Crooked Bough News Round-up

— Iran Update, August 20, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 8:54am

 Nidal Morrison, Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update dailyClick here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported on August 20 that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.[1] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The AJC reportedly barred eight members of Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun Movement, seven Badr Organization candidates, five members of Kataib Hezbollah’s Hoquq Movement, six members of the Imam Ali Brigade’s Services Alliance, the head of Kataib Sayyid al Suhahda in Kirkuk, one member of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc, and three candidates from Labor Minister Ahmed al Asadi’s Jund al Samaa bloc.[2] Asadi is aligned with Sudani.[3] Shia political parties, but particularly Maliki, previously used the AJC ahead of elections in 2010 to bar candidates opposed to him, and could be weaponizing the commission again.[4] It is highly unlikely that seven Badr Organization members, for example, have real Baathist ties due to Badr’s history. Badr Organization is the rebranded Badr Corps. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) founded the Badr Corps as an Iraqi Shia formation to fight Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army during the Iran-Iraq War.[5] The AJC only excluded three candidates aligned with Maliki for suspected Baath party ties, according to leaked documents published by Iraqi media on August 13.[6] Candidates from political parties and coalitions that are competing with Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, meanwhile, constitute a disproportionate number of those barred due to alleged Ba'ath party links. This report comes after Maliki’s Dawa Party released a statement on August 13 affirming its support for the Commission’s measures.[7] Maliki also emphasized on August 8 the need for the AJC to take action against Baathists.[8] Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, once a member of Maliki’s former Dawa Party, criticized on August 20 the weaponization of the AJC for political purposes.[9] Shia political parties, particularly Maliki, have long manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[10]The Accountability and Justice Commission’s investigation and exclusion of candidates tied to Shia Coordination Framework parties reflects ongoing tensions among Shia parties within the Framework. Iraqi media reported on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided over US pressure to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[11] Political sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 6 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds” with some elements of the Shia Coordination Framework.[12] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections because factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups before the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections ultimately advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the elections.[13]Key TakeawaysIraqi Parliamentary Elections: Former Prime Minister and State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al Maliki may be using the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to sideline political opponents ahead of the November 2025 elections. Iraqi media reported that the AJC has so far barred 33 candidates affiliated with the Shia Coordination Framework parties for alleged Baath party ties.Damage at Fordow: The New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.US Counter-ISIS Operations: The United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting senior Iraqi ISIS leader Salah Noman in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20. The US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria near the Turkish border, including a recent ground operation in al Bab in July 2025.IranThe New York Times reported on August 20 that conclusive damage assessments of US strikes on Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant require more time, which is consistent with previous reporting.[14] The United States dropped twelve 30,000lb GBU-57 bunker buster bombs on Fordow in June 2025, targeting ventilation shafts at the site that led to a centrifuge cascade hall located at least 250 feet underground.[15] An unspecified US Department of Defense official said that the United States aimed to destroy the centrifuges with shock waves and other effects of the blasts because the bombs would probably not make direct contact with the centrifuge chamber itself.[16] International Atomic Energy Agency Director Rafael Grossi previously stated that the Fordow centrifuges are “no longer working” and emphasized that even small vibrations can destroy them.[17] The US bombs would have generated a blast wave far more significant than small vibrations. Several technical experts told the New York Times that a precise damage assessment requires advanced computer simulations, exact details of the bombs, and extensive knowledge of the geology of Fordow.[18] Iranian officials have emphasized that Iran cannot access the nuclear sites struck by US and Israeli airstrikes yet, which also prevents conclusive battle damage assessments.[19]Several factors may have impacted the effectiveness of the US strikes on Fordow. A US defense official familiar with US decision-making said that the main targeted ventilation shafts had bends near the shaft entrances, which means the path to the underground facility through the shaft was not straight.[20] Several geologists also stated that the geology of Fordow almost certainly had an impact on the extent of damage. One expert said that Iran likely built Fordow using volcanic tuff, which may have helped cushion the site from the bombs due to its porosity.Iran secured loans against tankers transporting Iranian and Iranian allies’ oil exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to circumvent Western sanctions between 2019 and 2023, according to the Financial Times on August 20.[21] A US-sanctioned Iranian broker set up one billion dollars' worth of mortgages in Switzerland against at least 34 oil tankers, according to Panama Maritime Authority documents.[22] The United States has sanctioned 20 of these 34 tankers.[23] The Iranian broker used these mortgages as collateral, which allowed the broker to take ownership of the tanker if the buyer did not complete the payment once the oil arrived at its destination.[24] Buyers traditionally require official bank documents to prove their credit to traders.[25] These mortgages allow buyers to circumvent bank involvement in the process. Many banks have increasingly refused to work on transactions related to Iran's illicit oil trade since the United States began to impose strict sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in 2019.[26] Iran’s illicit oil export network has moved at least 130 million oil barrels worth $9.6 billion using mortgages to circumvent detection between 2019 and 2023. This network transferred sanctioned Iranian oil as well as sanctioned Russian and Venezuelan oil. The network exported the vast majority of this oil to the PRC, according to a research group focused on illicit networks.[27]Iran’s use of mortgages on tankers to evade US sanctions is only one of the many strategies that Iran employs to obfuscate illicit Iranian and Russian oil trade to the PRC. Many companies affiliated with Iranian oil tankers use fake addresses and conduct ship-to-ship transfers.[28] The multi-national network controlled by Senior Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani’s son, Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, frequently changes vessel operators and managers to obscure ownership, falsifies cargo information, and turns off automatic identification systems (AIS) during loading. The United States sanctioned Shamkhani on July 30.[29]Iran is deepening its economic and military cooperation with Belarus. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20 in Minsk, Belarus, to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[30] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and want to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the region.[31] Pezeshkian emphasized that both countries can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[32] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[33] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[34] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation over the past few years.[35] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[36] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37]IraqSee the topline section.SyriaThe United States conducted an operation reportedly targeting an Iraqi Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leader in Atmeh, Idlib Province, on August 20.[38] A Syrian security source and Syrian residents told Reuters that local Syrian forces cordoned off the neighborhood, but that only US forces participated in the raid.[39] A US official confirmed to Reuters that the operation targeted a “suspected high-value target.”[40] US Central Command (CENTCOM) has not acknowledged the operation or its outcomes as of this writing. Syrian state-owned outlet Al Ekhbariya reported that senior Iraqi ISIS leader Salah Noman was killed during the operation, citing an unspecified security source.[41] The source said that Noman was responsible for activating ISIS cells in Syria.[42] The General Security Service (GSS) had pursued Noman from Dana, in the Idlib countryside, to Atmeh.[43] Noman is also known as Abd al Nayif al Jabouri and previously operated with the Islamic State (IS) in Salah al Din Province, Iraq.[44]The US ground operation in Atmeh occurs amid ongoing counter-ISIS efforts in northern Syria near the Turkish border. Syrian Interior Ministry forces arrested nine members of an ISIS cell in Harem, near the Turkish border, on August 7.[45] Syrian government forces also participated in a recent US counter-ISIS ground operation that targeted and killed senior ISIS leader Dhiya Zawba Muslih al Hardani in al Bab, Aleppo Province, on July 25.[46]Anti-government Druze militia Liwa al Jabal announced on August 19 that it has joined a “unified army” that is aligned with Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri, which indicates that some anti-government forces in Suwayda Province seek to form a more unified armed force to support Hijri’s new autonomous project.[47] Liwa al Jabal is a prominent Suwayda-based Druze militia that has an estimated 5,000 fighters.[48] The faction’s August 19 statement claimed that the group’s recent defense of Suwayda Province from ”dark militias supported by government forces” has led the group to conclude that it must ”unify efforts and close ranks” to defend Suwayda Province and Syria.[49] Liwa al Jabal said that its new participation in this ”unified army” is ”under the blessing” of Hijri, who is the most prominent anti-Damascus Druze leader in Suwayda Province.[50] Hijri's political movement declared an autonomous Suwaydawi government on August 6.[51] Judges on the “Supreme Legal Committee” within the new ”autonomous government” appointed an executive body, security officials, and ministerial heads to govern Suwayda instead of the Damascus-based transitional government.[52] Liwa al Jabal’s announcement of its participation in a new Hijri-aligned force suggests that Hijri or his political allies may be uniting Suwayda’s anti-government militias under a single command or structure to support the new autonomous government.CTP-ISW has not observed any other Druze militias discuss membership in a new force under Hijri’s autonomous government, but Liwa al Jabal is not the only Druze militia that has expressed its support for Hijri’s political aspirations. A group of Druze militias have long opposed Shara’s government, and several other militias, including Liwa al Jabal, have turned against the government in recent months after government forces committed abuses against Druze during the violence in Suwayda in July 2025. Liwa al Jabal, for example, participated in the December 2024 offensive on Damascus as a member of the Southern Operations Room and emerged as an initial supporter of President Ahmed al Shara and the new Syrian government soon after the fall of the regime.[53] A spokesperson more recently wrote an op ed on August 9 in support of an alliance to stand up to the “terrorist [Shara] government” and restore “consideration” for minorities and moderate Sunnis, highlighting the significant breakdown in trust between some Druze militias and the transitional government.[54] The breakdown in trust is at least partially motivated by political divisions (not just intercommunal divisions). Another Southern Operations Room faction, the Eighth Brigade, was subverted and suppressed by Shara’s government. It is possible that Liwa al Jabal and others seek to avoid a similar fate. The formalization of the alliance between anti-government Druze militias under the term “unified army” would represent a significant hurdle to the Syrian government's efforts to work with Druze parties with the aim of gradually incorporating Suwayda into state institutions.Humanitarian aid providers opened a new humanitarian corridor that leads into northern Suwayda Province due to repeated attacks by Sunni tribal fighters and unknown gunmen along the previous southern corridor. Sunni tribal fighters have attacked civilians four times on the outskirts of Suwayda Province since August 15.[55] Unknown gunmen previously attacked a Syrian Red Crescent convoy headed toward the corridor on August 8.[56] These attacks have prevented humanitarian workers from distributing aid via the Busra al Sham corridor.[57] Humanitarian organizations have since adapted by opening a new humanitarian corridor that enters northern Suwayda Province near Busra al Harir on August 19.[58] It is not clear if the government or humanitarian agencies will reopen the Busra al Sham corridor.[59] The General Security Services (GSS) lack the strength to guard the full 90-kilometer border of Suwayda Province and cannot reinforce their positions in the event of an attack, according to a Syrian journalist.[60]The attacks along the humanitarian corridor may suggest that tribal fighters are attempting to disrupt Suwaydawis’ evacuations from Suwayda Province, the provision of humanitarian aid to Suwayda, or both. Tribal fighters reportedly feel neglected by the Syrian transitional government because the government continues to send aid to Suwayda Province, but has done little to address Sunni Bedouin displacement in Daraa Province.[61] It remains unclear why the Sunni tribal fighters have attacked civilian vehicles, however. The civilians subjected to these attacks are not solely Druze, which suggests that the attacks are not entirely motivated by intercommunal tensions.Arabian Peninsula Nothing significant to report.Palestinian Territories and LebanonSenior Lebanese officials have continued diplomatic efforts to generate support for the French-drafted resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate.[62] UNIFIL, which patrols Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, operates under an annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[63] The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is expected to vote on a French-proposed resolution on August 25 to extend UNIFIL’s mandate until August 31, 2026 (see graphic below).[64] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam each met with US Senator Markwayne Mullin and a delegation of other unspecified US officials in Lebanon on August 20 and discussed UNIFIL‘s role supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).[65] The United States has reportedly opposed an automatic renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate and raised concerns over the French resolution’s lack of an explicit withdrawal date for UNIFIL.[66] Salam emphasized that UNIFIL provides critical support to LAF efforts to assert state authority over southern Lebanon.[67]UNIFIL’s presence and familiarity with southern Lebanon may be needed to conduct a successful transfer of authority in southern Lebanon.[68] Berri stated that Lebanon was surprised by US opposition to UNIFIL’s mandate extension and questioned how the United States ”can target its own efforts.”[69] Berri is suggesting that US opposition to the resolution goes against US sponsorship and leadership in the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire monitoring committee, which contains UNIFIL forces in its structure and tasks.[70]Several other UNSC members, including Russia and the PRC, have opposed extending UNIFIL’s mandate. Unspecified diplomatic sources told Lebanese media on August 20 that the PRC and Russia informed Lebanon that they reject the proposed UNIFIL resolution.[71] The PRC and Russia said that they will not oppose any proposals to end UNIFIL’s mission in Lebanon, according to the source.[72] The PRC and Russia have consistently expressed their discontent with UNIFIL by abstaining from previous UNIFIL mandate renewals.[73] The PRC and Russia’s opposition to UNIFIL is also unsurprising given Russia and the PRC’s ongoing political support for other members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, such as the Houthi Movement.[74] The PRC and Russia both abstained from the July 15 vote on UN Security Council Resolution 2787, which condemned the Houthi strikes against international shipping as acts of terrorism, for example.[75][1] https://almadapaper dot net/411281/[2] https://almadapaper dot net/411281/[3] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/280620256[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf[5] https://www.hudson.org/international-organizations/badr-organization-irans-oldest-proxy-iraq[6] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-55-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A8-400 ; 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https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769822/%d9%85%d8%b3%d9%84%d8%ad%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%8a%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%b7%d9%81%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%ab%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d8%a3%d8%b4%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b5-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b7%d8%b1%d9%8a/[61] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1956355472123953600[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025[63] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/[64] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/[65] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Fr5MJ8QMc/?mibextid=wwXIfr ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1958184279780798549 ; https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958183655412486260[66] https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/trump-administration-end-peacekeeping-lebanon-europe-pushing-back-124718708[67] https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958183655412486260[68] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/lebanon-33.php[69] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1314311236718041&id=100044175322236&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=RYOlN0jksozbbjXB# ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314807-berri-meets-us-delegation-criticizes-us-move-to-end-unifil-s-mission[70] https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1314311236718041&id=100044175322236&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=RYOlN0jksozbbjXB# ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314807-berri-meets-us-delegation-criticizes-us-move-to-end-unifil-s-mission ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/us-names-new-head-lebanon-ceasefire-monitoring-mechanism[71] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/855567/أميركا--يجب-إنهاء-عمل--اليونيفل--خلال-6-أشهر[72] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/855567/أميركا--يجب-إنهاء-عمل--اليونيفل--خلال-6-أشهر[73] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/08/un-interim-force-in-lebanon-unifil-vote-on-mandate-renewal-2.php ; https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15400.doc.htm[74] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-23-2025[75] https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202507/1338477.shtml

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 19, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 8:05am

Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterApril 19, 2025, 10:30pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast. Lavrov claimed in a televised interview on August 19 that the Kremlin has "never talked about the need to seize any territories" from Ukraine and that Russia's goal was not to seize Crimea, Donbas, or other areas of Ukraine.[1] The claim seems bizarre in the context of Russia's repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, including territory Russian forces do not control. It reflects the deeper Russian aims in Ukraine, however, quite accurately. Lavrov reiterated that Russia's war objectives concern "protecting" the people in Ukraine from the Ukrainian government, which the Kremlin falsely portrays as illegitimate and oppressive.[2] Lavrov's description of the Kremlin's aim to "protect" Ukrainians from their own government reflects the fact that the Kremlin seeks to remove the democratically elected Ukrainian government and replace it with a pro-Russian government that would allow the Kremlin to control Ukraine without needing to fight for physical control over territory or annex it. Lavrov notably made demands during the interview that reject Ukraine's sovereignty including that Ukraine repeal laws regarding language and religion that are the proper concern only of the government of a sovereign state. Lavrov stated explicitly "there can be no talk of any long-term [peace] agreements" with Ukraine "without respect" for Russia's security and the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as "these are the reasons that must be urgently eliminated in the context of a settlement."[3] The Kremlin's continued insistence on controlling Ukrainian domestic affairs reflects the arguments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his 2021 essay arguing that Ukraine should not exist independently of Russia.[4]Lavrov's August 19 statement further emphasizes the Kremlin's broader objective of obtaining full political control over Ukraine before Russia ends its war.[5] Considering Russia's territorial demands separately from demands concealed by its references to "root causes" obscures the reality that the Kremlin views its war demands as indivisible – the Kremlin aims to accomplish all of these goals and has shown no willingness to compromise any of them or sacrifice some for others to facilitate or complete a peace process. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring it from joining NATO and other international alliances.[6] Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically in line with Lavrov's August 19 statements.[7]Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means. Russia has long attempted to exert control over former Soviet states through continuing cognitive warfare efforts.[8] Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, in which the Ukrainian people protested for a transparent Western-style government, threatened effective Russian control over Ukraine and prompted the Kremlin to launch a series of cognitive warfare efforts in order to stop and reverse the loss of Russian influence in Ukraine.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin accelerated his efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that drove out Ukraine’s Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, and in favor of a democratically elected, pro-Western government.[10] Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in response, accelerated hybrid operations, and backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.[11] Putin tried to force Ukraine to legitimize the Russia-invented Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) in the 2015 Minsk II accords that established the ceasefire that Russia broke fully in 2022. The Kremlin pressured Ukraine to extend the legal limited autonomy of the regions in December 2019 and to enshrine broader autonomy for Donbas as a constituent part of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Constitution so that the DNR and LNR could serve as conduits for Russian influence in and ultimately control over the government in Kyiv, but Ukraine rejected this effort.[12] The Kremlin ultimately launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 after this failure to bring Ukraine back under Russian control. Putin has long denied Ukrainian sovereignty and alleged that Ukrainians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared "historical and spiritual space."[13] Putin used these claims as part of his justification for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which was the culmination of eight years of failed efforts to regain control of Ukraine through hybrid warfare campaigns.Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance. Russian officials are setting informational conditions to justify exerting control over former Soviet states, including NATO members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, by denying the legality of the collapse of the Soviet Union.[14] The Kremlin asserts its right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic States by prosecuting officials who remove Soviet-era war monuments and citizens who graffiti them within these states’ sovereign territories in absentia under Russian law that does not apply to those states.[15] Russia notably launched one of the first ever cyberattacks against Estonia in response to the Estonian government's decision to relocate a Soviet "Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn."[16] Russian efforts to exert control over the Baltics has failed. Russia has been much more successful in establishing control over both Belarus and Georgia, however, by launching hybrid operations in both countries and backing pro-Russian governments that are loyal to the Kremlin.[17] The Kremlin now seeks to bring Belarus further into Russian control through the Union State framework and to eliminate the facade of an independent Belarus completely.Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine. Lavrov stated on August 19 that Russia and Ukraine cannot make any long-term agreements that do not take into account Russia's “security interests,” very likely referring to Russia’s demand for Ukrainian “neutrality.”[18] Russian officials have long insisted on Ukrainian neutrality and non-alignment with NATO as a precondition to negotiations, and Russia is likely setting information space conditions to oppose Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[19] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]... any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries."[20] The Kremlin’s demand ostensibly for Ukraine’s neutrality is in fact meant to isolate Ukraine from its allies and deny Ukraine its sovereign right to form alliances even as Russia insists on de facto control over Ukraine's domestic internal affairs.[21] Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration. Geolocated footage published on August 18 and 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in an area northwest of Poltavka and northeast of Volodymyrivka (both southeast of Dobropillya).[22] Russian milbloggers also claimed on August 18 and 19 that Russian forces are bypassing Volodymyrivka toward Sofiivka (northeast of Volodymyrivka) and are flanking Ukrainian positions in and near Shakhove (immediately north of Volodymyrivka) from the west in the main penetration and from the east near Volodymyrivka.[23] The Russian advance and pattern of attacks support an August 18 assessment from Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets, who stated that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) are attacking in the area east of Volodymyrivka to threaten the flank of Ukrainian forces that are attempting to cut off the base of the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[24] The base of the penetration is relatively narrow compared to its depth and runs along the Dorozhnie-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line (all southeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets assessed on August 18 that Russian forces attacking east of Volodymyrivka were advancing more slowly than Ukrainian forces attempting to cut off the base of the penetration, and noted that the forces operating within the main penetration are largely elements of the 51st CAA (SMD). Mashovets reported on August 19 that fighting begun for Mayak – indicating that Russian forces no longer exert firm control over Mayak and other settlements forming the base of the penetration and that Ukrainian forces are now threatening the heart of the penetration.[25] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced toward or into Vesele and that heavy fighting is ongoing near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Dobropillya in the main penetration).[26] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating near Dobropillya reported on August 19 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attack near Vesele and that Russian forces are attempting to bring forward reserves to reinforce within the penetration.[27]Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya – at least temporarily. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction have a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction, particularly near Dobropillya, and do not have continuous defensive positions but rather intermittent outposts on the frontline.[28] The terrain near Dobropillya consists of wide, open fields and a low density of settlements. These factors all favor rapid, tactical gains even in conditions of positional warfare, allowing Russian forces to attempt a flanking maneuver in support of a tactically significant penetration. Russian forces do not appear to have established a continuous defensive line within their narrow penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya, likely in part due to the infiltration tactics used to achieve the penetration. The tactical penetration is also a reflection of this low manpower density and relatively sparse positions on the frontline, in combination with favorable terrain in the area, can permit a degree of tactical maneuver. Russian forces likely remain unable to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield in the near-term in large part due to the threat Ukrainian drones pose to Russian armored vehicles.Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported on August 19 that Russia released the bodies of 1,000 deceased Ukrainian soldiers, including the bodies of five soldiers who died in Russian detention.[29] The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported that Ukraine previously listed the servicemembers on the lists of severely wounded or severely ill prisoners to be exchanged in accordance with the June 2 Istanbul agreements.[30] Russian authorities confirmed that Russia returned the bodies of 1,000 KIA Ukrainian soldiers on August 19 and claimed that Russia only received the bodies of 19 KIA servicemembers.[31]Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that it opened an investigation into a Russian soldier of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) who participated in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POW) at the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant on June 16 and July 2, 2024.[32] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office noted that the Russian soldier, whom Ukrainian forces captured after the seizure of the plant on September 24, 2024, told Ukrainian investigators that a Russian commander ordered the execution of the Ukrainian POWs.[33] There has been a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025, and ISW continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or directly enabling their subordinates to conduct systemic executions in direct violation of international law.[34]Key Takeaways:Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast.Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means.Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance.Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine.Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration.Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya —at least temporarily.Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19.Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024.Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 18 and 19.[35]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Yastrubne, Sumy Oblast, toward the international Kursk border area (southeast of Glushkovo).[36]Two unspecified sources told Reuters on August 18 that Ukrainian drone strikes on August 13 and 14 damaged Lukoil’s Volgograd City oil refinery and that the refinery will halt oil processing until mid-September 2025 at the earliest.[37] Reuters reported that the strike damaged three distillation units with a combined daily processing capacity of 42,270 metric tons and noted that the refinery produced 5.1 percent of Russian refineries’ total oil volume in 2024.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) advanced within Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[38]Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City within Yunakivka on August 18 and 19.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Stepove, Novokostyantynivka, and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne.[40]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Seredyna-Buda (northwest of Sumy City), Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and Velyka Pysarivka (southeast of Sumy City).[41]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 19 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 18 and 19.[42]The deputy head of a Ukrainian fire support unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 19 that Russian forces have conducted ineffective frontal assaults on Vovchansk since May 2024 and that Russian forces maintain positions in ruined buildings within the city.[43] The officer added that Russian forces continue attempts to assault Ukrainian positions in small infantry groups but that Ukrainian drone operators strike Russian force concentrations, preventing Russian assaults. The officer noted that Russian forces are moving infantry fighting vehicles close to the frontline but are unable to leverage tanks due to Ukrainian drone activity. Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 19 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie on August 18 and 19.[44]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 19 but did not make advances.Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and toward Blahodativka; just northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Holubivka and toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka, Kamyanka, and Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 18 and 19.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Synkivka.[46]An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 19 that Russian forces are supplying forward units operating in this direction through drone drops and individual personnel carrying ammunition and provisions.[47] The officer reported that Russian forces are increasingly leveraging anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks to evade Ukrainian drones during assaults, and that Russian infantry stop intermittently in dugouts and trenches to allow the cloaks to cool down in order to evade drone detection.The commander of Ukraine’s National Guard reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced-platoon sized Russian mechanized assault of four MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) and a tank in the Kupyansk direction.[48]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[49]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 19 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on August 18 and 19.[50]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized over half of the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[51]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Karpivka and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Zelena Dolyna, Ridkodub, and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske, Zarichne, Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and Hryhorivka and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 18 and 19.[52]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces have concentrated large numbers of manpower in this direction and are constantly conducting highly attritional small infantry group attacks ranging in size from two to four personnel and leveraging large numbers of Lancet, Molniya, and Cube (or “Kub”)-type drones.[53] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are leveraging large numbers of personnel to assault and attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines but that these personnel are often poorly trained, financially motivated recruits.[54] The spokesperson attributed Russian forces’ ability to maintain positions along the frontline in the Lyman direction to a numerical, rather than quality, advantage in manpower. The spokesperson also noted that Russian forces are attempting to concentrate armored vehicles in hidden positions, possibly in preparation for renewed mechanized assault attempts in the Lyman direction.[55]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Yampil.[56]The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on August 19 that SBU drones struck two Russian ammunition depots in Bilokurakyne, Luhansk Oblast, overnight on August 18 to 19.[57] The SBU stated that the depots are located along a railway branch leveraged by the Russian military command to supply materiel to Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[58]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 19 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the north (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets river toward Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) in order to support efforts to envelop Siversk in a semicircle.[59]Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 18 and 19.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[61]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 18 that Russian forces recently advanced to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal east of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[62]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Maiske (northwest of Chasiv Yar), within Mykolaivka (west of Chasiv Yar), south of Stupochky, southeast of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar), and into southeastern Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[63]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself, northwest of Chasiv Yar toward Virolyubivka, west of Chasiv Yar within Mykolaivka and toward Stinky, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky on August 18 and 19.[64]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[65] Artillery elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[66]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Poltavka (northwest of Toretsk).[67]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, and Stepanivka, and toward Berestok, Pleshchiivka, and Nelipivka on August 18 and 19.[68]Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated on August 19 that Russian forces conducted ten FAB-250 unguided glide bomb strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, damaging residential and administration buildings and a school.[69]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August 19 that Russian forces in this direction have suffered heavy losses over the past year of fighting.[70] The spokesperson added that Russian forces in the Toretsk direction recently began leveraging unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for logistical support but are deploying the UGVs under infantry escort, making the transports vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes. Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Hrodivka.[71]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Dorozhnie, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Myrnohrad, Vesele, Sukhetske, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, Udachne, and toward Molodetske and Novopidhorne on August 18 and 19.[72] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayak.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Sofiivka, and Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk).[74]A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to accumulate forces in this direction and constantly launch large numbers of camouflaged small infantry group assaults in ongoing attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian positions and observation posts, but that Ukrainian drones are repelling them.[75]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[76]Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 19 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces cleared elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and elements of an unspecified 229th Regiment (unidentified – possibly a typo in reference to the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 90th Tank Division) from a 2.5-kilometer section of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border area near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka).[77] Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka, south of Novopavlivka near Zirka and toward Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Hrushivske on August 18 and 19.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Filiya.[79]A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that the majority of Udachne is now a contested “gray zone.”[80]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near the Dnipropetrovsk border area in the Novopavlivka direction.[81] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[82]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the settlement. [83]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Zelenyi Hai (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[84]Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelenyi Hai and toward Ivanivka; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Novodaryvika, Maliivka, and Vilne Pole and toward Komyshuvakha on August 18 and 19.[85]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vorone and Novoselivka (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[86] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Novoselivka.[87]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 19 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Novopil, Novodarivka, Olhivske, and Zelene Pole and toward Novoivanivka and Novohryhorivka on August 19.[88]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[89] Drone operators of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[90]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 19 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Kamyanske on August 18 and 19.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 19 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Stepnohirsk.[92]Geolocated footage published on August 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian fuel train west of occupied Tokmak (south of Orikhiv), setting several fuel tanks on fire.[93] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that elements of the Ukrainian National Guard, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), and two Ukrainian brigades coordinated the strike.[94]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) strikes against Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv,Novoandriivka, and Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[95] Elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and artillery elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[96] Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 19 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge, southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island, and southwest of Kherson City near Dniprovske, on August 18 and 19.[97]A Russian milblogger reported on August 19 that Russian forces have been striking Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (northeast of Kherson City) and other areas on the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast for a several weeks and that this area is a potential zone of interest for Russian forces.[98]A Ukrainian open-source intelligence channel posted satellite imagery on August 19 showing a damaged Russian Kasta-2E2 mobile radar system near Khutorok, occupied Crimea, following a Ukrainian drone strike on the radar system at an unspecified time between August 6 and 11.[99]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and occupied Crimea; five Kh-101 cruise missiles from strategic bombers over the Caspian Sea; and 270 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[100] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 230 drones, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and four Kh-101 cruise missiles and that four missiles and 40 drones struck 16 locations in Ukraine and debris fell in three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Poltava oblasts and that two Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, killing three civilians and injured 36.[101]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on August 18 that elements of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense arrived in Russia to participate in missile launches, anti-air operations, and aerial combat exercises at the Ashuluk Training Ground in Ashuluk, Astrakhan Oblast, ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in September 2025.[102]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://t.me/severnnyi/4863  [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332193[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/77789[47] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsDU2Y76iyk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/zupynyayutsya-na-bazi-shhob-vony-ohololy-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorozhi-shturmovyky-nakopychuyutsya-v-posadkah/[48] https://t.me/Pivnenko_NGU/3000; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15889[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/16526[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32669[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32669[53] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/ukrayinski-vijskovi-rozpovily-yak-nyshhat-pryhovani-tanky-okupantiv/[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/zbroya-lyshe-na-specztochkah-pered-shturmom-rosijski-komandyry-boyatsya-zavchasno-sporyadzhaty-soldativ/[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/ukrayinski-vijskovi-rozpovily-yak-nyshhat-pryhovani-tanky-okupantiv/[56] https://t.me/Sinkovka_Kupyansk/13662; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41059[57] https://t.me/SBUkr/15606; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1094172-droni-sbu-znisili-sklad-boepripasiv-rf-na-lugansini/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/drony-sbu-urazyly-dva-sklady-z-bo%d1%8dprypasamy-na-luganshhyni-pozhezhu-bulo-vydno-z-kosmosu/[58] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@38.75,49.54,14.00z[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32669[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41094[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41094[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[63] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/17652; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176528; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66801; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41057 [64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/dva_majors/77789; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66801[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32642 [66] https://t.me/dva_majors/77833[67] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9821; https://t.me/bbs117_army/77; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1957585926424785061[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66801[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1094122-okupanti-zavdali-10-udariv-po-kostantinivci-zrujnovano-skolu-ta-adminbudivlu/[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsDU2Y76iyk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/vidpravlyayutsya-do-lyuczyfera-u-toreczku-okupanty-prodovzhuyut-zaznavaty-kolosalnyh-vtrat/[71] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1957648300678828076; https://t [dot] me/frontline_pvt/10652[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66800; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsDU2Y76iyk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/komanduvannya-okupantiv-vvelo-yih-v-omanu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-prodovzhuyut-likvidovuvaty-rosijskyj-proryv/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176481; https://t.me/yurasumy/24385[73] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2929[74] https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66800[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/kamuflyuyut-sebe-i-peresuvayutsya-nepomitnymy-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-haotychno-jdut-vpered/[76] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14191[77] https://t.me/skala425/646; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q61eVkGsgqI; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-polk-skala-vidkynuv-rosiyan-na-3-kilometry/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/ye-poloneni-skala-provela-uspishnu-nastupalnu-operacziyu-vidkynuvshy-voroga-vid-dnipropetrovshhyny/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22227  [78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32656[80] https://t.me/rybar/72922[81] https://t.me/wargonzo/28613[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/16522[83] https://t.me/ZSU_141OMBr/1189; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1957494465536618942[84] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32656[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921; https://t.me/wargonzo/28599[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16522 [87]  https://t.me/voin_dv/16521[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15921   [89] https://t.me/voin_dv/16523[90] https://t.me/voin_dv/16529[91] https://t.me/wargonzo/28599; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12866; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979; https://t.me/dva_majors/77789[92] https://t.me/wargonzo/28599[93] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1957719844599800116; https:// t [dot] co/ophxbYhShZ; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1957718876055080960  https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/686; [94] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22231; https://t.me/andriyshTime/42133; https://t.me/andriyshTime/42136 ; https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/686 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/42153 ; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6479 [95] https://t.me/dva_majors/77769[96] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32642;   https://t.me/mod_russia/55701[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28016; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27981 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12866; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27979 [98] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28325; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28326; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28329; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28332; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28335 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28338[99] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11935 [100] https://t.me/kpszsu/40676[101] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1094130-armia-rf-pocilila-sahedami-po-navcalnomu-zakladu-na-dnipropetrovsini-poskodzeni-kabineti-zrujnovani-zali/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/rosijskyj-udar-po-shkoli-na-dnipropetrovshhyni-vogon-ohopyv-budivlyu/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/48109; https://www.facebook.com/share/r/15t6TEBWPC/?mibextid=wwXIfr; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/vorog-vdaryv-raketamy-iskander-m-po-slov%ca%bcyansku; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1093686-armia-rf-atakuvala-slovansk-dvoma-iskanderami-e-poranena/ ; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/23516; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/rosiya-atakuvala-chernigivshhynu-poshkodzhena-infrastruktura/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1093716-rosia-atakuvala-lozivsku-gromadu-na-harkivsini-cetvero-ludej-postrazdali/; https://t.me/synegubov/16628; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/25666; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/19/vijska-rf-masovano-atakuvaly-poltavshhynu/; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1092914-armia-rf-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni-10/?anchor=live_1755504356&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps;  https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1092914-armia-rf-atakuvala-zaporizza-e-poraneni-10/?anchor=live_1755600721&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23985 [102] https://t.me/belta_telegramm/329888; https://belta dot by/society/view/voennosluzhaschie-vvs-i-vojsk-pvo-belarusi-pribyli-v-rf-dlja-uchastija-v-operativno-takticheskom-732614-2025/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, August 19, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 6:07am

Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, Ben Schmida, Katherine Wells, William Doran, Ria Reddy, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A source close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided into two “camps,” with the first in support of challenging US objections to the PMF and the latter concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq.[1] The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[3] This report of Shia Coordination Framework divisions comes amid a broader debate within Iraq about limiting the transfer of arms to the Iraqi state and efforts by Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[4] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, which the Iraqi Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures, like the al Muhandis General Company, as part of the Iraqi government.[5] This company is controlled by Iranian-backed factions and acquired land along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border that Iraqi groups used to launch drones targeting Saudi Arabia.[6] The law nominally subordinates the PMF to the defense minister via the head of the future Popular Mobilization Authority, but the PMF has officially answered to the prime minister since 2016 without answering to the prime minister in reality.[7] The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the law.[8] The Shia Coordination Framework source did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties support challenging US pressure to dissolve the PMF, but many Shia Coordination Framework parties with affiliated armed groups likely support passing the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[9] Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri and Asaib Ahl al Haq’s Sadiqoun bloc have expressed willingness to wear the PMF uniform during the next Parliament session to induce a vote on the PMF law.[10] CTP-ISW assessed on July 16 that some Iraqi parliamentarians, including Shia Coordination Framework-aligned Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi, have previously threatened to remove Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, likely in an effort to force Mashhadani to put the law on the Parliamentary agenda.[11] Mashhadani has so far not placed the law on the agenda for a vote.  Over 120 parliamentarians submitted a petition on August 5 to amend the agenda for the August 5 parliament session to include a vote on the law.[12] Mandalawi, the deputy speaker, chaired the session, which ended early due to a lack of quorum.[13] Mashhadani accused Mandalawi of violating the Parliamentary bylaws by chairing the session and called the session invalid.[14] Parliament reportedly did not discuss the law during the session.[15]There is domestic opposition to the law among Kurdish and Sunni parties. Parliament read the law for a second time on July 16, but Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians left parliament to protest the law because it was raised without prior ”political consensus” or discussion in committee.[16] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[17]Iraqi media similarly did not specify which Shia Coordination Framework parties are concerned about the threat of US sanctions or military action in response to US pressure to dissolve the PMF.[18] Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein stated in a recent interview that he objected to the “timing” of the Iraqi Parliament’s efforts to pass the law.[19] Hussein emphasized the importance of convincing Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to disarm rather than forcing them to do so, however. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, some of which refuse to disarm before the return of the ”mahdi,” are very unlikely to be ”convinced” to disarm.[20] A State of Law Coalition parliamentarian and member of the Shia Coordination Framework separately told Iraqi media on August 7 that unspecified actors submitted a proposal to Mashhadani to postpone the approval of the law until after the elections to allow time for discussion with the United States about the law’s ”controversial provisions.”[21] Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[22]Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically.[23] The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands.[24] This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.[25] Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[26] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability.[27] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda.[28] Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.[29]The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction.[30] This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to decrease support for Hezbollah. Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber announced on August 13 that the Lebanese cabinet authorized him to sign the agreement, which the World Bank previously approved in June 2025.[31] The loan agreement is dedicated to rebuilding infrastructure and clearing the remaining rubble in Lebanon from Israeli operations since September 2024.[32] Lebanon has reportedly received an initial installment of 75 million euros from France and 20 million USD from Iraq, which the Lebanese Finance Ministry has started to allocate to reconstruction efforts in Beirut’s southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, which were heavily damaged during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon.[33] The 250 million USD loan will serve as the initial funding for a 1 billion USD financing program that aims to launch reconstruction and recovery efforts in Lebanon.[34] International organizations and entities will reportedly provide the remaining 750 million dollars in grants.[35] The Lebanese Parliament will vote on the loan in early September 2025.[36]The Lebanese government has taken early steps to begin reconstruction in Lebanon following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024. The Lebanese government has secured several foreign donations, appointed individuals to focus on reconstruction efforts, started clearing debris, and taken steps to reform government policies to address corruption and economic issues that may deter foreign investors.[37] Hezbollah previously led such reconstruction efforts and provided a social safety net for the Lebanese population after the 2006 war, but Hezbollah has recently struggled to reconstruct damaged infrastructure following the conflict in late 2024.[38] Hezbollah has similarly struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters, which has contributed to growing frustration among Hezbollah supporters.[39] Frustrated Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds to rebuild businesses and homes destroyed in the war.[40] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation to those who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[41] The Lebanese government’s recent reconstruction efforts amid growing frustration among Hezbollah’s Shia support base could weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base. These efforts will need to be sustained to be successful, however. Key TakeawaysIraqi Domestic Politics: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.Iranian Internal Fissures: Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West.Lebanon’s Reconstruction: The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction. This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base.IranIranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Armenian officials in Yerevan, Armenia, on August 19 to discuss concerns about the US proposal to oversee a transit corridor in the southern Caucasus.[42] Pezeshkian emphasized Iran’s concerns about ”the presence of third-party forces” near the Iran-Armenia border during his meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.[43] Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a declaration of intent on August 8 for a US-brokered peace deal that grants the United States exclusive development rights to a 27-mile corridor through southern Armenia that connects Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region. Senior Iranian officials have strongly criticized the proposal due to Iranian fears that its adversaries and competitors could use the transit corridor to undermine Iranian security and economic interests. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee visited Iran’s northwestern border on August 19 to ”ensure decisions reflect national security interests.”[44]Iranian officials emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral relations with Armenia during the visit, likely as part of a broader Iranian effort to try to hedge against future US influence in the region.[45] Iranian ministers signed ten memorandums of understanding (MOU) focused on bilateral trade and transportation relations.[46] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 19 that Iran and Armenia agreed to finalize a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement soon.[47] Iranian Minister of Transport and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh discussed the reopening of the Jolfa–Yerevan–Georgia rail link with the Armenian territorial administration minister and mentioned the role the link could play in boosting regional transit.[48]IraqIranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya spokesperson Adel Garawi told Iraqi media on August 18 that Israel may attack Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, which suggests that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias continue to fear imminent Israeli attacks in Iraq.[49] Garawi did not provide further details. Israel last struck PMF bases in Iraq in 2019, but there have been unexplained explosions in Iraq since then.[50] An Israeli airstrike killed a senior member of the Iranian-backed Iraq militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada (KSS) on the Iran-Iraq border on June 21.[51]SyriaSyrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack in Paris on August 19.[52] The meeting focused on security arrangements for the Israel-Syria border, which includes an Israeli proposal to establish a humanitarian aid corridor spanning over 40 miles from the Israeli border to Suwayda City, according to Israeli media.[53] Barrack, Dermer, and Shaibani previously met during US-brokered peace talks in Paris on July 24 after Israel conducted airstrikes in Syria in response to intercommunal violence in Suwayda.[54] Israeli officials said that the Israeli government seeks to deliver humanitarian supplies to the Suwaydawi Druze population.[55]Arabian PeninsulaThe Houthis continued to conduct repairs at Hudaydah Port after Israeli airstrikes damaged the port between May and July.[56] Commercially available satellite imagery captured between August 2 and 16 showed that the Houthis filled in craters at berth six and between berth four and five at Hudaydah Port. Satellite imagery from August 15 showed that the Houthis had moved containers near the filled-in crater between berth four and five. A Yemen analyst reported that only berths four and six were fully operational, while berth eight was partially operational.[57] Local sources reported that the Houthis were filling in the craters so that they could resume shipping operations at the port.[58] Commercially available maritime data confirmed that several cargo ships and oil tankers arrived at Houthi-controlled ports in June and July.[59]Palestinian Territories and LebanonNeither Israel nor Lebanon has changed its position on the timeline for disarming Hezbollah, which could further delay the implementation of the US disarmament plan. Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri told Qatari media on August 18 that the Lebanese government would not be bound to its responsibilities outlined in the US proposal if Israel does not commit to the proposal.[60] Mitri noted that the Lebanese government would not implement the US plan to disarm Hezbollah until Israel commits to ending its military operations in Lebanon.[61] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun similarly told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[62] Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[63] Israel previously rejected Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all airstrikes in Lebanon before the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[64] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack told Lebanese reporters after he met with Aoun on August 18 that the United States has discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[65] Barrack suggested that Israel would take unspecified ”steps“ in the coming weeks.[66] Barrack did not make clear whether the steps would be the steps outlined in the proposal.The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussed on August 18 a French resolution to extend the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)’s mandate until August 31, 2026.[67] The UNSC is expected to vote on the proposed resolution on August 25.[68] UNIFIL, which patrols Lebanon’s southern border, operates under an annually renewed mandate that is set to expire on August 31, 2025.[69] The French resolution reportedly states that the UNSC would indicate its intention to gradually withdraw UNIFIL forces from Lebanon with the aim of making the Lebanese government the sole security provider in southern Lebanon.[70] This intention is contingent upon the Lebanese government’s full control of all Lebanese territory and that all parties agree on an unspecified comprehensive political arrangement.[71] Unspecified US officials noted that the draft resolution includes a one-year extension of UNIFIL’s mandate, followed by a withdrawal period of six months.[72] A previous extension resolution from August 2024 notably did not include any details about UNIFIL’s withdrawal.[73]Lebanese and European officials have supported extending UNIFIL’s mandate, while Israel and the United States have expressed reservations about the resolution.[74] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar reportedly recently sent a letter to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio opposing the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, arguing that UNIFIL has failed its core mission.[75] US officials stated that the United States would require the resolution to explicitly identify a date for UNIFIL’s withdrawal.[76] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met with UNIFIL Commander Major General Diodato Abagnara on August 19 to express his support for renewing UNIFIL’s mandate.[77] Aoun reportedly told Abagnara that Lebanon needs UNIFIL to help maintain security and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)’s deployment to southern Lebanon.[78] UNIFIL’s presence and familiarity with southern Lebanon may be needed to conduct a successful relief-in-place/transfer of authority in southern Lebanon.[79] UNIFIL has largely failed to undertake the tasks given to it under its mandate. UNIFIL is present in southern Lebanon to monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 1701 and to “take all necessary action” to prevent the area from being used for hostile activities, which would include Hezbollah‘s extensive development of military infrastructure.[80] UNIFIL has previously taken only rare and very limited steps to degrade Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon.[81] [1] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/[2] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[4] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate072825 ; 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https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240224-.html[14] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240256-.html[15] https://www.mawazin dot net/Details.aspx?jimare=264687 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86[16] https://en.964media dot com/38210/[17] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820257[18] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/[19] https://almadapaper dot net/411192/[20] https://shafaq dot com/en/Security/Iraq-s-Kataib-Hezbollah-rejects-disarmament-Weapons-for-Imam-Mahdi[21] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/07082025[22] https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraq-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly[23] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-report?id=60940[24] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/others-report?id=60940 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2025 ;https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60355[25] https://hammihanonline dot ir/بخش-سیاست-18/46601-بیانیه-جبهه-اصلاحات-ایران-تنها-راه-نجات-کشور-تغییر-بازگشت-به-مردم-است[26] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484[27] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379624[28] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6565050/[29] https://kayhan dot ir/fa/news/316751[30] https://x.com/nivcalderon/status/1955679499791552983 ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en[31] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas ; https://www.aljadeed dot tv/news/محليات/541761/معلومات-الجديد-مجلس-الوزراء-فوض-وزير-المال-توقيع-اتفاقية-قرض-مع-البنك[32] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas[33] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/economy/873437/lebanon-to-sign-250-million-reconstruction-loan-with-world-bank-in-com/en[34] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en ; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas[35] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en[36] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en[37] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/25/lebanon-new-us-250-million-project-to-kickstart-the-recovery-and-reconstruction-in-conflict-affected-areas ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/313411-reconstruction-process-to-begin-in-late-2025 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1463993/reconstruction-work-to-begin-in-lebanon-before-the-end-of-the-year-announces-cdr-president.html ; https://www.dw dot com/en/lebanese-strive-to-rebuild-amid-uncertainty-over-ceasefire/a-71005031 ; https://www.newarab dot com/news/lebanon-passes-banking-restructuring-law-key-reform ; https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/873597/250-million-loan-marks-start-of-lebanons-major-reconstruction-effortst/en[38] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024[39] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025[40] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html[41] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/[42] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379612 ; https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/240469[43] https://x.com/drpezeshkian/status/1957744683536552229[44] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6565189[45] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771329[46] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/771329[47] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379645[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/28/3379172[49] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820259[50] https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/american-officials-confirm-israeli-strikes-in-iraq-report-599465[51] https://t.me/Smedia1/1129 ; https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iran/210620253[52] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957839678175850718 [53] https://www.mako dot co dot il/news-world/2025_q3/Article-22396bbfad2c891026.htm?utm_source=AndroidNews12&utm_medium=Share , https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957911747202789653[54] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1957839678175850718 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrian-israeli-officials-discuss-de-escalation-paris-meeting-us-envoy-says-2025-07-24/[55] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack[56] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919435502656053678; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1923386330408521805; https://x.com/tvalmasirah/status/1932309142754205807?s=46&t=nQTab-m77zhUUBSh8E68DQ; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1941972900321362343; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1947208668241375573  [57] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1957532144131273176[58] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/5170728-أنشطة-عسكرية-وحشود-حوثية-متسارعة-في-الحديدة [59] Starboard Maritime Intelligence. Available by subscription at https://www.starboardintelligence.com/[60] https://www.alaraby dot com/news/نائب-رئيس-الحكومة-اللبناني-لـالعربي-لم-نتلق-ضمانات-حتى-اليوم[61] https://www.alaraby dot com/news/نائب-رئيس-الحكومة-اللبناني-لـالعربي-لم-نتلق-ضمانات-حتى-اليوم)[62] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957111439585333565[63] https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2603593/amp[64] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-pressures-lebanon-issue-cabinet-decision-disarm-hezbollah-before-talks-2025-07-29/[65] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/ ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-us-envoy-hezbollah-barrack-fe54aba5e9614b77b6b7b19438bae815 ; https://ca.news.yahoo.com/u-envoy-israel-must-comply-153049688.html[66] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/08/18/اهتمام-اميركي-مزدوج-بلبنان-جدول-زمني-لسحب-السلاح-وتقليص-اليونيفيل-[67] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623[68] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/[69] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/[72] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623[73] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4060205?v=pdf ; https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15801.doc.htm[74] https://apnews.com/article/un-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-israel-trump-f11b5b48425de7a7c5c91978319b9623[75] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/ ; https://www.israelhayom dot com/2025/08/19/israel-takes-official-step-to-end-un-mission-in-southern-lebanon/[76] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-starts-talks-fate-peacekeeping-force-lebanon-2025-08-18/ ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-security-council-begins-debates-to-extend-unifil-mission-in-lebanon/[77] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957696111860158672[78] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314775-aoun-stresses-importance-of-unifil-s-presence-in-south[79] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2025-07/lebanon-33.php ;[80] https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate[81] https://x.com/EtatMajorFR/status/1953394699680501817

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, August 18, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 5:11am

Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Nidal Morrison, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.Syrian security forces told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others are likely part of an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender to the transitional government.[1] The Syrian security sources told Emirati media that the MoD has assembled 50,000 troops near the city of Palmyra, Homs Province, to capture Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces with support from local Arab tribes if the SDF refuses to hand over these provinces to the transitional government by October 2025.[2] A separate Syrian source said that the MoD is preparing staging grounds for the offensive in Rusafa, Raqqa Province, and Sukhnah, Homs Province, which are around 166 kilometers northeast and 70 kilometers northeast of Palmyra, respectively.[3]It is unlikely that the Syrian transitional government is preparing for a major offensive at this time. Local Syrians would almost certainly observe and publicize the movements of 50,000 personnel. The much smaller mobilizations towards the Syrian coast in March 2025 and southwestern Syria in July 2025 garnered significant media attention both within Syria and in the West. Satellite imagery shows no prepared staging areas in any of the locations mentioned by the sources. Some of the locations make little military sense as staging areas, moreover. Sukhnah is a less optimal staging area for a major offensive against the SDF compared to other areas closer to the Euphrates River. Deir ez Zor City and its surroundings have a significant amount of military infrastructure left over from the Assad regime, including Deir ez Zor Airport, which would be far more suitable than the remote desert town of Sukhnah.[4] Sukhnah is also 135km by road from Deir ez Zor City, and any force staged in Sukhnah would need to travel 135km to reach its point of departure. Palmyra is even further to the west. Forces travelling from the staging grounds to the point of departure would also have to travel to areas frequently attacked by small ISIS cells. These cells could not stop a large Syrian force, but they could disrupt the movement and make an already challenging operation even more complex.Rusafa presents a more viable staging ground for the MoD than Sukhnah. MoD forces in Rusafa would be positioned at the rear of SDF forces based in Deir Hafer and could try to cut off the ground line of communication between Deir Hafer and SDF-controlled Raqqa Province. Rusafa is located 26 kilometers south of two hydroelectric dams controlled by the SDF. The MoD would have to capture these towns in order to stage an assault to capture Raqqa City. An unspecified source told Emirati media that newly-integrated Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) units would advance on SDF positions near Tishreen Dam, which is located northeast of Deir Hafer.[5] This force would be canalized by the Tishreen Dam crossing, the eastern side of which is surely guarded by SDF units. Tishreen Dam is the only intact Euphrates River crossing between Lake Assad and the Turkish border.This report comes amid similar reports in Turkish media that Turkey and the Syrian transitional government are preparing for an offensive against the SDF. Turkish media recently claimed on August 14 that a joint offensive by Turkey and the Syrian government against the SDF is imminent.[6] These reports likely seek to pressure the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state and surrender its territory by threatening a military operation against it. An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025.[7] A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”[8] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining forces would withdraw by the end of 2026.[9] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have repeatedly threatened to attack US forces if the United States postpones its military withdrawal from Iraq.[10] Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18.[11] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun told Barrack that Israel and Syria must commit to the contents of the US proposal, which the Lebanese government approved on August 7.[12] Aoun told Saudi media on August 17 that the US proposal will not become effective until all relevant parties approve it.[13] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam separately told Barrack that the United States must fulfill its responsibilities by pressuring Israel to cease hostilities, withdraw from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon, and release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.[14] Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri similarly called on Israel to commit to the proposal during his meeting with Barrack.[15] Barrack told Lebanese reporters following his meeting with Aoun that the United States has discussed the potential for a long-term ceasefire with Israel but has not shared the Hezbollah disarmament proposal with Israel.[16] Barrack suggested that Israel would take unspecified steps in the coming weeks.[17]Barrack also reportedly told Aoun that Syria has not responded to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[18] The US proposal includes provisions to increase joint Lebanese-Syrian border operations and demarcate unspecified areas of the Lebanon-Syria border.[19] Lebanese and Syrian officials signed an agreement in March 2025 to demarcate the border and increase border security coordination.[20] Lebanese officials have recently expressed willingness to discuss issues with Syrian officials that have complicated relations between the two countries, including the issue of imprisoned and displaced Syrians in Lebanon.[21] The Syrian government has consistently called on the Lebanese government to release Syrian prisoners and allow them to serve their sentence in Syria, but Lebanese judicial officials have denied these requests.[22]Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed.[23] Israel previously rejected Berri’s July 2025 demand that Israel halt all airstrikes in Lebanon prior to the Lebanese government’s disarmament of Hezbollah.[24] An unspecified Israeli official told Saudi media on August 18 that Israel will “play its part” in the US proposal when Lebanon takes unspecified “concrete steps.”[25] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) recently shifted to a “forward defense” posture on August 1 to maintain Israel’s “strategic superiority” in southern Lebanon and prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting capabilities that could pose a threat to northern Israeli towns.[26] Recent IDF operations, including ground raids, airstrikes, and drone strikes, demonstrate this posture shift.[27] The IDF had a similar objective in its campaign against Hezbollah in late 2024 due to Israel’s concern about a potential Hezbollah ground incursion into northern Israel.[28] The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement in November 2024 included an addendum that ensures the Israeli right to self-defense against any future threat that Hezbollah may pose.[29] The IDF has acted on this addendum and has continued to operate against Hezbollah since November 2024, including via airstrikes and raids targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.[30]Hezbollah would likely use any delay in the implementation of the US disarmament plan to reconstitute its forces, increase its weapons stockpiles, and bolster its domestic support base, which would increase Hezbollah’s relative strength vis-à-vis the Lebanese government and thus make it more challenging for the government to disarm Hezbollah. Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah began appointing new commanders to reconstitute its command structure.[31] Hezbollah reportedly began prioritizing domestic drone production in June 2025 to reduce its reliance on Iranian weapons.[32] The IDF destroyed approximately 70 percent of the drones of Hezbollah’s primary aerial unit, Unit 127, during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[33] Hezbollah is also restructuring its financial system to confront challenges to its ability to pay salaries and provide services to Lebanese civilians.[34] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[35] These actions highlight how Hezbollah is actively trying to reconstitute itself as a military organization and maintain its domestic support base. Any delay in the implementation of the US proposal would give Hezbollah more time to try to achieve these objectives.Key TakeawaysTurkish Pressure Campaign: Syrian security sources told Emirati media on August 16 that the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is preparing a three-pronged offensive to seize Raqqa and Deir ez Zor provinces. This report and others appear to be an effort by Turkey and some elements of the Syrian transitional government to coerce the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to surrender.US Withdrawal from Iraq: An adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani announced on August 17 that US forces will withdraw from Ain al Asad Airbase and Baghdad International Airport in September 2025. A spokesperson for the US Embassy in Baghdad separately told Iraqi media on August 18 that the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq will transition to a “more traditional bilateral security partnership.”Hezbollah Disarmament: Senior Lebanese officials called on the United States to pressure Israel and Syria to agree to the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah during US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s visit to Beirut on August 18. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed.Iran The Iranian Reformist Front issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, which highlights how reformists in the Iranian regime may feel emboldened in the post-war environment to call for change.[36] The statement warned that Iran’s fragile economy and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions could cause Iran to enter a deeper economic crisis.[37] The Reformist Front outlined eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, freeing political prisoners, excluding the armed forces from non-military fields, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight in exchange for sanctions relief.[38] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency condemned the statement on August 18, criticizing the Reformist Front’s call to suspend uranium enrichment and accusing reformists of pursuing policies that weaken Iran in favor of Iran’s adversaries.[39] The Reformist Front statement comes after former President Hassan Rouhani urged the regime on August 13 to implement reforms, ease tensions with the West, and limit the Iranian armed forces’ involvement in politics and the economy.[40] Rouhani framed the post-war period as an opportunity to restore public trust and recalibrate Iran’s trajectory.[41] The emergence of reformist and moderate elements in the Iranian regime likely reflects a political opening created by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s absence from the public view and the loss of hardliner leadership during the Israel-Iran War.[42]Iranian security forces raided a house near Enghelab Square in central Tehran on August 17, where unspecified individuals were reportedly constructing drones for Mossad.[43] Iranian security forces seized several drones during the raid [44] This incident highlights Iranian officials’ heightened concern about Israeli infiltration following the Israel-Iran War.[45] Israel clandestinely built a one-way attack drone base in Iran that it used to strike Iranian ballistic missile launchers at the beginning of the war.[46] This operation hindered Iran’s ability to immediately respond to Israel.[47]Iranian security forces continue to conduct counterterrorism operations against Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl in Sistan and Baluchistan Province, southeastern Iran.[48] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces Quds Operational Base dismantled two Jaish al Adl cells in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 17.[49] The Quds Operational Base stated that it killed six fighters, detained an unspecified number of others, and seized 25 kilograms of explosives and other military equipment during an operation in Chabahar.[50] The IRGC Ground Forces separately dismantled a safe house and killed several armed militants in northern Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[51] These operations came after Jaish al Adl fighters shot at a vehicle in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 15, killing an Iranian Law Enforcement Command (LEC) officer and wounding another.[52] Senior Iranian security officials have recently met with Pakistani officials to discuss how to address Jaish al Adl attacks.[53]IraqThe Iraqi Accountability and Justice Commission is investigating Shia Coordination Framework electoral candidates for alleged ties to the Baath Party, according to leaked documents published in Iraqi media on August 18.[54] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The Accountability and Justice Commission is reportedly investigating between 250 and 400 candidates. The candidates represent “most” Shia Coordination Framework parties.[55] Iraqi media noted that the individuals under investigation include a senior official of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada in Kirkuk Province, Bassem Ghazi al Amerli. This report comes after State of Law Coalition head and former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki emphasized on August 8 the need for the Accountability and Justice Commission to take action against Baathists.[56] Shia political parties have long manipulated the Accountability and Justice Commission to target political opponents.[57] The commission has barred several candidates in recent months from competing in the November 2025 parliamentary elections due to alleged Baathist ties.[58]An unidentified Iraqi official told Fox News on August 14 that US Treasury Department officials pressured Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein in March 2025 to prevent Iraq’s largest bank from engaging in financial transactions with the Houthis.[59] The US officials called for the Sanaa branch of Rafidain Bank to relocate to internationally recognized Yemeni government-controlled territory. The Iraqi Embassy in Washington, DC, denied the Fox News report and claimed that Rafidain Bank has not operated in Sanaa since 2017.[60] The Fox News report comes as Rafidain Bank signed a “professional partnership agreement” with US-based financial consulting firm K2 Integrity on August 15 to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[61] The Iraqi federal government has previously used Rafidain Bank to process and distribute salaries to members of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[62] Iraqi media reported in July 2025 that US pressure on Rafidain Bank caused a multi-week delay in the distribution of PMF salaries in June 2025.[63]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have historically exploited loopholes within the Iraqi financial system to commit fraud and obtain funds to support Iranian and militia operations, including attacks on US forces and allies.[64]Sunni Azm Alliance head Muthanna al Samarrai discussed cooperation between “political forces” with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) head Masoud Barzani on August 16.[65] Samarrai and Barzani’s meeting is notable given that these parties allied following the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[66] This meeting follows Samarrai’s request on August 13 for the Iraqi electoral commission to disqualify former Parliament Speaker and Progress Party head Mohammad al Halbousi from competing in the upcoming elections.[67] Samarrai also discussed the elections and “support for the executive parties” with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on August 15.[68]SyriaThe General Security Service (GSS) arrested an MoD member whom the Syrian National Inquiry Commission accused of involvement in the March 2025 coastal massacres.[69] This arrest marks the Syrian transitional government’s first publicized arrest of an MoD member for their involvement in the atrocities on the Syrian coast.[70] The Syrian National Inquiry Commission referred 298 individuals to the Syrian judiciary on July 22 for their attacks on Alawite civilians in March.[71] The Syrian judiciary must prosecute, try, and punish the individuals involved in atrocities against Alawites in order to be able to rebuild minority trust in the government.Arabian Peninsula The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Navy struck the Houthi-controlled Hezyaz Power Station, south of Sanaa City, on August 16 in response to Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting Israeli civilian and military sites.[72] The IDF Navy struck a generator at one of the power station’s three production units, damaging the unit, according to an Israeli open-source analyst.[73] The IDF previously targeted the Hezyaz Power Station in December 2024 and May 2025.[74]The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel on August 17 in response to the Israeli attack on the Hezyaz Power Station.[75] The IDF intercepted the missile outside Israeli territory.[76] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[77]Palestinian Territories and LebanonSee topline section.[1] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/[2] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/[3] https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-11-2024[5] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/16/syria-kurds-hts-sdf-turkey-us/[6] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003[7] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/170820254[8] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7 ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B5-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/us-iraq-deal-would-see-hundreds-troops-withdraw-first-year-sources-say-2024-09-06/       [10] https://t.me/centerkaf/5026   ; https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-iraq-militia-issues-trump-ultimatum-us-troops-2047594[11] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957344935193059790 ; https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1957409055149899827 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/220271[12] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/ ; https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957344935193059790 ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314756-aoun-tells-barrack-israel-and-syria-need-to-commit-to-declaration-paper ;  https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/[13] https://x.com/LBpresidency/status/1957111439585333565[14] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1957409055149899827[15] https://t.me/almanarnews/220271[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-envoy-says-israel-should-comply-with-lebanon-plan-disarm-militant-groups-2025-08-18/ ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-us-envoy-hezbollah-barrack-fe54aba5e9614b77b6b7b19438bae815 ; https://ca.news.yahoo.com/u-envoy-israel-must-comply-153049688.html[17] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/08/18/اهتمام-اميركي-مزدوج-بلبنان-جدول-زمني-لسحب-السلاح-وتقليص-اليونيفيل-[18] https://www.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/باراك-بعد-لقائه-عون--القرار-اللبناني-بشأن-نزع-السلاح-يتطلب-خ[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/[20] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-syria-saudi-arabia-deal-demarcate-border-c9fde4946055a889326c330abb40c6a4[21] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5175986-سلام-لـالشرق-الأوسط-الدولة-اللبنانية-استعادت-قرار-الحرب-والسلم ; 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https://x.com/manniefabian/status/1933455569429357026 ; https://x.com/chawshin_83/status/1933431758160011480 ; https://www.axios.com/2025/06/13/how-israel-executed-strike-iran-nuclear[47] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025[48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/[49] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/[50] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/)[51] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/26/3377860/)[52] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1956451382728269920 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/iranian-policeman-killed-in-clash-in-restive-southeast/[53] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/767425/[54] https://almadapaper dot net/411092/[55] https://almadapaper dot net/411092/;[56] https://aawsat dot com/node/5173233[57] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-14-2024  ; https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2011/12/28/rivals-say-maliki-leading-iraq-to-civil-war[58] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/en/story/854197 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/170820252[59] https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-news-world/iraqi-state-bank-accused-processing-payments-houthi-terrorists-who-disrupt-red-sea-commerce ; https://cosmopolitantdaily.com/blogs/top-banks-in-iraq/#:~:text=Rafidain%20Bank%20remains%20the%20largest%20and%20most%20influential,role%20in%20managing%20government%20deposits%20and%20public-sector%20payrolls.[60] https://www.foxbusiness.com/fox-news-world/iraqi-state-bank-accused-processing-payments-houthi-terrorists-who-disrupt-red-sea-commerce[61] https://www.iraqiembassy dot us/in-the-news/rafidain-bank-signs-professional-partnership-agreement-with-k2-integrity-in-washington[62] https://aawsat dot com/node/5160266[63] (https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/المالية-النيابية-ضغوط-مريكية-تعرقل-صرف-رواتب-الحشد-الشعبي)[64] https://www.facebook.com/cbi.iraq/posts/pfbid0b9PGHoCE4jsrP87RDSymB4cXejuwnm4UnpNdF7t789f1bbC6URXViV7FWnf8NbjNl?__cft__[0]=AZXqnC97zgV9_hzLwM-JSqwF22xlCgATZQT6svfIdeF9YNgeAYuopNCNR8XNxHd_QchfquzH5DnO_rfRLmHVLcrR9lwifFnVCsocDIk7sc_AgrCJz7YBkNpyAQZpyJ57fV8uI2vk7M0ESjOuTDa_f6yUAyHubDi-YyPKBFZ_Z90qgyoFENK7f63YM6TvqCgAnks&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-visa-mastercard-dollars-sanctions-militias-0ecea0b9?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhr1uSTiruOYrGuIWjIIjbRuUW27PFcNXZmCHl0tZaWn1CO6YrhcdUEwk2In9o%3D&gaa_ts=683d80bd&gaa_sig=nk2zUi0FJs_UxUi7rcoM8CjVcuK5W1F4_XeluNzwSsh8gSxEsptAbOH99ab2F_wA-2Iel3qF-FLXKaB8FTIb2w%3D%3D ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2025[65] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/537389/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84[66] https://www.middleeasteye dot net/news/iraq-iran-pressure-sunni-kurdish-leaders-crack-sadr-alliance[67] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/politics/536987/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%91%D9%85-%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7[68] https://baghdadtoday dot news/280978-.html[69] https://x.com/EuphratesPost/status/1956703043811983835[70] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1956725563160146216[71] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025 ; sana dot sy/?p=2251643 ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kaZuGkdTQSM&ab_channel=SyriaTV%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7[72] https://x.com/Almasirahbrk/status/1956923066627314100; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1956957836535054541;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1957108113548394896;https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1957084123354300525; https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1957074975837258124; https://saba dot ye/ar/news3536599.htm[73] https://x.com/BenTzionMacales/status/1957074975837258124[74] https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1919742997958152521; https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1869670576496775558; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1869572738962386975; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1869732085164097786;[75] https://t.me/army21ye/3304[76] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1957070052789719175[77] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php  ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 18, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 3:46am

     Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, Justin Young, Nate Trotter, and George Barros August 18, 2025, 10 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 18, except for reports regarding the August 18 multilateral US-Ukrainian-European meetings in Washington, D.C. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin did not publicly commit to a bilateral or trilateral leader-level meeting, contrary to US President Donald Trump's announcement following the August 18 multilateral summit. Trump stated that he called Russian President Vladimir Putin following the August 18 summit and began to arrange a bilateral meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Putin at an unspecified date and undetermined location.[1] Trump stated that he will meet with Zelensky and Putin in a trilateral meeting at an unspecified time after the bilateral meeting. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov spoke to reporters following the August 18 Trump-Putin call and that Putin and Trump “expressed support for the continuation of direct negotiations between the delegations of Russia and Ukraine” and expressed that "it would be necessary to study the possibility of raising the level of representatives of the Ukrainian and Russian sides" — a far cry from agreeing to leader-level bilateral and trilateral meetings.[2] Zelensky reiterated, following the August 18 summit, that he is ready to meet with Putin unconditionally and that Russia was the first to propose a bilateral Ukrainian-Russian meeting followed by a trilateral meeting with the United States.[3] Zelensky stated that territorial issues are issues that he will leave "between [himself] and Putin."Western leaders reaffirmed the importance of strong security guarantees for Ukraine to ensure a just and lasting peace at the August 18 summit. Trump met with Zelensky at the White House before both joined a meeting with European leaders, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.[4] The leaders discussed security guarantees for ensuring a lasting peace in Ukraine, plans for future meetings between Ukrainian and Russian leaders, and continued NATO and EU support for Ukraine. Trump stated that the meeting went well and that the US and European diplomatic and security support is paving the way for peace in Ukraine and Russia.[5] Zelensky stated that he and Trump agreed to work together on an all-for-all exchange of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian prisoners, and the return of Ukrainian children whom Russia had kidnapped.[6]The Western leaders emphasized the importance of a peace deal and security guarantees that deter further aggression against Ukraine and ensure both Ukrainian and European security.[7] Von der Leyen, Meloni, and Starmer expressed support for Ukrainian security guarantees styled after NATO's Article 5, which obliges member states to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force," in case of aggression against a single member state.[8] Trump stated that his intent is that the unspecified security guarantees for Ukraine will deter future aggression against Ukraine.[9] Trump also verbally stated that the United States will provide some unspecified support for the security guarantees, with European states bearing most of the burden of these guarantees. Trump’s readout of the meeting posted on Truth Social states that “various European countries” would provide the security guarantees and that the United States would provide “coordination” for the guarantees.[10] The US position on American involvement in providing Ukraine security guarantees, therefore, remains unclear. Zelensky stated in a joint press conference with Trump that Ukraine needs security guarantees from its partners as well as resources to keep its military strong, including weapons, training, and intelligence sharing, and that a strong Ukrainian military is itself a security guarantee.[11] Zelensky noted that Ukraine and European partners now have a program to purchase weapons from the United States and that this is part of the guarantee of a strong Ukrainian military.[12]Ukraine reportedly proposed a deal to purchase US weapons and produce Ukrainian drones in exchange for US security guarantees. The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 18 that it obtained a document that Ukraine will promise to purchase $100 billion worth of US weapons with European financing should the United States provide security guarantees, but noted that the document did not specify which weapons Ukraine seeks to purchase.[13] The FT reported that Ukraine also proposed a $50 billion deal to produce drones with Ukrainian companies, but that the documents did not indicate how much of the drone deal would be procurement or investment. The FT cited four people familiar with the matter that these proposals were on a Ukrainian list of talking points shared with European leaders ahead of the August 18 summit.Russian officials largely rejected Europe's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine in a potential peace agreement. Trump stated on August 18 during his meeting with Zelensky and European leaders that Putin stated on August 15 at the Alaska summit that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine as part of a peace agreement.[14] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on August 18 that Russia "categorical[ly] reject[s]" "any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries," however.[15] Zakharova's rejection covers both a formal NATO contingent to a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine as well as contingents from any NATO member state in Ukraine, even if those contingents are not part of a NATO mission. Zakharova's statement is consistent with previous Kremlin statements rejecting the possibility of any NATO member state deploying a military contingent to Ukraine and threatening that Russia would deem any such deployment of forces to Ukraine as legitimate military targets.[16] Trump and other EU officials reiterated that any deployment of peacekeeping forces to Ukraine would not be a formal NATO military contingent.[17] Western leaders expressed support for a ceasefire that may follow a possible future trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin. Trump stated that all the leaders in attendance at the August 18 multilateral summit “would obviously prefer an immediate ceasefire while we work on a lasting peace," but that "as of this moment, it's not happening."[18] Trump stated that he supports a ceasefire because it could stop the casualties "immediately." Merz and Macron also expressed support for Ukraine and Russia to implement a ceasefire either ahead of or following a trilateral Trump-Zelensky Putin meeting.[19] Both Trump stated that both Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin "can talk a little bit more" about a potential ceasefire, presumably in a potential future bilateral or meeting.[20]Russian forces conducted long-range strikes against Ukrainian rear areas that resulted in civilian casualties ahead of the August 18 White House meetings. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Taganrog and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, and Kursk City; and 140 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight on August 17 to 18.[21] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 88 Shahed drones and decoys over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that missiles and drones struck 25 locations in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts.[22] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on August 18 that Russian missile strikes killed three and injured 20 in Zaporizhzhia City.[23] Zelensky also reported that Russian forces struck an Azerbaijani energy facility in Odesa City. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported that Russian missiles and drones damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and killed seven civilians and injured 18.[24] Russian forces conducted combined missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night before and after the Alaska summit on August 15, also inflicting civilian casualties and damaging civilian infrastructure.[25] Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.Russian budgetary constraints are forcing Russia to employ alternative mechanisms to fund enlistment bonus payments and recruit soldiers for its war in Ukraine. Russian opposition media outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on August 18 that data from Russian federal budget expenditures indicate that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) contract recruitment rate fell to a two-year low in the second quarter of 2025.[26] Vazhnye Istorii reported that the Russian MoD made payments to 37,900 people for signing a contract in the second quarter of 2025, but that the Russian MoD made payments to 92,800 people in 2024, a significant decrease. ISW previously observed reports that the Kremlin exceeded its 30-billion-ruble ($381.5 million) 2025 federal budget allocation for contract payments by Summer 2025 and increased its budget allocation to 35.8 billion rubles ($455.3 million).[27] Russia’s recruitment rate likely has not slowed despite the federal recruitment budget’s depletion, however. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on July 2 that the Russian MoD signed over 210,000 contract soldiers, which Vazhnye Istorii noted is 1.6 times higher than what the budget expenditure data reflects.[28] Vazhnye Istorii reported that other research assessed that the MoD secured about 191,000 new contracts using regional budgetary data, suggesting that the Kremlin is using other budgets to finance recruitment.[29] Russian officials are increasingly attempting to circumvent budgetary shortcomings by informally recruiting conscripts, offering additional payments to foreigners, and shifting the financial burden by tapping the budgets of Russian federal subjects (regions) rather than the direct budget of the federal government.[30] Russia’s attempt to place the onus of funding enlistment bonuses on federal subjects represents a cosmetic attempt to obscure the fact that Russia’s finite national wealth is unable to sustain long-term recruitment efforts indefinitely without cutting into other government programs. Increased financial challenges will likely degrade Russia’s overall force generation apparatus. Additional Western sanctions targeting Russian oil revenues will likely exacerbate greater economic challenges that can degrade Russia’s long-term ability to continue its war in Ukraine.[31]Russian forces are struggling to exploit the infiltration in the Dobropillya direction in the face of continued Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 18 that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka) and Dorozhnie — both southwest of Dobropillya — at the very base of the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[32] Geolocated footage published on August 14 and geolocated on August 18 shows Ukrainian servicemembers detaining Russian soldiers along a windbreak southwest of Petrivka (northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces advanced to the area prior to August 14 during the initial infiltration operation.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on August 17 and geolocated on August 18 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces had advanced to the settlement before August 17 and that Ukrainian forces were then able to liberate the area.[34] ISW had previously not coded these settlements as Russian advances on ISW’s maps due to the lack of geolocated evidence of Russian presence in either Petrivka or Zolotyi Kolodyaz.ISW has observed indications that Russian forces are struggling to translate the initial tactical infiltration around Dobropillya into a wider operational-level breakthrough. Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 18 that Ukrainian forces collapsed the Russian salient in the Dobropillya direction by cutting off Russian infiltration elements from main forces, presumably by denying Russian forces the ability to supply and reinforce the infiltration groups at the scale necessary to exploit the infiltration.[35] Mashovets stated elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are attempting to bypass Volodymyrivka (southwest of Dobropillya) from the east in an attempt to threaten the flank of the Ukrainian forces currently threatening elements of the 51st CAA, which are holding a narrow penetration toward Dobropillya between Zapovidne and Novotoretske (southwest of Dobropillya).[36] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advancing on the western side of the penetration are advancing faster than elements of the 8th CAA are advancing east of Volodymyrivka, however. Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th, 110th, and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (all 51st CAA) operating within the penetration are therefore "fracturing" in their efforts to support the base of penetration and can only hold a 2.5 kilometer width of territory within the penetration as a result.[37] A Russian milblogger recently warned that the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya was too narrow relative to its depth and therefore vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction.[38] Russian milbloggers are also notably increasingly discussing the Rodynske direction (north of Pokrovsk and southeast of Dobropillya) as opposed to Dobropillya, indicating that failures to reinforce the initial infiltration are now being reflected in the Russian information space's reporting of the Pokrovsk direction.A Russian servicemember recently murdered a Ukrainian woman in the Pokrovsk direction in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on August 18 that it opened an investigation into a Russian servicemember murdering a Ukrainian woman as she walked on a street near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[39] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that "intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[40] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in Ukraine as part of the wider military modus operandi.[41]Key Takeaways: The Kremlin did not publicly commit to a bilateral or trilateral leader-level meeting, contrary to US President Donald Trump's announcement following the August 18 multilateral summit.Western leaders reaffirmed the importance of strong security guarantees for Ukraine to ensure a just and lasting peace at the August 18 summit. Russian officials largely rejected Europe's proposed security guarantees for Ukraine in a potential peace agreement.Western leaders expressed support for a ceasefire that may follow a possible future trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin.Russian forces conducted long-range strikes against Ukrainian rear areas that resulted in civilian casualties ahead of the August 18 White House meetings.Russian budgetary constraints are forcing Russia to employ alternative mechanisms to fund enlistment bonus payments and recruit soldiers for its war in Ukraine.Russian forces are struggling to exploit the infiltration in the Dobropillya direction in the face of continued Ukrainian counterattacks.A Russian servicemember recently murdered a Ukrainian woman in the Pokrovsk direction in clear violation of international law.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Dobropillya. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continues in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 17 and 18.[42]Russian authorities confirmed that a Ukrainian strike recently seriously injured a senior Russian military commander. Republic of Dagestan Head Sergei Melikov confirmed the Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) August 17 report that Ukrainian forces seriously wounded Russian Northern Group of Forces Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Esedulla Abachev.[43] The GUR reported that Ukrainian strikes against a convoy along the 38K-040 Rylsk-Khomutovka highway in Kursk Oblast on August 16 injured Abachev, requiring an arm and leg amputation.Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Tambov Oblast overnight on August 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 18 that Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces and other Ukrainian forces struck the Nikolskoye oil pumping station in Tambov Oblast.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the strike stopped oil flow through the Druzhba pipeline, which supplies Russian oil from Russia to various locations throughout Europe.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 18 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) elements advanced in Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[45]Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Oleksiivka, and northeast of Sumy City in Yunakivka and near Varachyne on August 17 and 18.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Oleksiivka, Stepove (north of Sumy City), in Yunakivka, and near Varachyne.[47]Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) to another unspecified direction, while limited elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[48] The source reported that this redeployment ended Russian naval infantry forces’ participation in the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces. Elements of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mohrytsia (northeast of Sumy City).[49] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment, 137th Airborne Regiment (106th VDV Division), and the Tiger Drone Detachment (83rd Separate VDV Brigade) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[50]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 18 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on the southern (left)bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) and west of Synelnykove (south of Vovchansk).[51]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on August 17 and 18.[52]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the pro-Russian Chechen Sheikh Mansur volunteer battalion (subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense [MoD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[53]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 18 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on August 18 and 19.[54]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 18 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka, and Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 18 and 19.[55]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 18 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on August 17 and 18.[56]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 18 that elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka and Hrekivka.[57]Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[58] Mashovets reported that Russian forces recently advanced southwestward in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[59]Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets claimed that Ukrainian forces recently eliminated Russian forces who infiltrated Ukrainian lines after crossing the Chornyi Zherebets river near Zarichne (east of Lyman).[60]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka and toward Korovyi Yar and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 17 and 18.[61]A Ukrainian brigade operating on the Lyman direction reported on August 18 that Russian forces in this direction have suffered heavy losses in constant assault operations and are increasing their use of small fireteam infiltration tactics.[62] The Ukrainian brigade added that Russian fireteams try to bypass Ukrainian positions to infiltrate the Ukrainian near rear, where survivors of the initial infiltration then use dense foliage and ruined buildings as concealment while waiting for reinforcements. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 18 that Russian forces have failed to make significant advances in the Lyman direction but continue to rely on attritional, infantry-led assaults.[63] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are increasing their usage of drones due to the ineffectiveness of attritional assaults, and are deploying Molniya strike drones along the frontline rather than only in longer-range strikes against Ukrainian logistics.Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Karpivka and Ridkodub.[64] Drone operators of the Russian 236th Artillery Brigade (20th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rubtsi (northwest of Lyman).[65]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 18 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Novoselivka (southeast of Siversk) and west of Ivano-Darivka (southeast of Siversk).[66]Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka and Ivano-Darivka, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 17 and 18.[67]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Ivano-Darivka.[68] Mashovets stated that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 3rd CAA), the 127th Motorized Rifle Brigade (reportedly 3rd CAA), and unspecified motorized rifle regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve are attempting to use infiltration tactics to advance in the Siversk direction. Elements of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Soledar direction (southeast of Siversk).[69]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 18 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Predtechyne on August 18.[70]Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) and 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are operating near the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal southeast of Chasiv Yar.[71] Mashovets stated that the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division is operating in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Kalynivka-Virolyubivka, and northeast of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske. Reconnaissance elements of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) and drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[72] Artillery elements of the 1065th Airborne Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne Division) are reportedly operating west of Chasiv Yar.[73]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Russian forces recently advanced in northern Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk).[74]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Bila Hora; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, Oleskandro-Kalynove, Yablunivka, and Stepanivka, and toward Pleshchiivka and Nelipivka on August 17 and 18.[75] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[76]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian armored assault near Katerynivka.[77]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are operating near Bila Hora.[78] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and the 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are operating near Katerynivka. Mashovets stated that other elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are operating in the Novoolenivka-Rusyn Yar direction and that other elements of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are operating near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that elements of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka (Toretsk) direction.[79]Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced between 200 and 300 meters toward Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk).[80] Mashovets stated that Russian assault groups advanced into northeastern Krasnyi Lyman (north of Pokrovsk) but that Ukrainian forces pushed the Russian forces back out of the settlement. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[81] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Rodynske and Bilytske (both north of Pokrovsk).[82]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Vilne, Ivanivka, and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Dorozhnie, Mayak, and Volodymyrivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar and Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and toward Molodetske on August 17 and 18.[83]The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 17 that Russian forces have accumulated and are using a massive number of drones in the brigade's area of responsibility (AOR) and that Russian forces can launch seven first-person-view (FPV) drones at one section of Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOC) within 10 minutes.[84] The commander reported that Russian forces are constantly changing tactics and attacking on one flank to draw Ukrainian forces to that area and then attacking on the other flank to take advantage of the distraction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to attack in small fireteams in the Pokrovsk direction in attempts to gradually weaken Ukrainian forces and avoid direct frontal assaults.[85]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Udachne; that elements of the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (15th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 2nd CAA) are operating near Zvirove; and that elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, are operating near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman.[86] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the general Pokrovsk direction.[87]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 18 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste, Zirka, Zelenyi Hai, and Hrushivske on August 17 and 18.[88]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 18 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) advanced toward Vilne Pole (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[89] Mashovets stated that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) likely bypassed Maliivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) from the north and south and that Russian forces are advancing at a pace of four to five square kilometers per day in this direction.[90] Mashovets also reported that Russian forces advanced a few kilometers east of Zaporizke (northeast of Hulyaipole) but that Ukrainian forces hold the Zaporizke-Novohrehorivka (northeast of Zaporizke) line.[91]Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Maliivka, and Komyshuvakha on August 17 and 18.[92] Mashovets reported on August 18 that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) and 69th Separate Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are attacking along the Temyrivka — Zaporizke line and the Zelene Pole – Novohrehorivka line (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[93]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are operating near Zelenyi Hai and Andriivka-Klevstove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[94]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 18 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka on August 17 and 18.[95]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 18 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, and Plavni on August 17 and 18.[96]Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on August 18 that Russian forces are using 600 to 700 first-person view (FPV) strike drones and increased monthly artillery usage by 54 percent from 12,000 munitions per month to 19,000 in the Zaporizhia direction.[97] Voloshyn also stated that Russian forces continue to accumulate equipment; are not using armored equipment; and last conducted a mechanized assault near Mali Shcherbaky (southwest of Orikhiv) in the week of August 11.[98]A Ukrainian milblogger published footage on August 17 of Ukrainian FPV drones striking a Russian Barnaul-T air defense command and control (C2) system in Zaporizhia Oblast.[99]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka; artillery elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction; and drone operators of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 69th Separate Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[100] Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 17 and 18, but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge, southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island, and southwest of Kherson City near Dniprovske, on August 17 and 18.[101]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are actively striking areas northeast of Kherson City and near Antonivka with aviation and drones in an effort to prepare a bridgehead on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[102] The milblogger noted that Russian forces are actively demining the coastal areas in preparation for a future offensive in Kherson Oblast and that Russian forces consider any vehicle movements, including civilian vehicles, as legitimate targets. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) struck Ukrainian communications infrastructure northeast of Antonivka with Molniya FPV drones.[103] Geolocated footage published on August 17 reportedly showed Russian forces striking buildings in Korabel Microraion (southwestern Kherson City) and fortified Ukrainian positions northeast of Kherson City.[104]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text for reports of Russian strikes in Ukraine.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich stated on August 17 that Belarusian Air Force elements and pilots will participate in the upcoming Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises.[105] Lukyanovich stated that the main goals for the Belarusian Air Force during the Zapad-2025 exercises will be securing the airspace, but did not disclose which tasks the Belarusian Air Force will practice during the exercises.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/18/rrossiyskie-drony-udarili-po-pyatietazhnomu-zhilomu-domu-v-harkove-pogibli-chetyre-cheloveka-18-postradali; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/2989; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/u-harkovi-zrosla-kilkist-zhertv-unaslidok-udaru-rf/; https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/24483; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/masovani-udary-po-harkovu-sered-zagyblyh-2-richnyj-hlopchyk/[25] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-14-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025[26] https://storage.googleapis dot com/istories/news/2025/08/18/vo-vtorom-kvartale-2025-goda-kontrakt-s-minoboroni-podpisali-379-tis-chelovek-eto-v-25-raza-menshe-chem-god-nazad/index.html[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-18-2025[28] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/02/07/2025/686523b09a7947ca680a6faf[29] https://janiskluge.substack dot com/p/russian-recruitment-the-first-half[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-6-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-23-2025[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425;[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2926[33] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30330; https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/1347[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30327; https://t.me/fenix_3_79/483[35] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/krashhe-ne-pokazuvaty-prystojnomu-tovarystvu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vdalosya-zagasyty-pozhezhu/[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[37] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[38] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625[39] https://www.facebook.com/don.gp.gov.ua/posts/pfbid0UUtA9tAsViWCcXXw2iiZg797LyjYq99XnwiuZDX838AyCGwzTFLiMbJLXtjKv3e9l ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1093344-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-rosijskij-vijskovij-jmovirno-rozstrilav-civilnogo/ ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/kadry-voyennogo-zlochynu-rosijskyj-vijskovyj-stratyv-bezzbrojnogo-czyvilnogo/[40] https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934;[43] https://t.me/melikov05/4096; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84359; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2025[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27978; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/zsu-urazyly-naftoperekachuvalnu-stancziyu-nikolskoye-zupynyvshy-postavky-truboprovodom-druzhba/[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32599[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/28577; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32599; https://t.me/severnnyi/4854[47] https://t.me/rybar/72899; https://t.me/dva_majors/77687; https://t.me/severnnyi/4854; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577; https://t.me/tass_agency/331858[48] https://t.me/severnnyi/4861[49] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32599[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97951; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176349; https://t.me/brigada_83/2206; https://t.me/brigada_83/2217; https://t.me/russian_airborne/11113; https://t.me/voin_dv/16513[51] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32587; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32587; https://t.me/severnnyi/4854[53] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5913[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13869; https://t.me/alehingennadiy/5992; https://t.me/tass_agency/331885[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934[57] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[58] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1957353452666831056 https://t.me/ombr66/1942[59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15854; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577[62] https://t.me/ombr66/1942; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15885[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/uvyazneni-pered-yakymy-klasychnyj-rosijskyj-vybir-poblyzu-lymana-okupanty-zbilshyly-kilkist-atak-dronamy/[64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[65] https://t.me/operationall_space/5822; https://t.me/voin_dv/16506[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32622[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32622; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176360[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2925[72] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14186[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32599[74] https://t.me/motolifeua/1344; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1957146495452663824[75] https://t.me/wargonzo/28577; https://t.me/dva_majors/77687; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15854 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2926[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2926[77] https://t.me/azov_brigade_ngu/446; https://t.me/azov_media/7168; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/bijczi-azovu-ne-daly-rosiyanam-zakripytysya-u-katerynivczi/[78] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2926[79] https://t.me/mod_russia/55674[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[81] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176427[82] https://t.me/tass_agency/331866[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15854 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176427 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25266[84] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092620-bukvalno-za-desat-hvilin-zalitaut-sim-fpv-droniv-rf-komandir-roti-udarnih-bpla-pro-pokrovskij-napramok/ ; https://youtu.be/5WZAGNaN7lU[85] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176427[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176343[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15854[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[90] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2928[91] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15854[93] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[94] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2927[95] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/wargonzo/28577; https://t.me/rybar/72899; https://t.me/dva_majors/77687[97] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-rosiyany-na-54-zbilshyly-limit-vykorystannya-boyeprypasiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0[98] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/18/na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-rosiyany-na-54-zbilshyly-limit-vykorystannya-boyeprypasiv/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/12/bilshist-ne-zmogla-motoczykly-my-tezh-spalyly-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-yaskravo-palyly-vorozhu-bronetehniku/[99] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-drones-hit-module-of-russia-s-rare-barnaul-t-system/; https://t.me/ssternenko/48034[100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32599; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97977 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/42084 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/42086 ; https://t.me/rt_russian/253446; https://t.me/voin_dv/16505; https://t.me/voin_dv/16511; https://t.me/dva_majors/77744[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27977; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27936; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27934[102] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28308; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28300[103] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28301[104] https://t.me/HersonVestnik/42370; https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1957146441861722365; https://x.com/Brokenarrow42/status/1957139557952163920; https://t.me/HersonVestnik/42372[105] https://belta dot by/society/view/belorusskie-voennye-letchiki-primut-uchastie-v-uchenii-zapad-2025-732432-2025/ ; https://t.me/belta_telegramm/329715

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 17, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 1:06am

Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate TrotterAugust 17, 2025, 9:45 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on August 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement.[1] Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered "a couple" of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit, but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal.[2] Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to "be assured" a Russian invasion "never happens again." Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to a year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.[3]Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired.[4] Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force.[6] Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since.[7] Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024.[8] Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.[9]The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast, began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024.[10] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement.[11] It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast, in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far been unsuccessful after more than 18 months.[12]Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas. Russian forces took open areas without any significantly fortified settlements during their recent penetration northeast of Pokrovsk near Dobropillya.[13] Russian forces still have not demonstrated any capability to rapidly seize large, fortified positions, however, as the campaigns for Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have shown.[14] Russian forces are struggling to supply and reinforce their tactical penetration near Dobropillya and defend against Ukrainian counterattacks on the flanks —suggesting that Russian forces may not be able to consolidate their positions and exploit this penetration. The Russian effort for Dobropillya is just one part of Russia's broader 18-month effort to seize Pokrovsk, moreover. Russia's efforts near Dobropillya result from the failure of Russia's initial effort to encircle Pokrovsk from the southwest and northeast, causing the Russian command to try a deeper envelopment further northeast and north. ­­None of these many-months-long efforts to take Kupyansk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk have been at the scale needed to seize all of Ukraine's fortress belt – Ukraine's highly fortified, main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of cities that are significantly larger in terms of size and population.[15] Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast by force would take several years, given the number of fortified urban areas Russian forces must overcome to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative boundaries.Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. The New York Times (NYT), Reuters, and BBC, citing anonymous European officials, reported on August 17 that Putin asked Trump on August 15 for guarantees that Russian would become an official language again in parts or all of Ukraine and that Ukraine would end its "persecution" of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[16] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization, but rather is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine.[17] The ROC is notably an element of Russia's hybrid warfare toolkit, particularly in the Kremlin's efforts to promote Kremlin narratives and Russian nationalist ideology to sustain and expand Russia's influence in former Soviet states.[18] The ROC has also advocated for the codification of a Russian state ideology premised on the idea that Ukraine should not exist.[19] Putin's demands regarding the Russian language and the protection of the ROC's activities in Ukraine via the UOC MP deny Ukraine the right to establish its own domestic laws as a sovereign and independent state.Putin's demands that Ukraine make Russian an official language again and allow the UOC MP to operate in Ukraine are similar to Russian demands to exert control over Ukraine's domestic affairs in the 2015 Minsk accords. The Minsk II agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to give more autonomy to the Russia-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republic (DNR and LNR) and expand their role in Ukraine’s politics.[20]Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the "root causes." Putin reiterated his ongoing demand that any peace agreement must eliminate the "root causes" of the war during the joint press conference at the Alaska summit on August 15.[21] Putin stated on August 1 that the "main thing" in the peace process is the eradication of the war's "root causes," which Putin described as issues related to Russia's security, the use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and the conditions for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) – the ROC's arm in Ukraine.[22] Putin's demands to formalize Russian as an official language in Ukraine and protect the ROC in Ukraine come from Russia's demands of Ukraine that the Kremlin made in the Spring 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Russia demanded in Spring 2022 during the Istanbul negotiations that Ukraine "prevent restrictions and discrimination" against the UOC MP and restore all of the church's rights.[23] Russia also demanded in Spring 2022 that Ukraine guarantee the Russian language as an official language.[24] Marco Rubio responded to a question regarding Putin's demands at the Alaska summit during an interview with Face the Nation on August 17, stating that Putin's demands to address the alleged "root causes" allude to long historical complaints that the Kremlin has repeatedly invoked.[25] Rubio stated that the United States is not going to focus on the "root causes" but rather on halting the fighting.Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO. Russian officials have defined one of the "root causes" of the war as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.[26] Russia issued a broad set of ultimatums to the United States in December 2021 demanding that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[27] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Putin's demand that any peace agreement eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine would require a lengthy, complicated negotiation process not only with Ukraine but also with NATO and the United States. Russia's demands about the "root causes" are demands for massive NATO concessions that would jeopardize NATO's integrity and European and US security more broadly.Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires. US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff stated on August 17 that Putin agreed during the Alaska summit that Russia would "legislatively enshrine" promises that Russia would not invade any other territory in Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe – likely referring to the creation of new Russian legislation or amendments to the Russian Constitution.[28] Putin has extensively disregarded and amended the Russian Constitution to support his political objectives, as evidenced by the Kremlin's manipulation of the 2020 vote for a constitutional amendment to allow Putin to run for president again in 2024 and potentially remain in power until 2036.[29] Putin's two invasions of Ukraine also broke Russia's obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine within Ukraine's borders at the time.[30] Russia has continually violated international agreements prohibiting aggression against Ukraine, including the Minsk agreements.[31] Putin’s promise to codify Russian promises against future aggression into Russian legislation or the Russian Constitution is neither credible nor a concession, and there is no evidence to suggest that Putin would abide by any such law forbidding a renewed invasion of Ukraine after concluding a peace agreement.The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees. Axios stated on August 16 that sources briefed on Trump's call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders after the Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska stated that Putin said he was willing to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine and mentioned the People's Republic of China (PRC) as one of the possible guarantors.[32] Witkoff stated on August 17 that Trump and Putin came to an agreement that the United States and Europe could "effectively offer Article 5-like language" as a security guarantee for Ukraine against future renewed Russian aggression – referring to NATO's collective defense clause.[33] Putin's reported suggestion that the PRC could be a security guarantor mirrors Russia's proposed peace settlement in Istanbul in April 2022. The April 2022 proposed treaty listed the PRC, several Western states, and Russia as the security guarantors for Ukraine.[34] Russia demanded in the proposal that guarantor states provide Ukraine with aid in the event of a future attack only after all guarantor states had agreed to such a decision. The PRC is a close Russian ally that has significantly helped the Russian war effort and defense industrial base (DIB), and the PRC would not be a neutral guarantor.[35] Russia's involvement in the guarantee would make it meaningless. The parameters of the security guarantees for Ukraine that Putin is reportedly willing to accept are unclear. Any future peace settlement that includes stipulations similar to the demands that Russia made in April 2022 requiring unity among guarantor states would enable the PRC (or Russia, if Russia is one of them) to veto any decisions to help Ukraine in the event of another Russian invasion.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Brussels on August 17 to meet with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and to participate in a Coalition of the Willing teleconference.[36] The teleconference aimed to coordinate Ukraine's and Europe's positions before Zelensky's visit to the White House on August 18. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Italian President Giorgia Meloni, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte, and Von der Leyen announced that they will accompany Zelensky during his meeting with Trump.[37] Key Takeaways:US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force, as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances.Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs. Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires, given the complexity of the "root causes."Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine, and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments not to invade and because Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationLimited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 16 and 17.[38]A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on August 17 that two companies of the Russian 346th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Mobilization Reserve) are operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and that the number of Russian soldiers in the unit who are deserting is increasing.[39]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Tetkino.[40]Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike in Kursk Oblast that severely wounded the Russian Northern Group of Forces Deputy Commander. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian column on an unspecified sector of the 38K-040 Rylsk-Khomutovka highway and seriously wounded Russian Northern Group of Forces Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Esedulla Abachev.[41] The GUR reported that Abachev required an arm and leg amputation after the strike. Geolocated footage published on August 17 shows at least three damaged and burned Russian transport vehicles along the highway south of Zhuryatino (just north of Rylsk).[42]Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian logistics hub in Voronezh Oblast. A GUR source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) news agency ArmyInform that the GUR, Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, and other Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Lisky railway station, disrupting rail traffic and damaging the rail connection[43] The GUR source stated that the Lisky railway station is a critical railway hub that supplies Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and that the strike disrupted the supply of Russian ammunition and personnel. Geolocated footage published on August 16 shows a fire at the Lisky railway station in Voronezh Oblast.[44] Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev claimed that Russian air defense downed at least six drones and that drone debris damaged a power line at a railway station.[45] The Russian Federal Passenger Company claimed that drone debris at the Lisky railway station delayed 14 trains.[46] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage on August 17 showing a drone strike and subsequent explosion near the Lisky railway station.[47]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction. Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[48]Unconfirmed claims: The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 17 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[49]Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 16 and 17.[50] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) and Novokostyantynivka.[51]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Sadky.[52] Elements of the 106th VDV Division, including of its 137th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[53]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Tykhe and west of Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City) on August 16 and 17.[54]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on August 16 and 17.[55] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory and Synelnykove.[56] Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 17 but did not advance.[57]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 17 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka, Holubivka and Zapadne; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 16 and 17.[58]The head of unmanned systems of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 17 that Russian forces have recently become more active in the area.[59] The head noted that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups as part of efforts to seize Kupyansk. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that small Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups of three to five soldiers are trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in areas such as Kivsharkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[60]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka.[61] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[62]Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on August 17 but did not advance.[63]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 17 but did not make any confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kolodyazi (north of Lyman) and Dibrova (east of Lyman).[64]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Kolodyazi and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on August 16 and 17.[65]A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 17 that Russian forces are attacking largely with sabotage and reconnaissance groups in an effort to reach the Ukrainian near rear.[66] The servicemember noted that drone operators accompany the sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The servicemember reported that Russian forces are using light vehicles to bring supplies to frontline positions but noted that Russian servicemembers sometimes must transport supplies on foot up to 30 kilometers. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a transformer substation in Lyman, disrupting power supply in southern Lyman and complicating Ukrainian logistics.[67]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vovchiy Yar (northwest of Lyman).[68]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 17 but did not advance.Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk).[69] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Serebryanka as of August 16.[70]Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 16 and 17.[71]Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have increased the number of assaults and artillery and air strikes in the Siversk direction and are attacking with a large number of personnel, armored vehicles, and motorcycles.[72] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have so far failed to achieve their Summer 2025 task of gaining a foothold on the outskirts of Siversk. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are accumulating troops at the Lysychansk Oil Refinery in occupied Verkhnokamyanske (east of Siversk) and will likely conduct mass assaults with equipment by the end of August 2025. Zaporozhets added that it is still unclear how many pieces of equipment Russian forces have accumulated at the refinery but that Russian forces will definitely use motorcycles in future large-scale assaults.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Soledar (Siversk) direction.[73]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 17.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced southeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[74]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Poltavka, Kleban Byk, and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 16 and 17.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[76]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Raiske (northwest of Toretsk).[77]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk.[78] Elements of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Nelipivka.[79]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[80]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and Dobropillya).[81]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, and Volodymyrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Troyanda, Leontovychi, Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 16 and 17.[82]A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that the intensity of the Russian assaults that initially infiltrated Ukrainian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya is not sustainable and that Russian force quality, attrition, fatigue, and increased operational tempo will limit how long Russian forces can maintain their current pace in the area.[83] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are intensifying their use of modified fiber optic drones that can wait in standby mode "for a long time" for Ukrainian equipment targets to appear.[84] The NCO stated that Russian forces have modified drones to extend the amount of time they can stay in the air, allowing Russian forces to conduct reconnaissance longer.[85]Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Police stated that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against Svyatohorivka (just west of Dobropillya), killing two civilians.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted Geran-2 and glide bomb strikes against Bilozerske (north of Dobropillya).[87]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[88] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[89]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka toward Filya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste and Novokhatske on August 16 and 17.[90]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Zaporizhzhia (south of Novopavlivka).[91]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 17 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne and Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Ternove, Novomykolaivka, and Maliivka on August 16 and 17.[92]A Russian milblogger claimed that Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka) is a contested "gray zone."[93]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[94] Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske and Temyrivka on August 16 and 17.[96]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole) and Novohryhorivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 17 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[98]Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, and west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 16 and 17.[99] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Stepnohirsk and Plavni and near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka.[100]Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the GUR destroyed a Russian ammunition depot near the Korvatskyi passage in occupied Melitopol on August 16, killing at least six Russian naval infantrymen and a Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion drone crew.[101]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepnohirsk, and elements of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the BARS-1 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[102] Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 and 17 but did not advance.[103] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 60 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine and that 20 drones and the missile struck 12 locations in the frontline areas of Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian border guard unit reported on August 17 that Russian Shahed drones struck Chernihiv Oblast.[105]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html[35] https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf; https://isw.pub/UkrWar092524; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-9-2025[36] https://suspilne dot media/1092628-zelenskij-pribuv-u-brussel-ta-zustrivsa-z-golovou-evrokomisii-fon-der-laen/ ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1957075367883325563 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1957075364104024137[37] https://suspilne dot media/1092586-merc-meloni-i-stubb-takoz-budut-na-zustrici-zelenskogo-i-trampa/ ; https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/donald-trump-keir-starmer-volodymyr-zelensky-ursula-von-der-leyen-european-b1243315.html ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/17/european-leaders-to-join-zelenskyy-washington-meeting-trump-ukraine-russia[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27879[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4852[40] https://t.me/severnnyi/4852[41] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6679[42] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1957071333470175344; https://x.com/blinzka/status/1956788117605617775; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956780324060299679[43] https://suspilne dot media/1092638-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-vdarili-dronami-po-logisticnomu-vuzlu-u-voronezkij-oblasti-rf/ ; https://t.me/army_tv/11990 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/drony-gur-urazyly-vazhlyvyj-zaliznychnyj-vuzol-u-voronezkij-oblasti-dzherela-armiya-tv/[44] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1956890556598215150; https://x.com/VyshnyaOstap/status/1956882955030425658[45] https://t.me/gusev_36/4244; https://t.me/gusev_36/4246 ; https://t.me/gusev_36/4248; https://t.me/tass_agency/331687; https://t.me/tass_agency/331692 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/331693[46] https://t.me/luchshepoezdom/3430[47] https://t.me/astrapress/89794[48] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9809; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/11008; https://t.me/oprichnikbpla/132[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27901[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27879; https://t.me/rybar/72881; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847[51] https://t.me/tass_agency/331707; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32585 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32585[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565[54] https://t.me/wargonzo/28552 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32557?single[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32557?single; https://t.me/severnnyi/4847[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4847[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/17/na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-ale-tehnika-navit-ne-doyizhdzhaye-do-pozyczij-zsu/[60] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/rosijski-drg-namagayutsya-prorvaty-oboronu-vijskovi-pro-sytuacziyu-na-kordoni/[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41032[62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176253[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917[64] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176268 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66749[65] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791[66] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/17/u-povnomu-ekipiruvanni-tyagnut-boyekomplekt-na-plechah-do-30-km-yak-rosiyany-zabezpechuyut-logistyku/[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176293[68] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9580 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/16499 [69] https://t.me/dva_majors/77644 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66749 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97890 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176188 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176268[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-16-2025[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791[72] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/try-pyat-sim-desyat-u-sylah-oborony-nazvaly-napryamok-de-vorog-chy-ne-najaktyvnishe-vykorystovuye-motoczykly/[73] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176249[74] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1956878304192889106; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1048; https://t.me/shock3OA/1929[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280[76] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280[77] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176209[78] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176168[79] https://t.me/shock3OA/1929[80] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9812; https://t.me/argus38/658[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41039[82] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176280[83] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1957040241703002137[84] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092472-ukrainski-sili-strimuut-vijska-rf-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-rosiani-zastosovuut-legku-tehniku/[85] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/17/desantnyky-rozpovily-pro-osoblyvosti-povedinky-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/[86] https://dn.npu.gov dot ua/news/piat-zahyblykh-i-chotyry-poranenykh-naslidky-rosiiskykh-obstriliv-donechchyny; https://suspilne dot media/1092360-zelenskij-pogovoriv-z-trampom-rosijski-vijska-mozut-posiliti-tisk-na-ukrainski-pozicii-1271-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755427516&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps [87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176209; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176306[88] https://t.me/mod_russia/55631; https://t.me/milinfolive/154812[89] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14185[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791[91] https://t.me/voin_dv/16497; https://t.me/voin_dv/16498[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791[93] https://t.me/wargonzo/28552[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16500[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16492  [96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15791; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552  [97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16492  [98] https://t.me/vrogov/21559[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881; https://t.me/wargonzo/28552; https://t.me/rybar/72881; https://t.me/dva_majors/77641; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32572 [100] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32572; https://t.me/vrogov/2155; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32581[101] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/hurkit-u-melitopoli-znyshcheno-sklad-bk-ta-okupantiv-yakykh-perekydaly-na-zaporizkyi-napriamok.html[102] https://t.me/osetin20/11419; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565; https://t.me/mod_russia/55625; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32565[103] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27883; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27881[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/40519  [105] https://suspilne dot media/1092360-zelenskij-pogovoriv-z-trampom-rosijski-vijska-mozut-posiliti-tisk-na-ukrainski-pozicii-1271-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755411974&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16, 2025

