its own degree of immersion in the new technological order and its own history of encounters with interference. For some countries, certain  aspects of interference simply do not exist. There can be no interference in digital electoral infrastructure if there is no such infrastructure. For most countries, interference in electoral infrastructure can be nothing more than old-fashioned physical seizure of a polling station or an entire constituency. Some countries’ histories have made them very sensitive to the problem of interference, while others have not yet developed sufficient mechanisms for recognizing it. Russia’s heightened alertness was produced by the collapse of the USSR and then of illusions regarding openness’s unalloyed goodness. States’ institutions for countering foreign interference also vary. Some focus on protecting electoral processes and on limiting foreign support for the opposition, while others focus on protecting education and research and on regulating digital platforms. Actions are taken both regarding infrastructure (e.g., the development of technology to protect critical infrastructure such as communications and electronic electoral systems) and regarding individuals and organizations (e.g., restricting or prohibiting foreign influence on the political system via specific actors). A number of countries complement institutional restrictions with social and political pressure on those political actors that seek support abroad or directly act in the interests of foreign states. Foreign-supported political and sub-political activities are stigmatized, and their participants become “outcasts,” often pushed to the periphery of the political arena or out of it altogether. The institutionalization and legitimization of political stigmatization is done in three ways. First, specific states and their supporters or representatives are labeled as threats in legislation and other official documents (for example, the West’s reference to a ‘Chinese threat’ in academia). Second, demonstrative procedures convey some form of condemnation (for example, the French National Assembly’s hearings on foreign political, economic, and financial interference). Third, specialized labeling directly imposes stigmatization (for example, Russia’s register of foreign agents, the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the UK’s Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS)). The EU is implementing a similar mechanism within the Defense of Democracy package, and France and Canada are also discussing the urgent need for registers of foreign influence. Russia and China tend to universalize the threat via linkage to state sovereignty. Foreign interference is presented as a danger common to all countries, stemming from attempts by individual states to blur the boundaries of national sovereignty and interfere in others’ internal affairs. In contrast, the U.S. and its allies reject the universalization of the threat, adhering to interference narratives based on different principles. Western official discourse rarely connects foreign interference to sovereignty, and instead narrows the concept to “interference in democratic processes” or (even more specifically) to “interference in elections.” Executive Order 13848, “Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election” (Executive Order, 2018), emphasizes that “foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America’s free and open political system.” The U.S. National Security Strategy similarly states that “America will not tolerate foreign interference in our elections” and “will act decisively to defend and deter disruptions to our democratic processes” (The White House, 2022). Thus, foreign interference is understood primarily as an attempt to influence elections by affecting electoral infrastructure and via information campaigns for or against specific candidates/parties. This avoidance of a more general conceptualization is explicable given the West’s flexible approach to interpreting threats and justifying protective measures. The Western strategic narrative of interference is built around three key elements: drawing a normative distinction between interference against democracies versus non-democracies; narrowing the definition of interference with a focus on specific risks; and attributing threats to specific countries or groups of countries. The latter is also observed in Russia, where interference is discursively associated with the Western countries, but this is limited at the official/legislative level. In the U.S., the linkage of the threat of interference to specific actors is a well-established tradition. As early as 1918, the Senate created “a subcommittee to investigate German and Bolshevik propaganda” (CRS Report, 2020), and in 1938 the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) was passed amid concerns over Nazi Germany’s propaganda activities. This tradition continues with the October 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, which blames foreign interference on specific countries: China, Russia, and Iran (The White House, 2022).   Stage Three: conceptualization Over the decades, states have moved from recognizing the problem of interference to attempting a systemic response. The initial reaction was similar to piloerection in animals, as states bristled against the threat. Evolutionarily, this reflex demonstrates a sensitivity to external stimuli and a readiness to retaliate and is associated with maintaining or challenging the existing hierarchy (Muller and Mitani, 2005). Similarly, states demonstrate a willingness to assert sovereignty in various spheres and use the defenses available to them. The reflex inevitably outstrips rational comprehension of the situation, and its conceptualization remains sketchy. Once, states generally acted straightforwardly: if there was a sufficient imbalance of capabilities (or perceptions of such an imbalance), the stronger actors used diplomatic, economic, and even military interventions. However, advancements in information and communication technology have granted states a wider range of indirect instruments of influence, and a greater ability to vary the degree of pressure. Some of these processes were conceptualized as ‘soft power,’ which could not have emerged without information flows strong enough to influence foreign audiences. However, categorizing the instruments of external influence solely by their hardness is clearly insufficient. Their conceptualization has also seen the emergence of certain ambiguities. The first attempts resulted in the confusion of ‘intervention’ with ‘interference’ (Bartenev, 2018), while some authors assert the concept’s essential indeterminacy (Istomin, 2023). Academics and practitioners now offer contradictory distinctions between ‘interference’ and ‘influence’ and various typologies of such activities. State actors have joined these processes. For example, research carried out on a grant from the Australian Department of Defense has produced a model for analyzing interference with regard to the most vulnerable elements of political systems: institutions, infrastructure, industry, individuals, and ideas (Henschke et al., 2020). The existing approaches’ key problem is their attempt to exhaustively explain various related phenomena through a single concept. In fact, interference does not supplant but rather supplements previous practices, which are altered and obtain greater flexibility and more opportunities for use. An action’s most important characteristics are the degree to which it is direct (or indirect) and hard (or soft). Intertwining, these characteristics make up the following matrix: Direct actions include intervention or overt pressure. Intervention is inherently hard but is not limited to military incursion, instead including all crossings of sovereign borders: informational, electoral, cultural, educational and other interventions. Cultural intervention, for example, could include support for cultural projects in a foreign country aimed at undermining the government. Pressure entails the use of economic, diplomatic, political, and other instruments to change a state’s behavior. For example, unilateral economic sanctions. Indirect actions can be termed interference if hard and influence if soft.  