mark
Responsible State Craft
[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/8/25 11:58am
Recent news that high level Trump administration officials — including special envoy Steve Witkoff — will meet either indirectly or directly with their Iranian counterparts, including Iran’s foreign minister, this coming weekend in Oman is quite remarkable, particularly given that the Biden administration never managed to get this far in four years. Many in Washington will conclude that Trump succeeded in getting these negotiations to rein in Iran’s nuclear program started because he orchestrated a credible military threat against Iran. Indeed, that is a factor. But a far more important factor is the other side of the equation: Tehran appears to believe that Trump really wants a deal and that he's willing and capable to offer serious sanctions relief to get it. That upside never existed with Biden. Lifting sanctions on Iran was just too painful for the former president. And even the limited sanctions relief Biden was willing to offer, he could not make sustainable. In that sense, Trump is very different. He doesn't treat diplomacy with America's detractors as a costly endeavor, nor is he a fan of sanctions that punish American companies. So the promise for Iran is far greater with Trump than it was with Biden. And Tehran is apparently willing to offer concessions to secure that upside. Which is the main (but not the only) reason as to why things are moving so fast now. As far as the substance of the talks goes, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in Washington this week pushing for the so-called “Libya model” — or a complete dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. But if Trump seeks to dismantle the Iranian nuclear program Libya-style, in addition to closing down Iran's missile program and Tehran's relations with its regional partners, then diplomacy will most likely be dead on arrival. This strategy has been favored by proponents of war with Iran precisely because they know it will fail. If Trump's strategy is centered on achieving a verification-based deal that prevents an Iranian bomb — his only red line — then there is reason to be optimistic about upcoming talks. But beyond the substance of Netanyahu’s proposal, Trump would be foolish to take his advice on Iran diplomacy, given the fact that this accused war criminal has — for more than 20 years now — sought to prevent and sabotage talks in order to trap the U.S. into a forever war with Iran. Instead, Trump should listen to those — including many of his own prominent supporters like conservative media personality Tucker Carlson — who know that a U.S.-Iran war would have destructive consequences for America. Following Netanyahu and others who share his views down the path to war with Iran is a great way to ensure that U.S. foreign policy puts Americans' best interests last.

[Category: Qiosk, Iran nuclear program, Benjamin netanyahu, Israel, Donald trump, Iran]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/8/25 11:56am
Amid the broken ceasefire in Gaza and boiling Israel-Iran tensions, Arab and Israeli media outlets are reporting that the U.S. is now deploying more missile defense capabilities to Israel.The news broke ahead of President Trump’s Monday meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington. NBC News previously reported on March 30 that defense officials had approved a second Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system’s relocation to the Middle East; the Telegraph reported Monday that a C-5M Super Galaxy, a large U.S. transport aircraft able to carry a THAAD system, was at Nevatim airbase in Southern Israel on Saturday. “America is understood to have delivered an advanced missile defence system to Israel,” the Telegraph reported.One of the U.S.’s most powerful anti-missile systems, THAAD can intercept incoming projectiles with kinetic energy, in a process often referred to as “hit-to-kill,” or “kinetic kill.” Through this process, THAAD can intercept ballistic missiles from up to about 120 miles away.With seven THAAD battery systems in its arsenal, the U.S. previously deployed a battery to Israel in October 2024 after an Iranian missile strike on Israeli soil earlier that month. That first battery system has gotten a “workout," according to reports but it is not clear whether it successfully intercepted any incoming missiles."If reports that a second THAAD missile battery is being deployed to Israel are true, this would put almost a third of U.S. THAAD systems in the small country,” Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, told RS. “This incredible commitment of scarce resources is out of proportion with the limited U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Trump administration's stated intent to focus on security threats in Asia.” One hundred U.S. soldiers went to Israel to help operate the first THAAD system sent there, suggesting more troops could be on their way to operate a reported second one. This follows numerous other weapons sent to Israel in the last few weeks, which Kavanagh said includes B-2 bombers, fighter jets and warships, a Navy carrier strike group, and Patriot air defense systems. Meanwhile, Israel already has other anti-missile systems on hand, including missile-based projectile interception system Iron Dome and David’s Sling, which can take out short-range targets.Altogether, this continued proliferation of advanced weapons systems in the region creates prospects for more explosive conflict under already tenuous geopolitical conditions.With THAAD, “the Trump team might be setting the foundation for further escalation in the region, including strikes on Iran. In advance of such a move, U.S. defense leaders might put air defense and other assets in place to guard Israel from any Iranian blow back,” Kavanagh explained. “Regardless of the intent, the deployment of second THAAD sucks the United States more deeply into a region it has been trying to get out of and risks pulling it more directly into Israel's ongoing wars with its neighbors, not least because a THAAD in Israel will mean more U.S. operators on the ground in that country as well,” she added.Indeed, others observed that the THAAD deployment enables Israel to pursue further conflict with its neighbors.“The deployment of a second THAAD missile defense battery to Israel could just be another symbol of the Trump administration's ‘all in’ support for Israeli aggression in Gaza and beyond,” said William Hartung, a Senior Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. “Or it could have specific relevance to defending Israel from a counter-attack in the event that it goes forward with plans to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities. This is precisely the wrong approach.”

[Category: Gaza war, Iran, Trump administration, Defense tech, Qiosk, Israel]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/7/25 10:05pm
President Donald Trump’s unorthodox diplomacy has alarm bells ringing around the world, not least in Washington, D.C. While much of the inside-the-beltway elite is horrified at the prospect of America supposedly reorienting toward Russia, administration insiders have hinted at an ambitious plan to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing.They’ve raised the possibility of a so-called “Reverse Nixon” maneuver aimed at fostering a global balance of power more favorable to America. But can it work?President Richard Nixon famously visited China in 1972, ending a 25-year freeze between Washington and Beijing. The table had been set for his diplomacy years earlier with bloody skirmishes along the Chinese-Soviet border in 1969. This fracture between the Eurasian communist giants effectively opened a door for Nixon.Nixon’s decisive move on the global chessboard proved an immense geopolitical blow to the Soviets. Now, the Kremlin had to contend with powerful military blocs on both its western and eastern frontiers. And, as would become clear in the 1980s, the combination of America’s technological prowess and China’s immense demographic resources and hunger for modernization would prove more than a little unnerving for the USSR, which was already overextended.Today’s world is very different, of course, but could Trump’s attempted rapprochement with the Kremlin bring about a similarly stunning transformation in world politics?Unfortunately, such an outcome is unlikely. Beyond the acute antagonism in U.S.-Russia relations, there’s another important factor at work: the broad and deep solidarity that characterizes the China-Russia relationship.Some Western experts have characterized the ties that bind Beijing and Moscow as a mere “marriage of convenience,” suggesting that a hypothetical break — akin to what occurred in the 1960s — remains conceivable. It’s not that the relationship is devoid of tensions, whether with respect to environmental issues, such as rapacious logging in Siberia for the Chinese market, or lingering foreign policy questions like how to deal with India or Vietnam. After all, Beijing is not pleased that Moscow sells myriad armaments to China’s regional rivals.Moreover, neither side is eager to discuss the painful history of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Many have pointed out there is an obvious power asymmetry between the two countries that has created some instability.Yet the overall picture is of a harmonious bilateral relationship. China-Russia trade has boomed in recent years. The vast Chinese market has allowed Russia to divert exports previously meant for Europe to Chinese customers. This has meant cheap energy for Beijing and, more critically, has played a key role in stabilizing Russia’s finances amid the heavy sanctions that have been slapped on the country since 2022.Beijing has done much more for the Kremlin than simply stabilize Russia’s finances and fill in its large consumer markets. Crucially, it has provided both key components to Russia’s war machine as well as timely logistics aid, including non-lethal assistance that has proven significant too.Chinese excavators seem to have proven quite important to building the Russian “Surovikin Line” that decisively defeated Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive aimed at reaching the Sea of Azov. Just as importantly, Beijing leaders and experts have provided a steady stream of statements that are generally supportive of the Kremlin in its struggle against the West.And while China has refused to send lethal weapons let alone troops to Ukraine, it has continued regular joint military exercises with Russia that now routinely include both strategic forces and irregular forces. In October 2024, Chinese and Russian coast guard forces linked up for their first ever joint patrol through the Bering Strait — proximate to Alaska’s shoreline. The Arctic forms an arena of multi-domain partnership between China and Russia wherein their interests are quite well-aligned. In short, China seeks natural resources, while Russia badly needs both capital and technical expertise to spur development of the High North.Notably, the Sino-Russian military partnership now sometimes embraces third countries, such as Iran. A 2024 Chinese academic analysis suggests, moreover, that the pressure from “U.S. maritime hegemony” can be felt simultaneously in both the Black Sea and also the South China Sea, implying a genuinely common strategic viewpoint.The many cooperative domains suggested above imply a deeply rooted bond between China and Russia that will not be easily broken. This casts major doubt on the viability of a so-called “reverse Nixon” maneuver.Yet there are still sound reasons to pursue improved relations between Washington and Moscow. First and foremost, there is the humanitarian necessity to stop the awful bloodletting in Ukraine.Second, the best way to mitigate nuclear war dangers and curb nuclear proliferation is to reinvigorate arms control by improving relations between the leading nuclear weapons states. Improved relations with the Kremlin could yield strategic dividends with other problematic states like North Korea and Iran.Finally, it is conceivable that a more confident Russia will be slightly less beholden to China and thus less likely to share the “crown jewels” of Russian military technology. This includes the sensitive domains of nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons development.

