Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Is Israel expanding territorial control toward Syria?

 

at 11/21/24 10:05pm

Beyond Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon, Israel now appears to have set its sights as well on the festering conflict with Syria, constructing developments in a critical buffer zone between the two countries in violation of a previous ceasefire agreement and sparking fears of further conflict escalation in the region.Last week, the Associated Press published aerial footage of Israel building along the Alpha Line, which delineates a demilitarized zone or area of separation between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Images taken on November 5 by Planet Labs PBC for AP showed about 4.6 miles of construction by Israeli forces along the line.“In recent months, [the UN Disengagement Observer Force] UNDOF has observed some construction activity being carried out by the IDF along the ceasefire line,” a UN peacekeeping spokesperson told RS. “The IDF construction of ditches and berms appears to prevent movements across the ceasefire line of individuals from the area of separation. UNDOF has observed that, during the construction, in some instances, IDF personnel and Israeli excavators and other construction equipment, and the construction work encroach into the area of separation.”Such construction efforts, which the AP footage suggests is ongoing, were previously mentioned by Geir O. Pedersen, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, to the UN Security Council late last month. Israel, which presented a 71-page report alleging Syrian violations of the Alpha Line to the UN Security Council in June, says its construction efforts are necessary for defense. As the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) told CNN, such developments are intended “to establish a barrier on Israeli territory exclusively in order to thwart a possible terrorist invasion and protect the security of Israel’s borders.”But fears persist that these developments could threaten a decades-long ceasefire agreement that has been key to maintaining relative peace between Israel and Syria, which have formally been at war since 1948. To uphold this ceasefire, UNDOF has patrolled the demilitarized zone since 1974. “Violations of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement have occurred where engineering works have encroached into the AoS [Area of Separation, or demilitarized zone],” UNDOF said in a November 12 statement, according to AP. “There have been several violations by (Israel) in the form of their presence in the AoS because of these activities.”Such “severe [Israeli] violations” around the demilitarized zone, UNDOF claimed, “have the potential to increase tensions in the area.”A UN spokesperson also stressed to RS that “UNDOF protests all violations of the Disengagement Agreement.”Territorial disputes between Syria and Israel remain a contentious subject. A 1981 UN Security Council resolution deemed Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights territory — which Israel seized from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and annexed in 1981 — “null and void and without international legal effect.”In contrast and sparking controversy among Syrians and myriad governments alike, the Trump administration recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights in 2019, a decision subsequently upheld by the Biden administration.And now, developments in the Alpha Line area suggest that Israel intends to expand its territorial control.“It is essential to see [ongoing Israeli developments near the Alpha Line] in the wider context of Israel’s constant attacks on targets in Syrian territory, especially since October 7, 2023, and its determination to take full advantage of the Syrian state’s weakness to advance the Netanyahu government’s Greater Israel agenda,” Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy, told RS.“What Israel is doing is consolidating its hold over the occupied Golan Heights,” according to Josh Landis, a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute who chairs the Middle East Studies Department at the University of Oklahoma. In an interview with RS, he noted that there are about 25,000 Israeli settlers currently in the Golan Heights. “Over the last several years, there’s been a big effort to grow the settlements and increase by 5,000…the number of settlers in the [Golan Heights]. ...And so, Israel is expanding.”Regional Israeli offensives intensifyThe Alpha Line-area construction follows many Israeli incursions and assaults across the region since Hamas launched its deadly attacks against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. This includes extended IDF airstrikes and ground operations in the Gaza Strip, which have killed over 43,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, to date. In addition to restricting Palestinians’ movements there, the IDF has also increased the number and scale of its attacks and raids on Palestinian towns and refugee camps in the West Bank, which several Israeli cabinet members have recently urged the government to fully annex.Asserting itself over the border between Gaza and Egypt as well, the IDF took over the Rafah crossing last May, destroyed its departure hall, and established a military presence along the so-called Philadelphi Corridor that runs along the border. Israel insists these actions were designed to prevent weapons smuggling. For its part, Egypt, which has strongly objected to these operations and denied that any smuggling from its side of the border has taken place, has charged that Israel is using the issue to obstruct ceasefire negotiations. Zooming out, Israel has increasingly attacked neighboring Lebanon as part of its war against Hezbollah, which has been engaging in its own rocket and missile attacks against Northern Israel since Oct. 7. Israel's recent attacks in Lebanon include strikes on humanitarian zones, residential areas, villages, and pager bombings in September that killed 12 and wounded 2,800. Expanding ground operations, Israel is currently sending troops further into southern Lebanon in an intensifying military campaign to rout Hezbollah that has decimated villages close to the border. Israeli forces have also hit Lebanese Army facilities, and targeted UN peacekeepers and their bases in Lebanon, injuring UN staff and attacking UN-maintained watchtowers, fences, and other structures.Although it has received little media coverage, Israel has also been striking Syria at an increased rate since October 7. On Nov 14, for example, Israeli aircraft bombed residential buildings in the Syrian capital Damascus, killing 15. On Wednesday, Israeli airstrikes killed upwards of 36 people in the Syrian city of Palmyra, according to Syrian state media. Israel’s latest actions across the Alpha Line are taking place as Syria, itself recovering from over a decade of war, has taken in hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing growing Israeli operations in Lebanon. “Israel has been bombing Syria at least three times a week since October, so the ceasefire [between the two countries] is already threatened by this constant military activity,” Landis told RS.Reporting to the UN Security Council last month, Pedersen stressed that the recent escalation could have dire consequences: “I want to issue a clear warning: regional spillover into Syria is alarming and could get much worse, with serious implications for Syria and international peace and security.”Altogether, Israeli incursions of all kinds and against multiple targets risk greater escalation across the region. This is all made possible with continued U.S. assistance. “This is a moment when (Netanyahu) is in the driver’s seat because the Biden administration has demonstrated it’s willing to back Israel in almost any military adventure in the region," noted Landis, "whether it’s an invasion of Lebanon or taking the Golan Heights, or endless war in Gaza.”

[Category: Syria, Gaza war, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel-palestine, Israel]

— Diplomacy Watch: Russia retaliates after long-range missile attacks

 

at 11/21/24 1:26pm

As the Ukraine War passed its 1,000-day mark this week, the departing Biden administration made a significant policy shift by lifting restrictions on key weapons systems for the Ukrainians — drawing a wave of fury, warnings and a retaliatory ballistic missile strike from Moscow. On Thursday, Russia launched what the Ukrainian air force thought to be a non-nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, which if true, would be the first time such weapons were used and mark a major escalatory point in the war. In a televised address on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Moscow launched medium-range ballistic missiles, not ICBMs. He added that the long-range strikes from Ukraine this week have given the regional conflict the elements of a global one, and that Russia could use the missiles against countries that have allowed Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia. The strike was seen largely as a response to the Biden administration’s authorization for the Ukrainian military to use the American-made ATACMS missile system to strike deeper into Russian territory. On Tuesday Ukraine reportedly used the system to fire six missiles into Russia’s western Bryansk region, which Moscow said it successfully defended. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy led a months-long effort for NATO authorization to strike deeper into Russia. On Tuesday, according to CNN, he said his military now has the U.S. ATACMS system and its own long-range capabilities, and that “we will use all of this.” The Ukrainian military also struck Russian targets with UK-made long-range Storm Shadow missiles on Wednesday. Some Russian officials warned that the strikes could lead to a “third world war.” Moscow’s position for months has been that an attack on Russian territory with British, French or U.S.-made missiles would constitute direct warfare against those countries. Russian ambassador to the UK Andrei Kelin doubled down on this threat after Ukraine fired UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles into Russia on Wednesday. "Britain and the UK are now directly involved in this war, because this firing cannot happen without NATO staff, British staff as well," Kelin said. Earlier this week, as an apparent warning to the West, Putin signed an update to Russian nuclear policy that lowers the threshold for a retaliatory strike. The revised document says Russia could use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear or WMD strike against Russia or its allied nations, or in response to aggression against Russia or Belarus with conventional weapons threatening their sovereignty or territorial integrity. The doctrine also declares that an attack by a non-nuclear power supported by a nuclear power is considered a joint attack, and that an attack from one member of NATO would be considered an attack from all members. The White House said the policy came at no surprise, and that it will not respond with any alteration of its own nuclear policies. Other Ukraine News This Week: The U.S. gave Ukraine further slack later on Tuesday, with The Washington Post reporting that Biden approved the provision of antipersonnel mines to Ukraine — undoing his own policy from 2022. According to CNN, the Americans expect Ukraine to use these mines to defend their own territory, not as an offensive tactic in Russia. Russian forces, on the other hand, have been using similar devices on the front lines since their invasion began in 2022. Still, Biden’s move could prove controversial, the Post said, citing their indiscriminate nature and a 160-member international treaty banning their use based on an elevated risk to civilians. The Biden administration’s policy shifts came after a violent weekend of Russian attacks: according to CBS, Moscow launched a drone and missile assault on Ukraine on Sunday, targeting energy infrastructure ahead of the winter and killing scores of civilians. Biden is just under two months away from exiting office, with the incoming Trump administration having made clear in recent months its intentions to try to end the war. From State Department Press Briefing on Nov. 18 In Monday’s press briefing, State Department Matthew Miller repudiated the idea of presidents working together across terms when asked about how typical it might be for a lame-duck president to make significant foreign policy decisions like enabling the long-range missiles. “...the President was elected to a four-year term and the American people expect him to govern for a four-year term and make the decisions that he believes are appropriate,” Miller said. “There is no one who thinks that for the first two months of the next term they’re supposed to continue to carry out the decisions made by this President.” From State Department Press Briefing on Nov. 19 Miller condemned Russia’s rhetorical responses to the long-range missile attack in Tuesday’s press briefing. “Since the beginning of its war of aggression against Ukraine, [Russia] has sought to coerce and intimidate both Ukraine and other countries around the world through irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and behavior,” Miller said. “Despite what Russia says, neither the United States nor NATO pose any threat to Russia. Russia’s irresponsible and bellicose rhetoric will not do anything to improve Russia’s security.” “This policy in itself just highlights Russia’s hypocrisy,” he added. “Russia is suggesting here that they would use or could use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state if they undertake the same kind of aggression that Russia itself is inflicting upon Ukraine and its people.”