Influence does not necessarily entail negative effects on the target of influence. It can be exercised openly and is generally regarded as legitimate practice in international relations. Interference, on the other hand, is usually covert and always aimed at harming the opponent. The difference between influence and interference may also be seen in the way they are addressed. In its June 2023 report, the French Commission of Inquiry on Foreign Interference stated: “Influence can most often be tolerated and is tolerated, which is not the case with interference” (Rapport d’enquête n°1311, 2023). All foreign activities fit into this typology. In the electoral sphere, which is most sensitive to external influence, all four types of foreign activities are clearly visible. Influence manifests itself in assessments by foreign actors of electoral procedures and campaigns. Pressure is enforced, for example, through sanctions on elections officials, calls for changes in legislation, etc. Interference is more covert: from non-public support for the opposition to targeted long-term “nurturing” of future candidates through leadership training programs. Finally, direct attacks on electronic election infrastructure, or the dissemination of misinformation (e.g., falsified opinion polls), are electoral interventions. The list of tools to affect elections is far longer, but all of them fall into one of these four categories.   Balancing Interference is commonplace today and will likely become only more so, especially as it has become possible in “endoscopic” form. Channels and instruments are hidden, and external interests can exert themselves from within the sovereign political space. The escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, between China and the West, and generally around the world, only adds to the importance of the matter. Countries find themselves in a new reality of multiplying challenges of foreign influence. As countries approach future political cycles, they observe interference in various disguises and hope that the most destructive types are not directed against them. Their first reactions seek to eliminate vulnerabilities. Most major powers have begun developing protective mechanisms, but this is just the beginning. The British National Security Act and the Hungarian Act on the Protection of National Sovereignty, both adopted in 2023, emphasize measures to counter foreign interference in elections. In the United States, various initiatives are constantly emerging at both the federal and state levels. For example, in April 2024, Senator Bill Hagerty, along with other senators, introduced the Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act. Before the 2024 elections, Taiwanese officials offered a cash reward for evidence of foreign interference. Even before the Russian presidential campaign began, it was clear that attempts to meddle would be part of the overall drama. Attempted interference will also surely enjoy special attention in the upcoming U.S. and British elections. Special apprehension, regarding the security of the processes of power-formation, is understandable. However, an excessive emphasis on elections may be counterproductive. Firstly, claims of foreign interference are weaponized in internal political battles, hindering objective analysis. Secondly, less obvious (but no less significant) cultural, educational, and economic processes (strategic infrastructure, etc.) should not be ignored. An over-simplified or reductive approach to matters can lead to exaggerated reactions or careless neglect. Without meaningful discussion, the analysis of interference and related phenomena may well be displaced by moral evaluations that are far-removed from reality. Further technological development, including the spread of artificial intelligence, will make the topic more controversial. States will long remain in the position of Achilles, patching up legal loopholes to keep pace with the technology of their competitors. In the long run, the conceptualization of interference is likely to become increasingly diverse, followed by tougher rhetoric and firmer domestic countermeasures. The sooner the countries realize that they are dealing with a complex system of interrelated phenomena, the more effective and less painful the adaptation process will be. Challenges and institutional responses must be balanced. Given the speed of the ongoing processes, equilibrium will probably not be attainable for several decades. Influence, pressure, interference and interventions require different responses. How quickly they are identified will determine the degree of sovereignty held by states in the new system of international relations. The U.S.’s Pursuit of NATO Expansion into Ukraine Since 1994 Dylan Payne Royce It is ironic that NATO, an alliance ostensibly committed to preserving peace in Europe, has once again made war the ultima ratio, the only effective way for a state to preserve its security. But such an outcome was essentially predetermined almost as soon as the USSR collapsed, when the U.S. decided to expand NATO into Ukraine. More

[Category: Issues]

— Global Memory Culture in Doubt

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Miller, A.I., 2024. Global Memory Culture in Doubt. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 32–44. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-2-32-44   As the old world order crumbles, the factor of memory politics in international relations is also undergoing major, multifaceted change. Some of these developments have long been extensively examined, including in Russia, while others have remained in the shadows until recently, at least in Russia. The developments that began manifesting themselves in the early 2020s are of unclear scale and relation to one another, but it is already obvious that they will be serious and lasting. Russian memory politics were mostly institutionalized in 2012-2014 with the establishment of the Russian Historical Society (RHS), the Russian Military Historical Society (RMHS), and the Unified Historical and Cultural Standard; the launch of the Immortal Regiment and Last Address campaigns; the cancelation of the Program for the Commemoration of Victims of Political Repressions (adopted earlier in 2013); the enactment of the Law on Foreign Agents; and the drafting of the Law On Undesirable Foreign Organizations (enacted later in 2015). This list is by no means complete, and a similar understanding of the changes that took place in the first half of the 2020s will probably require a similar temporal distance.   