 

at 8/31/25 12:15am

Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. KaganAugust 16, 2025, 9pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump stated on August 16 that his meeting with Putin and subsequent call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders were productive.[1] Trump stated following that "all" determined that the best way to end Russia's war in Ukraine is to begin direct negotiations for a peace agreement, rather than a ceasefire agreement. Trump announced that he will meet with Zelensky at the White House on August 18 and that he and Zelensky may schedule a subsequent meeting with Putin if the August 18 meeting goes well. Trump did not specify whether the subsequent meeting with Putin will be bilateral or trilateral, though Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit on August 15 that both Putin and Zelensky want Trump to attend a leader-level meeting.[2] Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified source who was on Trump's call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin expressed interest in a comprehensive settlement to end the war rather than a ceasefire and stated that "a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire."[3] Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Trump stated on this call that Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but noted that it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do with its territory.[4] The sources told Bloomberg that Putin proposed to effectively freeze the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the United States' readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine so long as the guarantees do not involve NATO, and that Trump suggested that Putin would accept this. Axios reported, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's phone call, that Trump informed Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces were making significant battlefield progress and that Putin could seize all of Donetsk Oblast.[5] The source told Axios that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders during the call on how Putin views territorial issues and what Putin is willing to give in return. The source reported that Witkoff informed the leaders that Putin is willing to end the war and commit to abstaining from seizing more Ukrainian territory and not to attack Ukraine or other countries in a new war.It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the subject of a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been discussed.[6] Ravid reported that a source briefed on Trump's talks with Putin stated that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine's withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations regarding Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[7] Ravid reported that Putin requested that the United States recognize "these four oblasts" (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, although the reporting is not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Financial Times (FT) reported, citing four sources with direct knowledge of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.[8] Three of the sources told FT that Putin offered to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and not to launch new attacks to seize additional territory (it is not clear if he meant in those two oblasts or elsewhere), in exchange for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officials and most sources speaking to Western media did not indicate that Putin mentioned Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable because Russian forces are also conducting offensive operations in these regions. Newsmax White House correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to teaching the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states providing security guarantees to Ukraine that would enable NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any agreement.[9] Carter reported that the unspecified sources stated that Russia and Ukraine still need to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Putin may have also offered a limited ceasefire in southern Ukraine in exchange for Donetsk Oblast, but other details of Putin's offer to Trump remain unclear. Putin has established territorial demands over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, which are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, as preconditions for any possible future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official suggested to FT that Putin is prepared to compromise on other issues, including territory, if Putin is satisfied that an agreement addresses the “root causes” of the war.[10] The Kremlin has repeatedly defined root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian control over Ukraine.[11] Putin's demand that any agreement address these "root causes" is not a compromise from his original war aims, and reports that Putin "compromised" on issues such as Ukraine's ability to teach its own language in its own country are designed to obfuscate Putin's actual unwillingness to compromise.Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however. A Ukrainian withdrawal from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast – which ISW continues to assess would be a major strategic military and political concession – without a full ceasefire that extends to long-range strikes and all frontline activity would pose major risks to both withdrawing Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian forces in rear areas in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin notably has not offered a ceasefire under which Ukrainian forces would be able to safely withdraw across the Donetsk Oblast border and defend rear areas against renewed Russian aggression on the flanks. The Donetsk Oblast administrative boundary is far from Ukraine's main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast known as the "fortress belt," and even if Putin implemented a ceasefire long enough for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from Donetsk Oblast, renewed Russian ground assaults and fires both from advancing forces in Donetsk Oblast and forces on the flank in Kharkiv Oblast would threaten Ukrainian forces along the frontline and in rear areas.[12] A Ukrainian withdrawal would likely result in large force concentrations along major Ukrainian thoroughfares and defensive structures that Russian aviation, drones, and artillery would likely target upon the expiration of a ceasefire. These strikes would degrade Ukrainian forces' combat capabilities, including Ukraine's ability to defend against renewed Russian efforts to advance into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk Oblast or along the right flank in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces operating in Donetsk Oblast would also likely pursue withdrawing Ukrainian forces along routes of egress, threatening to rout the withdrawing Ukrainian forces and degrade their ability to establish new defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast would likely also receive fire support from Russian forces already operating in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, which would further threaten the rear of the withdrawing Ukrainian forces. These Russian strikes would also make it untenable for Ukrainian forces to maintain their positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and set conditions for Russian forces to push further into Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. A partial ceasefire that does not extend to Russian military activity in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts would therefore be insufficient for assuring the safe withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast.ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression. ISW continues to assess that surrendering currently unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would position Russian forces extremely well to renew their aggression against Ukraine on much more favorable terms, having avoided a long and bloody struggle for this territory and given Russia the opportunity to build up manpower and weapons stocks.[13] ISW previously noted that allowing Russia to occupy the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would concede Ukraine’s fortress belt to Russian forces, and this fortress belt also includes significant DIB infrastructure. Russian forces have notably been unable to advance to or envelop the fortress belt since Fall 2022. The Russian military command would almost certainly work to rapidly establish lasting positions throughout the fortress belt and utilize the fortress belt's DIB for military production if Ukrainian forces withdraw from their positions in Donetsk Oblast. ISW also previously noted that the Donetsk Oblast border area is naturally poorly suited to act as a robust defensive line due to its few settlements, open fields, and natural obstacles such as the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers.[14] A Ukrainian withdrawal across the Donetsk Oblast border would therefore also require the deployment of a robust international peacekeeping force and large-scale investment in infrastructure compatible with a large-scale, long-term ceasefire monitoring mission to prevent future Russian aggression. The absence of a full ceasefire on the frontline and regarding long-range strikes would likely preclude the deployment of this international force, however.Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace. Putin has remained committed to slow, grinding advances on the battlefield through attritional infantry assaults – constraining the maximum possible rate of Russian advance to footpace.[15] Ukrainian drone strikes have significantly complicated the Russian military command's ability to tactically employ heavy equipment, as Russia has not figured out how to adequately protect armored vehicles and tanks from Ukrainian drones.[16] Russian forces have therefore been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield to create and exploit breakthroughs and achieve operationally-significant advances.[17] The Russian military command has implemented an operational pattern that leverages creeping partial envelopments of frontline towns and settlements before beginning street-by-street frontal assaults to force Ukrainian withdrawals. Russian forces have proven unable to make significant advances in Ukraine by conducting frontal assaults.[18] The Russian military command has failed to operationalize its envelopment tactic against a significant Ukrainian defensive line and will likely be unable to leverage this tactic to seize the fortress belt cities that form the backbone of the Ukrainian forces' defense rapidly — such an operation three and a half years into the war would likely be a multi-year effort with significant Russian personnel and material losses.[19] Russian forces have also recently leaned on infiltration tactics to make tactically-significant advances, but have thus far struggled to exploit these infiltrations and consolidate positions in their paths of advance at scale.[20] Russian forces currently have no means of rapidly enveloping, penetrating, or otherwise seizing Ukraine’s fortress belt or the remainder of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast, which Putin has demanded as a precondition for a ceasefire with no comparable Russian concessions.Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed. Medvedev stated on his Russian- and English-language Telegram channels on August 16 that the Trump-Putin meeting "demonstrated that negotiations are possible without preconditions" while Russia continues its war in Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin appears to have successfully narrowed discussions of the war in Ukraine to the fate of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — the four oblasts that Russia illegally annexed in September 2022.[22] Russian forces continue offensive efforts to advance into northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast, however. Putin's reported demands largely do not address the fate of these oblasts or the Russian military efforts within them. Russian forces would presumably continue their offensive efforts in these areas while negotiations are ongoing. Putin is attempting to obfuscate his unwillingness to commit to a comprehensive ceasefire by repackaging one of his war aims as a prerequisite to negotiations for a permanent peace. Putin likely aims to both stave off further US sanctions that could hinder Russia's ability to finance its war effort and to extract further US, Ukrainian, and European concessions through the ongoing negotiation process.The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on August 16 that the Kremlin disseminated an instruction manual to pro-government and state-run media outlets in Russia after the summit to report that "no deal [on Ukraine] was reached at the summit — and that no deal could have been reached."[23] Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to claim that Trump and Putin did not discuss "Ukrainian and European demands for an unconditional ceasefire," that Trump urged Zelensky to make a deal with Putin, and that Trump greeted Putin on the tarmac as a gesture of goodwill. Meduza reported that the Kremlin instructed media outlets to describe the meeting as "historic" because "Putin restored Russia's status as a great superpower" and to describe Trump and Putin as "equals." Meduza quoted the manual as claiming that "the revival of Russia’s power and authority is the result of recent years," likely referring to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, long-term military reorganization efforts, and strengthened ties with states including Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) since February 2022.[24] Meduza reported that the Kremlin issued a separate instruction manual before the summit stating that media outlets should emphasize that Putin spoke with Trump about "Kyiv's unwillingness to negotiate," that Russia is ready for any scenario in the talks, and that it is Putin — rather than Trump —who sets the agenda for US-Russian relations.[25] Meduza reported that the pre-summit manual instructed reporters to emphasize that the United States and Russia have many avenues for "mutual understanding" and that bilateral cooperation would not be limited to the "Ukrainian issue." A media strategist working with the Russian Presidential Administration’s political team told Meduza that the Russian government aimed to prepare the Russian public for the possibility that the summit would fail to pause fighting and emphasize that Putin is setting the terms — cohering with ISW's long-held assessment that the Kremlin is not setting informational conditions for Russians to accept an end to the war that does not amount to a Russian victory on Putin's terms.Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with Russian outlet News dot ru on August 16 that Trump and Putin communicated as political equals and that the summit was a major event in global diplomacy.[26] Zhuravlev also claimed that the United States understands the ”root causes” of the war in Ukraine — a term Russian officials use as shorthand to reiterate Putin's pre-war demands of Ukrainian neutrality and regime change.[27] Zhuravlev claimed in another interview to Russian outlet Gazeta dot ru that the war in Ukraine can only end if the United States "confirm[s] Russia's security guarantees" and added that Ukraine and the EU should not be involved in the peace process.[28] Russian officials have frequently claimed that Ukrainian and European leadership are prolonging the war in Ukraine and are not interested in peace negotiations in an effort to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty, deny Kyiv a role in the peace process, and divide Ukraine from its allies.[29] Russian Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building Chairperson Andrei Klishas claimed that the meeting between Trump and Putin confirmed Russia's desire for a long-term and just peace and that Russia will achieve this goal either through military or diplomatic means.[30] Klishas also reiterated a long-standing Russian claim that there can be no unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine.[31] This rhetoric reinforces to a domestic Russian audience that it must not expect Putin to compromise on his long-held, public demands to achieve his full objectives in Ukraine.Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was part of the Russian delegation in Alaska, arrived in Anchorage on August 15 wearing a USSR sweatshirt in a staged media stunt.[32] Lavrov likely sought to present Russia as the inheritor of the Soviet Union and simultaneously equate Russia and the United States as comparable superpowers, in line with the reported Kremlin command to Russian media to report that Putin restored Russia to its great power status, a status that Putin and other Russian officials have long complained was lost when the Soviet Union collapsed.[33] Russian officials have claimed that the Soviet Union never legally dissolved and that the Soviet Union therefore still exists, with Russia as the legal inheritor of its power, territory, and treaties — setting informational conditions to exert control over former Soviet Union states.[34] ISW continues to assess that Russia very likely maintains territorial ambitions beyond occupied Crimea and the other four Ukrainian oblasts it has illegally annexed.[35] Lavrov also likely sought to present the war in Ukraine as a matter that falls within Russia's sphere of influence in which other states should not interfere, similar to Russian Presidential Advisor Anton Kobyakov's claim in May 2025 that the Soviet Union still legally exists and that the war in Ukraine is therefore an "internal process."[36] Putin also stated during the joint press conference with Trump on August 15 that Russia and Ukraine share the "same roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation, a long-standing Kremlin narrative with roots in Putin's July 2021 essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" that also seeks to present the war in Ukraine as an internal affair.[37]Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions and taking Russian prisoners of war (POWs) northeast of Dobropillya within Vesele and Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[38] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed the 1st Azov Army Corps (AC) August 15 report that Ukrainian forces cleared six settlements northeast of Dobropillya, including Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz in operations from August 12 to 15.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff and 1st Azov AC stated that Ukrainian forces killed 271 Russian personnel, wounded 101, and took 13 POWs, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed one Russian tank, two armored vehicles, and 37 motorcycles and other vehicles in these operations. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only advanced in unfortified areas northeast of Dobropilllya and that Russian forces are strengthening their positions in the northern section of the penetration.[40] One Russian milblogger denied Ukrainian claims that Ukrainian forces advanced in the salient but conceded that Ukrainian forces entered Vesele and Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[41] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces are holding their positions near Zolotyi Kolodyaz.[42] Another Russian milblogger complained that the Russian penetration is not sustainable because it is too narrow and vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts and assaults that threaten Russian forces' ability to sustain the penetration.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to cut the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway because the base of the penetration is too narrow for its depth, and that Russian forces need to widen the penetration’s flanks before fighting toward the highway. The footage of Ukrainian forces recapturing settlements northeast of Dobropillya and the lack of reporting suggesting that Russian forces are reinforcing and resupplying the penetration enough to exploit the penetration indicates that Ukrainian forces have likely retaken these settlements, as multiple Ukrainian sources have now reported.[44] This footage and these reports also suggest that Russian forces very likely do not have stable and enduring positions within the penetration and likely do not control the area between Russian positions east and northeast of Dobropillya and the base of the penetration southeast of Dobropillya.Key Takeaways:Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims.It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit.Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, howeverISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression.Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than foot pace.Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed.The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine.Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya.Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationLimited fighting continued in Kursk Oblast on August 16.[45] Russian forces continued ground attacks in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast.[46] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and crossed the Seim River.[47]Ukrainian forces likely struck a Russian defense industrial base (DIB) enterprise in Stavropol Krai overnight on August 15 to 16. The Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai Mayor Mikhail Minenkov claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the city's industrial zone overnight on August 15 to 16.[48] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported, citing locals, that there were at least nine explosions and a fire near the Azot chemical plant in Nevinnomyssk.[49] Astra noted that the August 15 to 16 strike marks the third strike against the Azot Chemical Plant thus far in Summer 2025. Astra reported that the Azot chemical plant is Russia's largest producer of nitrogen fertilizers and ammonia and is located roughly 650 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.[50]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novokostyantynivka and Varachnye and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 15 and 16.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City), and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[52]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[53]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced to the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River in central Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[54]Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove on August 15 and 16.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River and near Synelnykove.[56]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on August 16 that Russian forces are attacking blindly in small infantry groups with drones to guide their routes of advance and are leveraging motorcycles and foliage and motorcycles to advance more quickly.[57]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 16 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on August 15 and 16.[58]The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported that Russian forces increased their guided glide bomb strikes to support assaults in the Milove and Khatnie directions.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) with unguided glide bombs.[60]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[61]Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault southwest of Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[62]Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and Zapadne and toward Kolodyazne; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka; and west of Kupyansk near Solobivka on August 15 and 16.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Petropavlivka.[64]The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes to disguise themselves as locals to infiltrate Ukrainian battle formations in the Kupyansk direction.[65] Combatants dressing as civilians to support efforts intending to injure, kill, or capture an adversary is classified as perfidy and is illegal under international law.[66] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces have maintained the intensity of their attacks and are trying to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Kupyansk direction.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions with Groza Leska fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones near Kupyansk.[67]Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove on August 15 and 16, but did not advance.[68]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 16 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Ridkodub (north of Lyman).[70]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and Zelena Dolyna; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Yampolivka; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 15 and 16.[71]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[72]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Serebryanka (north of Siversk).[73]Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself, north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 15 and 16.[74]The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that recent rainfall has complicated Russian forces’ attempts to field infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[75]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Chasiv Yar near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Bondarne on August 15 and 16.[76]Ukrainian Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov stated on August 15 that Russian forces conducted two first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kostyantynivka, killing one Ukrainian civilian.[77]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Oleksandro-Shultyne, and northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Kleban Byk, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, and Katerynivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 15 and 16.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[79]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly coordinating artillery strikes of elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) against Ukrainian positions near Kleban Byk.[80]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Rodynske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and are attacking on the north and northeast outskirts of the settlement.[81] Another Russian milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces are attacking in Rodynske, claiming that Russian forces hold positions in the north and northeastern outskirts but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the settlement.[82]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Nove Shakhove, Zapovidne, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Troyanda, Leontovychi, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 15 and 16.[83]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to constantly attack in small infantry fire teams of one to two personnel and are attempting to camouflage themselves with greenery and anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are attempting to use motorcycles to bypass Ukrainian positions. The commander of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction assessed that Russian forces continue to fear the heavy losses necessary for an operation against Pokrovsk itself and are attempting to encircle Pokrovsk and Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk) instead.[85]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian AirNomads Group reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 16 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Novoukrainka, and Horikhove; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Novokhatske and Tovste on August 15 and 16.[87]A servicemember of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction stated that Ukrainian drone strikes, mines, and anti-tank ditches are denying Russian forces the ability to advance closer than five kilometers from the frontline in this direction.[88] The servicemember stated that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry assaults of two to four personnel to several areas to attack Ukrainian positions from multiple sides.Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) direction.[89]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 16 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Velykomykhailivka).[90]Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, and Myrne; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Vorone, and Maliivka, and toward Zaporizhske, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 15 and 16.[91]Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on August 16 that the Russian military command is sending small infantry groups of two personnel to bypass Ukrainian positions, enter a given settlement, and film themselves raising a Russian flag in order to falsely claim seizures of settlements and create the false perception of Russian advances.[92] The GUR reported that Russian forces recently filmed themselves near Andriivka-Klevtsove for this purpose, but that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.Order of Battle: Artillery and drone elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly participated in the August 15 claimed seizure of Vorone.[93] Elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Oleksandrohrad.[94] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka).[95]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and toward Olhivske on August 15 and 16.[96]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[97]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 16.[98]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[99]Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 16 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and rail bridges and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 15 and 16.[100]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on the Dnipro River islands.[101] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 85 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones over northern and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted frontline areas in Sumy, Donetsk, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[103]The US Special Inspector General Quarterly Operation Atlantic Resolve report from April 1 to June 30 indicated that a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report confirmed that the increase in Russian use of ballistic missiles with enhanced maneuverability has undermined the effectiveness of the Patriot air defense system in Ukraine.[104] The report stated that Ukraine is struggling to consistently down Russian ballistic missiles due to Russian tactical technological improvements, including enhanced guidance and maneuverability systems, that allow missiles to fly irregular flight paths and adjust paths in-flight rather than only flying along typical ballistic trajectories. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported in late May 2025 that Russian adaptations to its ballistic weapons were complicating Ukraine's efforts to intercept these ballistic missiles[105]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/azov_media/7159 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1956410147233771808 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956411132001784116 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27846[40] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[41] https://t.me/yurasumy/24361[42] https://t.me/yurasumy/24354[43] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2955[44] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840[48] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-attacked-azot-chemical-plant-in-stavropol-krai/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/89723[49] https://t.me/astrapress/89723[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564[51] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847[52] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564[53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4840[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32496[57] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/slipyh-shturmovykiv-vedut-pomyraty-yihni-zh-roboty-poblyzu-vovchanska-rosiyan-masovo-utylizuyut/[58] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738[59] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738[60] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[61] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852[62] https://x.com/moklasen/status/1956665765538508803 ; https://t.me/skyraders/776[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852[64] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13852[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/chuvaky-v-czyvilnomu-vykonuyut-speczyfichni-zavdannya-nepodalik-kupyanska-aktyvni-vorozhi-dyversanty/[66] https://casebook.icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NTM4NzY5MCwiaWF0IjoxNzU1Mzg3NjgwLCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS03YzY0NDU3ZmMtYnRsNnciLCJzdWIiOiIxOTEuOTYuMTIyLjUzIiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MTZUMjM0MTIwWi1yMTdjNjQ0NTdmY2J0bDZ3aEMxTE9ObWM1czAwMDAwMDExYTAwMDAwMDAwMG43bnAiLCJiIjoidkR2YUkzU2hQWGhlYVpUQkxQTy1qLU0xV2JDMTRxOVBrYlY0UWVJOGRWWSIsImgiOiJ6RzJjOHlianMzS0ViV1oyZmU1S1dlbG9ZQkdCRS1Yemp4b00tWTFNTk44In19.VmeeKq3sRMyLISuDjXxphUfPVbvXVJ91GQdc9HToDgJsEG6wLdpyhySnQ3brL-V_BBB8bCq7cRU8m7XyAzmm6RyRZ8sUL4Nd1GZEOrGr_fOLX-jpb-UiFTF7sxUOdhtinSA0WJhY1PcZ6OK4jxVuVNZ6Bl0YUhL6HZkXpeRBh9K1biVc9PbATtnA9ojhIf8o1jgU6tSO1m_iDELNhfRhgFFyDCmEOu-B26nq2I7wutu7uJim_3jmlcdy9QpOPffPUrqUqNqti07M2TMOmFErr7flVXpGunMI173mk7ZtNjsZ5hHd8EsdRY8Bqm--fRFiD3Gc4yjyDPLZeqaTHCA8cw.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s[67] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97842[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738[69] https://t.me/mod_russia/55613 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/55615 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32542 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77590 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66738 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55601[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32539[72] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/20539[73] https://t.me/osintpen/1642; https://t.me/shock3OA/1933[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32546[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/vse-peretvoryuyetsya-na-take-safari-na-siverskomu-napryamku-vshhent-rozbyrayut-shturmovi-grupy-rosiyan/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847[77] https://www.facebook.com/sergij.gorbunov.197981/posts/pfbid0Q6rk1Y6gkXETfDDsmwx4hEMYhv6hKAuETG8ht1KiWhiovJH5VGTB21vzgoAoyY8yl[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[79] https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[80] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14183[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564[82] https://t.me/yurasumy/24355[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32550 , https://t.me/wargonzo/28528 , https://t.me/dva_majors/77564[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1HcYjRrAbE/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/rezhym-nevydymky-ne-spraczyuvav-pid-pokrovskom-vorozhi-grupy-shhodnya-stayut-mishenyamy/[85] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1092170-armia-rf-moze-zajti-v-pokrovsk-ale-boitsa-velikih-vtrat-komandir-zagonu-bpla/[86] https://t.me/voin_dv/16490 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32548 ;[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738[88] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/16/yakshho-zastrybuye-v-riv-to-bude-jomu-aj-yaj-yaj-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-galmuyut-fortyfikacziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-O_iTjCYsKI[89] https://t.me/dva_majors/77574 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77601[90] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9806; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/269; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956600815470391789[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32538; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[92] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6668[93] https://t.me/mod_russia/55618; *GRAPHIC* https://t.me/voin_dv/16484; https://t.me/voin_dv/16488; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97867; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32551[94] https://t.me/dva_majors/77564[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16491[96] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15738[97] https://t.me/voin_dv/16480[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/dva_majors/77564; https://t.me/wargonzo/28528[99] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97850[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27869; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27849; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27847[101] https://t.me/mod_russia/55621[102] https://t.me/kpszsu/40478[103] https://t.me/synegubov/16537 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/16/vorog-obstrilyav-harkivsku-oblast-poshkodzheno-zhytlovi-budynky/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/udar-po-czentru-sum-vorog-atakuvav-misto-bezpilotnykom-na-misczi-vluchannya-pozhezha/; https://t.me/sumy_mva/547[104] https://www.twz.com/land/ukraines-patriots-now-struggling-with-enhanced-russian-ballistic-missiles ; https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/oar_q3_fy25_final_508.pdf[105] https://kyivindependent dot com/the-missile-no-longer-flies-straight-ukraine-says-russia-improved-its-ballistic-missiles/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15, 2025

 

at 8/30/25 10:25pm

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Justin Young, and Frederick W. KaganAugust 15, 2025, 9pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on August 15, except for reports about the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15. Trump and Putin initially planned to meet one-on-one, but the talks expanded to a three-on-three format, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff, for unspecified reasons.[1] Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the talks went "remarkably well" following the three-on-three discussions.[2] Trump and Putin then held a joint press conference. Putin addressed the crowd first and spoke in Russian, reiterating several long-standing Kremlin information operations about the war in Ukraine, Russian history, and the US-Russia relationship.[3] Putin invoked the geographical closeness of Alaska and the Russian Federation and called back to US-Soviet military cooperation during the Second World War in order to artificially highlight bilateral US-Russia relations. Putin emphasized the importance of solving the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[4] Putin also accused European states of attempting to undermine the negotiation process. These statements are two standard narrative lines that the Kremlin employs in order to justify its illegal invasion of Ukraine and to drive a wedge between the United States, Europe, and Ukraine.[5] Trump then spoke for a shorter time than Putin and emphasized that the meeting had been "productive," but that the US and Russian delegations reached "no deal." Putin concluded by addressing Trump in English and inviting him to Moscow.[6] Trump and Putin left the press conference stage without taking any audience questions, and a luncheon planned for after the meeting was reportedly cancelled.[7]Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Putin again demonstrated that he has not changed his views on Ukrainian sovereignty since 2021 and remains disinterested in serious peace negotiations with Ukraine. Putin used the joint press conference following the August 15 Alaska summit to evoke the Kremlin's long-standing narrative that Russia and Ukraine share the "same roots" and that Russia considers Ukraine to be a "brotherly" nation.[8] Putin published an essay on the "Historic Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" in July 2021, in which he similarly ideologized that Ukrainians and Belarusians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared "historical and spiritual space."[9] ISW previously assessed that the essay, which Putin published less than a month after meeting with then-US President Joe Biden in Geneva in June 2021, was an ultimatum to Kyiv as it openly questioned Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Putin stated in the essay that Ukraine was a ”product of the Soviet era shaped on the lands of historical Russia,” and reiterated these arguments in his February 2022 declaration of war against Ukraine as a justification for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[10] The continuity between Putin's statements at the August 15 press conference with Trump and his previous statements demonstrates that he remains committed to the view that Ukraine's existence as a state and territorial integrity depend on Ukraine's alignment with Russia.Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine. Trump reported that he and Putin "made great progress" and agreed on "many points," but did not agree on other points.[11] Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of what the US and Russian delegations discussed, upon what points the delegations agreed, and which points remain in contention. Trump stated that "there's no deal until there's a deal" and stated that he will inform Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and NATO states about the conversation and that an agreement on Ukraine is "ultimately up to them."[12] Trump reiterated his timeline that any bilateral economic agreements with Russia will come after the war is "over with."Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Bryansk oblasts and 97 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast on the night of August 14 to August 15.[13] Russian forces used drones to target frontline areas of Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Chernihiv oblasts, and the missiles to target Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down or suppressed 63 Shahed-type and decoy drones over northern and eastern Ukraine.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the two Iskander-Ms and 34 drones struck 13 locations throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the ballistic missiles hit cars in Dniprovskyi Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and an agricultural enterprise in Koryukivka Hromada, Chernihiv Oblast, killing and wounding civilians.[15] Russian drones hit an ambulance and a civilian car in Velykapyskarivka Hromada, Sumy Oblast, on the morning of August 15, killing one civilian.[16] Ukrainian officials and media sources reported on the evening of August 15 that a Russian drone hit the Sumy City Central Market, damaging retail outlets, an educational institution, and other buildings.[17] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Sumy, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts "on the eve of the [Alaska] meeting."[18] US President Donald Trump responded to the August 15 Russian strikes while en route to Alaska, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is "trying to set a stage" ahead of the summit.[19] Trump stated that the Russian strikes will "hurt" Putin's ability to make a deal with Trump. Russia continues to conduct drone and missile strikes that result in high civilian casualties even as Trump has repeatedly called on Russia to stop strike series that disproportionately affect civilian areas.[20] The United Nations (UN) reported on August 13 that Russian air and drone strikes in July 2025 contributed to the highest total monthly casualty toll since May 2022.[21]Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have stabilized Russian penetration near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya.[22] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces continue to destroy the Russian assault groups in the area and that Russian forces have not been able to redeploy additional troops to the area. A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Pokrovsk of Russian groups and individual soldiers who had previously infiltrated the settlement.[23] A Ukrainian corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces cleared Hruzke, Rubizhne, Novovodyane, Petrivka, Vesele, and Zolotyi Kolodyaz (all northeast of Dobropillya).[24] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on August 15 that Ukrainian forces have in part stabilized the situation along the Vesele-Zolotyi Kolodyaz-Kucheriv Yar line (northeast of Dobropillya).[25] ISW has not observed broader reporting about Ukrainian forces clearing settlements in the Russian penetration near Dobropillya at this time. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 15 that elements of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) initially advanced several hundred meters east of Pankivka (east of Dobropillya) but that Ukrainian counterattacks from Volodymyrivka and Shakhove (both north of Pankivka) pushed back the Russian advance.[26] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) have been attempting to hold Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya) and to repel Ukrainian counterattacks in the Ivanivka-Zapovidne direction (north to east of Dorozhnie) since August 13.[27] A Russian milblogger also acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya).[28] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces had tactical successes near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[29] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Volodymyrivka and Shakhove.[30] ISW has not observed confirmation of these claimed Russian advances, however.The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful. Mashovets stated that small infantry groups of the Russian 5th, 110th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (all three of the 51st CAA) conducted the initial penetration, but that the total number of Russian forces that conducted the tactical breakthrough did not exceed 300 to 350 personnel.[31] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command tried to consolidate the penetration by redeploying elements of the 114th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) to near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne.[32] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command asked senior commanders in the area to provide additional forces and means by redeploying up to two battalions with armored vehicles from the 8th CAA (SMD), which is largely operating in the Toretsk direction, to support the other elements of the 51st CAA that conducted the tactical breakthrough.Ukrainian officials continue to conduct evacuations of settlements near the Russian penetration area, however, likely reflecting the increased Russian drone threat due to the Russian advance near Dobropillya. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin announced on August 14 the mandatory evacuation of families with children from Druzhkivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and villages in Andriivka Hromada, northeast, north, and northwest of Zolotyi Kolodyaz, noting that roughly 1,800 children live in these settlements.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russia's use of drone strikes to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects in the Ukrainian near rear is severely hindering Ukrainian evacuation efforts in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.[34]Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) and other Ukrainian elements conducted a drone strike against the Rosneft Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing explosions and fires.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Syrzan Oil Refinery is one of Rosneft’s largest refineries and produces a wide range of fuel products, including aviation kerosene for the Russian military. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian drone strikes, posted images on August 15 showing smoke over the Syzran Oil Refinery.[36] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in February 2025.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 15 that the Ukrainian SSO and other Ukrainian forces also struck the Russian Olya Seaport in Astrakhan Oblast, including the Port Olya 4 vessel, which was carrying Shahed-type drone components and ammunition from Iran.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian military uses the Olya Seaport as a logistics supply point for military goods from Iran. The Ukrainian SSO Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Port Olya-4.[39] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin claimed that Russian air defenses downed Ukrainian drones targeting the Olya Seaport and that drone debris damaged a ship.[40]Russian opposition outlet Baza reported on August 15 that there was an explosion at the Elastik Gunpowder Factory in Ryazan Oblast.[41] Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov confirmed that there was an "emergency situation" at a plant in the area that killed five and injured 100 others and declared a state of emergency in the municipality.[42] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) opened an investigation into the violation of safety procedures following the explosion.[43] Kovalenko posted footage on August 15 showing an explosion at a gunpowder plant in Ryazan Oblast, noted that there were roughly 50 workers at the plant, and stated that "something strange" occurred at the plant.[44] Ukrainian sources have not yet claimed responsibility for the strike, however, and ISW cannot confirm its causes at this time.Key Takeaways:US President Donald Trump met with Russian President Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15.Putin said nothing in the joint press conference to indicate that he has moderated either his war aims or his willingness to compromise on them and reiterated language he has used since 2021 to justify Russia's aggression against Ukraine.Trump stated that the United States and Russia did not come to a firm agreement about the war in Ukraine.Russia conducted drone and missile strikes in Ukraine in the hours before the August 15 Alaska summit, causing civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that Ukrainian counterattacks are stabilizing the situation east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk).The Russian military command is reportedly trying to redeploy forces and means to reinforce and exploit the penetration near Dobropillya but has so far been unsuccessful.Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on August 14 to 15.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in Belarus Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationLimited fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 15.[45]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked southwest of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) along the Seim River shore.[46]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger, citing unnamed Ukrainian military analysts, claimed that Russian forces advanced into Novokostyantynivka (near the international border north of Sumy City) and that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[47]Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Novokostyantynivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Sadky on August 14 and 15.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novokostyantynivka, Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City), and Sadky.[49]A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) continue to face the threat of encirclement in an unspecified forest area, likely referring to previous reports of the Russian military command abandoning elements of the regiment near Sadky on August 12.[50] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced on two flanks and from the rear, forcing Russian forces to hastily retreat to unprepared positions. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling with logistics and are unable to resolve supply problems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in forested environments. The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces are actively targeting elements of the regiment with drones.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are working with elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) in the Sumy direction.[51]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 15 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hlyboke, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 14 and 15.[52] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[53]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated that Russian forces operating in the Vovchansk direction mostly leverage small infantry groups for assaults because Ukrainian strikes against Russian armored equipment have forced the Russian military command to pull Russian materiel, such as tanks and artillery systems, back to Russia.[54]Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on August 15 but did not advance.[55]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 15 that the intensity of Russian military activity in the brigade's area of responsibility (AOR) decreased compared to the first half of July 2025, particularly near Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burlyk).[56]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 15 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; north of Kupyansk near Radkivka and Holubivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 14 and 15.[57]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 15 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and Olhivka on August 14 and 15.[59]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Ivan Group of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions southwest of Lozova (northeast of Borova).[60]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stavky (north of Lyman) and into western Zarichne (east of Lyman).[61]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Serednie, Shandryholove, and Karpivka; north of Lyman near Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 14 and 15.[62]The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 15 that Russian forces in this direction are attempting to set conditions for a mechanized assault by using engineering detachments to build river crossings, including across the Chornyi Zherebets (Zherebets) River.[63] The officer added that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are conducting motorcycle assaults in small fireteams of four to eight infantrymen. The officer noted that Russian forces are using anti-heat vision cloaks and tents to evade detection and constantly reinforcing elements of the Russian 3rd (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th (MMD) combined arms armies (CAAs) operating in the Ukrainian unit’s area of responsibility (AOR) with drone detachments. The officer added that Russian forces operating near Lyman are increasing air strikes with guided glide bombs and other munitions and drone strikes, suggesting that Russian forces are intensifying their offensive tempo. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction are leveraging small infantry groups in day and night assaults, expecting that some of the groups will reach assigned rally points in the Ukrainian near rear.[64]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Serebryanske forest area.[65] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[66]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 15 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka, and Vasyukivka on August 14 and 15.[67]The Ukrainian Dnipro Grouping of Forces reported on August 15 that Russian forces in the Siversk direction increased their use of guided glide bomb strikes from eight to 22 in the past three days (since August 12).[68]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces advanced in Mykolaivka (just west of Chasiv Yar).[69]Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora on August 14 and 15.[70]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1065th Artillery Regiment (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaivka.[71]Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[72]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Poltavka, south of Rusyn Yar, and toward Sofiivka (all northwest of Toretsk).[73]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 14 and 15.[74]A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have been fighting for Toretsk for more than one year and that the brigade has killed or wounded more than 50,000 Russian forces in that time – roughly five divisions' worth.[75]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and the Kleban Byk reservoir.[76] Drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction.[77]                                                                                  Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.See topline text for reports of activity east and northeast of Dobropillya.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces likely withdrew from Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up), with support from elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), advanced from Udachne toward Zvirove (east of Udachne).[80]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Fedorivka, Novoekonomichne, Zapovidne, Mayak, Shakhove, Krasnyi Lyman, Zaytshok, and Vesele; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Sukhetske, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, and Rubizhne; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Myrolyubivka, and Mykolaivka and toward Balahan; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne and toward Molodetske on August 14 and 15.[81]A servicemember of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking during both the day and night and continue to use tactics to accumulate small groups of one to two personnel for further attacks.[82] The commander of a drone crew operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to conduct repeated highly attritional, infantry-led assaults to attack the same positions.[83] An aerial reconnaissance officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to attack in groups of two to six personnel.[84] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using "Hiyena" unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that can carry 26 kilograms of explosives to attack Russian fortified positions or infantry in buildings.[85]Mashovets reported that the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 2nd CAA (CMD) extends approximately from the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk to Myrolyubivka.[86] Mashovets stated that the AoR of the 41st CAA (CMD) extends approximately from Kotlyne to north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Novopavlivka) and that the AoR of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), which includes personnel from occupied Ukraine, is approximately from Myrolyubivka to Popiv Yar (northeast of Pokrovsk and northwest of Toretsk).Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in the Surove-Bilytske direction (north of Pokrovsk) and that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[87] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are fighting in southern Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).[88] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Rodynske.[89] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Andriivka-Klevtsove (southeast of Novopavlivka).[90]Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai, Tovste, Zirka, Andriivka-Klevtsove, and Ivanivka on August 14 and 15.[91]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 15 shows elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a flag in western Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka), indicating that Russian forces recently seized Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrohrad).[92]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and advanced west of Oleksandrohrad to the Dnipropetrovsk-Donetsk Oblast border area.[93Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka, and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Zelene Pole, and toward Zaporizke, Komyshuvakha, and Novoheorhiivka on August 14 and 15.[94]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vorone, Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka), and Sosnivka (south of Velykomykhailivka).[95] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Novoselivka.[96]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map on August 15 that claimed that Russian forces advanced into central Temyrivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[97]Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novodarivka, and Temyrivka on August 14 and 15.[98]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[99]Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 15 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 15 that Russian forces are advancing from the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) in order to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City.[100] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southeastern side of Mala Tokmachka.[101]Russian forces conducted offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Prymorske on August 15.[102] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Stepnohirsk.[103]Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces struck a highway near Orikhiv with a first-person view (FPV) drone, injuring one civilian.[104] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Plavni (west of Orikhiv).[105] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.[106] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 15 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked in the Kherson City direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road bridge and southeast of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on August 14 and 15.[107]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating on unspecified islands of the Dnipro River Delta.[108] Drone operators of an unspecified Russian VDV artillery brigade, likely the 52nd VDV Artillery Brigade, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River with Lancet loitering munitions.[109]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text for today's report on Russian air, missile, and drone campaign,Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)US President Donald Trump called Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 15 ahead of the Alaska summit and thanked Lukashenko for releasing 16 prisoners.[110] Trump stated that the United States and Belarus discussed the release of 1,300 additional prisoners, the Alaska summit, and plans for a future Trump-Lukashenko meeting. Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed that Lukashenko invited Trump and his family to visit Belarus and that Trump agreed.[111] Belta added that Trump and Lukashenko discussed bilateral relations, regional affairs, and war in Ukraine. Lukashenko recently met with US Special Envoy to Ukraine General Keith Kellogg on June 21 and requested an interview with Time Magazine published on August 8.[112]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/top-putin-aides-will-join-trump-meeting-AAWryfNUXRFLA6qJJf1o ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63871[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/updates-trump-putin-meet-alaska-summit-war-ukraine-2025-08-15/[3] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar053025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122924[6] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAgDtYYBoHGseNzklHvHtk1TURzZ0KSHNmP21v9MG8m_XImpjI4NLv9X5BdH5nI%3D&gaa_ts=689fc8c1&gaa_sig=lqBHP6Jl4yS655aH2kk0wEQU3lcfdQGiTb0jeXFT_SqEUJkDVooxf7pZCrbjnAS7nMINZOdLDF-hL8MlgUEM4A%3D%3D[7] https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/trump-putin-meeting-alaska-ukraine/#post-update-4b3acefa[8] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77793[9] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/66181[10] http://en.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843[11] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0[12] https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-putin-meeting-news-08-15-25#cmedgbprz00053b6vgezqijf0[13] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434[14] https://t.me/kpszsu/40434[15] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/23635 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1091620-raketna-ataka-po-dniprovskou-rajonu-e-poranenij/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/okupanty-vdaryly-balistychnoyu-raketoyu-po-selu-na-chernigivshhyni/; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/23420[16] https://t.me/prokuraturasumy/4475; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/432; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091144-rosijskij-dron-atakuvav-civilnu-avtivku-na-ohtirsini-zaginuv-colovik/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-sumshhyni-vorozhyj-bezpilotnyk-atakuvav-mashynu-medykiv-ye-zagyblyj/;[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1091688-armia-rf-vdarila-po-centru-sum-zdijnalas-pozeza/; https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/433[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472[19] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/trump-putin-alaska-summit/card/trump-says-drone-attacks-are-negotiating-strategy-ahead-of-talks-mI67MUFTzjj3gofLyPeV[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar07292025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025[21] https://ukraine.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2025-08/Ukraine%20-%20protection%20of%20civilians%20in%20armed%20conflict%20%28July%202025%29_ENG.pdf[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhaliyutsya-v-telegrami-shho-hlopczi-goli-j-bosi-rosijsku-infiltracziyu-poblyzu-dobropillya-zupynyly-j-vidsikly/[23] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/224[24] https://t.me/azov_media/7159[25] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22318[26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[29] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176012[31] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921[32] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922[33] https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/10352[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27842[36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9628[37] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021925[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27823[39] https://www.facebook.com/usofcom/posts/1138440454766888?ref=embed_post[40] https://t.me/babushkin30/8726[41] https://t.me/bazabazon/40058 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/40063[42] https://t.me/tass_agency/331268[43] https://t.me/tass_agency/331262[44] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9632[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32481[47] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97755[48] https://t.me/rybar/72833 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ;[49] https://t.me/severnnyi/4832 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472 ; https://t.me/rybar/72833[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/4836 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025[51] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97758[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/severnnyi/4832[54] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[56] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/yak-tilky-vyyavlyayut-zhyrnu-czil-tudy-praczyuyut-usi-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-ne-ryzykuyut-pokazuvaty-tehniku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[58] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[60] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1956027445997658237; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/16823; https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/1956353186375016773[61] https://t.me/tass_agency/331172; https://t.me/tass_agency/331195[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490   [63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/vorog-vykorystovuye-kytajski-namety-rosiyany-hochut-peretyagty-tehniku-cherez-chornyj-zherebecz/[64] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/kill-zony-popovnyuyutsya-tilamy-rosiyan-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupanty-nevdalo-pidkradayutsya-vnochi/; https://t.me/ombr66/1930%5C[65] https://t.me/operationall_space/5777; https://t.me/voin_dv/16465;[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/16464[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32490 [68] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/na-siverskomu-napryamku-okupanty-vtrychi-zbilshyly-vykorystannya-kabiv/[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822[71] https://t.me/mod_russia/55597[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1956107606587793677 ; https://t.me/z4lpr/1171[73] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32223[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472[75] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zamist-pereglyadu-futbolu-rosiyany-obraly-pomerty-v-toreczku-staleva-sotka-peremolola-kilka-vorozhyh-dyvizij/[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40868 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40813 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97743[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467[78] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30272; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9802; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22120[79] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922[80] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2922[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[82] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/15/vidsotkiv-50-vedut-ptashky-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-pokladayutsya-na-karty-v-telefoni/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O14SWvrF1AU[83] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/nazad-ty-200-vpyerod-uvidim-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-u-rosiyan-nevelykyj-vybir/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/zhodnyh-genialnyh-planiv-tilky-kilkist-operator-droniv-pro-shturmy-okupantiv/[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/15/giyena-na-kolesah-ukrayinskyj-robot-kamikadze-znis-ukriplennya-voroga-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BvAKBx5sY/[86] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2919[87] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921[88] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2921[89] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1956353087708205220; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/413[90] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705[91] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678[92] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1956275486776287456; https://t.me/voin_dv/16472; https://t.me/osintpen/1627; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9797[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40865; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15678; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66705; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175932; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16468[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16478[97] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97767[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822[99] https://t.me/voin_dv/16476[100] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472[101] https://t.me/wargonzo/28507  [102] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[103] https://t.me/dva_majors/77472; https://t.me/wargonzo/28507[104] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/23798[105] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32467[106] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97747[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27844; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27824; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27822[108] https://t.me/mod_russia/55578[109] https://t.me/mod_russia/55571[110] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://t.me/bbcrussian/84217; https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/115033133751064517[111] https://t.me/pul_1/17844; https://t.me/sotaproject/101786; https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-trump-and-family-to-visit-belarus-170549-2025/[112] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8-2025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2025