[Category: Russia, Nato, Us, Uk, Putin, Biden, Trump, Zelensky, Atacms, Storm shadow, Hypersonic, Ballistic, Missile, Kursk, Dnipro, Qiosk, Ukraine]

— UK dutifully follows Biden into Ukraine doom spiral

 

at 11/21/24 11:08am

The UK has apparently given the greenlight for Kyiv to use its Storm Shadow missiles for attacking inside Russia. While the British government has not commented publicly, the Ukrainian military used the missiles to strike Russia for the first time on Wednesday.In keeping with most British military “decisions,” its actions Wednesday followed the Biden Administration’s approval to allow Ukraine to use its own long-range ATACMS in the same way. The British government seems to have forgotten that two months from now, the Biden administration will no longer be in office and the Trump White House may not take kindly to what some of its future members see as British support for a preemptive Biden attempt to wreck Trump’s peace agenda in Ukraine. From the point of view of Britain’s own security interests (which do not appear to play any part in British establishment thinking about Ukraine), British citizens just have to hope that after January the Russian government does not retaliate against the UK — for if it does, they may not receive much sympathy from Washington. The official argument for the ATACMS and Storms Shadows decision is to put Ukraine in a stronger position before peace talks are initiated by Trump. Russia seems certain to try to gain as much territory as possible before these talks begin, and the Ukrainian armed forces are in serious danger of collapse. This is a dangerous gamble, because the missiles (which are guided to their targets by U.S. personnel) risk infuriating Russia without giving really critical help to Ukraine. It is especially dangerous for the UK, because if Putin feels impelled to live up to its promises to retaliate without attacking U.S. interests and alienating Trump, he could well feel that the UK makes a safer target — it is at least a gamble based on rational calculations. This is not exactly what the government and the British security establishment have been saying. Like some East European governments, and influential political voices in Western Europe, the British government is still talking of helping Ukraine “win” — not to achieve a better compromise. Like the Biden administration, British and NATO language of the “irreversibility” of Ukrainian NATO membership, and the necessity of Russia leaving the Ukrainian territory it has occupied suggest opposition to any conceivable peace settlement that Trump could seek to achieve. If the UK is seen by Trump to be deliberately sabotaging his peace agenda, this will be hugely damaging to the American-British relationship, and put Britain in an extremely exposed position. Such an interpretation by Trump is likely to be encouraged by the talk in Washington, London and European capitals about “Trump-proofing” aid to Ukraine, and suggestions by European analysts that Europe both should and can support Ukraine in continuing to fight even if the Trump administration withdraws U.S. support.At a meeting in Warsaw this week, European foreign ministers pledged (without giving any details) to increase aid to Ukraine. Furthermore – in words, which if meant seriously, would make peace impossible — declared: “(that we) remain steadfast in our support for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, based on the UN Charter, reaffirming that peace can only be negotiated with Ukraine, with European, American and G7 partners by its side, and in making sure that the aggressor will bear consequences, also financial ones, of its illegal acts that violate rules set out in the UN Charter.”This is lunacy. It is not even likely that Europe will be able to sustain present levels of economic aid to Ukraine for long. Budgets all over Europe are under intense strain, leading to bitter political struggles. The German coalition government has just collapsed due to a fight between its constituent parties over how to pay simultaneously for support to Ukraine, German re-armament, German industrial regeneration and social welfare.Berlin had already announced radical cuts to its bilateral aid to Ukraine. For the European Union to take up the full burden of existing European aid — let alone replace that of the U.S. — would almost certainly require acceptance of EU control over collective European debt, through a huge issue of “Defense Eurobonds.” This would, however, likely be opposed by dominant elements in the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which seems certain to be the dominant partner in a new coalition after elections now due in February. Their opposition stems not only from their own convictions, but also from the fear that ceding German economic sovereignty in this way would deeply anger many Germans and give a strong boost to support for populist opposition parties of the Right and Left.As to Europe replacing the U.S. in terms of military support for Ukraine, this looks absurd. In critical areas like air defense systems, European military industries are not remotely capable even of providing for their own countries’ defense, let alone of providing what Ukraine needs. Earlier this year, European governments rebuffed Ukraine’s appeal for more air defense weapons. These shortages extend across the board. Almost unbelievably, the British government’s decision on Storm Shadows occurred simultaneously with an announcement of further deep cuts to the UK armed forces, including its last amphibious assault ships and a large proportion of its transport helicopters.Europe can of course buy from the U.S. — but only if Washington is capable of supplying systems for Ukraine and for Israel and adequately supplying America’s own forces for possible war with China. Is it likely that a Trump administration angered by Ukrainian and European rejection of a peace deal would prioritize weapons for Ukraine, even if the Europeans were paying for them? The utterly confused state of British and European thinking about the military realities of the Ukraine conflict and Europe’s role is in large part due to the pitiful ignorance of military matters on the part of politicians — and therefore governments — who with the rarest of exceptions have never served in the military themselves, or bothered to study military issues, or devoted serious study to any foreign country. This makes them completely dependent on advice from their foreign and security establishments; and for decades now, these establishments have outsourced to Washington not just responsibility for their national security, but thinking about it. If you ask most members of European think tanks to define the specifically British, or French, or Danish interests in the Ukraine War, they are not merely incapable of answering, they clearly regard the very question as somehow illegitimate and disloyal to the U.S.-mandated “rules-based order.” But the America to which these Europeans are loyal is the old U.S. foreign and security establishment — not the America of Trump, which they do not understand and deeply hate and fear (just as they do their own populist oppositions). Indeed, until a very few months ago the great majority of European politicians and experts simply refused to believe that Trump could possibly win the elections. Many have now lost their heads entirely, and are just running around in circles. Others, like the Poles and Balts, have their heads firmly screwed on, but back to front. As to the British government and security establishment, since the U.S. elections they have resembled their predecessor King Charles I, who according to legend went on talking for half an hour after his head had been cut off. Perhaps given time they can grow a new head of their very own. But in the meantime, for people in this embarrassing position, a period of silent inaction would seem to be the wise course to adopt.

[Category: Atacms, Biden, Britain, Enewsletter, Russia, Storm shadows, Uk, Ukraine, Ukraine war]

— ICC issues arrest warrants for Netanyahu, Gallant

 

at 11/21/24 6:46am

On Thursday the International Court of Justice (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as a member of Hamas leadership.The warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant were for charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The court unanimously agreed that the prime minister and former defense minister “each bear criminal responsibility for the following crimes as co-perpetrators for committing the acts jointly with others: the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare; and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts.”“The Chamber considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that both individuals intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, water, and medicine and medical supplies, as well as fuel and electricity, from at least 8 October 2023 to 20 May 2024,” the court detailed in its allegations. The ICC also charged Hamas leader Ibrahim Al-Masri for mass killings during the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks on Israel, including rape and hostage taking.A plan suggested by former IDF general, Giora Eiland, called for the explicit emptying out of northern Gaza and the labeling of all remaining civilians as military targets, as well as the purposeful blockage of humanitarian aid. Netanyahu reportedly did not agree to the plan, but evidence points to aspects of the plan being enacted. “The ICC decision shows once more how out of sync Biden's Gaza policy is with both American and international law,” says the Quincy Institute’s Executive Vice President Trita Parsi. “Biden has sacrificed America's international standing to arm and protect leaders who the international courts have deemed to be war criminals.” The ICC’s move comes just one day after unprecedented votes in the U.S. Senate to end the sale of certain offensive weapons to Israel. The measures ultimately failed, with the White House telling senators that they would be supporting Iran and Hamas should they vote to curb weapons sales to Israel. Because of the ICC warrants, Netanyahu or Gallant could be arrested upon entering a nation that has recognized the ICC and its rulings. However, Israel is among dozens of other countries, including the United States, that do not recognize the court’s jurisdiction.After warrants were requested in October, Israel reacted by challenging the jurisdiction of the ICC in the matter, but that challenge has been rejected. “Israel's reaction — that no other democracy has been treated this way by the ICC — is indicative of how perverted certain approaches to international law have become,” said Parsi. “Israel essentially argues that because it defines itself as a democracy, it should be above the law. That war-crimes, apartheid, and genocide are ok as long as the perpetrator identifies as democratic. This approach — creating different sets of laws and standards for different countries — is a recipe for global instability and a threat to American security.”

[Category: Netanyahu, Israel, Israel-palestine, Palestine, International criminal court, International law, War crimes, Qiosk, Gaza war]

— Is Turkey's big break with Israel for real?

 

at 11/20/24 10:05pm

In recent months, media reports have suggested that long-standing Israel-Turkey relations have reached a “breaking point,” particularly as Israel intensifies its attacks on Gaza and Lebanon. These claims exploded following President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s declaration last Wednesday that Ankara has “currently severed all relations with Israel.” That assertion, however, was complicated by the response from Israel’s foreign ministry, which stated it was “not aware of a change in the status of relations with Turkey,” despite the trade embargo imposed by Ankara last May. Nonetheless, it is clear that the longstanding and generally cordial Israel-Turkey relationship is fractured, primarily due to the policies of the current Israeli government. A protracted war in Gaza, a second war in Lebanon, the expansion of settlement activities on the West Bank, and the intractability of the Palestinian issue have led to the present impasse. Yet, the long history of engagement and mutual interests suggests that their relationship will likely withstand the current challenges. A long historyOne of the most notable historical links between Turkey and the Jewish community dates back to the Ottoman Empire, which provided refuge to Jews fleeing persecution in Europe from the late 15th century onward. Jewish Ottomans enjoyed privileges, such as holding key positions in state institutions and engaging freely in business activities. Today, Turkey’s Jewish community, concentrated primarily in Istanbul, traces its roots to this era. The term “Mousavi,” a term derived from the biblical Moses and used instead of “Jew,” reflects an effort to avoid the negative connotations imposed by European prejudice.Following World War II and the establishment of the state of Israel, the Mousavi community in Turkey continued to thrive – in stark contrast to Jews in Arab countries, most of whom were expelled or forced to flee their homelands. To this day, the Mousavi community remains largely silent during periods of heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey, avoiding public involvement in conflicts such as those in Gaza and the West Bank and prioritizing its security and sustainability within Turkey. This legacy helped to influence Ankara’s post-World War II approach to the numerous Arab-Israeli conflicts. While Turkey repeatedly faced criticism from Arab states for recognizing Israel in 1948, Ankara has usually maintained a balanced position, in large part due to pressure from its American and European NATO allies.Domestic considerationsOver the decades, Israel-Turkey relations have suffered frequent ups and downs, but shared interests have consistently brought the two sides back together. Of late, however, the bilateral relationship has deteriorated to historic lows for a number of reasons, primarily, however, as a result of changes in the ideologies of the two countries’ ruling parties.Ultra-conservative coalitions in Israel have hardened policies on Palestinians and other minorities, fueled by their claims to the “promised land” and aspirations for a “Greater Israel,” the realization of which would impact Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, as well as the West Bank.At the same time, since the AK Party’s rise to power in Turkey in 2002, Erdogan has pursued a foreign policy guided by “justice and Islamic values.” Rights for Palestinians have become an important driver, illustrated most dramatically perhaps by Erdogan’s confrontation with then-Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in 2009. Tensions peaked with the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident, when Israeli forces killed 10 Turkish activists aboard a humanitarian aid ship bound for Gaza. Turkey demanded compensation and condemned Israel’s actions, further deepening the rift.Yet there are a number of key issues that, so far, have prevented a complete break, notably the geoeconomic dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean. Recent developments in energy politics have driven some reconciliation efforts and are likely to remain relevant if and when the Palestinian question is resolved. Shared interests in energy cooperation had prompted dialogue between Erdogan and Israeli leaders, including President Isaac Herzog and Netanyahu. Meetings, notably one in New York on September 20, 2023, signaled progress toward full normalization. The October 7 attacks by Hamas three weeks later and subsequent Israeli military operations, however, reignited tensions, with Turkey condemning civilian casualties inflicted by Israel’s offensive and eventually filing a case with the International Court of Justice accusing Israel of genocide.Prospects for rapprochementTurkey’s approach to Palestinian issues is often perceived as a strategic factor for Israel, particularly due to Ankara’s engagement with and political support for various groups, including Hamas. However, its policy has fluctuated over the years, shaped by broader regional dynamics and Turkey’s shifting diplomatic priorities. While Ankara has sought to reassert its leading role in promoting Palestinian aspirations — particularly through strong rhetoric and international legal actions after October 7 — its actual sway over groups like Hamas and Hezbollah remains subject to debate and varies depending on specific circumstances. The recent allegation that Turkey has offered to host Hamas political offices is perceived by both Israel and the United States as a major setback to improving relations. Turkish officials reject the accusation, suggesting that permitting some Hamas members to “occasionally visit” Turkey does not equate to providing an institutional base for the group. Historically Turkey has taken in members of various opposition groups (as far back as the post-Russian Revolution period) but has been clear about prohibiting operational activities within its borders. Israel has sought to counter Turkey’s regional influence in recent years by strengthening its ties with Greece, the Greek-led government of Cyprus and various Kurdish factions. Recent developments, such as Turkish allegations that the government in Nicosia is allowing U.S. and allied forces to use their ports for supplying Israel, certainly work against better relations.Quo Vadis?Nearly universal condemnation of Israeli military actions and few prospects for ceasefires – much less lasting peace – underpin the view that an intransigeant Israeli prime minister is the most disruptive factor in regional peace and stability. That perception is very much shared by Erdogan’s Turkey. There is a sense that only a successor Israeli government may offer an opportunity for serious dialogue.Turkey-Israel relations is likely to return to a status quo antebellum, but that would require Israel to shift back to centrist policies, reject the expansionist and neo-colonial agenda of Israel’s ultra-orthodox and ethno-nationalist political parties, and clearly embrace a settlement that respects Palestinian aspirations for a viable state of their own.