The Nuremberg Consensus abandoned In Russia, most attention is naturally paid to the radical changes that World War II’s narrative has recently undergone in the West (see Miller  et al., 2020). True, the Nuremberg Consensus was never universally recognized, and the memory of World War II differed significantly across countries (Miller and Solovyov, 2022), but these differences were not emphasized. The leading Allied powers, even those subsequently divided by the Cold War, shared a common understanding: Germany bore most guilt for the unparalleled evil of the Holocaust, and it was defeated by an alliance of countries that were different but united in defense of human values. In the 2010s, however, the Nuremberg Consensus was replaced by the narrative of two totalitarianisms, Nazi and Communist, which made them equally responsible for all the evils of World War II. Thus Russia, as the Soviet Union’s legal successor, turned from a leading force against Nazism to its accomplice in unleashing the war (Resolution, 2019; Miller, 2016). Russia, naturally, defended the Nuremberg Consensus (Miller, 2023), but its memory of the war is also undergoing significant changes. Its previous focus on the heroism of the victors is now being displaced by the theme of suffering and victimhood. This can be seen in adjustments made to the main Victory Museum on Moscow’s Poklonnaya Hill[1] and to other regional museums; in the war crime trials conducted in many regions; and especially in the No Statute of Limitations project that was launched in 2019 to investigate the invaders’ crimes on Russian soil. The complicity of various Europeans—from Spaniards and Italians to Norwegians and Finns—in the invasion and occupation, and associated crimes, is no longer swept under the carpet, but instead emphasized (see No Statute of Limitations, n.d.). In February 2024, the Russian Interior Ministry put a number of Baltic politicians on the wanted list for “desecration of historical memory”—the demolition of monuments to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II (Interfax, 2024a). Thus, the polyphony of war memories is increasingly a war of memories. Another change is the growing global discussion of colonialism, its consequences, and the former empires’ belated and evasive responses. Until recently, Russia was little involved in such discussions, but now official and public discourse increasingly features the Soviet anticolonial tradition. Meanwhile, Russia’s foreign adversaries are applying the notion of decolonization to Russia’s past and future. Why and how the postcolonial studies have given way to the decolonization discourse has been considered brilliantly by Vladimir Malakhov (2023), although not from a memory-politics perspective  (Malakhov, 2023). The colonial past is becoming less a matter of scholarly debate and academic resource-competition, and more a tool of propaganda.   Colonialism vs. Holocaust In recent years, the subjects of colonialism and Holocaust remembrance have come under intense scrutiny. In 2020-2021, a fierce debate erupted in Germany, quickly termed Historikerstreit 2.0. The first Historikerstreit, or “historians’ dispute,” was a high-profile controversy in 1986-1987. Historian Ernst Nolte proposed “contextualizing” National Socialism and the Holocaust, which supposedly emerged largely in response to the challenge of Bolshevism. Leftists, led by Jürgen Habermas, successfully rejoined that the Holocaust was unprecedented and incomparable, and that any attempt to relativize German responsibility should be condemned, a view that endured for years.[2] (Some of the dispute’s polemical methods prefigured the now-widespread practice of “cancelation,” suggesting that it might have been better if the dispute had not happened at all.) The naming of Historikerstreit 2.0 reflected not only a similar level of antagonism between its opponents, but also the understanding that it was equally capable of lastingly affecting historical memory. Perhaps the most dramatic episode of Historikerstreit 2.0 occurred on the eve of the COVID-19 lockdowns. At the beginning of 2020, the Ruhr Cultural Forum invited Achille Mbembe, a Cameroonian historian and philosopher based in South Africa, as a guest speaker. Lorenz Deutsch, a politician from the ruling coalition’s Free Democratic Party, demanded that the organizers revoke the invitation, accusing Mbembe of “anti-Semitic criticism of Israel, Holocaust relativization, and extremist disinformation.” Deutsch drew these conclusions from Mbembe’s work, which compares Apartheid in South Africa to the situation in the Gaza Strip (Capdepón and Moses, 2021; Rothberg, 2022). The lockdown resolved the issue by canceling the forum, but the incident sparked debate in several hundred publications in April-May (Günes, 2020), and the term Historikerstreit 2.0 was coined (Rothberg, 2022). Many renowned intellectuals supported Mbembe. In one of his public lectures, Professor Wulf Kansteiner, one of the world’s authorities in memory studies, asked the audience: “Don’t you find it strange that Germans are trying to teach a native of their former colony, Cameroon, how to discuss genocide and the Holocaust?” (Quoted from memory, not verbatim.) Like a scalpel, this question ripped open a long-standing, but until recently carefully silenced problem. In German, and more generally European, memory culture, the discussion of genocide must invariably begin with the Holocaust. The Holocaust is considered a unique phenomenon. In this view, only dictatorial regimes from Hitler to Milošević can be responsible for committing or attempting genocide. For Africans, however, the first genocide by the Germans occurred when they responded to the Herero and Nama uprising in German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) by exterminating 80 percent of the Herero people and half of the Nama between 1904 and 1908. Jean-Paul Sartre declared as early as 1967, during Bertrand Russell’s ‘public tribunal’ regarding U.S. crimes in Vietnam, that colonialism had featured quite a few genocides by empires that are fairly democratic in their metropoles. Regarding the debate on Achille Mbembe’s alleged anti-Semitism—specifically Michael Rothberg’s Multidirektionale Erinnerung [Multidirectional Memory] (2021) and Jürgen Zimmerer’s From Windhoek to Auschwitz (2011)—Dirk Moses (2021) writes that: “Linking German colonialism, to the Nazi war of annihilation, has foreign observers like me scratching our heads. After all, we have been raising these issues for twenty years.” “We are witnessing, I believe, nothing less than a public exorcism performed by the self-appointed high priests of the Katechismus der Deutschen,” which insists on the incomparability of the Holocaust and other genocides. What is new is that today the ‘ministers of the Katechismus’ are fighting defensive battles, rather than punishing the few apostates, as in earlier years. The intensification of the “mnemonic conflict” in Germany has occurred not least because new voices are entering the discussion—migrants and their descendants, who have studied in Germany and are often German citizens. Michael Rothberg gives striking examples of such intellectuals who challenge the dominant “memory regime.” They bring in a different tradition and a different history, and yet they are already part of German society and, as a consequence, they feel they are in a position to challenge it from within (Rothberg, 2021). One of them, Mohammed Amjahid, born in 1988, who studied political science in Berlin and mastered the Germans’ penchant for inventing new composite concepts, added to the famous and untranslatable Vergangenheitsbewaltigung the new sarcastic concept of Erinnerungsüberlegenheit, i.e. ‘memorial superiority,’ referring to the poorly-disguised German ambition to become a world model for interpreting the past (Amjahid, 2021). Rothberg (2021) expresses the cautious hope that the conflict can be overcome. However, his optimism is difficult to share as leading universities publish piles of works that describe German memory politics, considered a model just yesterday, as carefully camouflaged racism (Marwecki, 2020, p. 256; Özyürek, 2023; Port, 2023; Mishra, 2014). A connection between Nazism and colonialism has long been proposed but was marginalized in Europe until the early 2020s, when—especially in Germany—there began attempts to strictly “discipline” deviants from the “Katechismus.” 