[Category: China, Russia, Nixon, Trump, Trump administration, Europe, Enewsletter]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/7/25 10:05pm
Enjoy our new column by the Democratizing Foreign Policy team exposing stealth corruption infecting our system — in plain sight.Disclosure under the nation’s preeminent law for regulating foreign influence in America is plummeting. A review of Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) filings shows that disclosure of informational materials — items such as one-pagers and lobbyist talking points that are distributed to influence policy and public opinion — is down over 30 percent in the first quarter of 2025, compared to this time last year and over 40 percent compared to 2022. This follows repeated efforts by the Trump administration to curtail investigations and enforcement of FARA and other foreign influence laws.In one of her first acts as attorney general, Pam Bondi — who was previously registered under FARA to represent the Qatari government — took a sledgehammer to FARA in a memo making clear that FARA was no longer a priority and that she would only bring criminal charges under the law in “instances of alleged conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.” The Trump administration took the memo in stride, gutting efforts to combat foreign influence in America. The new administration is reportedly forcing out dozens of government officials flagging foreign interference in U.S. elections, including teams tracking cyberattacks and influence operations. Several government bodies working on these issues have been dismantled entirely, including the State Department’s Global Engagement Center and the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force. A Justice Department memo from late March reportedly called to reduce “the number of attorneys working on investigations and prosecutions related to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.” The result of all this is a perverse incentive system where foreign powers are emboldened to disclose far less about their efforts to influence the American political system. We’re already seeing the results of this in reduced filings under FARA and multiple sources that spoke to us on condition of anonymity confirmed that foreign embassies are reviewing their FARA disclosures in light of the Bondi memo. Even before the Trump administration gutted foreign influence oversight, foreign governments were seeking ways to avoid FARA registration altogether. The Trump administration has effectively given foreign powers the green light to move their foreign influence operations entirely underground, while Americans still have to play by the rules. If an American organization hires a lobbying firm, for example, they have to report it to the U.S. government under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, which has not been gutted. In short, we’re quickly approaching the point where American citizens that want to influence their own government have to be more transparent about it than a foreign dictator.Foreign influence is also on the rise in America — making this the worst possible time to pump the brakes on FARA enforcement. In 2016, the top 10 most active countries disclosed a combined $205 million on lobbying. In 2023, that number ballooned to a whopping $742 million. Similarly, foreign governments have increased their funding across D.C.’s foreign policy think tanks by 30% in the past five years, with the highest donor being the United Arab Emirates, as we discovered in creating the Think Tank Funding Tracker. Incidents of foreign powers being caught engaging in illicit influence operations have also gone up in recent years, many of which included prominent elected officials. But now, because of the Trump administration’s changes to foreign influence enforcement, lawyers for the people caught up in these cases are seeking — and in some cases getting — reprieve from a sympathetic Trump administration. “Some have requested that the Justice Department drop pending charges, or have suggested they are planning to make such requests,” wrote Ken Vogel in the New York Times. “Others are expected to use the directives to seek clemency from Mr. Trump or leniency in dealings with prosecutors, according to people familiar with the reactions to the changes ordered by the new administration.” Former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), for example, was caught taking gold bars from Egypt in exchange for political favors such as giving the go-ahead for arms sales. After being convicted and sentenced to prison for 11 years, Menendez appealed to the president on X.“President Trump is right. This process is political and has been corrupted to the core,” he said.Similarly, lawyers for Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-Texas) — who was indicted last May for bribery and acting as a foreign agent while a sitting member of Congress — see the Trump administration’s shift on FARA as an opportunity. “The new policy largely affirms our position in the case,” Eric Reed, a lawyer for Mr. Cuellar, said in an interview with the Times. “We’re evaluating the new policy and assessing the best manner to address it with the Department of Justice.” While Menendez and Cuellar are still seeking a reprieve from their alleged transgressions, New York City Mayor Eric Adams has already gotten it. Adams was indicted last year for allegedly accepting $123,000 in travel benefits and tens of thousands of dollars in illegal campaign contributions from Turkish nationals. Then the charm offensive began; Adams met with Trump in Mar-a-Lago, praised Elon Musk, and skipped two scheduled events in New York in order to attend the inauguration. With Trump’s intervention, last week a judge begrudgingly dismissed the charges against Adams, writing that he couldn’t force federal prosecutors to pursue charges."Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions," the judge said.All of this flies in the face of Bondi’s justification for crippling America’s ability to counter foreign influence operations: that it had been politicized. To be sure, FARA is an overbroad, vague statute that can be, and has been, politicized. The International Center for Non-Profit Law has tracked dozens of congressional investigations into U.S. non-profits, many of which called for the non-profit to be investigated for not registering under FARA. But, these are politicized accusations by Congress, not prosecutions by the Department of Justice. The fact is that actual prosecutions for FARA related charges in recent years have not been politicized, despite the well-meaning concerns of non-profit groups and the self-serving alarmism of law firms that have created a cottage industry advising clients concerned about FARA compliance. In fact, all of the high-profile cases brought during the Biden administration were Democrats, including Cuellar, Menendez, and Adams (a Democrat whose case was dismissed by Trump). Sue Mi Terry, the wife of ardent Trump critic Max Boot who once called Trump a foreign asset, was also indicted for FARA violations during the Biden administration.But, the larger problem is that even if you buy the argument that FARA has been politicized, that doesn’t mean that you should dismantle our government’s ability to track foreign influence operations in America. While it’s still too early to know exactly how the Trump administration’s FARA sledgehammer will play out, we are barrelling towards a wild west of unregulated foreign influence with a sheriff that is nowhere to be found. In this lawless land, foreign powers will be all too eager to work toward secretly bending U.S. foreign policy to their will.

[Category: Lobbying, Fara, Foreign influence, Qiosk, Lobby horse]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/7/25 4:09pm
During Monday’s last-minute meeting between President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump announced that the U.S. will meet directly with Iran on April 12 to talk about a potential agreement over Tehran’s nuclear program. Prior to this statement, Iran had declared that it was willing to engage in indirect talks with the U.S. about the possibility of renegotiating a nuclear deal. When reporters asked for more information on this previously undisclosed plans for a direct meeting, which Tehran has not yet confirmed, Trump merely reiterated that the talks would be at “almost the highest level” and “on Saturday.” “Everyone agrees that doing a deal is preferable to doing the obvious,” Trump said, referring obliquely to the possibility of direct American military action against Iran, a long-held goal of Netanyahu’s. Recent U.S. military deployments — most notably B-2 bombers to Diego Garcia and additional assets to the eastern Mediterranean — suggest contingency planning is well underway.“I think everybody agrees that doing a deal would be preferable to doing the obvious," he added. "And the obvious is not something that I want to be involved with, or, frankly, that Israel wants to be involved with, if they can avoid it." Prior to the meeting, Israel had voiced concern that Washington might reengage Tehran without obtaining sufficient guarantees on curbing or ending its nuclear program or curtailing its regional activities, particularly in Syria and Lebanon. Netanyahu’s team reportedly pushed for closer coordination with the administration on potential red lines, while also discussing enhanced air-defense cooperation, including recent deliveries of THAAD and Patriot systems. During the press conference, several journalists pressed Trump for more information on his administration’s protectionist trade policy, including the 17% tariffs the U.S. levied on Israeli goods. When asked if those might be reduced, Trump demurred, replying, “We help Israel a lot, we give them four billion dollars a year,” and acknowledged that the amount the U.S. sends annually to Israel is among the highest. “We take good care of our friends,” he concluded. The 17% duty imposed by the Trump administration on Israeli exports has created widespread concern among Israel’s economic sectors. Even after Israel removed the tariffs on American goods in a bid to escape Trump’s tariffs, the administration declined to exempt Israel. An Israeli manufacturing association estimated that the tariffs will result in a $2.3 billion decline in Israeli exports every year, as well as a possible loss of 18,000 to 26,000 jobs. Netanyahu arrived in Washington seeking to reverse or at least soften the policy, underscoring Israel’s longstanding dependence on U.S. markets and the symbolic weight of reciprocity in the alliance; on that, he seems to have failed. Despite Trump’s unwillingness to lift tariffs, Trump and Netanyahu projected a sense of camaraderie, with Trump falsely declaring that “this man is working very hard to get the hostages out, I hope he’s being appreciated,” despite abundant evidence that Netanyahu prioritizes bombing Gaza over rescuing Israeli hostages. Netanyahu responded, “I have a good partner.” In his opening remarks, Netanyahu asserted that he wishes to allow Palestinians to leave Gaza, echoing Trump’s plan — aired during Netanyahu’s February visit, when he became the first foreign leader hosted by Trump at the White House since his inauguration — to remove all Palestinians from Gaza. Contrary to recent reporting, Netanyahu claimed that Israel is not preventing Palestinians from leaving the enclave. Netanyahu appears to be trying to soften his tone on ethnic cleansing by emphasizing “voluntary” removal. In that vein, his government has now established a new agency to help facilitate the emigration of Palestinians who wish to leave Gaza, as his military expands its occupation of the territory, wreaking even more destruction and rendering it uninhabitable. Netanyahu’s announcement of plans to create a so-called “Morag Corridor” in southern Gaza — an Israeli-controlled zone intended to split the enclave — has drawn criticism for institutionalizing fragmentation under the pretext of enhancing security. At the same time, the situation on the West Bank remained tense following the killing of 14-year-old Amer Mohammad Saada Rabee, a Palestinian-American fatally shot by Israeli forces during a raid on the town of Beit Rima, as well as the killing of 15 humanitarian workers by Israeli forces in Gaza. The incidents have reignited scrutiny of U.S. policy toward Israel's military conduct, particularly in light of Washington’s continuing weapons transfers and staunch diplomatic support. According to a recent poll, 70 percent of Israelis want Netanyahu to resign. He was supposed to appear on Monday and Wednesday in the Jerusalem District Court due to his ongoing efforts to escape prosecution for corruption and fraud. Netanyahu’s last-minute trip to Washington followed a visit to Budapest that prompted Prime Minister Victor Orban to begin the process to withdraw Hungary from the International Criminal Court in order to avoid its legal obligation to detain Netanyahu as a wanted war criminal. During the briefing, a journalist asked about the reaction of Palestinian Americans who had voted for Trump because they believed he would end the war in Gaza. “I’d like to see the war stop,” Trump replied, adding that he hoped it would soon, but then shifted to discussing the U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, as well as his plans to provide the Pentagon with a trillion-dollar budget, its largest ever. The journalist’s question remained unanswered.

[Category: Israel, Iran, Gaza, Netanyahu, Enewsletter, Trump administration]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/7/25 12:13pm
For three years the United States has been giving Ukraine everything it needs by way of offensive and defensive weapons in its war with Russia. Critically, this has included air defense systems, much of it taken from our own national stockpiles. Now it turns out that our own troops may have been denied access to anti-drone air defense systems and more sophisticated radar detection months before a lethal attack on a small American outpost in Jordan on Jan. 18, 2024. The drone assault, reportedly launched by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iranian-backed militia group, resulted in the deaths of three American Army soldiers.According to the Washington Post, which obtained access to the massive Army internal investigation of the incident through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the small outpost was ill-prepared for the attack on a number of levels. But this is key:The investigation’s findings appear to have some contradictions. For instance, investigators faulted Tower 22’s leaders for failing to “visualize risk” and not appreciating the likelihood of an attack.Yet commanders above them also failed to envision the base’s vulnerability. Four months before the attack, Army Central, which oversees operations throughout the Middle East, denied a request for an air defense system capable of shooting down drones because, investigators found, only one such system was available and troops in the United States needed it to prepare for deployments. A request for a radar system that could better detect drones also was denied, the report said.The only counter-drone defenses at Tower 22 were electronic warfare systems designed to disable the aircraft or disrupt their path to a target, according to the investigation and previous reporting by The Post.A spokesperson for Army Central did not respond to repeated requests for additional information, including regarding who at Army Central denied Tower 22’s appeal for an air defense system.That "previous reporting" found that:The early findings, which have not been previously reported, indicate that the drone may have been missed “due to its low flight path,” a U.S. defense official with direct knowledge of the assessment told The Washington Post. Additionally, this person said, the base, known as Tower 22, was not outfitted with weapons that can “kill” aerial threats like drones, and instead relied on electronic warfare systems designed to disable them or disrupt their path to a target.It is outrageous to think that after the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel, when the entire region was put on heightened alert, that this outpost was not considered at risk enough to get what it needed to protect itself, especially after some 160 drone and rocket attacks had been launched against similar U.S. outposts in Syria and Iraq at the time. Meanwhile, the Council on Foreign Relations has a nifty tracker of all the funding and specific weapons (more than $70 billion) that the United States has given to Ukraine since Feb. 2022 including all sorts of anti-drone and anti-missile air defense systems. On October 11, 2023, just three months before the Tower 22 attack, the U.S. announced a new tranche of weapons, "up to $200 million" from the stockpiles, including "additional air defense capabilities, anti-tank weapons, and other equipment to help Ukraine counter Russia's ongoing war of aggression." It was the among a series of tranches that fall that included drawdowns from the DoD stockpiles and aid to contract for more.Experts had been warning that up until the end of the Biden administration, DoD stockpiles were running low of the sophisticated weapons systems, including air defenses. An email to CENTCOM public affairs to ask about this thread in the Washington Post report was unreturned as of Monday afternoon."This report is maddening to me," said Ret. Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, a senior military fellow at Defense Priorities and host of the Deep Dive podcast. "Its unconscionable to have denied adequate air defense for the risk all of our troops face. We've spent hundreds of billions on Ukrainian defenses and we skimped on our own. Shameful."He added the longstanding critique that subsequent administrations, including the current Trump team, have not articulated why these troops are even in the Middle East today (2,000 in Syria and 2,500 in Iraq). The outpost in Jordan was reportedly part of U.S. "anti-ISIS" operations in that region just over the Syria border. "These troops provide zero strategic benefit to the U.S.," he added. "The claim that we're there for the 'enduring defeat of ISIS' is complete military nonsense. It's simply untrue. The troops should be withdrawn, immediately. Doing so would not only reduce our risk in the region, it would end the potential for the death of American servicemembers."