[Category: Gaza, Hamas, Erdogan, Enewsletter, Netanyahu, Israel, Israel-gaza, Turkey, Turkey]

— With Rubio, Waltz, a harder line on Latin America looms

 

at 11/20/24 10:05pm

While the United States has its hands full with conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, Latin America may become a region of greater focus for the incoming Trump administration. The region, sometimes derided by policymakers as the “United States’ backyard,” was hardly brought up directly by Donald Trump, Joe Biden or Kamala Harris on the campaign trail. But issues that were at the center of the election, such as immigration, tariffs and economic policy, are likely to shape how P resident-elect Trump engages with leaders of the Americas, especially newly elected president Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico.If Trump’s first cabinet picks are any indication of his policy toward Latin America, figures like Florida Senator Marco Rubio and Florida Rep. Michael Waltz, who have been nominated as secretary of state and national security adviser, respectively, could be a sign of a harsher posture, especially as U.S. competition with China plays out in the region .A more aggressive posture?​​Dr. Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, an expert in international relations at Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that Trump’s new term may bring a reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, a 201-year-old policy that served as the basis for some of Washington’s more aggressive interventions in Latin America from the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars in the 19th century to through the end of the Cold War. Tokatlian told Responsible Statecraft that he sees figures like Rubio using China’s advances in Latin America to revive the policy.“There are signals, at least, …that this may be a rehearsal of the Monroe Doctrine at least in terms of positioning of the United States. Marco Rubio… has a very strong anti-Cuban, anti-Nicaraguan, anti-Venezuelan, but also anti-Petro and anti-Lula position,” he said in reference to the current presidents of Colombia and Brazil. “This all together in the context of what he sees as a growing challenge of a malign foreign power, … China.”Rubio has been a champion of some of Washington’s most aggressive policies in Latin America. He has argued in defense of the 62-year-old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba , introduced a bill to prohibit Cuba’s removal from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism List, and promoted Trump’s decision to impose “maximum pressure” sanctions against Venezuela and as part of a larger effort to achieve regime change there . He has also argued at length that China poses a “rising threat” in Latin America on the ideological, economic, and military fronts, While it cannot be denied that China is advancing in the region — as the recent construction of a Chinese megaport in Peru demonstrates — the U.S. military footprint dwarfs any purport ed threat that China’s military presence may pose. As for China’s economic advances, Tokatlian argues that years of the United States offering little to nothing of value to Latin American countries have driven them to look more to trade with China.“For years the United States did nothing, and so those countries decided to go to the best of their possibilities,” Tokatlian said. This point was demonstrated at the recent G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro when China unveiled the $1.3 billion megaport in a remote fishing town just 37 miles outside of Lima. In contrast, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken boasted that the U.S. is “building a new passenger train line” in Lima. In reality, all the U.S. did was transfer a fleet of retired diesel trains.Waltz shares much of Rubio’s focus on Latin America and has also promoted aggressive positions in the past. In 2021, he co-wrote a letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations calling on his colleagues to reject Biden administration nominees who “refuse to assure tough stances on Cuba & Venezuela regimes.” Waltz has also argued that China’s advances in Latin America pose a military threat to the United States.​A focus on MexicoCuba, Venezuela and China may be the biggest targets of hawkish policies in Latin America, but perhaps the bellwether for what Trump’s policies will look like is Mexico where he will negotiate with leftwing President Claudia Sheinbaum. Last year the country replaced China as Washington’s biggest trading partner, making the U.S.-Mexico relationship a priority. The country, in particular its role in U.S. immigration policy, has been a consistent focus of Trump’s political career and was a focal point of his presidential campaign .During Trump’s last term, then-Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador agreed, under threat of tariffs, to enforce U.S. border policies to greatly restrict migration from Central America. U.S.-Mexico relations will also be shaped by Trump, with the upcoming renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Aileen Teague, a nonresident fellow at the Quincy Institute who teaches the history of U.S.-Mexico and Latin America relations at Texas A&M University , anticipates that Trump’s negotiations with Mexico may cause friction in the relationship.“Issues surrounding security, migration, and the economy are likely to be contentious as Trump, I believe, is unlikely to back away from many of his campaign promises,” she told RS in an email exchange.“ Trump will increase pressure on Mexico to reduce migration and the drug trade, using the threat of tariffs and the looming revision of the USMCA (and potential consequences on the Mexican economy) to force Mexican action. This is significant,” she stressed. “ With Trump's campaign pledges to impose steep tariffs on Mexican goods, the value of the peso fell on election night (though has since recovered), indicating that investors are anticipating what Trump’s actions will look like and how that will affect economic relations.”Teague added that Sheinbaum might bring her own demands into negotiations that could cause tension with Trump.“She could take a more principled stance on some of these issues like crime or migration with a more nationalistic posture, which Trump might not respond well to,” Teague added. “She has suggested Mexico will not bow to U.S. demands over immigration issues.”On Mexico, Trump’s cabinet picks again signal that the administration may engage aggressively. Waltz, for example, ignited an interventionist frenzy in the Republican Party last year when lawmakers and presidential primary candidates called for U.S. military action in Mexico. He co-authored legislation for the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Mexican Cartels.While calls for military intervention in Mexico have largely died down, Waltz once again proposed extreme measures during a FOX News Interview in October, in which he argued that the United States should deploy special forces to Mexico to fight the cartels. Waltz cited the deployment of U.S. Green Berets in Colombia as a successful example of this policy. Critics of the U.S. policy known as Plan Colombia highlight how it failed to reduce cocaine production in Colombia while fuelling an uptick in civilian casualties in the drug war and human rights abuses . The 2008 Merida Initiative, a security cooperation agreement between the United States, Mexico and Central American countries, resulted in similar failures.Despite the calls for military action by figures like Waltz, however, Teague has doubts about the likelihood of such a policy defining U.S.-Mexico relations during a second Trump administration. “I could see the Trump administration taking a firmer, more militarized stance in the initial days of his presidency, but I don’t believe such an approach is sustainable,” Teague said.Rubio, for his part, has said that he would be willing to deploy U.S. troops to Mexico to combat drug cartels, but emphasized “it has to be in coordination with the [Mexican] armed forces and the Mexican police force.”Of course, Latin America is not a homogenous region. Important countries in the Southern Hemisphere have undergone unprecedented shifts to both the right and the left in recent years. How the different leaders engage with the United States must also be considered, and they may not all have the same approach or same priorities.But if the past is precedent, and if personnel is policy, U.S. policy toward Latin America may be easier to predict. The next few years could bring a return to economic threats and bombastic rhetoric as ways to address complex issues ranging from drug trafficking, immigration and growing Chinese influence.

[Category: Venezuela, Cuba, Marco rubio, Michael waltz, Mexico]

— Ukrainian civilians will pay for Biden's landmine flip-flop

 

at 11/20/24 10:40am

The Biden administration announced today that it will provide Ukraine with antipersonnel landmines for use inside the country, a reversal of its own efforts to revive President Obama’s ban on America’s use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of the indiscriminate weapons anywhere except the Korean peninsula. The intent of this reversal, one U.S. official told the Washington Post, is to “contribute to a more effective defense.” The landmines — use of which is banned in 160 countries by an international treaty — are expected to be deployed primarily in the country’s eastern territories, where Ukrainian forces are struggling to defend against steady advances by the Russian military.But much like the Biden administration’s controversial decision to supply Ukraine with cluster bombs — another indiscriminate weapon system whose unexploded ordinance can maim and kill civilians, especially children, for decades after their use — this move may offer limited military upside, but it comes with massive risk to Ukrainian civilians, and it will not turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the policy shift to reporters this morning during a trip to Laos, a nation which the U.S. helped turn into the world’s most bombed country per capita. Either blind or indifferent to the irony of making this announcement from a country where 30% of the territory remains contaminated by unexploded ordinance thanks to the U.S. military, Austin prebutted humanitarian concerns with the weapons transfer by arguing that the land mines are “not persistent,” so “we can control when they would self-activate, self-detonate and that makes it far more safer eventually.” But as arms experts at the Friends Committee on National Legislation have pointed out, drawing a distinction between persistent and non-persistent landmines is “dangerously misleading” because of the well-documented failures of the self-destruct and self-deactivation features that supposedly make these weapons “safer” for the civilians who stumble across them years after a war has ended. In fact, the “smart mines” the U.S. deployed in the Gulf War failed at a rate 150 times higher than the Department of Defense claimed. The reality is that, no matter the mechanisms meant to make these weapons more humane, non-persistent landmines are still packed full of explosive materials — and so their lethality, indiscriminate nature, and ability to harm civilians persist. In fact, when President Trump first reversed the Obama-era landmine restrictions in 2020, Joe Biden himself recognized the move for what it was — “another reckless act” that would “put more civilians at risk of being injured by unexploded mines.” Biden lived up to his campaign pledge to “promptly roll back” Trump’s move on landmines in 2022 — only to reverse his own position on the way out of the White House doors.Coming on the heels of Biden’s decision to allow Ukraine to use U.S. long-range missiles to strike Russian territory, this move is presumably aimed at proving Biden’s willingness to do “whatever it takes” to help Ukraine prevail over Russia. But as a battered Ukraine prepares to enter its fourth year since Russia’s invasion, and Ukrainian support for a war-ending diplomacy continues to grow, the question remains: when will U.S. leaders stop searching for a silver bullet weapon that enables Ukraine to win an unwinnable war, and actually pair U.S. military aid to Ukraine with an all-out push to get Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table and broker an end to this bloodshed?