2024 saw a clash of approaches to the genocide issue as South Africa filed suit in the UN Court of Justice against Israel for its actions in Gaza. The Court’s statement, finding a high probability of Israeli culpability for genocide, showed that the Holocaust narrative that immunizes Israel from genocide charges is no longer universally accepted, even in Europe. Although Germany is still trying to defend this narrative, that is becoming increasingly difficult. In February 2024, Israel declared Brazilian President Lula da Silva persona non grata for comparing its actions in Gaza to the Holocaust, for which he refused to apologize (Interfax, 2024b). Once-sidelined conflicts thus resurface in “wars of memory.”   Multiplying victimhood At the turn of the millennium, when every Eastern European country began a “search for  (its own) lost genocide,” pushing Holocaust into the shadow of their own suffering, emphasizing the Holocaust’s uniqueness acquired political utility, as it could interfere with various countries’ attempts to focus on their own suffering (Finkel, 2010). But this pragmatism worked only briefly in Europe, where the Holocaust had been committed (to various degrees) by people from all nations. Up until the 1980s, non-Germans’ responsibility for the Holocaust was hardly ever raised. The 1990s and early 2000s appear to have seen the subject’s most honest discussion in the EU, with the French, Dutch, Norwegians, and others earnestly pondering over their responsibility. But the EU’s new eastern members then began to turn its memory politics towards the history of ‘two totalitarianisms’ and their own genocides and suffering. Poles denounced “critical patriotism” as a “pedagogy of shame” and replaced it with what Krystyna Konczal calls “mnemonic populism,” i.e. the pure (and electorally popular) image of a sufferer-nation: “poll-driven, manifestly moralistic, and above all [consisting of] anti-pluralist imaginings of the past” (Kończal, 2021, p. 458).  This effort has been buttressed by the attempted suppression, including via legislation, of domestic and foreign researchers who are critically assessing Polish participation in the Holocaust. Little now remains, even within the EU, of the former consensus that recognized the Holocaust as the 20th century’s core, unparalleled crime.   Moralization versus reconciliation Another aspect of memory politics that has enjoyed less (critical) attention, until recently, is the effort to globally standardize the “reckoning with the past” and the remembrance of the victims of crimes against humanity, an effort that became an important part of human rights ideology in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In her work The Past Can’t Heal Us: The Dangers of Mandating Memory in the Name of Human Rights, Irish scholar Leah David (2020) analyzes the construction and effectiveness of memory politics (“moral remembering”). She considers the 1986-1987 Historikerstreit an important trigger for the conceptualization of “moral remembering.” In the course of the dispute, Habermas and his supporters succeeded in establishing Geschitspolitik (historical politics) as a purely negative concept, reflecting the view of historical remembrance as a sphere in which civil society should play a major role and in which politicians should not interfere. (Beyond this controversy, in his concept of the public sphere, Habermas emphasized its link to politics and power (Habermas, 2016(1962)).) Soon after the dispute, the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed, followed by the Soviet Union. The 1980s saw the demise of most Latin American military dictatorships and some authoritarian regimes in East Asia. In 1994, the Apartheid regime in South Africa came to an end. All these events, as well as the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s, generated demand for “reckoning with the past,” studying the history of human rights violations and dictatorships’ other crimes, and claiming compensation for their victims. A growing number of influential international NGOs involved themselves in this work, firmly inserting the “reckoning with the past” into world politics. The Cold War’s ideological confrontation was replaced by human rights, which gradually transformed into an ideology of its own—an integral part of which was the “moral remembering” of nondemocratic regimes’ past crimes. Human rights ideology, like any ideology, was keen to assert its approach to historical remembrance as the only correct one. Louis Joinet’s Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (UN, 1997) focused on four elements of transitional justice: the right to information, the right to redress, the right to reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence. In 2005, the Principles were expanded by independent expert Diane Orentlicher to include the duty of “moral  remembering.” And in 2014, UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights Farida Shaheed released On Memorization (i.e. Memorialization) Processes in Post-Conflict and Divided Societies (UN, 2014), which she saw as a continuation of her predecessors’ work. Shaheed’s report recommends the compilation of best practices in memorialization, “which should reflect difficulties encountered and the results achieved in the process.” (UN, 2014) Thus there was an ever more rigorously formulated unified global standard of moral remembering. Amongst David’s various critiques of the moral remembering policy, she argues that standardizing memorialization in conflict and post-conflict societies (as sought by the global human rights ideology) cannot ensure the acceptance of human rights, nor can it prevent or even mitigate nationalist conflicts. Although this conclusion is based on just two cases, Yugoslavia and Palestine, it is sufficient to at least place in doubt the unconditional efficacy of moral remembering. Moreover, David actually argues that moral remembering is not only ineffective, but potentially harmful. Given its imperative to unambiguously group historical actors into the categories of victims, perpetrators, and onlookers, “moral remembering” references a particular past, one that is strictly bounded in time and represented by a single narrative. In reality, the “victims” are often perpetrators in other cases, and vice versa. As stated above, all parties to ethnic conflicts seek to present themselves as victims of genocide, since such victims are immune to questions and claims. Thus, artificial division into victims and criminals perpetuates ethnic inequality and confrontation. David has also shown that the standards of moral remembering imposed by international organizations, firstly, ignore both local specificities and other possible approaches (e.g., the 1975 Spanish ‘Pact of Forgetting’); and, secondly, often yield superficial imitation by national authorities, who look for (and find) ways to keep even those who have committed crimes against humanity in the pantheon of national heroes. Just several years ago, David’s viewpoint would have been seen as dissenting and marginal. A “correct” way of remembering was (and for many remains) essential for the prosperous development of society (in Russian popular literature, see e.g., Epple, 2020). But now David’s fierce criticism of the liberal-globalist normative approach to moral remembering is drawing extensive and very positive comments (see Book Debate, 2021). Many agree that attempts to globally impose and standardize moral remembering fail to support, and can even harm, democracy and human rights.   *  *  * The three main pillars of “global memory”—the Nuremberg Consensus regarding the Second World War, the memory of the Holocaust as a unique and incomparable atrocity, and the standards of moral remembering of crimes against humanity and human rights violations—are not just being questioned but are losing legitimacy. The sense of the old order’s instability, which caused and occasionally still evokes the wish to defend it against challenges with tough measures, is giving way to the realization by most actors that it cannot be preserved. Almost a decade ago, some memory politics scholars called for an agonistic approach to the field, i.e. to engage in a mutually respectful dialog, while recognizing the impossibility of reaching the common understanding of the past that was sought by the cosmopolitan approach in the 1990s (Bull and Hansen, 2016; Berger and Kansteiner, 2021). These calls reflected concern over the growing antagonism between mnemonic actors, the securitization of memory, the cleansing of national media spaces of dangerous external influences, the stigmatization and canceling of foreign and domestic opponents, and the tight linking of memory politics to identity politics that are increasingly based on one’s own supposed victimization. As renowned China expert, Professor Alexander Lomanov has aptly remarked  regarding contemporary Chinese memory politics, the consolidation and cementing of memory within individual countries is an important cause of the global memory project’s collapse.[3] For now, the agonistic approach remains almost entirely hypothetical, which is unlikely to change any time soon. The antagonization of memory politics is increasing. New digital forms of memory, especially social media, have become a powerful factor in reinforcing antagonistic tendencies (Pavlovsky and Miller, 2023). Memory politics have become a scene of irreconcilable confrontation not only between Russia and the West, and between the West and the Global South, but also within Western societies. There are no zones of global consensus left, as underlined by the recently-emerged critical analysis of memory politics, including of its key globalist postulates. The title of Leah David’s book, The Past Can’t Heal Us, seems a likely prediction of the foreseeable future. Neo-Tsymburskian Cycles in the History of Russian-Western Relations Gordon M. Hahn Russia’s relations with its Other have gone through repeating cycles of emulative Westernization, Western intervention, Russian rebuff to the intervention, and Russia’s revival of traditional values, norms and practices with limited survival of elements borrowed from the more advanced, liberal Western cultural strains. More

[Category: Issues]

— Transformation of the UN’s Power in International Governance—from Political to Ideological

 

at 7/1/24 12:00am

For citation, please use: Borisov, D.A. and Burkina, Ya.R., 2024. Transformation of the UN’s Power in International Governance – from Political to Ideological. Russia in Global Affairs, 22(3), pp. 94–109. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2024-22-3-94-109   In the first decade after the collapse of the bipolar system, the prospects for a unipolar world order were discussed globally. However, as the limitations of this model became increasingly obvious by the turn of the millennium, a demand formed for more representative institutional models of international governance. As an alternative to the unilateral action of a hegemon, the UN has the potential to meet this demand. In this article, the emergence and functioning of new institutional forms of international governance, under the auspices of the UN, are considered through comparative analysis of key UN sustainable development documents, G20 documents, and national sustainable development doctrines, which indicate the UN’s growing ideological authority at the national and international levels. Conceptually, the article is based on Michael Mann’s four sources of social power—ideological, economic, political, and military (IEMP model)—and is complemented with practical-relational constructivism. In line with this concept, we consider the UN as a subject (agent) in international relations, which, along with states, has the opportunity to use all four sources of social power, but due to the established practice, it is ideological power that becomes the basis of the UN’s influence. We define international power as “a generalized means” (Parsons, 1968, p. 263) used to meet the needs of a subject in  international relations through interaction based not on a subject-object dichotomy but designed to facilitate joint actions and achieve a common goal…“This concept of power is based on dialogue that is always carried out between equal but not identical participants” (Tikhonov, 2008, pp. 90-91). At the same time, international power in conditions of sovereign equality and diversity of IR participants is characterized by power relations through voluntary submission or cooperation between subjects. Ideology is here defined as a system of collective (international) meanings that surpass personal (national) experience. Its collective and individual recognition ensures the manageability of interstate relations by putting into practice the reasonable, moral, and emotional in the foreign policy of a state. Relations in the ideological sphere are built around two tasks: ensuring security and developing or motivating commonality (Zinoviev, 2002). The former is solved through social practices that legitimize actions on the basis of guidelines for creating rules and justifying order. The latter, by changing mainstream discourse through critically assessing reality and developing a concept of the future (Griffin, 2006; Hamilton, 1987; Skinner, 2002). A broad discussion organized by the International Organization journal in 2019 showed that intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations tend to use Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) to affect the behavior of international actors (Kelley and Simmons, 2019). Studies have reported on the effect of the Millennium Goals on the educational policies of 114 states (Bisbee et al., 2019) and the social pressure exerted by GPIs on public and business decision-makers (Honig and Weaver, 2019; Doshi et al., 2019). This article considers the impact of GPIs as an ideological element of international governance.   