 

at 8/30/25 9:53pm

Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate TrotterAugust 30, 2025, 8:15 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on August 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces have seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 210 square kilometers and 13 settlements just in northern Sumy Oblast — likely also since March 2025. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces occupy 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 76 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 74 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Gerasimov additionally claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk and seized 10 settlements in the Lyman direction since March 2025: Myrne, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Lypove, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Serednie.[2] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized five settlements in the Velykomykhailivka direction since March 2025: Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Zaporizske.ISW assesses that Gerasimov is inflating most of his claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements since March 1. Gerasimov’s claims notably inflate Russian gains by roughly 1,200 square kilometers and 19 settlements. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained 212 square kilometers in northern Sumy Oblast, but only occupy nine settlements in northern Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 76.7 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 73.2 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 73 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces have only seized 6.3 percent of Kupyansk and that Russian forces have not seized all of Myrne, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Kolodyazi, Serednie, Vorone, Sichneve, or Komyshuvakha. Gerasimov is not the first senior Russian military official in recent days to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are currently seizing 600 to 700 square kilometers per month, but ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced only 440 to 500 kilometers per month in June, July, and August 2025.[3] The Kremlin is likely attempting to influence Western policymaking by creating the false impression that Russian advances and victory are inevitable. The Kremlin appears to be trying to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield. The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.The Kremlin's presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia's advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000).[4] The outlets used a predictive model to estimate that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers had died since the start of 2025. The outlets caveated that the RND data is imperfect for assessing Russian losses as relatives of deceased have at least 180 days to open an inheritance case for dead or presumed-dead Russian soldiers, so the last six months' worth of data (since about February 2025) is significantly incomplete. The outlets stated that the number of inheritance cases rose to 2,000 per week by mid-2025. There was a sharp increase in the second half of 2024 of Russian court cases recognizing missing persons as dead (including but not limited to missing in action [MIA] Russian soldiers whom the court deemed killed in action [KIA]). The outlets found that there was only an increase of cases involving missing persons in the RND since mid-2024 among men — not women — a phenomenon that the outlets stated can only be consistent with an increase in fatality rates in the war.Russian forces have been suffering from especially high casualties since Winter 2024, and these losses have come at disproportionately small territorial gains.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia's high losses are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.[6] Russia's gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia's rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare. Russian forces have been using light motorized vehicles (such as buggies, ATVs, and motorcycles) and infiltration tactics to make gains across the front, but Russia's rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace.[7] Russian forces have also not been able to consolidate and exploit their infiltrations, such as the recent penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[8] Any assessment of Russia's battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains. The Kremlin’s presentation of likely inflated territorial gain statistics without critical context for the losses for those gains is likely an attempt to manipulate perceptions about Russia’s military performance and buttress a longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia’s victory on the battlefield is inevitable. It is not. Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and 37 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast, the Black Sea, and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 537 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatlovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 510 drones; six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; and 32 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 24 drones struck seven locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 21 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring dozens.[10] Zelensky reported that Russian drones and missiles struck primarily civilian infrastructure in Volyn, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the Russian strike on Kyiv City lasted 10 hours and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure.[11] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported that the strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the US administration.[13] Russia will likely escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[14]The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree on August 29 abolishing the Presidential Administration's Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Department for Cross-Border Cooperation, instead creating the Department for Strategic Cooperation.[15] Kremlin Presidential Administration Deputy Head Dmitry Kozak supervised both these departments prior to their dissolution. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on August 29, citing two sources close to the Presidential Administration and another source in the office of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug, that Kozak is a candidate to become the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug.[16] Two additional sources indicated to Vedomosti that there are discussions within the Kremlin about Kozak's resignation from his Presidential Administration post — effectively pushing Kozak out of the Kremlin and Putin's inner circle. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after he advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[17] Kozak had been one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine and Moldova before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko after February 2022.[18] Reports indicating that the Kremlin is preparing to push an established senior Kremlin official from his position after expressing a desire to end the war in Ukraine are further indicators that the Kremlin has no plans to end the war, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly stated since the August 15 Alaska summit.[19]Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian elements, including from the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO), conducted drone strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast and the Krasnodar Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Syzran Refinery can produce 8.5 million tons of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, fuel oil, and bitumen per year and that the Krasnodar Refinery can produce three million tons of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel per year. The General Staff reported that there was a fire at the Syzran Refinery and numerous explosions at the Krasnodar Refinery. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows a fire at Krasnodar Refinery.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at Syzran Refinery.[22] The Krasnodar Krai Operation Headquarters claimed on August 30 that drone debris damaged a processing unit at Krasnodar Refinery and caused a 300-square meter fire at the enterprise.[23] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[24]A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 30 that the GUR destroyed a Russian explosives warehouse in Tula Oblast near the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces pyroxylin powder for small arms ammunition, artillery systems, and rocket engines.[25]Russian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year, following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position. Russian President Vladimir Putin extended on August 30 Bastrykin's term as the chairperson of the Investigative Committee until August 27, 2026.[26] Bastrykin was reportedly a candidate to become the chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, but refused the position during a closed-door meeting with Putin.[27] Bastrykin reportedly asked Putin to remain in his current position for another year.An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30. The Ukrainian National Police reported on August 30 that an unidentified shooter killed Parubiy in Lviv City.[28] Sources reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the shooter shot Parubiy eight times, was wearing a Glovo delivery service uniform, and fled the scene on an electric bike.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities are investigating the murder.[30]A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian National Guard's 1st Azov Corps reported that a soldier of the Russian 95th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) murdered an unarmed Ukrainian man standing in his yard in southeastern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and published footage of the murder.[31] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that "intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[32] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in Ukraine as part of the wider military modus operandi.[33]Key Takeaways:The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable.The Kremlin's presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia's advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield.Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine.Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in RussiaRussian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position.An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30.A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationSee topline text for Ukrainian strikes in Russia.Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the northern Sumy Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on August 29 to 30.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka.[35]A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes prevented elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) from attacking near Novyi Put (northwest of Sumy City across the international border).[36] The milblogger complained that the Russian military command frequently sends Russian soldiers across the international border to assaults despite heavy Ukrainian indirect fire.Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Prilipka on August 29 and 30.[37]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces became more active north of Kharkiv City along the Kharkiv City-Belgorod City railway line and that Russian forces are fighting toward the Prudyanka, Hraniv, and Slatyne railway stations on this railway line.[38]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[39]Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 30.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces likely no longer hold positions in Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk and immediately south of Myrove) and likely also seized Sobolivka.[40] A Russian milblogger corroborated Trehubov's reporting by claiming that Russian forces have not completely seized Myrove and that the area northwest of Myrove is a contested "gray" zone.[41]Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Fyholivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 29 and 30.[42]The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 30 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate into Kupyansk by moving through sewer lines into the settlement.[43] The commander noted that Russian forces continue to attempt to establish makeshift means to transport infantry across the Oskil River.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[44]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Olhivka and toward Druzhelyubivka and entered Maliivka and Andriivka (all southeast of Borova).[45]Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Andriivka and Maliivka, and toward Druzhelyubivka and Olhivka on August 29 and 30.[46]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Hlushchenkove and Ridkodub (all north of Lyman).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized the O-0527 Korovii Yar-Shandryholove highway and advanced east of Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman).[48]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman and toward Shandryholove and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on August 29 and 30.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shandryholove, Ridkodub, and  Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[50]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian infantry are leveraging People's Republic of China (PRC)-produced thermal imaging tents to conceal their heat signatures to approach forward positions in the Lyman direction.[51] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 29 that Russian forces are conducting simultaneous assaults against forward positions and operations to infiltrate into the rear of Ukrainian forces.[52]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[53]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk operations on August 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 29 and 30.[54]A noncommissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on August 30 that Russian forces are operating with a four-battalion system in which three battalions are operating on the frontline and actively fighting against one Ukrainian battalion, while Russian forces always keep the fourth battalion in reserve.[55] The Ukrainian NCO stated that each Russian brigade has an electronic warfare (EW) company tasked with detecting and suppressing Ukrainian drones. The Ukrainian NCO stated that Russian forces usually launch over 200 artillery shells at Ukrainian forces per day in the Siversk direction and that Russian forces expertly hide the artillery systems from Ukrainian drones, forcing Ukrainian forces to expend large numbers of drones to strike each artillery system.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[56]Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to the western outskirts of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[57]Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 29 and 30.[58]A Russian milblogger rejected claims that Russian forces advanced into Kostyantynivka (west of Chasiv Yar) from the east.[59]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[60]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and northeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[61]Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Kleban Byk, and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 29 and 30.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly reconnoitering and striking the Ukrainian forces near Kleban Byk.[63]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage filmed on August 28 and published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[64]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Vilne, and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Sofiivka, Shakhove, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Mayak, and Zapovidne and in the Kapitalna Mine (just west of Novoekonomichne); east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on August 29 and 30.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Pokrovsk itself, near Volodymyrivka, and from Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]An NCO of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 30 that Russian forces are attempting to advance and accumulate in small assault groups and have been pulling forward a large number of self-propelled artillery systems since about August 22.[67] The NCO stated that Russian forces suffered heavy artillery losses due to Ukrainian drone strikes and are using tanks as artillery systems. The Ukrainian NCO stated that these Russian tanks engage in shoot-and-scoot tactics by driving to firing points and driving away after firing. The NCO stated that Russian forces in this direction are increasingly using unmanned ground systems (UGVs) for logistics and are attempting to use motorcycles and buggies to transport ammunition for use in later assaults.Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[68] A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[69]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka and on the southwestern outskirts of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[70]Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on August 29 and 30.[71]Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[72]Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized Komyshuvakha.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized the settlement.[74]Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Maliivka, Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, and Zaporizske on August 29 and 30.[75]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and elements of the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka and Sosnivka (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[76] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[77] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Berezove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[78]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 30 that Russian forces advanced towards Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[79]Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and toward Novoivanivka on August 30.[80]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, and Plavni on August 29 and 30.[81]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne [VDV] Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[82]Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 30 but did not advance.[83]A Russian milblogger who frequently reports on Russian indirect fire missions against western Kherson Oblast claimed on August 29 that Russian forces will soon increase the number of artillery crews and strikes against the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[84]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[85]Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows smoke, reportedly from an explosion, near the Simferopol International Airport in occupied Aeroflotskyi, Crimea.[86] The cause of the explosion is unclear.Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025[4] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/29/2000-chelovek-v-nedelyu-stolko-teryala-rossiya-na-pike-svoego-nastupleniya-v-donbasse[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112424;[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025; 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https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103130-persij-korpus-ngu-azov-zafiksuvav-fakt-zagibeli-ludini-v-civilnomu-odazi-u-pokrovskomu-rajoni-na-doneccini/[32] https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33158 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4975[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33158[36] https://pikabu dot ru/story/boytsyi_2_msp_vks_vozle_vechnogo_ognya_v_np_kozinka_12659512 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4977[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33192 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4975 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982[38] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982[39] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982[40] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1102928-bila-kupanska-zsu-zvilnili-selo-z-akogo-rosiani-kontroluvali-trasu-na-misto/[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41590[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/netypove-pronyknennya-yak-rosiyany-namagayutsya-forsuvaty-richku/[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41604[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67111[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67109 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/24479[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67110 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67112 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172[51] https://suspilne dot media/1102758-rosia-vdarila-po-zaporizzu-ermak-zustrivsa-z-vitkoffom-u-nu-jorku-1284-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756544837&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/29/perekydannya-uskladnene-chornym-zherebczem-poblyzu-lymanu-voroga-vidbyvayut-na-peredovij-ta-v-tylu/[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/78461[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33180[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/stysnuly-motoczykletnyj-bataljon-zsu-pro-protydiyu-taktyczi-voroga/[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41620[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41622[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416;[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41622[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9897; https://t.me/blak93/11019[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33157[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41607; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14236[64] (GRAPHIC): https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1961810466218348924; https://t.me/azov_media/7219[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25443[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25443[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/okupanty-pochaly-yizdyty-na-monokolesi-ta-vykorystovuvaty-tanky-yak-artyleriyu/[68] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid04v1rVpW9cgFikRVnvRpoZwqCaPV3XBF3WCLcR1kZ9PFYDYAL8j42d9ZHDgnBoavgl; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2952[69] https://t.me/opforukraine/176 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22545[70] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32296[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865;[72] https://t.me/osintpen/1707; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9899; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1961762625156763998; https://t.me/voin_dv/16677[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/56061[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/16677; https://t.me/dva_majors/78497[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/rybar/73216; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2952; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67107[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/16667; https://t.me/voin_dv/16675[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/16671[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16680[79] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67107[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12898; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465[82] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7521[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12898[84] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28659[85] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28654[86] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1961742404710441368; https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1961719020115181945; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/85450; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/explosion-heard-near-airport-in-simferopol-thick-column-of-smoke-in-the-sky/

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Adversary Entente Task Force Update, August 27, 2025

 

at 8/27/25 3:16pm

Kelly Campa, Daniel Shats, Karolina Hird, and Grace Mappes, with Nicholas Carl2 pm ET, August 26Key takeaways:The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal following the Israel-Iran war. The PRC has a history of providing Iran with material support, including dual-use technologies and chemical components, to support missile production.North Korean state media released combat footage of North Korean troops fighting in Kursk Oblast, Russia, highlighting the tactical and technical lessons that North Korea could learn from supporting the Russian war against Ukraine.Iran and Belarus have continued to deepen their ties, especially regarding military and military industrial cooperation. This growing cooperation will ultimately benefit Russia and help sustain its war against Ukraine.A Ukrainian investigative report confirmed the depths of the PRC-Russian cooperation on drone production. Both Beijing and Moscow could benefit considerably from their collaboration in the field.US and Western pressure on the PRC has thus far failed to stop it from economically supporting Russia and Iran. The PRC will likely continue to do so as long as it calculates that the associated risks are negligible.Russia proposed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that would reportedly delay the potential reimposition of UN sanctions against Iran, demonstrating how Russia uses its UNSC role to provide critical diplomatic cover for Iran.Defense and Military-Technical CooperationThe People’s Republic of China (PRC) may be helping Iran rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal following the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, according to Israeli sources. Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter said on July 24 that Israel has observed “disturbing signs” that the PRC may be aiding Iran with its ballistic missile program, including by providing certain “chemicals” and “rebuilding and reorganizing the ballistic missile program.”[1] Israeli outlet Yedioth Ahronoth (Ynet) published a report on August 15 saying that Tehran may be looking to Beijing to rebuild its missile arsenal, citing unspecified Western intelligence agencies.[2]Iran has previously looked to the PRC for support with its ballistic missile program, and the PRC has historically obliged. PRC-based entities have transferred dual-use technologies to Iran for decades, which Iran has mostly used to support its ballistic missile development.[3] The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission published a report in June 2021, saying that it found that Iran used PRC-origin technology in the missiles with which it attacked US troops in Iraq in January 2020.[4] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported in June 2025 that Iran ordered “thousands of tons” of ammonium perchlorate that could fuel “hundreds” of ballistic missiles, which Iran and its Axis of Resistance could use.[5] WSJ noted that its sources expected the shipment to reach Iran within a few months. The Israel-Iran war erupted a week later, however, and ensuing Israeli strikes significantly degraded Iran’s missile forces.[6]The Financial Times reported in January 2025 that two Iranian-flagged cargo ships delivered over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate—a key ingredient in the production of ammonium perchlorate—from ports in the PRC to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in Bandar Abbas, Iran, highlighting previous such cooperation between the PRC and Iran.[7] These reports came as ISW separately assessed that Iran may be looking increasingly to the PRC for military support since Russia declined to provide anything meaningful during the Israel-Iran war.[8] The PRC is unlikely to acknowledge growing military cooperation with Iran outright. It has, however, recently emphasized its continued right to sell military material to friendly countries.[9]North Korean state media aired footage for the first time on August 22 showing North Korean forces operating alongside Russian troops in Kursk Oblast, Russia, highlighting the longstanding ISW warning that North Korea could gain valuable tactical and technical lessons from its involvement in fighting Ukraine.[10] North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with North Korean commanding officers, who participated in the “overseas” operations to “liberate the Kursk Region of the Russian Federation,” in Pyongyang on August 21.[11] North Korean state media posted pictures on August 22 of Kim pinning medals on the photos of North Korean soldiers who died in combat in Kursk Oblast.[12] Images of the ceremony show at least 100 North Korean soldiers killed in action—the first North Korean confirmation of casualties suffered in Kursk Oblast.[13] Ukrainian intelligence has estimated that North Korea sustained around 5,000 soldier casualties in Kursk Oblast as of August 2025.[14]North Korean state outlet Korean Central Television (KCTV) released footage on August 22 as part of a ceremonial concert for North Korean troops who fought in Kursk Oblast, showing North Korean soldiers in combat—sometimes in North Korean-only units and sometimes alongside Russian forces and prominent Russian commanders.[15] The footage includes several tactical and technical artifacts that underline the modern combat conditions that North Korean troops experienced while fighting in Kursk Oblast, including clips of North Korean soldiers operating first-person view (FPV) drones and installing counter-drone measures to protect against Ukrainian drone strikes.[16] One clip shows Russian soldiers showing North Korean troops how to operate a captured US Mk-19 grenade launcher, and other clips showcase North Korean troops using a range of Russian- and North Korean-origin weapons in combat. The KCTV footage also shows North Korean troops executing fire team-level clearing exercises around buildings.Kim likely agreed to send upwards of 12,000 North Korean soldiers to fight alongside Russian forces for them to acquire the sort of tactical and technical experience depicted in the KCTV footage.[17] South Korea’s National Intelligence Service warned in October 2024 that North Korean forces were interested in receiving training from Russian forces on drone operations and on how to integrate drones into wider offensive operations.[18] The KCTV footage depicts several instances of North Korean forces operating FPV drones, which have become a critical component in shaping the battlespace in Ukraine. FPV drones are generally inexpensive, easy to operate, and have an average range of 20 kilometers (sometimes more or less, depending on the model), therefore representing an attractive and low-cost addition to the North Korean arsenal. North Korea’s integration of FPV tactics is likely to pose substantial security risks on the wider Korean Peninsula as North Korea likely seeks to institutionalize lessons learned into its wider doctrine. North Korean forces also received exposure to various anti-drone techniques and technologies from Russian forces.[19] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov recently remarked that North Korea’s involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine has “transformed” the North Korean military, echoing ISW’s warnings.[20]Iran and Belarus have continued to deepen ties, especially regarding military and military industrial matters.[21] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk, Belarus, on August 20 to discuss expanding bilateral cooperation and sanctions mitigation efforts.[22] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding intended to strengthen bilateral trade, military technical cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[23] Belarusian state media reported that Pezeshkian and Lukashenko agreed to work toward codifying a strategic partnership treaty.[24]Lukashenko said during the meeting that Belarus is ready to expand “military technical collaboration” with Iran, though Lukashenko did not specify what this cooperation could entail.[25] Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) warned on August 22 that Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare (EW) equipment that Israel damaged during the June 2025 war.[26] The SZRU did not specify how Belarus could help Iran restore damaged assets, and Belarus likely lacks the domestic capabilities to do so. Russia effectively controls Belarus' air defense assets within an integrated air defense system, and Russia's delays in providing S-400 systems to Iran have been a source of friction between Russia and Iran.[27] Iran may seek to increase defense industrial cooperation with Belarus, given that Israeli strikes also targeted Iranian domestic production capabilities for air defense components.[28] Belarus reportedly produces missile components for Russian air defense systems, including S-300 and S-400 systems, and Iran may hope to secure similar components from Belarus.[29] Such an arrangement would mirror the way that Russia currently uses Belarus’ industrial base to source munitions and other dual-use components to augment Russian military output and sustain its war effort in Ukraine.[30] Iran and Belarus may additionally further collaborate on drone production; Lukashenko announced in March 2025 that Russia would open a drone production facility in Belarus.[31] Iranian engineers previously traveled to Belarus in May 2023 to reportedly examine modifying local factories to produce Iranian drones, like Shahed-type models, for Russia.[32]Iran’s deepening cooperation with Belarus ultimately benefits Russia and helps sustain the Russian war effort against Ukraine, given Minsk’s role as Moscow’s key sanctions evasion partner. The SZRU noted that looser restrictions on Belarus’ military sector may make Belarus a more compelling partner for Iran compared to Russia.[33] Iranian officials have more publicly voiced discontent with Russian military support for Iran since Russia’s non-response to the Israel-Iran war.[34] Iran’s expansion of ties with Belarus will not sideline Russia as Iran’s primary military partner, however, and will simply allow Iran to diversify the manner in which it interacts with Moscow. ISW has long assessed that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus, and Iran may seek to benefit from this de facto annexation without having to circumvent the same suite of sanctions that are currently levied against Russia.[35]The United States and its European partners should view Belarus’ cooperation with Iran as an extension of Russo-Iranian engagement, with similar impacts and potential consequences. Russian efforts to de-facto annex Belarus ensure that Russia reaps any benefits brought to Belarus from cooperation with Iran.[36] Expanding military technical or defense industrial cooperation between Iran and Belarus will likely directly support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, given how the Kremlin has subsumed elements of Belarus' defense industrial base.[37] Iranian economic cooperation that reinforces the Belarusian economy bolsters Russia’s ability to leverage Belarus as a key sanctions evasion partner.[38] Iranian-Belarusian economic cooperation furthermore takes place within and reinforces Russian-led initiatives, including the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and efforts to develop the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).[39] Russia similarly uses Belarus’s relations with other Russian partners, such as the PRC, as a way to circumvent international sanctions and use engagement with these partners to support its war effort.[40] The United States and European partners should endeavor to levy the same suite of sanctions on Belarus as they do against Russia in order for sanctions on Russia to bear weight.  Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cooperation  A recent report confirms the extent to which Russia is reliant on PRC-based entities for its production of long-range strike drones and its broader war effort. Ukraine-based, open source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight published an investigation on August 21 indicating that Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), which produces much of Russia's long-range strike drones, is dependent upon PRC-based entities for at least 41 components for its long-range strike drones.[41] These long-range strike drones include Russian Geran-2 and Geran-3 strike drones (Russian-produced variants of the Iranian Shahed drones) and Garpiya drones (Shahed variants with PRC components). Frontelligence Insight identified several companies as key suppliers of drone components to Russia, including:Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System, which resells engines to Russia from the Xiamen Limbach Aviation Engine Co.Redlepus TSK Vector Industrial Shenzhen Co Ltd, which exports electronic and mechanical drone components primarily to the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol that manufactures Garpiya drones.Juhang Aviation Technology Co., Ltd, which sells aviation spare parts, materials, and components to Russia through the Russian TSK Vector intermediary company.Jinhua Hairun Power Technology Company Ltd, which primarily exports drone engines to Russia but also exports engine components, control systems, electric motors, telecommunications gear, and video systems.Shandong Xinyilu International Trade Co., Ltd, which exports goods including carbon fiber, engine parts, batteries, antennas, and electronic components to intermediary companies that import goods for the ASEZ.Fujian Jingke Technology Co., Ltd, which ships carburetors for drone engines to the ASEZ.Mile Hao Xiang Technology Co., Ltd, which produces aircraft engines found in Gerbera-type drones (a decoy drone resembling Shahed drones).Suzhou Ecod Precision Manufacturing Co. Ltd, which ships custom aluminum parts to a Russian firm supplying drone components to the ASEZ.Shenzhen Jinduobang Technology Co., Ltd, which produces high-tech electronic components and batteries and has shipped goods to Russia explicitly labelled to support Russia's war in Ukraine.Frontelligence Insight assessed that Russia's claims that it has localized the production of drones used in the war in Ukraine are Russia’s in-country assembly of drones using PRC imported components. ISW continues to assess that Russia's war effort in Ukraine remains dependent upon support from its allies, particularly in weapons components and sanctions evasion schemes.[42] The PRC remains a direct enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine, particularly of Russia's long-range strike campaigns that disproportionately affect Ukrainian civilians. Russian forces use Shahed-type strike drones—including the Shahed-131/136, Geran-2/3, and Garpiya drones—during nightly strikes that target Ukrainian defense and civilian infrastructure, and often utilize these drones for strike tactics that overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.[43] Russia uses decoy drones, such as Gerberas, to augment the size of these strike packages, force Ukrainian troops to take the time to distinguish between the decoy drones and strike drones, and increase the likelihood of the strike drones and missiles hitting their targets.[44] Russia has also equipped its strike drones with warheads designed to inflict maximum damage and equipped the decoy drones with warheads that can detonate when falling or when civilians and emergency responders handle drone wreckage.[45] The PRC is directly enabling the use of all these drones and strike tactics.Russia is also investing in a dedicated PRC-Russia trade hub at the ASEZ that will likely further facilitate the import of PRC drone components for Russian strike drones. The ASEZ announced in March 2023 a new project to construct the Deng Xiaoping logistics complex at the ASEZ's Ethylene 600 industrial park, which aimed to facilitate trade between the PRC and the Republic of Tatarstan (where the ASEZ is located) as well as neighboring Russian federal subjects.[46] The ASEZ planned to complete the first stage of construction in the second quarter of 2024 and complete the second stage of construction and fully launch the logistics hub in 2025. The first train importing goods from the PRC to the Deng Xiaoping logistics center arrived in September 2024, and the first train exporting Russian goods to the PRC from this logistics hub departed in October 2024.[47] The Deng Xiaoping logistics center fully launched its first stage of operations by November 2024, with six railway tracks and a processing capacity of up to eight container trains per day and 2.4 million tons of cargo per year.[48] Local Tatarstan official Kamil Nazmiev said in July 2025 that Russia will complete construction of the Deng Xiaoping logistics center in 2026 and that the total investment in the center is 51.5 billion rubles (around 639 million US dollars).[49] The Deng Xiaoping trade hub illustrates the links that Tatarstan already shares with the PRC. Russia is likely to use these logistics links to further import needed dual-use components for its DIB.Russia and the PRC are also increasing cooperation in drone technology and tactics. Russian Emergency Situations Minister Alexander Kurenkov and PRC Deputy Emergency Situations Minister Xu Jiaai signed an agreement on August 20 on cooperation in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) development as part of a broader agreement to cooperate in emergency prevention and response.[50] Kurenkov emphasized that Russia is ready to contribute to developing drone technology with the PRC and that Russia is sending specialists to PRC drone factories. Russia and the PRC will likely expand cooperation in drone technology and tactics beyond preventing or responding to emergencies. ISW recently assessed that Russia and the PRC may be setting conditions for the PRC to become involved in drone production in Russia, particularly at the ASEZ, and the August 20 Russia-PRC agreement indicates that Russia and the PRC may also be setting conditions for Russian involvement in PRC drone production.[51] Russia and the PRC are already reportedly collaborating on drone production within the PRC, which is providing Beijing with an opportunity to learn direct lessons on the development and production of combat drones from a partner that is actively using such systems in combat.[52] ISW has repeatedly assessed that Russia's partners, particularly members of the Adversary Entente, are directly benefiting from Russia's military and technological knowledge obtained through Russia's war in Ukraine.[53]Economic and Financial CooperationUS and Western pressure on the PRC thus far has failed to stop PRC economic support for Russia and Iran, including via purchases of sanctioned oil. US President Donald Trump announced on August 6 that the United States would double tariffs on Indian goods from 25 percent to 50 percent due to India’s purchase of Russian oil and weapons. The new tariffs will take effect on August 27.[54] The threat of the tariffs prompted Indian refiners to briefly pause their purchase of Russian Urals Crude oil near the end of July, though they reportedly resumed purchases by August 18.[55] PRC refiners quickly purchased some of the relinquished oil shipments during this pause, nearly doubling the PRC’s average daily imports of Russian Urals crude oil from 40,000 to 75,000 barrels per day thus far in August. Energy analysts told Bloomberg that PRC refiners likely booked 10-15 cargoes of Urals crude for October and November.[56] This increased purchase is a very small portion of the PRC’s total purchases of Russian oil, however, which averaged well over 2 million barrels per day in 2024.[57] The PRC receives most deliveries of Russian oil through the Russian Far East, while Urals crude is shipped through the Baltic and Black Seas.[58] The PRC’s new purchases also did not make up for the short-term shortfall in Indian oil imports. Beijing is very likely to remain Russia’s top oil importer but is unlikely to substantially increase purchases purely to support Russia if Indian imports of Russian oil fall in the long run, unless Russia offers sizable additional discounts. India and Russia have signaled that India will continue to buy Russian oil in the long run, though Bloomberg reported on August 26 that some Indian refiners are planning to slightly reduce their purchases.[59]The US Department of State and the US Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions on August 21 targeting Iran’s oil exports, which included sanctions against PRC companies. The State Department sanctioned Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products Co., which operates Dongjiakou Port in Shandong Province, and Yangshan Shengang International Petroleum Storage and Transportation Co., which operates Yangshan Port in Zhejiang Province. The State Department stated that both ports had received Iranian crude oil on US-sanctioned ships and described Dongjiakou Port as the largest entry point into the PRC for Iranian crude oil by volume.[60] The Treasury sanctions targeted owners of ships that transported Iranian oil to the PRC, including two Hong Kong-based companies.[61] PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning condemned the “illegal unilateral sanctions” on August 22 and defended “normal cooperation between countries and Iran” under international law.[62] Past US sanctions targeting Iran’s “shadow fleet” of foreign-flagged tankers and PRC independent refineries have made temporary dents in PRC purchases of Iranian oil.[63] PRC state-owned Shandong Port Group banned shipments of sanctioned oil at its ports in January 2025, forcing shipments to reroute and delay their journeys.[64] The company’s home province of Shandong is the destination of most sanctioned oil to the PRC and is home to many independent “teapot” refineries that rely on access to Iran’s significantly discounted oil to stay profitable. PRC imports of Iranian oil appear to have recovered quickly, however, via alternate terminals owned by other companies.[65] The PRC continues to be the largest purchaser of Iranian oil by far.[66] The PRC purchases around 90 percent of Iran’s oil, which only amounts to an estimated 11 percent of PRC oil imports. The PRC, by contrast, purchases around 47 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports, which is about 20 percent of its imports.[67]The PRC has devised effective sanctions evasion methods to continue trade with Russia and Iran without incurring serious harm from US and international sanctions. Seaborne shipments of sanctioned oil, which constitute the vast majority of the PRC’s oil imports, are often shipped on foreign-flagged “shadow fleet” ships and transferred to other ships mid-journey, especially in the case of Iranian oil.[68] PRC customs data has not reported any oil imports from Iran since 2022 and instead falsely reports such imports as originating in Malaysia or other countries. Ships carrying the oil often “spoof” their transponder signals to disguise their true sailing path. The PRC pays for the shipments through small, US-sanctioned banks, using renminbi rather than US dollars, which minimizes exposure to the US financial system and protects larger banks from sanctions. The PRC and Russia have also collaborated on ways to evade sanctions in other kinds of trade, with the European Union estimating in May 2025 that the PRC is responsible for 80 percent of circumventions of sanctions on Russia.[69] Russian State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin began a visit to the PRC on August 25, ahead of a state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin, and said that his meeting agenda included discussing how to counteract sanctions pressure and expand trade relations, suggesting that the Russia-PRC relationship remains a strategic economic priority for the Kremlin.[70]The PRC has been able to ignore external pressure to stop trading with Iran and Russia because it is a critical trading partner for most of the countries behind the sanctions regimes. US President Trump has not levied the same punitive tariffs on the PRC as he did on India for purchasing Russian oil. European countries are likewise unwilling to seriously jeopardize their trade relationship with Beijing, even though Russia relies on the PRC to sustain its war in Ukraine.[71] Sanctions on major PRC banks and other institutions that do business with both Russia and Western countries could seriously disrupt international supply chains.[72]The PRC is unlikely to meaningfully reduce its purchase of discounted Russian and Iranian oil until its other trading partners credibly threaten punitive measures that exceed the economic benefits of purchasing the discounted oil. The PRC’s outsized role in supporting Russia’s and Iran’s economies gives it significant leverage over both countries, but it has not appeared to significantly exercise this leverage for geopolitical ends. It has instead enjoyed highly discounted prices while maintaining a diverse range of other suppliers, suggesting that economic calculus primarily drives its energy purchases. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on July 30 that the PRC will ensure its energy supply according to its national interests and that coercion and threats of tariffs will not achieve anything.[73] The PRC’s overall trade volume with both the United States and the European Union is much higher than its trade volume with Russia or Iran; however, this consideration may have already restrained Beijing from more openly supporting Russia’s war.[74] The PRC may reduce its support for Iran or Russia if it faces the risk of seriously jeopardizing its other trade relations, particularly with Europe.Political and Diplomatic Cooperation   Russia proposed a draft resolution that would reportedly further delay the potential imposition of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[75] Unspecified sources told UK-based Amwaj Media that Russia submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC that would extend UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and includes an extension of the snapback mechanism on the condition that it cannot be triggered for six months.[76] Triggering the snapback mechanism would reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran—an outcome that Iran and its partners are working hard to avoid. The Russian proposal to extend the snapback mechanism is similar to a proposal that the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) offered to Iran in July 2025.[77] The E3 offered to extend its August 31 deadline to trigger the snapback mechanism as long as Iran fulfilled certain conditions, including cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resuming nuclear talks with the United States, and “accounting” for its 60-percent enriched uranium stockpile.[78]Russia's proposal reportedly lacks any preconditions for Iran and prevents the E3 from triggering the snapback mechanism for six months, which Iran likely views as a more favorable outcome than the E3’s promise to trigger the mechanism by August 31.[79] Iran has repeatedly opposed the E3 proposal.[80] Iran is additionally very unlikely to meet the E3’s conditions before the E3’s end-of-August deadline, and the Russian draft resolution is therefore likely a much more attractive option for Tehran.[81] Iran has not yet expressed public support for the Russian draft resolution. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Esmail Baghaei said on August 26 that Iran is reviewing the text of the proposal.[82] An Iranian delegation met with E3 officials on August 26 to discuss potential snapback sanctions and a snapback mechanism deadline extension.[83] An unspecified source told Axios that Iran offered “very little to work with” towards meeting the E3’s conditions.[84]The Russian proposal likely reflects coordinated diplomatic efforts between Russia, Iran, and possibly the PRC to counter the imposition of snapback sanctions. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi discussed potential snapback sanctions on August 25 in separate phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, respectively.[85] Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi also called PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on August 24 to discuss a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue.[86] Unspecified informed sources told Amwaj that the PRC would co-sponsor the Russian draft resolution.[87]Russia’s proposal to extend the snapback mechanism highlights Russia's routine use of its position on the UNSC to provide Iran with diplomatic cover on the international stage.[88] Russia will likely continue its diplomatic support for Iran if the E3 triggers the snapback mechanism. Araghchi told Iranian state media on August 14 that Iran, Russia, and the PRC have “tools to respond” if trilateral efforts to stop the imposition of snapback sanctions fail.[89] It remains unclear how Russia or the PRC will adapt their economic and military support for Iran to mitigate the effects of UNSC sanctions, however. Russia and the PRC’s responses to the imposition of snapback sanctions will serve as powerful indicators of how the Adversary Entente may rebalance in response to rising pressure from the United States, European Union, and other UN member states.[1] https://www.voachinese dot com/a/exclusive-israeli-envoy-to-us-warns-china-may-be-helping-iran-restore-its-missile-program-20250725/8050129.html; https://x.com/VOAChinese/status/1948869555096371281[2] https://www.ynetnews dot com/article/s1lk1fhdlx; https://www.newsweek.com/israel-report-iran-china-missile-boost-2114156[3] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf[4] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf[5] https://www.wsj.com/world/iran-orders-material-from-china-for-hundreds-of-ballistic-missiles-1e874701[6] https://isw.pub/IranSpecialReportPM062425; https://isw.pub/IranSpecialReportPM062125; https://www.twz.com/news-features/one-third-of-irans-long-range-missile-launchers-destroyed-israel-claims; 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https://energyandcleanair.org/june-2025-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/[68] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/27/china-us-sanctions-shadow-fleet-top-iranian-oil-buyer-trade.html[69] https://www.rferl.org/a/german-report-eu-china-russia-sanctions-avoidance-80-percent/33425633.html ; https://merics.org/en/comment/china-russia-trade-asymmetrical-yet-indispensable ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/24/business/russia-sanctions-ukraine-war.html[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russian-parliamentary-speaker-discuss-countering-sanctions-beijing-2025-08-25/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/64345[71] https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/11/nato-summit-russia-ukraine-war-china-enabler ; https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/The%20Strengthening%20China-Russia%20Nexus.pdf[72] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/24/business/russia-sanctions-ukraine-war.html[73] https://www.mfa.gov dot cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202507/t20250730_11679709.shtml[74] https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/CHN ; 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[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, August 8, 2025

 

at 8/27/25 1:36am

Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.Hezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah.[1] Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term. The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025.[2] Hezbollah supporters protested in several Beirut suburbs, southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and other Hezbollah strongholds in Lebanon.[3] The majority of these areas are largely comprised of Lebanese Shia civilians, who have fervently backed Hezbollah since the 1980s.[4] Hezbollah has long exploited the Lebanese government’s shortcomings to deeply entrench itself in Lebanon.[5] Hezbollah was able to assuage domestic discontent and gain widespread support and influence following the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War despite suffering military losses.[6] Hezbollah has used financial incentives, including pensions for families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, and social services to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia civilians.[7]The Lebanese government has undertaken steps to inhibit Hezbollah’s ability to provide financial benefits to its supporters, which could decrease support for Hezbollah in the mid- to long-term. The Lebanese government and the United States have taken steps to restrict the flow of money to Hezbollah to prevent its reconstitution since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in November 2024.[8] Hezbollah, which quickly rebuilt Lebanon and provided a social safety net for Lebanese civilians after the 2006 war, is struggling to reconstruct damaged infrastructure and reconstitute its forces following the conflict in late 2024.[9] Hezbollah has also struggled to maintain its financial commitments to fighters. Hezbollah’s primary financial institution, Al Qard al Hassan, claimed that it would continue to provide financial resources to its supporters despite restrictions placed on it by the Lebanese Central Bank. Al Qard al Hassan has not resumed payments to fighters since June 2025.[10] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah, but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time.  Key TakeawaysHezbollah supporters held protests in 16 locations across Lebanon on August 7 in response to the Lebanese government’s support for disarming Hezbollah. Public support for Hezbollah presents a significant obstacle to decreasing Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon in the short term.State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).IranSupreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Abdollah Hajji Sadeghi, implicitly expressed support on August 8 for negotiations with the United States.[11] Sadeghi stated that “wise negotiations under the supervision of the Supreme Leader” could support Iran’s fight against Israel. Iran has not softened its stance on domestic uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point between Iran and the United States in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War. Multiple Iranian officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi, have insisted that Iran will continue domestic uranium enrichment despite the war.[12] The United States has maintained that domestic uranium enrichment is a non-starter in negotiations.[13]IraqState of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki told Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati during a phone call on August 8 that Iraq will not allow the United States or Israel to disarm the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[14] Velayati expressed Iranian support for the Axis of Resistance. The phone call occurred amid ongoing discussions about restricting arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the PMF.[15] The Iraqi parliament is yet to vote on a law that would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the PMF’s structure and responsibilities.[16] Maliki and Velayati’s phone call also comes after the Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah.[17] Maliki emphasized the importance of the PMF’s existence in the face of US and Israeli efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[18] CTP-ISW assessed on July 29 that Iran likely seeks to preserve the strength of its Iraqi partners in the Axis of Resistance in the wake of almost two years of conflict, which has severely weakened Iran and other Axis of Resistance members.[19]The Ya Ali Popular Formations, which is likely an Iranian-backed Iraqi militia, announced on August 7 that it met with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Sarkhat al Quds to discuss the presence of US forces in Iraq.[20] The Ya Ali Popular Formations stated that it has “adopted the file” of US bases in Iraq. The Ya Ali Popular Formations announced its establishment in March 2025 and attacked individuals accused of being affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) in Baghdad amid the March 2025 Syrian coastal violence.[21] The Ya Ali Popular Formations did not provide any evidence that the individuals it attacked were affiliated with HTS. The Ya Ali Popular Formations and Kataib Sarkhat al Quds released a joint statement on August 7 that discussed a variety of issues, including these militias' support for the Popular Mobilization Forces.[22]SyriaThe Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) held a conference on August 8 in which it reaffirmed its goal to establish a decentralized system under the Syrian transitional government. AANES is the governing authority in northeastern Syria and is affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). AANES held the “Unity of Position for the Components of Northeastern Syria” conference in Hasakah City on August 8, which was attended by over 400 AANES representatives, tribal leaders, and religious figures.[23]The participants released a statement calling for a new democratic constitution to guarantee political pluralism, the equal participation of all Syrian communities in the government, and a decentralized governance system that respects northeastern Syria’s cultural and geographic differences.[24] The Syrian transitional government and SDF signed an eight-point framework agreement in March 2025 that outlined principles for the SDF’s integration into the Syrian state, but have not made meaningful progress toward integrating the SDF into the government.[25] The Syrian transitional government continues to demand that the SDF dissolve prior to integrating into the Syrian state, unlike other armed factions that have joined the Syrian Defense Ministry without adjusting their command structures.The participation of Druze and Alawite leaders in the August 8 conference highlights that these communities share many of the demands and grievances that the Syrian Kurdish community has toward the Syrian transitional government. Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al Hijri and Alawite leader Ghazal Ghazal attended the conference remotely.[26] Hijri emphasized in a pre-recorded statement that "Syria’s future can only be achieved through dialogue among its components.”[27] The Druze, Kurdish, and Alawite communities have a shared distrust of the transitional government given that they are skeptical of the government’s willingness and ability to protect their respective communities. This distrust, compounded by the transitional government’s failure to hold its forces accountable for abuses against minority communities, has deterred Druze militias and Kurdish groups from disarming and integrating into the Syrian state. Hijri has rejected unification with the Syrian transitional government and established a “temporary” autonomous government in Suwayda Province on August 6.[28] The participation of Druze and Alawite leaders in the AANES conference may be meant to try to place pressure on the Syrian transitional government to accept these communities’ demands.Arabian Peninsula Nothing significant to report. Palestinian Territories and LebanonSee topline section. [1] https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/1953534237522481419 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/1953561857337254340 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1953595314365247607 ; https://x.com/MonitorX99800/status/1953536549876117882[2] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025[3] https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1953545830390284792 ; https://x.com/ME_Observer_/status/1953534237522481419 ; https://x.com/AlArabiya_Eng/status/1953561857337254340 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1953595314365247607 ; https://x.com/MonitorX99800/status/1953536549876117882 ; https://x.com/SprinterObserve/status/1953574932597842375 ; https://x.com/theGeoView/status/1953542467422498895[4] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-role-of-hezbollah-among-its-shia-constituents/ ; https://omerjournal.com/2023/10/11/dahieh-a-visit-to-beiruts-southern-suburbs/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html ; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/27/world/middleeast/bekaa-valley-lebanon-hezbollah.html[5] https://www.stimson.org/2024/how-hezbollah-grew-over-four-decades-profiting-from-chaos/[6] https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/09/hezbollah-is-in-a-bind?lang=en[7] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/ ; https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah[8] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2024[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-22-2025[11] https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1953765275138150891, https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2099732[12] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20r18x8x05o, https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/02/3361438, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-30-2025, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2025[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-israel-nuclear-program-693a4e2a?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAhVWvFqThnDkBKG2IwF5kYQN5HhFrrxoRR1EEN3LPPY8QM4rT4ZT6P5zKmgf-Q%3D&gaa_ts=68965197&gaa_sig=Lpvs6UCBVrZ9vvE_pwpJOyO1Nj458Iq2bj6NSYZzut5F8uI5WB-YyofW9g4dsXfSU1vHJ2CoWLi19rI5Y-CZwg%3D%3D[14] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768583/[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/[18] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768583/[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-29-2025[20] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Iraq-based Shi’ite Militant Group Says It ’Adopted File’ on US Bases in Country,” August 8, 2025, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.[21] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/138168[22] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Iraq-based Shi’ite Militant Group Says It ’Adopted File’ on US Bases in Country,” August 8, 2025, available by subscription at https://www.siteintelgroup.com.[23] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/[24] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/[25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[26] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/[27] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/768283/%d9%85%d8%a4%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b1-%d9%85%d9%83%d9%88%d9%91%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%b4%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84-%d8%b4%d8%b1%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a7-%d9%8a%d8%af%d8%b9%d9%88-%d9%84%d8%af%d8%b3/ ; https://npasyria dot com/en/128103/[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025  

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2025

 