[Category: Ukraine, Landmines, Qiosk, Ukraine war]

— Brazil pulled off successful G20 summit

 

at 11/20/24 10:09am

The city of Rio de Janeiro provided a stunningly beautiful backdrop to Brazil’s big moment as host of the G20 summit this week. Despite last minute challenges, Brazil pulled off a strong joint statement (Leaders’ Declaration) that put some of President Lula’s priorities on human welfare at the heart of the grouping’s agenda, while also crafting impressively tough language on Middle East conflicts and a pragmatic paragraph on Ukraine. Key financial issues such as reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs) also continued to make progress.An organization of 19 states and two regional organizations (the European Union and African Union), the G20 is the high table of global economic governance, which came into its own with annual leaders’ summits in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It inevitably tackles the most prominent issues of security during these summits as well.In a world racked by two major regional conflicts and several other crises, and with the tectonic power shift underway in Washington, this year’s G20 was shaping up to be a challenge. Although the United States was represented by President Joe Biden, the election of Donald Trump cast a long shadow over the proceedings. This was also the third G20 summit hosted by a Global South state (and South Africa will be the fourth next year), which has led to a concentrated push on “Southern issues” in these summits. Early in the summit, Argentina indicated it may not sign on to taxing the ultra-wealthy, a cause President Lula had prioritized (though this would require domestic legislation within states to be implemented). Argentinian president Javier Milei’s prior meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago (the first foreign leader the president-elect has met since his reelection) triggered speculation that Argentina was potentially playing a spoiler. But cooler heads prevailed, and Argentina ultimately signed on to the joint statement. Along with another 81 nations, Buenos Aires also joined the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty inaugurated at Rio.The G20 has historically focused on the more macroeconomic aspects of global economic governance. By placing hunger and poverty squarely within the grouping’s agenda, Brazil has introduced a more clearly human dimension to the elite body that can only help it gain more credibility across the world, especially across the Global South.The summit’s achievement of consensus on the horror unfolding in the Middle East was also impressive. There has been a wide divide between the Global West and most of the Global South on Israel’s war on Palestine and Lebanon. But the joint statement demanded “the lifting of all barriers to the provision of humanitarian assistance at scale,” strongly backed the “Palestinian right to self-determination,” a two-state solution, and a comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza “in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2735.” On Lebanon, the statement, while not mentioning UNSC resolution 1701 (that has been prioritized by the United States), called for a ceasefire that enabled “citizens to return safely to their homes on both sides of the Blue Line.”The Russia-Ukraine war was a major point of contention at the 2023 New Delhi G20 summit and nearly torpedoed the 2022 Bali summit. But the delegates at Rio, perhaps chastened by serious obstacles now evident to maximalist positions on both sides of the war, agreed to a modest paragraph on the conflict. It mainly cited the UN charter and various dimensions of “human suffering.” Preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, a consistent point of international consensus on Ukraine, was only mentioned in a separate paragraph that addressed all global conflicts.Despite Brazil’s current prioritization of the issue in international diplomacy, climate change was one area where the Rio summit could have shown greater muscle. For instance, there was no call to “transition away from fossil fuels,” a major commitment from last year’s COP. Sources in Rio told me that the overlapping dates with the ongoing COP29 at Baku added to the complications, as key climate negotiators of the various nations were holed up many time zones away. But the challenge also symbolizes an overall weakening of international climate action and an increasing paralysis of the UNFCCC process.On reforming international institutions, the New Delhi G20 summit provided a substantive push on MDB reform, an issue the Global South has been pushing vigorously. The Rio process took the next step by producing a comprehensive roadmap on the question. The joint statement also pushed for greater Global South inclusion in the UN Security Council by inclusion of “underrepresented and unrepresented regions and groups (in) Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean”Brazil’s success at Rio demonstrated that, in a world in which the forces of fragmentation are ascendant, the G20 remains the one forum that can still bring the world’s key states together in one room and engage with each other. That may sound like a low bar, but it is, in fact, an achievement. As I wrote recently, even America Firsters in the United States will likely find the grouping useful due to its informality, lack of a permanent bureaucracy, and the ample opportunity for bilateral meetings with strong global leaders.

[Category: Brazil, Lula, Qiosk, G20]

— ‘Peacemaker’ Faye wins snap Senegal elections

 

at 11/20/24 8:01am

The Patriotes africains du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité (PASTEF) party — the party of Senegalese president Bassirou Diomaye Faye — won handily in Sunday’s parliamentary snap elections, giving the president a strong mandate with which to govern. Faye, 44, was inaugurated president of Senegal on April 2, only a few weeks after being released from prison following a sentence he served for "spreading false news, contempt of court, and defamation of a constituted body" for a social media post he made questioning injustice within the country’s judicial system. Since taking office, Faye has set forth an ambitious agenda and has sought to make Senegal a power within West Africa, a region that has struggled in recent years with the spread of armed group violence and numerous coups that have toppled governments. Faye has taken a lead in efforts to warm relations between Senegal and the junta-led countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. All three of these states have experienced coups in recent years and have since left the West African regional body of economic and political integration, ECOWAS. Faye has been one of the few heads of state in Africa that has visited Burkina Faso and Mali in an effort to mend ties with the junta leaders. He was also named by ECOWAS as its special envoy tasked with warming relations between these three states and the regional bloc. Rather than holding a more traditional perspective — that economic and political seclusion caused by isolating the junta governments will force them to reinstitute a constitutional democracy — Faye has operated under the realist belief that it’s better to take the governments of these states as they are, and work with them to try to solve mutual concerns. In other words, engaging with them rather than isolating them, Faye believes, is more likely to bring them back into the diplomatic fold, which will lead to greater political and economic cooperation. Faye’s ambitions extend beyond regional diplomacy. Among Faye’s most ambitious proposals is a 25-year plan to improve the country’s justice system and political and economic sovereignty, which he argues has been infringed upon by Western economic and political players. Senegal 2050, as the plan is known, lays out goals for the country to meet over the next quarter century, including massively reducing inequality, connecting its natural resources to the global economy, building sustained industry in Senegal, and diversifying the economic makeup of the country. Among the plan’s central components is an effort to move past Western dependency. Faye’s Minister of the Economy has been critical of past Senegalese regimes’ willingness to strike foreign debt agreements, which he blames for the country’s current economic strife and inability to break past a suffocating cycle of debt repayment. Senegal’s debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 84%, significantly higher than the sub-Sarahan average of 59%. American policymakers should not ignore Faye’s arguments or brush off his goals as unrealistic. It would be in Washington’s interest to look beyond traditional lending and aid programs, and instead invest in long-term investment projects, as requested by Senegal, that raise the standard of living for private citizens across the region. By creating long-term job opportunities in down-stream employment sectors based in Africa, the United States can become a stronger partner to Senegal and other African countries. Doing so would also benefit Americans, as the U.S. private sector would be able to access new markets and do business in places currently beyond its reach. Faye has also announced that his administration will move forward with the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) program that the EU and a group of wealthy, western countries (known as the International Partners Group (IPG)) announced in 2023. This $2.7 billion plan is aimed at funneling public and private money as well as technical support from these wealthy countries to Senegal in an effort to transition the Senegalese energy sector away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy options. Senegal is in the process of working out the details of this multi-billion dollar plan with the IPG, which is expected to be finalized sometime in December. Winning a sweeping parliamentary majority will afford Faye the ability to move forward on these ambitious goals. In many ways, Faye represents the future of Africa. He is a young and forward-looking leader who was carried into power on the shoulders of those ready for African states to seize their economic potential and move past traditional relations with Western states rooted in security, lending, and aid. Political and economic sovereignty is the throughline tying together Faye’s foreign policy objectives.

[Category: Election, Faye, Burkina faso, Mali, Niger, Ecowas, Coup, Senegal, Qiosk]

— Will Democrats help Bernie block weapons to Israel?

 

at 11/20/24 6:18am

UPDATE 11/20, 9:30 PM: The Senate Wednesday overwhelmingly rejected three Joint Resolutions of Disapproval which would have blocked the sale of offensive weapons to Israel. The votes were 79-18 against each of the measures. The Senate today is set to vote on a measure that, if passed, would block $20 billion worth of arms sales to the state of Israel.The Senate vote is the first of its kind regarding weapons to Israel, according to advocates supporting the Joint Resolutions of Disapproval, which were introduced by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) in September.The JRDs are co-sponsored by Sens. Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii). Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) have subsequently endorsed them.“Clearly what is happening in Gaza today is unspeakable, but what makes it even more painful is that much of this has been done with U.S. weapons and American taxpayer dollars,” Sanders said in a Nov. 19 press conference held with Merkley, Welch, and Van Hollen ahead of the vote. Sanders said the U.S. could not stand by while Israel violated human rights with American made weapons including “the loss of 43,000 and rising Palestinians, many of whom are women and children and non-combatants, not at all connected to Hamas,” and “over 100,000 children and innocent bystanders who have been severely injured, including amputation.” Welch added that the Leahy Law, which makes the sale of such weapons to foreign forces that violate human rights illegal, demands they block the sale.“Is the United States and its foreign policy — with that commitment we’ve had to Israel — forced to be blind to the suffering before our very eyes, particularly when it’s our munitions that are being used? Should we be blind to the suffering of those Palestinian women and children when top military officials in Israel themselves have said that there’s no further military purpose for continued bombing and military activity in Gaza?” asked Welch. “Our view is no.”Sanders noted that in the last year alone, the U.S. has provided $18 billion in military aid to Israel and delivered more than 50,000 tons of military equipment. “In other words, the United States is complicit in these atrocities. That complicity must end, and that is what these resolutions are about,” Sanders stressed. “It is time to tell the Netanyahu government that they cannot use U.S. taxpayer dollars and American weapons in violation of U.S. and international law and our moral values.” In his own statement supporting the JRDs, Van Hollen said that the United States should “pause the delivery of offensive weapons to the Netanyahu government until it complies with U.S. law and policy and until we can advance the security interests, priorities, and values of the American people.”It is not clear how much support the measures will get from the full Senate. RS contacted the offices of 25 Democratic senators who might be likely to join Sanders in blocking the weapons package. None responded with a clear position as of Tuesday night.For example, the staff at Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy’s office said they had “nothing to share” about the upcoming vote. New Mexico Sen. Ben Ray Luján’s office remarked that “[Luján] hasn’t updated us about his position on [the JRDs], but it’s on his radar.” New Mexico Sen. Martin Heinrich’s office said that “the senator has not released a statement at this time.” And according to an email from Sen. Angus King’s office (I-Maine): “Different offices do different things, I realize, but we do not proclaim or signal votes in advance.” Similar responses came in from Sens. Thomas Carper (D-Del.) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.). (Editor's note: King's office sent RS the following statement after he voted for the JRDs on Wednesday: "The goal is to work towards a more prosperous, safer, and peaceful future for both Israelis and Palestinians. I am optimistic about this future and believe that this vote brings us a step closer to achieving it.”)Notably, the vast majority of email and phone requests as of Tuesday night went unanswered.It may be that cutting off weapons to Israel is a bridge too far for lawmakers who have otherwise vocalized support for the civilians on the ground in Gaza. For example, although Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) has supported a ceasefire and previously joined other senators’ calls on Biden to create a path for a “nonmilitarized Palestinian state” a Daily Cardinal article reported that Baldwin’s staff has offered “no commitment either way” on the upcoming JRD vote.Supporters are hoping to get at least as much — if not more Democratic support — than a pair of similar measures received earlier this year. In one case, 21 senators voiced support for a legislative amendment ensuring that Congress be notified of all military assistance to Israel. Another, a bill led by Sanders requiring the State Department to provide Congress with information on Israel's human rights practices, only received 11 votes at the time in January. In any case, the pressure is on. Over 175 businesses and organizations called on Maine Senators Angus King and Susan Collins to vote for the JRDs on November 19. Furthermore, a coalition of 56 progressive groups led by Demand Progress called on Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.) to take on Van Hollen’s pro-JRD stance in a Tuesday press release, highlighting Reed’s previous collaboration with the senator. “Sen. Reed joined Sen. Van Hollen to say that U.S. support for Israel must never be a blank check,” the release says. “It’s now time to revoke Israel’s blank check. Sen. Reed needs to back up his words and join Sen. Van Hollen by voting to support the resolutions blocking the transfer of offensive weapons to Israel.”Along similar lines, Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) demonstrators called on Reed to support the JRDs last month at a “Democratic Unity” fundraiser. Relevant staff at Reed’s office could not be reached for comment. While the JRDs appear unlikely to pass, some say this marks a turning point in U.S.-Israeli affairs after over a year of war.“These Joint Resolutions of Disapproval mark a historic moment — the first vote in Congress to block offensive arms sales to Israel in United States history,” Hassan El-Tayyab, the Legislative Director for Middle East Policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), told Responsible Statecraft. “Even if these resolutions don't pass, the fact that they are up for consideration at all signals a major shift in the U.S.-Israel relationship.”RS reporters Aaron Sobczak and Sam Bull contributed to this report.