[Category: Enewsletter, Tower 22, Jordan, Qiosk, Us military]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/6/25 10:05pm
A disagreement between America and Europe on reducing low impact Russia sanctions may have big consequences for peace talks on Ukraine. Tariff wars will only complicate matters. President Trump may need to weigh in to break the deadlock.For the first time since the Ukraine crisis bubbled up in 2014, a split has emerged within the Western alliance on sanctions policy towards Russia. U.S.-brokered peace talks in Saudi Arabia late last month edged Russia and Ukraine closer to reviving a 2022 Black Sea grain deal through a maritime ceasefire. However, what promised to be a helpful, small step forward became hijacked by European and Ukrainian efforts to block minor concessions to Russia. As part of the proposed revival of a maritime ceasefire, a European spokesperson was quick to shut down suggestions that Russia might receive sanctions relief. At the Paris Summit of the coalition of the willing on March 26, European leaders and President Zelensky weighed in further, calling for no sanctions relief for Russia, repeating the line that more sanctions are key to bringing Putin to the negotiating table. The U.S. and Europe are no longer in lockstep on sanctions policy. Since 2015, the Ukrainian government has worked hard both to encourage Western powers to impose more sanctions on Russia and to minimize any possibility of sanctions removal as part of peace efforts. Still reeling from the seismic shift in U.S. policy towards Ukraine under President Trump, Europe is siding with Ukraine.Yet, the argument over sanctions relief appears somewhat of a phoney debate that has the potential to disrupt meaningful steps towards a much-needed peace. Specifically, this argument over the maritime ceasefire has been triggered by the question of whether to allow some limited access by a major Russian bank to the payment messaging service SWIFT. That would allow importers to make payment for Russian agricultural exports more easily. This is a tiny concession in the context of a Russian sanctions regime that includes more than 20,000 measures against individuals, companies and types of goods. Agricultural exports, while significant, are small compared to Russia’s oil and gas exports which continue to make up the bulk of Russia’s $433 billion total exports in 2024. The proposed limited easing of sanctions on SWIFT usage would not extend to relief for Russian trade in oil and gas. But, in any case, the impact of the SWIFT ban is questionable. When war broke out in 2022, it was described as the “nuclear option.” Severing Russia’s ability to transact international trade would have had devastating short-term consequences on the volume of its import revenue, so the argument went. But that didn’t work. In 2022 and following the outbreak of war, Russia generated a record-setting $592 billion from exports, and exports since that time have returned to the pre-war trend. There is little evidence that partially excluding Russia from SWIFT has had any substantive impact on Russia export volumes.The idea that the SWIFT option was nuclear was only vaguely valid in 2014, the year that Western sanctions were first imposed on Russia. In that year, Russia exported more ($497 billion) than it exported in 2024, as the price of Brent crude hovered about $100 per barrel for the first half of the year, compared to around $72 today. However, European nations vetoed U.S. moves to cut Russia off from SWIFT. They did so precisely because it would have had nuclear consequences for European energy security, at a time when Europe was more dependent, compared to now. It would also have been difficult in 2014 to remove Russia from SWIFT because Russia had a seat on the SWIFT Board, by virtue of the volume of its international financial transactions. In the eight years of indecision that followed, Russia worked hard to reorient its economy away from overdependence on dollar denominated trading. This helps to explain why its economy has remained resilient since the war started. The SWIFT ban is not, in any case, a sanction per se, but rather an impediment on the processing of international payments, by cutting access to payment messaging services. Hard currency doesn’t flow through SWIFT. Sanctioning SWIFT has stimulated a race to create alternatives to a legacy system that is now over 50 years old through crypto networks. Russia, China and other countries have been developing their own alternatives too. As Russia has progressively shifted its exports to Asia, these transactions are increasingly settled in local currencies, including yuan, rupees and rials. The agreement in Saudi to allow one Russian state bank to access SWIFT for agricultural exports will help smooth the process. But it won’t boost the volume of those exports, which have continued throughout the war. Of course, Russia will value any easing of access to SWIFT because of the signal it sends of a gradual normalization of relations, in particular with the U.S. That would also build confidence about the possibility of more substantive sanctions relief as a longer-term peace process unfolds. However, President Putin will also know that this is essentially an argument over a minor sanctions concession with negligible economic benefits for his country. He’ll be aware of the potential for tension to build between President Trump and European leaders, as Zelensky urges Europe to resist any compromise advanced by the White House.In the context of President Trump’s April 2 announcement on the imposition of tariffs against the European Union and other countries, Putin will watch as relations are further soured. Still eking out small gains on the battlefield most days, Putin can afford to sit back and claim that the Europeans and Ukrainians are blocking progress, and that he’s the reasonable guy. So, the SWIFT issue risks becoming an unhelpful side-show. Treasury Secretary Bessent has kept the door open for a partial Russian re-entry, although the EU position seems to be getting more entrenched. President Trump may need to engage with European colleagues to clear the blockage, if he is to end the bloodshed in Ukraine.

[Category: Ukraine, Russia, European union, Sanctions, Ukraine war]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/6/25 10:05pm
If and when it finally comes to be written decades from now, an honest history of the F-47 “fighter” recently unveiled by President Trump will doubtless have much to say about the heroic lobbying campaign that garnered the $20 billion development contract for Boeing, the corporation that has become a byword for program disasters (see the KC-46 tanker, the Starliner spacecraft, the 737 MAX airliner, not to mention the T-7 trainer.) Boeing, which is due to face trial in June on well-merited federal charges of criminal fraud, was clearly in line for a bailout. But such succor was by no means inevitable given recent doubts from Air Force officials about proceeding with another manned fighter program at all. “You’ve never seen anything like this,” said Trump in the March Oval Office ceremony announcing the contract award. Well, of course we have, most obviously in recent times with the ill-starred F-35. Recall that in 2001 the Pentagon announced that the F-35 program would cost $200 billion and would enter service in 2008. Almost a quarter century later, acquisition costs have doubled, the total program price is nudging $2 trillion, and engineers are still struggling to make the thing work properly. Thus, succeeding chapters of the F-47’s history will likely have to cover the galloping cost overruns, unfulfilled technological promises, ever-lengthening schedule shortfalls, and ultimate production cancellation when only a portion of the force had been built.There seems little risk in predicting the F-47 — “a beautiful number," said the 47th president — will follow the same dollar-strewn path. As Trump truthfully remarked, “we can’t tell you the price.” And don’t imagine that, if the development phase reveals that the program can’t fulfill any or most of its projected requirements, the Air Force will call it a day and kill the program. The official Air Force press release accompanying the announcement states: “This phase will produce a small number of test aircraft for evaluation. The contract also includes competitively priced options for low-rate initial production.” In other words, the fix is in. “Low rate initial production” means that subcontracts will be spread across the political landscape, ensuring the creation of an unstoppable lobby preventing any future effort to strangle this boondoggle in its cradle. For confirmation, look only at the F-35, 1,000 or so copies of which were cranked out before Lockheed got the go-ahead for full-scale production. In confident anticipation that nothing will interrupt the production cycle, Boeing has invested a reported $2 billion in expanding production facilities at its St. Louis, Missouri, plant, where production of the F-15EX (a costly version of the venerable F-15, originally gold-plated to sell to the Qataris) is due to end this year. Extolling the plane’s advertised virtues, Trump singled out its presumed invisibility to radar. “America’s enemies will never see it coming,” he said. Stealth has indeed been the holy grail of aerospace development ever since the days when Jimmy Carter sought to kill the B-1 bomber program in favor of the F-117 stealth bomber. (We did of course end up buying both.) Claims for this technology appeared to be justified when Lockheed's F-117 diminutive bomber was advertised as having effortlessly penetrated Iraqi air defenses undetected on the first night of the 1991 Gulf War. Only later did a GAO report reveal that in fact the planes had required the protection of a fleet of electronic warfare planes, and they missed most of their assigned targets, and furthermore failed to destroy Saddam’s air-defense network as claimed. In the 1999 Kosovo war, the Serbs managed to knock down one F-117 and severely damage another using clever tactics and a modified ancient Soviet SAM missile system. Nowadays both the Chinese and Russians claim to have developed technologies to detect stealth intruders — there are even claims that the Chinese system could passively employ signals from Elon Musk’s SpaceX Starlink satellite array!Nevertheless, the F-47 designers have clearly prioritized stealth, despite the fact that obligatory features, such as carrying all bombs and missiles internally, enlarge the fuselage. Hence the large nose-on profile, apparent even in the uninformative images so far released. This militates against aerodynamic performance and maneuverability, unfortunate deficiencies for a fighter. Such carping aside, the most notable feature of the F-47 program is that it will purportedly not fly alone, but be accompanied by unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft, or drones, “as many as you want,” according to Trump. The Air Force plans to buy 1,000 of them, at around $30 million a pop. Under the overall direction of the F-47 pilot, they will in theory at least be able to engage enemy planes, attack targets on the ground, or perform reconnaissance. Two contractors, General Atomics and Anduril, are already competing for the initial CCA contract and have been displaying mockups of their candidates at trade shows since last year while hurling insults at each other via social media and the trade press. “Anduril is the Theranos of defense,” jibed General Atomics spokesman Mark Brinkley during the Air Force Association jamboree in Washington D.C. last September, referencing the infamous Palo Alto startup that fraudulently claimed to perform comprehensive medical diagnostics from a single drop of blood. Both contestants are supposed to put prototypes in the air this summer. Pentagon insiders are not impressed either with the concept or at least progress to date. One veteran observer of technologically ambitious programs suggested to me that the Air Force staff officers supervising the CCA program may be easy prey for the contractors. “They’re not nearly skeptical enough about General Atomics or Anduril. I don’t see any of the skepticism they should be exhibiting for pouring out this kind of money,” the observer said. Hopefully, these glib enthusiasts will be mulling the problems associated with the software required to enable an F-47 “quarterback” pilot to oversee the operations of the wingmen drones. After all, their peers in the F-35 program are still struggling with “Technology Refresh-3,” the latest (failing) effort to make the plane’s software work adequately. Mulling other inevitable problems facing an F-47 in combat, such as surviving enemy efforts “to find you, track you, and kill you” before getting into position to deploy the unmanned aircraft with their missile loads “I don’t know why we’re doing it, I don’t get it,” the observer concluded.Last December, then-Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall suggested that the Air Force might not be able to afford a next-generation fighter as well as the collaborative drone, in addition to a next-generation refueling tanker, and that “we have to get somewhat creative…to meet the threat.” As it turned out, no creativity at all was required, as the history books will most assuredly record.