at 8/27/25 1:03am

Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Karolina HirdAugust 7, 2025, 10:45 pm ETClick here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on August 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain. A White House official told ABC News, Bloomberg, and the New York Post on August 7 that the United States and Russia have not yet set a location for the meeting, and a White House source told CNN on August 6 that the meeting could occur within the next two weeks (by about August 21).[1] The White House official told Western news outlets that Trump set the condition that Putin must agree to meet bilaterally with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky before Trump would meet with Putin. Putin stated on August 7 that he is not against meeting with Zelensky "in general" but that "certain conditions must be created" before such a meeting.[2] Trump later clarified, however, that Putin does not have to meet with Zelensky before Trump will meet with Putin.[3]Putin proposed the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a possible location to meet with Trump.[4] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed on August 7 that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff proposed a trilateral meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and Putin during Witkoff's August 6 visit to Moscow but that Russia did not comment on this "option" during the visit.[5] Ushakov stated that Russia wants to first focus on a bilateral Trump-Putin meeting and claimed that the United States and Russia have set a location or this meeting. The Kremlin has attempted to set the pace and sequence of negotiations about temporary ceasefires and a permanent peace in Ukraine since the start of the US effort to hold negotiations to end the war in February 2025.[6] Putin's efforts to posture himself as amenable to US peace proposals and meaningful negotiations while refusing to meet with Zelensky in the near-term are attempts to obfuscate the reality that Putin remains uninterested in ending his war and is attempting to extract bilateral concessions from the United States without meaningfully engaging in a peace process.Zelensky reiterated his willingness on August 7 to meet with Trump and Putin and commit to a ceasefire.[7] Zelensky listed Ukraine's top priorities as ceasing casualties and reaching a ceasefire agreement with Russia; a meeting between the heads-of-state to achieve a lasting peace; and ensuring long-term security with assistance from the United States and Ukraine's European partners.Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy. Bloomberg reported on August 5, citing people familiar with the situation, that Russia considered accepting a moratorium on long-range strikes in order to mitigate the threat of secondary US sanctions.[8] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who often reiterates Kremlin rhetorical lines to support the Kremlin's objectives, claimed on August 1 that he recently told US representatives that Russia is interested in another long-range strikes moratorium.[9] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed on August 6 that Putin gave Witkoff a ceasefire proposal but did not specify the contents of the proposal.[10] Rubio stated that a ceasefire is an important part of the negotiation process because it is difficult to negotiate a permanent peace deal while under fire — reiterating Trump's preferred timeline of establishing a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting formal peace negotiations to end the war.[11]Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) assessed on June 9 that Russia can produce roughly 170 Shahed-type drones per day and that Russia plans to increase production capacity to 190 drones per day by the end of 2025.[12] Ukrainian outlet Kyiv Independent reported on June 24 that it received GUR intelligence in early June 2025 that indicated that Russia had stockpiled roughly 600 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 300 Iskander-K cruise missiles — a stockpile that would last about two years, should Russia sustain its current pace of missile strikes against Ukraine.[13] Russia continues to heavily invest in its long-range drone and missile production capabilities, including by leaning on partners and allies like Belarus, Iran, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korea for weapons provisions, joint production efforts, and sanctions evasion schemes.[14] Russia will only continue to invest in its drone and missile production capabilities and lean on its allies as it prepares for a prolonged war effort in Ukraine and potential future conflict against NATO. The size of Russia's strike packages against Ukraine will therefore likely only continue to increase, as will the damage to civilian infrastructure and civilian casualties.[15] Russia in 2025 has already conducted over 10 of the largest-ever drone and missile strikes in the war thus far and reportedly seeks to increase the size of its strike packages to contain up to 2,000 drones.[16] A temporary strikes moratorium would also degrade Ukraine's long-range strike campaign targeting Russia's defense industrial facilities and energy infrastructure — a campaign that is aimed at targeting Russia's defense production and energy revenues, as opposed to the solely civilian infrastructure that the Russian campaign often strikes.[17] Any agreement less than a full and long-term cessation in long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure will pose a great threat to Ukraine's civilian population and infrastructure upon the expiration of the agreement and resumption of long-range Russian strikes.Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands. Kremlin sources recently implied to Reuters that Putin remains committed to his demand that Russia occupy all four oblasts before he would be willing to establish a ceasefire — a reiteration of Putin's June 2024 demand that he and other Kremlin officials have since publicly repeated.[18] A Kremlin source also told Reuters that the Russian General Staff recently told Putin that the frontline in Ukraine will likely "crumble" in two to three months. ISW assessed that the Kremlin is likely leaking this information to try to project confidence in Russia's military capabilities and, in turn, to undermine Ukrainian and Western morale.Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors. ISW assesses that Russia has yet to seize roughly 6,500 square kilometers of Donetsk Oblast, or about 25 percent of the region. Russian advances aimed at enveloping Pokrovsk have accelerated in recent weeks, but Russian forces have spent the last 18 months trying to seize an area of about 30 square kilometers.[19] Russian forces have been fighting to seize Chasiv Yar (pre-war population of 12,000) since April 2024, and it took Russian forces 26 months to advance 11 kilometers from western Bakhmut to western Chasiv Yar.[20] Russian forces in the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk directions are increasingly threatening the southern tip of Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast at Kostyantynivka.[21] Kostyantynivka is roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk, the northern tip of the fortress belt, and the cities in the fortress belt (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk) collectively had a pre-war population of roughly 373,000. Russian forces have not demonstrated the capacity to seize cities of this size since mid-2022, and ISW continues to assess that the seizure of the fortress belt will be a difficult, multiyear effort.[22]Future Russian operations to seize the entirety of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts will require significant river crossing operations that Russian forces have historically struggled to complete since 2022. Russian forces still have to seize roughly 7,200 square kilometers of Zaporizhia Oblast (about 26 percent of the region) and roughly 7,000 square kilometers in Kherson Oblast (about 26 percent of the region). Russian gains in the Zaporizhia direction in the past two years have mostly consisted of advances in areas that Ukrainian forces liberated during their Summer 2023 counteroffensive, and Russian forces have yet to seize Orikhiv (roughly 35 kilometers southeast of Zaporizhzhia City). Russian forces appear to be trying to advance along the Kamyanske-Stepnohirsk line (west of Orikhiv on the bank of the Dnipro River) northward toward Zaporizhzhia City but are roughly 20 kilometers from the southern outskirts of the city. Zaporizhzhia City had a pre-war population of 706,000 people, and the seizure of the city and the rest of the oblast will require Russian forces to cross the Dnipro River, which runs through the city and separates northwestern Zaporizhia Oblast from the rest of the region. Zaporizhzhia City is a heavily fortified city like those of the Donetsk Oblast fortress belt, and the Russian military command would have to commit a significant contingent of Russian personnel and equipment to the seizure of these cities. The seizure of Kherson Oblast would also require operations to cross the Dnipro River, establish a lodgment on the west (right) bank of the river, and seize Kherson City (pre-war population of 275,000). Russian forces would also have to contend with significant defenses that Ukrainian forces have established on west bank Kherson Oblast since liberating this area in 2022. Russian forces have not conducted a successful cross-river operation at scale across the Dnipro River since Russian forces withdrew to east (left) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022, and this river crossing occurred as Russian forces attempted to rapidly retreat from oncoming Ukrainian forces. Russia would likely struggle to pursue simultaneous efforts in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, particularly considering the impacts of three years of war on Russian combat capabilities.Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims. Statements from Kremlin officials, including Putin, have repeatedly indicated that Russia has more expansive territorial aims in Ukraine beyond the four oblasts.[23] Putin recently claimed that "all of Ukraine" is Russia's, Russian officials have called for Russia to seize Sumy City, and Kremlin officials routinely label Odesa and Kharkiv cities as "Russian" cities, for example.[24] Russia is also committing significant forces and means to offensive operations beyond the four oblasts, further casting doubt on claims that Russia only seeks to occupy these four regions. Russian forces are currently conducting offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast and northern and eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian military command has committed elements of its relatively more "elite" airborne (VDV) and naval infantry forces to fighting in northern Sumy Oblast and has been intensifying efforts to seize Kupyansk in recent months.[25] The deployment of VDV and naval infantry forces to these sectors suggest some level of prioritization within the Russian General Staff — prioritization that is incongruent with the claim that Russia is only concerned with the seizure of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory. Kremlin statements continue to indicate that Putin remains committed to replacing the democratically elected Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government, reducing Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself from future aggression, abolishing NATO's long-held Open Door Policy, and changing the Ukrainian constitution to commit Ukraine to neutrality.[26] Putin remains committed to destroying the Ukrainian state, identity, and culture and subjugating the Ukrainian people.[27] Russian efforts to conquer all of Ukraine through battlefield gains would take decades should the current rate of advance continue, but Putin's theory of victory is contingent on the hypothesis that the West will abandon Ukraine long before he must.[28] Putin continues to believe that time is on Russia's side and that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. Economic measures coupled with Western military aid that enables Ukraine to inflict battlefield setbacks on Russian forces remain critical to changing Putin's calculus and bringing him to the negotiating table willing to make compromises to end the war.The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes. Russian State Duma Deputy and former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed on August 7 that "under no circumstances" should one expect talks between Putin and Trump to end Russia's war against Ukraine.[29] Sobolev claimed that Russia will not be able to accomplish its war goals with a ceasefire or truce. Sobolev reiterated claims that any peace settlement must eliminate the "initial causes" of the war — a variation on the phrase that Kremlin officials often invoke to refer to NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers.[30] Sobolev repeated Putin's original war goals to "demilitarize" and "denazify" Ukraine — that is, to significantly constrain the Ukrainian military and replace the Ukrainian government. Sobolev claimed that Russia seeks control over Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Russian forces will create "buffer zones" in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. Russian forces currently only occupy minuscule parts of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv oblasts, and Sobolev appears to be demanding that Russia seize additional territory. Russian forces are also notably not operating in Chernihiv and Odesa oblasts, indicating that Sobolev is calling for Russia to launch completely new offensive operations. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 7 that Russia will "obviously" not be satisfied with freezing the frontline and that Trump must understand that Russia "cannot be defeated."[31] State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 7 that Russia has always been ready for peace talks but noted that Russia's position has not changed since Russia's pre-war ultimatums in 2021 (when Russia demanded that NATO and the United States cease NATO expansion and limit military activity in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia).[32] Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad published an op-ed on August 7 claiming that the war in Ukraine is an "internal affair" for Russia.[33] The article claimed that Russia does not want peace with Ukraine, "but peace without Ukraine," as "there should be no Ukraine." Russian state media also amplified narratives from Russian officials on August 7 about Ukrainian authorities' alleged disregard for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians.[34]Russian deputies' statements are largely intended for domestic consumption, and Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch, Orthodox nationalist, and Tsargrad founder Konstantin Malofeev often works to condition the Russian nationalist community to support Russia's war effort.[35] These statements from Russian officials and Russian media are part of the Kremlin's efforts to prepare Russian society for negotiations to fail and for the war to continue. The Kremlin is setting conditions to accuse Ukraine of not caring about its own population in the event of Ukrainian disagreements with Russian demands in future negotiations. The Kremlin will likely try to use this narrative to shift the blame for failed negotiations onto Ukraine — not Russia — and to justify a prolonged war to the Russian people.Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are likely operating west of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces may not yet maintain enduring positions on the settlement's western outskirts in Sobolivka. ISW reported on August 6 that geolocated footage showing two Russian servicemembers moving on foot in fields and windbreaks in Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) indicated that Russian forces recently advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and seized Sobolivka.[36] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces have not seized Sobolivka.[37] The milblogger claimed that the footage may show a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group and referenced another milblogger’s claim from late July 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Kupyansk.[38] Russian forces are increasingly using sabotage and reconnaissance groups to infiltrate behind Ukrainian positions into settlements as part of larger envelopment efforts.[39] ISW assessments of Russian advances based on geolocated footage reflect the observed presence of Russian forces within a given area. ISW’s "Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine" map layer is distinct from the "Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory" layer, for which ISW uses the doctrinal definition of control that imposes a high bar to confirm the exclusion of enemy forces from an area.[40] ISW will continue to monitor the situation for further reporting about Russian activity near Sobolivka.Key Takeaways:US and Russian officials continue to provide updates about a possible meeting between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the near future, but exact details remain uncertain.Putin may have used his meeting with Witkoff to propose a long-range strikes moratorium, which would allow Russia to stockpile long-range drones and missiles and renew devastating large-scale strikes against Ukraine after the moratorium expires. A strikes moratorium will also handicap Ukraine's ability to continue its long-range strike campaign aimed at attriting the Russian defense industrial base and wartime economy.Russia has significantly scaled up its drone and missile production in 2025, allowing Russia to rapidly increase the size of its strike packages that it launches against Ukraine.Putin likely claimed to Witkoff that Russia's territorial ambitions are limited to the seizure of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Putin is likely attempting to frame Russia's seizure of the four oblasts as inevitable in order to push Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Kremlin demands.Russia's occupation of the four oblasts is neither inevitable nor imminent, as Russian forces will face serious operational obstacles in what are likely to be multi-year endeavors.Russian objectives are not limited to the occupation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, however, despite Kremlin attempts to frame Russia's war aims as such in an effort to make its demands seem more reasonable. Russia has not abandoned its more extensive, original war aims.Putin's war aims are also not limited to territory.The Kremlin is engaged in a delicate balancing act between feigning interest in negotiations to Trump and conditioning Russian society to accept nothing short of Putin's desired full victory in Ukraine, no matter how long it takes.Russian forces advanced in the Toretsk direction and likely completed the seizure of Toretsk.We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 6 and August 7 but did not advance.[41]Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military infrastructure and defense industrial base (DIB) facilities in the Russian deep rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 7 that Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky Oil Refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, overnight on August 6 to 7.[42] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows a drone strike and subsequent fire at a gas and gas condensate processing unit of the Afipsky Refinery.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery refines 6.25 million tons of oil annually, which is 2.1 percent of Russia's total oil refining capacity.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces also struck other unspecified Russian defense industrial facilities and are clarifying outcomes. Krasnodar Krai authorities reported that falling drone debris caused a fire that burned down a gas processing unit at the Afipsky Oil Refinery.[45] Russian opposition outlet Astra published footage of a fire at Russian military unit number 61661 in Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Krasnodar Krai and stated that local authorities reported a drone strike on the military unit.[46] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence-focused channel stated on August 7 that drone strikes against the base of unit number 61661 caused a fire at a fuel and lubricant warehouse reportedly belonging to the Russian 76th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalion.[47] Astra also published footage on August 6 of a fire at a railway station in Surovikino, Volgograd Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[48] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrey Bocharov reported on August 7 that Russian air defense repelled drone strikes against Volgograd Oblast and that a fire broke out at an unspecified railway station.[49]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced on the east (left) bank of the Loknya River in Sumy Oblast (northeast of Sumy City).[50]Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Kostyantynivka, and Novokostyantynivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky; and southeast of Sumy City near Lukashivka (near the Sumy-Kharkiv Oblast administrative border) on August 6 and 7.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Stepove; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Varachyne, and Sadky.[52]A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed that the Russian military command deemed elements of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade unfit for assault tasks and sent the brigade to dig trenches and hold defensive positions near Yunakivka in areas under threat by Ukrainian drones.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces broke through defensive positions of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) in Yunakivka, compelling Russian military command to divert elements of the 234th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) from assault missions to reinforce the 104th VDV Regiment.[54] The milblogger stated that there are roughly three such Ukrainian breakthroughs per day. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command is using assault troops to hold fortifications while regular infantry conduct assaults. The milblogger added that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) recently refused to take up assigned positions in their area of responsibility (AOR).[55] ISW observed reports of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade operating near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City) as of August 6.[56]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the eastern bank of the Loknya River.[57] Elements of the 1st Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[58] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Sadky.[59] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, 11th Separate VDV Brigade, and artillery elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Berizka (northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka, Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City), and Luhivka (southeast of Sumy City).[61] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[62]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Vovchansk and Synelnykove (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[63]Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Vovchanski Khutory on August 6 and 7.[64]The commander of a Ukrainian border guard brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported that the Russian military command is constantly concentrating forces for combat operations in the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces launch daily assaults in fireteams of three to five personnel with support from large numbers of strike and reconnaissance drones.[65] The commander added that Russian forces are landing fiber-optic cable drones in fields near Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), setting the drones to wait, and then activating the drones to strike passing Ukrainian vehicles.[66] The officer also reported that Russian forces still field tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers to transport infantry during larger-scale assaults.[67]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Zorya, Neskuchne, and Hoptivka (all north of Kharkiv City).[68]A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove.[69]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[70]Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka and Myrove; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka, Krasne Pershe, and Kamyanka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on August 6 and 7.[71]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Azimut-31 Detachment (Belgorod Oblast's volunteer unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk.[72]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 7 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Olhivka on August 6 and 7.[73]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, and Shandryholove; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and in the Serebryanske forest area.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that at least part of Zarichne is a contested “gray zone."[75]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Myrne, and Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske, Dibrova, and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 6 and 7.[76]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 7 that the Russian military command is sending poorly equipped and supplied personnel to conduct attritional infantry-led assaults.[77]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[78]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 7 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 6 and 7.[79]Ukrainian 11th Army Corps Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets, operating in the Siversk direction, stated that Russian forces recently intensified their offensive activity and are attempting to bypass Siversk from the directions of Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area.[80] Zaporozhets stated that Ukrainian forces are anticipating that Russian forces will soon resume offensives in the Siversk direction from the Toresk direction in an effort to consolidate the frontlines and put more pressure on Ukrainian defenses in Kostyantynivka. Zaporozhets added that Russian forces are currently taking a tactical pause in the Siversk direction and are not conducting active assaults against Kostyantynivka but are instead launching artillery and air strikes against the city. Zaporozhets added that Russian shelling increased from five to 10 artillery fires per day to between 150 and 180.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[81]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of southern Chasiv Yar.[82]Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 6 and 7.[83]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced to central Katerynivka (immediately northwest of Toretsk) and central Shcherbynivka (immediately west of Toretsk) during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault, indicating that Russian forces likely recently completed the seizure of Toretsk.[84]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk), east of Nelipivka, and northeast and southwest of Rusyn Yar (both northwest of Toretsk).[85]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka; north of Toretsk toward Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Poltavka, Katerynivka, Yablunivka, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Rusyn Yar on August 6 and 7.[86]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated that the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 3rd CAA, SMD) and the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are relatively well-trained units and that elements of these units recently redeployed to the Toretsk direction.[87] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are only conducting infantry assaults and not fielding heavy military equipment, and that Russian forces are actively operating fiber-optic and reconnaissance drones in the Toretsk direction.A Russian milblogger published footage purportedly showing a Russian FAB-3000 glide bomb strike near Kostyantynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[88]Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking toward Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk) from Poltavka.[89] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian targets near Kostyantynivka.[90]Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[91] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Oleksandro-Kalynove.[92] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[93] Elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly fighting near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[94]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to seize Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces may have retaken some or all of the settlement.[95] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized Kotlyne as of January 24, and a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces had retaken Kotlyne.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Pokrovsk.[97]Russian forces attacked north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske and toward Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Mayak, Novoekonomichne, Boykivka, Nykanorivka, Zatyshok, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 6 and 7.[98] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayak and Udachne.[99]The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are attempting to bypass and envelop Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces are using motorcycles, buggies, and first-person view (FPV) and fiber-optic drones in attacks.[100] The communications department head of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are utilizing injured personnel in attempts to infiltrate Pokrovsk.[101] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces sometimes wear civilian clothes or clothes with Ukrainian patterns to evade detection and merge with the terrain.[102] Wearing civilian clothing in combat operations is perfidy under international law, which prohibits killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy.[103]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly attacking toward Volodymyrivka and Mayak.[104] Mashovets stated that elements of the 1st and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating northeast of Pokrovsk near Fedorivka and Razine and north of Pokrovsk toward Rodynske. Mashovets stated that elements of the 1441st Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) are simultaneously attempting to retain control over Zvirove. Elements of the Russian Somali Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[105]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 7 but did not advance.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Yalta (south of Novopavlivka).[106]Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykailivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and near Zelenyi Kut; south of Novopavlivka near Zaporizhzhia; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and toward Filiya on August 6 and 7.[107] Mashovets and a Russian milblogger stated that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Kotlyarivka and Horikhove (both northeast of Novopavlivka) and near Filiya and Dachne (south of Novopavlivka).[108]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating near Kotlyarivka and Horikhove.[109] Mashovets stated that elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are operating toward Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka (both southwest of Novopavlivka).[110] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[111]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) advanced 1.5 kilometers northeast of Oleksandrohrad (northeast of Velykomykhailivka) with support of elements of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA).[112] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also seized Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and consolidated positions within the settlement.Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Oleksandrohrad and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Novomykhailivka near Voskresenka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Maliivka and Novopil and toward Zaporizke on August 6 and 7.[113]Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating near Voskresenka, Maliivka, and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[114] Mashovets stated that elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) and the 69th Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are operating near Shevchenko and Komyshuvakha (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade or 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 5th CAA, EMD), are operating southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Novopil and Temyrivka. Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zaporizke, Sichneve, Berezove, and Kalynivkse (both south of Velykomykhailivka).[115] Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7.Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ternove (southeast of Hulyaipole).[116]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Plavni and made advances northeast of Kamyanske and near Stepnohirsk (all west of Orikhiv).[117]Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and toward Plavni and Stepnohirsk on August 6 and 7.[118] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepnohirsk.[119]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv).[120] Elements of the 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both 7th VDV Division), are reportedly operating near Kamyanske.[121]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 7 but did not advance.[122]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the right (west) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[123]Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) published footage on August 7 showing Ukrainian drones striking Russian Nebo-SVU, Podlyot K-1, and 96L6E radar stations, a Raptor-class project 02510 landing craft, and the air defense base of the Russian 3rd Radio Engineer Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces' [VKS] radio engineering troops) in unspecified locations in occupied Crimea.[124]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 112 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[125] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 89 strike and decoy drones and that 23 Russian drones struck 11 unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential buildings and transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[126]Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 7 that Russian forces currently launch about 200 guided glide bombs against Ukraine per day.[127]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) submitted a draft law to the Belarusian House of Representatives on August 7 that proposes amending the criteria for adopting martial law in Belarus to include attacks on the Union State and CSTO member states.[128]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.[1] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/08/06/europe/putin-witkoff-meeting-constructive-kremlin-says-intl; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-07/russia-says-putin-trump-meeting-to-take-place-in-next-few-days; https://nypost.com/2025/08/07/us-news/trump-to-meet-putin-in-coming-days-with-venue-to-be-announced-later-kremlin-says/; ttps://abcnews.go.com/International/kremlin-trump-putin-agreed-meeting-coming-days/story?id=124438908&cid=social_twitter_abcn[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728[3] https://x.com/Archer83Able/status/1953555552627576928; https://x.com/annmarie/status/1953554705277497696; https://x.com/christopherjm/status/1953561690118766911?s=46[4] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77728[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77725; https://t.me/tass_agency/329676; https://t.me/tass_agency/329678; https://t.me/MID_Russia/63555 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/kreml-rossiya-i-ssha-dogovorilis-o-vstreche-putina-i-trampa-v-blizhayshie-dni[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022625[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15536; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15551; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezidenti-ukrayini-ta-franciyi-obminyalisya-detalyami-konta-99393[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-05/russia-weighs-ukraine-air-truce-offer-to-trump-without-ending-war[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/24688783[10] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/08/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-larry-kudlow-of-fox-business-network[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225;[12] https://mezha dot media/oboronka/chi-bude-1000-shahediv-za-nich-302439/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2025[13] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025; https://kyivindependent dot com/investigation-russia-expands-strategic-plant-producing-icbms-with-chinas-help/[14] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2025[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072625[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2025[17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-battlefield-air-interdiction; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2025[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-5-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar053125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060225; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125[27] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-1-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071525; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-2-2025 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2025 https://isw.pub/UkrWar061424[29] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/07/26444930.shtml[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar052825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051125; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024[31] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13436 ; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13434[32] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/07/v-rossii-vyskazalis-ob-ozhidaniyah-ot-vstrechi-putina-i-trampa/[33] https://tsargrad dot tv/articles/ukraina-raspolzjotsja-do-urala-esli-peregovory-neizbezhny-bej-pervym_1330855[34] https://t.me/MID_Russia/63567; https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13428; https://t.me/tass_agency/329569; https://t.me/tass_agency/329570; https://t.me/tass_agency/329663; https://t.me/tass_agency/329574; https://t.me/tass_agency/329575; https://t.me/tass_agency/329776; https://t.me/tass_agency/329769[35] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/primer-russian-cognitive-warfare[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9758[37] https://t.me/rybar/72676[38] https://t.me/kcaebirds/1820[39] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225;[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Cartographical%20Methodology%20Explanation%20ISW%20CTP%202022.pdf[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522; https://suspilne dot media/1085219-gur-ta-sili-oboroni-urazili-naftopererobnij-zavod-u-krasnodaskomu-krai-rf/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/88909 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/07/drony-vsu-atakovali-krasnodarskiy-kray-proizoshel-pozhar-na-neftepererabatyvayuschemzavode[43] https://t.me/supernova_plus/42433; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435619348103417; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1953435701699051918; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1953314750084874734; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953413656068215217[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27522[45] https://t.me/opershtab23/13899[46] https://t.me/astrapress/88886 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88881 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88898[47] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/11872[48] https://t.me/astrapress/88878 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88880 ; https://t.me/astrapress/88882[49] https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953340389148053703 ; https://t.me/rgn_34/9609 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1953341054062637162; https://t.me/tass_agency/329632[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084; https://t.me/tass_agency/329670[52] https://t.me/tass_agency/329670; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752; https://t.me/rusich_army/25084  [53] https://t.me/severnnyi/4753[54] https://t.me/severnnyi/4756[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753[58] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752[59] https://t.me/severnnyi/4752[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/76910; https://t.me/severnnyi/4753;[61] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105[62] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/380; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175151[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152; https://t.me/severnnyi/4752[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/tass_agency/329641[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wn0NmT8f2mg; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/07/sidayut-na-dorozi-chekayut-na-tehniku-zasyllya-vorozhyh-dronnyh-zasidok-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku/[68] https://t.me/bear007/73394; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175105[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32152[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40084; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32178; https://t.me/rybar/72676; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903[72] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13772[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176[74] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/milinfolive/154239; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240; https://t.me/tass_agency/329635[75] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66487; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32180; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22276; https://t.me/milinfolive/15423; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97240[77] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/prosto-jdut-u-pustyh-bronikah-poblyzu-lymanu-rosiyany-pryrecheno-chvalayut-vmyraty-z-minimumom-amunicziyi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GuRX3eyVWyA&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16354[79] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176[80] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/u-sylah-oborony-rozpovily-yak-vorog-zastosovuyu-taktyku-tysyachi-poriziv/[81] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40119[82] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176[84] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953363367231377818; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30102; https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1449; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9761[85] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40137; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66512[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/zayihaty-na-bud-yaki-pozycziyi-cze-fart-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-drony-lyutuyut-v-kilzoni/[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175132[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14157[91] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40100[92] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/379[93] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97261[94] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40144[95] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907[96] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2025[97] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40106; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907[99] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907[100] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/drg-ta-vulychni-boyi-okupanty-namagayutsya-vzyaty-pokrovsk-v-kilcze/[101] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/probuvav-na-mylyczyah-prosuvatysya-pid-pokrovskom-menshaye-rosiyan-vidpravlyayut-atakuvaty-poranenyh/[102] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/07/maskarad-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-protyvnyk-pochav-chastishe-zminyuvaty-taktyku/[103] https://casebook dot icrc.org/a_to_z/glossary/perfidy?afd_azwaf_tok=eyJraWQiOiJCMERCQzkzNTgwRTlCM0FCNzJBRUMyRDQ4RjU0MDYwRkI5Rjc2ODIzMEE5OUJDOEEyQUE0MUEwMkE0RjIzNTUzIiwiYWxnIjoiUlMyNTYifQ.eyJhdWQiOiJjYXNlYm9vay5pY3JjLm9yZyIsImV4cCI6MTc1NDYxMTExNywiaWF0IjoxNzU0NjExMTA3LCJpc3MiOiJ0aWVyMS04NGZiZjk3ODU5LXZoOTI0Iiwic3ViIjoiMTI2OjUyMDE6MjAyOmQwZDY6OWM3Yjo4OTgyOjVjYmE6NTg2IiwiZGF0YSI6eyJ0eXBlIjoiaXNzdWVkIiwicmVmIjoiMjAyNTA4MDdUMjM1ODI3Wi0xODRmYmY5Nzg1OXZoOTI0aEMxQkwxcTMwczAwMDAwMDA2ZjAwMDAwMDAwMDd2cjAiLCJiIjoieEJoNDRvS0VKcUFFSktkVWMzMm1fUkJreEZqLTE2enJIZk41a0RQU1VhRSIsImgiOiJtUkdoZzJvaUNsSU9SSzJwanctNmFieFYyUmRjZXVqRWpyTnhacEZybHlNIn19.be5B7dfTWqsKZ1MIYH9FAs3_CFJZKwKIls7kBcCyi8vpWduHztz9L0jZiMePWLKGugJqmVuikjuvgBT8m9_jviF1Sr76dx3HCdSW6E0Tb6RVCiUCHfp9moi3eZCaN3rlsnC2Rz_CaJP8XUuC79BWRp5_fBZ34MWIKgoebYcTJJwqZ4knKkt-0PaoGLx2J1cXQU_POnMu6nXPg6NZKogtmVnLlm_xg-hHx6L8k7_deyyAO1teP5ddja7_GENEslr4QrL6Xc8wHkFx9odDVG06UxlCTgFmf47DB6Le4VueZrDgqWMK0g7L_sEKDUHEZ7DeTWASBkREiJRoOlZem-R6Og.WF3obl2IDtqgvMFRqVdYkD5s[104] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2907[105] https://t.me/basurin_e/20296[106] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154[107] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154[108] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32154; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908[109] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2908[110] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909[111] https://t.me/dva_majors/76913[112] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909[113] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27514; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15176; https://t.me/wargonzo/28324[114] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2909[115] https://t.me/voin_dv/16357; https://t.me/voin_dv/16357[116] https://t.me/voin_dv/16363[117] https://t.me/wargonzo/28324; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175106; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089[118] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://t.me/dva_majors/76903; https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192  [119] https://t.me/rusich_army/25089; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192[120] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97260[121] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32192[122] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27501; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27532; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02hpJQkC51M21tFvcKjfmJrfmWXHk6G2JtK9np1WBQTkFATLwDdmdzTX5ocZPqaEhQl[123] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32163[124] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6583; https://suspilne dot media/crimea/1085223-gur-pokazalo-r

— Iran Update, August 7, 2025

 

at 8/26/25 10:21pm

 Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry, Ben Schmida, Adham Fattah, and Brian Carter Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025. Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day. The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah.[1] The proposal’s objectives include a phased plan to completely disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025, and to ensure an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon.[2] The objectives also include the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to key border areas, the commencement of indirect Israel-Hezbollah talks to facilitate prisoner exchanges, and the permanent demarcation of Lebanon’s borders with Israel and Syria.[3] The Lebanese Council of Ministers did not agree on all details included in the proposal, but it did agree to the overall objectives.[4] The United States submitted the proposal to the Lebanese government on June 19.[5] The United States and the Lebanese government have negotiated the details of this agreement over the past six weeks, but had not previously reached an agreement.[6] Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government’s agreement on the US proposal. Three unspecified political sources told Reuters on August 7 that Hezbollah and its allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the US proposal.[7] Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun to reconstitute its command structure, but it is very unlikely that Hezbollah could rebuild its units to the level of proficiency the units had before the war. Hezbollah also faces several significant challenges that will complicate its ability to reconstitute. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on August 6 that Hezbollah is restructuring itself and appointing new commanders.[8] Axis-affiliated media echoed this statement. Araghchi added that Iran will continue to support the group.[9] Araghchi noted that Hezbollah will remain a “dominant force" that Iran will continue to support.[10] Axis-affiliated media claimed that Hezbollah has not exhibited any internal disarray and has continued its political and regional "presence.”[11] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem also noted on August 5 that Hezbollah still has fighters who are ready to make “the harshest sacrifices” if needed.[12] These statements ignore that Hezbollah units reconstituted from the remaining Hezbollah cadres will be less effective than their predecessor units due to a lack of experienced commanders. The IDF has killed nearly all of the top Hezbollah commanders and inflicted a 45 percent casualty rate on Hezbollah.[13] The casualty rates in units in southern Lebanon may be higher because the IDF focused much of its campaign there. A representative of Hezbollah’s Association of the Wounded noted on August 6 that none of the individuals injured in the pager attack against Hezbollah devices have recovered.[14] Over 3,000 individuals were injured in the attack, many of whom were presumably Hezbollah officials and fighters.[15] The extremely high casualty rate, combined with the deaths of top commanders, means that Hezbollah will have a much less experienced command cadre around which it will need to build units composed mostly of green, inexperienced fighters. These units will be far less effective than the experienced, veteran units led by 40-year veterans of Hezbollah prior to the war. The post-war units will have the added challenge of needing to replenish their weapons arsenal under many more constraints than Hezbollah experienced before the war, as well. Israel destroyed much of its heavy weapons and short-range missile stockpile during and after the war.[16] The fall of Syria and the crackdown by the Lebanese government on weapons and money smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings will make any Iranian effort to resupply Hezbollah relatively slow and inefficient.[17] Hezbollah could attempt smuggling efforts through Lebanese ports, as it has already set conditions to do so. An unspecified Western official told Saudi media in April 2025 that Hezbollah had begun to reassert its control over the port through a network of collaborators, including dock workers and customs agents.[18] The official noted that Iran has relied on the maritime route to support Hezbollah after the closure of smuggling routes via Syria.[19] Lebanese officials denied these claims and stated that Lebanese authorities had implemented ”serious” security measures at the port.[20] Maritime smuggling through the ports will be relatively more challenging than the land border crossings that were controlled by the pro-Hezbollah Assad regime on the Syrian side before 2024. Hezbollah’s continued weakness is exemplified by increasingly confident Lebanese authorities and United Nations forces in Lebanon, which have not previously challenged Hezbollah at scale. Lebanese authorities have taken steps to curb Hezbollah smuggling. Lebanese airport authorities fired several Hezbollah-affiliated employees at the Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport in May 2025 and began to inspect all planes and passengers that arrive at the airport.[21] Iran has tried to use the Beirut airport to smuggle funds to Hezbollah since the loss of its weapons smuggling routes through Syria due to the fall of the Assad regime.[22] The LAF has shut down several known smuggling routes and increased its presence along the Lebanon-Syria border to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling in recent months.[23] The LAF and UN are reinforcing the counter-smuggling effort with relatively more significant operations in southern Lebanon as well. The LAF announced in May 2025 that it had dismantled over 500 Hezbollah military positions and weapons depots in southern Lebanon.[24] United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces have also taken previously rare steps to degrade Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon, such as by dismantling a likely Hezbollah tunnel network and several weapons caches in southern Lebanon on August 7.[25] These efforts will need to be sustained to be successful, however. Iranian media outlet Nour News proposed on August 7 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will likely increase its focus on domestic security, while still prioritizing foreign policy.[26] Nour News, which is affiliated with Supreme Leader adviser Ali Shamkhani, concluded that newly appointed SNSC Secretary Ali Larijani would also “speak more to the public,” compared to his predecessor, Ali Akbar Ahmadian.[27] This follows Nour News’ July 29 and August 6 recommendations that the SNSC form a “Strategic Command Center” and adopt a more comprehensive security approach to counter emerging “hybrid threats.”[28] These ”hybrid threats” include misinformation and disinformation campaigns targeting the Iranian public and the ”collapse of public trust.“[29] The Nour News proposals align with President Masoud Pezeshkian’s call for Larijani to “prioritize emerging threats” and take a “people-based approach” to national security.[30] The SNSC has subsidiary councils that address internal security.[31] The increased focus of the SNSC on domestic security likely reflects regime concerns about regime destabilization in the wake of the 12-day Israel-Iran War. Pragmatic voices on the SNSC, such as Pezeshkian and Larijani, favor public engagement over tighter security measures to bolster national security. Larijani’s appointment signals the SNSC’s shift toward addressing emerging threats that impact trust between the government and the people through public engagement rather than purely security-focused measures, which represents a rebalancing almost certainly directed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khamenei officially replaced Ahmadian with Larijani as his representative on the SNSC on August 6.[32] The SNSC Secretary has historically been one of two Supreme Leader representatives on the SNSC. Khamenei also appointed Ahmadian and Shamkhani on August 6 as his representatives to the new Defense Council, which the SNSC established on August 3 to address emerging national security threats.[33] Shamkhani, who is also a pragmatic hardliner, notably called on the regime to resolve ”disputes” with the Iranian people through a ”process of understanding,” during an interview on June 29.[34] Nour News attributed Larijani’s appointment to the SNSC as well as the SNSC’s formation of the Defense Council in its August 7 op-ed to the “current security conditions,” including “the possibility of a renewed enemy [Israeli or US] attack” on Iran.[35] Iranian officials have continued to express their concern about the potential for future conflicts with Israel and the United States. Iranian Artesh Commander Major General Amir Hatami warned on August 3, for example, that “[Iran] should not underestimate the enemy and consider its threats over.”[36] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Intelligence chief Brigadier General Majid Khademi also declared on August 7 that “the war has not ended” and that Iran is just “in a state of temporary pause.”[37] Khademi asserted that the West is continuing to try to stoke internal instability in Iran.[38] Nour News suggested in its August 7 op-ed that pragmatic hardliner Larijani may bring the SNSC closer to Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry to coordinate on nuclear negotiations with the United States and Europe, which “cannot be ruled out.”[39] Nour News referenced Larijani’s past engagement in nuclear negotiations with the West during his first term as SNSC secretary between 2005 and 2007.[40] Larijani separately defended Iran’s agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States against hardliner criticism while serving as parliament speaker in 2015.[41] More recently, Larijani reportedly tried to contact Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War to advocate for "opening talks” with the United States.[42] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately expressed his optimism about working with Larijani, noting his ”deep and realistic insight into both domestic and foreign policy,” in an interview on August 6.[43] Araghchi added that Iran’s diplomats are ”fully prepared to engage in coordinated cooperation” with Larijani.[44] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah is attempting to use the Shia Coordination Framework as a vehicle to sideline the Sudani administration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Kataib Hezbollah announced on August 6 that Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al Hamidawi urged unidentified Shia Coordination Framework leaders during a meeting on August 2 to “block” Sudani’s decisions ahead of the upcoming elections after recent unspecified decisions by Sudani have “contradicted the fundamental positions,” presumably of the framework.[45] "Fundamental positions” may refer to policy issues such as efforts to remove US forces from Iraq, which was a policy issue that Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari mentioned in a statement on August 4.[46] Hamidawi also called for the creation of a specialized Shia Coordination Framework committee to investigate events surrounding clashes between Kataib Hezbollah members and Iraqi Federal Police officers in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27 that killed one civilian and a Federal Police officer.[47] Hamidawi’s request to use a Shia Coordination Framework committee appears to undermine Sudani’s previous order for the formation of a high-level committee to investigate the clashes using standard Iraqi judicial mechanisms.[48] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from the incident in Dora, which occurred amid policy discussions over restricting arms to the Iraqi state and dissolving the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces.[49] The Shia Coordination Framework groups are now in increasing competition with one another ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which will make it more difficult for Kataib Hezbollah to build a political coalition to sideline Sudani. Kataib Hezbollah’s attempts to obstruct Sudani’s influence follow an August 6 Iraqi media report that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds with the Shia Coordination Framework.”[50] CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this report likely refers to the disillusionment of some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias towards elements of the Shia Coordination Framework, such as Sudani.[51] The Shia Coordination Framework currently plans to run across multiple lists in the upcoming elections, which likely reflects divisions amongst the coalition.[52] Druze rhetoric and actions that are hostile to the Syrian government demonstrate the deep barriers to reconciliation and lack of trust between the transitional government and the Druze community. A committee formed by prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri announced the formation of a “temporary” autonomous government for Suwayda Province on August 6.[53] Judges on the “Supreme Legal Committee” within the new ”autonomous government” appointed an executive body, security officials, and ministerial heads to govern Suwayda instead of the Damascus-based transitional government.[54] A member of the Syrian Ministry of Justice said that the judiciary would investigate the committee judges for “engaging in political works” that conflict with Syrian national interests.[55] Two Assad-era brigadier generals, formerly responsible for coastal Syria and accused of committing war crimes, command the new Suwaydawi government’s internal security forces.[56] A militia spokesperson unaligned with Hijri said on August 6 that the only way to ”make proper amends and regain trust” would be to execute Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Suwayda General Security Service (GSS) leader Ahmed al Dalati in Suwayda for crimes against the Druze.[57] The Liwa al Jabal spokesperson also said that there was “no longer space for dialogue or discussion" with the transitional government.[58] Such strong rhetoric from Druze militias that previously collaborated with the transitional government demonstrates the level of distrust that has grown since intercommunal violence erupted in Suwayda Province in mid-July.[59] This rhetoric makes it unsurprising that the Druze have begun to implement alternative governance structures while refusing to collaborate with the transitional government. This new autonomous government and the strong rhetoric from Druze militias reduce the likelihood that the July 18 ceasefire between the transitional government and Druze militias will progress to its third phase. The third phase calls for activating state-run institutions, gradually deploying government forces to Suwayda Province, and integrating Suwaydawi institutions into the Syrian state.[60] Key Takeaways Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed on August 7 to the objectives of US Envoy Thomas Barrack’s proposal to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah Reconstitution: Iranian officials and Axis-affiliated media recently reported that Hezbollah has begun to reconstitute its command structure, but it is very unlikely that Hezbollah could rebuild its units to the level of proficiency the units had before the war. Hezbollah also faces several significant challenges that will complicate its ability to reconstitute. Iranian National Security Appointments: Iranian media outlet Nour News proposed on August 7 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will likely increase its focus on domestic security, while still prioritizing foreign policy. Nour News also attributed Larijani’s appointment to the SNSC, as well as the SNSC’s formation of the Defense Council, to the “current security conditions,” including “the possibility of a renewed enemy [Israeli or US] attack” on Iran. Iraqi Militia Political Maneuverings: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah is attempting to use the Shia Coordination Framework as a vehicle to sideline the Sudani administration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections. The Shia Coordination Framework groups are now in increasing competition with one another ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections, which will make it more difficult for Kataib Hezbollah to build a political coalition to sideline Sudani. Druze-Syrian Government Relations: Druze rhetoric and actions that are hostile to the Syrian government demonstrate the deep barriers to reconciliation and lack of trust between the transitional government and the Druze community. A committee formed by prominent Druze Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri announced the formation of a “temporary” autonomous government for Suwayda Province on August 6. Iran The United States sanctioned 18 entities and individuals on August 7 for their involvement in Iranian efforts to circumvent sanctions and generate revenue for the regime.[61] The sanctioned entities include the RUNC Exchange System Company, which has developed Iran’s bank messaging system. The sanctions target banks created by the Central Bank of Iran to evade existing sanctions, such as the Cyrus Offshore Bank. The sanctions also target the Pasargad Arian Information and Communication Technology Company (FANAP), which is owned by a major Iranian financial institution that was sanctioned on October 8, 2020.[62] FANAP has strong links to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.[63] Iraq See the topline section. Syria The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) arrested a large Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) cell in northern Idlib Province on August 7. The Syrian MoI arrested nine ISIS members during a raid in the town of Harem, Idlib Province, on August 7 near the Syria-Turkey border.[64] The MoI seized the ISIS cell’s cache, which included suicide vests, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), anti-materiel rifles, explosive materials, and grenades.[65] The MoI stated that the cell was responsible for targeting and killing five Iraqi nationals in three prior attacks in the towns of Salqin, Azmarin, and Kaftin in Idlib Province.[66] This included the assassination of a former Iraqi Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) commander in Azmarin on June 7.[67] The arrests in Idlib province come after the Islamic State criticized the Syrian government for assisting a US counter-ISIS ground operation in al Bab, Aleppo Province, that targeted an ISIS official on July 25.[68] The most recent arrests in northern Idlib Province are the eleventh counter-ISIS operation the transitional government has publicly conducted since the fall of Assad in December 2024.[69] The United States shared intelligence with HTS before the fall of the Assad regime to target ISIS and other al Qaeda-linked Salafi-Jihadi militant groups.[70] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani discussed recent clashes between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the transitional government with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Damascus on August 7.[71] A Turkish Foreign Ministry source told Reuters that Shara, Shaibani, and Fidan also discussed bilateral relations, Syria-Israel tensions, counter-terrorism cooperation, and Syrian reconstruction efforts.[72] The source also told Reuters that ”talks are expected to assess Turkey's national security concerns stemming from northeast Syria[...] at a time when preserving Syria's territorial integrity and unity is more important than ever.”[73] A Turkish Defense Ministry official told Reuters on August 7, prior to Fidan’s visit, that the SDF has failed to adhere to the March 10 framework agreement and that recent clashes between the SDF and transitional government forces damage Syria’s unity.[74] The Syrian transitional government and SDF signed an eight-point integration framework on March 10 but have yet to negotiate the framework’s exact terms.[75] The Turkish Defense Ministry official also said the SDF has become ”empowered by clashes in Syria’s south” in reference to the recent intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province.[76] The Syrian Army and the SDF clashed south of Manbij, Aleppo Province, on August 2 after the SDF attempted to advance toward a Syrian army position.[77] The Syrian transitional government has previously condemned the SDF’s references to the violence in Suwayda Province as a justification for refusing to integrate into the Syrian state.[78] The SDF, Syrian transitional government, France, and the United States agreed to meet in Paris to negotiate the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[79] The date of the meeting has not yet been announced, however.[80] Arabian Peninsula Yemeni government-affiliated forces intercepted a shipment of drone components, radios, and other unspecified weapon parts to the Houthis on August 6.[81] Government forces reported that the shipment was en route to Houthi-controlled Hudaydah Port from China.[82] Palestinian Territories and Lebanon See the topline section.

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update, August 25, 2025

 

at 8/26/25 3:40pm

 Andrew Raynus, Zachary Yacht, Sofia Walsh, Tetiana Trach, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George BarrosAugust 23, 2025, 10 am ETNote: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 20, 2025. This report focuses on technological adaptations and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and excludes reports on Russian force generation efforts. ISW will cover Russian force generation efforts in the upcoming Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update.Russian developers continue to introduce and test new kinetic anti-drone measures such as drone interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers. A Russian milblogger who focuses on Russian unmanned systems developments published footage on August 14, claiming that the optical-electronic module on Russia’s Yolka drone interceptor is artificial intelligence (AI) synchronized and can detect a 100-centimeter drone wingspan up to 700–1000 meters away, and advocated that such systems be deployed to defend Russian surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems.[1] Another Russian milblogger posted footage on July 29 of a Russian Yolka drone interceptor downing a Ukrainian Baba Yaga drone and claimed that Russia has been using these interceptors since at least May 2025.[2] The Yolka interceptor launches by catapult and operates on a fire-and-forget model due to its AI-based homing capability. The interceptor reportedly has no explosive warhead and simply intercepts targets with a kinetic strike. The milblogger claimed that Russia will attempt to adapt interceptor drones to intercept long-range Ukrainian drones. A different Russian milblogger posted footage on August 10 showing a new Russian drone that fires a shotgun-like combat load to destroy Ukrainian Mavic and Baba Yaga drones.[3] Russian firms presented a variety of interceptor drones at the ”Archipelago 2025” exhibition, which was part of Russia’s larger Unmanned Systems Technologies of the Future forum.[4] One displaced interceptor, the Skvorets PVO, has an AI-based target capture and active interception system and claims to be able to intercept targets at a maximum speed of 270 kilometers per hour.[5] The Bolt interceptor drone and radar system can receive target designations from external radars.[6] The Kinzhal interceptor drone (not to be confused with the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile) claims to be capable of independently striking targets, capable of being integrated into an autonomous drone detection system, and able to fly at a maximum speed of 300 kilometers per hour.[7] The Ovod PVO system reportedly can intercept drones using a kinetic strike or an integrated warhead.[8] The Ovod system can also be controlled manually or with an onboard guidance system.[9] The Krestnik M maritime interceptor drone can combat moving surface targets by launching from air, land, and sea platforms.[10] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that the Russian Central Bank also presented its “Digital Patrol” acoustic sensor network that can detect, classify, locate, and predict the flight paths of drones at the forum.[11] TASS also reported on August 10 that Russia‘s Kalashnikov weapons enterprise displayed the Granat-4 drone, which uses a laser target designation system to collect targeting information and provides automatic target tracking from 100 meters to 12 kilometers.[12]A Russian milblogger claimed on August 16 that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet tested the KRECHET thermal imaging sighting system, which allows an operator to fire the Soviet 7.62 GShG aircraft machine gun at 6,000 rounds per minute accurately at high-speed air and surface targets while maintaining spatial orientation.[13] The milblogger said that Russia does not currently produce the Soviet-era machine gun necessary for the system, necessitating Russia to resume production of a Soviet equivalent of a Gatling machine gun and turrets.[14] The milblogger said the machine gun demonstrated high efficiency during tests and that the machine gun should reenter production with modernized features to increase combat effectiveness.[15]Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on July 28 that Russian defense company KPB Polet introduced the second version of its hand-held Spider anti-drone netting system that allows a shooter to defend against small drones.[16] The updated anti-drone small arm has a reinforced metal core, upgraded projectiles, and fires an expanding net payload that expands to cover 30 meters. Russian soldiers are testing a trial batch of the Spider system in occupied Ukraine. Russian war correspondent Valentin Trushny claimed on August 18 that the Spider net launcher is still underdeveloped and ineffective as an anti-drone weapon due to a complex reloading process, limitations of the nets’ weights, and the power of the cartridge propelling the net.[17]Key Takeaways:Russian Technological AdaptationsRussian developers continue to introduce and test new kinetic anti-drone measures such as drone interceptors, thermal imaging sighting systems, and lasers.Russian and Ukrainian forces are racing to create “smart minefields” by developing complex mining systems.Russia is reportedly collaborating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an automated command and control (C2) system for amphibious operations.The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly developed new unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).Russian Unmanned Systems TacticsRussian forces are reportedly conducting an echeloned deployment of first-person view (FPV) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interceptor systems in Ukraine, which may be enabling Russian advances.Russia reportedly established the first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula.Russian Defense Industrial BaseRussian recruiters are continuing to recruit Russian and Central Asian children and teenagers to construct the Alabuga factory and produce drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ).The Kremlin officially extended tax benefits for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize Russian development and production of tactical drones.Russian Technological Adaptations (Assessed Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)Russian and Ukrainian forces are racing to create “smart minefields” by developing complex mining systems. Ukrainian weapon and military technology expert Bohdan Dolintse told Ukrainian military news agency ArmyInform on August 16 that smart minefields implement a new generation of mines that autonomously change their characteristics after installation to adapt to the operational environment, location, and mission requirements. Dolintse noted that mines can choose a different response model based on what threat enters their sector and can migrate across the battlefield within defined patrol zones by leveraging sensors and gauges to determine obstacles. Smart mines use the same power supply elements as sleep drones, such as small solar panels, and use acoustic and optical devices that gather intelligence on the environment. Dolintse emphasized that smart minefields are still in early development stages and that most minefields in Ukraine still use traditional mining technologies. Dolintse noted that innovations in mining technology will enable precise targeting. Dolintse noted that minefields are becoming more advanced and complex as they allow Ukrainian or Russian forces to conduct ambushes at the most opportune moments. Dolintse noted that neither Ukraine nor Russia has deployed smart mines at scale due to development and production limitations.Russian developers are trying to modify tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to carry new warheads. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 17 that the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center reported that their Center for Unmanned Systems is testing various newly adapted munitions tailored for specific tactical tasks.[18] BARS-Sarmat drone operators are reportedly training to strike targets using drone-delivered payloads that weigh up to seven kilograms, delivered by various drones such as the Moliya-2. The milblogger claimed that BARS-Sarmat is testing the new KZ-7 engineering charge. Russian milblogger Alexander Sladkov reported on August 15 that new Russian hexacopters can transport 80 to 200 kilograms, and some units are using such hexacopters to evacuate wounded soldiers.[19]Russian developers recently modified Gerbera decoy and reconnaissance UAVs to carry warheads.Ukraine’s State Border Guard Service reported on August 5 that Russian forces are increasingly equipping Gerbera UAVs with warheads, a break from their previous use of the Gerbera drones primarily as reconnaissance or decoy drones.[20]Russian developers continue to field UAVs with alternative navigation systems, machine vision, and artificial intelligence. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrtenov posted images of Russia’s V2U drone and stated that there is a new V2U that uses AI to conduct reconnaissance.[21] This variant differs from the existing strike version.[22] The V2U now has a strike version, a reconnaissance version, and a logistical courier version.[23] The drone’s developer and manufacturer are unknown, and it reportedly uses no Russian components.[24] Flash stated that this drone line, developed with AI, is the most innovative and dangerous Russian drone.[25] Flash reported on August 15 that Russian forces have been using land navigation in the V2U drone for a year and that Ukrainian drones must similarly develop drones that can operate in GPS-denied areas.[26]Russia is reportedly collaborating with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to develop an automated command and control (C2) system for amphibious operations. The BlackMoon hacker group posted leaked documents on August 18 indicating that Russia is collaborating with China to create an automated C2 system for amphibious operations under the codename of “Sword.”[27] The leaked documents claim that Russian state corporation Rosoboronexport signed a contract with the Chinese CETC International Corporation in June 2024 to supply technological documentation for the development of the C2 system. This system includes software and hardware systems for command and staff vehicles, communication devices, field command posts, amphibious assault vehicles, and wearable devices that ensure secure data transmission and coordination at tactical and operational levels. The leaked documents claim that commanders will manage this system at the corps-, brigade-, company-, platoon-, squad-, and individual level and implement mobile data transmission systems. The documents claim that Russia will deliver C2 hardware to China to integrate it into China’s domestically produced military vehicles. The BlackMoon reported that Russia completed two stages of research and development and that the third stage, involving the production of prototype samples and practical testing, is underway. The document leak also claims that Russia is training 60 representatives of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including training on radios at a Tulatotchmash facility in Tula Oblast, Russia. ISW is unable to verify the veracity of the document or BlackMoon’s report.A Russian-Chinese company reportedly developed a new fiber optic cable reinforced with Kevlar to ensure that Russian fiber optic UAVs and other unmanned vehicles can operate in difficult terrain. The Chinese-Russian PGI Technology company reportedly began combining Kevlar thread with optical fiber to increase the cable’s strength and ability to survive breakage caused by high speed maneuvers.[28] A social media source posted a video on August 5 purportedly of a five-kilometer spool of the newly-produced fiber optic cable, which reportedly can be used in fiber optic drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and field communication lines.[29]The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly developed new unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Beskrtenov reported on August 2 that Rubikon designed USVs to strike Ukraine’s maritime infrastructure.[30] Available photos and videos of the new naval drones suggest that operators are training to strike maritime targets with surface-based suicide drones and are testing at least one model with underwater capabilities, possibly indicating that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is pursuing hybrid designs to better avoid detection and interception.[31] Russian state media outlet Izvestiya reported on the creation of these units in May 2025, claiming that the Russian Navy is creating unmanned regiments that include aerial drones, USVs, and underwater unmanned vehicles (UUVs) to provide combined capabilities on land, air, and sea, and to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and anti-submarine defense.[32] Rubikon’s is also using Zala, Lancet, and Z-16 UAVs to counter Ukrainian USVs.[33]Russian developers continued to introduce new unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) capable of launching drones and providing logistics support. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on August 2, which reportedly shows elements of the Russian repair and restoration battalion of the 20th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) conducting UGV exercises. The Russian MoD claimed that the battalion fielded a newly developed radio-controlled UGV that can transport 150 kilograms at a maximum speed of 25 kilometers per hour.[34] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian developers designed the UGV to operate in conditions where covert movement is limited and that the UGV can evacuate wounded Russian servicemen and deliver supplies. The Russian Volunteer Corps published footage on August 1 showing drone developers of the Tekhnologia detachment testing a Russian UGV concept, which appears to have an attached propeller-less FPV drone for communication and video feed.[35] The Russian Korney company is developing a ground robotic drone carrier known as the Dronobus, which contains a transporter and launcher for wire-guided FPV drones. The Dronobus system is reportedly able to carry up to 150 kilograms and has fiber optic cables that can connect to other ground-based systems with a range up to 10 kilometers and to fiber optic FPV drones up to 15 kilometers.[36]Russian developers reportedly integrated cameras into Russian Shahed (Geran) strike UAVs and are fielding these UAVs in Ukraine. Beskrestnov posted footage on August 18 of Shahed debris and noted that several Shaheds had integrated video cameras.[37] Beskrestnov reported that Ukrainian forces previously found dozens of video cameras on Gerbera reconnaissance and decoy UAVs. Beskrestnov implied that previous Shahed modifications did not have integrated video cameras and assessed that Russian forces are likely trying to record Shahed’s path up until the moment of impact.Russian forces are reportedly using newly developed small cruise missiles to target Ukraine's deep rear. A Ukrainian social media account shared footage on August 10 reportedly showing a new Russian small cruise missile, which has a turbojet engine that allows the missile to travel significant distances.[38] The social media account noted that Ukrainian forces do not know the name of the missile and that the missile looks like a small Storm Shadow cruise missile.[39] The social media account observed that the new Russian missile conceptually resembles the Ukrainian Peklo missile.Russian Unmanned Systems Tactics (Assessed Russian objective: Achieve battlefield air interdiction effects and other battlefield advantages with unmanned systems).Russian sources commented on how the terrain in Ukraine is affecting Russian forces’ ability to support offensive operations with UAVs and how innovations in drone use are increasingly threatening Russian efforts to envelop Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk Oblast. A former Russian Storm-Z instructor and milblogger amplified a comment on August 15 that heights allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian forces with UAVs without aerial repeaters and that launching UAVs from heights simplifies reconnaissance operations.[40] The commenter noted that Russian forces have a more challenging time launching drone strikes from lowlands and that only UAVs with repeaters can fly close enough to strike targets on the lowlands. The commenter assessed that it is more advantageous for Russian assault elements to operate in the lowlands while receiving drone support from elements operating on dominant heights. The commenter stated that Russian forces cannot always use this tactic on the battlefield due to Ukrainian forces mining entrances to the dominant heights, forcing Russian personnel to bypass the heights to interdict Ukrainian ground line of communications (GLOCs). The commenter observed that Russian forces’ main goal in an envelopment is expanding flanks to increase logistics capacity because drones cannot supply a large force or evacuate wounded. The milblogger largely agreed with the commenter's observations and added that both Russian and Ukrainian forces increasingly face the risks of being cut off from salients by drone strikes and other means of remote destruction.Russian forces are reportedly conducting an echeloned deployment of first-person view (FPV) UAV interceptor systems in Ukraine, which may be enabling Russian advances. A Ukrainian servicemember reported on August 17 that rapid Russian advances on the battlefield coincided with Russian deployment of echeloned FPV drone interceptor systems.[41] The servicemember noted that Russian forces have mastered the echeloned deployment of FPV drone interceptor systems are currently adopting this tactic at scale. The servicemember stated that Russia’s echeloned deployment of FPV interceptors creates no-fly zones that prevent Ukrainian forces from using counter-UAV systems and detecting Russian manpower concentrations early. The servicemember argued that Ukrainian forces need to embrace systemic changes in conducting aerial reconnaissance in the wake of increased deployment of interceptor systems. The servicemember warned that Russian interceptors can degrade the quality and quantity of Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance.The Kremlin is introducing measures to surveil and centralize control over Russian civilian UAV usage via the Russian ERA-GLONASS information system. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti, citing a proposal from the Russian Ministry of Transport, reported on August 11 that the Russian government is preparing to transmit Russian civilian drone flight routes to regulatory authorities via the ERA-GLONASS state information system starting from March 1, 2026.[42] The proposal specified that all UAVs must be equipped with identification trackers that connect to ERA-GLONASS, and all previously released drones must obtain these trackers by March 1, 2026. The proposal stated that such measures will ensure transparency in UAV use, create a joint UAV identification database, and ease bans on drone flights in Russian oblasts. The ERA-GLONASS representative told Vedomosti that GLONASS will transmit UAV flight data for free to Russian federal agencies and ministries, oblasts, emergency response services, organizations performing tasks against illegal drone use, and educational and training institutions. ISW assessed in February 2025 that the Kremlin launched ERA-GLONASS in hopes of using the system to force civilian drones to land instead of expending anti-aircraft systems to shoot them down.[43]Russia reportedly established the first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula. Russian state newspaper Izvestia reported on August 7, per sources in the Russian MoD, that the Russian Navy deployed its first drone control center in Kamchatka Peninsula and plans to construct additional special deployment sites in Kamchatka for long-range drones. Russian MoD sources stated that the Russian Navy will monitor the situation in the Arctic region with Forpost and Orion (also known as Inokhodets) UAVs.[44] Russian military experts told Izvestia that the center's deployment will allow the Russian Navy to conduct patrols of the sea, airspace, and northern territories. Russian military experts also claimed that the drone center will allow the Russian Navy to monitor US military presence in the Pacific Ocean and the Bering Strait and defend the Russian nuclear submarine base in Kamchatka. A Russian milblogger affiliated with Russian Spetsnaz commented that Inokhodets and Forpost UAVs have limited operational range, but that Russian forces can modernize these UAVs and integrate AI to extend the range. The milblogger welcomed the deployment of the drone control center and implied that such deployment would compensate for Russia's lack of anti-submarine aircraft.[45] An Estonian OSINT analyst amplified satellite images on August 8 showing that Russia installed anti-drone nets at the Rybachy nuclear submarine base of the Pacific Fleet in Kamchatka.[46]Russian Defense Industrial Base (Assessed Russian objective: Increase Russia's defense industrial base production to support Russian war efforts)The Kremlin is continuing to expand the drone factory and supporting infrastructure at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to increase Russian Shahed drone production. CNN reported on July 25 that satellite imagery shows that Russia has been increasingly constructing new infrastructure at the Alabuga Drone Factory in the Republic of Tatarstan since August 2024.[47] Satellite imagery indicates that the Kremlin has constructed at least eight new warehouse-like structures near Shahed drone manufacturing facilities between late 2024 and July 2025, and at least 104 structures resembling partially or fully constructed worker dormitories between February and July 12, 2025. US-based experts shared estimates with CNN that new dormitories can potentially accommodate up to 40,000 workers when finished.[48]Russian recruiters are continuing to recruit Russian and Central Asian children and teenagers to construct the Alabuga factory and produce drones at the Alabuga SEZ. CNN reported that Russia opened the Alabuga Build summer camp on July 4 and that the Russian Student Brigades youth organization organized the camp.[49] The Republic of Tatarstan's Education Ministry claimed that Russian Student Brigades drafted about 2,500 students to build the Mediterranean Park housing complex at Alabuga, and CNN observed over 100 tents appear next to drone production warehouses like the ones seen in Alabuga Build promotional material. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Tatar-Bashkir Service Idel Realii reported on August 15 that Russian authorities are also recruiting Central Asian youth for work at Alabuga under deceptive promises that teenagers will receive education at the Alabuga Polytech College, located at the Alabuga SEZ.[50] Idel Realii reported that Russian recruiters are actively advertising schooling at the Alabuga Polytech College in Kyrgyz schools and colleges. ISW previously reported on Russia’s increasing efforts to involve children and teenagers in drone design and production, both at Alabuga and via networks of student clubs and training programs.[51]Russia is reportedly expanding its drone production in Rostov Oblast. Rostov Oblast Acting Governor Yuriy Slyusar stated during a meeting with Putin on August 18 that Rostov Oblast is actively expanding its drone production, including production of dual-use drones.[52] Slyusar stated in an interview after the meeting with Putin that Rostov Oblast drone manufacturers produce up to 100,000 drones per month, partly due to the support of Russia’s Unmanned Aerial Systems program.[53]A Russian source claimed that Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod produced between 540 and 630 T-90M tanks since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that Russia's primary tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) began mass producing modernized T-90M Proryv main battle tanks since the beginning of 2022.[54] Russian forces had approximately 65 to 85 T-90M tanks and 370 to 380 older T-90 and T-90A tanks in service as of February 2022. The milblogger claimed that UVZ’s annual production volume increased from 60 to 70 T-90M tanks in 2022 to 140 to 180 tanks in 2023 to possibly 250 to 300 tanks in 2024. The milblogger claimed that UVZ produced a total of 540 to 630 T-90Ms tanks since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that this total includes newly constructed tanks and modernized T-90A tanks. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces only sustained 130 confirmed T-90 tank losses and assessed that between 410 to 500 T-90Ms remain in service. Dutch open-source project Oryx visually confirmed that Ukrainian forces captured, damaged, or destroyed 140 T-90M, one T-90AK, 11 T-90S, and 45 T-90A tanks as of August 1, 2025.[55] The milblogger added that UVZ is preparing to expand production by establishing new welding stations and machines designed for nonstop operation, which can support higher production volumes in the coming years, but noted that increasing tank production requires additional investment and modern equipment.[56] [57] Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month.[58]Russia is facing procurement problems with Su-57 fighter aircraft due to Western sanctions. First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev claimed on August 1 that the Russian DIB is increasing the deliveries of Su-57 aircraft with hypersonic weapons to Russian forces.[59] Ukraine-based open-source intelligence organization Frontelligence Insight published an investigation on August 16, citing documents obtained from the Ukrainian Dallas analytics team, that revealed that the Russian MoD has been having problems with Su-57 procurement since 2021 and 2022. The documents indicated that the Russian Sukhoi aircraft manufacturer delivered the Su-57 jets without targeting pods and electro-optical targeting subsystems, which undermined their operational capabilities.[60] Frontelligence Insight reported in September 2024 that Western sanctions also impeded Russian Mikropribor military electronics manufacturer from producing critical microchips for Su-57 aircraft, resulting in disrupted procurement contracts and delayed production.[61] Frontelligence Insight observed that companies within the Sukhoi corporation have also inflated pricing and engaged in corruption schemes. Frontelligence Insight assessed that a combination of Western sanctions and Russian corruption resulted in the Russian MoD receiving Su-57s with reduced combat effectiveness due to a lack of necessary electronic components.Russian artillerymen are reportedly receiving poor quality Russian and North Korean artillery ammunition. A Russian milblogger amplified a complaint from a Russian artilleryman in an infantry regiment on July 29, which stated that Russian forces receive North Korean ammunition that lacks precision and is unreliable in combat. The artilleryman noted that Russian forces at first used Soviet ammunition, which worked well, but later switched to Iranian, North Korean, and recently made Russian ammunition. The serviceman noted that Iranian ammunition is precise and well-made, whereas recently made Russian ammunition is inconsistent, poorly produced, and lacks necessary quality control.[62] The milblogger claimed that Russian ammunition is off by 1-2 kilometers from the target and that Russian manufacturers do not provide manuals with usage recommendations for individual ammunition shipments. The artilleryman also complained that Russian commanders transfer artillerymen operating this inferior ammunition to assault units as punishment for poor combat performance. The milblogger attempted to excuse the poor condition of the Russian ammunition by noting that Russian forces need ammunition urgently and in large quantities, resulting in the Russian DIB needing to take shortcuts.[63] The milblogger recalled that Russian shell manufacturers delivered unpainted shells in 2022 and argued that modern Russian ammunition cannot be compared to Soviet ammunition because the Soviet Union produced limited batches of shells.The Kremlin officially extended tax benefits for some Russian drone manufacturers to incentivize Russian development and production of tactical drones. Putin signed a bill on July 31 that establishes a zero value-added tax (VAT) rate for producers that sell drones weighing from 0.15 to 30 kilograms.[64] The bill also established a zero VAT rate for imported engines, spare parts and components for drone assembly, repair, and modernization. Russian State Duma Deputy from occupied Crimea Mikhail Sheremet stated that the law aims to reduce drone production costs, support small business, and maintain Russian technological advantages in the drone industry.[65] The Russian State Duma originally adopted the bill on July 17.[66][1] https://x.com/sambendett/status/1956424585605480641; https://t.me/uav_tech/33289[2] https://t.me/rybar/72492[3] https://t.me/vestnik247/12440 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956644673805488134[4] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307[5] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[6] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[7] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[8] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[9] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307 ; https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[10] https://t.me/milinfolive/154383; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russian-company-presents-line-of-interceptor-drones/; https://x.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1954019325364576307[11] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/24733623[12] https://t.me/tass_agency/330285[13] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237[14] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237[15] https://t.me/rusich_army/25237[16] https://t.me/ramzayiegokomanda/28107; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-introduces-spider-hand-held-anti-drone-netting/[17] https://t.me/trueshniy/1066[18] https://t.me/dva_majors/77653[19] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13848[20] https://dpsu.gov dot ua/uk/news/47992-rosijskij-bezpilotnik-gerbera-staye-nebezpechnishim[21] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl[22] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl[23] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl[24] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl[25] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6082 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1956263087591374921; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176003; https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02cqt6YXrKkoT8iZLmc3nDNAYPxjTKTTWzAXDEmDNPoYEE7q6nfdrsDcSajPxStSeFl[26] https://www.facebook.com/Serhii.Flash/posts/pfbid02JFsNKEW5fA3ahmhB35uxFYp9E4vEcocCrbhyXQJ8TNA6p4c4pQuB6ySGDNcQthPNl ; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6087[27] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-developing-command-system-for-china-s-amphibious-operations-against-taiwan/; https://x.com/blackmoon_group/status/1950107050270478380[28] https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1952809125324431696 ; https://united24media dot com/latest-news/china-russia-joint-venture-develops-new-kevlar-fiber-optics-to-power-military-drones-10536; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24544[29] https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1952809125324431696; https://t.me/notes_veterans/24544[30] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6004[31] https://united24media dot com/latest-news/inside-rubikon-elite-russian-drone-unit-trains-suicide-vessels-for-future-naval-attacks-10419[32] https://en.iz dot ru/en/1884980/roman-krecul-bogdan-stepovoi/there-will-be-regiment-navy-creating-marine-parts-unmanned-systems[33] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174577[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/55217[35] https://x.com/sambendett/status/1951372746363117858 ; https://t.me/DobroKor/1815[36] https://t.me/milinfolive/154318;https://t.co/Ho72KcgWUR;https://x.com/sambendett/status/1953811072986562920;[37] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6100[38] https://t.me/war_home/4927; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-fires-new-small-cruise-missile-at-ukraine/[39] https://t.me/war_home/4927; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-fires-new-small-cruise-missile-at-ukraine/[40] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2954[41] https://x.com/zajobanyiroman/status/1957162405005521386[42] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2025/08/11/1130629-informatsiyu-o-poletah-grazhdanskih-dronov-peredadut-cherez-era-glonass ; https://meduza.io/news/2025/08/11/vedomosti-v-rossii-vse-grazhdanskie-bespilotniki-budut-obyazany-peredavat-dannye-o-svoem-peremeschenii[43] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2025[44] https://en dot iz dot ru/en/1932476/bogdan-stepovoi-roman-krecul/kamchatka-game-navy-has-deployed-first-drone-control-center ;https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/57943[45] https://t.me/rusich_army/25136[46] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1953717420645839108[47] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl[48] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl[49] https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl[50] https://t.me/idelrealii/42235[51] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025[52] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77806[53] https://news-don dot ru/society/2025/08/18/35569.html[54] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897[55] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html[56] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897[57] https://t.me/milinfolive/153897[58] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2024[59] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1039129[60] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1956760359953412586[61] https://frontelligence dot substack.com/p/missing-targeting-pods-inflated-bills[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/76355[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/76356  [64] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24679957; http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202507310043?index=5[65] https://t.me/sheremet_82/15959;[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, August 6, 2025