[Category: Bernie sanders, Weapons sales, Israel, Leahy law, Us senate, Congress, Gaza, Palestinians, Human rights, Gaza war]

— Fallout from Navy-flubbed jet fuel spill at Hawaii base

 

at 11/19/24 10:05pm

On November 20, 2021, 19,000 gallons of jet fuel leaked from Red Hill Bulk Fuel Facility, a fuel depot located just 100 feet above state-designated drinking water near Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. At least 6,100 patients reported a wide range of symptoms, from gastrointestinal and neurological damage to babies’ skin “as red as our flag’s.” Despite residents’ tap water smelling like jet fuel, the Navy maintained that the water was safe to drink. Amid a groundswell of public complaints, the Navy finally shut off the Red Hill pumps on November 29, a full nine days after the leak. “Whatever you knew before this incident became widely publicized and picked up internationally by the media is between you and your maker,” said Lauren Bauer, a military spouse, at a town hall. A new set of reports from the Inspector General of the Department of Defense confirms those suspicions.According to the IG, the Navy insisted publicly that the water was safe on November 21 and 22 despite never “conducting any laboratory analysis to confirm that was the case.” Nor did the reports “find any Navy media releases that specifically stated either ‘do not use’ or ‘do not drink’ the [Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam] Community Water System drinking water.” The report also corroborated an earlier investigation which found that “Every person physically present at Red Hill on the evening of November 20, 2021 knew within a short time after arriving that the spill was all or mostly fuel…This investigation also identified a persistent bias by Red Hill leadership toward assuming and reporting the ‘best case’ scenario following incidents,” including a bias toward assuming the best case scenario for environmental risk.” Unable to keep a lid on the fuel tank, the Navy tried to keep a lid on the story. Ernie Lau is the Manager and Chief Engineer at the Honolulu Board of Water Supply. “The regulators told us they felt that the Red Hill facility was a well run, well-maintained fuel storage facility, which we now know with this latest report from the Inspector General is absolutely not true,” Lau explained in a call with RS. The report detailed a mismanagement of facilities, bad record keeping, failure to alert the the Department of Health about missing fuel, and ineffective fuel release detection methods. The IG’s reports determined that “officials missed multiple opportunities to prevent or mitigate the November 2021 fuel incident and subsequent contamination of drinking water.” “Unfortunately, the Navy has embraced a pattern of lies, half-truths, and avoiding transparency to the public about what is actually happening. Trust levels are at zero right now,” said Lau. The Navy finally agreed to defuel and close Red Hill in March, 2022. “This is the right thing to do,” said Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in announcing the decision. Today, 99 percent of the 100 million gallons Red Hill used to hold have been defueled. Still, contaminants from Red Hill’s leaks continue to threaten the surrounding environment and nearby residents. Over Red Hill’s 80-year history, as many as 1.94 million gallons of fuel spilled. One of the IG’s recommendations included a review of leak detection systems at other fuel support facilities similar to Red Hill. There are also concerns about other chemicals such as PFAS, a synthetic “forever chemical” linked to weakened immunity and other health risks. In November 2022, a year after the jet fuel spill, 1,300 gallons of a highly toxic fire suppressant that contains PFAS leaked at Red Hill. Between December 2019 and November 2022, the IG identified four incidents involving the fire suppressant. The Navy mishandled most of these incidents, too, failing to “provide evidence indicating that they carried out required incident response actions, including reporting, and properly” cleaning up affected areas. The Navy last tested for PFAS near Red Hill over a year ago and has rejected repeated requests by the EPA to test all monitor wells. “When I see this effort to not find the contamination, it tells me that they probably know that it is contaminated,” Elin Betanzo, president of Safe Water Engineering, told Hawaii News Now. A Government Accountability Office report in April found at least 32 sites of soil and groundwater near Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam with known or potential PFAS contamination. Cleanup could take decades to complete. According to a 2022 analysis by the Environmental Working Group, the Pentagon likely serves PFAS-contaminated water to some 600,000 service members every year. Lau told RS that the vice governor of Okinawa even visited multiple times to learn from them in “how to deal with the military.” The U.S. military has likely polluted the drinking water for a third of Okinawa’s population.It has been difficult for the community to get straightforward answers from the Navy. During a contentious meeting held by the Red Hill Community Representation Initiative, a community-led oversight group, last December, Navy officials refused to answer a basic question about whether they are testing for ethylene dibromide, a carcinogen found in jet fuel. Navy officials refused to attend the next meeting.“The Navy has all of these weapons systems. They fight wars. They destroy things. You would think that they would have thicker skins when it comes to facing the community, but they don’t,” said Lau.Not taking responsibility may be business as usual for the Pentagon. For affected families, the contamination of water is life-altering, and they are still seeking accountability and answers. The latest Red Hill Community Representation Initiative meeting ended with Mai Hall, a Native Hawaiian and military spouse, fighting back tears:“Tomorrow morning, I just want you to say a little prayer for my son…I want everyone to remember his name. Tiberius Hall. He's going in for his second surgery on his left kidney, and I'm 100 percent positive it's due to the water. This is a real thing. These are real people we’re talking about, this is not something that the Navy can go under the rug.”

[Category: Pentagon, Defense department, Environment, Us navy]

— Biden's vaunted 'allies & partners' have their own ideas

 

at 11/19/24 10:05pm

A series of events last month underscored the Indo-Pacific’s shift toward a balance shaped increasingly by the actions and priorities of regional states rather than Western intervention led by the United States. This shift reflects both Asia's internal dynamics and Western miscalculations, which have collectively accelerated the transition.In mid-October, China and India agreed to disengage their militaries and restore patrolling rights along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC). This move, significant for both regional stability and strategic reallocation, presents an opportunity for Beijing and New Delhi to improve bilateral relations and focus military resources on other priorities — such as China’s interest in Taiwan.For years, tensions along the LAC have been a defining feature of Asia’s strategic environment. Any improvement in relations between these two major Asian powers signals a profound shift, with potential ripple effects across regional security, economic partnerships, and diplomatic alliances.Closer cooperation between China and India could pave the way for a coordinated effort to reshape Asia’s regional order, aligned more closely with the interests, values, and priorities of Asian states. Both nations share a vision of foreign policy that emphasizes autonomy from Western agendas, and a China-India détente could foster stronger policy alignment among the Global South.This trend was evident at the 16th annual BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 22, where representatives from countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey gathered to discuss the need for a new world order. The summit, which hosted 36 state representatives — the largest BRICS gathering to date — underscored the growing consensus among developing nations on issues like multilateralism, international financial reform, and collective autonomy from Western influence. Russia’s successful hosting of the event further highlighted the limits of Western-led efforts to isolate Moscow and showcased the willingness of large developing economies to collaborate in reducing the West’s influence on global governance.A significant step toward this strategic realignment came as China’s President Xi Jinping and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi used the BRICS platform to pledge further rapprochement, signaling a deepening partnership that challenges Western assumptions about regional alignments. This evolving partnership within BRICS could signify a broader trend of strategic cooperation, where Asian powers prioritize regional stability and economic integration over the security-driven approaches favored by Euro-Atlantic nations.Adding to this trend, North Korea began deploying troops to Russia in early October, marking an unprecedented intervention in a European conflict involving NATO. Some North Korean troops reportedly reached the frontline in the Kursk region, escalating the Ukraine conflict and highlighting the erosion of U.S. influence over its adversaries.This collaboration between North Korea and Russia has significant strategic implications for the U.S., as two of its foremost adversaries now have formalized military ties and are operationalizing their collaboration in opposition to Washington’s security interests. Within Asia, North Korean forces also destroyed key roads connecting North and South Korea, further intensifying the region’s security risks, especially for South Korea and Japan — two of the U.S.’s critical military allies in Northeast Asia.Early October also saw China conduct a large-scale military exercise around Taiwan in response to a National Day speech by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, which Beijing deemed inflammatory. The exercise, Joint Sword 2024B, involved the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and China Coast Guard, demonstrating China’s capability to blockade Taiwan — a move Taiwan's leaders called an “act of war.”On October 23, China conducted live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, warning Taiwan and its Western partners against steps toward de facto independence. While Taiwan's leadership described these drills as routine, the context of heightened regional tensions and recent Western naval transits through the Strait by Canada and the U.S. suggests a rapidly deteriorating security situation.In Japan, newly elected Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has repeatedly advocated for revising the Japan-U.S. Forces Agreement, suggesting a push for Japan to develop its own military strategy. He proposed the establishment of Japanese bases in Guam and a “nuclear sharing” agreement with the U.S., arguing that the current arrangement is “unequal” and emphasizing Japan’s need for security autonomy.This stance, while technically in favor of deepening U.S.-Japan military cooperation, also reflects a growing desire for greater agency in Japan’s defense policies. Washington has expressed concern over Ishiba’s vision, as it raises questions about the long-standing dependency model that has underpinned the U.S.-Japan alliance. Adding to U.S. unease is the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) stunning election loss in late October, which has introduced a period of political instability in Japan. This instability may weaken Ishiba’s ability to effectively manage the U.S.-Japan alliance and secure necessary defense funding, especially given the LDP’s new minority position.Southeast Asian states also demonstrated their push for greater autonomy at the 44th Annual ASEAN Summit in Laos, where leaders prioritized economic integration and regional cooperation over defense concerns. Topics such as digital trade, supply chain management, sustainable agriculture, and environmental protection took precedence, highlighting a pragmatic approach to regional growth. Only the Philippines prioritized the discussion of South China Sea tensions, setting its foreign policy apart from other ASEAN states, which appear to prefer detachment from contentious security issues.This series of events in October represents more than isolated incidents; collectively, they illustrate a structural realignment within Asia. The region is moving away from a paradigm where Euro-Atlantic nations drive security policies, evolving into a complex network of relationships less dependent on Western influence. Increasingly, the paths for countries throughout Asia are being defined by their own strategic calculations, which often conflict with the West's Indo-Pacific agendas. The West now faces a more challenging environment, where involvement in regional security comes with higher risks, exemplified by North Korea’s European engagement and Japan’s shift toward defense independence.Asia’s transformation is propelled by the agency of regional powers and the Global South’s willingness to counterbalance Western dominance. However, Western miscalculations have also expedited this shift. For example, Western powers have built their Indo-Pacific strategies on the assumption that India would remain a reliable partner in counterbalancing China. Countries like the U.S., UK, Australia, and others saw India as a stable anchor with a steadfastly adversarial stance toward Beijing. But India’s actions this October, including its rebuffed attempt to reconcile with Canada after accusations of extraterritorial actions, reveal a more nuanced and independent approach to its foreign relations.The U.S. narrative around the Quad, presented in the Wilmington Declaration as a “club of democracies” committed to an inclusive Indo-Pacific, also faces challenges. India’s actions, including its ties with Russia and domestic policies, contrast with the Western ideal of a democratic counterweight to China. While Washington has largely overlooked these inconsistencies to maintain alignment, India’s pursuit of its own strategic interests complicates the U.S. position.In light of October’s developments, the West must reconsider its approach in Asia. The U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategies that aim to counter Chinese influence may be misaligned with the region’s realities. The ASEAN and BRICS summits demonstrated Asia’s preference for cooperation with China, challenging the U.S. expectation that regional states would embrace a containment strategy. China’s leadership role in these forums indicates its ascension as the predominant strategic power in Asia.Looking forward, Western powers need to adapt their strategies to align more closely with Asia’s evolving priorities. A more collaborative model that respects regional autonomy would help preserve Western influence. As Asia asserts itself, the West’s continued reliance on containment and alignment may risk marginalizing its role in a region increasingly defined by endogenous dynamics and mutual interests among regional powers.