[Category: F-35, Weapons industry, Boeing, Donald trump, F-47, Pentagon budget, Enewsletter, Us military, Air force, Anduril, General automics]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/5/25 7:28am
Now that South Korea’s Constitutional Court has upheld the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol, attention is now focused on the upcoming snap election to replace him, with the opposition Democratic Party leader, Lee Jae-myung, with a hefty lead in the polls. A Lee victory would likely lead to major modifications in Seoul’s foreign policy and a possible convergence of interests with Donald Trump in defusing tensions with North Korea, if the U.S. president decides to resume his aborted courtship of Pyongyang’s leader, Kim Jong Un. In any event, the Constitutional Court’s decision and the formal removal of Yoon Suk-yeol marks a return to normalcy after a period of uncertainty and drift in South Korea that was touched off by what the judges determined was Yoon’s unconstitutional declaration of martial law and deployment of troops to the National Assembly. Yoon’s power grab, which was effectively undone when hundreds of thousands of citizens rallied to protect the parliament, also provoked a financial crisis. As foreign investors sold off nearly $1 billion in shares in the three days after the martial law declaration December 3, the South Korean won plummeted to its lowest value against the dollar since the 2008-09 global financial meltdown. Meanwhile, South Korea’s foreign policy engagement has been virtually paralyzed. The leadership vacuum and limited diplomatic capacity constrained Seoul’s much-needed engagement with the new Trump administration to discuss key issues, such as regional security cooperation and addressing tensions over elevated U.S. tariffs. On the whole, the political crisis has kept South Korea out of the Trump administration’s priority list, as evidenced by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s skipping of South Korea during his recent trip to East Asia, which included visits to Japan and the Philippines. What are the implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and regional geopolitics in East Asia in the case of Lee Jae-myung’s arrival as the next leader in Seoul? Lee has made a full recovery after being stabbed in the neck by a man pretending to be a supporter at a campaign rally in January 2024. He has been a vocal critic of Yoon Suk-yeol’s so-called “values-based diplomacy,” which hinged on the idea of cooperating with democracies to confront autocracies. Instead, Lee has advocated foreign policy pragmatism. While supporting a close security alliance with the United States, Lee has also emphasized the need for proactive diplomacy with North Korea to reduce intensified military tensions on the Korean peninsula and to maintain cooperative relations with China and Russia. “I’m a realist,” said Lee in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. There are apparent overlapping geopolitical interests between Trump and Lee that could allow both to work together — particularly on the issue of restarting nuclear talks with North Korea. Compared to Yoon, who was exceedingly hawkish toward North Korea, had minimal interest in diplomacy, and would have not reacted positively to Trump’s diplomatic overtures to Pyongyang, Lee likely will be a more suitable partner for Trump’s future diplomatic initiative with the North. Lee has even appeared to empathize with Trump’s transactionalist style in some respects. “Trump would do anything to defend America’s own interests, even if that means having a tariff war with allies or engaging with an adversary to end the war in Ukraine,” he said. ”It’s something we should learn from.” These apparent shared values between Lee and Trump could serve as a source of synergy if goals and interests align or a source of friction if goals and interests diverge. It remains to be seen whether the two sides will be able to manage potential differences and disagreements on issues such as tariffs, military cooperation against China, and the Taiwan issue. While it is unclear how Trump himself believes the United States should be approaching China and Taiwan, he is surrounded by advisers who are keen to mobilize U.S. alliances in the Pacific to focus on deterring China and are also eager to reorient the operational priority of U.S. regional forces around a Taiwan contingency. If Trump ends up going in that direction, Washington might see the Taiwan issue becoming a major tension point with a future Lee administration, as Lee would want to prioritize deterring North Korea and distance South Korea from the Taiwan issue. “Why should South Korea meddle with confrontation between China and Taiwan?” Lee once asked, adding, “let them handle their own business.” As South Korea is set to fill its leadership vacuum in two months, Washington would be well-advised to explore potential areas of agreement and disagreement, and map out a roadmap to maximize cooperation and overcome differences.

[Category: Lee jae-myung, Yoon, Yoon suk-yeol, Korea, South korea, Qiosk]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/4/25 7:44am
The European Union likes to portray itself as the last principled bastion of the “rules-based international order” and global justice standing. Yet its true commitment to that order is a bit suspect. By applying double standards, the EU is actually undermining it, rendering hollow its own exhortations to other international players to respect it. The collisions around the International Criminal Court (ICC) are a case in point. The EU itself has no standing with respect to the ICC. That means that its members have a sovereign right to decide to join the Rome Statute that established the court — or not. That said, since the inception of the ICC, Brussels has encouraged its current and aspiring members, as well as other nations, to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute and support the Court’s work. The EU’s leverage on this matter is more political than legal, but it appears to be deploying it selectively, depending on who the Court chooses to place in the dock.This week during a visit of Israeli Prime Minister of Israel Benyami Benjamin Netanyahu to Budapest, Hungary announced that it will withdraw from the ICC. The catch, however, is that the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against Netanyahu, having charged him for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during Israel’s ongoing campaign in Gaza in which more than 50,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed in retaliation for Hamas’ October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks (thousands more are presumed dead, still missing under rubble). Hungary’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute, assuming it is ratified by parliament, could still take months to take legal effect. Nonetheless, so long as the process is not finalized, Hungary has an obligation to arrest Netanyahu during his four-day stay.The EU’s reaction has thus far been muted. The European Commission’s spokeswoman Anita Hipper, reacting to the reports of Hungary’s intent to withdraw from the ICC, only offered platitudes about the EU’s support for the Court, and predicted “deep regret” if Hungary were indeed to leave.It remains to be seen how the EU’s top brass will react, should such be the case. However, that is not the point. When the EU summons political will, it could theoretically apply sufficient pressure to prevent undesirable outcomes before they materialize, rather than having to react after the deed.In 2023, for example, the EU exerted pressure on South Africa concerning the potential attendance of the BRICS summit there by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who by then, like Netanyahu now, had already been indicted by the ICC for war crimes in Ukraine. Brussels reminded South Africa that, as a member of the ICC, it had an obligation to arrest Putin if he were to show up in the country, and that his status as a head of state did not grant him any immunity in this case.The statements of EU officials, including the then-High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell, generally expressed a “with-us-or-against-us” kind of mindset. It left little room for countries like South Africa, which sought to chart a neutral course — neither condoning the Russian invasion of Ukraine nor joining in the U.S.- and EU-promoted sanctions and isolation of Russia. Such professions of neutrality — common in the Global South — were routinely dismissed as a sign of “siding with Putin.” While there were no overt threats of sanctions, European diplomats at the time hinted that Pretoria’s access to European markets and foreign investment could be affected should Pretoria fail to comply with its ICC obligations.The EU pressure and the prospect of strained ties clearly played a role in the internal deliberations in South Africa; in the end, Putin did not attend the BRICS summit in Johannesburg and sent his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, instead.No such leverage was apparent in the case of Netanyahu’s visit to Hungary. That is ironic as Brussels already has a rather confrontational relationship with the Hungarian prime minister. Brussels and Budapest have clashed regularly over domestic governance issues, particularly regarding Orban’s implementation of his “illiberal democracy,” in Hungary. Yet what really made Orban a pariah in Brussels is his insistence on opening space for diplomacy with Moscow to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. Frustrated with Orban’s position (which, in fact, is widely shared across the political spectrum in Hungary, but also, increasingly, in other EU countries), senior officials in Brussels are reportedly discussing ways to get Hungary expelled from the EU altogether.Yet, it would seem that Brussels is only exercised with Orban’s perceived flirting with Putin, but not Netanyahu, despite their both having been indicted by the ICC. Indeed, if the EU’s concern with the ICC and global justice were as consistent as it claims, it could already consider the failure to comply with the ICC orders as a breach of the rule of law — to add to the pile of other, preexisting disagreements Brussels has with Budapest. Yet political will is needed for the European Commission to move in that direction, and there is none. Perversely, Orban is being hammered for all sorts of issues, including diplomatic initiatives to end the war in Ukraine, but gets a pass for hosting a man accused of war crimes.And there lies the crux of the matter: The Brussels “blob” no longer appears to be worried about optics. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is as staunch a supporter of Israel as she is a Russia hawk. The contrast is even more pronounced in the case of the new EU high representative for foreign affairs, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas. She is obsessively focused on Russia. Just this week, she spoke in the European Parliament about the need to establish a special tribunal on Russian crimes in Ukraine — presumably in addition to Putin’s ICC indictment. Yet a few days earlier, she talked up friendship and cooperation at a meeting with Israel’s foreign minister, Gideon Saar. Of note, she also parroted hawkish Israeli talking points about Iran posing an “immense threat to the region and global stability” even though that has never been the EU’s official position.Such arbitrariness could create a domino effect: Hungary is not the only Israel’s ally in the EU. Other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Austria, may follow suit by ignoring their obligations under the ICC, literally with no consequences. And Netanyahu will have every incentive to exploit these cracks in the EU to vindicate his claim to his increasingly restive domestic audience that he is respected and authentic statesman.When the EU pressures other countries, such as South Africa and others in the Global South, to align with its geopolitical priorities (on Ukraine/Russia), while giving itself a pass when convenient (on Israel/Palestine), it grates in other parts of the world and undermines the very case for the “rules-based international order” that the EU purports to defend and exemplify.

[Category: Hungary, Orban, Israel, Icc, Netanyahu, Gaza, Putin, Brics, South africa]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/3/25 10:05pm
The NATO foreign affairs ministers’ meeting began in Brussels on Thursday amid frosty U.S.-EU relations, brought upon largely by the Trump administration’s recalculus toward a negotiated political solution for the Ukraine war.At the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated the Trump administration’s commitment to NATO — assuming its members bolster their defense spending, a talking point repeatedly pressed by the Trump team.“The United States President Trump's made clear he supports NATO, we're going to remain in NATO,” Rubio explained to reporters in Brussels. “The only way NATO can get stronger and more viable is if our partners, the nation states that comprise this important alliance, have more capability.”“A full-scale ground war in the heart of Europe is a reminder that hard power is still necessary as a deterrent,” Rubio explained, referencing the three-year-old Ukraine conflict. He hopes to leave the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting with a commitment from allies to spend 5% of GDP on defense.En route to the meeting, NATO head Mark Rutte likewise emphasized Europe’s recent commitment to upped defense spending. “It's my assumption that what we need to spend, the Canadians and Europeans together, will be north of 3%,” he said.Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin has sent investment envoy and top negotiator Kirill Dmitriev to Washington to meet U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff.Dmitriev said on social media that the meeting was meant to facilitate a U.S.-Russia dialogue “completely destroyed under the Biden administration.”The visit comes amid what appears to be snags in Trump’s efforts to get both sides to the negotiating table."We take the models and solutions proposed by the Americans very seriously, but we can't accept it all in its current form," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian magazine "International Affairs" in an interview released on Tuesday."As far as we can see, there is no place in them today for our main demand, namely to solve the problems related to the root causes of this conflict. It is completely absent, and that must be overcome,” Ryabkov explained.Trump, meanwhile, had also rejected Russia’s recent suggestion that a third party take control of Ukraine as part of a negotiated end to the war. Namely, the Russians want the United Nations and other countries to facilitate a transitional administration in Ukraine, which would include overseeing elections.Moscow’s suggestion comes in tandem with its repeated allegations that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose term expired in May 2024, is no longer Ukraine’s legitimate leader.Trump administration officials had initially hoped for a Ukraine peace keeping deal in upcoming months. Now, due in part to statements like Ryabkov’s, they’re recalculating their efforts for a longer diplomatic road ahead.“The White House has extensively engaged Russia on the central items of a peace deal, including NATO membership for Ukraine and questions regarding territorial claims, but it has so far proven difficult to arrive at anything approaching a consensus on these issues between the war’s four main stakeholders: Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the U.S.,” Mark Episkopos, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft’s Eurasia Program, told RS.“The problem is that Moscow will not agree to a complete ceasefire without a roadmap for settling these issues on terms it considers favorable, and the West lacks the coercive leverage necessary to get it to significantly dial back its demands. Breaking this diplomatic logjam requires working toward a shared set of viable aims with Kyiv and European leaders, and engaging Russia on a wider diplomatic front with the goal of inducing Moscow to soften its baseline conditions for war termination in Ukraine.”This is unwelcome news for the American president, who, on Sunday, had said he was “pissed off” at Putin for slow deal making progress. Indeed, Trump threatened Russia with additional tariffs. "If Russia and I are unable to make a deal on stopping the bloodshed in Ukraine, and if I think it was Russia’s fault...I am going to put secondary tariffs on oil, on all oil coming out of Russia,” Trump threatened.Some Europeans, meanwhile, are throwing more money — and troops — at the equation. Berlin pledged a further €130 million ($140 million) in stabilization funding and humanitarian aid for Ukraine on Tuesday."We will make it clear to the American side that we should not engage with Putin's stalling tactics," outgoing German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said in a statement about her Tuesday trip to Kyiv. "It is Putin who is playing for time, does not want peace and continues his illegal war of aggression.” During her trip to Kyiv, Baerbock said Russia should accept a Ukraine ceasefire without conditions. And on Tuesday, Berlin, which will be sending up to 5,000 soldiers to Russia-bordering Lithuania, launched its first permanent troop deployment since World War II. "We have a clear mission. We have to ensure the protection, freedom and security of our Lithuanian allies here on NATO's eastern flank,” German Brigadier General Christoph Huber said in a statement. In other Ukraine War news this week:According to Al Jazeera, Finland has left the Ottawa convention banning antipersonnel landmines. It follows fellow Ukraine allies and Russia neighbors Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, who did so last month, citing the perceived Russian threat. "Withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way," Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo explained the decision at a press conference.Ukrainian incursions continue into Russia’s Belgorod region. A Finland-based military analyst told Newsweek, however, that while Ukrainian forces have advanced to several villages in the area, they’re unlikely to threaten critical Russian infrastructure or the city of Belgorod itself.According to CNN, Russia’s ongoing conscription drive, the largest in years, has heralded about 160,000 new troops between the ages of 18 and 30.From State Department Press Briefing on March 31The latest State Department briefing addressed recent Ukraine war negotiation hiccups. “There was an idea from Russia about a temporary administration that was not appreciated by the president,” State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said, citing Russia’s recent proposal for a third party to control Ukraine. “Ukraine is – well, I don’t think I need to remind everyone, but it’s a good reminder – is a constitutional democracy. Governance in Ukraine is determined by its constitution and the Ukrainian people.” Despite the hurdle, Bruce emphasized the Trump administration’s push for a negotiated political solution in Ukraine. “We are committed to the diplomacy necessary to achieve a full ceasefire and to bring the parties to the negotiating table for a final and lasting settlement,” she said. “President Trump has made clear that Russia and Ukraine need to move to a full ceasefire now. None of that has changed.”