Bipolarity’s birthmarks: the crisis of the UN’s political influence The relatively peaceful dismantling of the bipolar system helped create conditions for the UN to fully resume the functions laid down in its Charter. The UN acquired the ability to fill the power vacuum in international governance by using the primacy of international law to address significant socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and humanitarian issues (Bogaturov, 2006, p. 9). However, the Cold War consigned to the UN the task of preventing war between the two nuclear powers (Freeman, 2023) by facilitating their strategic communication, while the broad issues of human development were shifted to the bloc level (Kissinger, 2014). These changes affected the institutional structure of the UN: its main international economic institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization) were detached, the UN Trusteeship Council was suspended, and the UN Security Council began adopting political decisions by consensus among its permanent members. The demolition of the Yalta-Potsdam international order further reduced the influence of the UN, which could not quickly adapt to the new international environment. Its diminished role became first evident in its area of immediate responsibility—international security (Zagorsky, 2015, p. 24). The UN failed to propose competent approaches to resolving conflicts: the scale of violence in Rwanda was monstrous, and the UN’s voice was completely ignored in the Yugoslav conflict (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 364).   The UN’s values in the new world order In the early 1990s, the UN sought to rethink the concept of interstate relations. The year 1992 saw several landmark events: UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace,” and the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro—which put more emphasis on human security and environmentalism in UN activities. New issues in the UN agenda were elaborated by relevant UN departments. The UN Development Program began compiling the Human Development Index, and the UN Commission on Sustainable Development promoted relevant indicators. However, the economic and political resources of the organization remained low. In his report, We, the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: “Our resources are simply not commensurate with our global tasks” (UNGA, 2000a, p. 52). Economic and political clashes between states began to undermine “the UN’s relevance” (Knight, 2000, p. 129). This spurred the organization to define new priorities in its development strategy. They were articulated by Kofi Annan in the same report: “We must strive not to usurp the role of other actors on the world stage, but to become a more effective catalyst for change and coordination among them. the United Nations needs to embrace the new technologies more wholeheartedly than we have in the past” (UNGA, 2000a, p. 49). Systematized UN values of peace were officially presented at the Millennium Summit as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNGA, 2000b). The 2005 World Summit formalized the shift towards sustainable development through a system of interdependent and complementary elements in the economic, social, and environmental areas (Larionova, 2020, p. 161). The UN’s development of the concepts of human security and environmental protection can be viewed as a new approach to using institutionalized ideological power in international practice. The UN’s new values ​(axiology) prioritized human interests, and called for fighting poverty and protecting the environment, thereby constituting an alternative to traditional state interests and increasingly popular civilizational values (Chebankova and Dutkiewicz, 2021; Efremova, 2016). This article demonstrates that the UN’s authority and ideological influence in international relations increased in the 21st century. The UN is becoming not just a mediator in political relations, but a guardian of universal humanity-saving values based on the MDGs and SDGs, contributing to the development of a single universal political culture in modern interstate relations.   The UN’s ideological power in action Efforts to promote sustainable development and the UN’s role in international governance were facilitated by a number of fundamental global changes in the first decade of the 21st century. Firstly, the crisis of Pax Americana and the U.S.’s failure in the military campaign in Iraq in 2003, which showed its inability to act as a world policeman, caused Washington to reorient its foreign policy from unilateral actions to the creation of a U.S.-centered network of international partnerships. Secondly, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis exposed the need for more inclusive multilateral cooperation in regulating the world economy. Thirdly, that crisis undermined the neoliberal ideology and values of the Washington Consensus and its economic institutions. The disillusion in U.S. leadership and the neoliberal model of economic development at the end of the 2010s spurred international demand for new values. The MDG-based UN axiology provided a good ideological and value framework for a new model of international multilateral partnership. The SDGs served as a vivid example of increasingly complex and transversal modern approaches to global governance, which had a major impact on the international agenda (Luckhurst, 2020, p. 57; Krylov, 2012, pp. 67-68). Analysis of the G20’s summit agendas confirms the UN’s ideological influence via the SDGs. Declarations of the first G20 summit touched on the UN MDG discourse just marginally and called for building a global partnership on the basis of the common principles for financial market reform, an open global economy, transparency, accountability, and integrity (G20, 2008). As forum diplomacy developed further, the G20 sought not only to coordinate global economic policy, but also to help implement some of the UN values. This led to the creation of the Environment and Climate Sustainability Working Group and the Anti-Corruption Working Group (Karin and Shorr, 2013). Work to embed UN values in the G20 agenda began after the transition from the MDGs to the SDGs. The 2015 Anatolian Summit reaffirmed the participants’ commitment to the SDGs: “The 2030 Agenda, including the Sustainable Development Goals sets a transformative, universal and ambitious framework for global development efforts” (G20, 2015). The following year, the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted in Hangzhou, China (G20, 2016). From a regulatory point of view, this document not only finally formalized the main areas of interstate cooperation based on the UN axiology, but it also expanded national obligations to implement the SDGs. Additionally, the G20 Action Plan strengthened the institutional component of the SDGs agenda by initiating the Development Working Group, which received broad powers to coordinate and concentrate political resources to develop specific G20 decisions concerning the SDGs. The evolution of the G20 agenda is a clear example of the UN’s influence on the multilateral interstate interaction. The placement of UN-committee-developed values on the G20 agenda ameliorated both disagreements among the G20’s member states and criticism of it for insufficient engagement with non-member states (Luckhurst, 2020, p. 59). Interaction between the UN and the G20 is indirect and appears like a consistent harmonization of positions via large-scale communication, through which the UN has been able to spread its political culture to interstate relations thanks to developed ties with non-profit, business, and civil actors. The UN’s institutional space played a significant role in popularizing the MDGs. According to Article 71 of the UN Charter, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is responsible for communication with international and national NGOs. Over the years, it has built a wide network for interaction with the non-state sector, which allows the UN to significantly