 

at 8/23/25 10:22am

Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Carolyn Moorman, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Parker Hempel, Ali Fishman, Avery Bernstein, Joe Clark, and Annika GanzeveldInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.The Lebanese Council of Ministers took an early step on August 5 to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced on August 5 that the Lebanese Council of Ministers tasked the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025.[1] The Lebanese Council of Ministers is Lebanon’s executive body that sets and implements Lebanese government policy.[2] This plan would require Hezbollah to disarm. The LAF will submit the plan to the Council of Ministers by August 31 for the council to discuss and approve.[3] It is unclear whether this review period will provide opportunities for Hezbollah and its allies to push back against and postpone the approval of the proposed plan. Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Rajai posted on X on August 6 that the Lebanese government’s decision to establish a state monopoly on arms is final and that there will be “no turning back.”[4]Hezbollah released a statement on August 6 that condemned the council’s decision and deemed it a “major sin.”[5] Hezbollah asserted that the decision is “a clear violation” of the Lebanese government’s February 2025 ministerial statement, which states that the Lebanese government is committed to the 1989 Taif Agreement and adopting a domestic national defense strategy.[6] Hezbollah has consistently called for the implementation of the 1989 Taif Agreement, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias except Hezbollah.[7] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem has repeatedly called on the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to coordinate a national defense strategy.[8] Hezbollah noted in its August 6 statement that it is open to dialogue and is prepared to discuss a strategy with the government, but not until Israel concludes its operations in Lebanon.[9] The Amal Movement, which is a close ally of Hezbollah, released a similar statement on August 5 condemning the council’s decision.[10]Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision reflects Hezbollah's relative loss of political leverage within the Lebanese government. Several Hezbollah and allied Amal Movement ministers symbolically walked out of the council session on August 5, but neither group was able to prevent the council from tasking the LAF to establish a state monopoly on arms.[11] The council was rarely able to pass legislation without Hezbollah’s approval between 2008 and 2019, given that Hezbollah held enough seats to have de facto veto power.[12] Hezbollah and the Amal Movement currently only hold five seats in the Council of Ministers, which is insufficient to veto a council decision.[13] Hezbollah has recently struggled to maintain its support base in the Lebanese government and Lebanese society, which has likely contributed to its waning political leverage. Notable Hezbollah allies have recently shifted their positions and expressed support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[14] Lebanese media reported on July 28 that Lebanese Parliament Speaker and long-time Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri is “in agreement” with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on the state’s "approach toward the weapons file.”[15] The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and the Marada Movement, which are two Lebanese political parties that have historically supported Hezbollah’s retention of weapons, have also publicly declared their support for the state’s monopoly on arms.[16]  Hezbollah’s recent political losses and declining political leverage are unlikely to prevent Hezbollah from attempting to block efforts by the state to disarm it, however. Hezbollah has long used its military capabilities and political influence within other state institutions to sway the Lebanese government’s decision-making.[17] Hezbollah has continued to reject calls to disarm, which suggests that it will oppose and challenge any LAF plan to establish a state monopoly on arms.[18]Iranian media outlet Nour News suggested on August 6 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian instructed newly appointed Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani to adopt a comprehensive security approach to counter hybrid threats. Nour News, which is affiliated with former SNSC Secretary and Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, suggested on August 6 that Pezeshkian instructed Larijani to “monitor and prioritize emerging and technological threats” and “redefine security concepts with a people-based approach.” Nour News stated that the “emerging” threats that Iran faces include cyberattacks, the spread of misinformation and disinformation exacerbated by artificial intelligence, international sanctions, climate-induced migration, and the “collapse of social capital and public trust."[19] These threats are consistent with the regime’s understanding of hybrid warfare, which the regime defines as the use of all domains of power—including information, electronic, cultural, social, and military operations—by hostile actors to destabilize Iran. Nour News previously proposed on July 29 the creation of a "Strategic Command Center" to accelerate the Iranian regime’s responses to hybrid threats in wartime.[20]Pezeshkian’s emphasis on a “people-based” security approach and Nour News’s call for increasing social capital and public trust are consistent with recent calls by moderate and pragmatic regime officials to increase societal resilience and resolve disputes between the regime and the Iranian people. Shamkhani called on the regime to resolve “disputes” with the Iranian population through a “process of understanding” in an interview on June 28.[21] Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati separately stated on July 21 that preserving national cohesion may require “revising social policies” and prioritizing public satisfaction.[22] Pezeshkian recently noted during a meeting with reformists on July 22 that the regime must engage in dialogue, not confrontation, to solve its problems.[23]Some regime officials welcomed Larijani’s appointment as a necessary shift for Iranian national security. Velayati stated on X on August 5 that Larijani’s appointment demonstrates the regime’s “foresight” and described his appointment as an “effective step.”[24] Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi separately expressed his willingness to cooperate with Larijani.[25] Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh praised Larijani as a seasoned politician who will prove transformative in his new role.Ultrahardliners criticized Larijani’s appointment as SNSC secretary, which likely reflects their broader dissatisfaction with the recent resurgence of moderates and pragmatists in the Iranian political sphere. Ultrahardline Paydari Front leader and Supreme Leader Representative to the SNSC, Saeed Jalili, criticized supporters of negotiations with the United States on August 6.[26] Larijani defended Iran’s agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the United States against hardliners’ criticism while serving as parliament speaker in 2015.[27] Larijani also reportedly tried to contact Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during the Israel-Iran War to advocate for "opening talks” with the United States.[28] A Larijani-affiliated outlet characterized Jalili’s criticism as resentment over his "diminished role” in the SNSC, highlighting the factional tensions surrounding Larijani’s appointment.[29] Jalili’s adviser, Amir Hossein Sabeti, also expressed pessimism about Larijani’s appointment on August 6, stating that Larijani’s approach to solving problems is "not fundamentally different” from those of moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian and former reformist President Hassan Rouhani.[30]Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed former Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian as the President’s Special Representative and Head of the Headquarters for National and Strategic Projects Development.[31] Pezeshkian stated that the new headquarters led by Ahmadian will help Iran accomplish its strategic goals and remove obstacles to domestic and foreign investors, including by mobilizing the Iranian public and Iranian intellectuals.[32] Pezeshkian said that Ahmadian’s role as the head of the “Progressive People’s Organization” will enable him to pursue these objectives. Ahmadian reportedly established the Progressive People’s Organization when he led the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Strategic Center between 2007 and 2023.[33] The organization was established to implement national projects outlined in the Iranian government's seventh five-year development plan.[34]Assadist remnants likely attempted to conduct a false flag attack on a church in Tartous Province on August 6 to heighten fears in the local community and incite sectarian tensions in coastal Syria. The Syrian government announced on August 6 that the General Security Service (GSS) thwarted an attempt by two Assadist remnants to detonate a large improvised explosive device (IED) at the Mar Elias Maronite Church in al Khreibat, east of Tartous City.[35] The GSS also seized leaflets with threatening sectarian messages, a black flag commonly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and weapons in the attackers’ vehicle.[36]The Assadist remnants likely intended to frame an attack on the church as an ISIS attack to incite sectarian strife. It is unlikely that the perpetrators were members of ISIS, despite the presence of an ISIS flag in their vehicle, given that the attackers were reportedly Alawite and ISIS has not historically sustained a presence in coastal Syria.[37] Unknown actors recently left threatening leaflets at a church in Tartous on July 6 that claimed to be from ISIS-aligned Salafi-jihadi group Saraya Ansar al Sunnah.[38] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah denied placing the leaflets at the church, and local priests attributed the leaflets to Assadist remnants.[39]The Assad regime often conducted false flag operations before it was overthrown in December 2024 to try to portray the Syrian opposition as jihadists.[40] The two regime remnants may have sought to employ a similar tactic to try to heighten fears in the local community, increase recruitment, and spread anti-government sentiment. Pro-Alawite insurgents, many of whom support the former regime, have participated in a low-level insurgency since the fall of the Assad regime to try to destabilize the Syrian transitional government.[41] The attempted attack resembles a recent ISIS-linked suicide bombing in a church in Damascus in June 2025 that instilled considerable fear in the Christian community.[42] Many prominent Syrian Christians criticized the transitional government’s response to the attack.[43]Key TakeawaysHezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers tasked the LAF with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025, which is an early step to attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s inability to delay or veto the council’s decision reflects Hezbollah's relative loss of political leverage within the Lebanese government.Iranian Defense Apparatus: Iranian media outlet Nour News suggested on August 6 that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian instructed newly appointed Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani to adopt a comprehensive security approach to counter hybrid threats.Security in Syria: Assadist remnants likely intended to frame a planned attack on a church in Tartous Province on ISIS in order to heighten fears in the local community and incite sectarian tensions in coastal Syria. It is unlikely that the perpetrators were members of ISIS, given that the attackers were reportedly Alawite and that the Assad regime has historically used false flag operations to generate sectarian tensions.IranIran continues to contend with a severe water and energy crisis. Iran’s Water Resources Management Company reported on August 3 that Iran’s total water reserves have decreased by 26 percent in the last year.[44] The CEO of the Tehran Provincial Water and Wastewater Company said on August 4 that the dams that supply water to Tehran Province are only 12 percent full and urged Iranians to decrease their water consumption.[45] An official from Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization told reporters on August 5 that Lake Urmia’s water volume decreased from two billion cubic meters in August 2024 to half a billion cubic meters in August 2025, which marks Lake Urmia’s lowest ever recorded water volume.[46] Lake Urmia, which is in northwestern Iran, was once the largest lake in the Middle East before it started to dry up.[47] The CEO of Iran’s Electricity Network Management Company separately announced on August 4 that Iranians' electricity consumption has surpassed 77,000 megawatts.[48] Iran has a maximum production capacity of 62,000 megawatts.[49] The Iranian Energy Ministry has implemented daily electricity blackouts in cities across Iran for four hours to reduce energy consumption.[50] Iran closed public offices, government buildings, and banks in over 20 provinces on August 6 to reduce water and energy consumption amid a severe heatwave.[51]It is unlikely that the regime will be able to improve the water and energy shortages without meaningfully addressing underlying issues that exacerbate these shortages, such as poor infrastructure and mismanagement. A Tehran City Council member stated on August 5 that nearly 30 percent of Tehran’s water is wasted due to outdated infrastructure.[52] Iranian state media reported on August 5 that agriculture wastes 24 billion cubic meters of water per year.[53] State media reported on August 4 that Iranian parliamentarians submitted a motion to impeach Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi for mismanaging water resources and failing to address structural corruption within the Energy Ministry.[54] Iranian authorities executed Iranian nuclear scientist Rouzbeh Vadi on August 6 for reportedly providing Israel with information about another nuclear scientist whom Israel killed during the 12-day Israel-Iran War.[55] Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media claimed that Israel recruited Vadi online and that Vadi met with Mossad officers in Vienna five times.[56] Vadi reportedly received instructions to leak classified technical information and identify nuclear scientists in exchange for money.[57] Israel killed at least 14 nuclear scientists during the war.[58] Vadi’s execution reflects the Iranian regime’s ongoing concerns about Israeli infiltration.[59]IraqPolitical sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 6 that unidentified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may “take to the streets” in response to an Iraqi federal government plan to dissolve the militias.[60] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which have armed wings. Unidentified “informed sources” stated that the Iraqi federal government intends to soon implement a 2022 plan to dissolve Iranian-backed militias.[61] CTP-ISW cannot verify the details of this reported plan. A Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)- affiliated journalist reported on July 20 that the Iraqi government drafted a new plan to dissolve the militias, integrate militia members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and offer militia leaders key leadership positions in the next Iraqi cabinet.[62] The report about Iranian-backed Iraqi militias threatening to organize protests comes amid ongoing Iraqi discussions regarding the dissolution of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.Political sources close to the Shia Coordination Framework also told Iraqi media on August 6 that some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are “almost at odds” with the Shia Coordination Framework.[63] This report likely refers to the disillusionment of some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias toward elements of the Shia Coordination Framework, rather than toward all of the parties that comprise the framework. This report comes after Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah Spokesperson Abu Ali al Askari implicitly criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and called on the Shia Coordination Framework to assume its “historical responsibilities.” These responsibilities likely include efforts to remove US forces from Iraq, among other policy issues.[64] Sudani recently delayed a vote on a law from the parliamentary agenda that likely would have increased Iran's influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the structure and responsibilities of the PMF.[65] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may also oppose other members of the Shia Coordination Framework. National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim and former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi are both members of the framework despite attempting to form a political party in 2020 that would have opposed Iranian-backed groups.[66] The Iranian-backed Badr Organization recently announced that it will run independently in the November 2025 parliamentary elections, which may reflect current divisions in the Shia Coordination Framework.[67]The Iraqi Navy seized the Liberian-flagged oil tanker Liliana in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Basra Province on August 6 because it lacked proper documentation.[68] An unspecified security official told Iraqi and Arab media on August 6 that the Iraqi Navy seized the vessel near the Basra Oil Terminal after its crew failed to provide official documents verifying the origin and ownership of its cargo. The vessel was transporting 250,000 tons of crude oil of unknown origin.[69] Smugglers who transport sanctioned Iranian oil frequently use forged documentation to misrepresent Iranian crude oil as Iraqi oil to evade sanctions.[70] Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[71]An unidentified senior Iraqi Oil Ministry official told al Araby al Jadeed on August 6 that the seizure was part of a broader Oil Ministry effort to combat Iranian oil smuggling.[72] The seizure comes after the Iraqi State Organization for Marketing Oil (SOMO) issued a document on July 28 calling on Iraqi authorities to halt “widespread” oil smuggling in Iraqi territorial waters.[73] The United States threatened in July 2025 to sanction SOMO and thereby block $350 million of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian oil smuggling.[74] The United States sanctioned six entities and four vessels on July 3 that are involved in smuggling Iranian oil, including a network of companies run by an Iraqi businessman.[75]SyriaSyrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack in Damascus on August 6.[76] The Syrian Ministry of Interior reported that the two officials discussed recent Syrian political and security developments and ways to advance the Syrian “political process” to ensure Syria’s “territorial integrity.”[77] The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian transitional government, France, and the United States are scheduled to meet in Paris soon to negotiate the integration of the SDF into the Syrian Defense Ministry.[78]Arabian PeninsulaNothing significant to report. Palestinian Territories and LebanonThe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed a Hezbollah fighter in the Bekaa Valley on August 6 who oversaw attacks against Israel from Syria.[79] The IDF said that the Hezbollah fighter directed cells in Syria to launch rocket attacks targeting the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[lxxx] Hezbollah fighters operated openly and in large numbers in Syria under the Assad regime.[80]The LAF has continued to dismantle Hezbollah-linked smuggling networks along the Syria-Lebanon border. The LAF engaged and killed three Hezbollah-linked smugglers in Baalbek, northeastern Lebanon.[82] The LAF killed a smuggler named Ali Zaiter (Abu Sala), who was a prominent member of the al Zaiter clan.[lxxxiii] The al Zaiter clan has reportedly been involved in drug and weapons smuggling and reportedly has ties to Hezbollah.[84] The LAF has shut down several known smuggling routes and increased its presence along the Lebanon-Syria border to curb Hezbollah-linked smuggling in recent months.[85][1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/ ; https://x.com/nawafasalam/status/1952798986470916262[2] https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/08/middleeast/lebanon-prime-minister-new-government-intl[3] https://x.com/nawafasalam/status/1952798986470916262 ; https://x.com/DavidADaoud/status/1952820070066848133[4] https://x.com/YoussefRaggi/status/1953071866689544513[5] https://t.me/mmirleb/9827[6] https://t.me/mmirleb/9827 ; https://dearborn.org/preview/full-text-of-the-ministerial-statement-of-prime-minister-nawaf-salams-government-65569[7] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/05-influence-over-military-and-security[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05/[9] https://t.me/mmirleb/9827[10] https://t.me/almanarnews/218805 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/218804[11] https://t.me/mmirleb/9827[12] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/02-influence-through-state-institutions[13] https://israel-alma dot org/the-new-lebanese-government-details-and-implications/[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-chief-rejects-disarmament-pressure-lebanon-grows-2025-07-30/ ; https://epc dot ae/en/details/scenario/between-monopoly-and-dismantling-prospects-for-disarming-lebanese-hezbollah ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314444-report-lebanon-warned-of-escalation-in-august-if-it-doesn-t-act-on-arms-monopoly[15] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314444-report-lebanon-warned-of-escalation-in-august-if-it-doesn-t-act-on-arms-monopoly[16] https://epc dot ae/en/details/scenario/between-monopoly-and-dismantling-prospects-for-disarming-lebanese-hezbollah[17] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-lebanese-state/02-influence-through-state-institutions[18] https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-disarmament-kassem-cabinet-7d8cca554405c85e80b010df0770b1ca[19] www.nournews dot ir/fa/news/238421[20] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/237258/[21] https://x.com/abdolah_abdi/status/1939016104351064085[22] https://x.com/Drvelayati_ir/status/1947234380054712351[23] https://president dot ir/fa/160486[24] https://x.com/Drvelayati_ir/status/1952769516649197841[25] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2099130[26] https://x.com/DrSaeedJalili/status/1952806588118646858;https://x.com/DrSaeedJalili/status/1952816085298020458;https://x.com/DrSaeedJalili/status/1952810264505795001; https://x.com/DrSaeedJalili/status/1953060084348563579[27] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/iranian-mps-conditions-revival-iran-deal[28] https://iranwire.com/en/news/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/[29] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2099130[30] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/878731/[31] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/5536196[32] https://www.tehrantimes dot com/news/516532/President-names-Ahmadian-to-head-new-strategic-development-body[33] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/03/01/2899592/; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2023/5/22/who-is-ali-akbar-ahmadian-irans-new-security-chief[34] https://www.shahrekhabar dot com/news/174100518007639[35] https://t.me/syrianmoi/25246 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/25253 ; https://t.me/syrianmoi/25259 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1953042122422051032[36] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1953042122422051032 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1953045884679131251[37] https://t.me/Alawis14/21163 ; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19JtExp2JE/[38] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1953093755814506671[39] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1953093755814506671 ; https://t.me/sraia8/586[40] https://x.com/azelin/status/1953048325713785245[41] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/alawite-insurgents-seek-use-sectarian-violence-destabilize-interim-government-syria[42] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-syria-after-israel-iran-war-june-13-%E2%80%93-july-3-2025[43] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-syria-after-israel-iran-war-june-13-%E2%80%93-july-3-2025[44] https://ifpnews.com/water-reserves-in-19-major-iranian-dams-fall-below-20/[45] https://www.khabaronline dot ir/news/2098105[46] https://www.entekhab dot ir/fa/news/878609[47] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507313216[48] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404051307763[49] https://apnews.com/article/iran-electricity-crisis-tehran-closure-b5ac44a1565d1ececa1aba0ab14b95a8[50] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/15/3370253[51] https://iranfocus.com/iran/55039-over-20-provinces-in-iran-shut-down-due-to-power-and-water-shortages/[52] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1082949[53] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1404051308173[54] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85904453[55] https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1953035329100795976 ;https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-mossad-islamic-state-executions-spying-1b65cbd0a4432d53ec8eb354f4037085 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768115 ; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768115[56] https://www.mizanonline dot ir/en/news/2030/execution-of-mossad-spy-who-transferred-information-related-to-martyred-nuclear-scientist-to-mossad[57] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/768115https://apnews.com/article/iran-israel-mossad-islamic-state-executions-spying-1b65cbd0a4432d53ec8eb354f4037085[58] https://apnews.com/article/israel-iran-nuclear-science-attacks-e298f00ba261debba4499a48c9df8b3d[59] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-june-27-2025[60] https://almadapaper dot net/410154/[61] https://almadapaper dot net/410154/[62] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996593653076228[63] https://almadapaper dot net/410154/[64] https://t.me/abualaskary/137[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2025[66] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2022/8/1/%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b3%d9%8a%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b1%d8%a7%d9%82%d9%8a-%d8%a5%d8%b7%d8%a7%d8%b1-%d9%8a%d8%ac%d9%85%d8%b9[67] https://alghadeertv dot iq/archives/351504[68] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/536171/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9 ; https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/details/9297905[69] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/536171/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9 ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9[70] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/[71] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/ ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/[72] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/economy/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D9%81%D8%B7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A9[73] https://almadapaper dot net/409304/[74] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/851317[75] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/[76] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1210[77] https://t.me/syrianmofaex1/1210[78] https://hawarnews dot com/ar/126630[79] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1952987539591070169[80] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1952987539591070169[81] https://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria[82] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1953078009147036123[83] https://x.com/AlHadath/status/1953039313752453603 ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1953041531549409714[84] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1887465945737625803 ; https://syrianobserver dot com/refugees/lebanons-drug-baron-relocates-to-syria-amid-regional-turmoil.html[85] https://www.lbcgroup dot tv/news/news-bulletin-reports/848527/ambush-on-the-border-107-illegal-crossings-closed-as-lebanese-army-thw/en ; https://www.facebook.com/middleeastmonitor/posts/lebanon-closed-six-illegal-border-crossings-with-syria-amid-efforts-to-stop-smug/1053827730110589/ ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1452914/lebanese-army-announces-closure-of-four-illegal-crossings-along-lebanon-syria-border.html ; https://www.arabnews dot com/node/2602658/amp

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 6, 2025

 

at 8/23/25 10:22am

 Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, and Karolina HirdAugust 6, 2025, 8:15 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed that the Witkoff-Putin meeting was "useful and constructive" and that Putin and Ushakov exchanged "signals" about Ukraine.[1] Ushakov stated that the Kremlin will refrain from issuing further statements about the negotiations until Witkoff has briefed US President Donald Trump about the results. Leading Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev also attended the meeting with Putin and Witkoff and called the negotiations "successful."[2] Trump characterized the negotiations as "highly productive" and stated that Witkoff and Putin made "great progress," and emphasized the importance of ending Russia's war in Ukraine.[3] Neither the Kremlin nor the White House has issued formal read-outs as of the time of this writing.Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks. White House Spokesperson Karoline Leavitt stated following the Putin-Witkoff meeting that Trump intends to meet with both Putin and Zelensky, and two people familiar with the matter told the New York Times (NYT) that Trump could hold a bilateral meeting with Putin followed by a trilateral meeting with Zelensky as soon as next week.[4]Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine. Russian state media and pro-Kremlin outlets amplified commentary from Russian State Duma deputies, largely framing Witkoff as a rational actor in US-Russia negotiations while portraying Trump as irrational. Russian State Duma Deputy Grigory Karasin stated on August 4 that he hoped that the results of Witkoff's meeting with Putin would be "specific, not emotional, like Trump's latest statements," and Russian media amplified Karasin's comment in reporting about the Witkoff-Trump meeting on August 6.[5] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed on August 6 that Trump sent Witkoff to "smooth over tensions" following Trump's recently issued "ultimatums" that Russia end the war or face US sanctions, and claimed that this smoothing over could negatively affect the image of the Trump administration.[6] Alexander "Sasha" Kots, a Russian milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin's Human Rights Council, accused Trump of "handing out" daily ultimatums and suggested that Witkoff will bring Trump a proposal that Trump "will perceive as a small victory."[7] The Kremlin has frequently attempted to sow divisions between Ukraine and its allies, as well as between the United States and Europe, as part of wider efforts to deter support for Ukraine.[8] The Kremlin appears to be employing similar informational tactics against the Trump administration to undermine ongoing US efforts to compel Putin to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war. The Kremlin also likely aims to coerce unilateral concessions from the United States regarding the war, including fostering US-Russian economic deals in Russia's favor without Trump's stated preconditions of a ceasefire and negotiations for an enduring peace.Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions. Bloomberg reported on August 5 that Russia's oil revenue fell by approximately a third from July 2024 to July 2025 due to the global decline in crude oil prices and the appreciation of the ruble.[9] Bloomberg reported that the oil industries continue to account for roughly a third of Russia's budget and that the drop in oil revenues therefore increases pressure on Russia's already-strained federal budget. Russian State Duma deputies downplayed the impact of the fall in oil revenue on August 6, however. State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed in an interview with the Russian outlet NEWS.ru that Russia would not stop the war in Ukraine even if it were "twice as expensive to fill oil tanks" and that the Russian government structured a reserve into its budget forecasts for 2025 such that even a $10 decrease in the price per barrel of oil would not impact the state budget.[10] State Duma Energy Committee First Deputy Chairperson Valery Selezne stated in an interview to Russian outlet OSN that Russia should take advantage of gas shortages in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to increase Russian exports to Central Asia to protect the Russian domestic economy from the financial burden of potential tariffs against Russia — somewhat in opposition to Zhuravlev's claim that Russia's economy is impervious to changes in oil revenues.[11] State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption member Adalbi Shkhagoshev stated in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS that further US sanctions against Russia will not affect the course of the war in Ukraine, and that new sanctions would amount to economic war against Russia and its BRICS allies.[12]Economic indicators suggest that the Russian economy is weaker than Russian officials project. The Russian Central Bank reported to TASS on August 6 that the Russian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025, below the originally forecasted growth projection of two percent, and by 1.8 percent in the second quarter of 2025, close to the forecasted growth projection of 1.9 percent.[13] The Russian Central Bank claimed that there was a "slowdown in the growth rate of household and government consumption" in April 2025, which the bank did not forecast. UK outlet Express reported on August 6 that Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade data showed that the passenger car market fell by 24 percent from July 2024 to July 2025.[14] Consumer spending is a major driver of domestic economies, and a decline in purchases of a common item such as passenger vehicles suggests that consumers either face or fear economic instability that would inhibit such purchases. The Russian Central Bank is likely attempting to use reports of GDP growth as a sign of economic stability to project confidence to the domestic Russian populace who may be worried about the impact of the war and further Western sanctions on everyday life. Russian officials and the Central Bank are also likely attempting to discourage the West from levying additional sanctions against Russia or secondary sanctions against Russia's trading partners. Increased sanctions, especially against Russian oil exports, will further hinder Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine. The sanctions remain critical — in tandem with continued Western defense assistance to Ukraine — to constraining Russian aggression.[15]US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia. Trump signed an executive order on August 6 that will impose an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian exports to the United States, starting on August 31, given India’s continued purchases of Russian oil.[16] The executive order includes a modification provision in the event that India ceases purchases of oil from Russia or in the case of retaliation against the United States for this order. The executive order describes Russia as “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to US national security and foreign policy. India is one of the largest importers of Russian oil and has continued to purchase Russian military equipment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.[17] ISW previously assessed that European and US sanctions appeared to be degrading Russia's revenues from third-country importers of Russian oil and that sanctions that target countries that purchase Russian oil will further hinder Russia's ability to finance its war in Ukraine.[18]Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town. Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Sobolivka (immediately west of Kupyansk) and likely seized Sobolivka and Myrne (immediately north of Sobolivka).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are close to interdicting the H-26 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway (running east-west from Kupyansk and roughly one kilometer south of Sobolivka), the main Ukrainian GLOC supplying Kupyansk.[20] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces would likely leverage advances northwest of Kupyansk to support efforts to envelop Kupyansk and complicate Ukraine's ability to supply positions in the town and defend areas to the west.[21] Russian forces have at least three possible courses of action (COAs) following the potential future seizure of Kupyansk. Russian forces may continue to push west of Kupyansk toward Shevchenkove or northwest of Kupyansk toward Velykyi Burluk in order to support Russian efforts to establish a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv Oblast and advance toward Kharkiv City.[22] The Russian military command may instead reprioritize the seizure of the remainder of the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Borova and Lyman directions to support efforts to seize the remainder of Luhansk Oblast or set conditions for a future offensive on Ukraine's fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the northeast, respectively. The Russian military command may alternatively redeploy manpower from the Kupyansk direction to higher priority areas such as the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, or Novopavlivka directions to facilitate Russia's long-standing objective of seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast. Russian advances in Sobolivka and Myrne appear to be consistent with Russia's recently demonstrated operational pattern of partially enveloping a settlement as opposed to trying to seize it using frontal assaults.[23] Russian forces are likely to use advances in these areas to support the envelopment of Kupyansk and pursue further advances west and northwest of Kupyansk.The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced on August 5 that the US State Department approved and notified US Congress of an FMS to Ukraine worth roughly $104 million for equipment, maintenance services, and long-term sustainment support for M777 howitzers.[24] The DSCA reported that UK defense manufacturer BAE Systems will be the principal contractor for this FMS.A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law. The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office reported on August 6 that it opened a case against a Russian servicemember who intentionally killed a Ukrainian man attempting to evacuate from Udachne, Donetsk Oblast, which Russian forces currently partially occupy.[25] The Ukrainian Prosecutor General published footage of the execution and reported that this is the third recorded incident of Russian forces executing civilians in occupied Donetsk Oblast thus far in 2025.[26] Russian soldiers and occupation authorities have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in occupied Ukraine in Russia's pursuit to eradicate an independent Ukrainian language, culture, and identity.[27]Key Takeaways:Russian President Vladimir Putin met with US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Moscow on August 6, but concrete results from the meeting remain unclear.Trump may meet with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the coming weeks.Certain Russian commentators are attempting to stoke schisms within the Trump administration, likely as part of a wider effort to avoid US sanctions ahead of Trump's stated August 8 deadline for peace efforts in Ukraine.Russian officials and media continue to project an image of a strong and resilient Russian economy in anticipation of further US sanctions.US President Donald Trump formally imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on India’s exports to the United States due to India’s ongoing economic cooperation with Russia.Russian forces likely advanced to the western outskirts of Kupyansk and secured positions from which they can threaten Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into the town.The US State Department approved a $104 million Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Ukraine.A Russian servicemember recently executed a Ukrainian civilian in occupied Donetsk Oblast in clear violation of international law.Ukrainian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar. Russian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv and western Zaporizhia oblasts and near Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Toretsk, and Pokrovsk. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 5 and August 6.[28]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 6 but did not advance.Russian forces continued ground attacks in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City toward Khotin and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on August 5 and 6.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) and Yunakivka.[30]Ukrainian State Border Guard Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko stated on August 6 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance activity in the Sumy direction has recently decreased but not completely stopped.[31] The Ukrainian National Police warned on August 5 that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are equipping strike drones with PTM-3 anti-tank mines, landing the drones in fields to wait for passing Ukrainian equipment, then activating the drones again to strike passing vehicles.[32] This technique essentially amounts to drone-based remote mining.A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces criticized the Russian Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin for Russia's failure to make operationally significant advances in northern Sumy Oblast despite the area's sparse population.[33] The milblogger claimed Lapin must "know something" about Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov that is protecting Lapin from being fired and suggested that the situation for Russian forces is bad enough that bringing North Korean forces into combat in northern Sumy Oblast would not generate a strategic effect in Russia's favor. The milblogger also claimed that elements of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) that are fighting near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City) are taking heavy losses and that the quality of reinforcements is very poor.[34]Order of Battle: A company of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) reportedly relieved a company of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) near Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[35] Elements of the 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion (810th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly transferring from Guyevo, Kursk Oblast to Kostyantynivka to reinforce the elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade currently operating in Kostyantynivka.[36] Elements of the Chechen Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly continue to operate in northern Sumy Oblast.[37]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in northern Vovchansk.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of northern Vovchansk, including all of the Aggregate Plant, as of August 5 after over a year of fighting.[39] ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces have seized the southern part of the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant as of August 6.Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City); 200 meters west of Vovchansk on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River; and one kilometer in the Synelnykove forest area (just southwest of Vovchansk).[40]Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and toward Hoptivka and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and toward Synelnykove on August 5 and 6.[41]The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported in August that Ukrainian forces repelled an attempt by Russian infantry clad in anti-drone thermal imaging ponchos to seize the Hoptivka Border Checkpoint on the morning of August 4 and posted footage of the event.[42] The Kharkiv Group of Forces stated that Russian forces have been attempting to seize the checkpoint since roughly July 29 and that Russian forces likely incorrectly assessed that poor weather conditions on August 4 would prevent Ukrainian forces from fielding drones to repel the attack.Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in western and southern Vovchansk.[43] Elements of the 68th and 69th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating on the flanks of the Russian salient in Vovchansk.[44] Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 6.Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.See topline text for information about advances in the Kupyansk direction.Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Putnykove, Tyshchenkivka, Holubivka, and Radkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Kurylivka on August 5 and 6.[45]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction using fiber-optic Groza Leska first-person view (FPV) drones.[46] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 6 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna and Olhivka on August 5 and 6.[47] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions (both of the 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka and Hrekivka (both southeast of Borova)[48][49] Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[50]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[51]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Karpivka and toward Serednie and Shandryholove; north of Lyman near Hlushchenkove, Ridkodub, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 5 and 6.[52]The spokesperson of a Ukrainian Army Corps (AC) operating in the Lyman direction stated on August 5 that the Russian military command is deploying untrained personnel in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults in the Lyman direction in order to identify weak points in Ukrainian defenses.[53]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating within and south of Kolodyazi.[54] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[55] Artillery elements of the 79th Guards Rocket Artillery Brigade (MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kreminna (northeast of Lyman).[56]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction. Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on July 30 and geolocated on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[58]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.5 kilometers east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka.[59] [60]Russian forces attacked toward Siversk itself; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, Serebryanka, and the Serebryanske forest area; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 5 and 6.[61]A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are concentrating on the seizure of Serebryanka and advancing towards Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) in order to establish pincer-shaped salients aimed at enveloping Siversk from the north and east.[62]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th, 7th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in and around Serebryanka.[63] Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Chasiv Yar.[64]Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and north of Chasiv Yar near Novomarkove on August 5 and 6.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar.[66]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[67] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[68]Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[69]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Toretsk itself; near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk); northwest of Toretsk near Kleban-Byk, Poltavka, Rusyn Yar, and along the H-20 Avdiivka-Yablunivka highway northeast of Yablunivka; 2.5 kilometers northeast of Bila Hora (north of Toretsk); and toward Nelipivka (south of Toretsk). [70]A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Poltavka.[71] Another milblogger denied previous milblogger claims that Russian forces advanced in northern Shcherbynivka.[72]Russian forces attacked in Toretsk itself; northwest of Toretsk near Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, Yablunivka, Katerynivka, and toward Ivanopillya; north of Toretsk near Bila Hora, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Dyliivka; south of Toretsk near Nelipivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 5 and 6.[73]A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence claimed that Russian forces are attacking from multiple directions near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka in order to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[74] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have reached the Kleban Byk reservoir (northwest of Toretsk), and established fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Ukrainian forces in the area, allowing Russian forces to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs and partially encircle Ukrainian forces defending Katerynivka, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk (south of the Kleban Byk reservoir).[75]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Poltavka.[76] Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Shcherbynivka.[78] Drone operators of the Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade and reconnaissance elements of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly conducting strikes against Ukrainian forces near Berestok (northwest of Toretsk).[79] Drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bila Hora (north of Toretsk).[80]Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0509 Fedorivka-Novoekonomichne highway in northeastern Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[81] Additional geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Chunyshyne (south of Pokrovsk).[82]Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and to Troyanda (south of Pokrovsk).[83]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Boykivka, Novoekonomichne, Zatyshok, Nykanorivka, Sukhetske, Krasnyi Lyman, and Mykolaivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and toward Promin and Myrnohrad; south of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne and toward Molodetske on August 5 and 6.[84]The Ukrainian General Staff denied claims on August 5 that Russian forces have encircled the Ukrainian units in Pokrovsk. [85]A drone crew commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are constantly attacking with no objective other than to advance anywhere near Pokrovsk and that Russian infantry often do not even know the names of the settlements they are assaulting.[86] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction claimed that Russian forces launch constant, "limitless" infantry assaults on Pokrovsk and that Russian military command transferred drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies to support Russian forces’ efforts to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that supply Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk.[87]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and reconnaissance elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly coordinating strikes on Ukrainian positions in Pokrovsk.[88] Drone operators of the AIRNOMAD Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[89]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 6 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka; south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste and toward Ivanivka on August 5 and 6.[90]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Novopavlivka) direction.[91]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 6 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Piddubne and toward Andriivka-Kletsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka; southeast of Velyomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Zelene Pole, Temyrivka, Sichneve, and Maliivka; and south of Novomykhailivka toward Novoivanivka on August 5 and 6.[92]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sichneve, Novoselivka (west of Velykomyhailivka), and Vorone (southwest of Velykomykhailivka).[93]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole, Novodarivka, Novopil, Temyrivka and toward Novoivanivka and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai and Malynivka on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[94]Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 35th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole, Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole), and Chervone (east of Hulyaipole).[95] Drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[96]Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Poltavka with glide bombs. Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Poltavka with glide bombs. Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Poltavka with glide bombs.Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[97]Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Plavni on August 5 and 6.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Kamyanske.[99]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including of its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, are reportedly operating near Plavni and Kamyanske.[100] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on August 5 and 6 but did not advance.[101]Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces used a fiber optic drone to strike a Ukrainian mobile communications center in Mykolaiv Oblast across from positions on the Kinburn Peninsula, unwinding 12 kilometers of fiber optic cable across the Black Sea.[102]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[103] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on August 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia launched 45 Shahed-type strike and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 36 strike and decoy drones and that nine Russian drones struck three unspecified locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged gas infrastructure in Novosilske, Odesa Oblast; struck a recreation center in Zaporizhzhia Raion, Zaporizhia Oblast, injuring at least 12 and killing at least two; and struck a residential area in Kharkiv City.[105]Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced that the first contingent of Russian troops and military equipment arrived in Belarus on August 6 ahead of the Zapad-2025 joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise in September 2025.[106] Belarusian officials previously claimed that at least 13,000 total military personnel would participate in Zapad-2025.[107] ISW previously assessed that Russia and Belarus likely had to downsize the joint exercise, as most of Russia’s forces that participated in the previous Zapad-2021 joint exercise are fighting in Ukraine.[108]Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://tass dot ru/politika/24720093; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/08/06/1129733-ushakov-nazval-dve-temi[2] https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953071545405886511; https://x.com/kadmitriev/status/1953061041929068846 ; https://t.me/kadmitriev/169[3] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/114982898525988419[4] https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5439509-trump-putin-zelensky-meeting/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/06/trump-russia-moscow-witkoff/; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/06/us/politics/trump-meeting-putin-zelensky.html[5] https://aif dot ru/politics/karasin-zayavleniya-trampa-ne-dolzhny-pomeshat-peregovoram-s-uitkoffom-v-rf; https://news.mail dot ru/society/67319722/[6] https://news.mail dot ru/politics/67319700/[7] https://t.me/sashakots/55352[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325[9] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-05/russia-s-oil-revenue-falls-by-third-on-weak-prices-strong-ruble[10] https://news dot ru/economics/pravitelstvo-etim-ozabocheno-deputat-o-vliyanii-ceny-na-neft-na-hod-svo[11] https://www.osnmedia dot ru/ekonomika/cnn-tarify-trampa-dlya-indii-udaryat-po-potrebitelyam-v-ssha/[12] https://tass dot ru/politika/24720647[13] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/24720611; https://www.cbr dot ru/Content/Document/File/179983/comment_06082025.pdf[14] https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/2091822/russia-economy-meltdown-car-sales[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122224; https://isw.pub/UkrWar120624;[16] https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/08/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-the-russian-federation/[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073025[18] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080225; https://isw.pub/UkrWar073125[19] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9758[20] https://t.me/yurasumy/24242[21] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025[22] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025[23] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025[24] https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4266194/ukraine-equipment-repair-services-and-sustainment-support-for-m777-howitzers[25] Warning - graphic footage: https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/31611; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/06/okupanty-rozstrilyaly-czyvilnogo-z-valizoyu-koly-vin-namagavsya-evakuyuvatysya/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1084089-vijskovij-rf-rozstrilav-mirnogo-zitela-na-doneccini-prokurori-rozpocali-rozsliduvanna/;[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar043025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469[29] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1084481-na-unakivskomu-ta-hotinskomu-napramkah-rosijska-pihota-prodovzue-sprobi-nastupu/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469[30] https://t.me/severnnyi/4743; https://t.me/wargonzo/28296[31] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1084481-na-unakivskomu-ta-hotinskomu-napramkah-rosijska-pihota-prodovzue-sprobi-nastupu/[32] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/46047; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/shahedy-z-kasetamy-vorog-stav-pidvishuvaty-na-svoyi-bpla-protytankovi-miny/[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/4745 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4746[34] https://t.me/severnnyi/4747[35] https://t.me/severnnyi/4747[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/4747[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/4747; https://t.me/epoddubny/24273; https://t.me/sashakots/55338; https://t.me/dva_majors/76858[38] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1952801530446303473; https://x.com/vovkodavy34/status/1952792478190309809[39] https://t.me/rybar/72648[40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32115; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016; https://t.me/severnnyi/4743[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016; https://t.me/severnnyi/4743; https://t.me/wargonzo/28295; https://t.me/wargonzo/28296[42] https://t.me/otukharkiv/7112[43] https://t.me/rybar/72648[44] https://t.me/rybar/72648[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28295[46] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97173[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40054[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9755; https://t.me/dumky_frontovyka/2557[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40054[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o4XONrDJWsc; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/zakydaty-myasom-plyus-bezpilotna-skladova-syly-oborony-rozpovily-pro-taktyku-rosiyan-poblyzu-lymanu/[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40054[55] https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9277 ; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/9284[56] https://t.me/epoddubny/24276[58] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1950655070523310249;  https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1953074578835575197[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32113; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32149 [61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32113; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32149   [62] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32149[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32113; https://t.me/shock3OA/1777; https://t.me/motopatriot78/40068   [64] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953065822701711851; https://t.me/razvedkasibir/4855[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/28296[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32122[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/97179[69] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1953074002416570630; https://t.me/BBpS_28/954; https://t.me/BBpS_28/955[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40045; https://t.me/wargonzo/28296; https://t.me/rybar/72645;  https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32111; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175013; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016[71] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32111[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40042[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175029  [74] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22266[75] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175029; https://t.me/epoddubny/24279; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32111[76] https://t.me/motopatriot78/40045[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/16347[78] https://t.me/CatBarmaley/6493; https://t.me/sashakots/55354[79] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14145; https://t.me/KubanArtilery/1341[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174983[81] https://t.me/ssternenko/47485; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/100; https://x.com/giK1893/status/1952829568026374466[82] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9749; https://t.me/shershni68/713[83] https://t.me/wargonzo/28296; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32148[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/wargonzo/28296; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174969 https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016[85] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27442; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09CEeFiuZ6Kp88VyGktgZseswyXv8fKJ4WWnH1MzDyorFkjPLUF712w1uwMRvYw4Al[86] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/05/vony-govoryat-my-shli-na-syevyer-poblyzu-pokrovska-zupynyayut-nashestya-targaniv-v-rosijskyh-mundyrah/[87] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/06/yihnya-zadacha-siyaty-paniku-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-diye-elitnyj-pidrozdil-rosijskyh-dronariv/[88] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/174997[89] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32112;[90] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110[91] https://t.me/dva_majors/76837[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110; lxiii https://t.me/wargonzo/28296;[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/16349[94] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15110[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/16341[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/16345[97] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30083; https://t.me/soniah_hub/11744[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12806; https://t.me/rybar/72645; https://t.me/wargonzo/28296; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016   [99] https://t.me/wargonzo/28296; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/175016[100] https://t.me/russian_airborne/11019; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32122; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32130 [101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27440; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27455; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12806; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/27469[102] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6030[103] https://t.me/mod_russia/55308[104] https://t.me/kpszsu/39979[105] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1952988554004414752; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1952988681414799477; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15487; https://t.me/synegubov/16362; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/06/bombarduvannya-harkivshhyny-ponad-70-snaryadiv-i-droniv-po-czyvilnyh/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/10827; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/06/na-odeshhyni-vnaslidok-ataky-rf-poshkodzheno-magistralnyj-gazogin/; https://t.me/energyofukraine/4232; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1084333-rosia-atakuvala-obekt-gts-na-odesini-udar-po-marsrutu-postacanna-gazu-z-evropi/[106] https://t.me/modmilby/49347[107] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2025[108] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2025