[Category: Diplomacy watch, Qiosk, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, Trump, Witkoff, Ukraine war]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/3/25 10:05pm
Between 2015 and 2018, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia with tens of millions of dollars worth of jet fuel in support for the kingdom’s bombing campaign in Yemen. Seven years later, the Saudis refuse to repay most of their debt. And they are being rewarded for it. A Department of Defense report that was sent to Congress last October, reviewed by Responsible Statecraft, and previously unreported suggests that Pentagon officials are becoming increasingly desperate to recoup an outstanding $13.7 million in fuel costs that Saudi Arabia owes the U.S.“DLA energy and US central command will continue to engage the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance through United State Military Training Mission - Saudi Arabia scheduled meetings, various MOD/MOF and DoD Key Leader Engagements, face to face meetings within the CONUS and Saudi Arabia, and through email correspondence until the SLC fuel debt is paid in full,” the report stated.In 2018, the Pentagon realized it had made an accounting error. The Pentagon had undercharged Saudi Arabia and the UAE by $36 million for jet fuel and another $294 million in flight hours for U.S. tanker aircraft that refueled Saudi and Emirati warplanes in midair. With Washington’s help, the arrangement allowed Saudi and Emirati jets — which, besides actual military targets, bombed hospitals, schools, marketplaces, and weddings — to stay in the air for up to three hours instead of a mere 15 minutes. But instead of the two oil-rich Gulf nations footing the bill for the aerial-refueling process, as is required by law, it was the American taxpayer. Seven years later — while the larger flight hours bill has been paid — Saudi Arabia has yet to pay $13.7 million worth of its jet fuel debt. The UAE, which owed the U.S. around $15 million for jet fuel, has reimbursed Washington in full. The kingdom certainly does not lack the funds. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund oversees $925 billion in assets. Rather, Saudi Arabia appears to be pleading ignorance; the Intercept reported that Saudi officials told representatives of the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Central Command last year that they were “not aware of the outstanding debt and requested some additional time to investigate the issue.” This defense is at odds with the recent Pentagon report, which maintains that Department of Defense officials are exhausting various avenues to bring up the debt, including email, virtual meetings, and in-person meetings with multiple agencies. The report also notes that the last payment, just over $1 million, was made in 2023. The Defense Logistics Agency confirmed it submitted the report, but did not elaborate if there have been any further payments since it was submitted in October. Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told RS that Saudi Arabia’s refusal to pay up speaks to the “privilege the Saudis enjoy with the U.S., as they fear zero repercussions for failing to repay a debt to American taxpayers.”Despite groveling about an unpaid debt privately, the U.S. continues to reward Saudi Arabia. Since 2018 when the accounting error was discovered, Washington has showered the kingdom with $14 billion in major arms sales, according to a tracker from Forum on the Arms Trade. Most of those transfers took place during the presidency of Joe Biden, who memorably fist-bumped Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after promising to make the de facto Saudi ruler “a pariah” during his 2016 campaign for office. Trump is now reportedly eyeing Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first overseas trip next month, just as he did during his first term. “I said I will go if you put a trillion dollars to American companies,” Trump told reporters in March. “Meaning the purchase over four years of a trillion dollars. They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.” While he’s at it, he could ask for the couple million in pocket change that Saudi Arabia owes the American taxpayer. The paltry $13.7 million sum may be small, but the foot-dragging speaks volumes.

[Category: Yemen, Defense department, Pentagon, Congress, Mohammed bin salman, Saudi arabia, Enewsletter]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/3/25 3:58pm
Last week, four young U.S. soldiers tragically died in a training exercise in Lithuania, highlighting the inherent risks faced by American forces stationed across Europe. With about 100,000 troops in the region, experts question the strategic value of America’s military presence — while President Trump says he wants a 20,000-troop reduction and European leaders urge an increase in U.S. support. Following a week of searching, all of the bodies of missing U.S. soldiers were found in Lithuania. The soldiers’ identities have been released: Sgt. Jose Duenez Jr., 25, of Joliet, Illinois; Sgt. Edvin F. Franco, 25, of Glendale, California; Pfc. Dante D. Taitano, 21, of Dededo, Guam, and Staff Sgt. Troy S. Knutson-Collins, 28, of Battle Creek, Mich. The men were operating an armored Hercules vehicle as part of a training operation and were reported as missing on Tuesday March 25, followed by an extensive search. Their bodies, as well as the vehicle, were located in a bog in the town of Pabradė, which is around 6 miles from the Belarusian border. While incidents like this in Europe aren’t common, it wasn’t the first time American servicemembers perished in Europe outside of combat. Four Americans were killed during the infamous 1988 Ramstein Air Show when an aircraft fell out of the sky and crashed into a crowd of servicemembers and civilian onlookers. Six American military flight crew members were killed in Croatia in 1996 when the pilots of a Boeing CT-43 carrying civilians and government officials crashed into a mountain close to the Dubrovnik airport. Today the United States has roughly 84,000 active duty troops stationed in Europe. President Biden sent 20,000 troops there following Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, saying, “In Poland, we're going to establish a permanent headquarters of the U.S. 5th Army Corps and strengthen NATO interoperability across the entire eastern flank.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that around 39,000 American forces are in Germany, 14,000 in Poland, 13,000 in Italy, and 10,000 in the United Kingdom. Lithuania hosts a rotating force of around 1,000 American soldiers. Additionally, Washington has over 40 military bases in Europe, with Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom hosting the most installations. Most of the bases are jointly operated with NATO partners. President Trump has expressed frustration with the uneven security relationship between the United States and its European partners. While he has suggested withdrawing troops from Europe he has disregarded the idea of withdrawing all of them, saying, “I don’t think we’d have to do that. I wouldn’t want to do that.” Trump did remove around 12,000 American soldiers from Germany in 2020, but almost half moved to other NATO countries rather than returning home. Nevertheless, some European leaders believe Biden’s 20,000 troops surge from 2022 will eventually return to the United States. A NATO diplomat said, “I would not be surprised if at some point [those troops] go back to their home base in America, the forces were sent at a height of emergency planning, so if they leave it would be, so to speak, a return to normalcy.” During NATO meetings in Brussels on Thursday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured NATO allies that “President Trump has made clear he supports NATO. We’re going to remain in NATO.” However, he explained that the Trump administration would still advocate for NATO members to increase their defense spending. While European leaders have called for the U.S. to provide military security guarantees to Ukraine, some experts applaud attempts to push Europeans to fund their own defense. “It is in Washington’s interest to facilitate a European takeover of NATO,” said the Cato Institute’s Doug Bandow. “They (Europeans) have an inherent right to self-defense. But a friendly push enhanced by helpful advice and practical experience could accelerate the end of European defense dependence, a process that some predict could otherwise take a decade.”The U.S. Army said in a press release that this “this is a tragic event, but it reinforces what it means to have Allies and friends.” It also reinforces that that our troop deployments put real lives at risk and there is no shame in asking if the tens of thousands of young American men and women we are sending there are strategically necessary.

[Category: Lithuania, Eastern europe, Troop deaths, Us soldiers, Nato, Trump, Qiosk, Us military]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/3/25 3:43pm
The Senate on Thursday smacked down two measures sponsored by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) that were intended to block the sale of some offensive weapons to Israel. The first, a resolution to end the sale of certain bomb components and warheads, S.J. Res. 33, had 15 votes in favor and 82 against. The second, a resolution to end the sale of Joint Direct Attack Munitions and some guidance kits, S.J. Res. 26, failed 15 - 83. All votes in favor were from Democrats. His previous attempt at passing joint resolutions of disapproval for the sale of weapons to Israel in November 2024 also failed. Last time, he brought three JRDs forward, and they garnered slightly more support. A resolution to block the sale of some tank rounds received 21 votes in favor, and resolutions to block mortar rounds and guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions received 22 and 20 aye votes, respectively. Israel’s war on Gaza has killed more than 50,000 Palestinians, with over 112,000 wounded, or 7% of the total population. Israel officially broke the January ceasefire and resumed military activity last week, killing at least 700 since. Sen. Sanders noted during his remarks that all humanitarian aid had been blocked from entering Israel for over 30 days. He called what Israel is doing a violation of the Geneva Convention and the United States’ Foreign Assistance Act.“It is no secret how these weapons have been used,” Sanders said. Strikes against civilian targets “have been painstakingly documented by human rights groups.”Sanders pointed to a recent Economist-YouGov poll that showed only 15% of Americans support increasing military aid to Israel, while 35% supported ending or decreasing military support. Additionally, a J Street poll found that 62% of Jewish Americans supported the withholding of offensive weapons to Israel until Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to an immediate ceasefire.