[Category: Brics, China, India, Japan, Indo-pacific]

— Poll: Over 50% of Ukrainians want to end the war

 

at 11/19/24 4:40pm

A new Gallup study indicates that most Ukrainians want the war with Russia to end. After more than two years of fighting, 52% of those polled indicated that they would prefer a negotiated peace rather than continuing to fight. Ukrainian support for the war has consistently dropped since Russia began its full-scale invasion in 2022. According to Gallup, 73% wished to continue fighting in 2022, and 63% in 2023. This is the first time a majority supported a negotiated peace. Throughout the country, Kyiv polled the highest in support of a continued fight with Russia at 47%, and the eastern regions of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhya all polled just 27% in support. Every region in the country polled below 50%. Of the majority who supported a negotiated end, 52% agreed that “Ukraine should be open to making some territorial concessions as a part of a peace deal to end the war.” Additionally, of those polled who supported continuing the fight, 81% said that a victory should occur “when all territory lost between 2014 and now is regained, including Crimea.” But that number is down from 92% and 93% in 2022 and 2023 respectively.The polling was conducted from August through October. During this period, President Volydmyr Zelensky ordered troops into Russia for the first time, taking a portion of Kursk in August, followed by a string of Russian battlefield successes in October in eastern Ukraine, and news that North Korean troops would soon be present on the battlefield, fighting for the Russians. Even before these developments, however, the Ukrainian consensus around the war has been complex. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released a poll in June, which found 46% of respondents supporting an end to the war if Russia withdrew from the territories occupied since 2022, and 50% supporting an end if Russia withdrew from everywhere, save Crimea. “These realities of Ukrainian public sentiment sadly weren't widely known until recently, but they were knowable,” said the Quincy Institute’s Mark Episkopos in a June article in The Nation. “This widespread sentiment in favor of peace provides President Zelenskyy with a powerful mandate to work with the incoming administration toward a shared strategy for reaching a negotiated settlement.”In addition to the Ukrainian public, members of the military and government have also spoken in support of negotiation with Russia. Battery commander Mykhailo Temper told The Financial Times in an early October interview that “it’s quite hard to imagine we will be able to move the enemy back to the borders of 1991.” According to FT, European diplomats noticed that Ukrainian officials were more open to agreeing to a ceasefire, even while Russian troops occupied parts of the country. One of the diplomats said, “We’re talking more and more openly about how this ends and what Ukraine would have to give up in order to get a permanent peace deal.”As the war continues, life in Ukraine has gotten more difficult for the average citizen. A summer study from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology found that 77% of respondents had experienced a loss of family members, friends, or acquaintances and two-thirds indicated that their wartime income was insufficient. Additionally, an October report from Florence Bauer, head of the U.N. Population Fund in Eastern Europe, pointed to a population crisis in Ukraine, as 10 million (25% of the population) had either fled the country or been killed as a result of the conflict. In addition to the population loss, Bauer also highlighted a steep decline in fertility: “The birth rate plummeted to one child per woman – the lowest fertility rate in Europe and one of the lowest in the world.”The Gallup report also found that more Ukrainians preferred that the European Union or the United Kingdom play a significant role in the peace process over the United States, with 70% preferring the EU and 63% the UK, compared to 54% supporting the United States under a hypothetical Harris presidency, and 49% under President-elect Trump.

[Category: Russia-ukraine, Ukraine war, Europe, Polling, Qiosk]

— Experts question Euro countries’ scare tactics hyping Russia threat

 

at 11/19/24 10:42am

Experts say that some European countries are exaggerating perceived security threats with recent moves to push their respective publics to prepare for worst-case scenarios.On Monday, the Swedish government began distributing a booklet that purports to help citizens prepare for war. This 32-page pamphlet advises citizens on digital security, how to seek shelter, and how to identify warning systems. “We live in uncertain times,” the booklet reads. “Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us.” This comes shortly after President Biden gave Ukraine permission to use American-made missiles to strike targets deep inside Russian territory. This move Russia’s foreign ministry said, would result in “an appropriate and tangible” response. Sweden Defense Minister Pål Jonson singled out Russia as being a “principal threat to Sweden,” and said that “the risk of an attack cannot be excluded.” In response, Sweden will increase its defense spending by 10 percent starting next year, amounting to a boost to 2.4% of GDP. Sweden also joined NATO in March of 2024 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pamphlet reminds its citizens of its obligations. “Sweden is part of the military alliance NATO,” it reads.“The purpose of the alliance is that the member countries collectively will be so strong that it deters others from attacking us. If one NATO country is nevertheless attacked, the other countries in the alliance will aid in its defense.” Other regional NATO members have taken similar measures, citizens of Norway and Finland — which also joined the alliance after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — have also received similar resources seemingly meant to prepare citizens in the case of "incidents and crises.”However, experts say that these steps are unnecessary. “Russia has made no military deployments to threaten Finland or Sweden,” says Anatol Lieven, Director of the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program. “Given the way that the Russian army is tied down in Ukraine, the very idea is absurd. Nor has any Russian official threatened this.” QI Research Fellow Mark Episkopos echoed this sentiment. “It is not reflective of the military realities of Russia-NATO relations,” he said, adding, “nor can it be taken as in any way suggestive of an impending Russia-NATO confrontation.”

[Category: Europe, Russia-ukraine, Qiosk, Nato, Ukraine war]

— New China port in Peru is about growth, but the sky is not falling

 

at 11/18/24 11:05pm

At a recently concluded summit of leaders from the Pacific Rim, Presidents Xi and Biden met in Peru against a rising tide of commentary that the U.S. is being outflanked in its own “backyard” by China. As if to underline this narrative, Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an announcement that the U.S. was transferring used Caltrain diesel engines for a Lima suburban rail line, a day after President Xi inaugurated a deep-water megaport in Chancay built and operated by Chinese entities. The port has sparked loud concern in U.S. military circles about a possible Chinese military presence in the hemisphere. It has also led one former NSC official who is advising the president-elect to suggest that the U.S. impose 60% tariffs on any goods entering America from Chancay. Hovering in the background of all this concern are “scare charts” like those published in the Wall Street Journal showing how China has overtaken the U.S. as the largest trading partner for most countries in South America. But for all the agitation, the deeper penetration of China in Latin America is largely a function of the pace and pattern of Chinese growth. China’s GDP rose from $1.2 trillion in 2000 to $17.8 trillion in 2023. And when a country with more than a billion people grows that fast, it is natural that it becomes the world's largest importer of iron-ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and a host of other materials. And South America grows, digs, or produces a lot of what China needs. But China’s major footprint as an importer of what South America produces also reflects that it is not as well endowed with natural resources as the U.S. There’s a reason “amber waves of grain” is a verse in “America The Beautiful.” The resource-sufficiency of North America has been a foundation of U.S. power for more than a century. And China’s role as an immense importer of commodities from the Middle East, Australia, Africa, and South America is simply the obverse. In other words, what might feel like an eclipse is more a function of resource endowments — a fancy way of saying, “who has more stuff on or underground.” While that’s mostly a good thing, the underlying cause for discomfort may be that it’s happening in a hemisphere the U.S. has considered its “own” for 201 years now. What about Chinese exports to the region? This too is a function of China’s growth pattern. The country has gone from accounting for roughly 5% of global manufacturing output in 1995 to about 33% now. Its exports to South America look a lot like its exports to everywhere else — electronics, consumer goods, and increasingly sophisticated capital goods and infrastructure equipment. These are industries that migrated slowly to East Asia over the last 50 years or so, and China is just following Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. And for all the angst about China building a port in Peru — that too is just a fact of life. Dredging, shipbuilding, port equipment design, and operation are increasingly sophisticated things that East Asia does very well. The world’s top-ranked port in terms of tonnage is Yangshan in China; the top nine ports are all in Asia. The highest-ranked U.S. port is Los Angeles in 16th place. Meanwhile, the outcome of the recent U.S. longshoremen’s strike points to some of the political obstacles to increased automation here — perhaps not the best thing to have on a port-builder’s CV. So when the outgoing head of U.S. Southern Command asks (referring to Chancay) why China is investing in strategic locations for global commerce, here is one plausible answer: The world’s second largest-economy, and its largest commodity importer, which also has a very good record in infrastructure and logistics buildout, is launching a container port in a country (and continent) where it is the largest trading partner. In any event, the worries that economic links will pull South American countries into China’s political orbit are likely overstated. As Sarang Shidore, director of the Quincy Institute’s Global South Program has repeatedly pointed out, middle powers in the Global South are increasingly hedging their exposures, as only makes sense when the world’s two largest economies are at loggerheads. Instead of hyperventilating about China in Latin America, there are more productive things Washington could be doing, particularly as it might be hard to displace China from its economic roles. The most obvious one would be manufacturing investment that transmits technological and managerial knowhow and leads to more diversified economies. Unfortunately, the backlash within U.S. domestic politics against offshoring may make that hard to replicate at scale. Even Mexico, the “friendshorers” poster-child and a member of the US-Mexico-Canada free-trade agreement, could face tough going from tariffs as a pressure tactic over immigration and other fraught issues. Similarly, countries like Brazil share U.S. concerns over Chinese imports and have responded with tariffs. That said, many of them are also likely to welcome inbound investment from China’s companies to service domestic markets — particularly in electric vehicles — as a way to create jobs and absorb new technologies where that country is the leader. Any pressures by Washington to exclude such investment will likely fail or backfire. So American opportunities to enhance its influence might lie elsewhere.South America has a long history of repeated episodes of financial distress stemming from a combination of lower commodity prices and a stronger dollar (the leading currency for cross-border lending). Financial vulnerabilities also go hand-in-hand with political vulnerability — recurrent crises have often led to alternations of left- and right-wing populisms. And decades of unhappy histories with the IMF make countries skeptical of the narrative that “debt-trap-diplomacy” is a recent Chinese invention. But this history also creates opportunities for the U.S. to do something different. With the dollar’s centrality in the international monetary system, one undisputed U.S. superpower is finance. Treasury or Federal Reserve programs could help stabilize economies in distress. And rethinking the political and economic conditionality behind access to either U.S. or multilateral assistance could offer dividends in political goodwill. Washington could also consider financing for strategic minerals supply chains in ways that allow countries to capture more of the downstream value-added beyond simple extraction. Many such minerals produced in South America, like lithium or copper, are associated with the energy transition. The change in administration might complicate questions over the American commitment to a faster and more comprehensive electrification as a key step in the fight against climate change. But if there is any such intention, it would offer a possibility to deepen U.S. economic links with South America. Even more promising is the fact that U.S. leadership in fracking technology also means expertise in geothermal energy projects that would be very welcome here. America still has a great deal to offer a region which, like much of the global South, wishes to avoid being corralled into a side in the U.S.-China rivalry. So rather than overreact to the elementary facts of economic complementarity that explain China’s presence, the U.S. should just focus on what it can do best.