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2025

 

at 8/22/25 2:45am

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Jennie Olmsted, Karolina Hird and Frederick W. KaganAugust 21, 2025, 6:15 pm ET Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a joint press conference with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 that Russia will proceed on the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine based on its experience with the 2015 Minsk II agreement and 2022 Istanbul negotiations.[1] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations were based on the concept of "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine, referencing the Kremlin’s oft-evoked accusation that the "root causes" of the war include NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[2] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have ensured Ukraine’s security "honestly and collectively" via a group of guarantor countries including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, Germany, and Turkey. Lavrov similarly stated on August 20 during a meeting with Jordanian officials that Russia was ready to sign on to an agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations and that those negotiations are a “good example” of a way to negotiate an end to the war.[3] Lavrov’s recent statements lauding the 2022 Istanbul negotiations suggest that the Kremlin has selected Lavrov to be the predominant amplifier of the longstanding Russian narrative that the Istanbul negotiations are the necessary starting point for negotiations. An agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have crippled Ukraine by permanently banning it from joining NATO, imposing draconian limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving any Western military assistance.[4] The draft agreement also demanded that Russia and the UNSC, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, a key Russian ally), be granted the status of guarantor states and that guarantor states must act in concert in the event of a violation of the agreement, which would allow Russia to veto Western military assistance for Ukraine.[5] The draft Istanbul agreement notably imposes no limitations on Russia’s military capabilities—effectively neutering Ukraine politically and militarily while protecting Russia’s ability to reinvade Ukraine in the future on much more favorable terms even than it faced in 2022. The Kremlin likely understands that the 2022 Istanbul framework is a non-starter for Kyiv and therefore continues to invoke it in an effort to paint Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate while Moscow continues to delay good-faith peacemaking efforts. The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected US- and European-led efforts to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees by reiterating on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 20 that "[Russia has] explicitly stated: No NATO troops as peacekeepers" and that Russia will not accept such a security guarantee.[6] Medvedev claimed that Ukraine does not need such security guarantees, contrary to the Trump administration's position on Ukraine's need for robust security guarantees.[7] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 21 that Ukraine should emulate Finland's negotiation model following World War II and become a neutral state and cede part of its territory and that negotiations will be based on battlefield dynamics.[8] State Duma Deputy Dmitry Belik echoed Zhuravlev's sentiments by claiming that Ukraine's attempts to alter its own territorial borders ignores the realities on the ground.[9] Kremlin officials often use the idea of "realities on the ground" to claim that Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands.[10] Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin claimed on August 21 that stakeholders must understand that Russia is concerned about its strategic security vis a vis Europe and NATO and that this raises questions about the overall viability of the entire negotiation process.[11] Several Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is defending new territories that are enshrined in Russia's Constitution and therefore international recognition of Russia's annexation is unnecessary, obfuscating the fact that Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts is illegal under international law.[12] Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Donbas and Novorossiya – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – are original Russian lands and cannot be part of any territorial concession to Ukraine.[13] Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets claimed on August 20 that Russia may allow European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine ceding all of its southern oblasts, including Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kharkiv, to Russia.[14] Russia notably does not occupy any part of Odesa Oblast and occupies slivers of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.Reuters, citing three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking, reported on August 21 that Putin continues to demand that Ukraine cede all of eastern Donbas, renounce ambitions to join NATO, and establish itself as a neutral state and refuse to host Western troops.[15] The sources added that Putin told US officials that he is willing to freeze Russian offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange as well as return small unspecified parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The sources reported that Putin continues to demand that NATO fundamentally alter one of its core tenets and commit to a legally binding pledge to not expand eastward, a demand that would require the renegotiation and re-ratification of the NATO treaty by all NATO member states. Lavrov recently stated that the Kremlin's objective is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast, further demonstrating that Russia remains unwilling to accept any agreement that falls short of Ukraine's full capitulation.[16] US President Donald Trump and US Vice President JD Vance have recently expressed the United States' willingness to contribute to the safeguarding of measures to prevent Russia from resuming its war in Ukraine.[17]Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 to discuss Russian-Indian relations and expanding economic investment in energy, including the oil supply, hydrocarbons, and nuclear energy.[18] Russian Deputy Energy Minister Roman Marshavin met with Indian deputy minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pankaj Jain on August 20 to discuss expanding cooperation in the energy trade.[19] Lavrov held a joint conference with Jaishankar after the meeting and announced that Putin would likely visit India before the end of 2025, and Jaishankar stated that India ”believe[s] that relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the Second World War.”[20] Putin and other high-ranking Russian officials are spending considerable amounts of time and energy to stabilize and strengthen relationships with India, indicating that Russia views India as a critical source of revenue. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21] Intensive Russian outreach to India suggests that Moscow is attempting to ensure that New Delhi does not curtail energy purchases from Russia because of these potential secondary sanctions.Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that overnight Russian forces launched 574 Shahed-type and decoy drones from over Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities, Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; four Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts; two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from over Voronezh Oblast; 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast; 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from over the Black Sea; and one unidentified missile from over occupied Crimea.[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 546 drones, one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drones and missiles struck 11 locations throughout Ukraine.[24] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck infrastructure in Lviv City; Lutsk, Volyn Oblast; Rivne Oblast; and Zakarpattia Oblast, causing civilian injuries and deaths.[25] Russia's August 20-21 strike notably targeted several areas in Ukraine’s far-western oblasts that border Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Russia launched a cruise missile at Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, striking the "Flex" US electronics manufacturing company and causing a massive fire and injuring at least 19 employees.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that "Flex" was a US-owned civilian enterprise that manufactured household goods such as coffee machines.[27] Russia likely struck the "Flex" enterprise to discourage the United States and Ukraine's European allies from investing in Ukraine or opening businesses within Ukraine. Russia likely prepared for this strike for several weeks, stockpiling drones and missiles over the backdrop of ongoing US-Russian negotiations and the August 15 Alaska summit.[28] ISW observed that Russia was launching much smaller strike packages in the weeks leading up to the Alaska summit in order to posture itself to the United States as a good-faith negotiator, and assessed that Russia was likely to leverage the smaller-scale strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for renewed massive strikes on Ukraine following the summit.[29] The size and composition of the August 20-21 strike package suggests that Russia successfully stockpiled significant numbers of both drones and missiles in the lead-up to the Alaska summit. Russian forces most recently launched Kalibr cruise missiles on July 21 and Kinzhals on August 4, suggesting that efforts to stockpile these munitions allowed Russian to use them in greater quantities during the August 20-21 strike series.[30]The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons. US President Donald Trump stated on August 21 that it is impossible for Ukraine to achieve victory against Russia if Ukraine is only able to use defensive weapons and systems and is “not allowed to play offense.”[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine has launched mass production of its new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32] The AP reported that Ukraine currently produces one FP-5 cruise missile per day and aims to increase daily production capacity to produce seven FP-5 cruise missiles per day by October 2025. Ukraine continues to successfully invest in and expand the Ukrainian DIB capacity for producing medium- to long-range weapons systems capable of striking military and DIB facilities within Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in December 2024 that Ukraine would work to scale its production capacity of Palyanytsya, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles.[33] Ukraine notably succeeded in increasing the range of Neptune anti-ship missiles to allow Ukrainian forces to strike military and DIB facilities located deeper within Russia.[34]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted video footage of Nikiforov briefing Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 21, confirming milblogger claims that Nikiforov replaced Lapin on August 8.[36] The Russian military command’s belated replacement of Lapin reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, as the Russian military command reappointed Lapin to another high-profile command post despite prominent protest in the Russian information space highlighting Lapin's significant battlefield failures.[37] A Russian milblogger noted that a scandal involving the embezzlement of money allocated for fortifications in Kursk Oblast and the August 2024 Ukrainian incursion into the oblast marred Lapin’s tenure in command of the Northern Group of Forces.[38] Russian milbloggers recently criticized Lapin due to Russia’s failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[39] Nikiforov, who began Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as chief of staff of the Eastern Military District (EMD), commanded the Western Group of Forces and Western Military District from December 2022 and was appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in Spring 2024.[40] The Russian MoD sent Nikiforov to assist Lapin and organize efforts to stop the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[41] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 8 that Nikiforov is a relic of the “parquet army” of the 2000s who criticizes subordinates over minor mistakes.[42] ISW assesses that Nikiforov is unlikely to make any major changes, given his presence in the Northern Group of Forces sector for more than a year.Key Takeaways:The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression.The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine.Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions.Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 21.[43]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that elements of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), along with other unspecified Ukrainian forces, conducted long-range drone strikes against the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, which supplies Russian forces operating in Ukraine and is one of southern Russia’s largest oil product producers.[44] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 21 that the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery can process 7.5 million tons of oil annually.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified military fuel and lubricant base in Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 20 to 21.[46]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 21 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Yablunivka on August 20 and 21.[47]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Sumy direction stated that Russian forces launch roughly five daily assaults and conduct 30 to 50 KAB guided glide bomb strikes daily.[48] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces only conducted one infiltration attempt in this direction so far in August 2025 due to Ukrainian fortifications and combat positions in this area.Sumy Oblast Head Oleh Hryhorov stated on August 21 that Russian drones struck a Ukrainian medical vehicle in Seredyna-Buda (northwest of Sumy City).[49]Order of Battle: Anti-aircraft gunners of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[50] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[51] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[52] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating strikes on Ukrainian positions near Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) with Akhmat Spetsnaz elements.[53] Drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[54] Elements of the 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[55] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[56]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in forest areas west of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City within Vovchansk and near Synelnykove on August 20 and 21.[58]A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on August 21 that Russian forces in this direction have not used armored equipment “for a long time” and occasionally assault Ukrainian positions using motorcycles.[59] The company commander noted that Ukrainian forces’ use of drones in the Kharkiv direction has prevented Russian forces from accumulating equipment as far as 30 kilometers away from the frontline. Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in forest areas towards Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[60]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 20 and 21.[61]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka on August 20 and 21.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[63]Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[64]Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 20.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Serednie (northwest of Lyman) and advanced west of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[66]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 20 and 21.[67]Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 21 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction have accumulated significant manpower and continue to launch traditional mass frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[68] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces in this direction continue to conduct small infantry assaults on Ukrainian positions and have recently increased their use of Lancet, Molniya, and other unspecified reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones.[69]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[70]Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 20 and 21.[71]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[72]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the dacha area near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) from the east but that Ukrainian drone activity forced them to retreat.[73] Another milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces entered Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) and eastern Kostyantynivka and advanced west of the Siverskyi-Donetsk Donbas Canal (south of Chasiv Yar), claiming that Russian staff officers above the brigade echelon systemically embellish reports of Russian gains for the Russian high command.[74]Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August 20 and 21.[75]Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on August 21 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) overnight with an FAB-250 unguided glide bomb, damaging civilian infrastructure.[76]Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 18 and geolocated on August 20 shows drone operators of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), including its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions southeast of Kostyantynivka.[77]Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators and sniper elements, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[78] Drone operators of the Grachi detachment of the 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[79]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and credited elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) with using small group tactics to seize the settlement.[80] A Russian milblogger refuted the Russian MoD’s claims of the seizure of Oleksandro-Shultyne and claimed that Russian forces are only fighting on the approaches to the settlement.[81] Another milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) seized and advanced north of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk); elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) advanced west and south of and within southwestern Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk); and that unspecified Russian forces advanced south of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[82]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka, Kleban-Byk, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Pleshchiivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 20 and 21.[83]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August 20 that Russian forces in this direction launch small fireteam-sized infantry assaults with two personnel using anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The brigade added that Russian infantry advance under the cover of windbreaks and ruins before reaching a designated rally point, where they hide while awaiting reinforcements.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.  Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pokrovsk into eastern Zolotyi Koldyaz; into southwestern Hruzke and southern Vesele; east of and into southwestern Krasnyi Lyman; and west of Zapovidne.[85] A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk to southern Petrivka, and interdicting the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[86]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Zapovidne, Kucheriv Yar, Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Zatyshok, Volodymyrivka, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne on August 20 and 21.[87]Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces are simultaneously exerting pressure on Pokrovsk itself and on Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya with the aim of identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses.[88] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian fires are complicating Russian forces' ability to accumulate forces within the Dobropillya penetration.Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) leveraged elements of its 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade to expand the penetration near Dobropillya westward toward Zapovidne and eastward toward western Shakhove.[89] Mashovets reported that elements of the 8th CAA (SMD) are expanding the left flank of the penetration. Mashovets’s reporting indicates that the Russian military command may be improving command coherence along its command seams in a mutually reinforcing effort to expand the Russian forces' penetration and consolidate positions. Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[90] Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.  Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the settlement.[91]Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 20 and 21.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykholaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[93]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces within Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces consolidated positions in eastern Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[96]Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and toward Lisne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Novoheorhiivka, and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha on August 20 and 21.[97]Trehubov reported that Russian forces are actively conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults.[98]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Zelene Pole, and toward Novohryhorivka on August 20 and 21.[99]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 20 and 21.[101]Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on August 21 that Russian forces launched 40 unguided aerial rockets (NARs) at Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[102]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[103]Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and railway bridges on August 21 but did not advance.[104] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat in the Black Sea near occupied Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast, with an unspecified high-precision missile.[105] Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SOF) reported that overnight on August 20-21 SOF elements struck Russian rail cars near occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, which were carrying fuel and lubricants for Russian forces operating in southern Ukraine.[106] Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 95408th military unit in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, overnight on August 20 to 21.[107] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 21 that the base currently houses elements of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU).[108]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. 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https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/[26] https://www.facebook.com/MyroslavBiletskyi.official/posts/pfbid0bxEHRmstnZMDYXpb7dxCNjRxEatxykxA5zurGbKqrgUDbWqTizBjsndLXBfDcgj5l?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9659 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958431237036536151; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1958435925769220322; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-strikes-american-flex-factory-in-zakarpattia-region/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176732; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/25319; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1958395505932915016[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15707; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1958603266134024247[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025[31] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/115067017601499775[32] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-drones-weapons-industry-russia-7201ab851544c394ee454407058b10ba;[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061824[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752; https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176783 ; https://t.me/istories_media/10235; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-guide-may-11; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/arbat/2133; https://t.me/dva_majors/77070; https://t.me/arbat/1860[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/4773[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096[45] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-novoshakhtinsk-oil-refinery-in-rostov-region/[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641;[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/zhodnyh-bufernyh-zon-sumshhyna-zalyshayetsya-polem-aktyvnyh-boyiv/[49] https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/490[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728[51] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5921[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77970[54] https://t.me/armycorp44/14[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4899[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/21/na-nogah-na-plechah-zanosyat-po-inshomu-niyak-na-harkivshhyni-vazhka-tehnika-voroga-boyitsya-i-hovayetsya/[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/28641  [64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32765[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143;[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143[68] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095496-60-ombr-ta-3-j-armijskij-korpus-zsu-strimuut-tisk-dvoh-rosijskih-divizij-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/pihota-ne-mozhe-nichogo-vony-pochynayut-zlytysya-poblyzu-lymana-rosijska-taktyka-buksuye/[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958456251118989664; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3479[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750[74] https://t.me/rybar/72998[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750[76] https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid0Uk4gfkzr4KqYxA1k5AUR9Yn6TRepCT9S24FavEPZbB65PWQGcsUH3zR1Q5zkg8Cpl[77] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958231350227665047; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31777[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/77914; https://t.me/milinfolive/155126[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/55746; https://t.me/mod_russia/55760; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98195 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55720 [81] https://t.me/rybar/72998[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41164; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41183  [83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/rybar/72990[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/zamaskuvalysya-pid-fantomiv-ale-staly-mishennyu-proval-okupantiv-u-charivnyh-plashhah/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16Vgppgnv8/[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41180 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874[86] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2938[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14204[91] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/271; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9839; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30393; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958455468956995990[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41145[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16548[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176758[96] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176791[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930[98] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[100] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176778; https://t.me/voin_dv/16544; https://t.me/wargonzo/28655; https://t.me/dva_majors/77966 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/59812[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/rusich_army/25313[102] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873[103] https://t.me/rusich_army/25313[104] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873[105] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6694; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/raketa-i-lazerna-pidsvitka-yak-bijczi-gur-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-kater-bilya-zaliznogo-portu/[106] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2028; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28095[107] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11676 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1958377943690039750[108] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-military-unit-in-sevastopol-triggering-fire/; 

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, August 21, 2025

 

at 8/22/25 2:45am

Nidal Morrison, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, and Brian CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.Iraqi Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20.[1] This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.[2] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service comprised of many militias, some of which report to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani instead of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani.[3] Fayyadh denied Iranian-backed Iraqi militia involvement in the law’s creation and added that the law has been in development for years with Iraqi Ministry of Defense support.[4] CTP-ISW is unable to verify Fayyadh’s claims about the militia's role in the law’s creation. The Council of Ministers, which is headed by Sudani and includes the Minister of Defense, approved the law and submitted it to Parliament in February 2025, which implies Ministry of Defense involvement, however.[5]  Fayyadh also claimed that the political debate over the Popular Mobilization Authority Law does not relate to the law’s “substance” but rather to his leadership.[6] This law would elevate Fayyadh’s role as head of the PMC to a cabinet-level position within the newly-created Popular Mobilization Authority, which surely, in part, explains Fayyadh’s support for the law.[7] Fayyadh’s interview comes as US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked debate on the future and potential dissolution of the PMF.[8]  The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the Popular Mobilization Authority law.[9]  The law also faces domestic opposition from Sunni and Kurdish parliamentarians, who walked out of a July 16 parliamentary session to protest the reading of the law.[10] A Shia Coordination Framework parliamentarian told Iraqi media on August 18 that over 100 parliamentarians have signed a petition to vote on the law in the next Parliament session, but added that no Sunni or Kurdish parliamentarians have signed the petition.[11] The votes of these parliamentarians and the support of the Iraqi voters they represent are critical to passing the law.Fayyadh attempted to portray the PMF as a responsible actor to defend it from critics. He noted that the Popular Mobilization Authority law would strengthen the separation between the PMC and unspecified armed groups, in reference to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that operate outside of the PMF.[12]   The PMC is formally responsible for ensuring that militias in the PMF answer to the Iraqi federal government, but has failed to enforce this requirement.  Fayyadh added that the PMF maintains a “high level of discipline,” which is false.[13] Some PMF groups have conducted attacks without orders from any government chain of command.[14] Militias within the PMF have explicitly rejected Iraqi government oversight.[15]Fayyadh also said that the PMF has no ”hostility towards any party,” which ignores attacks that militias within the PMF have conducted targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria and the attempted assassination of former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi by elements of a militia that is part of the PMF.[16] Fayyadh said that the PMF provides security to Iraqis, but he ignored the PMF’s efforts to commit sectarian cleansing in Sunni areas.[17] The PMF has prevented the return of residents who fled from al Awja, Salah al Din Province, in 2014 during the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) fight, which is an act of sectarian cleansing.[18] Fayyadh claimed that the PMF is in the process of resolving the al Awja issue.[19]Fayyadh also attempted to obfuscate the relationship between the IRGC and the PMF. He described the PMF as an “Iraqi force” with “no connection” to the IRGC, which is false.[20] Militias that comprise PMF brigades conducted hundreds of attacks that targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria between October 2023 to January 2024.[21] Those militias immediately stopped that campaign following direct intervention by IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani.[22] Fayyadh himself has also advanced Iranian objectives in Iraq. Fayyadh was part of a PMF ”crisis cell” formed in late 2019 to suppress mass Iraqi protests with the IRGC’s support.[23] Then-IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani supported this crisis cell.Fayyadh tried to justify the PMF’s continued role as a security force by asserting that the PMF would adhere to orders to dissolve by the Shia religious authority, despite having previously rejected such orders.[24] Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Iraq’s highest religious figure, said in November 2024 that arms should be confined to the Iraqi state.[25] Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada, denied that Sistani’s call was directed at the militias.[26]The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflict in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.[27] Captagon and other smuggling networks long helped sustain the Assad regime during the war. The regime profited 3 to 5 billion USD annually from the Captagon trade.[28] Many of these networks continue to survive in Syria because, while Assad’s collapse destroyed the regime, it did not destroy many of the disparate networks that helped the regime survive for as long as it did. The transitional government began a counter-narcotics campaign in January 2024 that has naturally spurred a violent reaction from many of these networks.[29] This campaign has reduced Captagon production by approximately 80%, according to the Financial Times on August 21.[30]The Captagon trade and other Assad-era criminal enterprises are almost certainly driving some—but not all—of the violence in Syria. Some of the violence along the Syria-Lebanon border and in western Syria in early 2025 appeared to be part of efforts by smuggling networks to defend their ratlines.[31] Not all of these criminal enterprises were allied with Assad, of course. Local reporting suggests that three key groups—the Bedouin Sunni tribes, Druze militias, and networks loyal to the Assad regime—have competed for control of the smuggling networks in southwestern Syria.[32] The divisions between the three groups are not purely identity-based, but competition over economic interests can rapidly take on an intercommunal bent as Bedouin Sunni fighters kill Druze or vice versa.  Many Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks persist, however, in areas that have little to no transitional government control, including within Suwayda Province, the Kurdish-controlled northeast, the Syrian coast, and the Syria-Lebanon border.[33] The Financial Times reported that Assad-linked criminal networks and Bedouin tribes sustain the drug trade in Suwayda Province by exploiting local poverty and the continued employment of Assad-era border guards on the Jordanian border.[34]Key TakeawaysCaptagon Networks in Syria: The continued survival of Assad-era Captagon smuggling networks, which helped Assad’s economy, demonstrates the economic interests that continue to animate internal conflicts in Syria. These networks have the potential to destabilize Syria, as demonstrated in violent flare-ups throughout 2025.Justifications for the PMF: Iraqi Popular Mobilization Commission head Faleh al Fayyadh defended the Popular Mobilization Authority Law against domestic critics during an interview with Iraqi media on August 20. This law, which Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the Iraqi security apparatus.IAEA Inspections in Iran: Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile is unclear.IranIranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Majid Takht Ravanchi discussed Iranian nuclear issues with Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs' International Security Division Head Ambassador Gabriel Lüchinger in Tehran on August 2.[35] Switzerland traditionally facilitates diplomatic communication between Iran and the United States because the United States does not maintain a diplomatic presence in Iran.[36] An unspecified US official rejected an August 20 report from Hezbollah media claiming that Lüchinger conveyed a message from US Special Envoy to the Middle East and lead nuclear negotiator Steve Witkoff to the Iranian government.[37]Iran continues to block International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to its damaged nuclear facilities and highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile after the 12-day war. Iran’s 409 kg HEU stockpile remains in one or several unspecified locations, and Iran’s access to the stockpile is unclear. Unspecified diplomats told Bloomberg on August 21 that IAEA officials will confer with US officials next week after IAEA inspectors failed to secure Iran’s approval to resume monitoring.[38] The unspecified diplomats added that Iranian officials told IAEA Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo during meetings in Tehran on August 12 that inspections could potentially occur at undamaged sites like Bushehr while Iran‘s main nuclear-fuel complex would remain closed.[39] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that the SNSC will decide whether inspections can resume.[40] Araghchi emphasized that Iran cannot cut cooperation entirely because activities like fuel replacement at Bushehr require IAEA oversight.[41] Araghchi stressed that any new cooperation must account for safety and security concerns after the recent strikes, however.[42] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told Israeli media on August 12 that Iran retains about 400 kilograms of enriched uranium.[43] This amount is consistent with the IAEA’s June estimate that Iran retains 408.6 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, though Iran may not have physical access to all of the uranium, which could be buried at Fordow or Esfahan.[44]The Iranian Artesh Navy conducted its first military exercise since the Israel-Iran War in the northern Indian Ocean and Sea of Oman on August 21.[45] The Artesh Navy tested multiple anti-ship cruise missiles, including the Nasir, Ghadir, and Ghadeer,[46] during the exercise.[47] The ”Bavar-5,” which is an Iranian drone that can be launched from naval vessels, reportedly destroyed a target after traveling 400 kilometers.[48] The naval exercise also included surface and subsurface vessels, aerial units, and electronic warfare units.[49]The United States imposed additional sanctions targeting Iranian oil trade networks and their international facilitators on August 21.[50] The US Treasury Department sanctioned Greek national Antonios Margaritis and five Marshall Islands-registered companies in Margaritis’ shipping network for facilitating the trade of Iranian oil products for “many years.”[51] The US Treasury Department previously sanctioned three shipping companies in Margaritis' network in December 2024.[52] The United States separately sanctioned six entities and eight affiliated vessels outside of Margaritis’ network for transporting Iranian oil to China and conducting ship-to-ship transfers with vessels already sanctioned by the United States.[53]IraqSee topline section. SyriaA Syrian transitional government source denied any plans for a humanitarian corridor across Syria’s borders, which represents an implicit rejection of a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel.[54] The source stated that the Syrian transitional government will coordinate the delivery of all humanitarian aid, including to areas beyond Suwayda Province.[55] The United States is attempting to broker a deal that would establish a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda City and Israel to deliver aid to the Druze community there, according to US and Israeli officials speaking to Axios on August 12.[56] An unspecified source separately told Saudi media that Israel and Syria agree on “80 percent of the points” after talks between Israeli and Syrian officials in Paris on August 19, which may indicate that both countries have agreed to continue negotiations.[57] The source also said that unspecified security arrangements between Israel and Syria regarding southern Syria “are almost complete.”[58] Saudi media claimed that Israel and Syria reached an agreement during the meeting in Paris on August 19 to de-escalate tensions and for Israel to refrain from interfering in internal Syrian affairs.[59] Saudi media added that Israel and Syria agreed to continue to stabilize and monitor the July 18 ceasefire between the transitional government and Druze militias within Suwayda Province.[60] An agreement between Israel and Syria was reportedly reached to reactivate the 1974 disengagement treaty between Israel and Syria.[61] Israel previously declared the disengagement treaty void after the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024.[62]Arabian PeninsulaNothing significant to report. Palestinian Territories and LebanonPalestinian leaders in the Burj al Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut and the al Bass refugee camp in Tyre turned over the first collection of medium and heavy weapons to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on August 21.[63] Saudi media reported on August 21 that the collected weapons belong to the security unit of the Palestinian Authority (PA)-controlled embassy in Lebanon.[64] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. The office of Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that this weapons handover marks the start of a broader effort to disarm all armed groups in Lebanon.[65] Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee Head Ambassador Ramez Dimashqieh noted that the LAF will receive additional batches of weapons from the Burj al Barajneh camp and other Palestinian camps in the coming weeks.[66] Palestinian militias have long operated with relative autonomy in the 12 Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon.[67]Salam and PA President Mahmoud Abbas previously agreed in May 2025 to disarm all Palestinian militias in Lebanon.[68] Saudi media reported on August 21 that members of Abbas’s Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization are handing over their weapons.[69] Fatah is the dominant political party in the PA, which governs the West Bank.[70]Other Palestinian factions, like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), are unlikely to turn over their weapons. These Palestinian groups are not beholden to Abbas. Hamas and factions closely aligned to it have continued to reject any disarmament.[71] An unspecified Hamas spokesperson, speaking on behalf of ”the Palestinian factions in Lebanon," stated on August 21 that this weapons handover only applied to Fatah.[72] Hamas’ statement added that the unspecified ”Palestinian factions in Lebanon”  will keep their weapons as long as Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip continue.[73] Disagreements among Palestinian militias in Lebanon regarding the mechanism to hand weapons over to the LAF have previously delayed the Lebanese government’s attempts to disarm these groups.[74][1] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025  ; https://www.rudaw dot net/Library/Files/Uploaded%20Files/07/NewFolder/175%20175%20175%20(1).pdf [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces [4] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[5] https://www.rudaw dot net/english/middleeast/iraq/250220253 [6] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-19-2025[8] https://almadapaper dot net/389291/ ; https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B0%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-10-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA[9] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025/[10] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/140720255 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025[11] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/180820257[12] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[13] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf [15] https://t.me/abualaskary/137 [16] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-next-after-assassination-attempt-mustafa-al-kadhimi[17] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[18] https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/BIC%20March%202023_Wilson%20fache_Commentary.pdf  ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-january-18-2025    [19] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[20] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[21] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/tracking-anti-us-and-anti-israel-strikes-iraq-and-syria-during-gaza-crisis ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate100424[22] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%81%D8%B5%D8%A7-%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AE%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B6%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7[23] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1231[24] https://almadapaper dot net/411316/[25] https://shafaq dot com/en/Report/Ayatollah-Al-Sistani-s-seven-commandments-Lessons-from-the-past-for-Iraq-s-better-future[26] https://shafaq dot com/en/Iraq/Exclusive-Al-Sistani-s-call-to-limit-arms-to-state-does-not-apply-to-Resistance-Groups[27] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb[28] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-the-assad-regime-made-billions-producing-and-exporting-party-drugs[29] ttps://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb[30] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb [31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-6-2025[32] https://en.majalla dot com/node/326719/politics/illicit-economies-play-big-role-syria%E2%80%99s-post-assad-flashpoints[33] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb [34] https://www.ft.com/content/d81e3c6c-c157-4281-92ec-135d70b497cb [35] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380622; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240657/[36] https://www.eda dot admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/human-rights/peace/switzerland-s-good-offices/protective-power-mandates.html[37] https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1958196817432096953[38] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks[39] h https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/iran-s-freeze-on-nuclear-inspections-prompts-un-us-crisis-talks[40] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/[41] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/29/3380412/[42] https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8xhaxo2JJY&t=83s[43]  https://www.i24news dot tv/en/news/israel/defense/artc-pm-netanyahu-we-would-have-struck-iran-even-without-the-us ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8xhaxo2JJY&t=83s   [44] https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-uranium-7f6c9962c1e4199e951559096bcf5cc0?taid=683ae0271dc7320001739354&utm_campaign=TrueAnthem&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter[45] https://apnews.com/article/iran-navy-drill-israel-war-f9b2057a6162ab3466af95220d2e70d3[46] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119[47] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85919119 [48] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/30/3381009 ; https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/ [49] https://nournews dot ir/en/news/240729/[50] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229[51] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229[52] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2758[53] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0229[54] https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf#[55] https://www.facebook.com/sana.gov/posts/pfbid02P7JiQvHu76dxrbT832C1DvVredTjnCSjRRKihgNNp2UB7Ra6nB7t7RgvjweNBkGgl?rdid=Eu6M0ekcIjusk8Sf ; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1958222116102541625[56] https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack[57] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7[58] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7 [59] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7 [60] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7 [61] https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/20/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-80-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B7 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d88 [62] https://x.com/netanyahu/status/1865757924594786810 ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/un-slams-violation-of-1974-disengagement-deal-as-israel-acts-in-syria-buffer-zone/[63] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-palestinian-refugees-camp-weapons-disarmament-e5f4158261635c2ce54e2cd196198758[64] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5177683-انطلاق-عملية-تسليم-السلاح-الفلسطيني-إلى-الجيش-اللبناني[65] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-says-it-is-beginning-disarmament-palestinian-factions-refugee-camps-2025-08-21/[66] https://x.com/nawafsalam/status/1958560091428249977 ; https://x.com/grandserail/status/1958512728605438255[67] https://thisisbeirut dot com.lb/articles/1316380/what-are-the-12-palestinian-camps-in-lebanon#:~:text=Following%20the%20creation%20of%20Israel,)%2C%20spread%20across%20the%20country. ; 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[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21, 2025

 

at 8/22/25 2:45am

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Jennie Olmsted, Karolina Hird and Frederick W. KaganAugust 21, 2025, 6:15 pm ET Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on August 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a joint press conference with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 that Russia will proceed on the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine based on its experience with the 2015 Minsk II agreement and 2022 Istanbul negotiations.[1] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations were based on the concept of "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine, referencing the Kremlin’s oft-evoked accusation that the "root causes" of the war include NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[2] Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have ensured Ukraine’s security "honestly and collectively" via a group of guarantor countries including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, Germany, and Turkey. Lavrov similarly stated on August 20 during a meeting with Jordanian officials that Russia was ready to sign on to an agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations and that those negotiations are a “good example” of a way to negotiate an end to the war.[3] Lavrov’s recent statements lauding the 2022 Istanbul negotiations suggest that the Kremlin has selected Lavrov to be the predominant amplifier of the longstanding Russian narrative that the Istanbul negotiations are the necessary starting point for negotiations. An agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have crippled Ukraine by permanently banning it from joining NATO, imposing draconian limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving any Western military assistance.[4] The draft agreement also demanded that Russia and the UNSC, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, a key Russian ally), be granted the status of guarantor states and that guarantor states must act in concert in the event of a violation of the agreement, which would allow Russia to veto Western military assistance for Ukraine.[5] The draft Istanbul agreement notably imposes no limitations on Russia’s military capabilities—effectively neutering Ukraine politically and militarily while protecting Russia’s ability to reinvade Ukraine in the future on much more favorable terms even than it faced in 2022. The Kremlin likely understands that the 2022 Istanbul framework is a non-starter for Kyiv and therefore continues to invoke it in an effort to paint Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate while Moscow continues to delay good-faith peacemaking efforts. The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected US- and European-led efforts to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees by reiterating on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 20 that "[Russia has] explicitly stated: No NATO troops as peacekeepers" and that Russia will not accept such a security guarantee.[6] Medvedev claimed that Ukraine does not need such security guarantees, contrary to the Trump administration's position on Ukraine's need for robust security guarantees.[7] Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 21 that Ukraine should emulate Finland's negotiation model following World War II and become a neutral state and cede part of its territory and that negotiations will be based on battlefield dynamics.[8] State Duma Deputy Dmitry Belik echoed Zhuravlev's sentiments by claiming that Ukraine's attempts to alter its own territorial borders ignores the realities on the ground.[9] Kremlin officials often use the idea of "realities on the ground" to claim that Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands.[10] Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin claimed on August 21 that stakeholders must understand that Russia is concerned about its strategic security vis a vis Europe and NATO and that this raises questions about the overall viability of the entire negotiation process.[11] Several Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is defending new territories that are enshrined in Russia's Constitution and therefore international recognition of Russia's annexation is unnecessary, obfuscating the fact that Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts is illegal under international law.[12] Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Donbas and Novorossiya – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – are original Russian lands and cannot be part of any territorial concession to Ukraine.[13] Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets claimed on August 20 that Russia may allow European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine ceding all of its southern oblasts, including Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kharkiv, to Russia.[14] Russia notably does not occupy any part of Odesa Oblast and occupies slivers of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.Reuters, citing three sources familiar with top-level Kremlin thinking, reported on August 21 that Putin continues to demand that Ukraine cede all of eastern Donbas, renounce ambitions to join NATO, and establish itself as a neutral state and refuse to host Western troops.[15] The sources added that Putin told US officials that he is willing to freeze Russian offensive operations in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange as well as return small unspecified parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. The sources reported that Putin continues to demand that NATO fundamentally alter one of its core tenets and commit to a legally binding pledge to not expand eastward, a demand that would require the renegotiation and re-ratification of the NATO treaty by all NATO member states. Lavrov recently stated that the Kremlin's objective is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast, further demonstrating that Russia remains unwilling to accept any agreement that falls short of Ukraine's full capitulation.[16] US President Donald Trump and US Vice President JD Vance have recently expressed the United States' willingness to contribute to the safeguarding of measures to prevent Russia from resuming its war in Ukraine.[17]Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 to discuss Russian-Indian relations and expanding economic investment in energy, including the oil supply, hydrocarbons, and nuclear energy.[18] Russian Deputy Energy Minister Roman Marshavin met with Indian deputy minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pankaj Jain on August 20 to discuss expanding cooperation in the energy trade.[19] Lavrov held a joint conference with Jaishankar after the meeting and announced that Putin would likely visit India before the end of 2025, and Jaishankar stated that India ”believe[s] that relations between India and Russia have been among the steadiest of the major relationships in the world after the Second World War.”[20] Putin and other high-ranking Russian officials are spending considerable amounts of time and energy to stabilize and strengthen relationships with India, indicating that Russia views India as a critical source of revenue. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21] Intensive Russian outreach to India suggests that Moscow is attempting to ensure that New Delhi does not curtail energy purchases from Russia because of these potential secondary sanctions.Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that overnight Russian forces launched 574 Shahed-type and decoy drones from over Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities, Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; four Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from over Lipetsk and Voronezh oblasts; two Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from over Voronezh Oblast; 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast; 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from over the Black Sea; and one unidentified missile from over occupied Crimea.[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly downed 546 drones, one Kh-47 Kinzhal aeroballistic missile, 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles, and 12 Kalibr cruise missiles.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that drones and missiles struck 11 locations throughout Ukraine.[24] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missiles struck infrastructure in Lviv City; Lutsk, Volyn Oblast; Rivne Oblast; and Zakarpattia Oblast, causing civilian injuries and deaths.[25] Russia's August 20-21 strike notably targeted several areas in Ukraine’s far-western oblasts that border Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. Russia launched a cruise missile at Mukachevo, Zakarpattia Oblast, striking the "Flex" US electronics manufacturing company and causing a massive fire and injuring at least 19 employees.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that "Flex" was a US-owned civilian enterprise that manufactured household goods such as coffee machines.[27] Russia likely struck the "Flex" enterprise to discourage the United States and Ukraine's European allies from investing in Ukraine or opening businesses within Ukraine. Russia likely prepared for this strike for several weeks, stockpiling drones and missiles over the backdrop of ongoing US-Russian negotiations and the August 15 Alaska summit.[28] ISW observed that Russia was launching much smaller strike packages in the weeks leading up to the Alaska summit in order to posture itself to the United States as a good-faith negotiator, and assessed that Russia was likely to leverage the smaller-scale strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for renewed massive strikes on Ukraine following the summit.[29] The size and composition of the August 20-21 strike package suggests that Russia successfully stockpiled significant numbers of both drones and missiles in the lead-up to the Alaska summit. Russian forces most recently launched Kalibr cruise missiles on July 21 and Kinzhals on August 4, suggesting that efforts to stockpile these munitions allowed Russian to use them in greater quantities during the August 20-21 strike series.[30]The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons. US President Donald Trump stated on August 21 that it is impossible for Ukraine to achieve victory against Russia if Ukraine is only able to use defensive weapons and systems and is “not allowed to play offense.”[31] The Associated Press (AP) reported on August 21 that Ukraine has launched mass production of its new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles which have a range of up to three thousand kilometers and can carry warheads up to 1,150 kilograms.[32] The AP reported that Ukraine currently produces one FP-5 cruise missile per day and aims to increase daily production capacity to produce seven FP-5 cruise missiles per day by October 2025. Ukraine continues to successfully invest in and expand the Ukrainian DIB capacity for producing medium- to long-range weapons systems capable of striking military and DIB facilities within Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in December 2024 that Ukraine would work to scale its production capacity of Palyanytsya, Peklo, Ruta, Neptune, and Sapsan missiles.[33] Ukraine notably succeeded in increasing the range of Neptune anti-ship missiles to allow Ukrainian forces to strike military and DIB facilities located deeper within Russia.[34]The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted video footage of Nikiforov briefing Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov on August 21, confirming milblogger claims that Nikiforov replaced Lapin on August 8.[36] The Russian military command’s belated replacement of Lapin reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, as the Russian military command reappointed Lapin to another high-profile command post despite prominent protest in the Russian information space highlighting Lapin's significant battlefield failures.[37] A Russian milblogger noted that a scandal involving the embezzlement of money allocated for fortifications in Kursk Oblast and the August 2024 Ukrainian incursion into the oblast marred Lapin’s tenure in command of the Northern Group of Forces.[38] Russian milbloggers recently criticized Lapin due to Russia’s failure to establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts.[39] Nikiforov, who began Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as chief of staff of the Eastern Military District (EMD), commanded the Western Group of Forces and Western Military District from December 2022 and was appointed Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in Spring 2024.[40] The Russian MoD sent Nikiforov to assist Lapin and organize efforts to stop the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.[41] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Group of Forces claimed on August 8 that Nikiforov is a relic of the “parquet army” of the 2000s who criticizes subordinates over minor mistakes.[42] ISW assesses that Nikiforov is unlikely to make any major changes, given his presence in the Northern Group of Forces sector for more than a year.Key Takeaways:The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression.The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine.Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions.Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons.The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  Ukrainian Operations in the Russian FederationRussian Supporting Effort – Northern AxisRussian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv CityRussian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk OblastRussian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk OblastRussian Supporting Effort – Southern AxisRussian Air, Missile, and Drone CampaignSignificant Activity in BelarusUkrainian Operations in the Russian FederationFighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 21.[43]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 21 that elements of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), along with other unspecified Ukrainian forces, conducted long-range drone strikes against the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery in Novoshakhtinsk, Rostov Oblast, which supplies Russian forces operating in Ukraine and is one of southern Russia’s largest oil product producers.[44] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 21 that the Novoshakhtinsky Oil Refinery can process 7.5 million tons of oil annually.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified military fuel and lubricant base in Voronezh Oblast overnight on August 20 to 21.[46]Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on August 21 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Novokostyantynivka, and Yablunivka on August 20 and 21.[47]The spokesperson for a Ukrainian detachment operating in the Sumy direction stated that Russian forces launch roughly five daily assaults and conduct 30 to 50 KAB guided glide bomb strikes daily.[48] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces only conducted one infiltration attempt in this direction so far in August 2025 due to Ukrainian fortifications and combat positions in this area.Sumy Oblast Head Oleh Hryhorov stated on August 21 that Russian drones struck a Ukrainian medical vehicle in Seredyna-Buda (northwest of Sumy City).[49]Order of Battle: Anti-aircraft gunners of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and elements of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[50] Elements of the 51st VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[51] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[52] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating strikes on Ukrainian positions near Nova Sich (north of Sumy City) with Akhmat Spetsnaz elements.[53] Drone operators of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[54] Elements of the 83rd Separate Guards VDV Brigade are reportedly operating south of Yunakivka.[55] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[56]Russian Main Effort – Eastern UkraineRussian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in forest areas west of Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City).[57]Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City within Vovchansk and near Synelnykove on August 20 and 21.[58]A Ukrainian company commander operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on August 21 that Russian forces in this direction have not used armored equipment “for a long time” and occasionally assault Ukrainian positions using motorcycles.[59] The company commander noted that Ukrainian forces’ use of drones in the Kharkiv direction has prevented Russian forces from accumulating equipment as far as 30 kilometers away from the frontline. Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced one kilometer in forest areas towards Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[60]Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 20 and 21.[61]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka on August 20 and 21.[62] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[63]Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[64]Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova toward Olhivka on August 20.[65]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Serednie (northwest of Lyman) and advanced west of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[66]Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske and Dibrova; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 20 and 21.[67]Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 21 that Russian forces in the Lyman direction have accumulated significant manpower and continue to launch traditional mass frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Serebryanske forest area (southeast of Lyman).[68] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces in this direction continue to conduct small infantry assaults on Ukrainian positions and have recently increased their use of Lancet, Molniya, and other unspecified reconnaissance and first-person view (FPV) drones.[69]Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk).[70]Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk toward Dronivka; north of Siversk near Serebryanka; northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka; southeast of Siversk near Vyimka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 20 and 21.[71]Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[72]Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered the dacha area near Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar) from the east but that Ukrainian drone activity forced them to retreat.[73] Another milblogger refuted claims that Russian forces entered Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar) and eastern Kostyantynivka and advanced west of the Siverskyi-Donetsk Donbas Canal (south of Chasiv Yar), claiming that Russian staff officers above the brigade echelon systemically embellish reports of Russian gains for the Russian high command.[74]Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August 20 and 21.[75]Kramatorsk City Military Administration Head Oleksandr Honcharenko stated on August 21 that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk (northwest of Chasiv Yar) overnight with an FAB-250 unguided glide bomb, damaging civilian infrastructure.[76]Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 18 and geolocated on August 20 shows drone operators of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD), including its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions southeast of Kostyantynivka.[77]Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators and sniper elements, are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[78] Drone operators of the Grachi detachment of the 346th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[79]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk) and credited elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) with using small group tactics to seize the settlement.[80] A Russian milblogger refuted the Russian MoD’s claims of the seizure of Oleksandro-Shultyne and claimed that Russian forces are only fighting on the approaches to the settlement.[81] Another milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) seized and advanced north of Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk); elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) advanced west and south of and within southwestern Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk); and that unspecified Russian forces advanced south of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[82]Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Nelipivka, Kleban-Byk, Yablunivka, Popiv Yar, Poltavka, and Pleshchiivka, and toward Stepanivka on August 20 and 21.[83]A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction stated on August 20 that Russian forces in this direction launch small fireteam-sized infantry assaults with two personnel using anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks.[84] The brigade added that Russian infantry advance under the cover of windbreaks and ruins before reaching a designated rally point, where they hide while awaiting reinforcements.Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.  Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Pokrovsk into eastern Zolotyi Koldyaz; into southwestern Hruzke and southern Vesele; east of and into southwestern Krasnyi Lyman; and west of Zapovidne.[85] A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk to southern Petrivka, and interdicting the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway.[86]Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Zapovidne, Kucheriv Yar, Novoekonomichne, Mykolaivka, Myrolyubivka, Zatyshok, Volodymyrivka, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne on August 20 and 21.[87]Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Russian forces are simultaneously exerting pressure on Pokrovsk itself and on Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya with the aim of identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses.[88] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian fires are complicating Russian forces' ability to accumulate forces within the Dobropillya penetration.Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) leveraged elements of its 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade to expand the penetration near Dobropillya westward toward Zapovidne and eastward toward western Shakhove.[89] Mashovets reported that elements of the 8th CAA (SMD) are expanding the left flank of the penetration. Mashovets’s reporting indicates that the Russian military command may be improving command coherence along its command seams in a mutually reinforcing effort to expand the Russian forces' penetration and consolidate positions. Drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[90] Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.  Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 21 shows Ukrainian forces raising a flag in central Tovste (southwest of Novopavlivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently retook the settlement.[91]Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Novoukrainka, and Dachne; south of Novopavlivka near Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Tovste on August 20 and 21.[92] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykholaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[93]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces within Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94]Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on August 21 but did not make confirmed advances.Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[95] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces consolidated positions in eastern Oleksandrohrad (east of Velykomykhailivka).[96]Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and toward Lisne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Sichneve; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vilne Pole, Novoheorhiivka, and Shevchenko and toward Komyshuvakha on August 20 and 21.[97]Trehubov reported that Russian forces are actively conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults.[98]Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Zelene Pole, and toward Novohryhorivka on August 20 and 21.[99]Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the Nemets group of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21 but did not advance.Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Kamyanske; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 20 and 21.[101]Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on August 21 that Russian forces launched 40 unguided aerial rockets (NARs) at Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[102]Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[103]Russian forces continued limited attacks east of Kherson City near the Antonivsky road and railway bridges on August 21 but did not advance.[104] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian boat in the Black Sea near occupied Zaliznyi Port, Kherson Oblast, with an unspecified high-precision missile.[105] Ukraine’s Special Operation Forces (SOF) reported that overnight on August 20-21 SOF elements struck Russian rail cars near occupied Dzhankoi, Crimea, which were carrying fuel and lubricants for Russian forces operating in southern Ukraine.[106] Geolocated footage published on August 21 indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s 95408th military unit in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, overnight on August 20 to 21.[107] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi reported on August 21 that the base currently houses elements of the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU).[108]Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)See topline text.Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)Nothing significant to report.Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. [1] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/[2] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1989213/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725[3] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022[6] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1958204624713748972[7] https://tass dot ru/politika/24833405[8] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/13543 ; https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gd-prizvali-zelenskogo-posledovat-sovetu-stubba-po-resheniyu-konflikta?ysclid=mel0z3ushu641003976 ; https://news dot ru/vlast/nelepaya-hitrost-v-gd-vyskazalis-ob-izmenenii-granic-na-ukraine[9] https://www.gazeta dot ru/politics/news/2025/08/21/26544752.shtml[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060825[11] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/zhelanii-moskvy/[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/regiony/ ; https://news dot mail.ru/politics/67542829/ ; https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/08/21/zhelanii-moskvy/[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/24834625[14] https://www dot kp.ru/daily/27741/5130745/ ; https://news dot ru/russia/ekspert-raskryl-chto-mozhet-vzyat-rf-v-obmen-na-vvod-vojsk-nato-na-ukrainu[15] https://archive.ph/A0AqV ; https://www.reuters.com/world/china/putins-demand-ukraine-give-up-donbas-no-nato-no-western-troops-sources-say-2025-08-21/[16] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025[17] https://suspilne dot media/1095396-rosiani-vdarili-po-rinku-ta-budinkah-u-konstantinivci-urad-vprovadiv-ecergu-do-tck-na-postijnij-osnovi-1275-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755752509&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081825 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-21/jd-vance-says-russia-wants-territory-that-s-under-ukraine-s-control ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625 [18] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/77831; https://t.me/MID_Russia/64166; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/[19] https://t.me/MID_Russia/64097[20] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2042424/; https://www.ndtv dot com/world-news/foreign-minister-s-jaishankar-meets-russian-president-vladimir-putin-in-moscow-9132385[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-20-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025[22] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795[24] https://t.me/kpszsu/40795[25] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9657; https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/1958400557007138983; https://t.me/andriysadovyi/3056 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/rosiya-zavdala-kombinovanogo-udaru-po-lvovu-ye-postrazhdali/; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/23497; https://www.facebook.com/MyroslavBiletskyi.official/posts/pfbid0bxEHRmstnZMDYXpb7dxCNjRxEatxykxA5zurGbKqrgUDbWqTizBjsndLXBfDcgj5l?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/[26] https://www.facebook.com/MyroslavBiletskyi.official/posts/pfbid0bxEHRmstnZMDYXpb7dxCNjRxEatxykxA5zurGbKqrgUDbWqTizBjsndLXBfDcgj5l?locale=uk_UA ; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47093 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/mukachevo-rosiyany-atakuvaly-raketamy-zavod-amerykanskoyi-kompaniyi/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9659 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958431237036536151; https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/1958435925769220322; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/russia-strikes-american-flex-factory-in-zakarpattia-region/; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176732; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/25319; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/1958395505932915016[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15707; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1958603266134024247[28] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025[29] https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-13-2025[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025[31] https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/115067017601499775[32] https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-drones-weapons-industry-russia-7201ab851544c394ee454407058b10ba;[33] https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225[34] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061824[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/55752; https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176783 ; https://t.me/istories_media/10235; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2024[38] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2025[40] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-guide-may-11; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024[41] https://t.me/dva_majors/77968; https://t.me/arbat/2133; https://t.me/dva_majors/77070; https://t.me/arbat/1860[42] https://t.me/severnnyi/4773[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096[45] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-novoshakhtinsk-oil-refinery-in-rostov-region/[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28096[47] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641;[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/zhodnyh-bufernyh-zon-sumshhyna-zalyshayetsya-polem-aktyvnyh-boyiv/[49] https://t.me/grigorov_oleg/490[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728[51] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898[52] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/5921[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/77970[54] https://t.me/armycorp44/14[55] https://t.me/severnnyi/4898[56] https://t.me/severnnyi/4899[57] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32717; https://t.me/severnnyi/4886[59] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/21/na-nogah-na-plechah-zanosyat-po-inshomu-niyak-na-harkivshhyni-vazhka-tehnika-voroga-boyitsya-i-hovayetsya/[60] https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[63] https://t.me/wargonzo/28641  [64] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32765[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[66] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143;[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41143[68] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[69] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095496-60-ombr-ta-3-j-armijskij-korpus-zsu-strimuut-tisk-dvoh-rosijskih-divizij-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8 ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/pihota-ne-mozhe-nichogo-vony-pochynayut-zlytysya-poblyzu-lymana-rosijska-taktyka-buksuye/[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32757[72] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958456251118989664; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3479[73] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750[74] https://t.me/rybar/72998[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750[76] https://www.facebook.com/alexander.vasilyevich.goncharenko/posts/pfbid0Uk4gfkzr4KqYxA1k5AUR9Yn6TRepCT9S24FavEPZbB65PWQGcsUH3zR1Q5zkg8Cpl[77] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1958231350227665047; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/31777[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32728[79] https://t.me/dva_majors/77914; https://t.me/milinfolive/155126[80] https://t.me/mod_russia/55746; https://t.me/mod_russia/55760; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/98195 ; https://t.me/sashakots/55720 [81] https://t.me/rybar/72998[82] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41174 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41164; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41183  [83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/rybar/72990[84] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/20/zamaskuvalysya-pid-fantomiv-ale-staly-mishennyu-proval-okupantiv-u-charivnyh-plashhah/; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16Vgppgnv8/[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32750 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41180 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874[86] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/66874[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098[88] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[89] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2938[90] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14204[91] https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/271; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9839; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30393; https://x.com/RoadtoMars9/status/1958396925813706784 ; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1958455468956995990[92] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098[93] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41145[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/16548[95] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176758[96] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176791[97] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930[98] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1095760-taktika-rosian-na-strategicnomu-vistupi-poblizu-dobropilla-provalilasa-rf-tisne-na-limanskomu-napramku-osuv-dnipro/[99] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064[100] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/176778; https://t.me/voin_dv/16544; https://t.me/wargonzo/28655; https://t.me/dva_majors/77966 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/59812[101] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/wargonzo/28641; https://t.me/dva_majors/77930; https://t.me/rusich_army/25313[102] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873[103] https://t.me/rusich_army/25313[104] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28098; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28068; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28064; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12873[105] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6694; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/21/raketa-i-lazerna-pidsvitka-yak-bijczi-gur-znyshhyly-rosijskyj-kater-bilya-zaliznogo-portu/[106] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2028; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28095[107] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/11676 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1958377943690039750[108] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/drones-strike-military-unit-in-sevastopol-triggering-fire/; 