[Category: Gaza, Qiosk, Israel, Senate, Bernie sanders]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/3/25 7:38am
At 4 p.m. on Wednesday — “Liberation Day” — President Trump announced the details of his “reciprocal tariff” strategy. He began with a speech that described persistent trade deficits over the last few decades as a sign that other countries were taking advantage of America through tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and currency manipulation. In an echo of the themes that powered his victory in 2016, he blamed these practices for the deindustrialization of the American heartland and the loss of manufacturing capacity in sectors critical for national security and technological advancement. The president then unveiled a scheme of tariffs remarkable for its complexity and for its impact on the international trading architecture. The levies on each country were said to be based on a quantified estimate of the tariff equivalent of all its “objectionable practices” — tariffs, non-tariff barriers, value-added taxes (sales taxes levied by national governments on both domestic and foreign production), alleged currency manipulation etc. However, there were suggestions, (confirmed here) that the tariffs were based on a simpler metric — the size of a country’s bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. as a percentage of exports, thus treating purportedly “missing imports” as a measure of all barriers to trade. Among other things the implication from the methodology is that in an ideal world, a country should have absolutely balanced trade not just across all its trading partners, but even with each single trading partner, perhaps an unrealistic expectation. Finally, there is also a floor of a 10% tariff on all countries covering those that run bilateral trade deficits with the U.S. The range of tariffs runs from the minimum of 10% for many countries (that are not enumerated in the linked annex) to 49% in the case of Cambodia, 48% for Myanmar, 46% for Vietnam, 45% for Laos, 44% for Sri Lanka, and 37% for Bangladesh. Among larger trading partners, the tariffs are set at 34% for China, 24% for Japan, and 20% for the EU. This set of tariffs is also additive to those already levied, particularly significant in the case of China, whose exports will now face a minimum tariff of at least 54%. For the global trading system, the introduction of bilateral tariffs across all products at the country level undoes a principle that has governed trade for decades. This is the idea of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, i.e., that subject to certain limited exceptions (such as within a free trade area), a country should levy the same tariff on the same product across all its trading partners. The effect is to dynamite a cornerstone of global trade law, a system that grants formal juridical equality to countries rather than reflecting sheer size and market power. The reciprocal tariff measures increase the distance between the U.S. and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and they come a little more than a week after America suspended its payment of dues to the entity. As the U.S. increasingly withdraws from the system, it remains to be seen whether other countries can revitalize the WTO as a dispute-resolution mechanism, perhaps by using its opt-in binding arbitration system, the MPIA, of which Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, and Mexico (among others) are members. The tariffs will likely weaken U.S. diplomatic efforts to present “Chinese overproduction” as the biggest threat to the system.Within the U.S., the tariffs are likely to push up inflation significantly, particularly in the near term, both from price increases and from shortages resulting from the scrambling of supply chains. And even though the tariffs have been announced, it remains unclear whether they will remain where they are or function as a bargaining chip, exacerbating consumer and business uncertainty, thus feeding into subdued investment prospects. The moves are also likely to have significant, yet differentiated, impact across the countries of the Global South. As noted above, some of the highest tariff rates are among lower income developing countries in South and Southeast Asia like Cambodia or Sri Lanka. However, tariffs on African countries like the DRC at 11%, Cameroon at 12% or Chad at 13% are significantly lower. The high tariffs in Southeast Asia capture how countries in that region have serially pursued a successful development strategy based on inbound investment that has integrated them in global manufacturing supply chains. This is a development pathway that has had the benefits of simultaneously raising incomes and the technological complexity of the export mix in countries like Malaysia. It has also conferred balance of payments resilience, a theme explored here, and one of critical importance in the region that suffered a deep financial crisis in 1997-98. Conversely, many African countries get the benefit of lower tariffs but that is in many instances a reflection of their dependence on commodity exports, a factor that also accounts for the limited number of South American countries hit with high tariffs. In effect the U.S. tariffs could cut off a successful development path unless other more industrialized economies are willing to absorb imports and leave “room” for poorer exporters in more rudimentary industries. If not, poorer countries with less technologically developed production structures could find themselves stuck in a low-income trap subject to periodic financial crises, an outcome with both humanitarian and security implications. The tariffs are also not a good omen for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a U.S. measure that provides duty free access for an expanded range of products to poor African countries that is up for renewal later this year. There may be a handful of (relative) winners here, like Brazil — which has been hit with only the minimum 10% tariffs and whose giant agricultural sector might benefit if countries retaliate against American farm exports. The tariffs have also hit America’s wealthier trading partners, who face several quandaries. One is whether to retaliate and how, particularly since the White House has threatened that retaliation will lead to higher tariffs. Another is whether (and how) to treat the interconnection of security and economic linkages. This might be easier for Europe, since the U.S. has signaled repeatedly that it wishes to see the continent do more for its own security, even as the EU is being hit with slightly lower tariffs (20%) than key U.S. allies in East Asia (24-32%). Europe’s largest economy, Germany, is increasing defense expenditures, which could act (in aggregate) as a macroeconomic offset to the impact of tariffs, thus making the security and economic response mutually consistent. Political and diplomatic calculations in East Asia could be more complex given that they are more dependent on exports to the U.S. and have high levels of interconnectedness with China, even as the U.S. pivots towards regarding the region ever more as its primary strategic theater. Canada and Mexico have not been hit by reciprocal tariffs, however, with the latter being particularly interesting, as it has replaced China as the largest trading partner in recent years. The U.S. ran a bilateral deficit of $172 billion with Mexico last year. Trump excoriated the NAFTA agreement yesterday and he has not exempted either country from his tariff wrath. Since his inauguration, he has targeted both Canada and Mexico on the issues of migration and narcotics, and has subjected them to steel and aluminum and automobile tariffs. Yet, their exemption from this round suggests at least some recognition of the extent to which automotive supply chains are integrated in North America, even if he seems inclined towards disintegrating them over the medium-term. In his actions on automotive tariffs announced on March 26, Trump exempted auto parts for now, but also imposed tariffs on all non-U.S. content embedded in imports within USMCA. This is formally at odds with the agreement, where such content should be exempt if 40-45% of the automobile is made by workers making 16 dollars an hour. The goal appears to be to force a return of large portions (if not all) of automotive supply chains back to the U.S. It remains to be seen how these aims will be viewed in Canada and Mexico given that the USMCA faces a review to be completed by July 1, 2026. Even so, the slightly different treatment of USMCA partners may suggest a desire to finesse the choice between aiming for reshoring entirely within the U.S. or permitting some “nearshoring” where American manufacturers have been deeply engaged for long. On this, as on many other issues, uncertainty seems to be the dominant outcome of yesterday’s announcement.

[Category: Enewsletter, Trump, Economics, Economy, Global south, Wall street, Tariffs]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/2/25 10:05pm
A political bombshell in France: the long-time leader of the right-wing National Rally party (Rassemblement National) Marine Le Pen has been banned from running for political office for the next five years after a court in Paris found her guilty of embezzling the equivalent of $4 million in EU funds to pay National Rally staffers not working for the European Parliament.She was also handed a suspended four-year prison term and ordered to pay a €100,000 fine. It remains to be seen whether the court decision means a political death sentence for her (it can be overturned if she wins an appeal), but it is certainly a devastating blow and a major shake-up of French politics.It matters because the latest polls showed Marine Le Pen leading in the presidential race for 2027, projecting 34-37% of the votes in the first round. That would secure her a place in the run-off, where her chances would depend on the ability of all the other parties to coalesce around her would-be opponent.At first glance, Le Pen’s disqualification could weaken the anti-war voices in France and the EU by reducing their cohesion and visibility. Her party is a founding member of the Patriots for Europe (PfE), the third largest political group in the European Parliament, where it sits with influential like-minded parties like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz, and Italian Deputy Prime Minster Matteo Salvini’s Lega. All of them have been vocal critics of the EU’s unconditional support for Ukraine, anti-Russia sanctions, and the dogmatic refusal to engage in direct diplomacy with Moscow to end the war.To highlight the opposition to the current militarization drive in Europe, the Patriots voted against the European Parliament resolution in early March that endorsed Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s equivalent of $900 billion “rearm” plan. Critics dismissed that plan as unrealistic given the fiscal dire straits in which the continent finds itself and the lack of unified threat assessment throughout Europe — if you are in Portugal, for example, your perception of the Russian threat would be vastly different from Poland’s.Opposition to the “rearm plan” was transpartisan as the Patriots were joined by the anti-war Left faction, and some dissidents from the center-left social-democratic group, such as members of the Italian Democratic Party. On the level of the member states, national interest still trumps ideological cohesion: the conservative Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — ideologically close to Orban and Le Pen — and the Socialist Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez both reject the “rearm” concept (even though the poorly-led Socialists in the European Parliament incomprehensibly voted to back Von der Leyen’s plan).Le Pen’s experience and networks in Europe made her a key player in ensuring the cohesiveness of these like-minded forces. Back in France, she has consistently criticized Macron’s hyper-activism on Ukraine and dismissed his idea of sending French peacekeepers to Ukraine as “sheer madness” — cognizant of the fact that, absent a Russian agreement to such a deployment (which will not be forthcoming), these forces would become targets for the Russian army. She also firmly opposed Macron’s ideas of diluting national sovereignty on defense matters, such as his loose talk of extending the French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe. Of course, this has prompted vivid speculation over the political motivations behind the French court’s decision to ban Le Pen from running. While her allies on the right predictably stand by her, leftist Yanis Varoufakis, an unlikely ally, chastised the “mind-boggling hypocrisy” of the liberal media in denouncing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s imprisonment of his main opponent, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, while rejoicing at the French courts “doing the same.” Some also tried to draw parallels with Romania, where the winner of the first round of the presidential elections Calin Georgescu had his victory annulled, and himself banned from a re-run on apparently flimsy grounds. Like Le Pen, Georgescu ran as a torchbearer of anti-establishment sentiment, and similarly opposed a further war in Ukraine. Yet one should not rush to hasty conclusions. The legal case against Le Pen appears to be robust. There is no evidence that the ruling of the court was politically motivated —France has a history of disqualifying misconducting politicians. In 2017, the mainstream conservative candidate Francois Fillon was disqualified for money diversion on a much smaller scale than Le Pen. What raises questions in Le Pen’s case is not so much the veracity of the allegations against her as the immediate enforcement of the five-year ban, even before any appeal could be resolved. Crucially, that period covers the next presidential elections in 2027. That urgency has led critics to accuse the judges of violating the people’s right to freely choose their representatives, particularly given Le Pen’s popularity. However, it seems indisputable that the judges enjoyed the discretion to do so.Short term, the news could be a boon for Macron and his liberal allies in France and the EU. For one thing, it may be giving some breathing space to the embattled centrist government led by Macron’s pick, Francois Bayrou. National Rally and the left have enough combined clout in the French parliament to oust the government, which they already did with Bayrou’s predecessor, another centrist. Yet doing so again, while mathematically feasible, could tempt Macron to call yet another parliamentary election, from which his most formidable foe would be excluded. Longer term impact would depend on more factors. Would Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s 29-year-old protégé and presumed presidential candidate (in case her appeal fails) prove to be an effective leader? Currently he is the head of the Patriots for Europe in the European Parliament, which gives him visibility and a network with the like-minded parties in Europe. His youth and inexperience could be a challenge for keeping the anti-war faction together. However, the Patriots network has other experienced representatives, such as Orban and Salvini, to lean on in this regard.Ultimately, the appeal and the resilience of the anti-war, pro-diplomacy voices in Europe does not depend solely on personalities, but on broader trends, such as war fatigue, changes in U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump, the battleground situation in Ukraine, social and economic pressures stemming from the militarization drive, and the growing perception that the European publics were not really engaged by the elites in a proper democratic debate on the nature of threats facing Europe.These currents exist, and they will find their champions, regardless of Marine Le Pen’s personal fate.