expand discourse on the new values and introduce it into the theory and practice of world politics. The Council’s potential for influence can be estimated using the following data: 5,593 NGOs have active consultative status with the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CoNGO) under ECOSOC; more than 1,500 NGOs are associated with the NGO/DPI Executive Committee, operating under the UN Department of Public Information (DPI); other UN bodies, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, regularly engage non-profit and civil organizations (ECOSOC, 2023). Such a wide network of communication between the UN and NGOs has facilitated the consolidation of the UN’s political culture, based on sustainable development values, in public opinion—both in individual, especially developed, countries, and at the global level. In the new millennium, the UN began to play a key role in international governance as a holder of the global agenda and a coordinator of policies regarding the most pressing international development issues. In turn, the active engagement of non-state actors in the decision-making process helped promote the UN discourse among the G20 states. Business and civil sector leaders, who often work in so-called outreach groups, are regularly engaged in drafting G20 summit decisions through the Business Twenty (B20), Civil Society (C20) and its individual segments (W20, Y20), expert and academic circles (Think-20, Science-20), and trade union associations (L20) (Prokhorova and Shokhin, 2017, p. 107). There is currently emerging a large-scale network of “power interactions,” involving institutional forms of UN ideological power, the economic and political power of leading states, and the non-state sector. An illustrative example is power interaction between the UN, G20 and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The latter regularly participates in drafting decisions of G20 summits, and actively supports the 2030 Agenda through its highest consultative status at the United Nations since 1946, and observer status at the UN General Assembly since 2016 (ICC, 2023). Acting through the ICC World Chambers Federation, the ICC coordinates the work of more than 12,000 chambers of commerce. In other words, the UN-G20-ICC interaction alone encompasses tens of thousands of government, business, and public-sector specialists. So, a new political culture, based on sustainable development values, has taken root in the system of international relations, thus regulating, unifying, and legitimizing the actors’ behavior.   The UN’s ideological influence at the national level The SDGs have been recognized as a universal international benchmark for development not only at the multilateral level but also at the level of national doctrines in major countries. Since 2016, developed and developing countries have been directly or indirectly adjusting their socioeconomic development strategies and international aid principles in line with the SDGs. For example, Germany, Canada, Japan, and India have adopted doctrines that stipulate the deadlines and officials responsible for achieving certain SDGs (Ignatov and Mikhnevich, 2017, p. 166). Countries have begun to use the UN axiology to justify not only their foreign policies but also domestic political activities. At the national level, the ideological influence of UN values helps build consensus between the state, society, and the individual. By employing “the best international practices” (to use the UN term), governments try to minimize the critical and negative public reaction to their socioeconomic policies. The governments of developed and developing countries turn to the SDGs to justify foreign aid, long-term social and environmental projects, and political commitments assumed under multilateral and bilateral agreements. The new UN political culture thus helps governments to shape public discourse in order to legitimize management decisions in foreign and domestic policies. States support the SDGs with targeted and consistent information policies, promoting state SDG priorities and practices, and engaging non-state actors to draft, adopt, and implement SDG decisions. For example, Germany has been carrying out the Sustainable Development Communication Strategy since 2014, and Global Affairs Canada ensures the transparency and accessibility of data on the financing and nature of its foreign projects under the International Development Assistance Accountability Act (Ignatov and Mikhnevich, 2017, p. 173). Governments expand their support for Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) of SDG implementation as a central element of the annual SDG monitoring process. In 2020, 47 VNRs were presented at a meeting of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development: nine from Latin America, 11 from Europe (including Russia, for the first time), 11 from the Asia-Pacific region, and 16 from Africa. The adoption by states of the UN SDG-based political culture in internal strategic planning and external doctrines is visible in UN General Assembly speeches. For example, in 2014-2021, Chinese officials mentioned “Sustainable Development Goals,” “SDG,” and “2030 Agenda” 37 times, Brazilian officials 29 times, German officials 12 times, and Russian officials 7 times. The following characteristics of the Sustainable Development Goals can be found: “the SDGs have already been adopted as a law” (Colombia, 2016); “2030 Agenda is a goal we must approach collectively our government’s priorities align with those of the international community” (Argentina, 2016); “Implementing the SDGs remains a priority” (Burundi, 2018); “…we need to work towards the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals” (Turkey, 2018); “we are firmly committed to implementing the Sustainable Development Agenda” (Greece, 2019) (UNGA, 2023). Developed and developing countries have thus embedded the SDGs into their policies and fully adopted this international discourse, having recognized the legitimating power of the “best social practices.”   Dissonances of the UN’s ideological power However, MDG reports for 2005-2015 showed that countries faced growing challenges when trying to meet the targets adopted in 2000 (UNDP, 2012). The most serious problems were unsurprisingly associated with insufficient funding and lack of political will. Achievement of the Goals arguably depends directly on the socioeconomic capabilities of a state, or on external financing. States’ inability to achieve the MDGs in the medium term undermines confidence in the UN’s proposed social development axiology. The past 15 years have proved that the eight Millennium Goals cannot serve as a universal agenda in their current interpretation. As a result, new dividing lines have emerged on the basis of states’ socioeconomic differences. For most developing countries with rather small budgets, the MDGs appear to be universal but hard to achieve. Poorer states face pressure to increase social spending rather than develop infrastructure (Peterson, 2010, p. 16). Furthermore, the MDGs increase such states’ dependence on foreign aid and undermine self-sufficient economic development strategies. Norwegian economist Erik Reinert has been most critical of the MDGs, calling them “palliative economics” (Reinert, 2007, p. 240). In 2012-2014, the UN launched a procedure to assess drawbacks in MDGs’ implementation. Its results were presented in the UN Secretary-General’s report The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet (UNGA, 2014). Ban Ki-moon