[Category: Us, Latin america, South america, Peru, Trade, Economy, Tariff, War, Blinken, Biden, Xi, Military, Border, China, Enewsletter]

— Germany's Scholz becomes first to break the ice with Putin

 

at 11/18/24 10:05pm

For the first time in two years, a head of state of a major Western country has spoken with Vladimir Putin, breaking with the Western pattern of isolating the Russian president.On November 15, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz initiated a phone call with Putin. Scholz says he made the call because "[i]t was important to tell [Putin] that he cannot count on support from Germany, Europe and many others in the world waning.”Scholz delivered four key points to Putin, according to a German government spokesperson. He condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine and demanded that Russia withdraw its troops and “be willing to negotiate with Ukraine with the aim of achieving a just and lasting peace.” He told Putin that the deployment of North Korean troops was a “grave escalation.” He condemned Russia’s attacks on civilian infrastructure. And he promised “Germany’s unwavering determination to support Ukraine in its defensive struggle against Russian aggression for as long as necessary.”Scholz told reporters that the “conversation was very detailed but contributed to a recognition that little has changed in the Russian President's views of the war — and that's not good news." Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the conversation “detailed” and “frank,” though they reached no “convergence of opinion.”Putin told Scholz that Russia “has never refused” to negotiate a diplomatic settlement and that he “remains open to the resumption of the negotiations that were interrupted by the Kiev regime.” Those negotiations, he said, should be based on terms he outlined in June, that included a withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territories annexed by Russia — but not a formal recognition of the annexation — and a written guarantee not to join NATO. He added that any negotiated agreement “should take into account the interests of the Russian Federation in the security sphere, proceed from new territorial realities, and most importantly, eliminate the root causes of the conflict,” including NATO expansion and its “aggressive policy aimed at creating in Ukrainian territory an anti-Russian bridgehead.”Putin said that “the very fact of dialogue is positive.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky disagreed, calling the phone call “a Pandora’s box.” Zelensky worried that Scholz’s decision to call Putin could lead to “other conversations.” Also commenting on the call, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, a strong supporter of defending Ukraine against the Russian invasion, said that it is “important… to see an end to the violence in Ukraine” and that that “requires a level of engagement with counterparts who in many cases we disagree with.” Zelensky complained that Scholz’s call was “exactly what Putin has been wanting for a long time: it is extremely important for him to weaken his isolation, Russia’s isolation, and to conduct ordinary negotiations that will not end in anything.”Though “Zelensky and other European officials” reportedly “cautioned Scholz against the move,” Scholz says that he “was not acting on his own, but rather in consultation with others.”It seems unlikely that the hour long phone call expired after Scholz and Putin repeated what both had already often said: that Scholz condemns the war and that Putin demands neutrality for Ukraine and a recognition of the new territorial reality. The Kremlin says that, discussing energy, Putin also told Scholz that Russia “is ready for mutually beneficial cooperation if the German side shows interest in this."Scholz assured Putin of Germany’s “unwavering determination to support Ukraine… for as long as necessary.” But his government has already made the decision to terminate funding for new military aid for Ukraine. And, on November 4, Scholz told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that he opposes Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations. Instead, there has reportedly been talk in Berlin of Ukraine negotiating peace and security arrangements in exchange for a promise of neutrality and of withdrawal from territory claimed by Russia without formally recognizing the territory as Russian, along the lines of the Finland model during the Cold War.The phone call to Putin is not the first time Scholz has broken with the West on negotiating with Putin over his unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. In December 2022, Scholz said that “there is a willingness” to engage with Putin and that “all questions of common security could be solved and discussed.”The complete content of the phone call is not known. It is not known whether, in addition to the maximalist positions reported, any of these more nuanced positions were discussed. Despite Moscow’s insistence that no “convergence of opinion” was reached and Berlin’s evaluation that “little has changed in the Russian President's views of the war - and that's not good news," perhaps the good news, the hopeful news, is that German officials say that “Putin and Scholz agreed to stay in contact.”

[Category: Germany, Russia, Olaf scholz, Vladimir putin, Ukraine war]

— Can Trump seal a deal with Iran?

 

at 11/18/24 10:05pm

Maybe Donald Trump really will be an anti-war president in his second term. Trump donor and adviser Elon Musk reportedly meeting Iranian officials with the aim of defusing tensions could be a sign that the once and future president may truly buck the neocons and interventionists who have dogged Republican and Democratic efforts to engage Iran and kept the U.S. bogged down in conflicts in the Middle East for a generation. However, the efforts to stop such diplomacy from happening will be fierce. Despite his hardline reputation and actions in imposing "maximum pressure" sanctions, exchanging strikes and threatening to blow up Iranian cultural sites, and tearing up the 2015 Iran deal — Trump has often been an outlier from the typical Republican hawkish line on Iran.In 2015, when candidates vying for the GOP nomination were falling over themselves to denounce and pledge to "tear up" the Iran deal negotiated by the Obama administration, Trump said he would not tear up the deal but rather enforce it harshly, claiming his opponents didn't understand how the world actually works. When he finally came around to promising to tear it up, one of his main critiques was that America couldn't benefit financially from it unlike other parties to the deal — which, of course, is due to the U.S.'s own self-imposed "sanctions wall" on Iran.When Trump made good on this promise and pulled out of the nuclear deal in 2018 — an approach his GOP opponents had endorsed but likely wouldn't have actually implemented — it sowed the seeds of disaster. Trump's surrounding himself with war hawks and neocons didn't help. He allowed the same political influences that limited Obama's ability to lift sanctions so America could benefit from the original nuclear deal; that ensured Biden would never rejoin that agreement and kept America embroiled in conflict after conflict with Tehran.Key Trump advisers like John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Brian Hook, and Elliott Abrams worked assiduously to prevent Trump from pursuing serious diplomatic options on Iran and delivering a "better deal." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has always worked to prevent anything close to U.S.-Iran rapprochement, bragged that it was he who manipulated Trump to abandon the agreement and shift to “maximum pressure.” Yet to hear Trump tell it, he would have had an Iran deal with just one more week in office. He even said he told Biden's team to quickly seal an agreement with Iran because he "handed (the Biden administration) a country that was ready for a deal" but that they didn't know how to do it. Now, Trump will get another chance.While Musk’s talks with Iranian officials are potentially important and could be a sign that major conflict can be avoided, progress will not come easy. Trump's concept of "deal making" heavily relies on the notion that the other side must be softened up in order to get the best deal from a "position of strength." But in his first term, the sanctions on Iran and provocative actions like the Soleimani assassination had the opposite effect and hardened Iran's position by sidelining those in Tehran interested in and capable of striking a bargain with Washington. In Trump’s first term, French President Emmanuel Macron tried to get Iran’s president to agree to a direct meeting with Trump. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) tried to get then-Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to come to the White House. But those efforts were ultimately rebuffed, likely by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, because hardliners did not want to reward Trump with a "photo op" after engaging in a series of escalations, with little assurance of any benefit for them. Despite the chaos of his first term, Trump says he still wants a deal. In September 2024, Trump was asked if he would seek diplomacy with Iran in light of allegations that Iran wanted to assassinate him. “Yes, I would do that," he said. "We have to make a deal, because the consequences are impossible. We have to make a deal." Trump also spoke against sanctions and said he wanted to lift them, and bluntly rejected the idea that he should pursue U.S.-led regime change in Iran. "We can't even run ourselves," he said in dismissing the notion. Trump’s instinct to negotiate is likely to run headlong into his elevation of hawkish advisers who don’t believe in negotiations. When Trump talks about the value of having John Bolton-types in the room to "scare" the other side, and then surrounds himself with hardliners like Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio and hawks like national security adviser-designate Michael Waltz and Defense Secretary-designate Peter Hesgeth, it signals he may not have learned from his self-acknowledged "biggest mistake" of "picking some people I shouldn't have picked" to serve in his previous administration.And it takes two to tango. Iran does have a reformist-minded president who campaigned on lifting sanctions and restoring the 2015 agreement, and who brought back pro-engagement diplomats to achieve that outcome. Their initial reactions to Trump appear to be open to negotiation, but guarded, emphasizing that Iran will react harshly to any escalation of pressure. Also notable is Iran’s reported pledge in writing that it will not retaliate against Trump following threats issued after Soleimani’s assassination in 2020, and public dismissals of allegations that Iran has engaged in such plotting as fictitious.Ultimately, however, the Supreme Leader — always cautious about engagement and eager to avoid any possible blowback from negotiations — will make the final call over whether and how to negotiate. In Trump’s first term, he was not open to talks. Now, that may change. If Iran is serious about preventing war and pursuing diplomacy, it must be willing to test if Trump can actually deliver where others could not. Meeting with Trump's apparent emissary Elon Musk within just a week of the election suggests it could be ready to do just that.

[Category: Iran nuclear deal, Donald trump, Iran]

— Biden's ‘Last bang’: Allow long range missiles in Russia

 

at 11/18/24 4:02am

It was widely expected, including by the victors of the 2024 presidential election, that the Biden government would ramp up its efforts through the end of the year to make it as difficult and costly as possible for a new administration to pursue a different course on Ukraine.U.S. officials recently described this initiative as “Trump-proofing” their approach, and the White House decision to reportedly greenlight Ukrainian ATACMS strikes within Russian territory shows just how far the Biden administration is willing to go to handcuff President-elect Donald Trump to its Ukraine policy. The announcement was tempered by some hedging, with officials telling the Washington Post that the initial missile strikes will “focus on and around” Russia’s southeastern border region of Kursk, though they “could expand” in the future. The decision was preceded by weeks of public insistence by White House spokesman John Kirby and others that ATACMS strikes inside Russia offer limited operational value and are constrained by insufficient stocks. This kind of hair splitting and drastic policy reversal is not atypical of the Biden administration’s approach, with similar stories playing out in recent years over U.S. provisions of Patriot missile systems and HIMARS missiles to Ukraine. The military logic by which these bans are imposed and subsequently lifted was always dubious at best, even as the stakes, and escalatory risks, have steadily crept up.The administration cited alleged deployments of North Korean troops in Kursk as a major reason for lifting the ban. The goal, apparently, is to deter Pyongyang from deepening its involvement in Ukraine. This is a puzzling rationale. That there are discrete North Korean brigades fighting in Kursk itself is hardly an established fact. But their participation is a non-factor in determining the overall outcome of the war. Additionally, Ukraine's armed forces can ill afford to deplete their minuscule ATACMS stocks on smatterings of DPRK personnel as opposed to the critical Russian military infrastructure — air bases, command and control (C2) centers, logistics and supply targets, etc. — that they would have had to prioritize with or without the North Korean presence in Kursk. Then there is the fact that, as acknowledged by U.S. officials, the Russians have had months to prepare for this decision by redeploying critical assets out of range of Ukrainian ATACMS and bolstering their local air defenses. These attacks are not just operationally fraught but strategically bankrupt, as an ATACMS used to prolong Ukraine's unsustainable control over a sliver of Russian territory is one less ATACMS to stem Russia's significant advances in the eastern Kharkiv and Donetsk regions. The intelligence community previously assessed that ATACMS strikes inside the Russian interior carry serious risks, possibly inducing Putin to restore deterrence with a major retaliation against the West. Biden administration officials, in attempting to justify their volte-face, are now arguing these risks have “diminished over time.” Yet neither this war's core dynamics nor the underlying logic of Russia's red lines has changed from two weeks ago, except to the extent that Ukrainian front lines are collapsing at an accelerated pace. The only appreciable difference, one that is surely not lost on either Moscow or Kyiv, is the looming transition to a Trump administration that is planning to pursue a negotiated settlement in Ukraine as one of its first foreign policy items.This decision also raises the corollary danger of similar reversals by Britain, which could grant Ukraine permission to use long-range Storm Shadow missiles, as well as accompanying green lights from France and Germany. Whereas Russia may be inclined toward leniency when it comes to the U.S. because of the presidential transition and Washington's overriding importance in steering the war to a negotiated conclusion, these allowances do not figure into Russian thinking on Ukraine's European partners and the bar for Moscow's retaliation against them may therefore be lower. The Kremlin is thus presented with a powerful incentive not to retaliate against NATO in ways that would jeopardize impending peace talks. Yet this needlessly escalatory step has put Russia and NATO one step closer to a direct confrontation — the window to avert catastrophic miscalculation is now that much narrower. Not incidentally, it creates yet another unnecessary sticking point between the incoming administration and Kyiv in what was already a difficult pre-negotiation process. It is, in its strategic confusion and tactical myopia, the tragic last bang of a US Ukraine policy that habitually prioritized “doing something” in the short to medium term over articulating and pursuing a credible endgame.