[Category: Enewsletter, France, Emmanuel macron, Eu, Ukraine war, Marine le pen]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/2/25 10:05pm
In the final days of Ramadan, before Mecca's Grand Mosque, Sudan's de facto president and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan knelt in prayer beside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Al-Burhan had arrived in the kingdom just two days after his troops dealt a significant blow to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), recapturing the capital Khartoum after two years of civil war. Missing from the frame was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf power that has backed al-Burhan’s rivals in Sudan’s civil war with arms, mercenaries, and political cover. The scene captured the essence of a deepening rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE — once allies in reshaping the Arab world, now architects of competing visions for Sudan and the region.For two years, Sudan has been enveloped in chaos. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed forces (SAF) and the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," has inflicted immense suffering: an estimated 150,000 killed, allegations of mass atrocities staining both sides but particularly the RSF in Darfur, 12 million displaced, and over half the population facing acute food insecurity. Khartoum, once a symbol of confluence, bears deep scars — widespread destruction, looted homes, and streets haunted by the unburied dead. It was against this backdrop of devastation and military gains that al-Burhan made his trip across the Red Sea.Early in the conflict, Saudi Arabia played a prominent role by facilitating the evacuation of thousands of foreigners via Port Sudan, an effort that garnered significant goodwill. Building on this, and alongside the United States, the kingdom stepped into the role of mediator hosting the Jeddah ceasefire talks in May 2023. This mediation aligned with Riyadh’s broader strategic pivot toward de-escalation, evident in its rapprochement with Iran and its transformation from aggressor to peacemaker in Yemen. Instability across the Red Sea poses a direct threat to the kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic overhaul — particularly its crown-jewel projects like NEOM and the Red Sea tourism megaprojects along its western coastline, as well as the Yanbu Terminal expansion, which aims to diversify oil export routes away from the Strait of Hormuz. Such turmoil also risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s critical food security investments in Sudan, where vast agricultural ventures had become a linchpin of bilateral ties.However, the Jeddah process withered and the commitments signed on paper dissolved under the reality of continued fighting. A subsequent U.S.-led effort in Geneva, pivoting to humanitarian access after the Jeddah talks collapsed, faltered when the SAF boycotted the talks entirely. By 2025, the return of President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine gutted what remained of American diplomatic capital. USAID’s funding slashes — which shuttered 77% of Sudan’s emergency food kitchens — not only deepened famine but stripped Washington of a key lever it could use to compel concessions. With the U.S. retreating inward, the vacuum proved irresistible to Saudi Arabia.The tipping point arrived in February 2025. As the RSF and its allies formalized their charter for a parallel administration in Nairobi, Saudi Arabia, alongside Qatar and Kuwait, issued a firm public rejection. The Saudi Foreign Ministry unequivocally stated its opposition to "any illegitimate steps taken outside Sudan’s official institutions that threaten its unity.” Al-Burhan’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and its timing solidified this alignment. The agreement announced by both nations during the visit to establish a “coordination council to strengthen relations” signaled long-term engagement, moving beyond the neutral arbiter role. Crucially, this meeting directly followed a high-level Saudi delegation's visit to Port Sudan days earlier, focused squarely on reconstruction.While Riyadh actively cultivates the role of regional stabilizer, Abu Dhabi faces mounting scrutiny regarding its alleged role in fueling the RSF’s war effort. In March 2025, Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention through its alleged military, financial, and political support for the RSF, thereby facilitating atrocities, particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Masalit in West Darfur. While the UAE’s foreign minister dismissed the case as "feeble media maneuvers," the charges echo findings from a U.N. Panel of Experts report, which deemed evidence of UAE arms supplies (including drones and air defenses) to the RSF as "credible."This alleged support has triggered significant political fallout in Washington. U.S. lawmakers Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) publicly confirmed in January, citing administration briefings, that the UAE was indeed arming the RSF, directly contradicting prior assurances it gave the Biden administration. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also placed holds on arms sales to the UAE over its role in Sudan. The UAE's actions in Sudan appear consistent with a wider regional modus operandi. Abu Dhabi’s playbook involves empowering non-state actors, often with secessionist leanings, to secure access to resources and strategic geography. We see this pattern in Libya with its backing of Khalifa Haftar, and in Yemen through its enduring support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose push for independence directly counters Saudi efforts to maintain Yemeni unity under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). Somalia offers another vivid example, where the UAE circumvented Mogadishu to directly arm and fund regional entities like Puntland (reportedly using its Bosaso base for RSF resupply), Somaliland, and Jubaland, thereby fragmenting the country while securing coastal footholds. The announcement of the RSF's parallel government in Nairobi last month seemed a direct application of these tactics. The UAE finalized a $1.5 billion loan to Kenya the same week, prompting speculation that its influence played a role in Nairobi hosting the event.The widening gulf over Sudan, therefore, is not an isolated disagreement but symptomatic of a deeper strategic divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Where they once coordinated closely, particularly in countering the perceived threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and attempting to reshape the GCC during the Qatar blockade, their paths now diverge sharply.Economically, they compete fiercely, with Saudi Arabia challenging Dubai's business hub status through policies requiring regional HQs in Riyadh and launching rival mega-projects. Within OPEC+, tensions have simmered between the two over production quotas, reflecting differing priorities and misaligned projections on the proximity of the decarbonized future. Even maritime borders near the Yasat Islands has become a point of contention, with Riyadh lodging complaints at the U.N. against Abu Dhabi's unilateral demarcation of the potentially oil-rich area.This rivalry now spills into the public domain via social media. Recent online clashes saw well-known and widely followed Saudi commentators brand Emirati counterparts as "outcasts," describing them as being "hated by Arabs and Muslims." In tightly controlled media environments, such sharp exchanges often reflect official displeasure. Ultimately, Sudan is paying the price for this fractured Gulf relationship. Saudi Arabia, driven by its Vision 2030 imperatives and a desire to reassert regional leadership through stability and state institutions, has placed its bet on the SAF. The UAE, focused on resource access and countering perceived ideological threats, continues its alleged support for the RSF despite the mounting condemnation.As long as the rivalry persists, Sudan will remain tragically caught in the crossfire, its future held hostage by a geopolitical struggle reshaping the contours of power across the region.

[Category: Saudi arabia, United arab emirates, Sudan, Enewsletter]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/2/25 10:05pm
While Donald Trump has repeatedly bragged that he can end international conflicts in days, he is clearly frustrated that global leaders are not bending to his will. Only last week, he said that he is “angry” that Moscow has not offered a Ukraine deal and that he might impose secondary “tariffs” on Russian oil sales. He also warned that if Iran doesn’t “make a deal, there will be bombing.”This lashing out is not part of some grand “madman” strategy. Rather, it is a product of Trump’s apparent need to project power. The trick is to know how to reward that projection: Putin’s commissioning of a portrait of Trump — which his personal Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, claims the Russian leader asked him to deliver to the president — paints a vivid example of the nature and perhaps limits of such strategic flattery.Iran’s Supreme Leader would never stoop to such antics. Still, it is possible that Ayatollah Khamenei understands that his negotiators might use Trump’s abiding need to display his global acumen to get American concessions on a nuclear deal. Because Trump’s volatility can open doors or blow them up just as quickly, international leaders — and his own advisers — are constantly struggling to manage (or exploit) an approach to the world that lacks any coherent strategy or even tactics.Thus, it is hardly surprising that while Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian insisted after Trump’s latest threat that “th[e] path for indirect negotiations remains open,” an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leader warned that American troops deployed “at least ten bases -around Iran” are “sitting inside a glass room.” Grappling with his impulse-driven foreign policy, Trump’s rivals find it difficult to get any sense of his bottom line.Hope and confusion in TehranU.S.-Iran relations are a case in point. It is worth recalling that in November Elon Musk met with Iran’s U.N. ambassador, Saied Iravani. Commenting on the surprise encounter, a conservative Iranian website declared that, “It appears that Trump has genuinely decided to adopt a different approach…perhaps, as (Foreign Minister) Abbas Araghchi put it, moving from 'maximum pressure' to 'maximum rationality.’” This observation echoed Araghchi’s previous statement that “maximum rationality” would “probably get a different result” and seemed calculated to test Trump.Trump’s decision in mid-January to remove security details for former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook — both men key architects of Trump’s first-term “maximum pressure” policy against Iran — encouraged Tehran’s cautious optimism. When Hook was summarily dismissed from a top position on Trump’s transition team after complaining about the Biden administration’s “appeasement” of Iran, the hardline Tehran Times quoted Trump’s announcement on Truth Social (“Brian Hook from the Wilson Center for Scholars... YOU'RE FIRED!") while the Islamic Republic News Agency speculated that Trump’s actions “could be sending signals to Iran that he may be willing to engage with Tehran diplomatically,” even if it is “unclear whether the moves signal a shift in tactics, strategy, or attitude.”Trump’s mysterious letter to KhameneiThe drama revolving around the letter that Trump sent Khamenei on March 5 shows that striking this balance won’t be easy. While not revealing the letter’s contents, Trump alluded to it during his March 6 Oval Office remarks.“I’d rather negotiate a peace deal…but we can make a deal…just as good as if you won militarily,” he said. Two days later on Fox News, he acknowledged that “I’ve written them a letter saying I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.” His assertion that the U.S. seeks a deal that would be “just as good as if you won militarily” suggests that Trump is telling Khamenei that, by dint of either talks or brute force, the administration will compel Iran to totally dismantle its vast enrichment facilities.This is a demand that no Iranian leader, including Khamenei, can possibly accept. As he and Araghchi made clear, they will not accept U.S. ultimatums. As Khamenei put it, the “negotiations” that “some bully governments” seek “are not aimed at solving issues, but to…impose their own expectations.” If his depiction of the letter’s take-it-or-leave-it tone is accurate, the U.S., Israel and Iran may well be on a path to military confrontation.A Trump-Netanyahu partnership without limits? While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would welcome a U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran, it is striking that only six weeks ago the Israeli press was full of reports speculating that, as one Haaretz writer put it, Netanyahu might “go head to head with Trump on striking Iran.” But everything changed with Trump’s February 4 remark that two million displaced Palestinians must leave Gaza. While world leaders strained to make sense of this statement, Netanyahu praised Trump’s “revolutionary, creative approach,” arguing that it created “many possibilities,” one of which, it now appears, was Israel’s renewed assault in Gaza. It is also very likely that Netanyahu construed Trump’s words as telegraphing U.S. support for an eventual attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But such an attack will not be easy given the domestic upheaval that Israel’s renewed assault on Gaza has sparked. Wading into the political waters, President Isaac Herzog declared that “thousands of citizens…are…crying out to prevent the widening of rifts and divisions….It is unthinkable to ignore these voices and not seek consensus.” Coming amid the controversy over Netanyahu’s March 20 firing of the head of Israel’s Shin Bet security service, Herzog’s statement points to a constitutional crisis that could send Israel into a kind of civil war. Undeterred, Netanyahu’s Likud Party asserted that “Herzog has joined the ‘deep state.’” Clearly, Netanyahu and his allies believe that he has much to gain by emulating Trump’s paranoia and thus intimating that he and the U.S. president are on the same page politically and strategically. Netanyahu cannot trust his mercurial twinStill, Netanyahu must tread carefully because the divisions tearing Israel apart will grow as it expands the war in Gaza and ramps up military actions in Lebanon and Syria. If these actions lead to the killing of the Israeli hostages and/or spark a military confrontation on three fronts, the specter of regional mayhem reflect poorly on Trump. The last thing he can tolerate is looking like a “loser.”In fact, Witkoff seemed to use his March 21 interview with Tucker Carlson to help his boss out. The resumption of war in Gaza, he argued, runs counter to Israeli public opinion. Moreover, he stated that Hamas is not ideological, that it must have a political role in a post-Gaza deal, and that real compromises with Hamas and Iran are vital to the stability that, according to Witkoff, is Trump’s number one goal when it comes to global affairs. And he seemed to walk back Trump’s own words when he argued that his letter to Khamenei was not an ultimatum, that he wants a nuclear deal that includes “verification,” and that the military option is not “a very good alternative.”Spinners beware!Witkoff’s interview provoked a storm in the Israeli press, and rightly so: a trusted envoy, he is struggling to transform Trump’s utterings into something resembling a coherent policy. Yet if the Middle East blows up, or seems to be moving that way, Trump might launch another verbal blast that will have leaders, policy analysts and pundits in Tehran, Jerusalem and Washington scurrying to fathom what it means. But if Witkoff and can temper his boss’s outbursts without embarrassing or antagonizing him, he could help Trump pull back from the brink. Such an effort will partly hinge on whether Trump can muster the emotional energy to articulate and sustain support for a real compromise. Perhaps pushing back against such a possibility, national security adviser Mike Waltz recently declared that nothing less than “full dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program is acceptable, thus perhaps putting him at odds with Witkoff.The battle to spin Trump’s verbal bouts continues not only in Washington, but also in Tehran. Days before Trump threatened to bomb Iran, government sources in Tehran claimed that the president’s letter “is not exactly clear, (but) is not an ultimatum.” Indeed, Araghchi’s assertion that “indirect negotiations can continue,” was a message reiterated by another close adviser to Khamenei.While, as noted above, Iran’s president has also repeated this message despite Trump’s recent threats, in the wake of the Signal Group Chat fiasco, senior administration officials are unlikely to risk their necks competing to influence Trump’s stance on Russia, Iran or indeed any other country. Like their counterparts in Tehran, Jerusalem, Moscow and other capitals, his security advisers must tread carefully in their attempts to manage Trump’s fiery temperament and careening impulses.A longer version of this article originally appeared at Arab Center Washington DC.