highlighted the following set of problems: a) access to vital and environmentally sound technologies is unevenly spread, with the poor and many developing countries essentially locked out; b) pervasive poverty, gross inequalities, joblessness, disease and deprivation for billions; c) policy incoherence between current modes of international governance in matters of trade, finance and investment; d) inequities in the international system to the disadvantage of developing countries… there must be a more fair representation of emerging and developing countries; e) urgent action is needed to mobilize, redirect and unlock the transformative power of trillions of dollars of private resources to deliver on sustainable development objectives; f) the regulatory frameworks and incentives that enable private investments and business models… must be aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals. In 2015, the UN released a new “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” that proposed 17 Sustainable Development Goals based on 169 target indicators (UN, 2023). The MDGs’ expansion naturally broadened their international audience, attracting a wide range of public institutions in developed countries, including the research community, transnational businesses, civil society, and youth movements and organizations (Lanshina and Barinova, 2019). By expanding the agenda and increasing the number of participants, the UN was able to restore the attractiveness of the SDGs and ensure the priority of its interpretation of world development values. However, the ideological and value aspects of the UN agenda evolved without accompanying institutional reforms: asymmetries between the UN’s security and development institutions were not corrected, and the UN’s economic authority remained low. The only institutional innovation was the High-Level Policy Forum, a mechanism for monitoring sustainable development (UN, 2012, p. 16). However, it was subsequently relegated to popularizing and promoting the SDGs at the national level through individual states’ voluntary public commitment to the SDGs. As a result, the SDGs became symbols more than objects for practical implementation, a problem from which the MDGs had already suffered, acquiring a sort of ritual significance within UN institutions. The UN’s drift towards solely ideological influence was indirectly recognized by international officials themselves: “This is no time to succumb to political expediency or to tolerate the lowest common denominator. The new threats that face us, and the new opportunities that present themselves, demand a high level of ambition and a truly participatory, responsive and transformational course of action” (UNGA, 2014, p. 5). The first five years of the new development model showed that the SDGs’ broad formulation had only increased asymmetries. When the SDGs were announced in 2015, environmental safety was linked to socioeconomic development, and the fight against climate change was declared an integral part of sustainable development (UNGA, 2014, p.11). As a result, environmental issues turned out to be the main prerogative of the UN, threatening the UN’s ideological power as the right to economic development collided with the right to protect the environment. (China is the most vivid example of this contradiction: the country has made the greatest contribution to fighting poverty, but its “economic miracle” has exerted a heavy anthropogenic burden on the environment (RIA, 2020).) It was this contradiction that became particularly obvious during the 2021 climate summit in Glasgow, where developing countries’ need to advance their real economies came up against developed countries’ advocacy for investment in a costly energy transition (RBC, 2021). The SDGs’ contradictions obstruct the 2030 Agenda’s implementation, which may discredit the entire UN system of international governance in the medium term.   *  *  * A new model of governance is emerging in international relations, in which institutional forms of the UN’s ideological power interact with the political and economic power of leading states and non-state actors to increase the heterogeneity of administrative decision-making in international affairs. The UN is emerging in the new world order as a source of institutionalized ideological power and, based on the axiology of sustainable development, is exerting an ideological and value-based influence on the behavior of states. Promoting the idea of sustainable development, UN institutions have become guardians of universal values within the new political culture, which legitimizes national development strategies and interstate interaction and offers the best social practices. A detailed elaboration of the universal sustainable development values has permitted the UN to coordinate international discourse in the medium term and enhanced the regulatory and motivating power of the SDG Index and Indicators. The SDGs have gradually become the core of the G20 agenda. Major powers have de facto recognized the UN’s ideological power in their foreign and domestic policy doctrines. Interaction between the UN and the G20 is facilitated by their influence over non-state actors. UN-G20-NGO interaction, and the UN’s institutional influence in ECOSOC demonstrate the emergence of new global governance and interstate interaction practices. The UN’s ideological power, the political and economic capabilities of the G20’s members, and the active involvement of non-state institutions, together create a network of international power capable of qualitative social change. This could eventually produce a new world order for governing the chaos-prone system of international relations. However, the UN’s new political culture faces challenges that could, in the medium term, substantially reduce its ideological power and the emerging orderliness of international relations. Firstly, the UN axiology’s prioritization of social spending (potentially at the expense of the development of the real economy and infrastructure), as well as the contradiction between socioeconomic development and the limitations of climate change, endanger the attractiveness and legitimacy of the UN’s ideological power. Secondly, the UN’s shift towards ideological power reduces its control over the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, while still remaining responsible for it. UN institutions become dependent on major powers’ interests and multilateral communication. If the 2030 Agenda fails, this could discredit the concept of universal interstate cooperation, increasing anarchy and competition between exclusive national or civilizational projects. The shift in the UN power model from politics to ideology, over the past 30 years, is changing the organization’s reputation. Endowed with explanatory and motivational power and leading the way towards sustainable global development, the UN appears to be an institutional bearer of the global conscience. Unfortunately, the existence of a moral guideline does not guarantee that it will be followed. Two Years of Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Ten Lessons to Learn Wang Yiwei, Duan Minnong On 24 February 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out. Now, two years on, it still rages. On the second anniversary of this geopolitical conflict, one should look at what lessons we can learn from the perspective of forms of warfare, the international order, and wartime narratives. More

[Category: Issues]

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