[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Iran Update, July 28, 2025

 

at 8/21/25 5:26pm

Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Andie Parry, and Brian  CarterInformation Cutoff: 2:00 PM ETThe Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.Click here to see ISW-CTP's interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.NOTE: CTP-ISW will publish the Iran Update Monday through Friday starting on July 25, 2025. CTP-ISW will resume seven-day coverage of the region should conditions warrant it and will notify our readers if we resume seven-day coverage.The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025.[1] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is unlikely to make concessions on key issues such as domestic uranium enrichment and limits to its ballistic missile program by the August deadline.[2] French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Noel Barrot told Western media on July 26 that the E3 will trigger the JCPOA snapback mechanism if Iran does not reach an agreement by the end of summer.[3] He stated that the E3 wants a "more comprehensive agreement" that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region, which refers to Iran's leading role in the Axis of Resistance. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on July 28 that Iran will not negotiate over its defense capabilities.[4] Iran sees its missile program and its proxies and partners as integral parts of its deterrence and therefore its defense. Senior Iranian officials repeatedly rejected demands during the US-Iran nuclear negotiations in April and May 2025 to limit Iran’s missile program and support for the Axis of Resistance because the missile program is Iran’s ”most reliable means of defense.”[5]The Washington Post quoted an Israeli source on July 25 who reported Iran is "no longer a threshold nuclear state" following US and Israeli strikes.[6] The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.[7] The source stated that Israel would very likely detect any Iranian efforts to test a nuclear weapon and launch an attack. Senior Israeli officials have repeatedly warned since the strikes that Israel would “almost certainly” detect any Iranian attempts to recover nuclear material and conduct renewed strikes to prevent Iran from accessing the material.[8] The source said that US and Israeli strikes destroyed the "logistical foundations" of Iran's nuclear program, which will hinder Iran's ability to weaponize.[9] The strikes destroyed the Uranium Metal Conversion Plant at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, which Iran could have used to transform uranium gas into dense metal in a process called metallization.[10] This process is one of the last steps required to form the explosive core of an atomic bomb. The source also stated that the loss of nuclear scientists will significantly hinder Iran's ability to conduct ongoing nuclear weapons research, including research Iran was reportedly conducting on electromagnetic pulse weapons that target electronics in a target area.[11] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the destruction of Iran’s metallization process and the loss of several Iranian nuclear scientists would hinder Iran’s ability to transform weapons-grade uranium, or 90 percent enriched uranium, into a usable nuclear weapon.[12]Israeli strikes also reportedly buried a site where Iran stored 400 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), or uranium enriched up to at least 20 percent.[13] Western media previously reported that Israeli strikes blocked tunnel entrances to an underground complex at the ENTC that stores part of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile.[14] The International Atomic Energy Agency reported in May 2025 that Iran had 683.1 kilograms of HEU as of mid-May 2025.[15] The Institute for Science and International Security previously assessed that the Israeli campaign also rendered most, if not all, of Iran's operational centrifuges inoperable and "effectively destroyed" Iran's enrichment capacity.[16]The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities, which could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence released a comprehensive report on July 28 detailing its efforts during and after the 12-Day Israel-Iran War to secure Iran. The report emphasized the scale and complexity of the threats Iran faced.[17] The ministry described the war as a coordinated campaign by the “American-Zionist front” involving military strikes, sabotage, “cognitive warfare,” and efforts to trigger internal unrest through armed groups, separatists, and political dissidents.[18] Iranian officials use the term “cognitive warfare” to characterize what they claim are enemy-led psychological operations aimed at spreading distrust and hopelessness among the Iranian public to weaken the regime.[19] The ministry claimed that it arrested three Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) commanders and 50 ”takfiri” fighters inside Iran as part of its counterintelligence efforts, seized suicide vests and advanced weapons, and disrupted the infiltration of 300 foreign fighters allegedly ”mobilized by Israel” under an entity called the “United Baluchistan Front.”[20] The statement is likely referring to Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group that frequently attacks Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran. The Iranian regime has previously accused Israel of supporting Jaish al Adl.[21] The report also cited operations in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kerman provinces that led to the seizure of rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and light arms intended for use in terror attacks.[22] These claims underscore the regime’s growing concern that internal threats are increasing at a time when it cannot address them all simultaneously.These internal security challenges will naturally limit Iran’s ability to reinvest in its external security. Iran will very likely prioritize its internal security challenges over rebuilding the Axis of Resistance or its external capabilities beyond the level necessary to deter attacks. Iranian officials would prioritize these internal security challenges because they remain concerned about regime stability over the long term.Jaish al Adl fighters attacked the Sistan and Baluchistan Provincial Courthouse in Zahedan on July 26.[23] Iranian security officials reported that three attackers disguised as civilians attempted to enter the building, threw a grenade inside, and opened fire.[24] The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Operational Base in Zahedan and the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) confirmed that six civilians died and 22 others suffered injuries, with several of the injured in critical condition.[25] The Iranian LEC stated that security forces killed all three attackers during the operation and found suicide vests on them.[26] Jaish al Adl said that it conducted the attack in response to death sentences, arrests of ”youth and clerics,” and orders to ”demolish mosques and homes.”[27] Jaish al Adl conducted its most complex and coordinated attack in April 2024 when over 160 fighters attacked multiple IRGC and police sites across Sistan and Baluchistan Province in a 13-hour operation.[28] Unspecified attackers separately killed a Basij Organization commander in Zahedan on July 27.[29] Jaish al Adl has not commented on the killing of the Basij commander at the time of this writing.This attack and others like it seek to disrupt Iranian regime activities to create opportunities for Jaish al Adl to gain the support of local Baloch civilians. Jaish al Adl justified the attack in defensive terms, which suggests the attacks are part of an effort to build the group’s popularity as a defender of local Balochi civilians. The courthouse attack follows a broader pattern of insurgents targeting LEC and IRGC personnel and judicial institutions in southeastern Iran since 2012.[30] Iranian security forces have taken steps to target anti-regime militant groups following an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023.[31]Syria will hold its first parliamentary elections through provincial subcommittees between September 15 and 20, 2025.[32] The new parliament will probably not act as a check on executive power because the executive appoints one-third of its members and the executive influences the appointments of the other two-thirds of the parliament‘s members. The Supreme Committee for People’s Assembly Elections also announced that it would request to increase the number of seats in Parliament from 150 to 210.[33] It is unclear at this time how the committee will distribute the additional seats among the provinces. Provincial subcommittees, which were created by Supreme Committee members, will select 140 representatives to the 210-seat People’s Assembly in these elections.[34] Each provincial subcommittee will elect People’s Assembly members from within the subcommittee.[35] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara will personally select the other 70 representatives, or one-third of the body.[36] Shara appointed the Supreme Committee‘s members, which thus enables him to influence the appointment of the provincial subcommittees and then the remaining 140 representatives.The way that the parliament is selected suggests that it will probably follow the executive’s lead on policy and exert very little legislative power. The People’s Assembly is a legislative body that will propose, adopt, and amend Syrian laws according to the Syrian Constitutional Declaration.[37] The process for securing a majority to pass laws that run contrary to Shara’s preferences will be extremely difficult because it will require votes from 106 of the 140 representatives that Shara did not appoint, assuming all the Shara-appointed members vote according to his wishes.Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani recently met with several Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad to discuss the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections and unspecified “regional developments.”[38] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. Ghaani reportedly held separate meetings with State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki, Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri, and Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq head Humam Hamoudi.[39] Iran has previously urged unity among Shia Coordination Framework leaders ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.[40] The Shia Coordination Framework currently plans to run across multiple lists in the elections, which will divide vote shares between Iranian-backed candidates.[41]It is notable that Ghaani’s visit occurred amid an ongoing debate in Iraq over the potential dissolution of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF is an Iraqi state service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Iraqi federal government has reportedly drafted a plan to dissolve the militias in the PMF, integrate militia members into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and offer key leadership positions in the next Iraqi cabinet to the militia political heads.[42] A Shia Coordination Framework member told a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-affiliated journalist on July 20 that the Iraqi federal government shared this plan with unspecified Iranian governmental figures.[43]Key TakeawaysIran: The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) reiterated that it will trigger the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism to reinstate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if Iran fails to make progress towards a nuclear deal by the end of August 2025. The E3 also wants a "more comprehensive agreement" that includes limits to Iran's ballistic missile program and activities that destabilize the region.Iran: The Iranian regime is facing a broad set of internal security challenges, including insurgency and anti-regime activities that could constrain its ability to rebuild military capabilities following the Israel–Iran war. These internal security challenges will limit Iran’s ability to reinvest in its external security.Iraq: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani recently met with several Shia Coordination Framework leaders in Baghdad to discuss the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections and unspecified “regional developments.” Iran has previously urged unity among Shia Coordination Framework leaders ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that Iranian-backed parties will maintain control of the Iraqi government.Iran: An Israeli source told the Washington Post that Iran is "no longer a threshold nuclear state" following US and Israeli strikes. The source stated that Iran will need at least one to two years to build a deliverable nuclear weapon, assuming it can do so undetected.Syria: Syria will hold its first parliamentary elections through provincial subcommittees in September 2025. The new parliament is unlikely to act as a check on executive power because the executive appoints one-third of its members and the executive influences the appointments of the other two-thirds of the parliament‘s members.IranIranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Brigadier General Majid Ibn al Reza as deputy defense and armed logistics minister on July 26.[44] Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh proposed that Reza replace former deputy Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Hojatollah Ghoreishi, who was appointed in January 2024 under former Defense and Armed Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani.[45] It is unclear what position Ghoreishi will hold, if any. Reza had served as the chief executive officer of the Armed Forces Social Security Organization (SATA) since 2022.[46] The Defense and Armed Logistics Ministry established SATA in 2009 to provide social security for veterans.[47]IraqSeveral Kataib Hezbollah members attempted to prevent the work of an Iraqi agriculture official, prompting engagements with Iraqi Federal Police officers in Dora, Baghdad, on July 27, killing one civilian and one Federal Police officer.[48] Several Kataib Hezbollah PMF fighters storming a Department of Agriculture building in Baghdad’s Dora district on July 27 as the new director was being sworn in, which spurred the fighting.[49] Unspecified security sources and three unidentified department employees told Al Arabiya on July 27 that the fighters aimed to stop the replacement of the former director by attacking the building.[50] Baghdad Province Deputy Governor Ali Zaidan dismissed Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Department of Agriculture Director Iyad Kazim Ali on July 23 and replaced him with Osama Hassan Saloumi.[51] Iraq’s Joint Operations Command announced on July 27 the arrest of 14 members of the PMF’s 45th and 46th Brigades for their suspected involvement in the attack.[52] The 45th and 46th PMF brigades are controlled by the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah.[53] The Ministry of Interior announced on July 28 the arrest of the former Department of Agriculture Director for his ”direct involvement” in the incident.[54]Kataib Hezbollah denied on July 28 any involvement in the Iraqi Federal Police attack.[55] A member of Kataib Hezbollah’s political party, Harakat Hoquq, described the clashes between Kataib Hezbollah militants and Iraqi Federal Police as “friendly fire” and a “mistake.”[56] The Shia Coordination Framework also condemned the attack on July 27.[57] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Iran-backed Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. The PMF’s Popular Mobilization Commission stated on July 27 that it will not “tolerate” any individual who violates orders or security procedures.[58] Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed Iraqi actors have tried to distance themselves from the incident, which occurred amid discussions on restricting arms to the state and dissolving the PMF.Iraqi media reported on July 28 that at least four one-way attack drones crashed in Erbil, Duhok, and Kirkuk provinces.[59] Iraqi media reported on July 28 that at least two one-way attack drones crashed in Erbil Province.[60] One landed near Korgosk village, and the other hit a popular cafe in Rizgari Subdistrict.[61] Shafaq News reported on July 28 that a drone crashed in Bardarash District, Duhok Province.[62] Iraqi media also reported on July 28 that a drone fell near Hihawa village in Kirkuk Province.[63] It is unclear what these drones were targeting because the crashes appear to be the result of a technical malfunction rather than precise targeting. This reporting coincides with Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al Araji’s visit to Erbil to discuss recent drone attacks targeting oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan with the Kurdistan Regional Government.[64] Likely Iranian-backed Iraqi actors conducted at least nine one-way drone attacks targeting seven oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan between July 14 and 17.[65]The Iraqi state-run State Organization for Marketing Oil (SOMO) called on Iraqi authorities on July 28 to halt “widespread” oil smuggling operations in Iraqi territorial waters.[66] SOMO’s statement came after the United States reportedly threatened in July 2025 to sanction SOMO and therefore block $350 million of Iraqi oil revenue if the Iraqi federal government failed to prevent Iranian crude oil smuggling.[67] Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates around a billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.[68] The United States sanctioned on July 3 six entities and four vessels involved in smuggling Iranian oil. The sanctioned entities included a network of companies run by an Iraqi businessman.[69]SyriaFrench, US, and UK officials are mediating stalled integration talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government. The SDF and Shara’s government have not fully negotiated the integration of Kurdish-majority northeastern Syria into the transitional government despite a March agreement that outlined a framework and set of principles.[70] French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot met with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi in Paris on July 25 to confirm future negotiations between the Syrian transitional government and the SDF and facilitated by US and French mediators to to implement the March 10 agreement, but did not provide a date for talks.[71] Barrot met with Abdi after a joint meeting between himself, US Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani, which focused on stability concerns in Syria, including the situation in Suwayda and integration negotiations with the SDF.[72]Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) Foreign Relations Department co-chair Ilham Ahmed attributed the failure to implement the March 10 agreement on July 27 to interpretive disputes from both sides regarding integration, participation, and unity in the new Syrian state.[73] Ahmed clarified the SDF’s position on integration into the state when she emphasized that “airports, passports, and identity cards are sovereign issues that must be managed centrally,” while “services, education, culture, and internal security must be managed decentralized to ensure genuine participation by local communities.”[74]Syrian Foreign Ministry Director for US Affairs Qutaiba Idlibi said on July 25 that the March 10 agreement ”does not require months to be implemented but rather requires a genuine desire to implement it” and that there has been no progress in implementing the agreement so far.[75] The implementation of the March 10 agreement requires genuine desire for implementation from both sides, and it is notable that the Syrian government has so far failed to implement the first stipulation, which calls for the inclusion of all Syrian ethnic and religious groups in the political process. The transitional government has included minorities only in less-significant political positions, and the Shara-led government has centralized control over the legislative branch, as noted above. Idlibi claimed that ”a lack of unified vision within the SDF’s leadership” has hindered negotiations.[76]SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi met with SDF generals, local council leaders, and tribal leaders from Deir ez Zor Province on July 27 in al Shaddadi, Hasakah Province, to discuss plans for an eventual SDF withdrawal from Deir ez Zor. [77]A source that attended the meeting told Syrian media that the purpose of the meeting was to agree on the withdrawal of the SDF from all of Deir ez Zor Province to allow the Syrian transitional government to assume administration for the entire province.[78] The source claimed that the SDF decided to withdraw from Deir ez Zor after US pressure.[79] The SDF has controlled half of Deir ez Zor Province since it completed its campaign against ISIS in Deir ez Zor with US support.[80] Syrian media reported that the transitional government will assume control of Deir ez Zor Province within two to three months, though Kurdish media denied this claim.[81]Syrian security forces dismantled an Assadist cell that participated in the March 2025 coastal violence. The General Security Services (GSS) arrested four Assadist insurgents in Jableh, Latakia Province, on July 26.[82] The Syrian Ministry of Interior (MoI) said in a statement on July 26 that it had dismantled a ”terrorist cell” led by Maher Hussein Ali, who attacked GSS forces on March 6 during a coordinated wave of Alawite insurgency in coastal Syria. The cell had planned future attacks on the transitional government.[83] The MoI claimed that Ali’s cell coordinated with Bashar al Assad’s brother Maher, the commander of the ”Mazkun Regiment”, and with Lebanese Hezbollah as part of a plot to destabilize the coastal region.[84] The GSS also arrested Wadah Suhail Ismail, the commander of the ”Mazkun Regiment,” on July 26, after transitional government forces dismantled Ali's cell in Jableh and received additional intelligence on Assadist activity.[85] The Mazkun Regiment is an Assadist insurgent group on the Syrian coast that created a social media presence on May 21 after the height of the coastal insurgency in March.[86] The GSS also arrested an Assadist Republican Guard Colonel on July 26, who was the commander of the ”Coastal Operation Room” that oversaw Assadist attacks on March 6.[87] The GSS arrested the colonel after it received intelligence from Ali’s cell.[88]Arabian PeninsulaThe Houthis said that they plan to expand their attack campaign on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, likely to put pressure on Israel to stop its war in the Gaza Strip.[89] The Houthis announced on July 27 that they entered the ”fourth stage“ of their attack campaign against Israel and will attack any vessel tied to Israel, regardless of the flag the vessel is sailing under.[90] The Houthis’ announcement comes after Israel and the United States withdrew from ceasefire talks with Hamas on July 25.[91] The Houthis have tied their campaign against international shipping to Israel’s war in the Gaza Strip since October 2023.[92]The Houthis published a propaganda video on July 28 interviewing Eternity C crewmembers under duress in an attempt to portray the Houthis as a responsible actor.[93] The Houthis blamed the crew’s captain and the shipping company for the sinking of the Eternity C and the death of four crewmembers. The Houthis initiated the attack on Eternity C and thus bear the responsibility for the deaths and damage.[94] The Houthis prompted one crewmember to warn shipping companies against trading with Israel to avoid being hijacked and their crew taken hostage.[95] The Houthis forced crewmembers to say that the Houthis rescued and provided shelter for the crew.[96] The Houthis also took the Eternity C crew hostage in international waters, which is an act of piracy under international law.[97]The Houthis launched three drones targeting Eilat, Ashkelon, and Hadera and a missile targeting a “sensitive” site in Beer Sheva in southern Israel on July 24.[98] The IDF Air Force intercepted a Houthi drone before it crossed into Israeli territory on July 24.[99] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic blockade on Israel in October 2023.[100]Palestinian Territories and LebanonNothing significant to report. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gladOoktj6Q ; https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-e3-leaders-26-july-2025[2] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-25-2025-68841c28e9371[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gladOoktj6Q[4] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/6543867/[5] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-s-ballistic-missile-program-non-negotiable-president-hassan-rouhani-n1251072  ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-28-2025 ;[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/[7] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/us/politics/iran-attacks-damage.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare  ; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/new-us-assessment-finds-american-strikes-destroyed-only-one-three-iran-rcna218761[9] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/28/science/iran-nuclear-uranium-metal.html[11] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-special-report-june-28-2025[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/25/israel-us-attack-irans-nuclear-program-destroyed/[14] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iaea-says-entrances-tunnels-irans-isfahan-site-hit-by-us-strike-2025-06-22/[15] https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/25/06/gov2025-24.pdf[16] https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/post-attack-assessment-of-the-first-12-days-of-israeli-strikes-on-iranian-nuclear-facilities[17] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/[18] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-29-2025[20] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/[21] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-9-2025 ;https://farhikhtegandaily dot com/news/196929/[22] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363782/[23] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088[24] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088[25] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088[27] https://t.me/mediaadl/648[28] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063220;https://t.me/mediaadl/342 ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/16/3063029 ;https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1775840050342682790[29] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/06/3363924[30] https://www.dni.gov/nctc/terrorist_groups/jaa.html ;https://www.israeldefense dot co.il/en/node/37476 ;https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-56249392 ;https://www.tabnak dot ir/fa/news/1267983 ;https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cl5qk32k271o ;https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/09/24/3006762;https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cxxlgkd8048o ;https://parsi.euronews.com/2023/05/21/five-border-guards-killed-in-attack-of-jaish-al-adl-on-the-saravan-border-post[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025 ;https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-18-2025  ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-28-2025  ;https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[32] https://t.me/sana_gov/134575 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/[33] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/[35] https://english dot enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/06/election-of-syrian-peoples-assembly-faces-challenge-of-competence-and-representation-demands/[36] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-expected-hold-parliamentary-election-september-2025-07-27/[37] https://www.aljazeera dot net/encyclopedia/2025/3/14/نص-الإعلان-الدستوري-لسوريا-2025[38] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/في-زيارة-خاطفة-استمرت-10-ساعات-قا-ني-يلتقي-ربعة-قيادات-شيعية-دون-السوداني[39] https://shafaq dot com/ar/سیاسة/في-زيارة-خاطفة-استمرت-10-ساعات-قا-ني-يلتقي-ربعة-قيادات-شيعية-دون-السوداني[40] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate043025[41] https://isw.pub/IranUpdate052725[42] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996593653076228[43] https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996597708988569 ; https://x.com/LawkGhafuri/status/1946996578885026280[44] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362682/[45] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85353533[46] https://www.isna dot ir/news/1401031812375[47] https://web.archive dpt org/web/20211221181209/https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/135743[48] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/07/27/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building [49] https://shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/ول-تعليق-من-هي-ة-الحشد-على-حداث-الدورة ;https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building-2025-07-27/ ;[50] https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/middle-east/2025/07/27/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building[51] https://alssaa dot com/post/show/37103-%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%A8%D9%87 [52] https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535011/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%87%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%8F%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/leadership-and-purpose-iraq%E2%80%99s-popular-mobilization-forces[54] https://almadapaper dot net/409332/[55] https://t.me/centerkaf/5117[56] https://x.com/thestevennabil/status/1949550837245890792[57][58] https://www.al-mirbad dot com/detail/186084[59] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ;https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-مجهولة-الهوية-شمالي-دهوك ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-في-حدى-قرى-الحويجة-بكركوك[60] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل ;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ;https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84[61] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رتين-مسيرتين-في-حدود-ربيل;https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/بيان-مني-من-كوردستان-الطا-رة-التي-سقطت-في-اربيل-مفخخة-ولا-صابات ; https://www.alsumaria dot tv/news/security/535052/%D8%B3%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B7-%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AE%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84[62] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/كوردســتانيات/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-مجهولة-الهوية-شمالي-دهوك[63] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/أمـن/سقوط-طا-رة-مسيرة-في-حدى-قرى-الحويجة-بكركوك[64] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/239604-.html[65] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-15-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-16-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2025[66] https://almadapaper dot net/409304/[67] https://www.kurdistan24 dot net/ckb/story/851317[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/ ; https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/[69] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/07/sanctions-on-oil-smugglers-exporting-iranian-oil/[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-10-2025[71] https://www.diplomatie.gouv dot fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/evenements/actualites-2025/article/syrie-entretien-du-ministre-avec-le-commandant-des-forces-democratiques[72] https://www.diplomatie.gouv dot fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/evenements/actualites-2025/article/syrie-entretien-du-ministre-avec-le-commandant-des-forces-democratiques ; https://x.com/syrianmofaex/status/1948715748894871854[73] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/interview/27072025[74] https://www.rudawarabia dot net/arabic/interview/27072025[75] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766087/%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%82-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%b0-%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%b9-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a/[76] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766087/%d8%af%d9%85%d8%b4%d9%82-%d9%84%d8%a7-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%af%d9%85-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%aa%d9%86%d9%81%d9%8a%d8%b0-%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%82-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%b1%d8%b9-%d8%b9%d8%a8%d8%af%d9%8a/[77] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/[78] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/[79] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/766526/%d8%a7%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%ad%d8%ab-%d8%a7%d9%86%d8%b3%d8%ad%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/[80] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sdfs-insurgency-challenge-deir-ez-zor[81] https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1949536571474215039 ; https://npasyria dot com/218694/[82] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949217711285735685[83] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/ ;[84] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/[85] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B97vLKqNX/[86] https://www.facebook.com/zl.almqdad[87] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949222462136414308 ; https://www.facebook.com/zl.almqdad[88] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1949222462136414308[89] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949573062262759840[90] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949573062262759840[91] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-trump-appear-abandon-gaza-ceasefire-negotiations-with-hamas-2025-07-25/[92] https://t.me/army21ye/3227; https://t.me/army21ye/1399[93] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1949902614063435929 ;  https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250709-ukmto_warning_incident_027-25-update-004.pdf?rev=334cdc3dd34b4e5287ac77b784c9c1fa ; https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1942961976340062717;[94] https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/products/20250709-ukmto_warning_incident_027-25-update-004.pdf?rev=334cdc3dd34b4e5287ac77b784c9c1fa ; 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[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

— Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 20, 2025

 

at 8/21/25 1:12pm

 Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Anna Harvey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, Adham Fattah, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan August 20, 2025, 7pm ET  Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast. Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1 pm ET on August 20, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 21, 2025, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed "collective security issues" can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[1] Lavrov also threatened that Russia will take “firm and harsh” action to ensure that Russia’s “legitimate interests” are a part of any postwar security arrangement for Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely trying to inject its demands into the ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian joint effort to create a security structure that will serve as a safeguard against a future Russian re-invasion in the event of a peace settlement.[2] Granting Russia veto power over Western security guarantees would enable the Kremlin to dictate conditions that will weaken Ukraine’s ability to resist another Russian invasion by preventing Ukraine from forming binding bilateral or multilateral security agreements such as are now being discussed, increasing and modernizing its military, and receiving support from Ukraine's partners. Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently said that Russia could not tolerate the presence of troops from NATO member states in Ukraine as part of any security guarantees.[3] European leaders recently released a joint statement reaffirming that no peace agreement should place limitations on Ukraine’s armed forces or on its cooperation with third countries nor can Russia have veto power over Ukraine’s pathway to joining the European Union (EU) or NATO.[4] European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas stated on August 19 that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be trusted to honor any promises or commitments to permanently cease military activity against Ukraine and that any security guarantees must be robust and credible to deter the Russian military command does not re-group and launch a future invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Russia is in favor of collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and that a good example of such guarantees was evident in the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations, which would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without any imposing restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces.[5] The security guarantees proposed in the draft 2022 Istanbul Protocol treated Russia as a neutral security “guarantor state” of Ukraine along with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, failing to identify Russia as a belligerent in the war. The outlined security guarantees would give China and Russia veto power over any action the guarantors could take in response to a renewed Russian attack by granting the UN Security Council the authority to take “measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”[6] Such "security guarantees" would allow the Kremlin and its allies to dictate the means and tools that Ukraine could use to defend itself against Russia and restrict the ability of other guarantor states to come to Ukraine's assistance. The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. Lavrov stated on August 20 that Putin confirmed his readiness to continue direct negotiations with Ukraine in the Istanbul format.[7] Russian and Ukrainian delegations have engaged in three rounds of bilateral talks in Istanbul since February 2025, which have resulted in nine prisoners of war (POW) exchanges, but little more.[8] Lavrov claimed that Putin would consider raising the level of the delegation heads after working groups had been established but added that a summit between Putin and Zelensky would need thorough preparations that could take time. Several US officials have stated that Putin promised Trump that he would meet with Zelensky following the multilateral summit between the United Stated, Ukraine, and European leaders on August 18.[9] Trump stated on August 18 that Zelensky and Putin need to meet urgently and that waiting too long before having a leader-level bilateral meeting would result in thousands of deaths.[10] Lavrov may have attempted to portray the Kremlin’s proposal of continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework and working groups as fulfilling Putin's reported promise to Trump to hold a bilateral meeting with Zelensky. Continued negotiations within the Istanbul framework are a far cry from a head of state-level bilateral meeting, however, and Lavrov's statement is likely part of the Kremlin’s continued efforts to protract peace negotiations and deflect blame for delays onto Ukraine and the West. The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Reuters reported on August 20 that the Russian government is preparing to increase taxes and reduce its spending as it attempts to maintain its defense expenditure amid economic cooling.[11] Russian Finance Ministry data indicated that the Kremlin ran a budget deficit of 4.9 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) from January to August of 2025, exceeding the target for the entire year by a quarter.[12] Russian Federation Council Committee on Budget and Financial Markets Chairperson Antatoly Artamonov claimed in late July 2025 that Russia needed to “urgently start fiscal consolidation” amidst increasingly pessimistic economic indicators and a decline in oil and gas revenues.[13] Reuters reported that Russia spends over 17 trillion rubles (roughly $211 billion) or 41 percent of its federal budget on its defense and national security. A Russian government source stated that Russia's defense spending likely constitutes more than the stated eight percent of Russian GDP and assessed that defense spending if unlikely to decrease in 2026 or in an event of a ceasefire.[14] Reuters reported that the Russian government is increasingly pulling funds away from the healthcare and education sectors, and Russian officials are pushing for Russia to reallocate funds from non-defense budgetary items to the defense sector. Reuters reported that Russia has relatively a low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 20 percent; however, this metric is much less consequential as Russia is a rentier state which uses oil and gas revenues and Russia’s sovereign wealth fund to fund its war in Ukraine. The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund that Russia pulls money from to avoid incurring debt, but Putin is steadily depleting the fund’s liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine.[15] Russia is jeopardizing its economic stability and the livelihoods of Russian civilians to increasingly feed its defense industrial base (DIB) and sustain the war effort in Ukraine. Russia faces a growing list of costs from the war, including providing compensation for servicemembers and their families, expanding its DIB, and sponsoring recruitment drives for its war in Ukraine.[16] Russian officials have repeatedly attempted to convince the Russian population that the Russian federal budget prioritizes civilian and social expenditures while continuing to allocate greater sums of the budget to defense spending.[17] The Russian government also must face the future costs of compensating veterans and their families by providing them with financial, medical, and psychological support from the government over the coming decades. Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth. Bloomberg reported on August 20 that India’s state-owned oil refineries purchased an increased amount of Russian oil from August 18 to 19, and Russian deputy trade representative in India Yevgeny Griva told Bloomberg on August 20 that Russia expects India to continue buying Russian oil because of a five percent discount.[18] Bloomberg reported that Russia deepened its discount from one dollar in July 2025 to $2.50 a barrel to Dated Brent, likely to incentivize Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil amidst secondary tariffs.[19] Bloomberg reported that Chinese oil refiners stepped up purchases of Russian flagship oil as some Indian companies pulled back purchases of Russian oil in August amidst US threats of tariffs.[20] Bloomberg reported that China received shipments of 75,000 barrels per day from the Urals, a marked increase from the year-to-date average of 40,000 barrels per day. Secondary tariffs may cost Russia additional foreign funds if Russia is unable to successfully convince tariffed countries to buy more oil from Russia that would compensate the difference between the discount and market price. ISW continues to assess that secondary sanctions will likely further impact the Russian economy by undercutting Russian oil revenues which are essential for the Kremlin's financing of its war against Ukraine.[21] The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new and younger elite. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 20 that the Kremlin is considering Bastrykin for the vacant position of Chairman of the Russian Supreme Court.[22] Unspecified sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration, Supreme Court, and judicial community told Vedomosti that Bastrykin’s replacement presents an opportunity to “introduce new blood” to Sledkom, given that Bastrykin has headed Sledkom since 2011 and is approaching the age of 72. The Kremlin allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024.[23] The Kremlin’s replacement of Bastrykin is in line with Putin’s recent practice of reshuffling older members of his inner circle to other roles rather than retiring or firing them, as demonstrated by the appointment of former Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to oversee the Russian shipbuilding industry in May 2025.[24] Putin has been recently promoting younger officials who have significant involvement with the Russian war effort such as former Tula Oblast Governor Alexei Dyumin, who became the youngest ever member of the Russian Security Council in September 2024.[25] The promotion of younger officials connected to the war effort is consistent with Putin’s February 2024 announcement that he is forming a new elite out of veterans and committed supporters of the war effort.[26] Key Takeaways: The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. The Kremlin appears to be demanding that any security guarantees be based on those proposed in the Istanbul 2022 framework, which would grant Russia and its allies the right to veto Western military assistance to Ukraine and leave Ukraine helpless in the face of future Russian threats. The Kremlin is continuing to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unwilling to have an immediate bilateral meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the timeline proposed by US President Donald Trump. The Russian economy continues to face budget deficits as a result of increased defense spending and detrimental effects of Western sanctions and secondary tariffs. Secondary tariffs are likely forcing Russia to sell oil below market price, which could be decreasing the incoming flow of foreign funds into the Russian economy and depleting Russia’s primary source of wealth. The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairman Alexander Bastrykin, likely as part of the Kremlin's efforts to form a new and younger elite. Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Lyman, Toretsk, and Velykomykhailivka.   We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.   Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts) Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign Significant Activity in Belarus Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Fighting continued in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on August 19 and 20.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in the direction of Novyi Put (southwest of Glushkovo).[28] Sources in the Ukrainian military told The New Voice of Ukraine (NV) that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian BARS Kursk Unmanned Systems Battalion base in Oboyansky Raion, Kursk Oblast, where Russian forces stationed drones overnight on August 19 to 20.[29] Social media sources geolocated footage of the strikes on August 20.[30] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed on August 20 that the FSB detained three Ukrainian servicemen conducting a sabotage and reconnaissance operation in an unspecified area of Bryansk Oblast’s international border area.[31] Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City) Russian forces recently advanced in the Sumy direction.   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19 and 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced seized Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) and into central Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[32]   Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy City) and west of Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City).[33] Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and Bezsalivka; north of Sumy City near Kindrativka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on August 19 and 20.[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne and Sadky.[35] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on August 20 that Russian milbloggers are mentioning Sumy Oblast less frequently because Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are suffering losses and gradually retreating in several areas of the oblast.[36] A Ukrainian reserve officer noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2025 plan to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast failed since Russian forces only maintain two small pockets in the oblast.[37] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka.[38] Elements of the 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment, including an attached Storm V company of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Varachyne.[39] Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City) Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances.   Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City).[40] Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and on the south (left) bank of the Vovcha River on August 19 and 20.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Synelnykove.[42]  Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Katerynivka on August 19 and 20 but did not advance..[43] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)   Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and northern Kupyansk.[44] Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, Fyholivka, and Kamyanka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on August 19 and 20.[45] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking within Kupyansk itself.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Synkivka and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[47] The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on August 19 that a Russian drone struck an ambulance in Kupyansk, in violation of international law.[48] Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) and infantry, likely of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[49] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novosellivka.[50] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA, MMD) and the Udaya Drone Group (reportedly of the 68th MRD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kupyansk and in the Kupyansk direction, respectively.[51] Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 20 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova toward Olhivka and near Hlushchenkove on August 19 and 20.[52] Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 1st GTA (MMD) are operating near Zahryzove.[53] Russian forces recently advanced in the Lyman direction.   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Russian forces advanced within southern Zarichne (east of Lyman).[54] Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove and Serednie; north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on August 19 and 20.[55] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces in this direction launch small infantry group assaults against Ukrainian positions at all times of the day, attacking from multiple directions simultaneously and constantly bringing up reserves to prolong assaults, sending as many as 10 successive small infantry groups per assault wave.[56] The NCO reported that Russian forces are supported by drone operators using Mavic, Lancet, and first-person view (FPV) drones, and occasionally leverage motorcycles for these assaults. The NCO noted that terrain features in this direction, including the Chorny Zherebets River, prevent Russian forces from leveraging armored vehicles. The NCO also stated that the Russian military command is deploying drone operators as close as possible to the line of contact in this direction in order to strike at Ukrainian firing points and logistical routes in the rear and that fighting is attritional in Lyman direction.[57] Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD), and the 1st and 15th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA, MMD) are operating toward the west (right) bank of the Oskil River and Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[58] Mashovets stated that elements of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are operating south of Karpivka. Mashovets stated that elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Ridkodub and that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Hrekivka (north of Lyman). Drone elements of the BARS-16 Kuban Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions west of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[59] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)   Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Siversk and south of Novoselivka (east of Siversk).[60] Russian forces attacked north of Siversk near Serebryanka and in the Kreminskyi forest area, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Novoselivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, south of Siversk near Pereizne, and southwest of Siversk near Fedorivka on August 19 and 20.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Serebryanka.[62] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Vyimka.[63] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (southwest of Chasiv Yar).[64] Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne and southwest of Chasiv Yar near Kostyantynivka on August 20.[65] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka (Chasiv Yar) direction.[66] Sniper elements and drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating and striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction and near Chasiv Yar, respectively.[67] Elements of the 299th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[68] Drone operators of the 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 238th Artillery Brigade, are reportedly coordinating Lancet drone strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[69] Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Oleksandro-Shultyne (north of Toretsk).[70] Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Dyliivka, and Bila Hora; west of Torestk near Shcherbynivka; and northwest of Toretsk near Kleban Byk, Katerynivka, Pleshchiivka, Yablunivka, Rusyn Yar, and Poltavka and toward Stepanivka on August 19 and 20.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shcherbynivka.[72] Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd LNR AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Shultyne.[73] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kleban Byk.[74]  Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.   Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka (north of Pokrovsk).[75] ISW did not previously extend assessed advances or claims over Petrivka and does not assess that Ukrainian forces retook Petrivka in the last 24 hours, given that Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement on August 15.[76] Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Pankivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forced advanced north of Poltavka and northeast of Poltavka within Volodymyrivka, east of Shakhove, toward Sofiivka, and north of Kucheriv Yar.[78] Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Shakhove, Zapovidne, Novoekonomichne, Fedorivka, Mayak, Sofiivka, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Vesele, Kucheriv Yar, Zatyshok, and Volodymyrivka and toward Myrnohrad; east of Pokrovsk near Promin, Hrodivka, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on August 19 and 20.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya, including north of Pokrovsk near Rubizhne and northeast of Pokrovsk near Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Zapovidne.[80] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the entire perimeter of the Dobropillya penetration.[81] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking Russian positions at the base of the penetration in order to cut off the salient along the Nykanorivka-Mayak line but that Russian forces still hold several positions along the railroad west of Sukhetske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces broke through to Mayak and are fighting in the settlement. Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in the Dobropillya penetration appear to be reinforced by up to one and a half battalions-worth of reserve units but that command will need time to regroup manpower and materiel before any units can press north of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[82] Mashovets stated that the Russian 41st CAA and 2nd CAA (both of the Central Military District [CMD]) are accumulating personnel and materiel near Pokrovsk in anticipation of future attempts by the 51st CAA to break through toward the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and sever the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Dobropillya, though this breakthrough is delayed due to Ukrainian counterattacks.[83] Mashovets reported that the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are operating northeast of Pokrovsk between Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and attacking toward Kucheriv Yar in order to advance to the remaining Russian assault units within the settlement but cannot break through.[84] Mashovets stated that the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion (77th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly of the 7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) and the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are attacking Ukrainian positions east of Nykanorivka and seized a windbreak north of Zatyshok (all northeast of Pokrovsk). Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 137th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) and the 72nd Spetsnaz Battalion (reportedly of the 3rd AC) are attacking toward Hrodivka and Myrnohrad and advanced one kilometer toward Promin (all east of Pokrovsk).[85] Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Udachne but have not advanced and that the 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) are still operating in Zvirove. Russian milbloggers claimed on August 20 that the Dobropillya penetration remains a fluid part of the frontline and that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces are able to seize the initiative.[86] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces maintain positions in Zolotyi Kolodyaz despite Ukrainian counterattacks and that Russian forces are consolidating positions in Rodynske.[87] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces allegedly cleared Zolotyi Kolodyaz and Kucheriv Yar but did not affirm those reports.[88] An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian special forces unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 20 that Russian forces are using anti-drone thermal imaging cloaks and transporting electronic warfare (EW) systems to forward infantry positions to counteract Ukrainian drone activity.[89] The intelligence officer reported that Russian forces often attempt to transport EW systems to the line of contact on motorcycles and scooters due to Ukrainian drone activity impeding Russian forces’ access to GLOCs. Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[90] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[91] Electronic warfare elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[92] Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 20 but did not advance. Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Novoukrainka; south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Hrushivka, and Dachne and toward Filiya; and southwest of Novopavlivka near Hrushivske and Tovste on August 19 and 20.[93] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka).[94] Drone operators of the 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Filya.[95] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka.[96] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Novopavlivka) direction.[97] Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.   Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) raising a flag in northern Novoheorhiivka, indicating that Russian forces recently seized Novoheorhiivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[98] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade with the seizure of Novoheorhiivka.[99] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 20 that Russian forces seized Maliivka and advanced east of Vorone (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[100] Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets stated on August 20 that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet) advanced toward Voskresenka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Sichneve (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[101] Mashovets added that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA) advanced up to 2 kilometers southeast of Velykomykhailivka between Zaporizke (southeast of Velykomykhailivka) and Novoserhiivka referring to Novomykolaivka or Novoheorhiivka) from the Temyrivka-Vilne Pole line. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Vorone and advanced toward Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[102] Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Velykomykhailivka near Voskresenka and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Shevchenko, Zaporizke, Sichneve, and Vorone and toward Komyshuvakha.[103]  Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)   Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 20 that Russian forces advanced along both sides of the O-080619 Velyka Novosilka – Hulyaipole road and in the Novopil – Novoivanivka direction (all northeast of Hulyaipole).[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced north and south of Temyrivka and toward Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[105] Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Temyrivka, Obratne, and Zelene Pole and toward Novohryhorivka on August 19 and 20.[106] Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[107] Drone operators of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast and artillery elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[108] Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 20 but did not make confirmed advances. Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Plavni (southwest of Orikhiv) and south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[109] Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Prymorske on August 19 and 20.[110] Geolocated footage published on August 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian command post in Myrne (southwest of Orikhiv) and Ukrainian drones striking a Russian S-300V air defense system north of Oleksiivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[111]  Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Kherson direction on August 20 but did not advance.[112]   Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the Naval Detachment of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near the coast of occupied Crimea.[113] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline) Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 19 to 20. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 93 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Millerovo cities; Primosko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[114] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 62 drones and one Iskander-M ballistic missile and that one missile and 31 drones struck 20 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones and missile damaged civilian and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[115] Sumy Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported that Russian forces struck a residential area in Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast, injuring 18 civilians.[116] Izmail Raion Administration reported that Russian forces struck port infrastructure and caused a fire at a fuel and energy infrastructure facility in Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[117] Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks) Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk on August 20 to discuss opportunities to expand bilateral relations.[118] Pezeshkian stated that Iran and Belarus share common interests and that both countries seek to combat US and European efforts to ”push unilateralism” in the regional and international affairs.[119] Pezeshkian emphasized that Iran and Belarus can cooperate to mitigate the effects of international sanctions.[120] Iranian and Belarusian officials signed 12 memorandums of understanding (MoU) focused on increasing bilateral trade, military-tech cooperation, and mutual investment during Pezeshkian’s visit.[121] Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi stated on August 20 that Iran plans to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Belarus.[122] Iran and Belarus have increased defense and security cooperation in recent years.[123] Iran showcased military equipment at a Belarusian military exhibit in May 2025.[124] Iran has reportedly worked to establish a drone factory in Belarus since May 2023 to support the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[125] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.   [1] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/ [2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://suspilne dot media/1094506-u-bilomu-domi-zapevnili-so-ssa-ne-vidpravlat-svoi-vijska-do-ukraini-ak-garantiu-bezpeki/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1094514-putin-poobicav-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-bilij-dim/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6377103891112 ; https://suspilne dot media/1094558-putin-pogodivsa-na-zustric-iz-zelenskim-ssa-ne-vidpravlatimut-vijska-do-ukraini-1274-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755677182&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps [3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2025 [4] https://www.consilium.europa dot eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/08/16/statement-by-president-macron-prime-minister-meloni-chancellor-merz-prime-minister-starmer-president-stubb-prime-minister-tusk-president-costa-president-von-der-leyen/ [5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022 [6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fact-sheet-istanbul-protocol-draft-document-april-15-2022 [7] https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2042165/ [8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022725 [9] https://suspilne dot media/1094514-putin-poobicav-zustritis-iz-zelenskim-bilij-dim/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csTu3YEniMM ; https://www.foxnews.com/video/6377103891112 ; https://suspilne dot media/1094558-putin-pogodivsa-na-zustric-iz-zelenskim-ssa-ne-vidpravlatimut-vijska-do-ukraini-1274-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1755677182&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps [10] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-putin-zelenskyy-meeting-russia-ukraine/%20;%20https://open.spotify.com/episode/5fwDeXpJbiJti9Zu1LqL9t?si=775b668b22814b29 [11] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/ [12] https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-seven-month-budget-deficit-exceeds-annual-target-2025-08-07/ [13] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/ [14] https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/ [15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-26-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-22-2025 [16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025 [17] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2025 [18] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-20/russia-says-it-will-keep-selling-oil-to-india-despite-us-tariffs [19] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-20/india-s-refiners-ramp-up-russian-oil-buying-despite-us-criticism [20] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-19/china-refiners-grab-russian-oil-as-trump-menaces-flows-to-india [21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-6-2025 [22] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/20/vedomosti-glava-sk-aleksandr-bastrykin-odin-iz-osnovnyh-kandidatov-na-post-predsedatelya-verhovnogo-suda; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/articles/2025/08/20/1132828-istochniki-vedomostei-bastrikin-odin-iz-kandidatov-na-dolzhnost-glavi-verhovnogo-suda [23] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2024/10/24/how-russia-returned-to-gerontocracy-a86797; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/60047/ [24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025 [25] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2025 [26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/948380; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/73585 [27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024 [28] https://t.me/rusich_army/25298 [29] https://english.nv dot ua/nation/russian-drone-base-located-in-kursk-oblast-s-children-s-camp-hit-50538677.html [30] https://x.com/OsintWarrior/status/1958127667640734015 [31] https://t.me/tass_agency/332385 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332373 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/332374 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/20/fsb-zayavila-chto-v-bryanskoy-oblasti-pri-popytke-proryva-zaderzhany-troe-ukrainskih-diversantov-esche-troe-ubity [32] https://t.me/osintpen/1656;%20https://t.me/severnnyi/4864;%20https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9836;%20https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/1958148603429421121;%20https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/1958138101018030405;%20https://t.me/black_swan_ukraine/391 [33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32683 [34] https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/severnnyi/4877; https://t.me/rusich_army/25298    [35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32683; https://t.me/dva_majors/77861; https://t.me/severnnyi/4877 [36] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9655 [37] https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1957971297322807632; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-21-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025 [38] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22252 [39] https://t.me/severnnyi/4884 [40] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676 [41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676; https://t.me/wargonzo/28624; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13881 [42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/32676 [43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056 [44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41116 [45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28056; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28026; https://t.me/motopatriot78/41116; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28024; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/15984; 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[Author: Institute for the Study of War]

As of 4/18/26 3:02pm. Last new 8/31/25 8:54am.