[Category: Israel, Iran nuclear program, Iran]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/1/25 10:05pm
“We are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry, including commercial shipbuilding and military shipbuilding,” President Trump said during his March 6 joint address to Congress.The president did not break new ground with the announcement. Virtually every year, Navy and industry leaders complain that the United States does not invest enough in the nation’s shipbuilding facilities. Yet according to the Congressional Budget Office, lawmakers have appropriated more shipbuilding funds than the president requested for at least 17 of the past 20 years. Even with the extra funds, the Navy’s major shipbuilding programs have consistently fallen behind schedule and over budget.Over the next three years, the Navy plans on retiring 13 more ships than it will commission, shrinking the fleet to 283 ships by 2027. According to the Navy’s current plan, the fleet will grow to 515 crewed and uncrewed vessels by 2054. To reach that goal, the Congressional Budget Office estimates the Navy will spend more than $1 trillion, nearly $36 billion each year for the next three decades on shipbuilding alone.It remains unclear if the Navy can realize its plan, even if Congress provides the funds. Ramping up naval construction is not simply a matter of resources. The Navy spent $2.3 billion between 2018 and 2023 to increase the capacity of the submarine shipyards. Despite this investment, the production rate for Virginia-class attack submarines decreased from around two boats per year to 1.2.In just 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the number of skilled shipyard workers shrank from 62,000 to 21,000. The number of workers has increased since 2001, but shortages remain. During a 2024 symposium, the director of the Navy’s Submarine Industrial Base Program said the United States needs to hire 140,000 workers just to meet the needs of the current submarine building program.One of the best ways for the Navy to ease the current shipbuilding struggles is to pursue better ship designs. The constant pursuit of exquisite technology and excessively complex ship designs results in longer construction times. The insidious practice of concurrency — beginning construction of a ship before the design is complete — causes further delays. As design flaws are discovered during construction, workers must go back and re-do already completed work. These often require extensive retrofitting, consuming substantial time and money. With limited shipbuilding facilities, longer construction times create a backlog that only exacerbates industry’s ability to meet demand.Navy leaders could provide some relief to the haggard shipyards by simplifying ship designs. Simplicity should always be a key design parameter in any weapon program. Designs based on proven technology can be developed and built faster. An acquisition strategy that prioritizes simplicity will keep the Navy and other services one step ahead of obsolescence.Navy leaders should have learned this lesson from the Littoral Combat Ship debacle. That program was intended to be the small surface combatant of the future with a complicated modular design to swap out specialized equipment for different missions. Engineers could not get that gimmick to work properly, and the scheme was eventually abandoned. The program has been beset by a string of embarrassing maintenance failures and questions about its combat survivability. The Navy is now in the process of retiring these troublesome ships. The Littoral Combat Ship program’s only milestone achievement is joining the mothball fleet early.Before throwing more money at the shipbuilding problem, the nation’s civilian and uniformed military leaders should first change their acquisition strategy to lessen the burden on the overworked shipyards already devoted to naval warships. The Congressional Budget Office recommended the Navy develop a missile corvette that can be built by the nation’s other shipyards. The Navy has used a similar approach of licensing designs to commercial shipbuilders in the past to meet its shipbuilding goals to great effect. The idea has merit today because doing so would expand both the size of the fleet and the industrial base.The Navy’s challenges didn’t crop up overnight, and they won’t be solved overnight. Another infusion of taxpayer money is unlikely to resolve the shipbuilding industry’s capacity limits.

[Category: Littoral combat ship, Us navy, Congress, Pentagon budget]

[*] [+] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/1/25 10:05pm
As the war between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and allied militias against the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group continues, the Trump administration is reportedly tapping Massad Boulos as the State Department’s special envoy to the African Great Lakes region. In this capacity, Boulos will be responsible for leading the American diplomatic effort to bring long-desired stability to the region and to end a conflict that has been raging in the eastern DRC for decades.Other than serving as an adviser on Middle East policy for President-elect Trump’s team during the transition period between the election and inauguration, Boulos has no U.S. foreign policy experience. Much of his previous work was in the private sector, where he most recently worked at a small automotive conglomerate for a West African company, called SCOA Nigeria, whose profit was less than $66,000 last year. Boulos also has familial connections with the first family. The president’s daughter, Tiffany Trump, is married to Massad Boulos’ son, Michael. In an email to Responsible Statecraft, the State Department would not provide comment on Boulos’ reported appointment.Since the early days of the most recent incarnation of this conflict in late 2021, two major peace processes have been running in parallel. In one, Kenya brought together many of the 120 disparate armed groups fighting in the eastern Congo, successfully reaching a truce between some of these groups and the Congolese government. However, the most powerful of these groups, the Rwandan-backed M23, was absent from the talks and remains the major threat to the DRC.In a separate peace track, Angola had been serving as the leading mediator, attempting to set up negotiations between M23 rebels, their backers in Rwanda, and the DRC government. But exhausted and disheartened following numerous failed mediation efforts, Angolan President Joao Lourenco announced in mid-March that he will no longer lead this mediation process.In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, Onesphore Sematumba, a senior analyst on the DRC and Burundi at the International Crisis Group, said that “peace efforts have been further complicated by the involvement of multiple state actors, each with their own interests.”Burundi, Rwanda’s southern neighbor, has provided direct support for the DRC and Congo-backed armed groups seeking to attack Rwandan assets. Uganda, which borders Rwanda to the north, has also sent troops to the region. Although Uganda’s involvement is more enigmatic, the United Nations found that Uganda has supported M23 rebels in the eastern Congo.Mediating an end to such a long and complicated war with numerous state and non-state actors is a difficult task. Just launching negotiations has proven to be a challenge, with each side at times refusing to accept the basic parameters set forth by mediators before negotiations even begin. In December, Rwandan president Paul Kagame refused to attend Angolan-initiated mediation efforts if M23 rebels were not also present, something DRC president Felix Tshisekedi, who discredits M23 as an unserious armed group whose entire financial and military strength rests on Rwanda’s support, refused to allow.If confirmed as special envoy, Boulos and the American delegation would have the advantage of coming to the table with a relatively fresh voice. Recent news that Trump is considering agreeing to a deal offered by the DRC to grant critical minerals access to the United States in exchange for military support through the provision of military resources and training to the Congolese military risks violating American neutrality, consequently hindering its influence to broker a peace agreement. Agreeing to such a deal, which the Trump administration is reportedly considering, would immediately collapse American credibility in the eyes of Rwanda, hurting U.S. efforts to bring about a lasting peace deal. According to Sematumba, funnelling more weapons into the arena and tilting the military scales in favor of one side would only intensify the fighting and exacerbate the conflict. The U.S., Sematumba said, “should not come to the region with a plan centered around adding to the violence.”In a major surprise, Tshisekedi and Kagame united in Doha on March 18 for peace talks hosted by Qatar, opening a third track of peace negotiations.Although Sematumba is skeptical that any major player, including the U.S. government, will be able mediate an end to such a complicated war anytime soon, he says that any American effort to do so should “consider all the existing peace initiatives,” rather than adding yet another one to an already “incoherent” peace effort.Attaching itself to Qatar’s negotiating track might be the way to go, seeing it is the only peace initiative so far that has successfully brought together the heads of state of both the DRC and Rwanda to discuss the conflict face-to-face.U.S.-ties to each country can help contribute to an end to the conflict. Both the DRC and Rwanda have close economic and diplomatic relations with the United States. Both have also benefited from large amounts of U.S. foreign aid over the decades, with the U.S. budgeting $990 million for aid to the DRC and $188 million to Rwanda in 2023, the most recent year with complete data. Although a recent analysis finds that Trump’s policies will cut 65% of aid funding directed towards Rwanda and 34% directed towards the DRC, the U.S. is still a major contributor of aid to the region, and through it has the requisite soft power to influence peace negotiations.Any successful and lasting peace agreement is likely to require Rwanda to end its support for M23 and remove Rwandan troops currently stationed in DRC territory. The challenge to Boulos will come if Rwanda remains intransigent on that issue. American sanctions remain a more extreme option. The United States last month sanctioned a senior Rwandan government official as well as a member of the larger rebel group of which M23 is a part. Sanctions were a key part of the United States’ strategy to ending the less severe incarnation of this crisis in 2012, the first time M23 threatened regional security. Donors back then froze $240 million in aid to Rwanda, and President Obama used American diplomatic and economic leverage to successfully pressure Kagame to end his support for the rebellion. This, however, proved to only be a temporary reprieve, with M23 returning more powerful than ever in 2021.Sematumba expressed doubt that sanctions would lead to a lasting peace, saying that sanctions are “more likely to hurt villagers than the country’s leadership,” and that the numerous sanctions already in place against Rwanda, including by the EU and the UK, have failed to move the needle, and have quite possibly made the conflict worse. Once the EU implemented its sanctions on Rwanda on March 17, M23 pulled out of peace talks just a day before they were scheduled to be held in Angola as a form of protest against the EU’s new sanctions policy.Although the power of the U.S. dollar and the sizable levels of American foreign aid funnelling into the region give the U.S. some leverage to implement economic sanctions against Rwanda, in 2022, the last year with full data, the U.S. was only Rwanda’s tenth-largest export market and eleventh-largest source of imports. Rwanda, therefore, has plenty of alternative trading partners it could turn to if the U.S. were to implement sanctions.Despite the complexity of this conflict and the difficulty facing Boulos and his team once they take the helm, using American soft power and leverage can help them mold peace talks and incrementally move the conflict towards a resolution.

[Category: M23, Rwanda, Democratic republic of the congo]

[*] [-] [-] [x] [A+] [a-]  
[l] at 4/1/25 3:43pm
Senators Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) have co-written a letter to the White House, demanding to know the administration’s strategy behind the now-18 days of airstrikes against the Houthis in Yemen. The letter calls into question the supposed intent of these strikes “to establish deterrence,” acknowledging that neither the Biden administration’s strikes in October 2023, nor the years-long bombing campaign by Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2020, were successful in debilitating the military organization's military capabilities. “Rather, these campaigns only served to embolden the Houthis and rally their recruiting base,” the senators said in the letter. “U.S. military action must have a clear strategy that advances our country’s long-term national security objectives and is compliant with the law of armed conflict.”In addition, “Congress should be briefed about the recent strikes against the Houthis and the total cost expected to be incurred by this campaign at the American taxpayer’s expense.”Rand and Merkley also correctly connect the Houthis’ recent attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea with the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire, pointing out that no such Houthi attacks took place while the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas (brokered by the Trump team ahead of the presidential inauguration) had been in place. Paul and Merkley also questioned the Constitutionality of the strikes, given there has been no Congressional declaration of war on the Houthis. Congress wasn’t even consulted.“We also recognize that any U.S. military response — especially sustained military engagement — must be conducted within the framework of the Constitution,” the Senators said in a release Tuesday. “Although the Constitution assigns the President the role of commander in chief of the U.S. military, it is Congress that is entrusted with the power to declare war — and Congress has not done so with respect to the Houthis.”The letter comes amidst an escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran. In a post on Truth Social yesterday, President Trump warned that if the Houthis did not cease shooting at U.S. ships in the Red Sea, the real pain would be “yet to come, for both the Houthis and their sponsors in Iran.”Such rhetoric calls into question whether the strikes on the Houthis are to set the stage for war with Iran itself. Recognizing this possibility in their letter, the senators call on the Trump administration to make clear to Congress and the American public if they indeed intend to strike Iran directly. They conclude the letter by warning of the United States “stumbling into another costly and unnecessary war.”Bipartisan opposition to military escalation in the Middle East is urgently needed, moving beyond the procedural ‘Signalgate' debacle to a more substantive focus on what the strikes on the Houthis are to realistically achieve, and what they portend for greater regional peace and stability. In intensifying strikes against the Houthis, President Trump appears to be contradicting his own expressed desire to rein in American military action in the Middle East, risking a broader, regional war, while seemingly failing to identify the Houthis’ strategic calculus tied to the war in Gaza. While President Trump pledged a legacy of peacemaker in his inaugural speech, continuing along his current path in the Middle East threatens to permanently derail this worthy pursuit, particularly if war with Iran were to break out. Skepticism from across the aisle to avert this outcome is a welcome development.

[Category: Us airstrikes, Us military, Houthis, Israel-gaza, Red sea, War powers, Senate, Congress, Qiosk, Yemen]

As of 4/8/25 9:37pm. Last new 4/8/25 12:30pm.

Next feed in category: South Front