[Category: Trump, Ukraine, Zelensky, Russia, Biden, Atacms, Enewsletter, Ukraine war]

— Trump shouldn't overestimate US influence on the world stage

 

at 11/17/24 10:05pm

The United States has been at risk for some time of overestimating its influence internationally by clinging to experiences from the past. In the immediate aftermath of World War II and following the implosion of the Soviet Union, Washington exercised virtually unchecked power and influence due to circumstances that no longer apply. Other powers decimated in WWII have recovered, and new powers have emerged. The return to a multipolar system is taking shape. Conflating power and influencePower and influence are related but not the same. Both are always relative and changing in the international environment. In 2024, the U.S. continues to have the largest economy in terms of GDP in the world; China has risen to second place. The U.S. also maintains the strongest military, dwarfing its major competitors. Washington accounts for 40.5% of total global military spending and more than the next ten countries in order of military spending combined. China accounts for 10% of the global total and Russia for 4.8%. The objective power advantage does not necessarily translate into influence, however, as seen in the growing number of challenges to U.S. pressure and preferences.Challenges to US influenceThe BRICS-plus summit, convened by Russian President Vladimir Putin last month in Kazan Russia is a recent example of the new reality. Instead of being a pariah and internationally isolated as Washington officials and pundits regularly assert, leaders of 36 countries from all parts of the globe convened to discuss an agenda that included the Russia-Ukraine war, the conflicts in the Middle East, and reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar. Multiple bilateral meetings were held on the sidelines. The Kazan Declaration was approved by all nine member states. .Although it does not present a cohesive alternative to Western dominated international institutions, BRICS continues to attract new members since its establishment in 2006. The differences among existing and aspiring members are real. Nonetheless, participants coalesce around an interest in creating a new, more just world order than the one created and enforced since WWII Other examples of declining U.S. influence are found in Washington’s “backyard” as well as places on the other side of the globe. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro flouted Washington’s warnings about unfair elections and Israel’s Netanyahu disregards the Biden administration’s admonitions to adhere to international law in its war in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. Countries that Washington regards as partners, such as India, carry on substantial trade with Russia and Iran despite increasingly harsh Western sanctions regimes against both. Courted by the U.S., Indonesia held its first joint military exercises with Russia just this month; and Arab States resist pressure from Washington to criticize the Houthis. In an intriguing flight of fancy, Washington has called upon China to use its influence on Russia and North Korea to prevent escalation of the war in Ukraine while at the same time blasting China’s military buildup in the South China Sea, sending U.S. warships to the region and imposing multiple sanctions and economic trade barriers on the country. A primary motivator for countries to challenge the U.S. is Washington’s tarnished image, which together with the disadvantages imposed on the non-Western world by the existing world order, drive the search for new international rules and norms. Struggling with the new reality Official Washington is struggling to adapt to the new reality. Often dismissing the importance of BRICS and other challenges, U.S. leaders, regardless of party, continue to assume an indispensable and preeminent role for themselves in the world, projecting interests and foreign policy objectives often in binary terms — good vs. evil, right vs. wrong, truth vs. lies — while ignoring a reality composed of many shades of gray. BRICS attendees are illustrative of a non-binary world. Some like Russia, China and Iran have an adversarial relationship with the U.S.; others, including India, Brazil and new partnerIndonesia, want good relations with Russia, China as well as the U.S.. Their interests require eschewing alignment in major power conflicts, similar to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), established in 1961 by India and Yugoslavia and active today with some 120 members.Historically, major powers have always struggled when their power declined. The path is seldom unilinear, and conflicts were often the result. To minimize the risk, Washington must abandon the binary lens through which it views international relations and instead recognize the preference among many countries for diversified security, economic and political partners. Put simply, a country should be able to maintain good relations with the U.S., Russia, and China, for example. In a revival of non-aligned principles, countries will hedge their bets and practice a la carte partnerships based on circumstances and specific issues of concern.Increasing risks in the Trump worldAt first glance, it may appear that the newly elected Trump administration will accept and adjust to declining U.S. influence because of its focus on domestic change under an America First agenda. More likely, however, Trump and his team will pursue the illusion of U.S. influence while accelerating its decline. Pew surveys of international trust in U.S. leaders show that confidence in Trump during his last term in office plunged to an all-time low of 23-31% compared to 74% confidence in Obama during his first term in office. Although trust in Biden recovered somewhat to a median of 43% the trend over the last eight years tracks with an overall decline in U.S. influence.So far, the president-elect’s well-known hubris, and that of his anticipated national security circle, do not bode well for a graceful adjustment to a multipolar world, his own transactional proclivities notwithstanding. The question will be whether the realities of this new world will help push him toward a more nuanced foreign policy — being that he already has relations with some of the key characters (the leaders of Russia, India, China, Turkey to name a few) rather an exacerbating a world of “strategic instability and a new era of contested power.”

[Category: China, Brics, Russia, India, Multipolarity]

— With Putin, Trump's 'art of the deal' is put the the test

 

at 11/17/24 10:05pm

“For every action there’s an equal and opposite reaction,” said President Vladimir Putin on the stage of his yearly economic Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia in 2017.I sat among the vast, mostly Russian, audience, and dwelled on Newton’s third law.During four and a half years at the British Embassy in Moscow, I’d learned one important lesson: Russia always responds in kind, both to aggression and to engagement. President-elect Trump should think how he might trade with Putin on this basis.Reciprocity is the most predictable tenet of Russian statecraft and Russia’s policy towards Ukraine offers the perfect illustration.Action: on February 22, 2014, Ukraine’s pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych was deposed, in what Russia describes as an illegal coup d’etat, supported by the U.S. and UK governments. Reaction: eight years and two days later, Ukraine’s pro-Western president, Volodymyr Zelensky, came within a whisker of being ousted by Russian troops. With its tanks rolling into Ukraine from the north, east and south, Russia launched a massive airborne assault on Hostomel Airport. If they had secured the runway, Russian forces would have poured in to overwhelm Kyiv’s defences. However, a quick and clinical coup eluded Putin.Yet, three years after the Ukraine war started, Russia has still achieved many of its objectives, albeit at a greater cost. Volodymyr Zelensky may be approaching the twilight years of his presidency; a future ceasefire would trigger calls to lift martial law and hold presidential elections. By that time, Russia will still occupy 20 percent of Ukrainian land. Ukraine’s future membership of the EU is on the very distant horizon and NATO membership is now buried deep in the pending tray.Putin likely believes the West failed in its attempt to land a decisive strategic defeat on Russia. There are three reasons why he has maneuvered himself into a strong position to negotiate with Trump.First, clarity. Putin’s simple, unerring and oft expressed goal is to deny Ukraine’s aspiration to NATO. He may also hope for a longer term renewal of relations with Ukraine as post-war resentment towards the West grows in that country.Western strategy has been complex, unclear and consistently erring. Western powers never acknowledged the legitimacy of Putin’s consistently expressed claim that NATO enlargement represented a core strategic threat to Russia’s national interest. An open door to possible Ukrainian membership of NATO, if the conditions were right and if every member could agree, was always a fudge that pleased no one. Zelensky was kept out of the tent while Putin fumed that the tent flap was open.Second, decisiveness.Russia has demonstrated the ability to act decisively which the collective West cannot do.Put another way, in the great game of chess, Putin played fractious teams of 32 players in NATO and 27 players in the EU whose every move emerged out of prolonged debate and lowest common denominator ideas. It took almost a year for the UK to agree to send Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine and 15 months for U.S. approval of F-16 aircraft.That chess game becomes three dimensional when domestic politics get involved. In the teeth of Republican resistance, the U.S. Congress took months to agree a $61 billion package of assistance in April 2024. Germany halved military aid to Ukraine in August 2024, against a rise in popularity among antiwar political parties on the left and right. Foreign policy is always, ultimately, driven by domestic considerations.Third, political will.Putin has always shown the political will and had the domestic support to press his strategy, in the way that the West cannot. His calculations were rooted in a single assumption, which proved correct, that the West would not fight Russia head on to protect Ukraine.He probably knew that the fear of escalation with the world’s largest nuclear power would prevent NATO members from agreeing to a direct military confrontation. When the fighting started in 2022, NATO offered every form of assistance except that more direct help.Since then, a groundswell in populism has swept Donald Trump to power in the U.S. and undermined liberal coalitions in Germany and France. Alternative voices of the left and right call for engagement with Russia, squeezing the room for the hawkish policy that in the space of a decade has led us to war.How did we get from the ouster of Yanukovych in 2014 to the attempted removal of Zelensky in 2022, and the devastating war that unfolded?There’s little evidence that Putin had conquest in his mind all along, rather than reacting to events as they unfolded. There is no evidence that he is driven by a master plan, that includes a suicidal bid to invade the Baltics or Poland.Putin’s grievances grew steadily in intensity across the eight years before war broke out as efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine conflict through the Minsk agreement failed. Indeed, it was one of the final acts of Zelensky’s pre-war government to declare the Minsk agreement officially dead. Yet, an unprecedented campaign of economic warfare against Russia through sanctions, led by the U.S. and supported by Britain, continued.The big question remains, how much influence will Donald Trump have in bringing the war to a close? Trump can bring greater clarity to U.S. and Western aims with Russia and Ukraine that moves on from Biden’s disastrous incrementalism. He should be bold and decisive in exploring new ideas as the strength of his mandate provides him with the political bandwidth in which to act. But right now, Putin remains in a strong bargaining position as his army is still gaining ground every day; even though Russia’s economy may be overheating under the war effort, he’s in no hurry to cut a deal. Which brings us back to reciprocity. In the art of the deal, Trump should prepare to make concessions if he expects Putin to reciprocate. Finally taking NATO out of the equation and a thought-through plan to leverage sanctions relief in a future peace process, would be good places to start.

[Category: Putin, Donald trump, Ukraine war, Ukraine, Nato, Russia, Enewsletter]

As of 11/22/24 10:54pm. Last new 11/21/24 10:35pm.